Affecting State Legitimacy from Abroad:

The Effects of Travel Policies on Citizens' Willingness to Obey Their State

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A thesis submitted to the Trinity College Dublin, the University of Dublin

in fulfilment of the requirements for the *Doctor of Philosophy*

February 2024

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Dissertation Summary:

This dissertation aims to examine the effects of restrictive travel policies implemented by foreign countries on citizens' evaluations of state legitimacy in electoral autocracies. This question matters because restrictive travel policies are usually experienced by citizens living in underdeveloped and/or corrupt country contexts, in which the legitimization of a state that is failing to deliver for its citizens in the long run might severely worsen the quality of government services. Moreover, the simple inability to travel and/or to permanently emigrate aboard might affect psychological well-being for millions of people living in countries with poor government quality across the world (Jost and Hunyady, 2003; Napier et al. 2020).

This dissertation is filling two major gaps in the extant literature. As both the input and the output determinants of legitimacy in electoral autocracies are subject to scrutiny (Luhrman, et al. 2018; Rothstein, 2009; Tyler and Huo, 2002; Dahlberg et al., 2015), it is unclear what motivates citizens in electoral autocracies to comply despite democracy being flawed, the economy often being underdeveloped and public institutions offer suffering from high levels of corruption. Moreover, little research has been done on the effects of external policies on the legitimacy of the state domestically.

In order to answer the main research question, I combine insights from system justification theory (SJT) (Jost and Banaji, 1994) and the literature on state legitimacy (Tyler, 2006a; Rothstein, 2009). SJT has been developed to explain people's tendency to support the status quo, especially in situations in which bolstering the status quo seems to go against self- or group-based interests (Friesen et al. 2019 p. 316). One section of this literature has focused on examining situational factors in which system justification is more likely to occur and showed that the feeling of system inescapability is one of them (Friesen et al. 2019; Laurin, et al., 2010; Proudfoot et al., 2015). Extending existing findings from SJT, I argue that restrictive travel policies introduced to a country from abroad will increase the feeling of inescapability, and in turn, have a positive effect on legitimacy evaluations. Overall, this dissertation attempts to extend the depth (psychological mechanisms) and the scope (foreign policy) of political science research on legitimacy in the setting in which legitimization is unlikely to occur (electoral autocracies).

The dissertation consists of three substantive chapters that all contribute towards answering the research question in different ways. Based on 21 semi-structured in-depth interviews with the citizens of Serbia – a typical case of electoral autocracy – Chapter 1 provides input on the valid operationalization of state legitimacy and its institutional level determinants for Chapter 2 (Gallagher, 2013). In Chapter 2, I conduct a survey experiment in Serbia, in order to examine the effects of future introduction of a restrictive travel policy scheduled to be implemented in 2024 by the EU on citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy. Since paying tax is argued to be a behaviour that captures the concept of state legitimacy well (Levi et al. 2009), in Chapter 3, I examine the effects of experimentally manipulated visa policies – a form of restrictive travel policy - on tax compliance by running two experiments based on a tax evasion game (Friedland et al. 1978). Taken together, the results provide some initial empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that restrictive travel policies implemented from abroad might positively affect citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy in their own country. As the empirical results are based on originally collected data from an electoral autocracy (or based on some of its features replicated in a lab-based setting) for which the existing political science literature would argue that legitimization is less likely to occur, this dissertation invites future research in examining the interplay between psychological need for better life and the often-unfavourable institutional reality.

Acknowledgements:

After being introduced to system justification theory as "probably one of the best social science theories in the world" by my supervisor Michelle D'Arcy, I couldn't help but constantly be suspicious about my happiness, level of satisfaction and the overall quality of my life choices (I am still not sure if this is a consequence of learning about the theory or another "gap" in need of further research). As the readers of this dissertation will see, SJT explains why we might still love and cherish our parents, partners, friends, superiors, educational institutions and states (as this dissertation will show), despite whatever comes to your mind at this point. Yet, for the people I will mention here, SJT simply does not apply.

First, my gratitude goes to my supervisor, Michelle D'Arcy. Thank you for putting up with a number of my "great new ideas" and guiding me through picking up and working on the better ones. The experience of being Michelle's supervisee not only made me a better researcher but also gave me an idea what a great supervisor looks like. I especially appreciate her *consistency* in providing guidance. For 4 years, without fault, Michelle always gave me prompt and valuable feedback and was understanding of the personal troubles every PhD student, including myself, might face during the PhD process. In short, Michelle has been a perfect supervisor without whom this dissertation would not be of the same quality.

Second, I would like to thank Andrej, Marina, Julia, Amelie, Marketa and all the other people from TRiSS for the laughs, loud (Italian) lunch discussions and mutual support we have given to each other in the last 4 years. I would especially like to thank Andrej for always being there to answer my "quick" questions and for his unlimited supply of "secretly" stored sweet snacks which I haven't raided at all while he was not around. Andrej, I am thankful for our friendship. Besides Andrej feeding my sugar craves, Marina was there for the other PhD fuel – coffee. Even Don Elena would have been jealous of the amount of coffee this PhD dissertation is drenched in. But, most importantly, this coffee has rarely been drunk alone. Marina, thank you for the company.

Third, my gratitude also goes to Milica, Željko, Ramin, and Žarko, with whom I spent a number of mainly virtual evenings. Although we were living in different countries, I am gratefull we kept in touch.

Finally, I would like to thank the people from the department, especially Gizem and Eman, for their feedback, all the people who helped me collect the data used in this dissertation and TRiSS for financially supporting data collection for chapter 3. Special thanks goes to Chris for her excellent job at making TRiSS an excellent working environment.

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Introductory Chapter

This dissertation examines the effects of foreign countries' restrictive travel policies on perceptions of state legitimacy in electoral autocracies. By building from existing insights from system justification theory (SJT) (Jost and Banaji, 1994) and the literature on legitimacy and its determinants (Tyler, 2006a; Rothstein, 2009) and by selecting electoral autocracies as the universe of cases, this dissertation attempts to extend the depth (psychological mechanisms) and the scope (foreign policy) of political science research on legitimacy in a setting in which legitimization is less likely to occur (electoral autocracies).

Legitimacy has been and still is one of the central concepts in Western political thought (Weber, 1978 [1922], Beetham, 2013; Gilley, 2006a; Gerschewski, 2018). In his seminal paper Lipset (1959) famously defined legitimacy as "the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society" (p. 86). Besides the relevance of this definition, Lipset's argument that political legitimacy is one of the prerequisites of a functioning democracy provided an important theoretical ground for later empirical assessments of the importance of legitimacy for the functioning and stability of political regimes. Similarly, in *Economy and Society,* Weber's (1978 [1922]) famous classification of legitimate authority based on traditional, rational/legal and charismatic principle marks an important first step in understanding legitimacy as an empirical concept and as a concept devoid of underlying normative claims which state that a legitimate state can only be achieved within a democratic regime (for a critique see e.g. Grafstein, 1981). By basing their work on Weber, scholars of legitimacy in autocratic regimes (e.g. Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2018; Abulof, 2017, Cassani, 2017), to which this dissertation communicates, open up an important new topic in empirical political science – the possibility of measuring legitimacy, it's antecedents and consequences in non-democratic regimes.

It has been argued that legitimacy provides political authorities the justification of their "right" to rule, enabling them to derive compliance, without necessarily resorting to excessive monitoring and punitive action (Levi and Sacks, 2009) or violence (Beetham, 1991). In other words, a legitimate authority is recognized by the people as an authority that deserves and has a commonly recognized "right" to be obeyed. Moreover, unlike it's related and often overlapping concepts such as political support (Easton, 1975) or loyalty

(Hirschman, 1970), legitimacy is, despite Weber's (1978 [1922]) normative deflection, often understood to have a positive normative connotation specific to democratic regimes. Although one can express high levels of political support or loyalty to an autocratic regime, only a democratic regime can be seen as legitimate (Gerschewski, 2018). Therefore, whether or not legitimacy is possible in non-democratic contexts remains a matter of mainly normative debate (Dukalskis, 2021; Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2018; Cassani, 2017).

Overall, the empirical interest in the questions of legitimacy could broadly be categorized in demand and supply side of legitimacy, confirming the overall notion that legitimacy is a relational concept, involving those who legitimize and the object being legitimized (e.g., von Handelwang, 2016). The literature on the demand side focuses on perceptions of legitimacy that citizen have towards different objects of legitimacy such as the state (e.g., Gilley, 2006a), more specific state institutions such as the law, police, courts, or tax authorities (for an overview see: Tyler, 2006b) or the governments in power (e.g., Levi and Sacks, 2009). On the other side, the literature on the supply side is interested in the perspectives on legitimization – the creation of legitimacy – by the political elite in power (e.g., Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2018; Abulof, 2017, Cassani, 2017). As it will be presented in chapter 1, an overview of the existing literature on legitimacy and its related concepts such as political support suggests that there seems to be a gap in the literature on the demand side of legitimacy in autocratic regimes (for exceptions see: Thyen and Gerschewski, 2018; Neundorf et al. nd). By looking at citizens perceptions on state legitimacy in electoral autocracies, this dissertation attempts to fill this gap.

From the perspective of the citizens (i.e., demand side), legitimacy is often defined to indicate citizens' readiness to obey the rules of the state because of an internalised notion that obeying is morally justified (Tyler, 2006a; Linz, 1978; Easton, 1965). In other words, such internalization is based on determinants beyond motivations based on fear from threats or sanctions (Worden and McLean, 2017; Becker, 1968). When it comes to its' antecedents, Rothstein (2009) distinguishes between the determinants on the "output" and "input" side of the political system. The factors suggested to affect legitimacy on the output side include for example procedural justice (Tyler and Huo, 2002), impartiality of service provision (Dahlberg et al., 2015), government effectiveness (Magalhães, 2014) and state economic performance (Klingemann, 1999; Zhao, 2009; Dagher, 2018) while the

input side of the political system is generated by citizens' beliefs that the state respects the principles of political equality, democratic representation and electoral democracy (Dahl, 2006; Dalton, 1998; Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014). Thus, the existing literature on legitimacy aims to capture how and why citizens decide to willingly support and comply with the rules of a state and looks at a number of input and output institutional factors which might affect it.

Yet, such individual-level approaches to the study of legitimacy are not without critique. In *Democracy and the Market,* within the context of democratization, Przeworski (1991) argued that the success of democratization does not depend on the level of legitimacy but on the successful "organization of counterhegemony" (p. 54). Moreover, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argued that the survival of authoritarian rule to a good extent depends on the capability of the autocratic legislatures to "incorporate potential opposition forces" (p. 1279) If successful, autocratic leaders could, in turn, use the institutions in place to secure their longevity in the office. Taken together, such claims imply that the individual perceptions of legitimacy among the citizens in autocracies do not have an effect on autocratic survival or the possibility of democratization. Gilley (2009) presents a response to Przeworski's critique by indicating that "no legitimacy theorist has even claimed that legitimacy crisis leads immediately and certainly to authoritarian collapse…" (p. 183). Instead, Gilley argues that "there will be lags as well as possibilities of escape from crisis without democratization" (p.183).

Yet, although I agree with Gilley's response, Przeworski's critique still poses as relevant and should therefore be accounted for by pointing out to what individual-level explanations could tell us. Existing empirical studies, at the aggregated level show that more positive perceptions of state legitimacy can make governing easier, more effective and less costly (Levi et al. 2009; Tyler, 2006b). Moreover, higher perceived levels of legitimacy are shown to positively affect cooperation with the police and courts and compliance with the law (Tyler et al. 2010; Worden and McLean, 2017), protest behaviour (Thyen and Gerschewski, 2018), and voting and civil society activism (Both and Seligson, 2005). On the other hand, lower perceived levels of legitimacy are linked with approval of military coups (Seligson and Carrion, 2002), regime destabilization and even the offset of conflict (Rothstein, 2009; Dagher, 2021). Therefore, at the aggregated level, individual

perceptions of legitimacy do seem to matter seem to play a part in maintaining well-functioning and stable polities.

Therefore, as it will be demonstrated in the dissertation, this research does not claim that with the lack of legitimacy, we could expect a collapse of the state. Instead, I argue that the results of this dissertation are important as they provide a more nuanced assessment of the potential mechanism behind the change in attitudes and behaviour connected to state legitimacy, which could, after further research is completed, tell us something more about the legitimacy of state institutions at the macro-level. Moreover, the results of this research also matter as they indicate that the micro-level argument presented in the dissertation can also inform us on the palliative function of higher state support (e.g. Jost and Hunyadi, 2003; Vargas-Salfate et. al 2018). As a result, the findings of the empirical chapters 2 and 3 are important as they offer an alternative empirical strategy for those researchers interested in the welfare of citizens.

This dissertation further informs the literature on legitimacy and its determinants by focusing on perceptions of legitimacy among citizens living in electoral autocracies – contexts in which high levels of legitimacy, at least according to the existing theory, are less likely to occur. Electoral autocracies, defined as regimes which have *de jure* but not *de facto* free and fair elections, (Luhrman, et al. 2018), are theoretically valuable contexts for the purposes of this research as their input and the output determinants of legitimacy are often subject to scrutiny (Rothstein, 2009). Although electoral autocracies do hold regular elections at a formal level, in practice, the principles of political equality and representation are severely undermined, therefore undermining the input side. On the other hand, electoral autocracies often suffer from high levels of corruption and nepotism (Fazekas and Toth, 2016; Kimya, 2019) and experience various levels of economic growth (Saha and Sen, 2021) and therefore potentially suffer from the low quality of output side determinants as well. In turn, it is unclear why citizens would exhibit some (if any?) levels of state legitimacy when both the input and the output side of their state's institutions are underperforming? What motivates them to comply despite knowing that their own country's democracy might be flawed, economy floundering and their public institutions corrupted?

A cross-country comparison of the responses to most common legitimacy measures used in existing research indeed suggests that, on average, people living in electoral autocracies see their states roughly as legitimate as their counterparts in electoral and liberal democracies. Although this dissertation is not comparativist *stricto sensu* as it does not aim to examine cross-country variation in reported levels of state legitimacy, I rely on some cross-country comparisons for description purposes. The third wave of the "Life in Transition Survey" (LiTS III),[1] gathered in 2016 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank (WB) offers data based on surveys from countries with a wide regime-type variation and items fit for these purposes. The survey has been conducted on a nationally representative sample of 34[2] countries at the household level. As the focus of the survey is on transitioning nations, data include respondents from countries from Central and Eastern and South Eastern Europe such as Poland, Romania, Hungary, Croatia and Serbia, as well as other countries such as Turkey, Russia and Uzbekistan. For comparative purposes, the survey also included liberal democracies such as Germany, Italy, and Greece, thus providing great variability in regime type. As noted, the survey has a number of question items which are often used to measure perceptions of legitimacy in the existing literature.

Figure 1 presents a series of plots examining the country-averaged responses to a Likert item ranging from 1 indicating complete agreement with the statement that *People should obey the law without exception* to 10 indicating complete agreement with the statement *There are times when people have good reasons to break the law*. This item has been reverse-coded so that higher values indicate higher agreement with the fist statement, in line with similar operationalizations of legitimacy on which this dissertation relies (e.g., Tyler and Jackson, 2014). Following the logic of input and output antecedents, the country-averages are plotted against Vdem's liberal democracy index in figure 1.a, and against the corruption perception index provided by Transparency International in figure 1.b, respectively. Both figures 1.a and 1.b depict country-level observations as either

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[1] For details on the survey and access to data and accompanying materials see: https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-data/data/lits.html (last accessed 28. 08. 2023.)

[2] Countries included in the survey include: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Georgia, Estonia, North Macedonia, Germany, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Montenegro, Mongolia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

closed autocracies (blue), electoral autocracies (red), electoral democracies (green), or liberal democracies (orange) (for definitions of regimes see: Luhrman et al. 2018). Figure 1.c depicts a bar plot of averages by regime type.

As shown in figure 1.a and 1.b, there seems to be no relationship between the quality of democracy (measured through the liberal democracy index as a proxy for input determinants) or the quality of government (measured through corruption perceptions as a proxy for output determinants) with country-averaged values of the willingness to obey the law. For example, Russia (an electoral autocracy), Mongolia (an electoral democracy) and Italy (a liberal democracy) have roughly similar values on the item measuring willingness to obey the law. Moreover, it seems that on average, the variation in the willingness to obey the law is sizeable and roughly similar across electoral autocracies, electoral democracies and liberal democracies, as well as within regime types, possibly suggesting the need for alternative theoretical explanations of determinants of legitimacy. Finally, figure 1.c suggests that on average, the willingness to obey the law in electoral autocracies, electoral democracies and liberal democracies is relatively high and roughly the same.

Figure 1: Comparison of country-averaged responses of *Willingness to Obey the Law* across Regime Types

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Next, figure 2 depicts the country-level averaged scores of alternative measures of legitimacy in a similar manner, in order to show that the puzzle remains even after looking at other legitimacy items. Figure 2.a, and 2.c look at the country-averaged responses ranging from 1 indicating complete agreement with the statement: *As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our authorities* to 10 indicating complete agreement with the statement *In our country today, we should show more respect for our authorities*. Figures 2.b, and 2.d look at the country-averaged responses to the question of rating *the overall performance of national government*, ranging from *Very Bad* (1) to *Very Good* (5). Figures 2.e and 2.f show a bar plot of averages across regime types for the item on respect and performance, respectively. In line with figure 1, country averages are colour marked according to their regime type.

Figure 2: Comparison of country-averaged responses of *Respect for Authorities* and *Perception of the Performance of National Government* across Regime Types

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Overall, the plotted results suggest a similar pattern as observed in figure 1. Focusing on figures 2.e and 2.f, the results suggest that the average respect for authorities as well as the perception of the performance of national governments are roughly the same across different regime types and that Uzbekistan – the only available closed autocracy in the data (marked as a blue circle) – figures as a country with the highest level of legitimacy according to these measures.

Finally, figure 3 depicts the country-averaged responses to the questions on trust in government, trust in the police and trust in courts. Although trust items are often used as a proxy measure for legitimacy (e.g., Gilley, 2006a) and political support (e.g., Booth and Seligson, 2009; Norris 1999), trust is also often considered as a concept "neighbouring" legitimacy (Gerschewski, 2018 p. 655-658). Although the use of trust items when measuring legitimacy might indicate conceptual and measurement confusion (as discussed at length in chapter 1), the research on determinants and consequences of trust prominently figures in the political science literature (e.g., Sønderskov and Dinesen, 2016; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). As such, it also helps motivate this dissertation as well. Overall, figure 3 shows a similar puzzling pattern. According to figure 3.g, trust in all three institutions is the highest in Uzbekistan – the only closed autocracy in the data. Looking at electoral autocracies, electoral democracies and liberal democracies, on average, there seems to be no discernible difference, as average levels of trust for specific institutions is roughly the same across regime types.

Taken together, it seems that the within and between regime-level variation in legitimacy measures cannot be explained by relying solely on input and output determinants. Moreover, the figures demonstrate that closed and electoral autocracies, despite their relative lack of both the input and output determinants, enjoy high levels of state legitimacy vis-à-vis their more democratic counterparts. As noted, this dissertation does not aim to explain the (lack of) variation across countries and/or regime types. Instead,

motivated by the figures above, this dissertation argues for the need of introducing additional possible determinants of state legitimacy. Therefore, this dissertation adds to the existing literature which has focused on internal factors by examining one external factor as an additional determinant of legitimacy: foreign country travel policies and focuses on contexts of electoral autocracies in which legitimation should be less likely to occur.

Figure 3: Comparison of country-averaged responses to questions on Trust in Government, Police and Courts across Regime Types

Note: Liberal democracy index, the Transparency International Corruption Perception index and the Regimes of the World variable (Luhrman et al. 2018) were taken from the Vdem v10 data (Copedge et al., 2020). Figures a to f depict country-averaged responses by regime type: blue circle for closed autocracies; red triangle for electoral autocracies, green diamond for electoral democracies and orange squares for liberal democracies. Country labels were omitted for readability.

The observed high levels of legitimacy across different measures in Uzbekistan – the only closed autocracy available in the LiTS data – as well as in some of the electoral autocracies such as Serbia, might suggest a concern for response bias or issues of

measurement equivalence (e.g. Kuran, 1987; Schneider, 2017; Esarey, Stockman and Zhang, 2017; Tannenberg et al. 2021; Robinson and Tannenberg, 2019; Tannenberg, 2023). Arguably, the people of Uzbekistan might have reported high levels of legitimacy out of fear from political repression, job loss or even imprisonment (see e.g., Edel and Josua, 2018). As such, it would be difficult to argue that the people of Uzbekistan internalized their willingness to obey out of feelings that obeying is *morally* justified. Since people living in electoral autocracies might potentially be in danger of such political repression as well (e.g., Gerschewski, 2013; Tertytchnaya, 2023), approaching measurement of legitimacy in such regimes deserves closer attention.

Alternatively, the figures presented above might be comparing inequivalent items and should therefore be understood only as tentative. Moreover, this potential issue represents an additional reason why the first chapter of this dissertation focuses only on one typical case of electoral autocracy - Serbia. The literature on measurement equivalence (e.g. Schneider, 2017; Esarey, Stockman and Zhang, 2017) can indicate whether there is measurement equivalence across contexts but cannot clarify whether the researcher's conceptualization of what the measure is capturing is necessarily the same as the understanding of the survey items by the respondents. In turn, the qualitative evidence based on the interviews conducted in chapter 1 complement the existing quantitative findings by providing substantive content to the understanding of legitimacy survey items, especially in terms of configural invariance – the notion that "same survey indicators measure the same latent construct in all groups" (Schneider, 2017, p. 969). In the words of Schneider (2017):

> "While factor analysis illuminates the regional clustering of measurement patterns using typical survey questions, it cannot determine the nature and content of the studied beliefs, nor the precise reasons for misfit. Qualitative probing studies can be useful to capture local knowledge about political trustworthiness and to construct more cross-nationally comparable survey items" (p. 981).

By jointly examining the same survey items from the second and third wave of the LiTS survey conducted in 2010 and 2016 in Serbia, the puzzle described above appears to be even more striking. According to Vdem data (Coppedge et al. 2020), Serbia has been

experiencing a steady autocratization process. After being assessed as a liberal democracy from 2007 up until 2012, Serbia turned into an electoral autocracy in 2014. Figure 4 provides evidence of within-country time variation (2010 and 2016) of the same legitimacy items used in Figures 1 to 3. Overall, it suggests that, on average, the more autocratic regime from 2016 has roughly the same (willingness to obey the law) or even higher levels of legitimacy (every other measure) in comparison to the liberal democratic regime from 2010. Although figure 4 depicts only a simple snapshot of state legitimacy perceptions at two points in time, it provides initial evidence that the ongoing autocratization in Serbia might not be related with a reduction in the overall levels of perceived legitimacy. Therefore, in the remaining part of this introduction, I sketch out my main theoretical argument and empirical strategy in order to address this puzzle.

Figure 4: Comparison of country-averaged responses to legitimacy items in Serbia in 2010 and 2016

In order to answer the main research question, this dissertation introduces the social-psychological insights from system justification theory (SJT) (Jost and Banaji, 1994) into

the wider literature on state legitimacy (Tyler, 2006; Rothstein, 2009). SJT has been developed to explain people's tendency to support the *status quo*, especially in situations in which bolstering the status quo seems to go against self- or group-based interests (Friesen et al. 2019 p. 316). Therefore, this theory offers an established theoretical framework which focuses on individual-level mechanisms that might be at play in order to explain the existing support for unfavourable systems.

One section of the system justification literature has focused on examining situational factors in which system justification is more likely to occur and showed that the feeling of system inescapability is one of them (Friesen et al. 2019; Laurin, et al., 2010; Proudfoot et al., 2015). According to SJT, when faced with an unfavourable system from which they cannot escape, people would be more likely to engage in motivated psychological processes in defence of such systems "aimed at rationalizing away [their] dissatisfactory elements" (Laurin et al. 2010 p. 1076). Anchoring the existing findings from SJT in a real-world policy context in chapter 2, as well as in a lab-based environment in chapter 3, I argue that restrictive travel policies introduced to a country from abroad may increase the feeling of inescapability, and in turn, have a positive effect on legitimacy evaluations. Moreover, I argue that such effect might be observed even in electoral autocracies – regimes in which citizens are more likely to face unfavourable conditions such as both input and output side deficiencies.

Drawing on the few studies which test the effects of the perceived enhanced difficulty of emigration (Laurin et al. 2010; Kay et al. 2009), I argued that the introduction of ETIAS (in chapter 2) and the restrictive visa decision (in chapter 3) will enhance the feeling of inescapability and in turn "pressure" the citizens to engage in justifying the existing status quo. This "pressure" would arise from the motivational need to perceive an inescapable situation as fair and just, even though, in reality, such situations might not in fact be as such (Osborne et al. 2019 p. 341; Jost and van der Toorn, 2012). In turn, through such psychologically motivated justifications, I expect that the perceived levels of state legitimacy, either through attitudinal measures of state legitimacy (chapter 2) or honest tax reporting behaviour (in chapter 3), will be positively affected after the realisation that the countries in which they are situated are their only available options. More specifically to each of the two experimental chapters, ETIAS should theoretically enhance the feeling of inescapability as it implies an additional difficulty (in terms of financial resources, time

and emotional stress) in obtaining an authorisation to leave while a hypothetical visa denial from chapter 3 represents an outright restriction to emigrate from country A.

Yet, what the existing literature on SJT cannot offer is a clear approach to the state as a politically relevant system. For example, Kay and Zanna (2009) define the system as "the overarching institutions, and social norms within which [people] live and the rules that they, to at least some extent, are required to abide" (p. 158). According to Friesen et al. (2019) these include systems such as national governments, cultures and families. Thus, although system justification literature relies on the definition of a system which is congruent with the political science understanding of the state (e.g., Poggi, 1978), the exact focus on the state seems to be lacking. By drawing from the wealth of political science literature on legitimacy, I adapt and apply them to social psychological insights in order to overcome this drawback.

Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that system justification and state legitimacy, while interconnected, constitute distinct concepts. System justification is a concept borrowed from social psychology and it is meant to indicate participants tendency to justify the *status quo* (Jost and Banaji, 1994). On the other hand, legitimacy is primarily a political science concept meant to capture the perceived level of willingness to abide to the rules of the state out of the conviction that the rules are morally right (Tyler, 2006a; Linz, 1978; Easton, 1965). Thus, the theoretical objective of the dissertation is to demonstrate that the willingness to justify the status quo (system justification) could inform us about the tendency to perceive the rules of the state as right and proper (legitimacy). Therefore, system justification is understood as a mechanism through which legitimacy could be changed/manipulated.

In the existing empirical literature, system justification and state legitimacy were not discussed and empirically evaluated concomitantly in a political science context. Thus, this dissertation offers an original theoretical contribution by arguing that system justification processes might affect the perceived levels of state legitimacy. As such, system justification provides the basis for the main theoretical argument proposed in the dissertation in which it is stated that people will be more likely to legitimize a ("faulty") state once they feel that they cannot escape it. Yet, it is important to note that the question on whether system justification poses as a necessary (or sufficient) condition for

legitimacy has not been the explicit theoretical interest of this dissertation. Instead, as stated above, system justification is a proposed theoretical mechanism through which perceptions of legitimacy could be changed and experimentally manipulated.

Moreover, system justification and legitimacy cannot be equated due to differences in their measurement and operationalization: In the wider social psychology literature, measuring system justification comes in at least three different forms: 1) generalized measure of system justification (Kay and Jost, 2003); 2) economic system justification measure (Jost and Thompson, 2000) and gender system justification measure (Jost and Kay, 2005), while legitimacy suffers from its own conceptual and measurement intricacies which are extensively discussed in the first chapter of the dissertation. Moreover, legitimacy measures were explicitly created to measure a sense of willing obedience to authorities such as the state, state institutions or political regimes while system justification has been applied in many contexts, out of which only a portion of the existing work could be regarded as relevant to the political science audience. In the state- or politically-relevant context where SJ has been adapted (e.g. van der Toorn et al. 2011), there seems to be a lack of understanding of the specificities of the state contexts, as discussed extensively in chapter 2. Thus, the differences in the methodological and measurement approaches figure as an additional reason why system justification, and especially its measure of generalized system justification, and state legitimacy cannot be equated.

Instead of examining the support for an unfavourable system defined in a broad sense (in order to be able to account for the various sets of systems in which the social psychological literature might be interested in), I rely on the political science institutionalist literature in order to examine legitimation of the *state*. By merging SJT with the political science literature, this dissertation offers and tests a new micro-level explanation for high support for, and the persistence of electoral autocracies. Drawing on the insights from social psychology is theoretically coherent as legitimacy as a concept seems to be at the intersection between individual and institutional level analysis. Thus, in line with the existing demand side literature on state legitimacy which looks at the effects of country-level institutional variables at the individual level, I extend the field of this research by 1) exploring the effects of policies created outside of the countries of origin and 2) by giving greater emphasis on the internal psychological processes operating within individual citizens.

Due to the conceptual and measurement discord in the existing literature on state legitimacy, in chapter 1 I first conduct a qualitative study using interviews in order to explore what might be the most valid way to measure state legitimacy in electoral autocracies (Gallagher, 2013). In subsequent chapters I then test my argument with a set of empirical strategies through which I aim at uncovering a causal relationship between travel policies and state legitimacy operationalized through both attitudinal and behavioural measures. I do this by conducting a survey experiment in chapter 2 and two lab experiments based on a tax evasion game in chapter 3.

In chapter 1, by conducting a set of 21 semi-structured in-depth interviews, I ask citizens of Serbia – a typical case of electoral autocracy – about their own understanding of a plethora of typical survey measurement items used to gauge their perceptions on state legitimacy. The results of this chapter offer some initial evidence on how to best conceptualize and measure legitimacy in the context of electoral autocracies. As the interview findings suggest a high level of conflation when responding to questions which tap into the support for, and legitimacy of key holders of public office, chapter 1 suggests that the empirical focus on the legitimacy of state institutions represented by appointed "street level bureaucrats" (Lipsky, 2010; Chang and Brewer, 2022 for overview) such as the police, courts, and the tax authority might be a more valid approach. As the procedural justice approach (Tyler 2006a; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; Rothstein, 2009) conceptualizes and measures legitimacy by often looking at the willingness to obey exactly these institutions, this approach has been evaluated as a good fit when measuring state legitimacy in electoral autocracies. By applying these insights in practice, the first chapter provides input on the operationalization of state legitimacy and its institutional level determinants used as the main outcome variables and controls in chapter 2 and 3. Moreover, for the broader political science literature with an interest in measurement equivalence, this chapter offers much needed qualitative evidence. Finally, while the primary focus was on electoral autocracies chapter one introduces a viable alternative for measuring state legitimacy that extends beyond this specific context.

In order to test my hypothesis in a real-world policy setting, in chapter 2, I conduct a survey experiment in Serbia. Specifically, chapter 2 examines the effects of European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), a real-world restrictive travel policy scheduled to be implemented in 2024 by the EU, on citizens' perceptions of state

legitimacy towards their country of origin. In chapter 2, I focus on attitudinal measures of state legitimacy and operationalize them based on the insights from chapter 1. I argue that being exposed to ETIAS-related information will increase the feeling of inescapability, and in turn, have a positive effect on legitimacy evaluations. Besides informing the treated participants about the future ETIAS policy introduction, I also inform them that most people who already emigrated from Serbia did it due to economic (higher earnings aboard) or political reasons (high corruption rates at home) in treatment 1 and 2, respectively. By conducting a survey experiment on a sample of students in Serbia (N=308), I show that being exposed to ETIAS-related information positively affects the willingness to obey the law and the tax authority under economic emigration conditions. The results were further supported by showing that the effects remained even after controlling for a school shooting (the first in Serbian history) – which occurred during the data gathering stages of the research.

As the preexisting perceptions of the EU among the respondents in chapter 2 might blur the inescapability mechanism this dissertation aims to test, I leave the real-world context of electoral autocracies by running 2 lab-based experiments in the third chapter of the dissertation in order to test the effects of "pure" escapability. Therefore, as the main aim of this chapter is to test the micro-level explanation of legitimization grounded in system justification theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994), this chapter cannot directly inform the discussion specific to electoral autocracies. Yet, as will be described below, the experiments do, to some extent, operationalize output side legitimacy determinants – weak economic performance in experiment 1 and high corruption rates in experiment 2.

Since paying tax is argued to be a behaviour that captures the concept of state legitimacy well (Levi et al. 2009), I examine the effects of experimentally manipulated visa policies — a form of restrictive travel policy— on a *behavioural* measure of legitimacy — tax compliance — by designing two experiments based on a tax evasion game (Friedland et al. 1978). Examining tax evasion in lab-based setting is further justified as the data on tax evasion is notoriously hard to come by. By experimentally inducing a motivation to migrate through economic (higher earnings) and political incentives (lower corruption rates) in experiment 1 and 2, respectively, I restrict or permit emigration in treatments 1 and 2 through restrictive and liberal visa decisions and examine their effects on the

likelihood (extensive margin) and the level (intensive margin) of tax evasion. The results based on chapter 3 suggest no overall effects of visa decisions on tax compliance. Therefore, this chapter provides a lack of evidence in support for the proposed mechanism that visa decisions — a type of restrictive travel policies — increase system justifying behaviour and in turn affect state legitimacy. Thus, this chapter discusses some possible limitations of the theory in general and the experimental design more specifically, and provides a number of fruitful avenues for further research.

Thus, taken together, this dissertation informs two main strands of literature: Firstly, for legitimacy research, this dissertation extends the possible determinants of legitimacy by examining the effects of external foreign-country introduced restrictive travel policies. Moreover, by relying on the insights from SJT, this dissertation offers a new micro-level explanation anchored in the human tendency to justify an unfavourable *status quo*. Although drawing on insights from social psychology is not new in political science, SJT has so far rarely been harnessed. When it comes to the ongoing discussion on conceptualization and measurement of state legitimacy outside of democratic contexts, this dissertation suggests that a focus on institutions represented by "street level bureaucrats" might provide a theoretically meaningful and empirically valid concept and measure of state legitimacy in electoral autocracies, and beyond.

Secondly, for system justification literature, by filling the gap in the existing research on the effects of inescapability, this dissertation further informs the research on situational factors which might enhance system justification processes. Moreover, the results from chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that even in electoral autocracies (but not in lab-based contexts), perceptions of state legitimacy might be enhanced though psychological mechanisms which system justification theory can explain. In other words, testing the theory within an electoral autocracy could be regarded as a harder case vis-à-vis liberal democracies in which we would expect the levels of state legitimacy to be generally higher. Finally, since this dissertation tests the theory with a methodologically novel approach, it demonstrates the potential limitations of the theory when explaining system justifying attitudes and behaviour. For the overall literature in political science, the micro-level explanation of legitimation and persistence of electoral autocracies, grounded in established and yet rarely used theory of system justification, offers an unexplored avenue for future interdisciplinary work.

Chapter 1

Capturing Legitimacy in Captured States:
An Interview-Based Exploration of Strategies for Measuring
Legitimacy in Electoral Autocracies

1) Introduction

Legitimacy, like many other key concepts in political science, is hard to define. In order to capture citizens' legitimizing perceptions, the political science literature developed a multitude of ways of conceptualising and measuring legitimacy (e.g., Tyler 2006a, Gilley 2006a, Booth and Seligson, 2009). The empirical focus has most often been reserved for the studies on the determinants and effects of the "demand side" of legitimacy, mainly in democratic settings thus examining citizens perceptions of the legitimacy of a democratic state (Norris, 1999; Dalton, 1998; Booth and Seligson, 2009), while less focus has been given to citizens' perceptions of legitimacy in autocratic or hybrid regimes. On the other hand, the legitimacy literature focusing on the "supply side" of legitimation, which looks at the strategies of legitimacy procurement by the political elites in power, primarily focuses on autocratic regimes (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2018; Abulof, 2017; Holbig, 2013; Josua, 2016; Kailitz, 2013). Therefore, it seems that there is a significant gap in the literature when it comes to understanding and validly measuring the "demand side" of state legitimacy in non-democratic settings. This chapter aims to fill that gap by focusing on conceptualization and measurement of the demand side of state legitimacy in electoral autocracies.

The existing literature has contributed richly to our understanding of legitimacy at a general level. Most authors agree that legitimacy indicates citizens' readiness to obey the rules of the state because of an internalised notion that obeying is morally justified (Tyler, 2006a; Linz, 1978; Easton, 1965). It is argued that such internalization is based on determinants other than a simple deterrence-based model in which the citizens comply with the rules of the state out of the fear from threats or sanctions (Worden and McLean, 2017; Becker, 1974). In terms of antecedents, Rothstein (2009) distinguishes between the

determinants on the "output" and "input" side of the political system. The factors suggested to affect legitimacy on the output side include for example procedural justice (Tyler and Huo, 2002), impartiality of service provision (Dahlberg et al., 2015), government effectiveness (Magalhães, 2014) and state economic performance (Klingemann, 1999; Zhao, 2009; Dagher, 2018) while on the input side of the political system it is generated by citizens' beliefs that the state respects the principles of political equality, democratic representation and electoral democracy (Dahl, 2006; Dalton, 1999; Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014). Thus, the literature on legitimacy aims to capture how and why citizens decide to willingly support and comply with the rules of a state and look at a number of input and output institutional factors which might affect it.

However, electoral autocracies often suffer from both input and output deficiencies leaving open the question of whether or not existing concepts and measures of legitimacy travel well to these contexts. Luhrman et al. (2018) defines electoral autocracies as political regimes where there are "no *de facto* multiparty, or free and fair elections" (p. 63). Electoral autocracies do hold *de-jure* elections which are severely undermined due to the lack of electoral accountability, electoral irregularities and other limitations to democratic party competition (p. 63). Thus, although electoral autocracies do hold regular elections at a formal level, in practice, the principles of political equality and representation are severely undermined. Moreover, electoral autocracies, often suffer from high levels of corruption and nepotism (Fazekas and Toth, 2016; Kimya, 2019) and experience various levels of economic growth (Saha and Sen, 2021). In turn, this raises the question on the rationale underlying citizens' legitimization of electoral autocracies in particular as both the input and the output determinants of legitimacy in such states are potentially subject to scrutiny.

Moreover, it is surprising that despite the fact that "electoral autocracy is the most common regime type in the world and has 44% of the world population, or 3.4 billion people" (Boese et al. 2022 p. 6), little research has been done on understanding and validly measuring the level of legitimacy as well as its determinants and effects in such regimes (for exceptions see Mazepus, 2017; Mazepus et al 2016; Case, 2005; Williamson, 2021). This chapter serves as a step towards that goal. Finally, correctly conceptualizing and measuring legitimacy matters in the context of the overall thesis because it provides an

input on the operationalization of state legitimacy and its institutional level determinants which are used as the main outcome variables and controls in chapter 2 and 3.

Therefore, by focusing on the "demand side" literature, this chapter first discusses some of the main approaches in conceptualization and measurement of state legitimacy (e.g., Norris, 1999; Booth and Seligson, 2009; Seligson and Carrion, 2022; Gilley, 2006a; Tyler, 2006a) by giving primary focus to the object and antecedents of legitimacy as well as their measurement strategies. Although this discussion by no means exhaustively captures all existing approaches, limiting the analysis to a subset of some of the most influential ones serves as a good point of departure which can help navigate the wider and complex legitimacy literature.

Secondly, I explore the measurement validity in an electoral autocratic setting of two common approaches: the political support approach (e.g., Norris, 1999; Booth and Seligson, 2009) and the procedural justice approach (for overview: Tyler, 2006a)[3] by conducting interviews with citizens of Serbia. Serbia is a good case in point because it is characterised as an electoral autocracy at least from the year 2014 (Papada et al. 2023), and has been exposed to widespread corruption, state capture and weak economic growth (Damnjanović, 2020, Kmezić, 2020; Pavlović, 2022; Vukmirović et al. 2021). Moreover, Serbia is one of the top 10 autocratizing nations globally with autocratizing tendencies very similar to Hungary, Turkey (Papada et al. 2023). Yet, it has received relatively less empirical attention. Therefore, as the country suffers from the relative lack of both input and output determinants of legitimacy (Rothstein, 2009) it figures as a fruitful laboratory for research on legitimacy.

In order to evaluate whether the citizens understand the question items in the ways that the two respective strands in the literature assume, I conducted 21 in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews. The interview findings suggest that in fact the interviewees do not; they often conflated their views on state institutions with the current political actors in office, therefore raising concerns on the validity of the items used to capture support for regime institutions (e.g., Norris, 1999; Both and Seligson, 2009). The interviewees often

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[3] I do not test the validity of Gilley's approach as I argue that legitimacy is *not* a latent concept. Moreover, most of the question items used by Gilley (2006a) are also operationalized elsewhere, thus making it redundant (for details see below).

"wrongly" referred to political actors when responding to the questions conceptualized to measure institutional support such as questions on institutional trust and the respect towards the political system. Therefore, the interview findings would suggest caution when using these items in contexts outside of liberal democracies. Secondly, the interviews provide some evidence suggesting the importance of the output side of the political system such as procedural justice and the state's level of corruption and economic performance. Moreover, oftentimes, the interviewees prioritized the fight against corruption and economic prosperity at the expense of respect for democratic principles. As a result, the interviews would suggest that some of the existing conceptualisations of legitimacy are in potential danger of failing to capture the output side of legitimacy determinants. The interviews not only suggest that a majority of the respondents do not take democratic principles as particularly relevant but often times have very poor understanding of what democracy is in the first place, thus corroborating the findings of previous survey-based research (Kruse et al. 2019; Kirsch and Welzel, 2018). This is a concerning finding in and of itself as it potentially casts doubt on the meaning of high support for democracy, observed in many cross-country studies (Cho, 2015; Doorenspleet, 2012; Alvarez and Welzel, 2011; Yeung, 2023).

Despite the arguments that legitimacy is, by the virtue of its origins in democratic theory (see e.g., Gerschewski, 2018), a highly normative and ideologically charged concept, this chapter offers conceptual and empirical reasons for considering alternatives when operationalizing state legitimacy which do not put democratic principles at the centre stage. In this regard, the interview findings suggest that a greater focus on key state institutions represented by appointed "street level bureaucrats" (Lipsky, 2010) such as the police, courts, and the tax authority may provide a more valid measure of state legitimacy in the context of electoral autocracies. As the procedural justice approach (Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler 2006a; Tyler and Jackson, 2014; see also: Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; Rothstein, 2009) conceptualizes and measures legitimacy by often looking at the willingness to obey exactly these institutions, this approach seems to be a good fit when measuring state legitimacy in electoral autocracies.

Overall, this chapter informs the wider legitimacy literature by concomitantly discussing and evaluating different conceptual and methodological approaches to the study of legitimacy. Besides providing a general overview, it also offers, based on original

qualitative interview data, some suggestions on measuring legitimacy in electoral autocracies. Finally, this chapter can be of interest to researchers interested in the Western Balkans and Serbia, given the fact that the data on the region is comparatively less available.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I provide a literature review on the existing approaches to conceptualizing and measuring legitimacy and discuss the implications of these approaches when attempting to measure legitimacy in electoral autocracies. Then, I present my empirical approach and give a brief justification for choosing Serbia as a good case in point. After presenting the interview findings, I discuss the benefits and drawbacks of each approach and present my argument for adopting the procedural justice approach.

2) Literature Review

Although the literature on state[4] legitimacy is in agreement when it comes to its definition, different authors rely on various terms, conceptualisations and measurement strategies in order to theoretically distil it, separate it from related concepts and empirically measure it. Yet, as legitimacy has proven to be a concept which is highly elusive and hard to capture empirically, the variety of approaches has produced considerable terminological, conceptual and measurement confusion. Nevertheless, the literature provides an ample amount of richness and depth that could ultimately help us in choosing a more valid conceptualisation and measurement strategy for state legitimacy in the context of electoral autocracies.

Authors agree that legitimacy indicates citizens' readiness to obey the rules of a state because of an internalised notion that obeying is morally justified. For example, Tyler (2006a) defines legitimacy as "the belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper and just" (p. 376). Linz (1978) defines legitimacy as "the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established, and that they therefore can demand

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[4] Although there are many definitions of the state, I refer to it as "a complex set of institutional arrangements for rule, operating through the continuous and regulated activities of individuals acting as occupants of offices. The state, as the sum total of such offices, reserves to itself the business of rule over a territorially bounded society; it monopolizes, in law and as far as possible in fact, all faculties and facilities pertaining to that business" (Poggi, 1978 p. 1).

obedience" (p. 6). Finally, Easton (1965) defines legitimacy as a conviction "that it is right and proper… to obey authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime". The common notion across these definitions is the assumption that legitimacy is based on determinants other than a simple deterrence-based model in which the citizens comply with the rules of the state out of fear from threats or sanctions (Worden and McLean, 2017; Levi and Sacks, 2009; Becker, 1974).

Yet, the literature on legitimacy exhibits a relative lack of systematic use of terminology, with a number of related terms often used as synonyms to legitimacy. Moreover, in cases where legitimacy is used as the term, a number of authors add various attributes to the word, often in order to further specify what exactly they refer to. For example, Linde (2012) and Anderson and Singer (2008) use "regime legitimacy" and "system support" interchangeably. Kwak et al. (2012) use the term "political legitimacy" interchangeably with "support for regime institutions" and "system support". Canache and Allison (2005) use "legitimacy" and "political support" interchangeably. Mishler and Rose (2001) use the terms "political" and "regime support" interchangeably while defining it in the same way as legitimacy is defined here, although they do not use the term legitimacy for their own analysis. Criado and Herreros (2007) on the other hand discuss "political support" as a separate concept as they go on to consider its potential implications for "democratic legitimacy". Levi and Sacks (2009) talk about "government legitimacy", Anderson and Just (2012) about "partisan" and "political legitimacy", Chu et al. (2008) about "democratic legitimacy" and Vassilev (2004) about "regime legitimacy". Booth and Seligson (2009) study on legitimacy in Latin America equate "legitimacy" with "political support".[5]

As a result, various authors conceive different concepts as the object of legitimacy (e.g., the political system, the state, the regime, the government) without always being clear about what exactly they refer to (e.g., the current regime or the regime type) and without recognising that the antecedents of various objects of legitimacy may differ from each other. For that reason, I organize the remainder of this literature review in order to map the possible objects of legitimacy of potential interest (i.e., what is being legitimized), and

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[5] Since the primary focus of this chapter is to validly capture citizens' perceptions of their willingness to obey the institutions of the state, I use the terms "state legitimacy" and "legitimacy" interchangeably throughout the remainder of the thesis.

their corresponding measurement strategies. Then, I explore the antecedents underlying these objects of legitimacy (i.e., the rationale behind the act of legitimization). I discuss a number of the most influential approaches including Tyler (2006a), Easton (1975) and Norris (1999) and Gilley (2006a) [6] in order to reach the widest possible breath in terms of the objects of legitimacy, proposed antecedents and measurement operationalizations (see also: von Handelwang 2016).

The Object of Legitimacy and the Accompanying Measurement Strategies

The selected approaches vary considerably in terms of the main object of legitimacy of interest. While Norris (1999) and Booth and Seligson (2009) explicitly distinguish between the support for the political community, the political regime and actors in office, other approaches focus on the legitimacy of the state alone (Gilley, 2006a). Moreover, some approaches focus their attention on the antecedents of legitimacy while providing less theoretical interest in situating their object of legitimacy of interest (most often the law, police, courts and tax authorities) into the wider legitimacy literature (Tyler, 2006a). In regards to their measurement operationalizations, Norris (1999), Booth and Seligson (2009) and Tyler (2006a) measure political support/legitimacy directly while Gilley (2006a) conceptualizes legitimacy as a latent concept and operationalizes it through its determinants and effects.

In terms of the object of legitimacy, most of the conceptualizations refer to Easton's (1975) early work on political support.[7] Easton (1975) distinguished between diffuse and specific political support and argued that diffuse support could be further broken down into support for the political community and regime support while specific support was intended to capture citizens' attitudes towards political authorities. Later works by Norris (1999), Dalton (1999), Klingemann (1999) and Booth and Seligson (2009) offered further subtypes of diffuse and specific support and confirmed the construct validity of their

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[6] According to Google Scholar, Tyler (2006a) has been cited 2588 times, Easton (1975), 4248 times, Norris (1999), 4854 and Gilley (2006a) 625 times (last checked on the 29. 07. 2023).

[7] Although, von Handelwang (2017) posits that political support and legitimacy are related but not identical concepts since "[p]olitical support may be based on different rationalities, including fear, habit, the expectation of short-term gains or long-term benefits…" (p. 272), the political support literature has been one of the most influential lines of work on the topic of legitimacy. Moreover, given its extensive array of potential objects of legitimacy and a wealth of associated metrics, this approach remains relevant for the purposes of this study.

measures through both exploratory (Booth and Seligson, 2009) and confirmatory factor analysis (Klingemann, 1999; Booth and Seligson, 2009) using cross-country survey data.

Easton's approach to political support has been advanced in particular by Pippa Norris (1999, 2011), who delineated between a particularly extensive set of possible objects of legitimacy of interest. According to Norris (1999), citizens are able to distinguish between support for the political community, support for the regime (subdivided into support for regime principles, regime performance and regime institutions), and support for political actors (p. 10; see table 1 for an overview of objects of political support and examples of their respective measurement operationalizations).

Table 1: Legitimacy as Political Support

	Dimension	Measurement
Diffuse Support	Support for the Political Community	Sense of belonging/national pride
	Regime Support	
	Principles	Democracy is the best form of government Approving the means to achieve political objectives (e.g., participating in a legal demonstration, working in election campaigns)
	Performance	Satisfaction with democracy in country X
	Institutions	Trust in institutions (e.g., legal system, police, bureaucracy Support/respect for the political system
Specific	Support for actors in	Trust in individual politicians

Support	office	

Support for the political community is "understood to mean a basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government and a general willingness to cooperate together politically" (Norris, 1999 p. 10) and is most commonly measured through "items tapping into a sense of belonging to the community, national pride and national identity" (Norris, 1999 p.11). Regime principles are designed to tap into people's values towards the political system and are operationalized through questions on freedom, participation, tolerance and moderation, respect for legal and institutional rights and the rule of law as well as agreeability with statements such as that "democracy is the best form of government" (Norris, 1999 p. 11). Regime performance on the other hand refers to attitudes people have on how political systems function in practice and is operationalized through questions on respondents' satisfaction with the performance of democracy. Regime institutions tap into attitudes towards governments, parliaments, the executive, the legal system and police, state bureaucracy, political parties and the military and are supposed to "measure generalised support for the institution". Items measuring support for regime institutions usually ask about the level of trust and/or confidence in these institutions. Finally, support for political actors refers to attitudes towards officeholders - specific individuals and/or political parties - and is the most specific of all elements of political support. Items used to operationalize support for political actors are often questions related to trust in individual politicians and various questions on the performance of particular political actors in office.

Related conceptualisations address political support through only one of the above-mentioned levels. Conceptualisations of diffuse support focus exclusively on some notion of the legitimacy of a political order (Seligson, 2002, Tyler et al. 2010) or the legitimacy of a political regime (Linde, 2012; Anderson and Just, 2012, Anderson and Singer, 2008; Chu et al., 2008; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Criado and Herreros, 2007). On the other hand, unidimensional notions of specific support include legitimacy of the government in power (Sacks, 2012; Levi and Sacks, 2009).

Yet, the abovementioned objects of political support do not consider the state to be a potential object of legitimacy. Such approaches have been advanced in particular by Bruce

Gilley (2006a) who posits that "a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power" (p. 500). Thus, the main object of legitimacy within this framework is the state understood as "the basic *institutional* and *ideological* structure of a political community (Gilley, 2006a p. 501l; italics in original). Gilley (2006a), like some others (Sun et al., 2018; Jackson and Bradford, 2019; Tankebe, 2013), understands state legitimacy as a latent concept, unmeasurable in direct fashion and conceptualizes it based on citizens' views on legality, justification and consent. Legality "refers to the idea that the state has acquired and exercises political power in a way that accords with citizen views about laws, rules and customs", justification refers to "responses to the moral reasons given by the state for the way it holds and exercises its power" and consent "refers to positive actions that express a citizen's recognition of the state's right to hold political authority and an acceptance, at least in general, to be bound to obey the decisions that result" (Gilley, 2006a pp. 503-504).

Table 2: State Legitimacy as a latent concept

Dimensions	Measurement
Legality	
	State respects individual human rights
	Confidence in the police
	Confidence in civil service
Justification	
	Satisfaction with democratic development
	Satisfaction with the operation of democracy
	Evaluation of the current political system
	Use of violence in civil protest
Consent	
	Voter turnout
	Payment of quasi-voluntary taxes
Note: Based on Gilley (2006a pp 522-523)	

As legitimacy cannot be measured directly according to this view, Gilley (2006a) relies on measures that theoretically should "cause" or are a "consequence" of state legitimacy.

Moreover, as the author aims to offer a measurement strategy that could be used for a large N cross-country comparison, the main dimensions are operationalized through items from existing cross-country and expert surveys such as the World Values Survey and the Government Finance Yearbook compiled by the IMF. Within Gilley's framework, legality is operationalized through three items; the evaluation of state respect for individual human rights, and the perceptions of confidence in the police and the civil service. Justification is operationalized through satisfaction with democratic development and the operation of democracy, the evaluation of the current political system and the expert-based measure of the use of violence in civil protests. Finally, consent is operationalized through voter turnout and the payment of quasi-voluntary taxes (Gilley, 2006 pp. 522-523; see Table 2).

The third approach discussed here is the procedural justice approach, advanced in particular by Tom Tyler (Tyler and Huo, 2002, Tyler 2006a), and disseminated to the wider political science literature by Bo Rothstein and colleagues (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; Rothstein, 2009). Tyler's work primarily focuses on particular authorities such as the police, courts and tax authorities (Tyler and Huo, 2002; Levi et al. 2009) as well as more general views of the legitimacy of the law (e.g., Johnston et al. 2014). For this view, the object of legitimacy is ultimately of secondary importance as the key aim of this approach is instead to empirically evaluate the notion that procedural justice acts as the main output determinant of legitimacy.

The procedural justice approach conceptualizes legitimacy as a multidimensional concept and relies on a number of operationalization strategies in order to empirically measure it. Due to the mere volume of the published empirical work, the specific operationalizations vary but do follow a generalizable pattern (Johnston et al. 2014). Levi et al. (2009) for example distinguish between value-based legitimacy, capturing the sense of obligation and willingness to obey, and behavioural legitimacy, understood to capture actual compliance (p. 357). Tyler and Jackson (2014) further distinguish between three dimensions of value-based legitimacy: the perceived obligation to obey rules and laws (understood as legitimacy in a narrower sense), an expression of trust and confidence in legal authorities and the perception that the authorities and the community share a common set of values (see also Tyler, 2023). Table 3 presents a summary of some of the items used to operationalize these concepts (for related operationalizations see: Tyler and Jackson, 2014; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Jackson et al. 2012; Jackson et al. 2011).

Therefore, the presented approaches suggest a plethora of different, but related, objects of legitimacy and offer replicable measurement approaches which can supposedly capture the corresponding nuances of the objects of political support/legitimacy in question. While Gilley's interest in the legitimacy of the state is complimentary to the aims of this research, it measures legitimacy through its determinants and effects, thus limiting the ability to empirically distinguish between the input and output antecedents of legitimacy from legitimacy itself. On the other hand, political support perspective offers a variety of different objects of legitimacy, all to some extent related but not identical to the state and potentially at risk of conflation by the citizens of electoral autocracies. Finally, the procedural justice approach focuses on the relevance of antecedents of legitimacy and provides comparatively less theoretical insights on what objects of legitimacy might be used to gauge the legitimacy of the state as a whole. As a result, arriving at conceptually meaningful and operationally valid measure of *state* legitimacy in electoral autocracies requires locating state-relevant objects of legitimacy which are possible to be measured directly. To provide a comprehensive portrayal of the state of the art and locate the potential determinants of legitimacy, the next section presents the key antecedents of legitimacy according to these approaches.

Table 3: Legitimacy in the procedural justice model

Dimension	Measurement
Willingness to Obey	
Law	"All laws should be strictly obeyed" (Tyler and Jackson, 2014)
Police	"The police always have the right to make people obey the law" (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009)
Courts	"The courts always have the right to make decisions people abide by" (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009)
Tax Department	"The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes" (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009)
Trust and Confidence	

	Law	"The law does not protect my interests (reverse coded) (Tyler and Jackson, 2014)
	Police	"You generally support how the police act in your community" (Tyler and Jackson, 2014)
	Courts	"Judges put people in jail for no good reason" (reverse coded) (Tyler and Jackson, 2014)
Normative Alignment		
Law		"Your own feelings about right and wrong usually agree with the laws that are enforced by the police" (Tyler and Jackson, 2014)
Police		"The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong that you do" (Tyler and Jackson, 2014)
Courts		"Judges stand up for the values that are important to you" (Tyler and Jackson, 2014)

Note: based on Tyler and Jackson, 2014 and Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009

The Antecedents of Legitimacy

I rely on Rothstein's (2009) input/output classification of possible antecedents of legitimacy as it offers a systematic and parsimonious way of organizing existing empirical evidence.[8] Through an examination of existing antecedents in light of this classification, this strategy can help evaluate which of the antecedents are theoretically meaningful to examine, depending on the object of legitimacy of interest. Moreover, Rothstein's primary *theoretical* interest in antecedents of state legitimacy, coupled with Tyler's *empirical* measurement, offers a clear theoretical mechanism and a replicable measurement strategy when investigating the effects of *output* antecedents. Finally, although Rothstein limits the output side to views of impartiality, other outputs, including "a broader range of economic and political outcomes" tapping into wider perceptions on government performance (Dahlberg et al. 2015 p. 22) also fit into the framework. In other words, Rothstein's logic (2009) could be extended to differentiate simply between "what you get" (the output side) and "how you get it" (the input side).

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[8] Rothstein's work is not included as a separate approach to the concept of legitimacy as he does not offer a replicable measurement strategy.

Rothstein (2009) categorizes antecedents of legitimacy as either input or output determinants. The input side of legitimacy is defined through the establishment of a well-functioning electoral democracy and its associated components, such as free and fair elections, the right to be elected into office, or the right to organize or have freedom of expression (Rothstein. 2009 p. 313; Dahl, 1989). These input determinants have often been utilized in order to explain "dissatisfied democrats" (Klingemann, 1999) and "critical citizens" (Norris, 1999; 2010) suggesting that "people accept a political authority because they have been given the right to take part in elections that have resulted in a government that represents the majority of the people" (Dahlberg et al. 2015 p. 21). According to this view, improving democratic performance of the actual political regime (i.e., specific democratic institutions and not diffuse democratic principles in Easton's terminology) will have a positive effect on citizens' political support.

On the other hand, Rothstein and Teorell (2008) define the output side of legitimacy through the quality of government and impartiality in the exercise of public power as its main normative basis. The principle of impartiality is defined in the following way: "[w]hen implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take anything into consideration about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law" (Rothstein, 2009 p. 314). Therefore, the output side implies that legitimacy is determined by perceptions of impartial implementation of public policies such as, for example, perceptions of corruption of public officials (Rothstein 2009, p. 323-325). In line with Rothstein's understanding of impartiality, Tyler and colleagues (e.g., Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler and Jackson, 2014), introduced procedural justice - defined as a "sense of fairness… that government officials follow a set of fair procedures and that they do so in a predictable and trustworthy fashion" (Levi et al. 2009 p. 360) - into the *empirical research on legitimacy* and argued that citizens' perceptions of justice and fairness are as important determinants of legitimacy as the deterrence mechanisms based on rewards and sanctions (e.g., Becker, 1974).[9]

The empirical literature suggests that both the input and the output determinants are relevant. On the output side, determinants found to positively affect legitimacy in existing

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[9] Tankebe (2013) extends on Tyler's processed based approach and suggest that distributive fairness, lawfulness and effectiveness are equally relevant as procedural fairness, although he considers them to be components of legitimacy and not its antecedents and treats obligation to obey as a consequence of legitimacy (see also Johnson et al. 2014).

empirical work include procedural justice (for reviews looking at a variety of state institutions such as the law, police and courts see Tyler, 2006b and Tyler 2023), impartiality of service provision (Dahlberg et al., 2015), lack of corruption (Gilley, 2006b; Seligson, 2002) government effectiveness (Magalhães, 2014; Gilley 2006b), welfare gains (Gilley, 2006b) and state economic performance (Klingemann, 1999; Zhao, 2009; Dagher, 2018). On the input side, citizens' beliefs that the state respects the principles of political equality, democratic representation and electoral democracy are also found to positively affect support for the political system (Dahl, 2006; Dalton, 1999; Norris, 1999; Rohrschneider, 2002). Dahlberg and Holmberg (2014) find that the ideological congruence between voters and parties have a strong and positive effect on the support for the political system.

As the main object of legitimacy of interest in this research is the state, various input and output antecedents of legitimacy might be more or less important. By design, input determinants are theoretically limited to democratic regimes, and can therefore be linked to objects of legitimacy such as the political system, democratic regimes or support for institutions in which the officeholders are *elected* representatives, such as the government, parliament of presidential office. On the other hand, the output determinants can be applied to state institutions in which the officeholders are either elected, such as the ones mentioned above, or appointed, such as the police, courts, healthcare and educational institutions or the tax office. Thus, the exact specification of the object of legitimacy and its successful operationalization and measurement also informs its theoretically meaningful antecedents. In the next section, I discuss the implications of determining the objects of legitimacy and their accompanying antecedents in the context of electoral autocracies.

Implications for conceptualizing and measuring legitimacy in electoral autocracies

As the political elite in electoral autocracies often "capture" the state and use state resources for private gain (Grzymala-Busse, 2008 p. 639), it seems challenging to both theoretically articulate and empirically operationalize the "right" object of legitimacy. Although state capture is not limited to electoral autocracies, they represent valuable theoretical cases as they offer us the opportunity to "stress test" existing conceptualisations of legitimacy in contexts in which the citizens live in *de jure* democracies while facing undemocratic practices by actors in power. Moreover, in the context in which both the

input and the output side of legitimacy are more likely to come under question – such as the case of electoral autocracies - what determines the perceptions of legitimacy remains unclear.

In regards to the objects of legitimacy within the context of electoral autocracies, it is unclear whether citizens would be able to delineate between their support for the regime (or support for institutions) and support for the actors in office as assumed by Norris (1999) and Booth and Seligson (2009). If not, what do these items actually capture? If there is a conflation, is it valid to focus the attention on other objects of legitimacy, such as the law, police, courts and the tax authority (Tyler and Jackson, 2014; Levi et al. 2009)? Although the existing analyses confirm the construct validity of different objects of political support (Klingemann, 1999; Booth and Seligson, 2009) it is still unclear what these distinct measures are actually capturing, particularly in the context of electoral autocracies.

Moreover, as some of the approaches presented in the literature review conceptualize legitimacy through its determinants (Gilley, 2006a), while others struggle to empirically differentiate between antecedents and the measures of legitimacy itself (Johnston et al., 2014), it becomes important to address qualitatively the extent to which citizens themselves perceive input and output determinants as distinct and well-defined concepts. Lastly, qualitative evidence could also help in examining whether input and output antecedents of legitimacy matter in electoral autocracies, and if so, which specific aspect of either type holds greater importance and for which object of legitimacy in particular? Qualitative evidence could help in providing initial answers to these questions and thus the empirical section of this chapter makes an attempt to contribute towards filling this gap through the use of qualitative interviews.

3) Interviews

In order to examine the validity of using different approaches when examining legitimacy in the context of electoral autocracies, I interviewed the actual subjects of study - the members of a polity. Qualitative interviews have been identified as a good way to examine measurement validity of concepts that may have time and context specific aspects (e.g.,

Gallagher, 2013). The interviews were conducted by drawing on the insights from best practices in cognitive interviewing defined as "the administration of draft survey questions while collecting additional verbal information about the survey responses, which is used to evaluate the quality of the response or to help determine whether the question is generating the information that its author intends" (Beatty and Willis p. 287; see also: Schlutz, 2017; Conrad and Blair, 2009). To the best of my knowledge, there are no qualitative interviews on matters related to the meaning of legitimacy understood by the citizens in electoral autocracies in the existing literature. Prior to presenting the results, I give a brief justification of choosing Serbia as a case study and present my sampling strategy, ethical considerations, and the interview question scheme. The results pertain to two main goals: 1) examination of what citizens have in mind as the object of legitimacy when responding to different questions and 2) examination of the relevance of a set of input and output antecedents of legitimacy observed in the existing literature.

Case Selection and Sampling Strategy

According to the latest V-Dem report (Papada et al. 2023), Serbia has been an electoral autocracy at least from the year 2014 and has been seen as one of the top 10 autocratizing nations globally with trends of autocratization very similar to the ones in Turkey and Hungary. This characterisation is further corroborated by related assessments of Freedom House, defining Serbia as a partially free hybrid regime (Freedom House, 2023). Serbia has been experiencing a downturn in democratic quality since the Serbian Progressive Party won the elections in 2012. Together with smaller coalition parties, the Serbian Progressive Party (*Srpska Napredna Stranka – SNS*) was accused of electoral pressures as well as extensive and undemocratic control of most of the media with nation-wide frequency (Damnjanović, 2020). As a result, the party has been accused of "capturing" and abusing state institutions outside of the limits of law (Kmezić, 2020; Pavlović, 2022). Moreover, Serbia has been facing considerable economic challenges compared to other European countries (Vukmirović et al. 2021) and has been grappling with widespread corruption both at the local and the national level (Pešić, 2007; Milovanović, 2007; Ivanović-Đukić et al. 2019). Consequently, given its poor democratic quality (an input determinant) and low quality of government (an output determinant), Serbia represents a typical case of an electoral autocracy. For that reason, the context of Serbia offers a good setting for investigating issues pertaining to legitimacy.

In order to acquire a sample of interviewees, I used a purposive sampling technique and relied on chain referral in order to access potential respondents.[10] I aimed to get a balanced sample in terms of age, gender, level of education as well as urban/rural residence in order to address the potential individual-level differences in the ways in which interviewees might understand state legitimacy. Out of 21 interviews in total, 15 were conducted in person in Serbia in three locations; in Belgrade (the country's capital), Novi Sad (the capital of the northern province of Vojvodina and country's second biggest city) and one town with roughly 30.000 inhabitants[11] in July and August 2021. An additional 6 were conducted online in September 2022[12] with interviewees living in rural areas or smaller towns, both in the north and the south of the country. All interviews were conducted in Serbian, and the survey questions were translated from English to Serbian by the author.

Out of 21 interviewees in total, 10 (48%) were female, with an average age of 41.4 (SD = 16.86), closely resembling the national average age of 43.8 according to the latest available census data from 2022 (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia[13]). Moreover, 8 (38%) interviewees came from rural areas, resembling the 40% of all citizens of Serbia who live in rural areas according to the latest available census data from 2011[14]. Finally, among all interviewees, 8 (38%) have a high school diploma, 12 (57%) have a bachelor or a master's degree and 1 (5%) interviewee completed elementary school only. Since almost 18% of all citizens in the Republic of Serbia has only elementary school education, while roughly 23% has some form of higher or university education (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2023), my sample of interviewees is overeducated. Although the aim of a purposive sample is not to arrive to a representative sample of the population, the higher education bias should be acknowledged and accounted for in terms of the interview

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[10] Ethical approval was granted by the School of Social Sciences and Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin.

[11] The name of the town is purposefully omitted in order to safeguard the anonymity of the interviewees.

[12] The almost 1-year time gap between the interviews conducted in the field and the ones conducted online might have affected interview responses, as a result of major political developments which occurred between the two periods. Although the responses to my interview questions often relied on examples from current political events, in terms of the level of conflation, key antecedents and understanding of democracy, no systematic differences were observed in connection to the interview time.

[13] https://popis2022.stat.gov.rs/ (last accessed 28. 07. 2023)

[14] https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-US/oblasti/popis/popis-2011 (last accessed 28. 07. 2023.). The results on urban-rural composition of the Serbian population from the 2022 census have not yet been announced.

findings. For a table of demographic statistics and individual occupations of all interviewees see Appendix 1.

An additional issue in terms of response bias is the danger from not accounting for potential fear the interviewees might have due to the possibility of a perceived threat of political repression. The interviewees might feel that they may lose their jobs or be exposed in the media in a variety of negative ways when they publicly express disagreement or criticism towards incumbents in power (Damnjanović, 2020). In order to protect their safety, I offered all interviewees anonymity and made sure that the interviewees themselves understood that fully.

Furthermore, active members from the political parties in power were not eligible for the interview. The decision to exclude active party members was motivated by two primary considerations: the apprehension that their responses might align closely with directives from their respective parties, thus making their responses biased and due to potential ethical concerns. I substantiate this decision by articulating that, despite the exclusion of active party members, individuals supportive of the government were not precluded from inclusion in the sample.

Although the existing literature on party support and party membership is severely lacking in the Serbian context (for an exception see: Čakar and Čular, 2023), anecdotal evidence and the overall autocratic and clientelist political climate in the country would suggest that party membership is, for example, often a condition of employment in the public sector. There have been numerous reports in the media suggesting that the citizens are "blackmailed" to join and participate in ruling parties' activities where they would in return be offered a job or be spared of getting fired (e.g. Vučković, 2019; Bogdanović and Martinović, 2023).[15] As such, I expected that the responses of active party members would be highly biased and qualitatively less useful. Moreover, in order to avoid raising further concerns to the wellbeing of the potential respondents, by interviewing people in potentially politically precarious positions (in which their job might depend on their political support to one of the government parties) I have decided to exclude any active party supporters.

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[15] This has often been raised as an issue by the interviewees themselves.

Yet, none of the sampled and interviewed participants belonged to any political party, obviating the need for implementation of this exclusionary criterion. Thus, responses from all interviewees were used in the analysis. Although no active party members of any political party were included in the sample, probably as an outcome of self-selection, the qualitative evidence would suggest that some of the interviewees were in strong Favor of government activities (for example ID 5, ID 8, ID 15). Thus, the resulting sample of interviewees does include government supporters and as such suggests a varied coverage of views pertaining to the views of current government in power.

Since establishing the actual levels of state legitimacy is ultimately of secondary importance for the goals of this chapter, even if the interviewees report biased (higher) levels of state legitimacy I should still be able to acquire valuable responses when they are asked about the reasoning behind expressed attitudes. This is further elaborated under the next section.

Interview schedule

As noted, the primary objective of conducting interviews is to provide the interviewees with an opportunity to elaborate on the rationale underlying their responses to conventional survey questions commonly employed to gauge their perceptions of state legitimacy. By delving into the perspectives of citizens, the interviews offer insights into citizens comprehension underlying survey responses. Consequently, the insights based on the interviews may shed light on the level of alignment between theoretical conceptualizations of legitimacy and their corresponding measurement approaches with the reasoning articulated by the citizens themselves.

The interview schedule was divided into two main blocks. In the first block I asked the respondents to answer a set of demographic and survey questions taken and expanded from Booth and Seligson (2009) and Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009) (for a full set of interview questions see Appendix 2). Items used by Booth and Seligson (2009) offer the opportunity to investigate the variety of objects of legitimacy in the tradition of research on political support while items used by Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009) tap into procedural justice approach to legitimation. Both set of questions are based on items which are often widely available and most commonly used in cross-country surveys such as Latin and

Afrobarometer. The questions operationalized by Gilley (2006a) have been dropped from empirical analysis for two key reasons: firstly, some of the employed measures are based on expert surveys and are therefore not measurable through citizens survey responses. Secondly, the items used by Gilley's often overlap with measures proposed by Norris (1999) and Both and Seligson (2009), which to a degree, suggests that including a separate battery for all perspectives would be obsolete.[16]

In the second block, after completing the survey questions, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews where I prompted the interviewees to expand on the reasoning behind their reported their answers. In order to examine conflation, I would usually ask the respondents to explain their reasoning behind their reported level of support for the political system and would ask them whether they would give a different evaluation if some other political party was in office. In addition, I would also ask the respondents to expand on the reasoning behind their perceptions of trust towards different institutions and the reasons behind their (lack of) respect of the law. In cases in which the level of conflation was still unclear, closer to the end of the interview, I would directly ask the respondents whether they thought about the difference between the institutions in general and current officeholders occupying them. In order to examine possible antecedents, I would prompt the interviewees to describe a political system, or specific institutions which "deserve" the lowest or highest mark. Then, we would discuss their understanding of democracy in principle and the state of democracy in Serbia in particular. In order to evaluate individual variability of their attitudes on main antecedents of legitimacy, I would usually end the interview by asking what would they like to see in the future, that might provide the basis for higher/better evaluations across different items.

4) Interview Findings:

Overall, the findings suggest that there were high levels of conflation, particularly on input side institutions and that output side antecedents carried more weight and less measurement error. In terms of conflation, when it comes to the questions on the support for the political regime, such as the question on support for the political system, there

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[16] For example, an item measuring satisfaction with the operation of democracy is used as a measure of different concepts such as views of justification (Gilley, 2006a), regime performance (Norris, 1999) or support for democracy as a form of government (Klingemann, 1999). This by no means suggests that these authors lacked analytic rigour. Rather, it just demonstrates the shortcomings of choosing between a limited number of already available items from secondary data sources.

seems to be a relatively high level of conflation. Moreover, in response to the questions taping into trust in institutions, those institutions which are, in the Serbian political system, filled with *elected* officials, were often conflated with their current occupants while less evidence of conflation was observed for the trust questions of institutions in which the officeholders are primarily *appointed*. In terms of antecedents, the overall interview findings suggest greater importance of the output side determinants. The input side determinants – most often operationalized through questions on the support for democratic principles and performance – seem to be less relevant and were often understood in various, and sometimes even outright "wrong" ways.

Conflation of the Objects of Legitimacy

Despite its conceptualization as an indicator tapping into support for the political regime, the interviewees most often understood the question about their respect for the political system as a question about current actors in office. Broadly speaking this happened in two forms: 1) there was no understanding of a difference between the political system and officeholders or 2) the respondents made a difference and a) gave great emphasis to the fact that the political system is "hijacked" by the officeholders which was understood to be a great issue of concern or b) the difference, when prompted, was regarded as irrelevant.

"They **are the state"**

After being asked what they referred to when responding to the question about their extent of respect towards the political system, most respondents indicated they were thinking about the current actors in power, especially the prime minister and the president, and how well they have performed on various aspects of governing throughout their time in office. One respondent, when asked to describe what she referred to when evaluating the political system stated:

> "I was referring exclusively to individuals, to only specific individuals. I didn't refer to the whole political system. I am not in support for that. Because the political system has the ruling party but it also has the opposition. I am not at all in support for the opposition" (ID7).

Another respondent, when asked to describe the current political system expressed a dislike with the "lies and persuasion from the TV" and went on to explain the "brainwashing" done in the media by the current president. Moreover, she indicated that the only place she has "contact with the political system is over the TV" (ID6) suggesting that her reference point from which she draws her evaluations of the political system are individual politicians which happen to often be depicted in the media – primarily the president and the prime minister. Similarly, another respondent indicated that "[t]he political system today is represented by Aleksandar Vučić and all the rest of them." and that the "[p]olitical system are the people in government" (ID2). Very similar statements were given by other interviewees as well. (ID4, ID8, ID15). For example, when asked to describe a political system for which she would give a very low mark, one interviewee explained that "[t]he political system that deserves a 1 [lowest mark] is the previous political system because of the criminal ways of how privatisation was conducted" (ID4). Through such an answer, the interviewee referred to the previous incumbents in government, accused to allegedly be involved in fraudulent privatisation of state businesses, as if they embodied the political system.

As noted, some interviewees would exhibit a somewhat better understanding of the difference between the political system and officeholders but would disregard such differentiation as irrelevant. For example, when prompted directly about whether there is a difference between the office itself and individual politicians currently in office one interviewee said that "[t]he difference between the office and the officeholders is a dead letter on a piece of paper" (ID5). Similarly, another interviewee went on to evaluate his respect towards the political system by comparing the current president with former presidents such as Boris Tadić (2004-2008 and 2008-2012 terms) and Slobodan Milošević (ID8). Other interviewees showed a lack of clear understanding on *who* exactly they referred to when responding to the political system question. For example, when asked about what she referred to when thinking about the political system one interviewee responded: "I don't know. In politics, there are other people other than Vučić. There are a lot of people in that, what is the name of it? Parliament?" (ID 21).

"*They* are the state, but they should not be"

Other interviewees also went on to report their (lack of) respect for the political system while referring to the actors in government in spite of their understanding that the institutions and actors should be perceived separately. Most of the interviewees who exhibited such understanding were highly educated, critical towards the government and in most of the cases had high support for democratic norms. After asking one of the respondents to clarify on what kind of a political system he referred to when answering the survey question, he said:

> "…I think that we already have a dictatorship, the only thing left to do now is to proclaim him [President Aleksandar Vučić] as the Patriarch [of the Serbian Orthodox Church]… If all of the political institutions become one person, as the things are currently progressing, then I would not respect anything at all because that first man is not respecting anything and is destroying all institutions in Serbia" (ID 14).

After following up with the prompt where I suggested that "in essence there is no difference between the institution of the president of the state and the current president" and asked whether we should "put an equation mark between these two" the interviewee responded:

> "No. Because he [current president] is not performing the role of the institution of the president. We should not put an equation mark between the two because he is currently doing it all. So, that literally means that we should put some sort of a union sign or something. The institution of the president is just currently under his jurisdiction… One person is governing everything, that is the problem and the reason why I have no trust in anything at all. And the question is how much longer my existing trust is going to last" (ID14).

Similarly, another interviewee, a student of law, gave the following assessment:

> "A political system is the implementation of law and respecting the rules, the whole procedure. Everything that has something to do with the state and the

citizens… I am referring here to the theoretical approach to institutions… In order for me to respect the political system, things that constitute the political system would need to exist, a debate based on arguments, a specific way of having these debates, there needs to be some sort of competition so it doesn't simply go from the top all the way down to the people. Again, my opinion about the political system is some sort of fatalism where we, more or less, always have a dictator… I only think that… in order for the political system to be respected, it first needs to exist. The thing that we have is not a political system, it is a trash can where we only stamped a sign on which we wrote 'political system', and that is that" (ID10).

This and similar argumentations were given by other interviewees as well when they argued that they respect the political system as a constitutional arrangement but answered that Serbia currently has "Vučić and a one-party system as a political system" and that "we all just accepted that it will be as Vučić says it will be and that this is a form of a lesser evil." (ID11) Similar notions were given by other interviewees as well (ID 1, ID 15, ID 16. ID 17). Thus, these interviewees not only suggests that the conflation is a source of measurement error but also a reason for their perceptions of illegitimacy.

Responses to the Trust questions

In order to evaluate the items tapping into the support for the specific institutions of the political regime – and therefore further specify the object of legitimacy - I investigate the conflation across different kinds of institutions separately. In order to do that, I probed the interviewees to explain their levels of reported trust in a number of different institutions. I present the interview responses after probing trust in institutions in which the officeholders are elected (e.g., the president, the prime minister and the parliament) and in which the officeholders are appointed (e.g., police, courts, tax authority). The reasoning behind the questions on trust could potentially provide some insight into which institutions are most likely to suffer from conflation.

According the interview findings, it seems that most conflation is observed in institutions in which the officeholders are elected – and not so much those in which the officeholders are appointed. This is especially the case with the institutions that are by design occupied by an individual or a smaller group of people, such as the institution of the president, the

prime minister and the parliament. This seems to be the most stable, and perhaps a not so surprising finding across individual interviewees. As the interviewees' reasoning behind their responses to levels of trust also reveals the most important perceived determinants of trust, antecedents are to some degree addressed in this section as well. The interviews show that trust seems to be assessed based on the performance on issues surrounding non-democracy related principles such as corruption and nepotism and rarely because of the lack of adherence to democratic norms, thus lending support for the notion of the relevance of the output side determinants of legitimacy. I later focus on the antecedents of other objects of legitimacy in a separate section.

Recall that the political support perspective on legitimacy operationalizes trust questions to capture institutional support as its object, regardless of who is currently occupying them (Norris, 1999). Yet, the often-reported low levels of trust towards the president is explained through high perceived levels of nepotism and the notion that the current president is "giving preference for his party members" (ID3) or because the president as well as the current prime minister are "still people who are just… humans, and have their own flaws" (ID12). When asked about why the trust towards the president is high, the interviewees asserted that "he works a lot and gets the job done" (ID 4), creates new job opportunities and is working on improving the living standard, developing infrastructure and improving how other state institutions work (ID4, ID5). Other interviewees asserted that both the president and the prime minister are to be trusted because of their efforts to procure Corona virus related medical materials and vaccines as well as because of their efforts to build hospitals and other infrastructure related to the pandemic (ID 15). Yet, the prime minister is often trusted less as she is perceived to be less capable than the president or because she is perceived as a "marionette" working according to the instructions of the president (ID4, ID5, ID6, ID14).

On the other hand, when interviewees were asked to explain their low levels of trust in the president and the prime minister one interviewee noted:

> "I have two main fears. First is that the current president will rule forever and the second is that he will die tomorrow and that, as an outcome, chaos will reign. His face does not give me trust, because it is evident that the gentleman received training in the psychology of the masses, in propaganda and manipulation of the

people… And when it comes to the prime minster, she is also trained, you can see it, but a bit less in comparison to the president." (ID 16)

The trust in parliament is assessed based on the performance of the members of parliament (ID2, ID3, ID9, ID15). For example, one interviewee said that "[b]ad and unqualified people sit in the parliament" and that the trust is low due to their "complete inactivity" (ID3). Others assessed that the members of Parliament are "uneducated" and that they "vote by the order from above" (ID 9), or that they quarrel too much and engage in no argument-based discussions (ID15). A second reasoning for trust evaluations is based on an argument that, in spite of their opinion of the members of parliament, the parliament should be trusted as the members are chosen through a democratic process. One interviewee explains that the trust in parliament should be high as the "parliament is created based on our votes" (ID 4) while another contends that her trust assessment is neither high or low "because there is no opposition in it but we are the ones to blame as we voted in that way" (ID 6). Regardless of whether their trust in parliament is assessed based on a performance related to non-democratic principles such as corruption or inactivity or based on some notion of democratic principles, such as the fact that the members of parliament were elected by the citizens, all of the interviewees assessed their trust based on their assessments of current officeholders.

The trust in the police, courts, and the tax authority are based on similar concerns on the widespread corruption and lack of efficiency. The courts are most often assessed based on interviewees evaluations on the level of corruption (ID 2, ID4, ID 7, ID 11) as the political "connections would get you out of jail" (ID 2), lack of efficiency (ID4, ID 7) and lack of impartiality as there are "different standards employed depending on the party lines" (ID 7, same concerns were raised by ID 9). Similarly, the trust in the police and the tax authority were based on the evaluations of the level of corruption and efficiency (ID 1, ID 3, ID 9; ID 16) but tended to be higher due to the notion that "they are a necessary evil" (ID 1).

Yet, the confidence in responses to the questions on trust in the police, courts, and the tax authority was variable, as many interviewees expressed the notion that they are more or less sure about their answers due to the difference in the a) amount of experience they (or people in their immediate surroundings such as family members or friends) have in dealing

with these institutions and b) whether they are familiar with the actual civil servants working in these institutions. When prompted to expand on the reasons behind her expressed levels of trust in these institutions one interviewee pointed that she was:

"referring to the experiences or things I found out about based on the information of the experiences of other people and not something based on the law and the constitution. That means, not the positions which these institutions have in the political system but my own experiences and the experiences of others from which I heard, or some examples based on what I already know or have read… I think that there is a discrepancy between what has been written and the things which are actually done" (ID 17).

Another interviewee provided his assessment of the trust in the police and added: "What can I say, I know a lot of them personally! I apologize, I am subjective". When asked to explain why he have given a relatively high mark for the courts and the police the same interviewee responded:

"Because I am subjective and because I personally know them. I know most of the people who work there and most of them want to do their jobs adequately, responsively and with quality, really most of the people. Police officers and tax public officials and healthcare workers and courts public officials. They want to do their jobs as they should but the problem is that they do not have the means to work and because of the system which is not motivating them to be more productive… So, this is the problem. We have that layer of lower managers who want to work as they should but they are blocked because most of the people who lead them and who are on top are like that that they do not like the efficiency and the good quality of the public service delivery… I know what they are dealing with because I've dealt with it myself." (ID 16).

Therefore, it seems that in a "captured" state such as Serbia, most of the respondents, understandably and accurately, conflate individuals and institutions and judge legitimacy on the former. Those who do not conflate are most often highly educated and in the minority among the interviewed. As only 23% of Serbia is highly educated the chances that the wider population sees this accurately is slim. Thus, such conflation leads to

problems of measurement validity, especially in the literature on political support, which often employs such when measuring institutional support.

Antecedents of State Legitimacy in Serbia

In this section, I first present the findings suggesting that many respondents did not base their assessment of the law, tax authority and the police on fear or habit, or because they were expecting individual gains (von Handelwang, 2017). This is an important finding as it suggests that interviewees responded to survey questions without referring to their instrumental and particularistic needs, and that an internalisation of norms behind the willingness to obey might indeed be at work. Then, I present evidence suggesting that democratic principles and democratic performance seem not to be as relevant as the proponents of the input side would assume and that principles such as impartiality, lack of corruption and good living standards, seem to hold most of the weight in this context. Overall, the findings provide support for the relevance of the output side determinants.

In relation to the potential danger that respondents base their answers on instrumental and/or particularistic assessments, when prompted, one interviewee explained why people respect the law:

> "People should respect it in the sense of the law of the state and the system. Because if they came to power and brought up these laws then we should respect them and to work on it. But in the sense of personal respect, in a sense whether I personally agree with their system, that is much lower. I mean, I do not agree with them but I still do the way they tell me. Do you understand this discrepancy which arose?"

When asked to expand on the discrepancy she responded: "I don't know. That is my personal conviction that we should all respect the law. The fact that they do not respect it does not mean that I should not respect it. It only means that they should respect it too…" When prompted to explain the motivation behind such respect for the law, the interviewee further elaborated that she would respect the law out of feeling of a "citizen duty to respect what the law is" (ID 18). Another interviewee, when discussing her lack of support for the

law pointed to the normative discrepancy between her sense of justice and the justice of the law:

> "The law is a little bit more of a general term so it is different. And I assume that there are a lot of unfair laws, just letters of the law without the feeling of justice. I think that in all justice systems there is this disagreement between the law and the inner feeling for justice and that is the reason why the support for it [the law] is lesser" (ID 19).

Similarly, when asked to explain what gives the right to the tax authority to have the right to make people pay their taxes, one interviewee explained: "What gives them the right? Well, we all live in a society in which people should respect the rules, and among other things the rule to pay the taxes. If *we* play by those rules, then those who do not pay the taxes, the tax authority should make them pay the taxes" (ID 19). When asked to expand on responses in relation to courts and the tax authority, another interviewee said that she completely disagrees with these statements since all courts are corrupted and that "when we would all pay the taxes, then the tax authority would have the right, but since they are making exemptions then no. They are making exemptions to some but not for all" (ID 21). When prompted to discuss corruption and nepotism in courts further, she also pointed that she does not want preferential treatment but fair treatment equal for all:

> "When I see the people who are employed in municipality offices, they do nothing and they are only there because their husband became someone. She works in the municipality office!? What is she doing there I do not understand. If I were to get that job, I would have learnt how to do it but I am of the opinion that I am not supposed to go there. Instead, someone who is educated should, someone who understands it. That is the system with the expertise. They should work there." (ID 21).

After I prompted the same interviewee to discuss her respect towards the police, the interviewee compared the police in Austria and in Serbia and concluded:

> "The problem in Serbia is in the law. Because the law is not protecting them enough. I am absolutely against them employing any kind of force if that is not

necessary but it should go the other way around as well… So, first there need to be some criteria that you are not allowed to attack them. There need to be some criteria to set how the police officers should behave and after that, when he stands in front of you and asks you something you can't laugh in his face but you must answer him if he asks you something… If there is a civil servant [police officer], I think that you have to listen to him, to answer his questions and that he is also not someone who is going to be unpleasant and rude" (ID 21).

As noted, closer to the end of the interview, I would usually ask the respondents what would increase their marks across different survey items. The interviewees tended to reiterate the level of performance aspects not directly related to *democratic performance* as the main aspects that could be improved, thus suggesting an overall good level of consistency of their answers throughout the interview. Moreover, *democratic norms* did not seem to be regarded with the same amount of relevance. For example, when asked about what he refers to when thinking about the "political system" one interviewee said that "[i]t is the President, Parliament and the Government. I referred to how it should look like based on the constitution…", but then noted that "[w]hat is important is that we should reach better standards…. My respect for the political system would be greater if the quality of public service provision was better" (ID3).

Similarly, due to the flow of the conversation two respondents compared Serbia with other democratic countries but never recognized the need for improvement of Serbia's democratic procedures. When asked about the differences between the political systems of Slovenia and Serbia, one interviewee pointed out to differences in the quality of public service provision such as healthcare and schooling, differences in wages and "most importantly" economic differences in general, where Slovenia was assessed as better in all cases. When prompted about differences in relation to politics she noted that the quality of people in politics in Slovenia is higher but stressed that she is not sure as she is not informed well enough about politics in Slovenia (ID6). Another interviewee compared Sweden and the US to Serbia and pointed out that the key role of the state is to assure that people "feel at peace and happy" which is according to him more attainable in Sweden due to its welfare policies. Moreover, he later pointed out that former Yugoslavia achieved that as well as it provided good living standards, the ease of traveling and a high level of the sense of security (ID5).

Other interviewees discussed the need for eradicating corruption at the highest level of government, non-interference of everyday politics in public service provision and better living standards as the main tasks based on which their assessment of the political system would have improved. (ID 1, ID 3, ID 8 and ID 10). Yet, a comparatively small number of interviewees noted that a "perfect political system" would also need to "be able to overthrow bad governments through elections" (ID 1), to have better informed electorate (ID 8) or improve the freedom of the press and have free and fair elections (ID 18), therefore pointing out that some interviewees expressed the need for improvement of democratic performance as well.

Taken together, it seems that democratic principles and aspects of democratic performance are not taken to be as important as the political support literature would assume. Rather, the assessment of support is based on principles such as impartiality, lack of corruption and good living standards, at least among the interview respondents. Moreover, it seems that these principles are formed based on the evaluations of current state performance and not the other way around. In other words, the interviewees often had no clear (democratic) ideal in mind based on which they would assess state performance. Rather, it seems that they construct their principles based on their needs which are to a greater or lesser extent not satisfied by the current performance of the state. Therefore, another important question emerged; whether respondents have a clear understanding of the principles of democracy. The next section discusses this in detail.

Describing the "ideal": Liberal Democracy?

Based on the survey responses, where all interviewees asserted that "having a democratic system where the representatives are chosen on free and fair elections" is a very good or a fairly good way of governing, it would seem that among the interviewees, the support for democracy as a principle is very high. In order to understand more closely how the interviewees understood and conceptualized democracy, during the interview, I would often ask the interviewees to define the key "features" or "principles" of a democratic system. Often, this would come naturally during the conversation in which cases I would prompt the interviewees to expand.

Overall, these interviews suggest that not everyone understands democracy fully or in the same way. Democratic principles are understood in at least 4 different ways: most though of democracy 1) as a catch all term for all the things they regard positively, some had 2) a good understanding of democracy in line with the literature, while a nonnegligible proportion of the respondents viewed it 3) as a term of mockery or even scapegoating or 4) showed a severe lack of understanding of the term or stated that they don't understand it and do not know what it means. For example, one interviewee correctly understood democracy to include free elections and freedom of speech and was certain that Serbia currently successfully operates under such regime. Yet, she pointed that in democracies

> "[p]eople can say different things and nobody could deny them that right. Is that democracy or a disbanded gang, I don't know. Everyone can do and say whatever they want, and not so many of them are held accountable for it. They need to be held accountable for the things they say which are not correct "(ID 4).

When prompted with the question that such a statement might potentially be against the freedom of speech she stated: "In some cases yes. But you can't be against the state and say different things and to live in that state at the same time. (ID 4)" A similar account of democracy was given by another interviewee while we discussed her belief that there is a lack of order in democracies. Talking about the recent media posts of a capture of notable members of one criminal organization, the interviewee stated that "[n]ow, we have luxurious prisons, TVs and phones, you can use it all now. He [criminal suspect] can command from the prison what people should do on the outside. Is that a democracy" (ID 7)?

Another interviewee expressed high support for democratic principles but when asked about what are the democratic deficits in Serbia at the moment she mentioned problems in international relations, accession process to the EU, nepotism and party employment and a lack of respect towards women. Also, she went at length to describe that Serbians have a "problematic mentality", especially in relation to how they behave towards women and their neighbours (ID 6). Although relevant, these issues could not easily be understood as *democratic* deficits *per se* which would indirectly indicate that this interviewee conceptualizes democracy as a catch all term in which all of the above issues are perceived to be solved.

Finally, some interviewees had questionable or wrong understandings of what democratic principles actually are. For example, one interviewee said "[m]y support for democracy as an idea would be the rule of the people by the rule of competent people… That means that not everyone can vote, but only people who have some qualifications, qualifications that we would all agree upon" (ID 14). Others explicitly stated they do not know what democracy is (ID 20, ID 21). Therefore, it seems that the "correct" understanding of democratic principles is relatively rare, at least among the interviewed respondents. Although this is a concerning findings in and of itself – as many respondents showed a concerning lack of knowledge of the basic tenets of democracy – such findings suggest that the responses to questions tapping into democratic performance might suffer from the lack of validity as well.

5) Discussion and Conclusion

In this section, I discuss the findings from the interviews in light of the presented approaches in order to arrive at a conceptually clearer and a more valid measure of the concept of state legitimacy in electoral autocracies. I first discuss how the subdimensions of regime support (i.e., support for principles, performance and institutions) and support for actors in office might be conflated by the respondents when answering these questions. Secondly, in terms of possible antecedents of legitimacy, I discuss whether the reliance on democracy-related questions, adopted by the political support approach (and Gilley, 2006a), might be misguiding. I suggest that the exclusive reliance on these questions theoretically restricts the possibility that citizens might perceive their state as legitimate despite the fact that the political regime of that state is (objectively) undemocratic. In the light of these claims, I discuss the benefits of using the procedural justice approach when measuring state legitimacy in electoral autocracies.

Conflation

As noted, electoral autocracies represent the hybrid form of a political regime in which *de jure* democratic institutions do not function in practice (Luhrman et al., 2018). One of the implications of such a regime is the higher possibility that the current actors in office often

"capture" the state and use the state resources for private gain (Grzymala-Busse, 2008 p. 639). As a result, the actors in office can "become the office itself" which might lead to a severe case of measurement conflation. The recognition of this potential issue is not new. Gilley (2006a) states that it is questionable if citizens in undemocratic states can make a "clear separation between their views of the state and their views of politicians" in cases where the government "has overstepped the bounds of holding office to actually define that office" (p.501). Similarly, Norris (1999) defines support for the regime institutions as the "approval of the powers of the Presidency rather than support for Bill Clinton" (p. 11) but admits that "in practice the dividing line between the office and incumbents is often fuzzy" (Norris, 1999 pp. 11-12).

Although it seems that, at the conceptual level, Norris (1999) and Gilley (2006a) are aware of this potential conflation, Norris (1999) does not discuss whether her operationalization strategy is capable of delineating between the two while Gilley (2006a) admits that his conceptualization is incapable of capturing such a distinction and does not seem to regard it as a conceptual problem. Indeed, the interview findings suggests that potential conflation issues may indeed be present. The interviewees overwhelmingly referred to current actors in office when they were asked to evaluate their support/respect for the *political system* and when responding to items taping into their perceived *trust* towards various institutions of the state, particularly in regards to institutions where there exists a limited number of elected representatives, such as the parliament, the office of the prime minister of the president. This observation raises a question regarding the suitability of the political system and trust items as valid measures of institutional support in electoral autocracies. Therefore, it seems crucial to consider the inclusion of a set of items regarding support for concrete individuals elected to hold key public offices, such as the support for the current president, prime minister and members of government. By incorporating such items into large scale cross-country survey projects, research interested in exploring different objects of legitimacy/political support may be able to address this potential conflation better.

On the other hand, the items measuring trust in institutions in which the civil servants are mainly appointed, such as the police, courts and the tax authority, seem to tap into interviewees' perceptions of performance of *civil servants*, therefore suggesting no conflation. The interviewees usually discussed their performance while considering the output side determinants and often based their assessments on how well they knew the

civil servants or whether, and to what extent, they had experience with requesting services from the institutions as a whole. Nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge that further qualitative research is warranted to gain a deeper understanding of whether the observed patterns of trust in these institutions are similar in other electoral autocracies. Such investigations could provide valuable insights into the nuanced dynamics of legitimacy in these regimes.

Views of Democracy

Asking citizens to share their views on democratic principles or the quality of democratic operation brings about a similar risk of unreliable measures. The previous literature suggests that the items measuring views towards democracy are often biased (Kirsch and Welzel, 2019; Yeung, 2022) or based on different understandings of what democracy actually is (Cho, 2016). Moreover, prior research suggests that many of these understandings are not only diverse but sometimes also outright "wrong" (Kruse et al. 2019; Kirsch and Welzel, 2018). The interview results seem to align with these cross-country findings and further suggest that "wrong" understanding of democratic principles or the outright lack of understanding seems to be particularly evident among the lesser educated part of the electorate.

More importantly, the inclusion of items measuring attitudes towards democracy as indicators of regime support (Norris, 1999) or measures of justification as one of the dimensions of legitimacy of the state (Gilley, 2006a) presupposes the normative importance of a *democratic* regime. Although this is less concerning if the object of legitimacy is the democratic regime, relying on measures capturing views on democratic principles and performance when the object of legitimacy of interest is the state seems to be conceptually limiting (but see von Handelwang, 2017). It theoretically restricts the possibility that people evaluate the legitimacy of their state based on principles not related to democracy. Moreover, putting such relevance on democratic principles might be less well founded in non-western and nondemocratic contexts, thus limiting the scope of the analysis to states with democratic political regimes. Lastly, the interview findings provide weak support for the notion in which legitimacy is understood to be based on the quality of democratic performance - an input determinant – even if the object of interest is the (questionably) democratic political regime such as the one in Serbia. Yet, due to the small

scale and qualitative nature of this research, examining whether this is indeed the case requires further empirical work (see: Rothstein, 2009; Dahlberg et al., 2015; Dagher, 2018).

Antecedents on the Input and Output Side

The interview findings suggest that antecedents of legitimacy could be operationally separated from the concept of state legitimacy itself as most of the respondents were able to communicate the reasons behind their assessment of different objects of legitimacy and political support. Moreover, these assessments would suggest that the institutional performance not related to views towards democracy (i.e., the output side) seems to be at least equally important as democratic performance (if not more so). Thus, the legitimacy of state institutions, or the lack thereof, seems to be justified based on (mostly) output determinants, such as perceptions of economic prosperity or impartial public service provision. Therefore, together with the findings in relation to the relevance of democratic principles and performance discussed above, the qualitative evidence suggests that the items tapping into the output determinants take the lead and that democratic principles and democratic satisfaction could, at best, be used only as *one of the possible* determinants of state legitimacy and not its defining feature. Lastly, the interviews provided no evidence that the respondents perceived the state institutions to be legitimate out of fear or because they already received or are expecting individual benefits. This is reassuring and in line with Gilley's (2006a) understanding that "[l]egitimacy is an endorsement of the state by citizens at a moral or normative level" (p. 502).

Adopting the Procedural Justice Approach

Contrary to the identified limitations in terms of conflation and the relative lack of relevance of democratic principles, the interview findings tentatively indicate that the procedural justice approach (Tyler 2006a; Levi et al. 2009; Rothstein, 2009) appears to exhibit greater efficacy in accurately capturing citizens willingness to obey. This effectiveness stems from several factors: Firstly, it is better suited to acknowledge the distinction between perceptions of state institutions as the main object of legitimacy and the support for the political actors in power. Secondly, this approach does not rely on the assumptions of the relevance of democratic principles and performance. Lastly, by operationalizing the antecedents of legitimacy and its objects separately, it promises the

capacity (and offers a replicable measurement strategy) to delineate between individual perceptions of antecedents of state legitimacy and the perceptions of state legitimacy itself.

This approach seems to be less prone to conflation as interviewees are asked to answer questions about the law in general and specific state institutions which are not directly and overtly tied to the individual actors in key positions of power. Although state capture would imply that the officeholders hold complete control over the activities of the police, courts and the tax authorities, it could be argued that this approach questions citizens about their views of the appointed civil servants or "street level bureaucrats" representing their respective offices (Lipsky, 2010; Chang and Brewer, 2022 for overview). In turn, it seems less likely that the respondents would conflate their perceptions on these institutions with the political elite in power. The interview findings offer initial support for this notion, as participants predominantly referred to the appointed civil servants when discussing institutions such as the police, courts and tax authorities, primarily due to their relatively higher levels of interactions with these actors. These observations align with Rothstein's contention "that citizens generally come into contact with the output side of the political system – with the administration, that is – far more frequently and intensively than they do with its input side" and that "what happens to them on the output side is often of crucial importance for their well-being" (Rothstein, 2009 p. 325).

Moreover, capturing the perceptions towards institutions which serve some of the most important functions of the state such as tax collection or the punitive role of holding the monopoly of coercive power, such as the police, offers an opportunity to measure the perceptions of legitimacy even outside of democratic regimes, including electoral autocracies. Since virtually every modern state in the world relies on some form tax collection and polices its citizens in order to (attempt) to maintain security, the procedural justice approach seems fit to measure citizens perceptions of *state* legitimacy, regardless of who is in office and whether the regime is democratic or not. Moreover, as civil servants of these institutions get *appointed* to these positions, the hard-to-capture attitudes towards the principles and performance of democracy seem to be of lesser importance as antecedents of legitimacy.

While the aim of the chapter has been to arrive at a more valid measure of state legitimacy in electoral autocracies, the scope conditions were, consistent with the aims, limited to

electoral autocracies. Yet, it seems that the evidence from the interviews and the resulting new suggested approach in measuring state legitimacy could be adopted outside of electoral autocracies as well. Therefore, I suggest that the use of the new measure could potentially be expanded to other regime types as well, although this was not the chapter's initial theoretical aim.

Yet, it is noteworthy that a non-negligible portion of the respondents discussed the certainty of their answers in light of their level of personal familiarity with the civil servants and the frequency of their interactions with them. Therefore, future studies could benefit from the examination of the effects of familiarity with the public officials on their perceptions on legitimacy in greater detail. One potential avenue for such research could look at the differential levels of legitimacy in smaller and bigger localities, under the premise that in smaller localities, the likelihood of personal acquaintance with individuals working with the police or other public officers may be higher. Such a study would shed light on the potential variations in legitimacy perceptions arising from differential levels of familiarity with public officials in different community settings.

Motivations such as "fear, habit, the expectation of short-term gains or long-term benefits" might pose as alternative explanations to higher or lower responses to these legitimacy measures (von Handelwang, 2017 p. 272; see also Gilley, 2006a p. 502; Tankebee, 2009; 2013). Such motives represent alternative explanations which could conveniently be described through the deterrence model discussed above (Tankebe, 2019; Tyler et al. 2010; Murphy et al. 2015). In other words, citizens might report having high perceptions of their willingness to obey out of non-legitimate motives. Although, these alternative explanations are not a threat only to the procedural justice approach, the interview results provide little evidence in support for this claim.

Therefore, in chapter 2, I utilize the procedural justice approach in order to operationalize state legitimacy as my main outcome variable of interest (Tyler, 2006a, Tyler and Jackson, 2014; Levi et al. 2009). In line with this approach as well as the overall interview findings, I assume that legitimacy can be measured directly and be operationally separated from the perceptions on antecedents of legitimacy. Furthermore, as I examine state legitimacy by looking at the willingness to obey and have confidence in the law, police, courts and tax authorities, input antecedents (i.e., democratic principles and performance) will not be

considered. Since I look at institutions which employ *appointed* civil servants, looking at *their input* determinants seems incoherent with the analytical framework. Moreover, the items measuring the input antecedents are likely to be of questionable validity as the interview findings suggested that the "accurate" understanding of democracy might be relatively rare. For these reasons, input antecedents of state legitimacy in chapter 2 are dropped out from the analysis. Finally, as my interest is to test a social psychological theory- system justification theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994) – in the remaining chapters of the dissertation, following the procedural justice approach grounded in the intellectual tradition of social psychology seems reasonable.

As all studies, this chapter suffers from a number of limitations. Firstly, it is questionable whether these findings are generalisable to other electoral autocracies. Although Serbian autocratizing trend is similar to the ones observed in Hungary or Turkey (Papada et al. 2023), the country's particular historical development such as the Yugoslav socialist past and the violent consequences of Yugoslav dissolution, might suggest that the findings cannot be generalisable to other electoral autocracies. Secondly, although the interviewees closely resembled the population in terms of gender, age, and the type of residency, the interviewed respondents were on average overeducated. This is important especially in relation to the assessment of conflation and understanding of democratic principles and democratic performance because a better educated electorate would probably be less likely to conflate and more likely to understand democracy "accurately". Nevertheless, the observed conflation and a lack of "accurate" understanding of democracy, even among the respondents in this study, suggests that that such conflation and inaccurate assessment of democracy might be worse than it is observed here. Therefore, this chapter serves as an important and yet tentative exploration of the rich legitimacy literature. By offering a qualitatively informed approach in measuring state legitimacy in electoral autocracies, I hope that I have cast the net and brought the research slightly closer to capturing this important concept.

Chapter 2

The Effects of Travel Restrictions on Citizens' Perceptions of State Legitimacy:

A System Justification Perspective

1) Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine the effects of an incoming real-life restrictive travel policy imposed by a foreign actor on the perceived level of state legitimacy of citizens living in an electoral autocracy.[17] This is done by examining the effects of an incoming European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), set to be implemented in the beginning of 2024, on perceptions of state legitimacy among the citizens of Serbia, a country which could be perceived as a typical electoral autocracy. Considering the likely inability of standard input and output determinants of legitimacy (Rothstein, 2009) to explain the relatively high levels of state legitimacy vis-à-vis more democratic regimes (as discussed in the introduction), this chapter tests the effects of an additional determinant – a policy implemented from abroad – while relying on a micro-level explanation grounded in system justification theory (SJT) (Jost and Banaji, 1994). In the context of the overall dissertation, this chapter tests the theory in a "real-life context" and looks at *attitudinal measures* of state legitimacy informed from chapter 1 as the main outcome variables. Since the reality of the preexisting relationship between the EU and Serbia is complex, therefore complicating the testing of the proposed theoretical mechanism, chapter 3 further tests the argument by examining legitimizing *behaviour* in a "pure", lab-based, artificial setting.

Although conceptualizations of state legitimacy are incredibly diverse (e.g. Gilley, 2006; Booth and Seligson, 2009; Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009), this chapter follows the procedural justice strand of literature which sprung from the work of Tom Tyler (2006a) and Bo Rothstein (2009). This is done primarily because I am interested in the effects of psychological motivations on state legitimacy and find their conceptualisation congruent

with the system justification body of work I build on (e.g., der Toorn et al. 2011). Therefore, as noted in the Introductory chapter, although system justification and state legitimacy are interlinked, they are understood to constitute distinct concepts. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 1, since these measures are the least prone to conflation, I look at the legitimacy of and confidence in the law, police, courts, and the tax authority while controlling for a number of variables including the perception of fairness and efficiency of the same institutions - two main output antecedents of state legitimacy, known from previous literature (Tyler, 2006; Rothstein, 2009; Tankebee, 2013).

Drawing on SJT (Jost and Banaji, 1994), the main hypothesis is that learning about the introduction of a restrictive travel policy will enhance citizens' feeling of inescapability from their country of origin – a situational factor known to enhance system justification processes (Laurin et al. 2010, Proudfoot, Kay and Mann, 2015) - and in turn lead to higher reported levels of state legitimacy in comparison to those who do not learn about the same policy.

Moreover, this chapter further argues that the effects will be stronger for those who expressed an interest in emigration, as these citizens are more likely to perceive the incoming policy change as detrimental to their plans. Finally, by drawing on the existing system justification literature on the interaction of dispositional and situational factors (Banfield et al. 2011; der Toorn et al. 2014; Cutright et al. 2011) I expect that the effects of restrictive travel policy introduction will be stronger for those with a lower pre-existing score of general system justification (Kay and Jost, 2003). Since justifying the system is understood to follow the principles of goal pursuit (Gollwitzer and Moskowitz, 1996; Banfield et al. 2011), when faced with a situational factor known to activate it, such as inescapability (e.g., Laurin et al. 2010), those who are initially low on system justification will have an stronger motivation to legitimize the state in comparison to those who are initially high.

In order to uncover the causal relationship between restrictive travel policies imposed by foreign countries and perceived state legitimacy of the institutions at home, I conducted a survey experiment in Serbia, a typical case of electoral autocracy in which both the standard input and output determinants of legitimacy are underperforming (e.g., Kmezić, 2018; Castaldo and Pinna, 2018; Pavlovic, 2020) By leveraging the introduction of the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) - a new travel

authorisation policy created by the EU and set to be implemented in early 2024 - I vary exposure to ETIAS-related information and test its effects on perceived legitimacy on a student sample in Serbia (N=308). In order to frame the ETIAS introduction in the wider context of emigration research (Gheasi and Nijkamp, 2017; Dimant et al. 2013; Cooray and Schneider, 2016), the existing research on the antecedents of legitimacy as well as the findings from interviews conducted for chapter 1, in treatment 1, I inform the participants that most people emigrate from Serbia due to better economic opportunities abroad, while in treatment 2, I inform participants that existing emigration from Serbia has so far been motivated by high corruption rates and nepotism at home. In chapter 3, I rely on a similar experimental setup in order to ensure comparability of the obtained results.

The results suggest an overall positive effect of treatment 1 – in which the participants read about the introduction of ETIAS and are informed that most Serbians emigrate for economic reasons - across most of the outcome variables, although the effect is statistically significant at $p<0.05$ only for the legitimacy of the law and the tax authority ($p<0.01$). Secondly, the effects of treatment 2 - where participants read about ETIAS and are informed that most Serbians emigrate due to high corruption and nepotism at home - are positive for all outcome variables except for the legitimacy of the courts, and confidence in the police and the tax authorities. Yet, none of the effects reached statistical significance at $p<0.05$. Finally, this research finds no statistically significant heterogenous treatment effect depending on emigration plans and the initial propensity to system justify.

This chapter offers a set of robustness checks by examining 1) treatment effects on a subsample of participants who took the survey after a school shooting took place, the first event of its kind in Serbian history which occurred during the data gathering stages of this research 2) treatment effects on the support for the EU and 3) the perceptions of fairness and effectiveness of officeholders. The results show that the effects remain even after subsetting for the school shooting – understood here to pose as system threat - an additional situational factor known to enhance system justifying attitudes and behaviour (see Friesen et al., 2019 for an overview). Moreover, the results show that learning about ETIAS authorisation has not affected perceptions towards the EU. This finding is relevant for both the policy world as well as system justification theory as it shows that system justification is "truly motivated" (Jost et al., 2010). Lastly, the null treatment effects on the perceptions of fairness and effectiveness of officeholders indicated additional support for

system justification theory in light of the ongoing discussion between the proponents of system justification theory and its critics (e.g., Owuamalam et al. 2019; Rubin et al., 2023a).

This research informs the political science literature on legitimacy by providing initial evidence that external factors – such as restrictive travel policies – might affect the levels of perceived state legitimacy in electoral autocracies. Moreover, by relying on the micro-level explanation grounded in SJT, this research suggests that restrictive travel policies pose as a situational factor affecting the feeling of inescapability and in turn increase the perceptions of the legitimacy of the law and the tax authority under the economic treatment condition. Yet, as ETIAS will be introduced by the EU, an international body with a long history of relations with Serbia, the observed effects might not strictly be observed due to inescapability alone. Although ETIAS introduction offers an incredible opportunity to test the theory, it suffers from limitations originating from the complexities of the real world. For that reason, the effects of travel policies – and their effects on inescapability – will further be tested in a "pure" lab-based setting in chapter 3.

This research also informs the system justification literature in three distinct ways. Firstly, it further examines the effects of inescapability, a situational factor which has received comparatively less attention than other factors, such as threat or criticism (Friesen et al. 2019). Secondly, by showing conjoint effects of multiple situational factors (escapability and system threat) in the context of an electoral autocracy, the paper lends further support for the external validity of the theory both outside of the lab and outside of the usual "Western" focus. Finally, by leveraging the sample characteristics, this research informs the discussion between system justification and social identity theorists on whether ego- and group-based motivations fully account for system justification processes (e.g. Rubin et al. 2023a; Jost et al. 2023). By examining the perceptions of fairness and efficiency of officeholders I provide additional evidence that system justification does indeed come from system-based motivation.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows; I first reiterate the relevance and use of willingness to obey and having confidence in state institutions as two attitudinal dimensions of state-legitimacy (for an in-depth discussion on the behavioural aspect refer to chapter 3) and discuss the multidimensional conceptualisation of state legitimacy. Then,

I present the framework of system justification theory overall, and focus on two situational factors known to increase system justifying attitudes; escapability and system threat. Then, I give an overview of previous work in system justification outside of "Western" contexts. This is followed by a case description of Serbia and a discussion of the context in which the study has been conducted. I proceed to presenting the design and results of the survey experiment and end by discussing the key findings and suggesting a path for further research in the conclusion.

2) Literature Review

Legitimacy and its determinants in electoral autocracies

In this section I briefly reiterate the definition, concept, and main antecedents of state legitimacy following the procedural justice approach (Tyler, 2006a; Rothstein, 2009). As discussed in chapter 1, this approach seems to be well suited for the context of electoral autocracies, since it is least likely to be prone to measurement conflation. Moreover, as this approach examines the legitimacy of the key institutions of the modern state – the law, tax authority, the police and courts - common to almost all states regardless of the type of the regime, it seems to be better equipped to measure state legitimacy in both democratic and undemocratic settings. The full overview of competing conceptualisations as well as the rationale for choosing procedural justice approach has been presented in chapter 1.

Legitimacy is often defined as citizens' readiness to obey the rules of a state because of an internalized notion that obeying is morally justified (Tyler, 2006a; Linz, 1978; Easton, 1965) The common notion behind such definitions is the proposition that people internalise the rules of the state because they perceive them morally appropriate and in turn motivate them to follow the rules voluntarily. Moreover, this conceptualisation of legitimacy has been offered as an alternative to deterrence models of rule abidance in which the legal authorities incentivise citizens to obey the law by threat of punishment (Tyler and Jackson, 2014). By proposing an alternative explanation to the question of the motivational origins of rule-abidance, process-based legitimacy offers an alternative mechanism in which people "feel an obligation to obey" mainly because they perceive the authorities to be just and fair (Tyler, 2006; Tyler and Jackson, 2014).

Tyler and Jackson (2014) conceptualise legitimacy as a multidimensional concept, understood to be consisted of three distinct dimensions: 1) the perceived obligation to obey (legitimacy in a narrower sense) 2) trust and confidence in authorities and 3) the perceptions of normative alignment between personal and authority's goals and values (p. 79-80). According to Tyler and Jackson (2014) "… obligation [to obey] is linked to the perceived responsibility to accept authority, not to the costs or rewards of deference" while "trust and confidence is linked to the character and intentions of the authorities, not their competence or ability to deliver services or safety" (p. 81).

This literature developed a number of survey items which are able to capture these distinct aspects of legitimacy and show their utility in predicting the level of law compliance, as well as cooperation and engagement with legal authorities (Tyler and Jackson, 2014; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Jackson et al. 2012; Jackson et al. 2011). Based on the discussion in chapter 1, in this research I focus on the first two dimensions: the obligation to obey and having trust and confidence in the authority. These two dimensions are seen to activate different types of attitudinal and behavioural responses. Having a feeling of duty to obey implies *passive* compliance while trust/confidence in authorities implies *active* justification of authorities' positions in society, such as voluntary cooperation and community engagement (Tyler and Jackson, 2014 p. 90). The perceptions of normative alignment have been dropped from the analysis as they tap into a related but separate and growing literature on the importance of personal norms (e.g., Jackson et al. 2021).

As noted in chapter 1, in terms of the antecedents of legitimacy, when state institutions are perceived to be fair, just and neutral or, in other words, procedurally just (Tyler, 2006a; Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Rothstein, 2009), people are more likely to feel the obligation to obey and have confidence in their institutions (Tyler and Jackson, 2014; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). Based on the results presented in chapter 1 in which I found that citizens would be much more likely to legitimize the state if they perceive that the state is providing better economic- and corruption-related conditions, next to the items measuring perceived procedural justice, I include a set of items measuring the perceived efficiency of the law, state institutions as well as the current politicians in office. By distinguishing between the incumbents from the institutions they occupy, I offer a valuable alternative

measurement strategy fit for research interested in state legitimacy outside of liberal democracies.

System Justification Theory

System justification theory has been developed to explain people's tendency to support the status quo, especially in situations in which bolstering the status quo seems to go against self- or group-based interests (Friesen et al. 2019 p. 316). In the words of Jost and Banaji (1994) system justification theory aims to explain why "existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group interest" (p. 2). The main argument proposed by the theory is that people have the need (i.e., a motivational goal) to perceive systems (e.g., societies, national governments, cultures) as fair and just, out of the need for certainty and meaning (epistemic), the need for safety and security (existential) and the need for sharing the views on reality in line with similar others (relational) (Osborne et al. 2019 p. 341; Jost and van der Toorn, 2012). Yet, as noted in to introductory chapter of this dissertation, although SJT has so far been tested in a broad range of systems (Friesen et al. 2019; Jost et al. 2019a for overviews) the theory seems to be lacking a clear approach to the *state* as a politically relevant system. By merging the insights from SJT with the wider political science literature on state legitimacy discussed above, I test this theory in a state- and policy-relevant context.

System justification theory has been tested in a considerable volume of scholarly work (for overviews see: Jost et al., 2019a; Jost et al., 2019b; Osborne et al., 2019; Friesen et al., 2019). One line of the literature focused on examining situational factors in which system justification is more likely to occur. According to Kay and Friesen (2011) there are at least four distinct contexts in which people would be more likely to engage in system justifying processes. These are 1) system threat, 2) system dependence, 3) system inescapability and 4) low personal control (see also Friesen et al. (2019) and Kay and Zanna, 2009). As restrictive travel policies are here understood to capture inescapability while the school shooting event presents a case of system threat, this chapter presents existing research on inescapability and system threat – two situational factors relevant for this research.

In comparison to other situational factors, inescapability has received less empirical attention. According to SJT, when people are faced with unfavourable situations from

which they cannot escape, they would engage in motivated psychological processes in defence of such systems in order to rationalize their "dissatisfactory elements" (Laurin et al. 2010 p. 1076). Laurin et al. (2010) show that when participants in their experiment are told that it is increasingly hard to leave the country (Canada), they were less likely to blame systematic unfairness of the gender pay gap in comparison to participants who read that leaving the country is becoming easier. In a similar study conducted by Kay et al. (2009), those participants who read that emigration from a country is becoming more difficult were much more likely to support existing income inequalities between the citizens and politicians in office than those who read that emigration is becoming easier. Lastly, Proudfoot, Kay and Mann, (2015) showed that workers are more likely to minimize or ignore the negative aspects of their jobs upon learning that the current job market offers limited alternative job opportunities. Yet, the empirical work on the effects of inescapability have been conducted either in the lab on a sample of Canadian students (Laurin, Shepherd and Kay, 2010; and Kay et al., 2009) or US citizens over MTurk (Proudfoot, Kay and Mann, (2015), providing little external validity in real-life, state-relevant scenarios outside of the Western contexts, where the reality of travel restrictions, and lower levels of state legitimacy, are more real and immediate. Therefore, by harnessing the insights from SJT, I expect that ETIAS will affect the feelings of inescapability and in turn have a positive effect on state legitimacy.

Moreover, I expect that the effect would be stronger for those citizens of Serbia who are planning to emigrate, as the relevance of this policy is arguably particularly salient for this subgroup. As most of the existing studies which examine the effects of situational factors utilize a fictional scenario, the experimental setup presented bellow offers the opportunity to examine an extension of the main hypothesis – the notion that the participants in the experiment who expressed an intent to emigrate would be more likely to be affected by the introduction of the ETIAS policy, and as a result, would me more likely to experience a sense of escapability. In turn, these participants would be particularly incentivized to engage in rationalization of the existing status quo by reporting higher levels of state legitimacy in comparison to the treated participants who did not report an intention to emigrate from Serbia.

The effects of threat on system justifying processes have received comparatively more attention (Friesen et al., 2019; Kay and Zanna, 2009; Kay and Friesen, 2011 for

overviews). Under the conditions in which an event threatens the legitimacy of a system people tend to elicit defensive responses in order to safeguard their existential needs. These events include terrorism, climate change, and economic or natural disasters (Milojev et al. 2015; Ulrich and Cohrs, 2007, Vainio et al. 2014; Kay, Jost and Young, 2005). Important for this research, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez Guede (2006) show that the 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid induced a stronger attachment to traditional conservative values and a reduction in the attachment to liberal values – a finding consistent with the notion that conservative ideology serves as a palliative function of system justification (Jost and Hunyady, 2002, 2005). Yet, to the best of my knowledge, no research to date looked at the conjoint effects of inescapability and threat. By examining the effects of ETIAS – tapping into inescapability - in the context in which a school shooting event occurred – tapping into system threat, I offer some initial evidence in order to fill this gap.

The existing literature on system justification also suggests that situational factors do not affect everyone in the same way. According to the theory, since system justification is a goal-oriented state based on existential, epistemic and relational needs (Jost and van der Toorn, 2012), people will differ when it comes to the level of fulfilling that goal. In other words, some people will have greater need to justify the system in comparison to others. Thus, when faced with situational factors which are shown to increase the motivational need to justify, such as system threat or inescapability, those who are initially low on system justification would feel the need to justify the system more while those initially high would not be affected by it (as their needs are already satisfied). In the words of Banfield et al. (2011) "if system justification […] does function as a motivational process that has a specific aim (Jost et al. 2010), then those low in system confidence – that is, those individuals who are especially fragile – should be the most likely to respond to threat via increased attempts at defending the system (p. 213). The existing empirical research supports this claim (Banfield et al. 2011; der Toorn et al. 2014; Cutright, 2011). Although this empirical research looks at the heterogenous effects of threat as the situational factor of interest, this chapter, by extension examines whether the feeling of inescapability will have a stronger effect on those initially low on system justification. This proposition has been evaluated under hypothesis 2 of this chapter as well in the second hypothesis presented in chapter 3.

Finally, as noted, most of the empirical work within the system justification literature has been done in "Western" contexts. Yet, the existing work in non-Western contexts shows that system justification is not specific to the "West". Some work has been done on post-communist countries such as Hungary (Lonnqvist et al. 2021; Szabo and Lonnqvist, 2021), Poland (Cichocka and Jost, 2014) and Russia (Agadullina et al. 2021) showing that overall, the average levels of system justification are below the ones usually observed in the US and other Western countries. Moreover, some work has been conducted in a cross-county setting (Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018; Brandt et al. 2020; Badaan et al. 2018), Japan (Nakagoshi and Inamasu, 2023), China (Tan et al. 2016), and Bolivia (Henry and Saul, 2016) often providing results in line with theoretical expectations. Yet, none of the studies cited above examine the effects of situational factors on system-justifying processes. By providing evidence on the effects of escapability and threat on system justifying processes in Serbia and by relying on measures of state legitimacy fit for the context of electoral autocracies, I further extend the geographical (Serbia) and theoretical scope (electoral autocracy) of empirical testing.

Yet, it is important to note here that the potential effect of external travel restrictions on perceptions of domestic state institutions should not be relevant in non-democracies only. As noted, the general theory has so far been proven to work in many different contexts while the examination of escapability as one of the situational factors which might enhance system justification has been shown to work in Canada (Laurin et al. 2010). Therefore, the results presented in this chapter might contribute to the existing literature as they demonstrate that even in electoral autocracies, perceptions of state legitimacy might be enhanced though psychological mechanisms which system justification theory can explain. In other words, testing the theory within an electoral autocracy could be regarded as a harder case vis-à-vis liberal democracies in which we would expect the levels of state legitimacy to be generally higher.

3) Case Description

Brief Overview

Like most electoral autocracies[18], Serbia has traversed a turbulent historical journey towards democratic consolidation. Moreover, with relatively poor economic performance in comparison to the rest of Europe (Vukmirović et al. 2021) and widespread corruption (Pešić, 2007; Milovanović, 2007; Ivanović-Đukić et al. 2019), Serbia represents a country in which, according to standard determinants, should be hard for citizens to see legitimately. Therefore, the country case provides a hard test for system justification theory. After regime change and the demise of Slobodan Milošević following the 2000 Yugoslav general elections and the massive protests that followed, Serbia experienced a period of democratization (Pavlović, 2020). In parallel, this period has been marked by often questionable and untransparent privatisation processes (Vujačić and Petrović-Vujačić, 2011) and the consequent "stabilization of oligarchic economic structures" (Džinić and Segert, 2011 p. 245). After the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections in which the Serbian Progressive Party (*Srpska Napredna Stranka - SNS*) was elected into government, the country has been experiencing a gradual but steady autocratization. Together with the smaller coalition parties, SNS has been accused of electoral pressures, extensive and undemocratic control of most of the media with nation-wide frequency (Kmezić, 2018; Castaldo and Pinna, 2018), as well as multiple accusations of corruption and patronage from local to the national level. Furthermore, the party has been accused of "state capture" by abusing state institutions outside of the limits of law (Damnjanović, 2020; Burazer, 2023).

The literature suggests many causes of autocratization in Serbia, such as the reluctance of the post-Milošević reformists to create independent institutions (Bieber, 2018), the lack of rule of law (Kmezić, 2020) and the role of the EUs conditionality (Richter and Wunch, 2020; Castaldo and Pinna, 2018, Pavlović, 2023), which have in turn allowed the incumbents to remain in power by relying on informal governance mechanisms (Kmezić, 2020; Pavlovic, 2022). Therefore, it is argued that the political parties in Serbia act as the "main agents of state capture" (Richter and Wunsch, 2020), where state capture is understood here as "the elite extraction of state resources for private gain" (Grzymala-Busse, 2008 p. 639), leading some to address the situation in Serbia as one of "hyper incumbency" (Pavlovic, 2020; Greene, 2007).

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[18] The general and comparative overview and discussion of choosing Serbia as a case fit for the analysis is presented in the introduction as well as in chapter 1.

From the citizens' perspective, the literature suggests that one of the reasons why Serbia is experiencing democratic backsliding is the relative lack of security and public service provision which in turn places pressures for democratization on the backburner. The argument by Džinić and Segert (2011) that "the general population's primary interest mostly lies in the stabilisation of state apparatus and its ability to produce common goods rather than the fast establishment of electoral democracy and formal democratic institutions" (p. 239) is congruent with the notion that more efficient social order emerges if democratization occurs after higher levels of state capacity are obtained (D'Arcy and Nistotskaya, 2016). Moreover, the results based on the interviews conducted in chapter 1 are in line with Džinić and Segert (2011) assertion suggesting that citizens request economic stability and better public service provision, potentially more so than the requests for democratization.

EU relations

In 2003, Serbia had been identified as a potential EU candidate member state and granted EU candidate status in March 2012 with the start of the accession dialogue occurring in 2014. The EU accession process includes a set of conditions to which the country must adhere to in order to be eligible to join (e.g., Soyaltin-Colella, 2022). Although the literature agrees that EU conditionality matters for Serbian quality of democracy, it disagrees on the direction of the effect. Richter and Wunsch (2020) argue that EU conditionality contributed to the poor democratic performance and state capture across the countries in the Western Balkans (see also Soyaltin-Colella, 2022; Borzel and Pamuk, 2012; Mendelski, 2016). Others blame the EU's inability to sanction candidate states for poor performance (Pavlović, 2023) or argue that the EU has the ability to incentivise further democratization (Bieber, 2018).

From a citizens' perspective, according to the 2022 Balkan Barometer opinion poll, 38% of Serbians thought that Serbia's EU membership would be "a good thing" in contrast to 22% who believe it would be "a bad thing", and 36% who believe it would be "neither good nor bad". Moreover, according to an opinion poll conducted by the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA)[19], Russia is perceived as the most

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[19] https://crta.rs/en/political-attitudes-of-citizens-of-serbia-february-2023/ (last visit 06.07.2023)

important political partner of Serbia (34%) followed by China (17%) and the EU (14%). When asked what Serbia's foreign policy should be, 43% of respondents answered that it should be Russia focused, either exclusively (10%) or while keeping good relations with the EU and the West (33%). On the other hand, 44% believe that the focus should be on the EU and the West, with 8% answering exclusively the EU and the West and 36% while keeping good relations with Russia (CRTA, 2023).

Thus, the current support for the EU membership among Serbians seems to be relatively weak. In addition, the results from the CRTA opinion pool suggest that the EU-Russia divide is stark. This is especially relevant in the current context of the ongoing war in Ukraine in which this divide is arguably becoming even more salient (Spasojević, 2023). Thus, the implementation of the ETIAS travel policy might be perceived by Serbian citizens as not only a simple travel policy but also as a highly politicized issue, given the specific geopolitical position of the country and the history of relations between the EU and Serbia. For that reason, the analyses conducted in this research controlled for left-right ideological self-placement and perceptions towards the EU and Russia in the context of Serbia's foreign policy.

Existing EU Travel Regulations and ETIAS

The existing EU travel regulations were put in effect in 2009 and allow citizens of Serbia to travel to the Schengen area visa-free as long as their stay is no longer than 90 days. In cases where Serbian citizens want to remain in the Schengen area for longer than 90 days, they need to acquire a visa prior to their travels.

According to the official website of the EU, the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) represents a new requirement when traveling to Europe. Starting from January 2024, all visa-exempt nationals (i.e., not only citizens of Serbia) wishing to travel to 30 European countries will be required to attain an ETIAS travel authorisation. When acquired, the authorisation will be valid for 3 years, for multi-entry short-term stays not breaching the 90 days maximum within a 180 days period. To acquire the authorisation, a citizen will be requested to complete an application form and pay a 7-

euro fee. According to the website, most of the applications will be processed in a matter of minutes while some may take up to 30 days.[20]

The rationale for introducing ETIAS is "to identify security, irregular migration or high epidemic risks posed by visa-exempt visitors traveling to the Schengen States, whilst at the same time facilitate crossing borders for the vast majority of travellers who do not pose such risks" (European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, para. 1).[21] It is a measure aimed to accomplish the goals set by the European Agenda on Security and the European Agenda on Migration and "in particular regarding border management and preventing cross-border crime and terrorism" (European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, para. 5).

Focusing on EU travel policies in the context of Serbia is justified since the vast majority of existing emigration is to members states under the Schengen agreement (Radonjić and Bobić, 2020). Moreover, as it will be shown below, a vast majority of the survey respondents report that they often travel to the EU and if a willingness to permanently emigrate is expressed, most of the respondents report they would emigrate to the countries in the Schengen area.

The existing research suggests that travel policies such as visa policies have a strong and direct impact on emigration. Liberalising the availability of travel to other countries has an immediate and positive effect on the size of emigration. (Czaika and de Haas, 2016). This in turn suggests that travel policies do indeed affect the possibilities of leaving one's country and are therefore tapping into the concept of escapability. Therefore, operationalizing escapability through ETIAS can be used to proxy for the effects of inescapability. Since ETIAS requires citizens to apply for the authorisation, thus implying a loss of resources such as time and money and a possibility of denial, it constitutes a restrictive travel policy which should, according to SJT, increase the feeling of inescapability. Yet, in comparison to other restrictive travel policies it might be considered as a weakly restrictive travel policy as the time and financial resources needed in other to

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[20] https://travel-europe.europa.eu/etias_en (last visit 29. 06. 2023).
[21] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/smart-borders/european-travel-information-and-authorisation-system-etias_en#:~:text=ETIASEN%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2,do%20not%20pose%20such%20risks (Last visit 28. 06. 2023).

obtain it will probably be significantly smaller in comparison to more stringent restrictions based on, for example, visa applications. Thus, with its relatively mild requirements, ETIAS could potentially represent a hard test of the theory.

Thus, in the context of this chapter, some further discussion of why being notified of ETIAS represents an appropriate treatment is needed. During the research design stage for this chapter, the main aim has been to locate a real and incoming restrictive travel policy change in the near future. Since changes in travel policies, such as visa requirements rarely occur (Czaika et al. 2018), the fact that ETIAS has been announced figures as a rare empirical opportunity fit for the aims of this research.

In regards to the potential issue that ETIAS might be a treatment so weak that it would not elicit a feeling of escapability, prior to actually conducting a pilot or the study itself, it is hard to evaluate with certainty. Given the reality that no other travel policy changes were announced in the near future at the time of the study, in comparison to a hypothetical scenario in which a researcher informs the participants to imagine an incoming travel restriction or simply suggests that emigration would be harder in the future (Laurin et al. 2010), the use of ETIAS seemed like a potentially stronger treatment as well as more ethical and policy relevant alternative.

Moreover, when travel and visa policies do change, they often come with a number of other changes. An informative example is the change in travel restrictions as a part of an EU enlargement. In such cases, citizens of a newly joined EU country could be affected by a change in travel policy. Yet, the introduction of changes in travel policies as a part of the EU enlargement package cannot be used as a treatment manipulating the feelings of escapability as EU enlargement implies a whole set of other policy changes which makes the disentanglement of its possible inescapability effects from other potential effects very hard, if not impossible. On the other hand, ETIAS has been devised as a travel policy only, including all countries in which citizens do not require a visa for stays longer than 90 days. Therefore, ETIAS is in that sense an appropriate and less selective real-life operationalization of a treatment tapping into the sense of inescapability induced from abroad. Thus, taking into consideration that the only two reasonable options were either the use of ETIAS or the use of a fictive treatment, I deemed the use of ETIAS as the best

way forward and ultimately decided to utilize it as a treatment for the purposes of this research.

Context of the Study: The School Shooting

In the early morning of the 3rd of May, Serbia experienced its first ever school shooting. A 13-year-old pupil of "Vladislav Ribnikar" elementary school in central Belgrade killed 8 of his classmates and one security guard officer and wounded 6 additional pupils and a teacher. According to the statement from the Serbian Minster of Education Branko Ružić, the perpetrator had been a victim of peer violence. The very next day, another mass shooting occurred in a village of Dubona, some 60 kilometres away from Belgrade when a 21-year-old man killed 8 and wounded 14 people.[22]

The shootings were widely reported by the national media and caused distress across the nation. The President of the Republic announced a 3-day long mourning period and the Minister of Education resigned. Shortly after the shooting, on the 8th of May, protests erupted in Belgrade and Novi Sad - Serbia's two biggest cities - requesting the resignation of top government officials and the closure of private pro-government media outlets perceived to promote violence and anti-social behaviour. The protests continued weekly and spread to 30 other cities by the time of the writing (for details see: BBC, 2023; N1, 2023) [23].

Although Serbia has the fifth highest gun ownerships per capita in the world (39.1 firearms per 100 people, according to the Small Arms Survey[24]), gun related violence in the country is rare. Thus, the school shooting event could be perceived as an exogenous shook posing as a threat to the safety the state can provide to its citizens.

The data gathering for the survey experiment was conducted in 14 separate sessions within the period between the 27th of April and the 25th of May, 2023. Two sessions were conducted prior to the shooting event, on the 27th and 28th of April, respectively, while the first session after the shooting was conducted on the 9th of May, just 6 days after.

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[22] For details see for example: https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/ceenq96kzrzt (last visit 06. 07.2023.)
[23] BBC article https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-65469813; N1 article (in Serbian) https://n1info.rs/vesti/pucnjava-na-vracaru/ (last accessed 12. 09. 2023.)
[24] https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/ (last accessed 12. 09. 2023.)

Therefore, as the perceived threat to the system might have been enhanced as a result of these tragic events, in my analyses I account for the timing in which the individual sessions took place in relation to the school shooting. This is not only essential in order to control for the treatment effects but also because it offers an opportunity to test the effects of two situational factors known to affect system justifying beliefs – escapability and threat – concomitantly.

Thus, by implementing a survey experiment and taking the context into consideration, this research tests the following set of hypotheses:

H1: *Participants who learn about ETIAS will exhibit higher levels of state legitimacy in comparison to participants in the control group.*

H2: *Under treatment conditions, participants who have an initially lower propensity to system justify will be more likely to exhibit higher state legitimacy than participants who have an initially lower propensity to system justify.*

H3: *Under treatment conditions, participants who plan to emigrate to the EU will be more likely to exhibit higher state legitimacy than participants who do not plan to emigrate to the EU.*

Lastly, following previous work on the effects of system threat (Osborne et al. 2019; van der Toorn, Jost and Loffredo, 2017; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede, 2006), I also explore the effects of the school shooting on legitimacy and expect that the school shooting would have a positive effect on state legitimacy, created by heightened existential motivations for safety and security.

4) Survey Experiment

In order to empirically test the hypotheses, I rely on a survey experiment conducted on a purposive student sample in Serbia. As there are still no openly available secondary data sources which include measures of perceptions towards ETIAS travel authorisation, it was

necessary to collect original data within a research design fit for testing the stated hypotheses.

After developing the design of the experiment and the accompanying analysis plans, I considered running a power analysis for this and the experiments conducted for the third chapter of the dissertation. Yet, due to the novelty of the designs as well as a considerable lack of research dealing with the effects of inescapability (for exceptions see: Laurin et al. 2010; Proudfoot et al. 2015; Kay et al. 2009), and the use of the survey items tapping into state legitimacy, a power analysis would have included a considerable amount of guess work, both in terms of the expected effect size as well as the standard deviation.

For example, only one existing study (Laurin et al. 2010) could be, to some extent, connected to the research aims of this chapter as well as the aims of chapter 3, and could therefore be used as a reference point for the power analysis. As noted above, Laurin et al. (2010) examine the effects of inescapability in the context of emigration from Canada and rely on what the political science literature would consider small sample sizes. Laurin et al. (2010) run 3 separate studies in which they test their predictions using 22, 62 and 35 participants for experiments with 2, 4 and 2 treatment conditions, respectively. As they relied on mixed model analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to test their predictions and as they did not test the treatment effects on the views of state legitimacy, the usefulness of this research as guidance for the power analysis is severely limited. What this research can inform us is that the sample size for experiments conducted in the dissertation should be higher than 62, especially given the more complex analysis plan and different outcome variables. This is unfortunately not substantively relevant as a sample size of 62 participants in total would be regarded as low by any political science journal reviewer.

Additionally, the use of pilot studies for power analysis purposes proved to be challenging since the readiness of students to participate in the experiments in both Serbia (for the purposes of this chapter) and Ireland (for chapter 3) has been low. The pilot study for this chapter has been conducted on an online sample from MTruk (see below) but low-quality data from MTruk and the decision to switch to a student sample made using the data from the pilot study for power analysis inappropriate (due to a demographically different sample, low response rate and poor data quality). In regards to the experiments conducted

for chapter 3, time constrains and low student response rates limited the possibilities to conduct pilot testing for power analysis purposes.

Therefore, taking into consideration the relatively demanding analysis proposed in the pre-analysis plan, time and financial constraints, as well as difficulties in obtaining research participants, my strategy has been to increase the sample size as much as possible. The relatively low sample sizes usually employed in well cited system justification work (Laurin et al. 2010; Proudfoot et al. 2015; Kay et al. 2009) give some credence to the sample size in the experiments conducted here and in chapter 3. Yet, it is possible that the experiments might be underpowered.

The students were invited to take part in a survey called "The Perceptions of Mobility Among the Youth in Serbia". The title of the survey was designed so that it vaguely indicates the topic of the survey, without disclosing the actual content and intentions of the study. After providing informed consent, the participants in all conditions were asked to respond to the general system justification scale (Kay and Jost, 2003) at the start of the survey. This was followed by a set of questions about their attitudes towards the EU, and their ability and plans to travel and live abroad. Then, the participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions.

In two treatment conditions the participants first read about the main motivations behind "massive emigration" from Serbia - economic reasons (higher earnings abroad) and political reasons (high corruption and nepotism at home) in treatment 1 and 2 respectively (see Appendix 3.B). The two treatment arms stated the following:

> *"The Republic of Serbia is a country from which many people emigrate, usually to member states of the European Union. Many believe that most of the people who emigrated did it because of better economic conditions in the EU (treatment 1)/poor political conditions in Serbia, such as widespread corruption and nepotism (treatment 2)."*

Based on interviews conducted for chapter 1 and the literature review on the importance of output determinants of legitimacy, corruption and economic difficulties were regarded as two main determinants which could affect state legitimacy. Moreover, these two treatment conditions are based on two main voluntary migration motivations observed by the

migration literature (e.g. Gheasi and Nijkamp, 2017; Dimant et al. 2013; Cooray and Schneider, 2016). Therefore, the treatment arms were included in order to prime the respondents on the two most important output determinants of legitimacy, which could in turn affect the outcome variable as well as to prime the respondents to think about emigration in more realistic terms.

As system justification theory is agnostic on the potentially heterogenous effects of different legitimacy determinants/emigration motivations, I do not have separate/varying expectations and hypothesis for each treatment arm. Therefore, the inclusion of two treatment arms has been motivated primarily in order to connect this as well as chapter 3 with the interview results from chapter 1 and the legitimacy and migration literature more broadly.

The treated participants read about the future implementation of ETIAS starting from January 2024. This information has been presented in the following way:

"Starting with the first of January, 2024, the EU has decided to introduce a new travel regulation policy called ETIAS (European Travel Information and Authorisation System). It is believed that the introduction of ETIAS will limit the ability to travel for the citizens of Serbia, because having an ETIAS authorisation represents a new condition for entering into Schengen member countries (marked on the map below) for all citizens who hold a biometric passport of the Republic of Serbia.

From 2024, only Serbian nationals with a valid ETIAS travel authorisation can enter the territory of these European countries and stay not longer than 90 days within any 180-day period. This authorisation does not guarantee entry. When you arrive, a border guard will ask to see your passport and other documents and verify that you meet the entry conditions. ETIAS is being implemented as citizens of Serbia might be a threat to EU countries' national security, public health and/or a migratory risk.

When applying, you will be required to provide the following personal details: your name, date and place of birth, sex, nationality, home address, email address and phone number. Furthermore, you will be required to share your parent's names, your level of education and occupation, as well as the name of the country of destination and the address on which you will be located during your stay. Applicants need to pay a fee every time they apply. Some applicants may be asked to provide additional information or documentation or to participate in an interview with national authorities. This may prolong the procedure up to an additional 30 days. Upon being granted the authorisation to travel, access can still be denied by border patrol officers."

In order to avoid the possibility that the participants do not know which countries ETIAS applies to, both treatments were accompanied by a political map of Europe where the relevant countries were marked in blue. In the control condition, the participants read a text informing them about internal migration of students to and from their localities of origin during and after a typical study program. (for a complete text of conditions see Appendix 3.B). Thus, no deception has been used.[25]

After treatment administration, the respondents in the treated groups were asked whether they were familiar with ETIAS from before, to describe how they feel about the new ETIAS policy, using an open-ended question, and how they think ETIAS would affect their ability to 1) travel and 2) permanently emigrate abroad. These questions serve as manipulation checks. The answers for the latter two questions ranged from 1 indicating that ETIAS will "greatly ease short term travels/permanent emigration" to 5 indicating that ETIAS will make "short term travels/permanent emigration even harder". The participants in the control group were asked whether they are considering moving back to their localities of origin after completing their studies and why. The questions asked to the participants in the control group were not used in the analysis as they are irrelevant for the study and were administered in order to assure that the time taken to complete the survey across conditions is approximately the same.

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[25] Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at Trinity College Dublin.

After manipulation checks, the participants answered a set of questions tapping into state legitimacy: 3 questions tapping into their perception on the obligation to obey the law and 3 questions tapping into their perception on the obligation to obey particular state institutions: the police, courts, and tax authorities. This was followed by 4 questions in relation to their perceived confidence in the law, the police, courts and tax authorities. These items were adapted from the survey items developed by Tyler and Jackson (2014) in order to capture two main dimensions of state legitimacy: the perceived obligation to obey (legitimacy in a narrower sense) and trust and confidence in authorities. Moreover, as the interviews from the qualitative study conducted in chapter 1 suggest high level of conflation between the perceived trust in state institutions and the incumbents in office, I did not include standard trust questions due to the potential danger of their poor measurement validity. All items are measured on 1-7 Likert scale where 1 means "completely disagree" and 7 "completely agree". The list of all questions used for measuring state legitimacy are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Wording of the Main Outcome Variables Used to Measure State Legitimacy

State Legitimacy	Survey Item
Obligation to obey	
Law	People should obey the law even if the law goes against what they think is right
Law	It is hard to break the law and keep your self-respect
Law	Sometimes, doing the right thing means breaking the law (reverse coded)
Police	The police always have the right to make people respect the law.
Courts	The courts always have the right to make decisions that people must respect.
Tax authorities	People should pay the taxes in the way the revenue service determined it, even when people disagree with it
Confidence	
Law	Serbian laws do not protect my interest (reverse coded)
Police	I generally support how the police act in my

		community
	Courts	Judges put people in jail only if there is a good reason for it
	Tax authorities	The money collected through tax comes back to me through public goods

Finally, the participants were asked about their perceptions on the fairness and effectiveness of the police, courts, tax authorities, and current officeholders (the PM and the President) tapping into the two main antecedents of legitimacy observed in the literature. All items were measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7 with 1 meaning "completely disagree" and 7 "completely agree".

In order to control for pre-existing views towards the EU, the participants were asked about their perceptions of the EU through 7 items taken from the latest 2022 "Alternative Report on the Position and Needs of the Youth in Serbia" conducted by National Youth Council of Serbia, and their perceptions on the recent school shooting through 3 items (only in sessions conducted after the shooting event). Finally, the respondents were asked about a set of demographic questions (citizenship, age, gender, student status, residence, income (calculated from the reported monthly household income divided by the number of household members), self-placement on the ideological scale and whether or not they feel closer to a particular political party, and if yes, to indicate which one). Upon completion of the survey, the participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation (for a full list of items and exact wording see Appendix 4). For a table description of the experimental setup see Table 2.

Table 2: Setup of the Survey Experiment

	Treatment 1	Treatment 2	Control Condition
Migration Motivation	Economic Reasons	Political Reasons	NA
ETIAS Information	Yes	Yes	No

Ethical considerations

The ETIAS prompt was written without the use of deception. Yet, the prompt focuses on the potential negative aspects of the ETIAS introduction in an attempt to elicit stronger feelings of inescapability. For example, the wording of the prompt emphasized what *Serbian* citizens will face and did not mention the fact that ETIAS will apply for citizens of all visa-exempt countries. Moreover, the prompt did not mention the exact cost of the authorisation (7 euros) which might be perceived as a relatively low and was vague in terms of how often the citizens of Serbia will be required to apply (only once in a 3-year period).

As noted, the study received ethical approval from the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at Trinity College Dublin. Still, based on the responses to the open-ended question on the feelings towards the introduction of ETIAS, it seems that some of the respondents reacted strongly to the ETIAS prompt by exhibiting negative feelings such as discrimination (see discussion section below). Although such strong responses are beneficial for research purposes, they raise concerns in terms of the ethics of the study.

To address these concerns, all participants were fully debriefed at the end of the study about the exact procedure which an ETIAS travel authorisation application would involve. The debrief explicitly stated that "we have emphasized the negative aspects of ETIAS authorisation and have left out a few important details..." Further, I explicitly stated that "according to the website of the European Union, acquiring the authorisation will be a short, and in most of the cases automatic process." Although the participants were offered an opportunity to contact the researcher directly over email, not one participant reached out to me or any of the instructors involved in the administration of the survey.

Data and Procedure:

The data was collected with the help of instructors working at Serbian Universities in Belgrade, the country's capital and Niš, the country's third biggest city. The surveyed students come from 7 different faculties, studying political science, sociology, law, pharmacy, medicine, biology and geography, thus providing a varied purposive sample of

the Serbian student body. In all sessions, the survey experiment was conducted during class. The instructors were asked to read the information brochure to the students prior to the start of the experiment (see Appendix 3.A) and presented them a QR code leading them to the Qualtrics survey. Upon scanning the QR code, the participants were randomly assigned to one of the treatment conditions using the Qualtrics randomization feature. The survey experiment was conducted in Serbian.

In total, 14 sessions were conducted within the period between the 27th of April and the 25th of May 2023. As noted, two sessions were conducted prior to the shooting event (which took place on the 3rd of May), on the 27th and 28th of April, respectively, while the first session after the shooting was conducted on the 9th of May, only 6 days after.

Altogether 426 students took part in the survey, of which 328 (73%) fully completed the survey. From those who completed the survey, 6 failed the attention check and 14 of them reported to have non-Serbian or dual citizenship, where the second citizenship in all cases was Croatian. Due to the nature of the argument, these participants had to be excluded from the sample because ETIAS applies to Serbian citizens holding Serbian passports only. This resulted in a sample of 308 participants in total, roughly equally distributed across treatments (105 in treatment 1, 91 in treatment 2 and 112 in the control group). Across the full sample, 74% are female, with the mean age of 21.5 (SD=.11).

Balance diagnostics on a number of variables confirm that the randomisation procedure was successful as there were no statistically significant differences across treatments. The only exception is the system justification score for which a one-way ANOVA showed a statistically significant difference between the groups ($F_{(2, 305)} = 7.07$, $p<0.05$). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed a statistically significant difference between T1 and the control group (diff=0.30 $p<0.05$) and T2 and the Control group (diff=.42 $p<0.05$) suggesting a substantively slightly higher, but significant, average system justification score for participants assigned to T1 and T2 in comparison to the control group (for the full set balance diagnostics see Appendix 5).

Looking at the post-treatment dropout, 24 (20%), 26 (23%) and 14 (12%) participants in treatment 1 and 2, and the control condition, respectively, dropped out from the survey after the treatments were administered. A chi-square test indicated a significant difference

across the treatment conditions X^2 (2, N= 404) p = 0.014, confirming that the participants in the treated conditions were much more likely to drop out from the survey in comparison to the control group. Thus, this indicates a potential danger of attrition bias in the estimates. I account for this by repeating the main analyses on a subsample in which the sessions run before the shooting occurred (2 sessions with N=63 in total) were systematically (regardless of the assigned treatment condition) dropped. A chi-square test on this subsample indicates a non-significant difference in post-treatment attrition across the treatment conditions X^2 (2, N= 348) $p > 0.05$. The results from the repeated analyses on this subsample are substantially the same (results presented below).

Manipulation Checks

All manipulation checks suggest a successful treatment manipulation. On a scale from 1 indicating that ETIAS will "greatly ease short term travels/permanent emigration" to 5 indicating that ETIAS will make "short term travels/permanent emigration even harder", the participants in both treatments on average reported that ETIAS will make travelling (M= 3.90, SD=1.08) and permanent emigration (M= 4.11, SD=1.07) more difficult. This is further supported by evidence from the open-ended questions suggesting dissatisfaction and anger with the incoming ETIAS policy.[26] Finally, out of 196 participants in both treatments, only 24% of respondents (n=47) reported that they were familiar with the fact that the EU is planning on introducing the ETIAS authorisation. Although this is of lesser importance since the treatment conditions primed the participants to think about ETIAS, it is reassuring that for 76% of the respondents, ETIAS-related information was new.

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[26] Some examples of the responses from the open-ended questions include: "I am not happy with this information because it will greatly complicate the tourist trips and business interests of all citizens of the Republic of Serbia. And therefore bring us back to the time about 15 years ago, when we did not have the right to enter the EU countries, that is to create such an impression. And at the same time, those same countries come to us to use us as the cheapest labour force. They don't give us freedom, they exploit us" or "I believe that this is too much rigorous control with the aim of publicly "separating" the citizens of Serbia as citizens of a country that is not a member of the European Union, and I believe that this measure aims to indirectly show the position of countries that are not members of the EU, and perhaps in that way influence on their foreign policy (commitment regarding the war between Ukraine and Russia, for example)." All responses were translated from Serbian by the author.

5) Results

Prior to presenting the key findings, a few important notes should be made. Across treatment conditions, the students have varied attitudes towards the EU, with 25% of them reporting a negative, 50.65% reporting a neutral and 24.35% reporting a positive attitude. Their answers on the questions on their ability to travel to the EU suggests that roughly 16% of the respondents indicated that they almost never travel to the EU while the majority of the sample indicated that they travel once in a few or once a year (70%) or many times a year (14%). Finally, around 32% of the respondents indicated that they wish to emigrate from Serbia, out of which 85 % indicated that they would emigrate to one of the countries in the EU. Taken together, although the attitudes towards the EU vary, most of the respondents do travel to the EU and almost a third of them indicated that they wanted to emigrate to the countries in the EU, suggesting that the new travel authorisation policy should matter for most of the participants, especially in terms of their perceived travelling and emigration opportunities in the future.

The Cronbach's alpha for the system justification score composed of 8 items (Kay and Jost, 2003) is α=.74 and for the index composed of 7 items on the attitudes towards the EU is α=.91 suggesting high internal consistency for both indices. The mean system justification score across samples is 2.55 (SD=0.84) and the mean score for the self-placement on liberal-conservative scale (1 to 7 Likert with 1 being very liberal and 7 very conservative) is 2.28 (SD=.99), suggesting that the participants in the sample do not, on average, exhibit system justifying attitudes and are more liberal. Such a low system justification score (or "system derogation" Szabo and Lonnqvist, 2021) is in line with the observations from studies conducted in other non-Western contexts on non-student samples, particularly in the cases of post-communist and/or eastern European contexts (Agadulina et al. 2021; Szabo and Lonnqvist, 202; Lonnqvist, Szabo and Kelemen, 2021; Friesen et al. 2019 for overview). Moreover, in comparison to the average score of system justification of 3.53 (SD=1.78) from the Irish student sample obtained in the experiments conducted in chapter 3, these results suggest that students in Serbia seem to be less likely to support the status quo in comparison to their Irish counterparts. Lastly, most of the participants expressed that they did not feel close to any political party (71%) and when they did, they always indicated a political party in opposition. Lastly, roughly 17% of

respondents refused to answer the income question. As a result, I do not control for income in the models in order not to lose additional observations.

Descriptive statistics for all outcome variables are presented in Table 3. Looking at the legitimacy scores in the control condition, the results would suggest that on average, Serbian students do perceive the law and state institutions as moderately legitimate. In most of the cases, the items taping into the obligation to obey are on average above the scale midpoint of 3.5 with the only exception being the obligation to obey the police scoring 2.98 (SD=1.74). The items taping into the confidence towards various institutions tell a different story by indicating that participants do not have the confidence in state institutions, as the scores of confidence variables are below the scale midpoint. Finally, the perceptions of just and efficient officeholders received the lowest scores (M=1.80, SD=1.30 and M=2.23, SD=1.48 respectively). These descriptive statistics suggest that participants do differentiate between the perceptions of obligation to obey and having confidence in state institutions as well as between questions regarding state institutions and key officeholders. This is an important finding in and of itself as it indicates that these items are able to capture the multidimensional nature of state legitimacy even in electoral autocracies such as Serbia.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on Key Outcome Variables

| | Means and Standard Deviations Across Treatment Conditions | | | |
	Treatment 1	Treatment 2	Control Group	Total
Leg. Law (1)	4.77	4.57	4.22	4.51
	(1.63)	(1.73)	(1.91)	(1.78)
Leg. Law (2)	4.03	3.76	3.71	3.83
	(1.66)	(1.70)	(1.91)	(1.76)
Leg. Law (3)	3.31	3.25	2.83	3.12
	(1.59)	(1.56)	(1.54)	(1.57)
Leg. Police	3.55	3.66	2.98	3.38
	(1.79)	(1.71)	(1.74)	(1.77)
Leg. Courts	4.70	4.42	4.49	4.54
	(1.67)	(1.55)	(1.69)	(1.64)
Leg. Tax	5.11	4.80	4.32	4.73
	(1.76)	(1.65)	(1.84)	(1.78)

Conf. Law	3.31	3.41	3.46	3.40
	(1.39)	(1.50)	(1.62)	(1.50)
Conf. Police	2.76	2.85	2.54	2.71
	(1.66)	(1.74)	(1.62)	(1.67)
Conf. Courts	3.94	3.51	3.33	3.59
	(1.70)	(1.68)	(1.73)	(1.72)
Conf. Tax	2.71	2.44	2.37	2.51
	(1.51)	(1.53)	(1.52)	(1.52)
Office Holders Just	2.13	2.40	1.80	2.09
	(1.42)	(1.53)	(1.30)	(1.43)
Office Holders Efficient	2.50	2.65	2.23	2.45
	(1.51)	(1.70)	(1.48)	(1.56)

Looking at averages across treatment groups, for all variables except the legitimacy of the courts and confidence in the law, the means are higher in the treatment conditions in comparison to the control group. Secondly, the mean tends to be higher in T1 in comparison to T2 in 7 out of 12 outcome variables. These descriptive statistics provide initial evidence which are overall in support for the main hypothesis so I test them more rigorously in the next section. Lastly, Cronbach's alpha for the three items measuring the legitimacy of the law is α=.51 indicating very poor internal consistency. Thus, I treat them separately and focus on the first item which was used in previous research (Tyler and Jackson, 2014).

Main Results

I ran a series of OLS regressions where I examine the effects of treatments while controlling for individual-level variables, and perceptions of the fairness and effectiveness of state institutions. These controls were included in order to potentially "improve the precision of the estimates" of treatment effects (Athey and Imbens, 2017 p. 97). Individual level controls include age, gender, type of the locality of origin, system justification score, self-placement on an ideological scale, student status, their attitude towards the EU and a dummy indicating whether they took the survey before or after the shooting event.

Age, gender, and self-placement on the ideological scale were included as they were shown to affect system justification tendencies from previous literature. For example, women are much less likely to system justify in comparison to men (e.g., Feygina et al. 2010; Jost and Kay, 2005; Goldsmith et al. 2013), older people are more likely to system justify than younger cohorts (e.g., Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018), while conservatives are generally more likely to system justify in comparison to liberals (e.g., der Toorn et al. 2014). System justification score has been included as it was shown that treatment randomization was unsuccessful (Athey and Imbens, 2017). The inclusion of locality size, student status and attitudes towards the EU stem from the particularities of the Serbian case as well as the interview results presented in chapter 1. As suggested in chapter 1 of the dissertation, it might be the case that those who live in smaller localities are more familiar with the appointed civil servants in comparison to those who live in larger localities, and would, in turn, respond to the questions of state legitimacy in a diverse way. Students who are financed by the state budget might feel more responsible to legitimize the state institutions, as they are more likely to feel dependent on the state in comparison to those who finance their education "out-of-pocket" (Friesen et al., 2019; Kay and Zanna, 2009). Finally, attitudes towards the EU might affect the perception of the inclusion of ETIAS as well as attitudes towards the state institutions as self-positioning on questions of EU support in the Serbian context also might indicate a preference for more liberal (favourable towards the EU) or more conservative (unfavourable towards the EU) policies (see Čavoški, 2013).

The controls for antecedents of legitimacy include their perception on the fairness and effectiveness of the police, courts, tax authorities and officeholders where I include them depending on the outcome variable (i.e., I control for the perception of fairness and effectiveness of the police only when I test the treatment effects on the legitimacy of the police and include fairness and effectiveness of officeholders in all models). Fairness and effectiveness are examined as the state legitimacy literature and the interview findings suggest that these are one of the most important antecedents of legitimacy. In all models, I include session fixed effects in order to control for the unobserved time-invariant characteristics at the session level (faculty-related characteristics for example) and cluster the standard errors at the session level (Abadie et al. 2019). The control group is the

reference category for the treatment variable. The main results from different model specifications are presented in Figure 1.[27]

The results from the fully specified models (marked with a full circle and coloured in brown) suggest an overall positive effect of treatment 1 - where the participants read about ETIAS and are informed that most Serbians emigrate for economic reasons - across most of the outcome variables. The effect is statistically significant at $p<0.05$ for the legitimacy of the law and the tax authority ($p<0.01$). Secondly, the effects of treatment 2 - where participants read about ETIAS and are informed that most Serbians emigrate due to high corruption and nepotism at home - are positive for all outcome variables except for the legitimacy of the courts, and confidence in the law, police and the tax authorities. Yet, none of the effects reached statistical significance at $p<0.05$. Table 4 presents the treatment effects in the fully specified models including individual-level and controls related to the antecedents of legitimacy. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is partially supported.

Figure 1: Main Regression Results

[27] To conserve space, all results presented in a figure format are presented in a tabulated format with the depiction of all control variables in Appendix 6.

Note: Results depict the effects of treatments with the control group as the reference category. The regression output in a table format can be found in Appendix 6, from Tables 1 to 8, models 1 to 4. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Table 4: OLS regression results of full models

	(1) Leg. Law	(2) Leg. Police	(3) Leg. Courts	(4) Leg. Tax	(5) Conf. Law	(6) Conf. Police	(7) Conf. Courts	(8) Conf. Tax
T1	0.385*	0.242	0.0731	0.637**	-0.339	-0.146	0.348	0.125
	(0.166)	(0.245)	(0.206)	(0.184)	(0.193)	(0.184)	(0.169)	(0.211)
T2	0.224	0.400	-0.0891	0.526	-0.329	-0.132	-0.00534	-0.138
	(0.205)	(0.225)	(0.235)	(0.253)	(0.234)	(0.216)	(0.224)	(0.225)
Observations	307	307	307	307	307	307	307	307
R-squared	0.197	0.236	0.205	0.258	0.245	0.517	0.406	0.346

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition. All models include individual-level controls and controls related to antecedents of legitimacy, session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level. For the full table with depicted effects of control variables see tables 1 to 8 in Appendix 6.

I move on to test H2 and H3 by interacting the treatment variable with system justification score and with the variable indicating emigration plans, coded as a dummy where 0 indicates no emigration plans and 1 indicates emigration plans. All models include session fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the session level. None of the interactions are statistically significant thus indicating no support for H2 and H3. See Tables 5 and 6, respectively.

Table 5: Interaction effects of treatment and system justification score on legitimacy and confidence

	(1) Leg. Law	(2) Leg. Police	(3) Leg. Courts	(4) Leg. Tax	(5) Conf. Law	(6) Conf. Police	(7) Conf. Courts	(8) Conf. Tax
T1	0.971	-0.0159	-0.244	0.502	0.0429	-0.721	1.112	0.337
	(0.657)	(0.973)	(0.554)	(0.987)	(0.509)	(0.873)	(0.652)	(0.600)
T2	-0.0858	0.279	-1.228	0.641	-0.210	-0.874	-0.451	0.0600
	(0.765)	(1.051)	(0.848)	(0.835)	(0.737)	(0.676)	(0.743)	(0.764)
SJ Score	0.529*	0.346	0.161	0.268	0.674**	0.715*	0.841**	0.728***

	(0.189)	(0.283)	(0.215)	(0.237)	(0.204)	(0.248)	(0.224)	(0.132)
T1 x SJ score	-0.213	0.176	0.141	0.0813	-0.138	0.308	-0.274	-0.0600
	(0.241)	(0.363)	(0.187)	(0.348)	(0.189)	(0.317)	(0.235)	(0.215)
T2 x SJ score	0.0708	0.0660	0.395	-0.0753	-0.0344	0.307	0.0903	-0.0787
	(0.250)	(0.404)	(0.317)	(0.317)	(0.290)	(0.277)	(0.283)	(0.269)
Constant	2.839***	2.546**	4.258***	4.445***	1.797***	0.659	1.225*	0.202
	(0.495)	(0.686)	(0.518)	(0.624)	(0.488)	(0.622)	(0.524)	(0.320)
Observations	307	307	307	307	307	307	307	307
R-squared	0.150	0.106	0.129	0.100	0.207	0.269	0.240	0.170

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition. All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Table 6: Interaction effects of treatment and emigration plans on legitimacy and confidence

	(1) Leg. Law	(2) Leg. Police	(3) Leg. Courts	(4) Leg. Tax	(5) Conf. Law	(6) Conf. Police	(7) Conf. Courts	(8) Conf. Tax
T1	0.389	0.624	0.0345	0.613	-0.135	0.222	0.499	0.272
	(0.226)	(0.297)	(0.217)	(0.321)	(0.152)	(0.267)	(0.265)	(0.281)
T2	0.356	0.578	-0.122	0.430	-0.0853	0.0906	0.191	0.130
	(0.265)	(0.340)	(0.288)	(0.280)	(0.131)	(0.278)	(0.322)	(0.286)
Emig. Plan	-0.145	0.183	-0.0916	-0.0419	-0.359	-0.544	-0.333	-0.109
	(0.402)	(0.403)	(0.265)	(0.268)	(0.299)	(0.272)	(0.289)	(0.243)
T1 x Emig. Plan	0.489	-0.245	0.384	0.561	-0.155	-0.0675	0.251	0.283
	(0.290)	(0.566)	(0.378)	(0.494)	(0.415)	(0.377)	(0.378)	(0.308)
T2 x Emig. Plan	-0.272	0.166	0.0973	0.411	-0.0700	0.229	-0.514	-0.114
	(0.656)	(0.798)	(0.437)	(0.371)	(0.355)	(0.491)	(0.477)	(0.368)
Constant	4.182***	3.299***	4.755***	5.151***	3.495***	2.575***	3.345***	1.974***
	(0.182)	(0.252)	(0.144)	(0.224)	(0.106)	(0.163)	(0.169)	(0.218)
Observations	307	307	307	307	307	307	307	307

| R-squared | 0.107 | 0.071 | 0.098 | 0.092 | 0.116 | 0.090 | 0.121 | 0.046 |

I move to robustness checks of the main treatment effect by examining 1) the main effects on a subsample of participants who took the survey after the school shooting took place, 2) treatment effects on the support for the EU and 3) on the perceptions of fairness and effectiveness of officeholders.

Robustness checks

Subsetting for participants after shooting

There are two main reasons for testing the treatment effects on a subsample of participants who took the survey after the shooting event took place. Firstly, the analysis of the post-treatment dropout rate suggested that the participants in the treated conditions were much more likely to drop out from the survey in comparison to the participants in the control condition, thus potentially causing the estimates to be biased. As noted, in order to correct for this, I systematically excluded all participants from sessions 1 and 2 - conducted prior to the shooting event. This implies a moderate drop (n=63) in observations, but allows me to produce more reliable results.

Secondly, as the previous literature on system justification suggests that threat and criticism act as situational factors which can enhance system justifying motives (Milojev et al. 2015; Ulrich and Cohrs, 2007; Vainio et al. 2014), it might be the case that the participants who took the survey after the shooting are driving higher support for state institutions as they perceived the shooting to be a significant threat to their safety. In fact, I show that this is indeed the case for the legitimacy of the law, and confidence in the law, police and tax authority although the shooting also has a negative effect on the legitimacy of the tax authority (see Figure 5 below). Thus, I repeat the main set of analyses on a subsample of participants who took the survey after the shooting event. All models are identical to the models presented in Figure 1 with one additional individual-level control - their agreement with the following statement: "I am worried about my safety when I am at

the University (7-point Likert scale from 1 being "completely disagree" and 7 "completely agree"). The results are presented in Figure 2.

The statistically significant effect of treatment 1 remained for the effects on the legitimacy of the law and the tax authority. Moreover, the effects on the confidence in the police turned negative upon inclusion of controls, although the effect did not reach statistical significance. Secondly, the effects of treatment 2 remained statistically insignificant across models for all outcome variables, except for the effects on the legitimacy of the tax authority which is now positive and significant at p=0.04. Overall, the results are substantially the same.

Figure 2: Main effects on a subsample of students who took the survey after the shooting

Note: Results depict the effects of treatments with the control group as the reference category. The regression output in a table format can be found in Appendix 6, from Tables 1 to 8, models 5 to 8. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Support for EU institutions

Next to the number of legitimacy and confidence related outcomes in relation to a set of state institutions, the participants in the survey also answered a set of items tapping into their perceptions of the EU. Altogether, the participants responded to 7 items on a 7-point Likert scale, including, among others: "I support Serbia entering the EU", "The EU is a guarantor of peace and stability for Serbia", "By joining the EU, we will lose national identity" (for a full list of questions see Appendix 4). I construct the "EU views index" based on these 7 items (α=.91). These questions have been introduced since testing the treatment effects on the views towards the EU in the context of this chapter serves as a placebo test. As the participants of the experiment are living in Serbia, according to system justification theory, there is no reason to expect any treatment effects on the views towards the EU. In other words, the null treatment effect would be further indirect evidence that the system justification is truly motivated (Jost et al., 2010). In order to test this, I run a series of OLS regressions examining the treatment effects on views towards the EU (for the wording EU-related questions see Appendix 4.C). In all models, I control for the attitude towards the EU collected prior to treatment deployment, self-placement on the ideological scale, system justification score and a dummy indicating whether the response has been collected prior or after the school shooting. All models have session fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the session level. The main results are presented in Figure 3.[28]

Across all outcome variables, the effects of treatments on the views towards the EU are statistically insignificant. Unsurprisingly, having a negative attitude towards the EU has a negative and significant effect on pro-EU statements and a positive effect on anti-EU statements. Similar results are observed for being conservative, although the effect size is considerably smaller.

The effects of the system justification score are largely non-significant, except for the weak positive and significant effects on the variables tapping into the perceptions that the

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[28] These findings are also arguably substantively important as they examine the effects of EU policies on the perceptions of the EU by members of a country which is officially a candidate member state. Therefore, these results might be important to the EU policymakers as Serbia represents one of the countries in which the EU has significant interest.

"EU is gradually deteriorating" and that "By entering the EU, the standard of living in Serbia would be much better". Finally, the timing of the survey in relation to the shooting event has no effect on the EU perceptions. Taken together, these results further reinforce my findings by showing that the treatment effects, as well as the effects of shooting are only observed in relation to the perceptions of the legitimacy and confidence towards the institutions at home.

Figure 3: Treatment effects on the views towards the EU

Note: Results depict the effects of treatments with the control group as the reference category. The regression output in a table format can be found in Appendix 6, table 9. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Support for Officeholders

By examining the treatment effects on the perception of fairness and efficiency of the officeholders, this analysis informs the ongoing discussion on "whether an autonomous system-based motive is necessary to explain instances of system justification" (Owuamalam et al. 2019a p. 393) between the proponents of system justification theory (Jost et al. 2019a; Jost et al. 2019b; Jost et al. 2023) and the proponents of social identity

model of system attitudes (SIMSA) (Owuamalam et al., 2019a; Owuamalam et al., 2019b; Rubin et al., 2023a; Rubin et al. 2023b). According to SIMSA, system-based motive is not necessary to explain system justification and offers three alternative explanations based on group-based motives: the social reality explanation, the ingroup bias explanation and the hope for future ingroup status explanation (for details on all three see Owuamalam et al. 2019a).

According to the ingroup bias explanation, people sometimes "conceive the 'system' as an ingroup (Owuamalam et al. 2019a p. 401) and would, as a result, identify with a superordinate group which subsumes the lower and higher status groups into one (Owuamalam et al. 2019a p. 401). When for example "lower class people identify with, and show bias towards, their nation, they may also show an ingroup bias in favour of their nation's intergroup hierarchy, resulting in an aversion to economic distribution" (Owuamalam et al. 2019a p. 401).

Szabo and Lonnqvist (2021) and Lonnqvist et al. (2021), do not find evidence in support for the ingroup bias explanation by showing that Fidesz supporters in Hungary exhibit higher levels of system justification in comparison to the more opposition-minded part of the electorate. In other words, if system justification is based exclusively on "group-based motives", as SIMSA would argue, those in opposition would also exhibit system justifying attitudes towards current officeholders. The results presented by Szabo and Lonnqvist (2021) and Lonnqvist et al. (2021) are of particular importance as in the contexts of electoral autocracies/competitive authoritarian regimes such as Hungary and Serbia, officeholders are understood to "capture" the state institutions and thus pose as the "face" of the state.

Against this backdrop, the sample characteristics of this study are leveraged to examine the ingroup bias explanation of system justification motives vis-a-vis an autonomous system justification motive. Most of the participants (just under 86%) reported that they do not feel close to any particular party and that none of the respondents reported feeling closer to the current party in power - Serbian Progressive Party. Following the logic of the ingroup bias explanation, even such an opposition minded sample of respondents should report system-justifying attitudes when faced with a lack of the possibility to escape. On the other hand, a system justification explanation would expect no effects as the officeholders do not

(and *should not!*) "capture" the institutions. Therefore, by examining the treatment effects on the perceptions of fairness and effectiveness of public officials, the results can help provide further support that the observed effects can in fact be explained through system-based motives.

I examine this by running a set of OLS regressions with the perception of fairness and efficiency of officeholders as the two main outcome variables. In the survey, the participants were asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the statements that the "Current president Aleksandar Vučić and the prime minister Ana Brnabić make their political decisions 1) transparently and in accordance with the law and 2) efficiently, which means that the decisions come into power quickly and without the unnecessary spending of public resources". In all models, I include session fixed effects and cluster the standard errors on the session level. The main results are presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Treatment effects on perceptions of fairness and efficiency of officeholders

Note: Results depict the effects of treatments with the control group as the reference category. The regression output in a table format can be found in Appendix 6, from table 10. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Across all models, the effects of treatment 1 is nonsignificant at $p<0.05$ for both outcome variables. The effects of treatment 2 are positive and significant at $p<0.01$ for both the effects on perceptions of fairness and efficiency when only the treatment variable is included in the model. Yet, with the inclusion of individual-level controls (age, gender, type of location of origin, self-placement on a left-right ideological scale, student status, attitudes towards the EU and a dummy indicating the timing of the survey in relation to the school shooting) the effect loses its significance and the coefficient drops from .52 to .22 and from .42 to .13 for fairness and efficiency, respectively. Upon further inspection, the inclusion of the system justification score as a control for the effects on fairness and system justification score and the left-right self-placement as controls for the effects on efficiency is responsible for the loss of significance (see the green line in Figure 4 for the treatment effects after omitting the system justification score and the left-right self-placement). Thus, the results show no support for the ingroup bias explanation proposed by SIMSA and lend further evidence that the observed treatment effects on state legitimacy items might indeed be explained through system-based motivation.

Yet, these results should be taken with caution as the questions are tapping into what the literature usually considers as antecedents of legitimacy. Moreover, the results serve only as initial evidence as none of the participants in the survey reported that they are supporters of the Serbian Progressive Party - the party in office, therefore not allowing a comparative assessment. Thus, due to the characteristics of the sample, there is no way of showing whether the treatment effects would differ for those who support the current political party in office.

6) Discussion

Overall, the results from the main analysis provide support for hypothesis 1 but only for the willingness to obey the law and the tax authority, and provide no support for hypotheses 2 and 3 examining heterogenous treatment effects depending on the initial propensity to system justify and intention to emigrate abroad, respectively. Moreover, the observed treatment effects remain significant only when participants are exposed to the

treatment suggesting that most of the emigration from Serbia has been motivated by better economic conditions abroad.

After a closer inspection of the open-ended responses to the question on participants' feelings towards the introduction of ETIAS, it might be the case that the observed treatment effects are an outcome of an increased feeling of discrimination, rather than the manipulation of the perceptions of inescapability. Some of the respondents indicated that they feel that ETIAS is "humiliating", "belittling" or "disrespectful". As the primary goal of this research has been to address the potential system justifying effects of a real and incoming policy, constructing a treatment in which I outlined the complexity of what this policy will bring outweighs the utility of creating a more clear-cut treatment able to manipulate the feelings of escapability only (this is done in chapter 3). Still, as the results from manipulation checks showed that participants do feel that the introduction of ETIAS will make it harder to travel and permanently emigrate abroad, the observed effects, at worst, might be a conjoint result of both the feeling of escapability and perceived discrimination.

Moreover, in countries afflicted with corruption and patron-client relationships, citizens might report a high level of state legitimacy out of rational and self-interested motivations. In the context of high levels of corruption citizens can express public support in return for promised goods and services or out of fear from losing certain "privileges" (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Chang and Kerr, 2017). Due to the characteristics of my sample, this explanation is unlikely as the sample is to a great extent opposition-minded (or at least "neutral"), thus making the findings of this research all the more convincing. Moreover, it has been clearly stated that the surveys are anonymous and conducted for academic purposes.

As noted, statistically significant positive treatment effects were observed only for willingness to obey the law and the tax authority, although the statistically insignificant effects of treatments across the 4 dependent variables tapping into obligation to obey were mainly positive, even after the introduction of a number of controls (see Figure 2). One obvious reason for such findings is the lack of statistical power lost by a relatively high dropout rate. Alternatively, the wording of questions tapping into the legitimacy of the law and the tax authority might be understood to capture a more general attitude towards the

obligation to obey, as these measurement items do not directly ask the participants to think about specific state institutions (such as the case for the legitimacy of the law) or ask about state institutions they are not regularly exposed to (such as the case for the legitimacy of the tax authority). Moreover, the police and the courts are often perceived as institutions which are more directly related to the corrupt elite and thus represent a harder test for system justification (e.g., Petrović, 2023). Yet, this interpretation of the findings is only tentative and requires further research.

Figure 5: Main results with depiction of the effects of shooting

Note: Results depict the effects of treatments with the control group as the reference category. The regression output in a table format can be found in Appendix 6, from Tables 1 to 8, models 1 to 4. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

The lack of the statistically significant effects on the dependent variables taping into the confidence in the institutions is another important null finding. As the legitimacy literature suggests that questions on trust and confidence in state institutions implies *active* justification of their positions in society, such as voluntary cooperation and community engagement (Tyler and Jackson, 2014 p. 90), it might be the case that the observed null effects on confidence measures indicates the limitations of system justification processes.

In other words, when the situation is perceived as inescapable, people might be more likely to passively tolerate unjust and/or inefficient institutions (through increased willingness to obey) but not more likely to actively support it (through expressing higher confidence). This reasoning would be in line with the findings of chapter 3 in which it will be showed that system justifying attitudes do not always translate into system justifying behaviour.

It is important to discuss why statistically significant effects were primarily observed for treatment 1, in which the participants read that the main motivations behind "massive emigration" from Serbia was due to "higher earnings abroad" while no effects were found for treatment 2 where "massive emigration" has been caused by "high corruption and nepotism at home". A possible explanation of such effects might be that the arguably more immediate need for economic security is simply more relevant than the fact that Serbian public officials engage in nepotism and other corrupt practices. A migration caused by economic incentives might have activated system justification processes as the lack of economic security taps into the existential needs.

Regardless of the possible but speculative explanations of the findings, the observed effects remained even after controlling for the school shooting event. In Figure 5, I replicate the findings of the full models presented in Figure 1 by also presenting the effects of taking the survey after the shooting event occurred. Figure 5 demonstrates that shooting has a positive and statistically significant effect on the willingness to obey the law and have confidence in the law, police and the tax authority. Moreover, the school shooting has a strong statistically significant and negative effect on the willingness to obey the tax authority. Although further research is needed to understand the effects of shooting, these results demonstrate that the effects of perceived escapability caused by the restrictive and incoming change of travel regulations remains a relevant situational factor capable of inducing system justification processes, even after controlling for the time in relation to the school shooting in which the survey took place.

Finally, the null findings in terms of the heterogenous effects of the initial score on system justification and emigration motivation might have been observed due to the lack of variation in the data. As noted above, the relatively low system justification score across samples of 2.55 (SD=0.84) suggest that, on average, students from the sample exhibited "system derogation" (Szabo and Lonnqvist, 2021). In other words, it might be the case that

the null findings in terms of the heterogenous effects of restrictive travel policies depending on the initial score of system justification were observed as there were simply not enough high system justifiers. Similarly, since 32% of the sample respondents exhibited emigration plans, the null results could be explained with low statistical power.

7) Conclusion

This chapter examined the effects of a restrictive travel policy on citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy towards their country of origin. Drawing on system justification theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994), I argued that the examined restrictive travel policy - the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) - will increase the feeling of inescapability, and in turn, have a positive effect on state legitimacy evaluations among citizens in Serbia. Moreover, I argued that this effect will be stronger for those with an initially lower system justification score and for those who plan to emigrate abroad. By conducting a survey experiment on a sample of students in Serbia (N=308), I show that being primed about the introduction of ETIAS positively affects the perceptions to obey the law and the tax authority, but only under the economic treatment condition, and find no support for heterogenous treatment effects depending on initial system justification score and the willingness to emigrate abroad. The main results were further supported by showing that the effects remained even after controlling for a school shooting (the first in Serbian history) – which occurred during the data gathering stages of the research. Moreover, ETIAS authorisation did not affect perceptions towards the EU - a finding showing that system justification is truly motivated (Jost et al., 2010). Thus, this chapter contributes to the overall thesis by showing that real-life restrictive travel policies might increase perceived levels of state legitimacy among citizens living in electoral autocracies.

This research suffers from a number of limitations. Most importantly, given the complex and pre-existing relationship between Serbia and the EU, and the resulting polarized views Serbian citizens have towards the EU and the integration process (Spasojević, 2023), it might be the case that the observed effects could partially be explained by the pre-existing views towards the EU. Although manipulation checks indicate that ETIAS did in fact affect feelings of inescapability, while EU-related controls included in the models account for some of this variation, the observed effects could still be an outcome of factors other

than feelings of inescapability. In order to address such alternative explanations, chapter 3 tests the effects of visa regimes in an artificial, lab-based environment free of such pre-existing factors often observed in the real world.

The main limitation of this chapter in terms of the characteristics of the obtained original data, is that the results rely on a purposive sample of students. Although the student sample is diverse, the results from this chapter cannot be generalized to the population of Serbia as a whole or to citizens living in other electoral autocracies. Yet, relying on the student sample also comes with a number of benefits. Since the students in the sample seem to be mostly neutral and "opposition-minded" in terms of their political party support, the observed increase in reported state legitimacy as an outcome of restrictive travel policies is unlikely to have occurred as an outcome of individualistic incentives based on fear or expected personal gain (von Handelwang, 2017). Moreover, it allowed this chapter to evaluate the implications of SJT in light of the recent SIMSA critique (e.g., Owuamalam et al., 2019a).

The analysis of the post-treatment survey dropout rate of 27% suggested that the participants in the treated groups were much more likely to dropout in comparison to the control group, indicating potential danger from post-treatment dropout bias. Yet, the replicated results based on a subsample of respondents who took the survey after the shooting (in which the post-treatment dropout difference is insignificant) address this issue. Moreover, this research did not control for income as most of the respondents were unwilling to report it. Yet, with the inclusion of variables such as the ability to travel in the models as controls, not accounting for income is partially accounted for as the ability to travel partially relies on individual financial situation. Lastly, with 74% of the sample being female, the obtained results seem reassuring, since the existing SJT literature suggests that women are much less likely to system justify in comparison to men (e.g., Feygina et al. 2010; Jost and Kay, 2005; Goldsmith et al. 2013). Nevertheless, future research should further account for possible gender differences.

In regards to future research, this chapter suggests a new line of system justification research which will not only focus on expanding the geographical scope of testing but also consider (and make its central point of interest!) politically diverse contexts, such as autocratic or hybrid regimes. Moreover, future research could also look at the effects of

system justification processes on a set of outcomes specific to autocratic or autocratizing regimes, such as support for populist and/or antidemocratic policies or radical political parties from both sides of the aisle. By doing so, system justification theory could offer fresh answer to important questions troubling the mainstream political science literature.

In terms of the policy relevance of this research, the results suggest that the views towards the EU are not affected by the ETIAS information exposure. Thus, restrictive and unfavourable foreign country travel policies could be implemented without necessarily producing a backlash effect towards the foreign actor implementing this policy. Secondly, for the governments of the countries of origin, better perceptions of state legitimacy imply more stability as well as easier and less costly governing (Levi et al. 2009) as it reduces the willingness of citizens to demand change (Booth and Seligson, 2005; Thyen and Gerschewski, 2018). Although a stable political system is advantageous and normatively desirable, it is questionable how this can be beneficial for those citizens living in countries with poor service delivery and corruption – which are often and unsurprisingly the biggest net-emigration countries in which the individual motivation for emigration is high. At the individual level, although the palliative effects of system justification might be useful and prominent in such countries, in the long run, the psychological and emotional suffering from the feeling of "being stuck" might have negative implications for individual's mental and physical health (Jost and Hunyady, 2002; see also Osborne et al. 2019 p. 344-345).

Chapter 3

Nowhere to go, nowhere else to pay:

The effects of visa policies on citizens' willingness to pay the taxes

1. Introduction

In order to address the potential research design drawbacks from chapter 2, this chapter aims to examine the effects of restrictive travel policies on state legitimacy in a fully lab-based, experimental context. [29] Due to potential issues of endogeneity of foreign travel policies to the institutional quality "at home" and the possibility that the pre-existing perceptions towards the EU among the surveyed Serbian students might have blurred the inescapability effects of ETIAS, this chapter relies on experimentally randomized visa decisions embedded in an original extension of the tax evasion game (Friedland et al. 1978) in order to account for these issues. Moreover, this chapter provides a more stringent test of the theory as it is relying on behavioural measures of state legitimacy – tax compliance – as the main outcome variable. Overall, by relying on the system justification framework (Jost and Banaji, 1994) this chapter contributes to the existing literature on state legitimacy by *experimentally* investigating the micro-level foundations of the possible effects of visa decisions implemented by foreign countries on the level of state legitimacy "at home".

Thus, this chapter complements chapter 2 in several distinct ways. Instead of looking at attitudinal measures of state legitimacy, it investigates legitimizing behaviour – tax evasion – often understood in existing legitimacy literature to capture the behavioural aspect of willing obedience (Levi et al. 2009). It examines the effects of visa decisions in a lab-based artificial context in comparison to the more general real-world policy examined in chapter 2. Since visa decisions in this chapter are randomized experimentally, the potential issues of travel policies being endogenous to the "home country" context are accounted for. Moreover, the experimental setting allows for a "pure" testing of the effects of travel policies since participants in the experiment do not have pre-existing perceptions towards artificially created states from the lab. Finally, this chapter relies on a sample of

Irish university students, in comparison to the sample of Serbian students collected for chapter 2. While it would have been ideal for the experiments undertaken in this chapter to have been conducted in Serbia, therefore providing consistency with the preceding empirical chapters, ethical and financial constrains rendered it unfeasible. Due to Trinity's strict ethical policy on participation reimbursement, it was not possible to conduct a study outside of Ireland in a timely and cost-efficient manner.

Yet, it might be argued that the link between this and prior two empirical chapters is unclear as the hypothetical scenario within the experiments in this chapter only vaguely mimics the conditions in electoral autocracies. In order to further clarify this link it is important to note that the decision to run a tax-evasion experiment has been made taking into consideration the importance of examining the effects of restrictive travel policies on behavioural outcomes of state legitimacy and due to the lack of available secondary data.

As noted, the primary aim of this chapter is to examine the same general hypothesis of the effects of restrictive travel policies on state legitimacy while using actual behaviour as the main outcome variable. After a thorough literature review, focusing on behaviour has been deemed as important as system justification literature generally lacks behavioural outcome measures (for an exception see study 2 in Jost et al. 2002) Therefore, the focus on behaviour in a politically-relevant context was regarded as an important gap in the literature worth filling.

Tax evasion has been regarded as one of the best behavioural measures of state legitimacy. Other potential behavioural measures included voting behaviour, use of violence in civil protests and voter turnout (Gilley, 2006a) but were regarded as distant proxies, too far away from the concept of state legitimacy. As actual data on tax behaviour is very hard to come by, especially given the interest in traveling policies which are rarely changing (Czaika et al. 2018), finding suitable and existing secondary data source on tax evasion fit for a natural experiment proved to be very hard and ultimately unsuccessful.

Similarly, during the research design stage in earlier stages of the dissertation (when the importance of behavioural measure was still not established) I explored the options for the use of secondary data which use attitudinal measures of legitimacy in the context of travel policy change. Theoretical limitations informing the search for an appropriate data source,

such as the lack of appropriate survey items in existing surveys and the generally rare occurrence of changes in travel policies made the search for useful secondary data source especially hard. Thus, lab-based experiment was deemed as the best available empirical strategy.

Therefore, as the main aim of this chapter is to test the micro-level explanation of behavioural legitimization grounded in system justification theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994) and therefore provide some internal validity for the results obtained in chapter 2, the question of scope conditions pertaining to regime type was regarded to be of secondary importance. Thus, the results of this chapter cannot directly inform the discussion specific to electoral autocracies. Yet, as it will be described below, the experiments do operationalize the notions of underperforming aspects of output side legitimacy determinants – weak economic performance in experiment 1 and high corruption rates in experiment 2 – thus lending some notion to underperforming output determinants observed in Serbia specifically (e.g., Kmezić, 2020; Pavlovic, 2022) and in some electoral autocracies more broadly (e.g., Fazekas and Toth, 2016; Kimya, 2019; Saha and Sen, 2021). Given that the primary research aims were to test the theoretical mechanism on a behavioural outcome and the limitations of external validity of any lab-based experiment, the inclusion of two antecedents of state legitimacy in the two treatment arms were deemed as sufficient but not ideal operationalizations of theoretically important aspects of electoral autocracies (for details on the logic of the inclusion of these two treatment arms see chapter 2).

As presented at length in chapter 2, based on the previous work on system justification theory (SJT) (Jost and Banaji, 1994), I argue that citizens are more likely to legitimize a state if they perceive that they cannot escape it through emigration. Moreover, according to the existing system justification literature, this effect is expected to be stronger for those with an initially lower pre-existing score on general system justification (Kay and Jost, 2003). Since payment of quasi-voluntary tax is argued to be a behaviour that reflects the perceived legitimacy of the state in the eyes of citizens (Levi and Sacks, 2009), I examine these hypotheses further by testing the effects of experimentally manipulated visa decisions on tax compliance in a lab-based setting. Since the existing research suggests that regular migration is to a good extent determined by visa regimes a country holds with potential host countries (Czaika and de Haas, 2016), relying on visa decisions as an

operationalization of foreign-country induced sense of escapability is theoretically justified.

As noted, building on the tax evasion game (Friedland et al. 1978), I design and run two separate experiments. I firstly experimentally induce a motivation to emigrate from the participants' own group ("Country A") to "Country B" through economic and political incentives by informing them that participants in "Country B" live in a richer or less corrupt country, in experiment 1 and 2, respectively. Then, I restrict or permit emigration for all participants willing to emigrate in treatments 1 and 2 through restrictive and liberal visa decisions and examine their effects on the likelihood (extensive margin) and the level (intensive margin) of tax evasion "at home".

The results show no support for the main hypothesis. Overall, I find no evidence of treatment effects on tax evasion on both the extensive and intensive margins in both experiment 1 and 2. In other words, both the probability as well as the level of tax evasion are not affected by the (im)possibility of emigration. Moreover, the results provide some evidence in contrast to the proposed hypothesis on the heterogenous treatment effects depending on the initial system justification score. This effect has only been observed on tax evasion on the extensive margin and only in experiment 2, where the participants are motivated to emigrate due to high corruption levels "at home". Under the restrictive visa regime, those with the *higher* propensity to system justify were more likely to report all of their income in comparison to those with a low propensity to system justify while the results under the liberal visa treatment are reversed.

The evidence on attitudinal measures, tapping into the evaluation of participants "living in Country B" understood to be members of an experimentally higher status groups (see e.g., Jost et al. 2002) further complement the overall findings showing a lack of support for the theory. Although proponents of SJT would argue that people belonging to lower status groups tend to exhibit outgroup favouritism towards their higher status group counterparts (Jost, 2017; Jost et al. 2002; Napier et al. 2020), this chapter provides no evidence in support for this claim. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that participants under the restrictive visa treatments in both experiments view their counterparts in Country B less favourably in comparison to participants under the liberal visa regime. Moreover, those with initially low system justification scores in the restrictive visa treatments perceived participants in Country B less favourably in comparison to those who with initially high

system justification scores while the effects were reversed under the liberal visa treatment. Therefore, the overall results would suggest no effects of visa decisions on tax compliance. Moreover, the heterogenous effects go in the opposite direction to the stated hypothesis and depend on 1) the situation "at home" and 2) on the initial system justification score.

This chapter advances 3 strands of literature. First, to the state legitimacy literature, I further contribute by examining the effects of external actors. Although some research has already been done on the subject, it mostly focuses on non-state actors (Sacks, 2012) and in countries affected by conflict (von Billerbeck and Gippert, 2017). Therefore, examining the effects of foreign state policies such as visa regimes in peace times offers a contribution to the field. Second, I contribute to the SJT literature by arguing that visa policies might act as one of the key factors affecting the sense of escapability which in turn might affect state legitimacy. Although I present overall null effects, this research suggests that eliciting system justifying attitudes within a lab-based context needs further research. Furthermore, since I operationalize state legitimacy through tax compliance, I test SJT through behavioural measures, which have been used comparatively less often to attitudinal measures (for overviews see: Osborne et al. 2019; Jost, 2019a). Third, I contribute to the literature on tax behaviour by examining the effects of emigration and emigration motivation on tax compliance. Building on the original tax game I offer a new line of research where researchers can investigate emigration motivation effects in the experimental settings.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2, presents the existing literature on state legitimacy, tax compliance and system justification theory. Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedure. Section 4 present the results, while section 5 discusses and section 6 concludes.

2) Literature Review

Legitimacy

Overall, the existing research is in agreement on the notion that state legitimacy indicates citizens' readiness to obey the rules of a state because of an internalized notion that obeying is morally justified (Tyler, 2006a; Linz, 1978; Easton, 1965). As noted in previous chapters, while conceptualizations and measurement of state legitimacy are incredibly

diverse (e.g., Gilley, 2006a; Booth and Seligson, 2009; Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009), one of the reasons this dissertation builds on the procedural justice approach (Tyler, 2006) is because its socio-psychologic theoretical origins seem congruent with the system justification body of work I build on (e.g., der Toorn et al. 2011). Moreover, based on the findings from chapter 1, the procedural justice conceptualization is closer to the definition of state legitimacy in comparison to other conceptualizations and is better suited to acknowledge the distinction between regime support, government support and system support, all concepts often conflated with (and operationalized as) legitimacy in the existing literature (e.g., Booth and Seligson, 2009). Lastly, this conceptualisation succeeds in theoretically disentangling the antecedents and consequences of state legitimacy from the concept itself which allows testing of the effects of the restrictiveness of a visa regime - my main independent variable - alongside other known antecedents of legitimacy observed in the literature (e.g., Gilley, 2006a).

The procedural justice approach understands legitimacy as multidimensional and often conceptualizes it through perceived obligation or willingness to obey the authorities, trust and/or confidence in the state institutions, and the willingness to cooperate or comply with the authorities' rules and regulations (for overviews see Tyler, 2006b; Worden and McLean, 2017). For example, according to Levi et al. (2009) "legitimacy is a concept meant to capture the beliefs that bolster willing obedience" which is derived "from a sense of obligation that induces voluntary deference to the directives of the authorities and rules precisely because they are believed legitimate" (p. 355). Further, Levi et al. (2009) model legitimacy through an obligation or willingness to obey which they term "value-based legitimacy", and actual compliance with governmental regulations and law termed "behavioural legitimacy" (p. 356). Importantly for this chapter, they operationalize state legitimacy through a measure related to the willingness to abide by the rules of the tax department (see also D'Arcy, 2011). Thus, while chapter 2 looks at attitudinal measures of state legitimacy, this chapter aims to examine actual compliance. Building on this line of work, I provide an actual behavioural measure of compliance - tax compliance - in an experimental setting.

In terms of the antecedents of legitimacy, this literature argues that procedural justice - one of the main output determinants of legitimacy observed in the wider political science literature (Rothstein, 2009; Dahlberg et al. 2015) - can best predict the level of legitimacy.

While arguing that antecedents of legitimacy may stem from both the input (quality of representative (or electoral) democracy), and the output side (quality of government), Rothstein (2009) finds that the output side, operationalized through a measure of impartiality in the provision of public services (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008), is better at predicting the levels of state legitimacy. Similairly, Levi et al. (2009) show that government trustworthiness and procedural justice are positively associated with citizens' willingness to obey across African states. Other suggested antecedents were discussed at length in chapter 1.

The procedural justice approach to conceptualization of legitimacy is often termed as a "process-based model of regulation" (Tyler and Huo, 2002) and is contrasted with an instrumental model based on deterrence grounded in the application of threat and criminal sanctions (Worden and McLean, 2017 p. 483). As paying taxes is perceived as a *quasi-voluntary* measure of compliance (Levi et al. 2009), thus implying some level of state coercion, it is important to acknowledge that the existing legitimacy literature shows that process-based regulation rooted in citizens' perception of state's fairness is at least as important as the instrumental model of state's reliance on threats and sanctions. While the state legitimacy literature has sometimes used tax compliance as a measure of legitimacy, there is considerable literature that has looked at tax behaviour independently and directly.

Tax compliance

The majority of tax compliance literature stems from the theoretical model of the economics of crime (Becker, 1968) and the pioneering work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973) who argue that the decision to evade is based on rational cost benefit analysis. The central point of these models of tax compliance is that citizens' decision to pay taxes is based solely on the fear from detection and punishment (see Alm, 2019 and Slemrod, 2019 for overviews). In other words, the taxpayers decide whether to engage in illicit activities solely based on their evaluations of the state's deterrence capabilities. Therefore, tax compliance can be regulated by increasing and effectively enforcing higher audit and penalty rates.

However, the empirical literature, as well as newer theoretical insights, suggest that compliance cannot "be entirely driven by financial considerations" and "cannot be explained only by the benefit-cost analysis of amoral individuals" (Alm, 2019 p. 355).

Next to the theory of the economics of crime model and its extensions, the tax compliance literature suggests and tests an array of factors outside of the classical factors affecting the taxpayers' rational choice calculus. These include non-financial considerations such as altruism and shame, social considerations such as social norms and public goods, and tax information and the way this information is processed (see Alm, 2019 for an overview).

The evidence examining tax compliance is based on a vast array of empirical strategies. As tax evasion is an illegal activity, the data is notoriously hard to come by. Yet there is some existing research which relies on original data mostly conducted by Revenue agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the US. Others have adopted existing cross-country surveys such as Afrobarometer (Levi et al., 2009) and rely on self-reported attitudes on tax compliance in spite of obvious concerns for data reliability and social desirability bias. Further, there has been an increase in the use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in which the researchers are able to examine the effects of various treatments sent through letters in physical or digital form on tax compliance in a controlled environment (see Slemrod, 2019 for overview). Finally, some researchers run laboratory experiments, most often on student samples and rely on their well-known high internal validity and relatively low running costs. Yet, as with most experimental research, tax evasion experiments suffer from external validity concerns, especially if student samples are employed (see Alm and Malezieux, 2021; and Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2016 on external validity).

Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the economics of crime model alone cannot explain tax compliance behaviour. Relevant for this research, the literature also shows that state and government related variables are also significant predictors of tax compliance. For example, Levi (1998) argues for a model of "reciprocal altruism" and suggests that compliance increases with citizens' trust towards the government and citizens' perceptions of the fairness of government's procedures (see also Ali et al. 2014 and Murphy, 2009 for similar results and Robbins and Kiser, 2018 for null results). Relatedly, Yamen et al. (2018) argue that the quality of the institutional environment impacts tax evasion. They show that government effectiveness is the only significant factor affecting evasion levels in the new EU member states while in the older EU states it is affected by regulatory quality, corruption levels, voice and accountability, political stability and government

effectiveness. This is in line with procedural justice conception of state legitimacy discussed above (Tyler, 2006; Levi et al. 2009).

The experimental evidence suggests similar findings. Hartl et al. (2015) show that the perception of a tax authority as legitimate increases tax compliance in the experimental setting. Finally, Romaniuc et al. (2022) run a series of tax evasion games in France and Moldova and show, by examining cooperation with the authorities operationalized through whistleblowing practices, that peer reporting is less socially acceptable and less often practiced in Moldova in comparison to France. Lastly, it is important to note that demographics, such as age and gender, especially in the laboratory context, are also known to affect the levels of tax compliance with younger people and men evading more than older people and women (Alm, 2019 p. 368).

Taken together, the existing literature on state legitimacy and tax compliance suggests that examining tax compliance as a behavioural measure of state legitimacy is theoretically and empirically sound.

System Justification Theory and Legitimacy

System justification theory "was developed by social psychologists to explain pervasive stability and support for the prevailing social order [and] resistance to social change" (Jost and Andrews, 2011, p.1). It argues that people will hold favourable attitudes . . . "with respect to the social system and the actions that are taken to uphold it" because doing otherwise would create an "aversive psychological state". This occurs due to the clash between their beliefs and objective facts about the world, therefore putting the individuals in situations where they can either change their beliefs or the actual state of affairs (Jost and Andrews, 2011, p.1).

System justification theory provides in-depth theoretical insights and experimental evidence on when system justification is more or less likely to occur. Kay and Friesen (2011) suggest four key situational factors. In the contexts of heightened system threat, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks, people will be more likely to engage in system justification (Napier et al. 2009; Ulrich and Cohrs, 2007; Milojev et al. 2015 and Vainio, Makiniemi and Paloniemi, 2014). Similarly, if the individual or a group feels highly system dependent or if they have low personal control, they are more likely to engage in system justification (van der Toorn, Tyler and Jost, 2011; van der Toorn et al. 2015; Kay et

al. 2009). Lastly, if the individual or a group perceives that the system is inescapable, they would be more likely to justify it. As discussed at length in chapter 2, the effects of escapability remains an empirically underexplored argument (for exceptions see: Laurin et al. 2010; Proudfoot et al. 2015; Kay et al. 2009).

As noted in chapter 2, since system justification is motivated by existential, epistemic and relational needs (Jost and van der Toorn, 2012) it follows the logic of goal pursuit (Jost and van der Toorn, 2012; Banfield et al. 2011). As a result, SJT predicts that situational factors will not affect everyone in the same way. The existing research provides evidence in line with the theoretical expectations that, when faced with situational factors known to trigger system justification, those with an initially low score on system justification will have a greater need to justify the system in comparison to those with an initially high score (Banfield et al. 2011; der Toorn et al. 2014; Cutright, 2011). Yet, the examined situational factors used in existing research in order to elicit system justifying processes have so far been relying almost exclusively on the manipulation of system criticism and threat (Banfield et al. 2011; der Toorn et al. 2014; Cutright, 2011). Although chapter 2 finds no support for this hypothesis, either because of sample characteristics or because of the reliance on inescapability as a situational factor, this chapter extends on this logic and examines whether experimentally induced feelings of (in)escapability elicit heterogenous effects depending on the initial justification score.

Although the main aim of this chapter is to examine the effects of experimentally introduced visa decisions on tax evasion understood as a behavioural measure of compliance, the experimental design also provides an opportunity to examine attitudinal measures of state legitimacy as well. As it will be shown below, the participants in the treated groups across experiment 1 and 2 are asked to evaluate participants "living in Country B". According to SJT, people belonging to lower status groups, such as for example the poor (Jost, 2017), discriminated racial minorities (Jost et al. 2002) and women (Napier et al. 2020) tend to exhibit outgroup favouritism towards their higher status group counterparts. Therefore, following this reasoning, the examination of the evaluations of participants "living in Country B" not only serves as a manipulation check but also as a proxy attitudinal measure of system justification.

Therefore, building on the link between escapability and system justification, I argue that visa policies act as a major policy determinant of escapability and therefore affect state

legitimacy. When citizens cannot escape because of restrictive visa regimes, they will be more likely to legitimize the state when compared to the legitimation levels when visa policies are liberal (i.e., when visa requirements are absent). While SJT does not elaborate on the institutional features of the system, by merging the theory with the insights from the existing state legitimacy and tax evasion literatures, this chapter suggests that restrictive visa regimes will have a negative effect on tax evasion – signalling behaviour in compliance with one of the key state institutions - the tax authority. Moreover, I expect that this effect will be stronger for those who initially have a lower score on system justification. [30] Therefore, by implementing a novel tax experiment I test the following hypotheses:

H1: Participants under restrictive visa policies will be more likely to show higher rates of tax compliance than citizens under liberal visa policies.

H2: Under restrictive visa policies, participants with an initially lower score on system justification will be more likely to show higher rates of tax compliance than participants with an initially higher score of system justification.

3) Description of the Experiment

The utility of behavioural economics games in political science literature has long been recognized as an approach which could offer evidence of a causal nature to otherwise hard to reach observational data (e.g., Martinangeli et al. 2023; Molina-Garzon et al. 2021; Chaudhuri et al., 2022; Chang and Peisakhin, 2018) and tax evasion games (TEGs) are no exception (Amdrighetto et al., 2016; Bruner et al. 2017; Pampel et al., 2019). TEG was originally developed by Friedland et al. (1978) and has been extensively used in the last 40 years. In the classic TEG, the player is endowed with (or provided with a way to earn) an initial income and presented with a set of tax rules based on which she is requested to report her income. She is further informed that there is a fixed chance that her tax return (calculated from the reported income) will be audited and in case the income is misreported, a certain fine is to be paid. The fine is most often calculated as a multiplication of the unreported income. For example, if a participant evaded and was audited, the participant is required to pay the remaining tax as well as pay a fine in the

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[30] For a detailed argumentation behind the expectations for hypothesis 2 see page 73 in the "System Justification Theory" section of chapter 2.

amount of the evaded tax multiplied by a value previously defined by the experimenter. Alm and Malezieux (2021) provides the most up-to-date meta-analysis of 70 papers and finds that the average rate of tax compliance is 65% (SD= 41), where full compliance happens in 45% of the cases (SD=49).

Building on the original tax game (Friedland et al. 1978), I hold the aspects of the original tax game such as audit probability, size of the fine etc. constant across treatment groups while varying the perceived possibility of migration through different visa regimes. In the remainder of this section, I present and discuss the decisions I have made in terms of non-varying aspects of the game across all treatments while taking into consideration the findings of the Alm and Malezieux (2021) meta-analysis. I then present the treatments and the experimental procedure.

Non-varying aspects of the game

All participants read that they will play "multiple rounds of the game" in a group where they are paired with 4 other anonymous participants. In reality, all participants play the game individually for five to six consecutive rounds with the treatment administered after the second round. This is done in order to reduce the end-game effects (see e.g. Watrin and Ullmann, 2008; Normann and Wallace, 2012) and the time taken to complete the experiment.

The instructions are loaded which means that the words used to describe the rules of the game intentionally resemble a real-life context of tax reporting (see Appendix 7.C for full instructions). Although Alm and Malezieux (2021) find a nondifferential impact of loaded and neutral framing on tax compliance, the experiments in this paper are with loaded instructions in order to increase the chance that the participants will think of the state and not perceive the tax game as a simple risk-taking game. Relatedly, a loaded frame is also meant to tie tax behaviour to state legitimacy in line with the findings of the tax and legitimacy literature. Lastly, as the treatment varies the perceived perception of the ability of emigration through visa restrictions, the instructions of the tax game need to be embedded in a state context.

The audit for all participants is 20%, the tax rate is 20% of the endowed income while the fine multiplication is 1. Alm and Malezieux (2021) find that the audit probability and fine rate have a positive effect on tax compliance on the extensive margin (occurrence of full

compliance) but a polarizing effect on the intensive margin (evaders evade even more and vice versa) while the tax rate has an unambiguous negative effect of tax compliance. Therefore, these decisions were made in order to produce lower levels of compliance as an attempt to avoid potential ceiling effects where everyone would report most or all of their income (e.g., with a very high audit rate, very high fine and very low tax rate). Furthermore, the audit rate of 20% is high enough to deter some participants from evasion but also low enough to reduce the number of participants who might potentially exhibit a "bomb-crater effect" - when high audit rates reduce post-audit compliance in successive rounds of the game (Alm and Malezieux, 2021; Mittone et al., 2017). As I am not interested in the effects of the level of audit rates on compliance, my aim is to reduce the chance for the "bomb-crater effect" as much as possible while still getting variation in the level of compliance.

All participants receive an endowed income of 1000 experimental currency units (ECU) in each round. This means that the participants are not required to earn their income. Introducing a real effort task (see Gill and Prowse, 2011 for an example), based on which participants would have earned their income would make the game too long as participants play multiple rounds. Given the financial constraints and higher attrition rates for longer experiments (Arechar et al. 2018) and the importance of multiple rounds for treatment deployment (see below), I decided to endow the participants with equal initial income. Lastly, the type of income, whether endowed or earned, does not have a clear effect on tax compliance in experimental settings (Alm and Malezieux, 2021; Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2016).

Further, all participants are informed that the tax collected will be used for further research purposes of the research team (similar to e.g. Dorrenberg, 2015; Fortin et al. 2007). In tax experiments, the collected tax can be invested in a wide array of public goods: it can go back to the researchers, non-student and student organizations, the government or back to the participants of the experiment (Coricelli et al. 2010; Coricelli et al. 2014; Dorrenberg, 2015; see Alm and Malezieux, 2021 p. 709 for an overview). Yet, as Alm and Malezieux (2021) point out "it does not seem to matter what kind of organization is used in a TEG ...", and that "...research-based public good seems like a representative type of real life public good to implement in a TEG" Alm and Malezieux, 2021, p. 719 but see Doerrenberg, 2015). Furthermore, if the tax collected was redistributed back to the

participants after the end of each round - thus making the experiment a version of a public goods game - then the design of the experiment would potentially blur the theoretical mechanism I aim to test.

Additionally, although incorporating the public goods game would to some extent better mirror the real life context, the participants might change their behaviour according to the behaviour of other members of their group (Lefebrve et al. 2015; Fortin et al. 2007) In other words, showing information such as tax reports and audits of other players in the group would probably further complicate the analysis as it is possible that the decisions in the succeeding rounds could be affected by decisions others have made in the previous rounds. Thus, it would be harder to disentangle the effects of visa regimes from the effects of group behaviour.

Emigration Motivation

Altogether, I run 2 separate experiments each consisting of two treatment groups and one control group where the participants played a classic 5-round TEG. In order to test my hypothesis, the participants in both treatment groups across the 2 experiments need to be motivated and offered an opportunity to emigrate. Without the motivation and the opportunity, it would not be possible to manipulate the perceived escapability through visa regimes. Similarly to chapter 2, following two main voluntary migration motivations - economic conditions and corruption levels (e.g. Gheasi and Nijkamp, 2017; Dimant et al. 2013; Cooray and Schneider, 2016) - I created two experimental backstories in experiments 1 and 2, respectively. In experiment 1, participants were informed that they "live in a poor country" as opposed to another group of participants "living in a rich country". In experiment 1, treated participants read the following paragraphs:

> *"By receiving 1000 points (5 euros) per each tax year, your earnings in this game are considered low.*
>
> *Yet, not all countries are as poor as yours. At the same time you are making your decisions, another group of 5 participants in Country B are playing the exact same game where each participant is receiving 2000 points per tax year. This means that participants in Country B receive an initial income of 10 euros per each round. Their tax rate is also 20% and there is a 1 in 5 chance (or 20% probability) for audit.*

You can emigrate and become a tax payer in Country B. All you need to do is to express your interest in emigration after the second round of the game and the taxpayers in Country B will decide whether or not you can emigrate."

In experiment 2, participants were informed that they "live in a corrupt country" and that another group is "living in a corrupt-free country". In the case where the backstory is the poor country context, the participants were informed that they are endowed with less income than their counterparts in the rich country while the participants reading the "corrupt" background would learn that a portion of the tax collected by the "state" from all participants in the group will be "taken away by politicians for their private needs". In comparison to experiment 1, in experiment 2, treated participants read the following paragraphs:

"The officials in Country A are corrupt, which means that some portion of your tax contributions will be lost to you and spent by the officials for their private purposes. Yet, not all countries are as corrupt as yours. At the same time you are making your decisions, another group of 5 participants are playing the exact same game in Country B where its officials are not corrupt. This means that they are also endowed with 1000 points before each round, there is a 1 in 5 chance (or 20% probability) for audit BUT whatever they pay in tax is NOT lost and spent by their country officials for their private purposes.

You can emigrate and become a tax payer in Country B. All you need to do is to express your interest in emigration after the second round of the game and the taxpayers in Country B will decide whether or not you can emigrate."

Both the "rich" and "corrupt free" countries, in experiments 1 and 2, respectively, in fact do not exist and are used as deceptions in order to motivate the participants to emigrate. Having two context stories mirrors two of the most relevant emigration factors. Higher wages are usually perceived as a pull factor of migration (Harris and Todaro, 1970) while unfavourable political situation at home, such as high corruption rate, is usually perceived as a push factor for emigration (Gheasi and Nijkamp, 2017; Cooray and Schneider, 2016). Moreover, in terms of antecedents of state legitimacy at the country of origin, poor economic conditions imply poor state performance while corruption and government embezzlement of the public funds imply a lack of impartiality and unfair procedures (Rothstein, 2009). Therefore, within the context of a lab experiment conducted in Ireland, it might be argued that the corruption condition is more likely to trigger system justifying motivation as it more directly taps into the issues of the experimental country of relevance

– the country in which one "lives in" (Country A) and because relatively well-of Irish students participating in the experiment might be indifferent to small payoff differences within the experimental context.

Treatments

As noted, in both experiments, there are two treatment conditions - a restrictive visa treatment (RVT) and a liberal visa treatment (LVT). All treated participants were informed in the instruction section that they will be able to emigrate and work in the "rich/corruption-free country" after the second round of the game and are asked whether they would emigrate after the second round. Participants who expressed the willingness to emigrate are then asked to go through a "visa application process" where they were required to write a minimum of 2 sentences explaining "why they should be granted a visa" for immigrating to a richer/corrupt-free country. The open-ended question serves as a manipulation check as well as a way to examine participants attention and overall data quality. They are informed that the participants belonging to the "rich/corrupt-free country" will examine their application and decide, solely based on the application, whether or not to grant a visa. As noted, these participants, as well as the sessions with rich/corrupt-free states, do not exist. After the visa application, participants under the restrictive visa treatment learn that they will not be granted entry while the participants in the liberal visa treatment learn that they will be granted entry after the 5th round of the game. This means that the instructions across the treatments are the same up until the visa decision has been presented to the participants. After receiving the visa decision, the participants are directed to the remaining rounds of the game. In case the visa has been granted, participants under LVT play an additional 6th round of the game in Country B, which for the purposes of this research is irrelevant and therefore dropped from the analysis. For a visual description of the experimental setups see Table 1.

Table 1: Experimental Setup for Experiment 1 and 2

	Treatment 1	**Treatment 2**	**Control/Classic TEG**
Experiment 1			
Home/Country A	Poor	Poor	NA

Abroad/Country B	Rich	Rich	NA
Visa Decision After Round 2	Negative (RVT)	Positive (LVT)	NA
Experiment 2			
Home/Country A	Corrupt	Corrupt	NA
Abroad/Country B	Corrupt-free	Corrupt-free	NA
Visa Decision After Round 2	Negative (RVT)	Positive (LVT)	NA

In all experiments, during the game no information on any of participants' decisions is shared with the experimenter, or members of the "country". This is consistent with the information the participants are presented in the instructions. This means that the information on how many people applied for a visa and how many were denied is also not common knowledge. As the interest of this chapter is not in the effects of inter-group dynamics (Matthaei and Kiesewetter, 2020) on tax compliance, providing such information to the participants would move me away from testing the proposed hypotheses as this information is likely to affect participants behavior in the rounds after the treatment is administered. Finally, information on visa applications is not disclosed to the public in real life so not providing such information in the experimental settings mirrors this.

Procedure

I ran 9 sessions with undergraduate students at two Irish Universities, 3 for experiment 1 and 6 for experiment 2.[31] (see Table 2 for details). Originally, in the earlier stages of the project I planned to run the experiments over Amazon Mechanical Turk. I conducted 5 MTurk sessions of the experiment with economic migration motivation only but have decided to omit them from the analysis due to very poor data quality (see Appendix 9 for

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[31] For a discussion on the reasons behind the decision not to run a power analysis, see Chapter 2, section 4, pages 81-82.

details). All student sessions were conducted during or after student lectures, in large lecture halls that allowed enough space between the students to assure independent work. All students were invited roughly 1 week prior to the experiment through a University online platform (see Appendix 7.A and 7.B for the exact text of the Invitation and of the Information Leaflet). The experiments were coded in a Python-based software oTree (Chen et al. 2016).

Table 2: Session information

Session No.	No. of Students	Major	Year of studies	Experiment	Date
1	73	Political Science	1st	1	March 2023
2	88	Political Science	2nd	1	March 2023
3	54	Social Science	1st	1	March 2023
4	7	Economics and Political Science	3rd	2	April 2023
5	7	Economics and Political Science	2nd	2	April 2023
6	12	Economics	1st	2	April 2023
7	24	Chemistry	4th	2	April 2023
8	67	Business	1st	2	April 2023
9	34	Political Science	1st	2	May 2023

After providing consent, the participants first completed a general system justification measure adjusted for the Irish context (Jost and Kay, 2005, see Appendix 8 for variables description). After reading the instructions of the game and completing comprehension questions, the participants were asked in each round to report their endowed income and were then presented with their earnings, together with the information on whether they have been audited and whether the fine has been deducted in cases where the income was misreported and the audit made.

Upon completion of all rounds, the participants were required to fill out a short questionnaire including demographic information, a 10-item measure of the Big 5 personality traits (Rammstedt and John, 2007), as well as an adjusted measure of the belief in a just world (Reich and Wang, 2015) and one feeling thermometer question towards the participants "living in" rich/corruption-free countries. Finally, the participants were fully debriefed, informed about their final earnings and given a unique code based on which the random draw has been made for 30 gift cards in total. The amount on the gift cards corresponded with the amount of money the participants earned in the game. The average duration of the experiment was between 15 to 20 minutes and the earning roughly between 15 and 35 euros.

Treatment randomisation was secured through a common waiting page before the start of the experiment. All students who wished to participate in the experiment were asked to scan a QR code which led them to a "waiting room". After all students entered the waiting room, a session was created in which the treatments were randomly allocated to each participating student. Treatment randomization is further confirmed through balance diagnostics on a number of demographic and personality traits variables. In experiment 1, openness is the only statistically significant variable ($p < 0.05$) indicating that the participants in the liberal visa treatment are more open than their counterparts in the control group. In experiment 2, conscientiousness in the subsample of those participants who decided to emigrate is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) indicating that the participants in the liberal visa treatment are less conscientious than their counterparts in the restrictive visa treatment (see Appendix 10.A and 10.B for experiment 1 and 2, respectively).

4) Analysis and Results

A) Experiment 1: Economic Incentives for Migration

Demographic information

Data collection for experiment 1 has been collected in 3 separate sessions with students studying political science and economics as their majors. In total, 215 students participated in the experiment. 95 received the restrictive visa treatment, 89 liberal visa treatment and 31 were in the control group playing the classical TEG. Moreover, in the restrictive visa treatment, 69% expressed emigration motivation compared to 77% in the liberal visa treatment (see Table 3).

Across all treatments, the mean age is 19.6 (SD = 3.86), 33% are male, 87% are white, and are on average more liberal (mean = 2.3; SD = 1.27; from 1 to 7 with 1 being "very liberal and 7 "very conservative"). Moreover, 3.3% of participants are exchange students, 76% are Irish citizens, 15% have immigration background, and 83% of students never participated in a similar experiment before (see Appendix 11.A for details).

Table 3: Emigration Decision Breakdown by Treatment for Experiment 1

Emigration Decision	Restrictive visa treatment	Liberal visa treatment	Total
No	29/31%	20/23%	49
Yes	66/69%	69/77%	135
Total	95	89	184
Classic TEG	/	/	31

Data Quality

Out of 215 participants, 2 failed the attention check, both in the control treatment. Therefore, I have decided to retain them in the analysis. The analysis of visa applications for those participants in the treatment groups who have decided to emigrate as well as the response time for the full sample for instruction pages suggest overall good engagement with the experimental material (see Appendix 12.A for details).

Manipulation check: Evidence of System Justification Based on Attitudinal Measures

Since the participants are led to believe that a group of participants live in Country B (richer country) it is essential to check whether the manipulation has been successful. I rely on two items to examine whether the manipulation was successful. Firstly, as the existing general system justification measure could not have been adjusted meaningfully to fit the experimental context, the participants completed an adjusted measure of a Belief in a Just World (Lipkus, 1991; see also Reich and Wang, 2015). As Kay and Jost (2003) found that their system justification scale reliably predicts the BJW, I included the system

justification scale at the beginning of the experiment and the adjusted scale of the BJW post-treatment.

The Cronbach's alpha for SJ scale and BJW are 0.75 and 0.87, respectively, indicating that both scales are reliable. Their correlation coefficient is $r = 0.3$, $p < 0.001$ for the whole sample. The correlation coefficient when subsetting for participants in the classic TEG is $r = 0.56$, $p < 0.05$, for participants in the RVT is $r = 0.3$, $p < 0.001$, and for participants in the LVT is $r = 0.23$, $p < 0.05$. In comparison to the correlation of $r=0.67$ in Kay and Jost (2003), the correlation coefficients when subsetting for treatments would suggest that the experimental manipulation has been successful as the treatment had an impact on the correlation coefficient. Yet, one way ANOVA differences in BJW between the 3 treatments are nonsignificant, although the sign of the coefficients from the post hoc Tukey test suggest the expected effect. BJW is higher in T1 in comparison to T2 and is higher for the classical TEG in comparison to both T1 and T2.

Figure 1: Manipulation check: Interaction Effects of SJ and Treatment on Thermometer

Secondly, the participants in the RVT and LVT were asked to rate the participants in Country B from "very cold" to "very warm". The participants who decided to emigrate under the RVT reported lower thermometer score on a standardized scale ranging from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates warmer feelings ($M = 0.37$, $SD = 0.04$) compared to the participants

under the LVT ($M = 0.71$, $SD = 0.02$) and the difference is statistically significant t (131) = -7.97, $p < .0001$. Moreover, relying on a subset of participants who decided to emigrate (truly treated), I interact the SJ scale and treatment on the thermometer variable with session fixed effects, and plot the marginal effects in Figure 1. Contrary to the SJT expectation on outgroup favouritism, the participants who are initially low system justifiers expressed colder feelings under the restrictive visa regime in comparison to those under the liberal visa regime. Moreover, as the SJ score rises, so do the feelings of warmth in the RVT, while as the SJ score rises, the feelings of warmth decrease in the LVT. Finally, there is no statistically significant difference in the feelings towards participants in Country B for high system justifiers in the both treatments. Introduction of game related, demographic and personality controls do not change the results in a meaningful way (not reported). Therefore, taken together, the results show that the manipulation was successful since the analysis so far suggested meaningful and statistically significant differences in the way that the participants perceived "participants of country B" despite the fact that these participants in fact do not exist. Yet, the results suggest evidence in opposition to the expectations proposed by SJT. In the next section, I analyse tax evasion behaviour.

Main analysis

Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of tax evasion behaviour across treatments for the full sample and the subsample of those who emigrated separately. Focus will be given on the subsample of those who emigrated as these participants are truly treated. Roughly 30% of all participants who emigrated always reported all of their incomes across the 5 rounds, both in RVT and in LVT. On average, the participants in the RVT reported 51 points more than the participants in the LVT. Looking at the average reported income for each round separately, the participants in the RVT reported more points in all rounds except for round 4 in which they reported roughly 2 points less than those in the LVT. In comparison to the results of the meta-analysis by Alm and Malezieux (2021) where the average rate of tax compliance is 65% (SD= 45), and where full compliance happens in 45% of the cases (SD=49), Irish students seem to be more honest on the intensive margin and less honest on the extensive margin. In other words, Irish students who cheated, cheated less than the meta-analysis average but taken overall, they are more likely to cheat than the meta-analysis average.

All of the main analyses are based on a sample of those who decided to emigrate as these participants are those who are truly treated. I test whether participants who expressed an interest in emigration are different to participants who did not express an interest in emigration. The results suggest that those who are male, and conservative are more likely to emigrate and those who are more conscientious are less likely to emigrate. Lastly, participants from session 3 were more likely to emigrate in comparison to participants in other sessions. In a full model where I include all control variables, only being in session 3 remains significant at 10% (see Appendix 13.A for details). Yet, as the experimental procedure is the same up until the visa decision is revealed (i.e., after the second round), there are no threats of the self-selection bias.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics for tax evasion behaviour: Experiment 1

		Restrictive Visa Treatment		Liberal Visa Treatment		Classic TEG		Difference in Means
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	(RVT-LVT)
Full Compliance								
	Full Sample	0.27	0.45	0.31	0.47	0.26	0.44	-0.04
	Emigrated only	0.3	0.46	0.29	0.46			0.01
Declared (avg. across rounds)								
	Full Sample	770.16	243.22	774.55	259.48	775.36	235.79	-4.39
	Emigrated only	802.16	220.73	751.03	274.76			51.13
Declared (R1)								
	Full Sample	820.89	290.79	785	319.62	806.45	319.31	35.89
	Emigrated only	868.11	248.99	757.46	343.85			110.64
Declared (R2)								

	Full Sample	762.99	329.44	766.67	315.93	722.58	305.18	-3.68
	Emigrated only	791.67	322.61	743.33	336.19			48.33
Declared (R3)								
	Full Sample	764.74	323.18	770.54	343.39	796.32	281.25	-5.8
	Emigrated only	802.64	310.31	743.19	360.08			59.45
Declared (R4)								
	Full Sample	747.45	337.52	813.92	309.29	777.74	252.39	-66.47
	Emigrated only	780.83	331.4	782.88	338.47			-2.05
Declared (R5)								
	Full Sample	754.73	328.17	736.6	361.25	773.71	304.3	18.13
	Emigrated only	767.56	336.16	728.28	374.77			39.29
N		95/66		89/69		31		

Extensive Margin: Probability of Full Compliance

First, I look at the extensive margin in order to examine whether there are differences in the probability of full compliance across the treatment groups. I construct my outcome variable as a binary variable and code it as 1 if the participant reported all of their income in all rounds and 0 otherwise. In all models, I run a logistic regression with clustered standard errors at the participant level in order to account for possible heterogeneous treatment effects (Abadie et al. 2023) and session FE in order to account for possible unobserved differences across different sessions. The results are reported in Table 5. Depending on the model, I control for game-related variables, audit dummy and fine application (for the extensive margin only) and a number of individual level controls: age, gender, race, political affiliation, exchange student, Irish citizen, game naivety, and immigration background. Game-related variables were included in order to account for the possible changes in behaviour due to previously established effects of being audited and/or fined in classic tax-evasion games (Alm and Malezieux, 2021). Individual-level variables

were included in order to arrive at a more precise estimate of the treatment effects (Athey and Imbens, 2017). For example, exchange students, non-Irish students or students with an immigration background might have experienced living in a country other than Ireland, which could in turn affect their tax behaviour in-lab (see e.g., Romaniuc et al., 2022).[32]

Table 5: Treatment Effects on the Probability of Full Compliance in Experiment 1

	(1) Full Compliance	(2) Full Compliance	(3) Full Compliance	(4) Full Compliance	(5) Full Compliance
LVT	-0.078	-0.120	0.314	0.310	-1.592
	(0.391)	(0.400)	(0.486)	(0.486)	(1.684)
SJ score			0.593*	0.677*	0.228
			(0.327)	(0.372)	(0.376)
LVT x SJ score					0.572
					(0.521)
Constant	-0.236	0.053	-1.008	-0.214	-0.305
	(0.344)	(0.423)	(2.322)	(2.396)	(2.446)
Observations	135	135	122	122	126
Session FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Game related controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES
Individual lvl. controls	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES

Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Reference group for Treatment is RVT. Game related controls are round dummies on whether the participant was audited. Individual level controls are age, gender, race, political affiliation, and dummies for exchange student, Irish citizen, game naivety and immigration background.

Overall, the results from all models suggest no treatment effects on the probability of full compliance. In comparison to model 1 where I only regress my treatment variable on the outcome, the estimate of the treatment effect remains insignificant with the inclusion of game related controls (model 2), individual level controls (model 3) and game related and individual level controls combined (model 4). Finally, the interaction effect of the system justification score and treatment is also insignificant (model 5). I present a plot of the interaction effect based on the regression output of model 5 in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Interaction Effects of SJ and Treatment on the Probability of Full Compliance; Experiment 1

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[32] For a discussion on the inclusion of other demographic variables (age, gender, political affiliation) see the discussion presented in chapter 2 on pages 92-93.

Predictive margins with 95% CIs

Intensive Margin: Level of Compliance by Evaders

Since the participants learn about their visa decision after the second round of the game, I examine the potential change in tax reporting before and after the second round. I construct the variable "level of compliance" as the ratio of declared to endowed income, ranging from 0 to 1. I run a pooled OLS with a round - treatment interaction term. The treatment variable is coded 0 in rounds 1 and 2 in the two treatment conditions and in all rounds in the control group, and 1 in rounds 3 to 5 in the two treatment conditions. In order to examine the overall effects of different visa decisions on the level of evasion, I interact the round with the treatment variable and in order to examine the heterogenous effect of the treatment and initial system justification score I run a triple interaction of round, treatment and system justification score. For easier interpretation, I run separate regressions including the RVT and the control group in models 1 to 3 and LVT and control group in models 4 to 6 (see Table 6). In all models I cluster standard errors at the participant level and include session FE. All analyses are conducted on evaders (those participants who did not report their full income in at least one round of the game), following standard practice (Alm and Malézieux, 2021).

Table 6: Effects of visa decisions on the level of compliance; Experiment 1

	(1) RVT Compliance	(2) RVT Compliance	(3) RVT Compliance	(4) LVT Compliance	(5) LVT Compliance	(6) LVT Compliance
Round	-0.019	0.003	-0.016	0.001	0.018	0.020
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.052)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.058)
Treated	0.020	0.057	0.245	0.038	0.018	0.186
	(0.131)	(0.128)	(0.425)	(0.102)	(0.107)	(0.351)
Round x Treated	-0.006	-0.030	-0.079	-0.011	-0.021	-0.053
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.114)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.088)
SJ Score		0.019	-0.001		-0.004	0.003
		(0.034)	(0.054)		(0.040)	(0.061)
Round x SJ Score			0.006			-0.001
			(0.016)			(0.018)
Treated x SJ score			-0.061			-0.054
			(0.134)			(0.104)
Round x Treated x SJ score			0.016			0.010
			(0.036)			(0.026)
Constant	0.769***	0.237	0.298	0.676***	0.206	0.190
	(0.067)	(0.286)	(0.305)	(0.077)	(0.320)	(0.356)
Observations	345	335	335	360	340	340
Number of participants	69	67	67	72	68	68
Session FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Game Related Controls	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Individual lvl controls	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES

Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Game related controls are round dummies on whether the participant was audited an whether the participant was fined. Individual level controls are age, gender, race, political affiliation, and dummies for exchange student, Irish citizen, naivety and immigration background.

The results from all models indicate no effects of visa decisions on tax compliance. In comparison to the control group, neither the restrictive nor the liberal visa decision have a statistically significant effect on the level of compliance. For the RVT, the significance of the estimate did not change with the introduction of game related and individual level controls (compare model 1 and 2) and the triple interaction terms is statistically significant (model 3). Similar results could be observed for the LVT (models 4 and 5 for the main effects and model 6 for the triple interaction). Thus, taken together, the results from experiment 1 provide no support for my hypotheses.

B) Experiment 2: Corruption Incentives for Migration

Demographic Information

Data collection for experiment 2 has been collected in 6 separate sessions with students studying political science, economics, business and chemistry as their majors. In total, 151 students participated in the experiment, 66 received the restrictive visa treatment, 62 the liberal visa treatment and 23 were in the control group playing classical TEG. In the restrictive visa treatment, 61% expressed emigration motivation compared to 63% in the liberal visa treatment (see Table 7).

Table 7: Emigration Decision Breakdown by Treatment for Experiment 2

Emigration Decision	Restrictive visa treatment	Liberal visa treatment	Total
No	26/39%	23/37%	49/38%
Yes	40/61%	39/63%	79/62%
Total	66	62	128
Classic TEG	/	/	23

Across all treatments, the mean age is 20. 12 (SD = 2.66), 41% are male, 82% are white and are on average more liberal (mean = 2.83; SD = 1.37). Out of all participants, 9% are exchange students, 73% are Irish citizens, 18% have immigration background and 78% of students reported that they have never participated on a similar experiment before (see Appendix 11.B for details).

Data Quality

All participants in experiment 2 passed the attention check. The analysis of open-ended visa applications for those participants in the treatment group as well as the response time for instruction pages for the full sample indicate good engagement with the experimental material (see Appendix 12.B for detail).

Manipulation checks: Evidence of System Justification Based on Attitudinal Measures

The same set of manipulation checks were conducted as described in experiment 1. First, the Cronbach's alpha for SJ scale and BJW are 0.77 and 0.89, indicating that both scales are reliable. Their correlation coefficient is $r = 0.25$, $p = 0.002$ for the whole sample. The correlation coefficient when subsetting for participants in the classic TEG is $r = 0.49$, $p <$

0.05, for participants in the RVT is r = 0.24, p = 0.05, and for participants in the LVT is r = 0.18, p < 0.05. In comparison to the correlation of r=0.67 in Kay and Jost (2003), the correlation coefficients when subsetting for treatments would suggest that the experimental manipulation has been successful. These results are very similar to the results in experiment 1. Moreover, a post hoc Tukey test suggests successful manipulation: BJW is lower for RVP and LVP in comparison to the control group (both significant at p<0.05), while the difference between RVP and LVP suggests higher values for LVP, although this difference is not significant.

Figure 3: Manipulation check: Interaction Effects of SJ and Treatment on Thermometer

Secondly, similarly to experiment 1, in terms of the attitudes towards the participants "living in Country B", the participants who decided to emigrate under the RVT reported a lower thermometer score (*M* = 0.38, *SD* = 0.05) compared to the participants under the LVT (*M* = 0.70, *SD* = 0.04) and the difference is statistically significant t(75) = -4.94, *p* < .0001. Using a subset of participants who decided to emigrate (truly treated), I interact the SJ scale and treatment on my thermometer variable with the inclusion of session fixed effects, and plot the marginal effects in Figure 3. The results are largely the same as in experiment 1. Introduction of game related, demographic and personality controls do not change the results in a meaningful way (not reported). Therefore, taken together, the

results show that the manipulation was successful, although the effect goes in the opposite direction to the one stipulated by SJT.

Main analysis

Table 8 presents descriptive statistics of tax evasion behaviour across treatments for the full sample and the subsample of those who emigrated separately. As in the experiment 1, focus will be given on the subsample of those who emigrated as these participants are truly treated. In the RVT, 35% of participants always reported all of their income, in comparison to 26% in the LVT. On average, the participants in the RVT reported almost 16 points more than the participants in the LVT. Looking at each round separately, the participants in RVT reported more in the first (1.16 points), second (81.75 points) and fourth round (92.6 points) and less in the third (45.83) and fifth round (51.57), in comparison to the LVT.

Table 8: Descriptive statistics for tax evasion behaviour: Experiment 1

		Restrictive Visa Treatment		Liberal Visa Treatment		Classic TEG		Difference in Means
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	(RVT-LVT)
Full Compliance								
	Full Sample	0.26	0.44	0.23	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.03
	Emigrated Only	0.35	0.48	0.26	0.44			0.09
Declared (avg. across rounds)								
	Full Sample	709.87	291.18	750.47	255.21	712.21	304.85	-40.60
	Emigrated Only	780.16	238.44	764.53	265.27			15.62
Declared (R1)								
	Full Sample	697.15	371.21	755.82	339.05	735.00	379.58	-58.67
	Emigrated Only	808.88	288.18	807.72	318.14			1.16
Declared (R2)								
	Full Sample	792.33	300.19	741.24	333.97	735.35	367.63	51.09

	Emigrated Only	850.60	225.71	768.85	333.37			81.75

	Emigrated Only	850.60	225.71	768.85	333.37			81.75
Declared (R3)	Full Sample	685.89	380.35	753.44	349.90	650.13	363.27	-67.54
	Emigrated Only	704.48	382.65	750.31	345.63			-45.83
Declared (R4)	Full Sample	721.53	356.39	718.23	364.33	723.17	330.85	3.30
	Emigrated Only	811.53	296.51	718.92	366.21			92.60
Declared (R5)	Full Sample	652.45	389.53	783.63	342.13	717.39	362.62	-131.17
	Emigrated Only	725.30	356.73	776.87	362.32			-51.57
N		66/40		62/39		23		

The analysis of determinants of migration in experiment 2 suggests that females are more likely to emigrate than males as well as exchange students in comparison to Irish students. Lastly, students in session 6 are also less likely to emigrate than students in session 1, which is the reference category. (see Appendix 13.B for details).

Extensive Margin: Probability of Full Compliance

I repeat the same analysis on the extensive margin as presented in experiment 1. In all models, I run a logistic regression with clustered standard errors at the participant level and include session FE. The results are reported in Table 9.

Table 9: Treatment Effects on the Probability of Full Compliance in Experiment 1

	(1) Full Compliance	(2) Full Compliance	(3) Full Compliance	(4) Full Compliance	(5) Full Compliance
LVT	-0.50	-0.43	-1.14	-0.62	8.79**
	(0.51)	(0.56)	(1.16)	(0.85)	(3.62)
SJ score			0.41	-0.10	1.07
			(0.58)	(0.46)	(0.71)
LVT x SJ score					-2.82**
					(1.11)
Constant	-0.48	0.01	-3.94	9.51	0.96

	(0.55)	(0.70)	(16.54)	(20.52)	(18.19)
Observations	79	79	63	63	63
Session FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Game Related Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES
Individual lvl controls	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES

Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ Reference group for Treatment is RVT. Game related controls are round dummies on whether the participant was audited. Individual level controls are age, gender, race, political affiliation, and dummies for exchange student, Irish citizen, naivety and immigration background.

Overall, the results from models 1 to 4 suggest no treatment effects on the probability of full compliance. In comparison to model 1 where I only regress my treatment variable on the outcome, the estimate of the treatment effect remains negative and insignificant with the inclusion of game related controls (model 2), individual level controls (model 3) and game related and individual level controls combined (model 4). Yet, the interaction effect of the system justification score and treatment is negative and statistically significant at 5% (model 5). I present the interaction effect based on model 5 in Figure 4.

The results of the interaction effect suggest heterogenous treatment effects depending on the initial score on system justification. Contrary to the expectations of hypothesis 2, under the restrictive visa treatment, the participants with an initially low score on system justification are less likely to report all of their incomes in comparison to those with an initially high score. The effects are opposite for those under the liberal visa treatment: those with a low propensity to system justify are more likely to report all of their incomes in comparison to high system justifiers. Thus, the results show evidence in contrast to H2.

Figure 4: Interaction Effects of SJ and Treatment on the Probability of Full Compliance:
Experiment 2

Intensive Margin: Level of Compliance by Evaders

I repeat the same analysis as in experiment 1 for the intensive margin. I run a pooled OLS
with a round - treatment interaction term and the round – treatment – system justification
score interaction term on level of compliance as my outcome variable. I run separate
regressions including the RVT and the control group in models 1 to 3 and LVT and control
group in models 4 to 6 (see Table 10). In all models I cluster standard errors at the
participant level and include session FE. All analyses are conducted on evaders.

Similarly to experiment 1, the results suggest no treatment effects for neither the restrictive
nor the liberal visa treatment. The interaction terms are insignificant without or with the
inclusion of controls for both treatments.

Table 10: Effects of visa decisions on the level of compliance; Experiment 2

	(1) RVT Compliance	(2) RVT Compliance	(3) RVT Compliance	(4) LVT Compliance	(5) LVT Compliance	(6) LVT Compliance
Round	-0.003	-0.008	-0.071	-0.009	-0.013	-0.014
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.054)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.054)
Treated	-0.191*	-0.296**	-0.329	-0.139	-0.133	0.034
	(0.107)	(0.118)	(0.271)	(0.173)	(0.176)	(0.680)
Round x Treated	0.019	0.051	0.121	0.027	0.024	-0.057
	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.084)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.166)
SJ Score		0.001	-0.026		0.146***	0.127**
		(0.044)	(0.072)		(0.036)	(0.054)
Round x SJ Score			0.018			0.000
			(0.017)			(0.017)
Treated x SJ Score			0.008			-0.051
			(0.071)			(0.218)
Round x Treated x SJ Score			-0.019			0.025
			(0.024)			(0.051)
Constant	0.797***	-1.056	-0.911	0.810***	-2.633***	-2.604***
	(0.066)	(1.178)	(1.118)	(0.079)	(0.728)	(0.755)
Observations	220	205	205	235	225	225
Number of participants	44	41	41	47	45	45
Session FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Game Related Controls	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Individual lvl controls	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES

Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Game related controls are round dummies on whether the participant was audited an whether the participant was fined. Individual level controls are age, gender, race, political affiliation, and dummies for exchange student, Irish citizen, naivety and immigration background.

5) Discussion

What might be the reasons behind the null treatment effects observed in relation to the main hypothesis? Firstly, since system justification theory is grounded in the notion that people justify the system out of epistemic, existential and relational needs (e.g., Osborne et al. 2019; Jost and van der Toorn, 2012), the existing empirical research has so far mainly focused on manipulating or examining dispositional and situational factors from the *real world* context, such as economic inequalities (Du and King, 2022), climate change (Feygina et al. 2010) or the effects of terrorist attacks (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez Guede, 2006) and natural disasters (Napier et al. 2006). In that sense, the reliance on the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al. 1971; Brown, 2020) in the experimental context studied here might not have been able to elicit strong-enough system justification

motivations. Secondly, it might be possible that in comparison to system justifying attitudes, system justifying behaviour might be harder to elicit, especially within the context of an in-lab game where such behaviour would have negative consequences on the payoff in the experiment. Lastly, the effects of inescapability vis-a-vis threat as the manipulated situational factor might not have the same or strong-enough effects on eliciting system justification. Regardless of the reason behind the observed null effects, this research fills a gap in the existing literature by testing the theory in a novel way while being theoretically consistent with extant system justification literature. Ultimately, future research should examine the possible limitations of the theory within the minimal group paradigm, system justifying behaviour and inescapability as a situational factor separately and independently.

Secondly, what might be the reason behind the observed effects in opposition to hypothesis 2? As noted, within the experimental context, not all participants reacted to visa decisions in the same way. In terms of outgroup favouritism, participants in both experiments who were initially high (low) in system justification expressed more (less) favourable attitudes towards "participants living in Country B" in the RVT while the effects go in the opposite direction in the LVT. Moreover, in terms of tax evasion behaviour, similar effects were observed but only in experiment 2 on the extensive margin. These results are in stark contrast to SJT expectations. Thus, these results inform the literature on the dispositional antecedents of system justification (Jost and Hunyadi, 2005) by confirming that not all individuals are equally likely to legitimize the state in response to being (un)able to migrate. Yet, due to the nature of the results, SJT could not explain the observed attitudes and behaviour. It might be the case that, due to the game-like nature of the tax evasion experiment, the treatments were not strong enough to trigger *system* justifying behaviour. Instead, the participants might have perceived their "Country B" counterparts only as members of a different *group,* therefore showing in-group bias consistent with the expectations of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 2004) on which SJT builds on. Therefore, future research interested in drawing on the benefits from experimental research might consider better and/or alternative research strategies when designing conditions which are supposed to elicit *system-related* attitudes and behaviour.

6) Conclusion

In this paper I presented a first test of the effects of escapability – a situational factor enhancing system justification (Kay and Friesen, 2011; Laurin, Shepherd and Kay, 2010) - on tax compliance in a laboratory context. By extrapolating from the general system justification literature (Jost and Banaji, 1994), I argued that different visa policies implemented by foreign countries will affect individuals' sense of escapability, and in turn, affect their tax compliance – an established behavioural measure of state legitimacy reflecting the perceived legitimacy of the state in the eyes of citizens (Levi et al., 2009; D'Arcy, 2011).

In order to test my argument, I conducted two experiments based on an extension of a tax evasion game (Friedland et al. 1978) in which the participants played 5 to 6 rounds of the game in either the two treatment groups or a control group in which the participants were playing the classic TEG. Firstly, all treated participants were motivated to emigrate from their own group ("Country A") to "Country B" by informing them that participants in "Country B" live in a richer/les corrupt country, in experiment 1 and 2, respectively. Then, all participants who expressed a willingness to emigrate were either treated with a "restrictive visa policy" in which the participants were informed that their visa application has been denied, or with a "liberal visa policy" in which the participants were granted a visa and allowed to emigrate to "Country B" after the fifth round.

The results of the two experiments suggest no support for the main hypothesis (H1) in either experiment 1 or 2 as I find no treatment effects on tax evasion, neither on the extensive nor the intensive margin. Furthermore, the results provide evidence in contrast to H2 but only in experiment 2 and on the extensive margin, suggesting differential treatment effects on the probability of full tax compliance depending on the initial score of system justification. In experiment 2, under the restrictive visa regime, those with the initially higher score on system justification were more likely to report all of their income in comparison to those with an initially lower score while the results under the liberal visa treatments are reversed (see Figure 4 above). These effects are further complemented by the evidence on attitudinal measures from both experiments suggesting similar heterogenous treatment effects for those high and low on system justification, on the

evaluation of outgroups (participants in "Country B") (see e.g. Jost et al. 2002). Thus, taken together, this chapter finds no support for the effects of restrictive visa policies on tax evasion consistent with the expectations proposed by SJT.

Regardless of the overall null effects, as most empirical work within the system justification literature looks at attitudinal outcomes (for examples of behavioural outcomes see: Jost et al. 2002, Godfrey et al. 2017), this paper advances the system justification literature by further examining the effects of escapability on a behavioural outcome – tax compliance. This is not only relevant for the system justification literature but also for the literature on tax evasion and the literature interested in antecedents of state legitimacy. Although the literature on tax evasion has examined individual level determinants in the past (Alm and Malezieux, 2021; Khlif and Achek, 2015), individual-level antecedents of state legitimacy have been relatively understudied. Moreover, as this chapter finds a differential heterogenous treatment effect for high and low system justifiers, on the evaluation of members of the outgroup (participants in country B), contrary to the expectations of SJT, this paper suggests the need for further research in order to examine who and/or under what experimental conditions would engage in justification within a lab-based context.

While beyond the scope of this dissertation, this chapter also illustrates the potential for using lab experiments in migration research. Firstly, this paper shows that economic and political conditions do matter for emigration motivation in experimental context, thus confirming the findings from existing migration research (Gheasi and Nijkamp, 2017; Dimant et al. 2013; Cooray and Schneider, 2016). Given that migration data is hard to find, this paper demonstrates that lab experiments could be used as an alternative research avenue in migration research, especially if one is interested in individual and situational causes (and consequences) of emigration that are otherwise hard to come by using secondary data. As a good case in point, I showed that in experiment 1, males are more likely to emigrate than females (for higher wages) while in experiment 2, females are more likely to emigrate than males (against corruption), suggesting possible gendered migration motivations. Therefore, taken together, this chapter has provided an attempt to examine the more fine-grained and lab-based evaluation of the *situational* factors that might trigger system justification beliefs and in turn affect legitimizing behaviour. Although the initial evidence in support of the relevance of restrictive travel policies as situational triggers for

higher levels of perceived state legitimacy were observed in chapter 2, this chapter provides inconsistent evidence and offers a path for further experimental studies.

Concluding Chapter

This dissertation provides initial empirical evidence in partial support for the hypothesis that, when faced with an institutional-level impediment to migration such as restrictive travel policies imposed from abroad, citizens often engage in system justifying processes and thus legitimize a set of state institutions, even in electoral autocracies. By relying on carefully crafted items based on a set of interviews conducted in Serbia (Chapter 1), this dissertation provides evidence of the positive effect of a real-life restrictive travel policy on a set of *attitudinal* measures of state legitimacy in the same country context (Chapter 2). Yet, through in-lab testing of the investigated mechanism (Chapter 3), this dissertation provides no evidence in support for the main hypothesis that restrictive visa decisions have a positive effect on *behavioural* measures of legitimacy such as tax compliance. Moreover, chapter 3 provides evidence in opposition to the stated secondary hypothesis that the effects of visa decisions depend on the interplay between individual characteristics and visa-related variables. As the empirical results are based on originally collected data from an electoral autocracy (or based on some of its features replicated in a lab-based setting) for which the existing political science literature would argue that legitimization is unlikely to occur, this thesis invites future research in examining the interplay between the psychological need for a better life and the often-unfavourable institutional reality.

The findings from chapter 1 not only support the importance of evaluating different conceptual and methodological approaches to the study of legitimacy concomitantly but also suggest the benefits of the use of qualitative interviewing (Gallagher, 2013) to inform measurement strategies in a conceptually consistent and methodologically rigorous way. By looking at the case of electoral autocracies with a focus on Serbia, this chapter provides insights on the conceptualization and measurement of the demand side of legitimacy, a gap in the literature which deserves further research and attention.

The empirical results of chapter 2 and 3 of this dissertation demonstrate both the benefits and the drawbacks of survey- and lab-based research designs. Although the observed positive effects of ETIAS on the legitimacy of the law and the tax authority persist even after a number of robustness checks, the survey experiment conducted in chapter 2 cannot account for the potentially endogenous effects of foreign-country induced restrictive travel

policies on the institutional quality and perceptions of state legitimacy at home. Moreover, despite the relative novelty of the policy and the resulting naivety about it among the sample of the surveyed respondents, the observed effects might have been an outcome of unobserved preexisting attitudes towards the EU. Thus, although testing the effects of ETIAS — a real-life policy yet to be implemented by the EU — provides an exciting opportunity to test a theory for which existing secondary data is hard to come by, the persistent issues of endogeneity remain a threat for causal inference.

On the other hand, as demonstrated in chapter 3, the benefits of an artificial context and full control over treatment randomization in lab-based settings can account for these potential issues. Yet, although this chapter made considerable effort to mirror the logic of the argument consistent with the system justification theory, the external validity of the experiment might be questioned. Due to the relatively inconsequential outcomes of engaging in a lab-based game, such as relatively low monetary rewards, this and similar experiments might constitute a particularly challenging methodological approach in testing system justification theory. Since the theory focuses on the effects of real issues with detrimental psychological consequences, eliciting *system* justification in a lab-based context requires further work. Therefore, although the issues of external validity of the experiments are not new, they seem particularly detrimental for the system justification theory.

Taken together, due to the lack of a time component in all three chapters, this dissertation provides only a snapshot of potential effects of travel restrictions on legitimizing attitudes and behaviour. Thus, the full extent of their effect (or the lack thereof) remain undiscovered. Moreover, as the data is based on purposive sample of citizens of Serbia (Chapter 1) or purposive samples of students (Chapter 2 and 3), another major limitation of this research is the lack of generalizability of the findings to the Serbian population as a whole or other electoral autocracies. Thus, future research should consider examining the potential effects of restrictive travel policies (as well as other policies which might fit the system justification framework) while relying on longitudinal data and/or nationally representative samples.

Despite these limitations, this thesis mainly contributes to the existing literature on state legitimacy and the literature on system justification. For state legitimacy literature, it

points out and begins the process of filling a gap in the literature on the conceptualization of the demand side of legitimization in autocratic settings. Moreover, it offers a way to measure legitimacy in electoral autocracies by suggesting a shift in focus from the legitimacy of state institutions in which the officeholders are elected to state institutions in which the officeholders are appointed. By focusing on the perception of legitimacy of institutions such as the police, courts, and the tax authority and their respective civil servants, this dissertation suggests an alternative measurement strategy appropriate for the context of electoral autocracies in which the perceptions of the legitimacy of elected officials and the institutions they uphold might be conflated. Secondly, by relying on system justification theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994), this dissertation offers new insights in terms of the micro-level mechanisms which might be at hand under which the act of legitimization occurs.

For system justification theory, this dissertation tests the effects of inescapability, a situational factor which has been examined comparatively less often in comparison to other situational factors. Moreover, this dissertation tests the theory in the context of the justification of the state, thus expanding the scope of the theory to issues directly related to political science. Methodologically, it examines the theory in a context in which justification is less likely to occur: an electoral autocracy in chapter 2 and in the lab in chapter 3. Lastly, it offers some insights on the limitations of the theory by demonstrating that system justification is less likely to be observed through measures of system justifying behaviour in the lab.

Turing back to the original puzzle which motivated this dissertation, to what extent can restrictive travel policies explain why people living in electoral autocracies see their states roughly as legitimate as their counterparts in electoral and liberal democracies? While restrictive travel policies might not themselves be a major explanatory factor, this dissertation provides some initial evidence on the importance of psychological micro-level explanations and in turn points that in an interconnected world, the determinants of domestic legitimacy may have important external antecedents.

Dissertation Appendices

Chapter 1

Appendix 1: Interviewee Background Information

Table 1: Interviewees

Interviewee ID	Age	Gender	Urban/Rural	Education	Occupation
ID 1	47	Female	Rural	High school	Tailor
ID 2	24	Male	Urban	High school	Electrician
ID 3	49	Male	Urban	High school	Car mechanic
ID 4	72	Female	Urban	University	Public service clerk (retired)
ID 5	71	Male	Urban	University	Engineer (retired)
ID 6	55	Female	Urban	High school	Factory worker
ID 7	65	Female	Rural	University	Teacher (retired)
ID 8	70	Male	Urban	Masters	Colonel (retired)
ID 9	35	Male	Rural	High school	3D artist
ID 10	24	Male	Urban	High school	Law student
ID 11	26	Male	Urban	University	IT specialist
ID 12	25	Male	Urban	High School	Art student
ID 13	32	Female	Rural	University	Small business owner
ID 14	29	Male	Urban	Masters	IT Specialist
ID 15	61	Female	Urban	High school	Public service clerk (retired)
ID 16	32	Male	Rural	Masters	Software Engineer
ID 17	30	Female	Rural	University	Communication Manager
ID 18	27	Female	Urban	University	Medical doctor
ID 19	28	Male	Urban	University	Medical doctor
ID 20	31	Female	Rural	University	HR
ID 21	37	Female	Rural	Elementary school	Homemaker

Appendix 2: Survey Questions

Demographic questions

1) Are you a citizen of the Republic of Serbia?

   Yes/No

2) How old are you

3) What gender are you?

4) Which of the following options best describes the place you live in?

   Urban environment

   Rural Environment

5) What is the highest level of education you have completed successfully?

   Elementary school

   High school

   University Bachelor degree

   Master degree

   Doctorate

6) What is your occupation?

Legitimacy-related questions:

Procedural Justice Approach

Let's start with a few questions about your attitudes towards state institutions:

1) Overall, on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 indicates "completely disagree" and 7 "completely agree" to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

In the Republic of Serbia…

a) People should obey the law even if the law goes against what they think its right

b) It is not necessary to obey the law enacted by the government for which you have not voted for.

c) The police always have the right to make people obey the law

d) The courts always have the right to make decisions which people must abide by.

e) The tax authority always has the right to make people pay their taxes

f) The public healthcare system always has the right to make people behave in accordance with the enacted measures as a goal of saving and promoting public health.

Political Support Approach

Support for the political community

1) On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means ""completely disagree" and 7 "completely agree" to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

a) I am proud of being Serbian

b) Despite our differences, Serbians share the values which unite us as a nation.

Regime principles

2) Now, I will describe different types of political systems. For each of the following types, would you say that it is very good (4), good (3), bad (2) or very bad (1) way of governing in Serbia?

a) The existence of a strong leader who does not have to deal with the parliament or depend on elections.

b) The existence of a democratic system in which the officials in power were elected in free and fair elections.

c) The existence of experts and not an elected government, who make decisions in line with what they think its right for the country they lead.

d) The existence of an army rule

3) Now I will read statements which people sometimes stay when describing a democratic system. Could you tell me on a scale from 1 to 4 where 4 means "completely agree" and 1 "completely disagree", to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

a) Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other system of government

b) In democracies, the economy functions badly

c) Democracies are indecisive in which people argue too much

d) Democracies are not good in securing order.

Support for regime institutions

4) On a scale from 1 to 7…

a) To what extent do you respect the political system of the Republic of Serbia?

b) To what extent do you think that the basic human rights are well protected within the political system of the Republic of Serbia?

c) To what extent do you think that one should respect the political system in the Republic of Serbia?

5) On a scale from 0 to 10, could you tell me how much do you personally trust the following institutions. 0 means that you have no trust at all and 10 means that you have complete trust.

a) Parliament of the Republic of Serbia

b) Political parties

c) The justice system

d) The police

e) The public healthcare

f) The tax department

g) The president of the Republic of Serbia

h) The prime minister of the Republic of Serbia

Regime Performance

6) Please tell me, on a scale from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates "very bad" and 5 indicates "very good", how would you personally evaluate…

a) The economic situation in Serbia in general

b) The functioning of democracy in Serbia

7) According to you, in the next 12 months…

a) The economic situation in Serbia will be

b) Political situation in Serbia will be

(Better than it is now/the same as it is now/worse than it is now)

Political Actors

8) When we take into consideration the activities of the government of Ana Brnabic and the President Aleksandar Vucic, on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 indicates "not at all" and 7 "very much", how much has been done in terms of…

a) Poverty reduction

b) Fight against corruption

c) Promotion of democratic principles

Chapter 2

Appendix 3: Information Brochure and the Text of Treatment Conditions

3.A Information Brochure

Original:

U ime (author name), doktoranda na (author affiliation), želeo/želela bih da

vas pozovem da učestvujete u njegovom istraživanju o Percepciji mobilnosti mladih

u Srbiji.

Učestvovanje u istraživanju je dobrovoljno i podrazumeva odgovaranje na nekoliko

pitanja o Vašim planovima o putovanju unutar i izvan Srbije kao i o Vašim stavovima

o temama koje se tiču političke situacije u Srbiji. Vreme potrebno za popunjavanje

ankete je oko 10 minuta.

Svi podaci koje budete dali su anonimni i biće sigurno uskladišteni u šifrovanom

formatu. Podaci će biti korišteni isključivo u naučno-istraživačke svrhe i analizirani na

(author affiliation). Individualni podaci nikada neće biti podeljeni sa bilo kojim trećim,

fizičkim ili pravnim licem. Anonimni, **zbirni rezultati** koji uključuju odgovore svih

učesnika u istraživanju mogu biti podeljeni isključivo sa naučno-istraživačkom

zajednicom.

Učesnici u istraživanju neće biti direktno nagrađeni. Ipak, mi se nadamo da će nam

rezultati ovog istraživanja pomoći da bolje razumemo stavove mladih o ovim važnim

pitanjima.

U slučaju da imate bilo kakva pitanja ili nedoumice u vezi sa ovim istraživanjem

možete kontaktirati autora na email: *XXX*

Skeniranjem QR koda sa prezentacije, započećete anketu. Ovom prilikom bismo želeli da

vam se zahvalimo na učešću!

English Translation:

On behalf of (author name), a PhD student at (author affiliation), I would like to I invite you to participate in his research on the Perception of Youth Mobility in Serbia.

Participation in this research is voluntary and involves answering several questions about your travel plans within and outside of Serbia, as well as your views on topics related to the political situation in Serbia. Time required to complete the survey is about 10 minutes.

All data you provide is anonymous and will be securely stored in an encrypted form for a minimum of 6 years. The data will be used exclusively for scientific research purposes and analyzed at (author affiliation). Individual data will never be shared with any third party, natural or legal. Anonymous, aggregated results that include responses from all research participants may be shared exclusively with the scientific research community.

Participants in the research will not be directly rewarded. However, we hope that the results of this research will help us to better understand young people's views on these important questions.

In case you have any questions or concerns about this research you can contact the author at: XXX

By scanning the QR code from the presentation, you will start the survey. We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your participation!

3.B Text of Treatment Conditions
Original:
Treatment 1 and 2

Republika Srbija je zemlja iz koje se ljudi masovno iseljavaju, i to obično u zemlje članice Evropske unije. Mnogi veruju da većina ljudi koji su se odlučili da emigriraju to čine zbog **boljih ekonomskih uslova u zemljama članicama Evropske unije (TREATMENT 1)**/**lоših političkih uslova u Srbiji, kao što su rasprostranjena korupcija i nepotizam. (TREATMENT 2)**

Od 1. januara 2024, Evropska unija je odlučila da uvede **novu politiku regulacije putovanja po imenu ETIAS** (European Travel Information and Authorization System) ili Evropski sistem za informacije o putovanju i autorizaciji. Veruje se da će uvođenje ETIAS-a **ograničiti mogućnost putovanja** građanima Srbije, zato što posedovanje ETIAS autorizacije predstavlja novi uslov za ulazak u zemlje članice Šengena (obeležene na mapi ispod) za sve građane koji poseduju biometrijski pasoš Republike Srbije.

Od 2024, samo oni srpski građani koji budu imali validnu ETIAS autorizaciju će moći da uđu na teritoriju ovih evropskih zemalja i to na ne duže od 90 dana u periodu od 180 dana. Ova autorizacija ne garantuje slobodan ulaz. Po dolasku, službenik granične policije će zatražiti vaš pasoš i ostala dokumenta na uvid kako bi verifikovao da ispunjavate uslove za ulazak. Uvođenje ETIAS autorizacje je zasnovano na mogućnosti da neki građani Srbije mogu biti pretnja nacionalnoj sigurnosti država članica Evropske unije, pretnja javnom zdravlju ili migratorni rizik.

Pri prijavljivanju, potrebno je da dostavite lične podatke i to: vaše ime i prezime, datum i mesto rođenja, vaš pol i nacionalnost, adresu stanovanja, email adresu i broj mobilnog telefona. Takođe, neophodno je da dostavite imena vaših roditelja, vaš nivo obrazovanja i zanimanje kao i ime zemlje u koju putujete i adresu na kojoj će te biti smešteni za vreme boravka u toj zemlji. Podnosioci prijave su u obavezi da plate naknadu svaki put kada se prijavljuju. Od nekih podnosilaca mogu biti zatraženi dodatni podaci ili dokumenta ili pozvani na intervju sa predstavnicima zemalja u koje žele da putuju. Ovo može da produži proceduru na dodatnih 30 dana. Po dobijanju autorizacije, ulaz u državu i dalje može biti odbijen od strane službenika granične policije.

Control Condition

U Republici Srbiji, prema poslednjim podacima Republičkog zavoda za statistiku iz 2021. godine, oko 135.000 lica je promenilo svoje prebivalište, odnosno trajno su se preselila iz jednog u drugo mesto Republike Srbije. Prosečna starost lica koja su promenila prebivalište je oko 35 godina. Posmatrano po regionima, Beogradski region i region Vojvodine su u 2021. godini imali pozitivni migracioni saldo. Ovo znači da se više lica preselilo u region Beograda i Vojvodine nego što se iselilo.

Ovakav trend unutrašnjih migracija (migracija u okviru države) prisutan je već nekoliko godina. Značajan deo ovih migracija čine studenti koji se iz manjih mesta sele u veće gradove kao što su Beograd, Niš i Novi Sad. Vikendom i praznicima, studenti se često vraćaju svojim porodicama i prijateljima u mesta iz kojih dolaze.

Po završetku studija, neki studenti se često vrate u mesta odakle su došli. S druge strane, neki studenti ostaju u većim mestima zbog različitih motiva kao što su bolji ekonomski uslovi ili veća ponuda kulturnih sadržaja.

English Translation:

Treatment 1 and 2

The Republic of Serbia is a country from which many people emigrate, usually to member states of the European Union. Many believe that most of the people who emigrated did it because of better economic conditions in the EU (TREATMENT 1)/poor political conditions in Serbia, such as widespread corruption and nepotism (TREATMENT 2).

Starting with the first of January, 2024, the EU has decided to introduce a new travel regulation policy called ETIAS (European Travel Information and Authorisation System). It is believed that the introduction of ETIAS will limit the ability to travel for the citizens of Serbia, because having an ETIAS authorisation represents a new condition for entering into Schengen member countries (marked on the map below) for all citizens who hold a biometric passport of the Republic of Serbia.

From 2024, only Serbian nationals with a valid ETIAS travel authorisation can enter the territory of these European countries and stay not longer than 90 days within any 180-day period. This authorisation does not guarantee entry. When you arrive, a border guard will ask to see your passport and other documents and verify that you meet the entry conditions. ETIAS is being implemented as citizens of Serbia might be a threat to EU countries' national security, public health and/or a migratory risk.

When applying, you will be required to provide the following personal details: your name, date and place of birth, sex, nationality, home address, email address and phone number. Furthermore, you will be required to share your parent's names, your level of education and occupation, as well as the name of the country of destination and the address on which you will be located during your stay. Applicants need to pay a fee every time they apply. Some applicants may be asked to provide additional information or documentation or to participate in an interview with national authorities. This may prolong the procedure up to an additional 30 days. Upon being granted the authorisation to travel, access can still be denied by border patrol officers.

Control Condition:

In the Republic of Serbia, according to the latest report by the Serbian Statistical Office from 2021, around 135.000 people have changed their permanent residence by moving from one location in Serbia to another. The average age of the people who changed their residence is around 35 years. Looking at the regional level, the region of Belgrade and the region of Vojvodina had a positive migration balance. This means that more people moved to the regions of Belgrade and Vojdovina in comparison to the number of people who moved out.

A trend of such internal migration (meaning migration within the country) has been existing for a couple of years. A significant part of this migration are students who move from smaller places to bigger cities such as Belgrade, Niš and Novi Sad. During the weekends and over holidays, students often go back to their homes, to their families and friends.

After completing their studies, some students often go back to places where they came from. On the other hand, many students stay in bigger cities for different reasons, such as better economic conditions or better cultural offerings.

Appendix 4: Survey Items
4.A: Outcome Variables

A summary of outcome variables and the survey items that measure them are presented below. All items are measured on 1-7 Likert scale where 1 means "completely disagree" and 7 "completely agree":

State Legitimacy	Survey Item
Obligation to obey	
General	People should obey the law even if the law goes against what they think is right
General	It is hard to break the law and keep your self-respect
General	Sometimes, doing the right thing means breaking the law (reverse coded)
Police	The police always have the right to make people respect the law.
Courts	The courts always have the right to make decisions that people must respect.
Tax authorities	People should pay the taxes in the way the revenue service determined it, even when people disagree with it
Confidence	
Trust in Law	Serbian laws do not protect my interest (reverse coded)
Trust in the police	I generally support how the police act in my community
Trust in courts	Judges put people in jail only if there is a good reason for it
Trust in the tax authorities	The money collected through tax comes back to me through public goods

4.B: Variables Measured Pre-Treatment

General System Justification Scale (Kay and Jost, 2003)	Item	Coding
	In general, you find the society to be fair.	7-point Likert
	In general, the Serbian political system operates as it should.	7-point Likert
	Serbian society needs to be radically restructured (reverse coded)	7-point Likert
	Serbia is the best country in the world to live in.	7-point Likert
	Most policies serve the greater good.	7-point Likert
	Everyone has a fair shoot at wealth and happiness	7-point Likert
	Our society is getting worse every year (reverse coded)	7-point Likert
	Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve	7-point Likert
Attitudes towards the EU and the East	What is your first reaction when someone mentions the following countries and international bodies?	Positive/Neutral/Negative
	EU	
	NATO	
	RUSSIA	
	CHINA	

IR reliance	If Serbia was forced to decide, who should, according to you, Serbia rely on when creating its foreign policy?	EU and the US/Russia and China
Ability to Travel and Emigration Plans		
Travel opportunities	How many times, on average, do you have the opportunity to travel to the following countries?	4-item Likert: Almost Never to Many times a year
	Neighbouring Countries outside of the EU (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina)	
	Countries in the EU	
	US and Canada	
	Russia	
	China	
Emigration plans	Are you planning to emigrate from Serbia during or after completing your studies?	a. No, I will not emigrate b. No, but I am not writing off the possibility. c. Yes, but I have not planned anything yet. d. Yes e. I don't know
Emigration location	What country would you like to emigrate to (presented only if the answer to the "emigration plans" question is b, c, or d)?	a. Neighbouring countries outside of the EU (Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia) b. Countries in the EU c. USA and Canada d. Russia e. China f. Other (please specify)

4.C: Variables Measured Post-Treatment

Variable	Survey Item	Coding
ETIAS Feeling	Please write in at least 2 sentences, how do you feel about the introduction of ETIAS authorisation a the beginning of next year?	Open-ended
Familiar with ETIAS from before	Did you know from before that the EU is planning on introducing ETIAS authorisation?	Yes/No
Manipulation Check 1	According to you, how will the introduction of ETIAS authorisation affect your ability to travel short-term in the future?	It will: a. Greatly ease b. Slightly ease c. Not affect d. Slightly hinder e. Greatly hinder short-term travel in the future
Manipulation Check 2	According to you, how will the introduction of ETIAS authorisation affect your ability to permanently emigrate in the future?	It will: f. Greatly ease g. Slightly ease h. Not affect i. Slightly hinder j. Greatly hinder permanent emigration in the future
ETIAS responsibility	According to you, who is responsible for the introduction of ETIAS authorisation system?	5-scale Likert from 1 indicating "completely EU" to 5 indicating "completely Serbia"
Police fairness	The police make fair and impartial decisions in the	7-point Likert

	cases they deal with	
Court fairness	Courts make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal with	7-point Likert
Tax authority fairness	The tax authority makes fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal with	7-point Likert
Police efficiency	The police do their job when called upon	7-point Likert
Courts efficiency	Judicial decisions are made in a timely manner	7-point Likert
Tax authority efficiency	The tax authority efficiently collects taxes	7-point Likert
State officials	The current president Aleksandar Vučić and the prime minister Ana Brnabić make their political decisions...	7-point Likert
Officials fair	…transparently and according to the law	
Officials efficient	…efficiently, which means that the decisions come into power quickly and without unnecessary spending of public resources	
EU and Current Affairs		
	I support Serbia joining the EU	7-point Likert
	The EU is a guarantor of peace and stability for Serbia	7-point Likert
	The EU is an organised system in which the rules	7-point Likert

	are followed	
	By entering the EU, we will lose our national identity (Reverse coded)	7-point Likert
	The EU is slowly deteriorating and it will soon seize to exist (Reverse coded)	7-point Likert
	By entering the EU, the living standard in Serbia would improve to a great extent	7-point Likert
	By entering the EU, the position of young people would improve	7-point Likert
War Kosovo	I often worry that Serbia might be under threat of entering an armed conflict due to the current situation in Kosovo?	7-point Likert
War Ukraine	I often worry that Serbia might be under threat of entering an armed conflict due to the current situation in Ukraine?	7-point Likert
School shooting questions	In the light of the recent tragedy in connection to the shooting in the elementary school "Vladislav Ribnikar" and the events which followed please tell us on a scale from 1 to 7, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements	7-point Likert

	The news about the shooting deeply disturbed me	7-point Likert
	Educational institutions in Serbia are no longer safe spaces for teaching.	7-point Likert
	I am worried for my safety when I am at the University	7-point Likert

4.D: Demographic Variables

Variable	Survey Item	Coding
Serbian Citizen	Are you a citizen of the Republic of Serbia?	Yes/No
Dual Citizenship	Do you have a citizenship of another country, beside Serbia?	Yes (please write the name of the country) No
Non-Serbian Citizenship (asked only if the responded marked "no" for "Serbian Citizen")	Which citizenship do you have?	a. Bosnia and Herzegovina b. Montenegro c. Other (please write)
Age	How old are you?	
Gender	What gender are you	Female/Male
Faculty	On which faculty do you study?	a) Political Science, University of Belgrade b) Medicine, University of Belgrade c) Pharmacy, University of Belgrade d) Phrarmacy, University of Nis e) Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade f) Other (please specify)
Study year	On which study year you are currently in?	1 to 6
Locality of Origin	Which of the following options best describes the place you come from?	a. Big city b. Suburb c. Small city d. Village

		e. Other
Household members	Including you, how many people live in your household?	
Income	Which from the following options best describes the overall income of your household. If you do not know the exact amount, please give us an approximation. The numbers indicate total monthly income.	a. 0 – 25.000 RSD b. 25.000-50.000 RSD c. 50.000-75.000 RSD d. 75.000-90.000 RSD e. 90.000-125.000RSD f. 125.000-150.000RSD g. 150.000-175.000RSD h. 175.000-200.000RSD i. 200.000RSD j. I prefer not to say
Student Status	Which of the following options best describes your student status?	a. Student financed by the Republic of Serbia b. Student partially financed by the Republic of Serbia c. Self-financed student
Studies Dependent on Aid (asked only if the answer to the "Student Status" question was a or b.	According to you, to what extent the fact that you are financed by the state is detrimental to your ability to study?	a. Not detrimental b. Partially detrimental c. Very detrimental
Liberal-Conservative	How would you place yourself on the scale of cultural values?	5-scale Liker from 1 meaning "very liberal" to 5 meaning "very conservative".
Party Affiliation	Is there a political party that you feel closer to than any	a. Yes b. No

	other political party?	c. I don't know
Party Affiliation Name (asked only if the answer to the "Party Affiliation" question was "Yes"	Which political party is that?	

Appendix 5: Balance Diagnostics

Table 1: One-way ANOVAs testing treatment randomization

	(1) SJ Score	(2) Conservative	(3) Age	(4) Income in RSD	(5) Log of Income in RSD	(6) Year of Studies
Treatment 1	0.30***	0.04	-0.32	1,004.73	0.03	0.03
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(4,157.63)	(0.10)	(0.16)
Treatment 2	0.42***	0.23	-0.01	77.09	-0.02	0.21
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.29)	(4,384.27)	(0.10)	(0.16)
Observations	308	308	308	255	255	308
R-squared	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ Reference group for treatment variable is the control condition.

Appendix 6: OLS Regression Tables

Table 1: Legitimacy of the Law

	Full Sample				After Shooting Only			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Leg. Law	Leg. Law	Leg. Law	Leg. Law	Leg. Law	Leg. Law	Leg. Law	Leg. Law
Treatment 1	0.553*	0.396*	0.451*	0.385*	0.642**	0.461*	0.608**	0.494**
	(0.188)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.166)	(0.180)	(0.175)	(0.149)	(0.148)
Treatment 2	0.316	0.158	0.281	0.224	0.289	0.141	0.331	0.264
	(0.227)	(0.219)	(0.207)	(0.205)	(0.253)	(0.249)	(0.231)	(0.238)
Age		0.0340		0.0139		0.0236		0.00205
		(0.0423)		(0.0517)		(0.0421)		(0.0518)
Female		0.0582		0.0619		0.141		0.175
		(0.246)		(0.234)		(0.297)		(0.273)
Suburbs		0.0890		0.133		-0.0190		-0.0183
		(0.317)		(0.316)		(0.291)		(0.281)
Small City		0.205		0.237		0.377		0.377
		(0.248)		(0.247)		(0.257)		(0.260)
Village		-0.175		-0.162		0.0293		0.0453
		(0.487)		(0.466)		(0.488)		(0.453)
Other		-1.284		-1.157		-1.064		-0.944
		(0.823)		(0.989)		(0.740)		(1.005)

Conservative	-0.0792	-0.118		-0.0547		-0.0960
	(0.105)	(0.111)		(0.108)		(0.118)
SJ Score	0.542**	0.383*		0.458**		0.318
	(0.140)	(0.150)		(0.147)		(0.182)
Partially State-Funded	-0.486	-0.502		-0.552		-0.653
	(0.430)	(0.452)		(0.479)		(0.498)
Self-Funded	-0.0160	-0.0134		-0.244		-0.219
	(0.352)	(0.372)		(0.332)		(0.383)
EU Neutral	0.203	0.176		0.247		0.254
	(0.291)	(0.276)		(0.327)		(0.311)
EU Positive	0.396	0.313		0.430		0.321
	(0.313)	(0.289)		(0.349)		(0.366)
After Shooting	0.720***	0.670**				
	(0.131)	(0.176)				
Police Just		0.106	0.0756		0.153	0.140*
		(0.0726)	(0.0670)		(0.0862)	(0.0630)
Courts Just		0.0936	0.0759		0.0985	0.0641
		(0.0655)	(0.0727)		(0.0483)	(0.0552)
Tax Authority Just		0.0819	0.0514		0.0119	-0.00818
		(0.118)	(0.109)		(0.113)	(0.103)
Police Efficient		0.0891	0.0710		0.0842	0.0659

			(0.0781)	(0.0795)			(0.0871)	(0.0864)
Courts Efficient			0.0151	0.0190			0.0416	0.0446
			(0.0987)	(0.0968)			(0.105)	(0.0949)
Tax Authority Efficient			-0.163**	-0.151*			-0.186***	-0.180**
			(0.0425)	(0.0554)			(0.0407)	(0.0546)
Office Holders Just			-0.0123	-0.0694			0.00405	-0.0653
			(0.114)	(0.119)			(0.131)	(0.140)
Office Holders Efficient			0.0851	0.0967			0.0380	0.0341
			(0.111)	(0.111)			(0.118)	(0.118)
Security Concerns After Shooting						-0.0937		-0.103
						(0.0868)		(0.0807)
Constant	4.102***	2.080	3.470***	2.672	4.128***	2.813*	3.554***	3.463
	(0.117)	(1.152)	(0.449)	(1.571)	(0.0944)	(1.092)	(0.512)	(1.634)
Observations	307	307	307	307	266	266	266	266
R-squared	0.101	0.169	0.159	0.197	0.119	0.201	0.182	0.236

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition, for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting", for student status is "Fully State Funded", for locality of origin is "Big City", and for gender is "male". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Table 2: Legitimacy of the Police

	Full Sample				After Shooting Only			
	(1) Leg. Police	(2) Leg. Police	(3) Leg. Police	(4) Leg. Police	(5) Leg. Police	(6) Leg. Police	(7) Leg. Police	(8) Leg. Police
Treatment 1	0.530* (0.233)	0.356 (0.241)	0.349 (0.212)	0.285 (0.242)	0.527 (0.265)	0.291 (0.252)	0.343 (0.242)	0.223 (0.263)
Treatment 2	0.586* (0.233)	0.437 (0.206)	0.419 (0.218)	0.408 (0.219)	0.526 (0.257)	0.383 (0.206)	0.363 (0.234)	0.346 (0.223)
Age		0.0625 (0.0767)		0.0453 (0.0696)		0.0426 (0.0722)		0.0255 (0.0633)
Female		-0.346 (0.218)		-0.343 (0.206)		-0.202 (0.264)		-0.207 (0.257)
Suburbs		-0.346 (0.236)		-0.237 (0.204)		-0.404 (0.259)		-0.275 (0.229)
Small City		-0.0216 (0.270)		-0.0206 (0.276)		-0.00689 (0.304)		0.00845 (0.288)
Village		-0.0639 (0.358)		-0.121 (0.305)		-0.0157 (0.441)		-0.0496 (0.387)
Other		-2.432*** (0.172)		-2.250*** (0.207)		-2.322*** (0.362)		-2.043*** (0.304)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conservative	0.123	0.0620	0.120	0.0632
	(0.132)	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.143)
SJ Score	0.434**	0.173	0.458**	0.187
	(0.124)	(0.111)	(0.118)	(0.120)
Partially State-Funded	-0.543	-0.531	-0.644	-0.697
	(0.511)	(0.594)	(0.481)	(0.603)
Self-Funded	-0.430	-0.396	-0.388	-0.355
	(0.368)	(0.297)	(0.432)	(0.349)
EU Neutral	0.529	0.492	0.493	0.475
	(0.272)	(0.242)	(0.290)	(0.252)
EU Positive	0.691*	0.573	0.606	0.494
	(0.268)	(0.295)	(0.301)	(0.338)
After Shooting	-0.132	-0.180		
	(0.104)	(0.106)		
Police Just	0.0735	0.0522	0.0554	0.0408
	(0.0621)	(0.0702)	(0.0726)	(0.0890)
Police Efficient	0.264**	0.222**	0.311***	0.263**
	(0.0663)	(0.0656)	(0.0608)	(0.0659)
Office Holders Just	-0.0408	-0.0552	0.00190	-0.0179
	(0.0673)	(0.0903)	(0.0748)	(0.107)
Office Holders Efficient	0.168*	0.171	0.130	0.103

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	(0.0768)	(0.0814)					(0.0753)	(0.0817)
Security Concerns After Shooting							-0.118*	-0.100*
							(0.0437)	(0.0397)
Constant	3.375***	0.632	2.169***	0.781	2.386***	0.679	1.086***	0.693
	(0.148)	(1.821)	(0.260)	(1.786)	(0.127)	(1.722)	(0.240)	(1.585)
Observations	307	307	307	307	266	266	266	266
R-squared	0.068	0.164	0.178	0.227	0.066	0.190	0.192	0.254

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition, for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting", for student status is "Fully State Funded", for locality of origin is "Big City", and for gender is "male". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Table 3: Legitimacy of the Courts

	Full Sample				After Shooting Only			
	(1) Leg. Courts	(2) Leg. Courts	(3) Leg. Courts	(4) Leg. Courts	(5) Leg. Courts	(6) Leg. Courts	(7) Leg. Courts	(8) Leg. Courts
Treatment 1	0.159 (0.164)	0.0565 (0.174)	0.0937 (0.181)	0.0731 (0.206)	0.0997 (0.176)	-0.0628 (0.207)	0.0648 (0.206)	-0.0114 (0.251)
Treatment 2	-0.0841 (0.251)	-0.147 (0.245)	-0.117 (0.227)	-0.0891 (0.235)	-0.107 (0.288)	-0.135 (0.275)	-0.0487 (0.262)	-0.0111 (0.265)
Age		0.0837 (0.0640)		0.0941 (0.0636)		0.0641 (0.0665)		0.0776 (0.0663)
Female		-0.203 (0.169)		-0.222 (0.174)		-0.174 (0.188)		-0.186 (0.200)
Suburbs		-0.671** (0.201)		-0.581* (0.213)		-0.758** (0.216)		-0.659* (0.245)
Small City		-0.274 (0.169)		-0.260 (0.158)		-0.319 (0.171)		-0.288 (0.170)
Village		-0.512* (0.225)		-0.520* (0.222)		-0.484 (0.267)		-0.452 (0.246)
Other		-2.011* (0.786)		-1.925 (0.975)		-2.055* (0.773)		-2.030 (1.057)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conservative	-0.108	-0.131	-0.118	-0.145
	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.125)	(0.135)
SJ Score	0.432**	0.252	0.403*	0.249
	(0.129)	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.159)
Partially State-Funded	-0.100	-0.156	-0.234	-0.290
	(0.313)	(0.277)	(0.315)	(0.296)
Self-Funded	0.266	0.184	0.306	0.212
	(0.157)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.218)
EU Neutral	0.0973	0.0470	0.159	0.0939
	(0.282)	(0.288)	(0.315)	(0.322)
EU Positive	0.197	0.0860	0.357	0.200
	(0.359)	(0.309)	(0.401)	(0.341)
After Shooting	-0.175	-0.214		
	(0.109)	(0.123)		
Courts Just	0.163*	0.125	0.209**	0.159*
	(0.0570)	(0.0598)	(0.0577)	(0.0535)
Courts Efficient	0.114	0.112	0.123	0.116
	(0.0667)	(0.0614)	(0.0732)	(0.0657)
Office Holders Just	0.105	0.0820	0.0366	0.0160
	(0.0739)	(0.0848)	(0.0466)	(0.0678)

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Office Holders Efficient			-0.0184	-0.0182			-0.0115	-0.0245
			(0.0646)	(0.0691)			(0.0664)	(0.0739)
Security Concerns After Shooting						-0.0698		-0.0538
						(0.0318)		(0.0365)
Constant	4.686***	2.308	3.873***	1.945	4.455***	2.798	3.376***	2.139
	(0.112)	(1.611)	(0.180)	(1.666)	(0.101)	(1.682)	(0.248)	(1.743)
Observations	307	307	307	307	266	266	266	266
R-squared	0.096	0.176	0.151	0.205	0.095	0.196	0.160	0.228

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition, for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting", for student status is "Fully State Funded", for locality of origin is "Big City", and for gender is "male". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Table 4: Legitimacy of the Tax Authority

	Full Sample				After Shooting Only			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Leg. Tax	Leg. Tax	Leg. Tax	Leg. Tax	Leg. Tax	Leg. Tax	Leg. Tax	Leg. Tax
Treatment 1	0.783**	0.727**	0.593**	0.637**	0.918**	0.770**	0.704**	0.668**
	(0.255)	(0.209)	(0.196)	(0.184)	(0.281)	(0.233)	(0.209)	(0.204)
Treatment 2	0.533*	0.509	0.463	0.526	0.642*	0.599	0.632*	0.666*
	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.216)	(0.253)	(0.266)	(0.276)	(0.217)	(0.287)
Age		0.0134		0.0290		0.0155		0.0348
		(0.0747)		(0.0693)		(0.0735)		(0.0669)
Female		-0.463		-0.460		-0.246		-0.195
		(0.230)		(0.249)		(0.191)		(0.183)
Suburbs		-0.921*		-0.803*		-1.131*		-0.991*
		(0.397)		(0.355)		(0.370)		(0.324)
Small City		-0.00573		0.0109		-0.0211		0.0227
		(0.190)		(0.152)		(0.224)		(0.167)
Village		-0.232		-0.335		-0.213		-0.260
		(0.310)		(0.215)		(0.329)		(0.205)
Other		-1.560*		-1.620		-1.668*		-1.794
		(0.716)		(0.947)		(0.620)		(0.929)

Conservative	-0.439*** (0.0927)		-0.427*** (0.0994)	-0.425** (0.0983)		-0.414** (0.106)
SJ Score	0.391*** (0.0743)		0.203* (0.0774)	0.385** (0.0883)		0.240* (0.0949)
Partially State-Funded	0.436 (0.323)		0.326 (0.273)	0.417 (0.365)		0.312 (0.311)
Self-Funded	0.479 (0.258)		0.360 (0.251)	0.402 (0.286)		0.259 (0.267)
EU Neutral	0.0438 (0.340)		-0.0944 (0.318)	0.0311 (0.360)		-0.178 (0.335)
EU Positive	0.0560 (0.404)		-0.0856 (0.381)	0.167 (0.422)		-0.0516 (0.415)
After Shooting	-0.371** (0.0900)		-0.482** (0.146)			
Tax Authority Just		0.280** (0.0809)	0.239** (0.0782)		0.303** (0.0795)	0.262** (0.0819)
Tax Authority Efficient		0.141 (0.0861)	0.144 (0.0913)		0.173 (0.0967)	0.166 (0.109)
Office Holders Just		0.0742 (0.0857)	0.0306 (0.0779)		0.0185 (0.0819)	-0.0375 (0.0722)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Office Holders Efficient			-0.0985	-0.0573			-0.0850	-0.0678
			(0.0599)	(0.0658)			(0.0634)	(0.0727)
Security Concerns After Shooting						-0.0554		-0.0515
						(0.0496)		(0.0469)
Constant	5.071***	5.101**	3.981***	4.303**	4.566***	4.397**	3.323***	3.391*
	(0.157)	(1.325)	(0.265)	(1.307)	(0.130)	(1.338)	(0.320)	(1.327)
Observations	307	307	307	307	266	266	266	266
R-squared	0.085	0.202	0.170	0.258	0.087	0.215	0.187	0.282

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition, for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting", for student status is "Fully State Funded", for locality of origin is "Big City", and for gender is "male". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Table 5: Confidence in the Law

	Full Sample				After Shooting Only			
	(1) Conf. Law	(2) Conf. Law	(3) Conf. Law	(4) Conf. Law	(5) Conf. Law	(6) Conf. Law	(7) Conf. Law	(8) Conf. Law
Treatment 1	-0.142	-0.324	-0.258	-0.339	-0.258	-0.430	-0.368	-0.449
	(0.167)	(0.177)	(0.197)	(0.193)	(0.170)	(0.199)	(0.213)	(0.217)
Treatment 2	-0.0438	-0.305	-0.181	-0.329	-0.209	-0.448*	-0.323	-0.503
	(0.187)	(0.201)	(0.208)	(0.234)	(0.165)	(0.200)	(0.210)	(0.239)
Age		0.0195		0.00289		0.0227		0.00459
		(0.0311)		(0.0328)		(0.0311)		(0.0340)
Female		0.0505		0.0308		0.0764		0.00769
		(0.161)		(0.148)		(0.216)		(0.204)
Suburbs		0.182		0.192		0.276		0.304
		(0.253)		(0.257)		(0.258)		(0.264)
Small City		0.248		0.205		0.191		0.167
		(0.144)		(0.151)		(0.148)		(0.143)
Village		0.209		0.193		0.324		0.299
		(0.317)		(0.329)		(0.356)		(0.375)
Other		-0.0988		-0.0560		-0.111		-0.0375
		(0.960)		(1.048)		(1.016)		(1.087)
Conservative		0.0336		0.0344		0.0937		0.101

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(0.122)	(0.112)	(0.134)	(0.124)
SJ Score	0.611**	0.486*	0.568*	0.427
	(0.160)	(0.214)	(0.185)	(0.252)
Partially State-Funded	0.237	0.143	0.320	0.186
	(0.443)	(0.439)	(0.407)	(0.452)
Self-Funded	-0.101	-0.0394	-0.179	-0.109
	(0.167)	(0.195)	(0.178)	(0.209)
EU Neutral	0.275	0.273	0.348	0.356
	(0.320)	(0.344)	(0.349)	(0.395)
EU Positive	0.438	0.464	0.592	0.669
	(0.307)	(0.345)	(0.292)	(0.324)
After Shooting	0.264*	0.354**		
	(0.101)	(0.117)		
Police Just	0.191**	0.110*	0.170*	0.0839
	(0.0542)	(0.0499)	(0.0593)	(0.0508)
Courts Just	0.0258	0.0231	0.0335	0.0375
	(0.0800)	(0.0736)	(0.0923)	(0.0926)
Tax Authority Just	0.0328	-0.0102	0.0111	-0.0316
	(0.0734)	(0.0843)	(0.0802)	(0.0877)
Police Efficient	0.00791	-0.00774	0.0356	0.0107

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
			(0.0905)	(0.0743)			(0.0965)	(0.0859)
Courts Efficient			-0.0331	-0.0472			-0.0612	-0.0760
			(0.0662)	(0.0827)			(0.0702)	(0.0856)
Tax Authority Efficient			-0.0951	-0.0843			-0.0862	-0.0658
			(0.0542)	(0.0489)			(0.0579)	(0.0556)
Office Holders Just			0.197	0.131			0.239	0.185
			(0.0972)	(0.0892)			(0.111)	(0.108)
Office Holders Efficient			0.00384	-0.00488			-0.0118	-0.00595
			(0.0876)	(0.0758)			(0.0994)	(0.0861)
Security Concerns After Shooting						0.0322		0.0426
						(0.0662)		(0.0649)
Constant	3.392***	1.108	2.629***	1.557	3.328***	0.782	2.857***	1.425
	(0.107)	(0.945)	(0.167)	(0.958)	(0.0759)	(0.995)	(0.237)	(1.094)
Observations	307	307	307	307	266	266	266	266
R-squared	0.100	0.223	0.187	0.245	0.100	0.221	0.187	0.248

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition, for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting", for student status is "Fully State Funded", for locality of origin is "Big City", and for gender is "male". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Table 6: Confidence in the Police

	Full Sample				After Shooting Only			
	(1) Conf. Police	(2) Conf. Police	(3) Conf. Police	(4) Conf. Police	(5) Conf. Police	(6) Conf. Police	(7) Conf. Police	(8) Conf. Police
Treatment 1	0.260	-0.0178	-0.0848	-0.150	0.0904	-0.143	-0.230	-0.244
	(0.261)	(0.172)	(0.219)	(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.0707)	(0.107)	(0.114)
Treatment 2	0.232	-0.0950	-0.126	-0.144	-0.0727	-0.294	-0.345	-0.307
	(0.291)	(0.236)	(0.244)	(0.214)	(0.191)	(0.205)	(0.164)	(0.182)
Age		0.0738*		0.0423		0.0507		0.0220
		(0.0326)		(0.0244)		(0.0297)		(0.0211)
Female		0.115		0.0982		0.103		0.0423
		(0.155)		(0.140)		(0.160)		(0.129)
Suburbs		-0.477*		-0.271		-0.439		-0.159
		(0.209)		(0.181)		(0.251)		(0.186)
Small City		-0.115		-0.210		-0.0310		-0.0371
		(0.311)		(0.316)		(0.348)		(0.315)
Village		0.0208		-0.143		0.110		-0.00114
		(0.406)		(0.337)		(0.483)		(0.392)
Other		-2.013**		-1.871***		-1.777*		-1.557***
		(0.525)		(0.261)		(0.659)		(0.225)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conservative	0.0402	-0.0448	0.0460	-0.0409
	(0.112)	(0.0927)	(0.119)	(0.0887)
SJ Score	0.918***	0.330**	0.850***	0.241*
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.0995)	(0.0856)
Partially State-Funded	-0.0263	-0.261	0.0236	-0.374
	(0.282)	(0.280)	(0.259)	(0.324)
Self-Funded	-0.312	-0.260	-0.304	-0.295*
	(0.261)	(0.131)	(0.288)	(0.124)
EU Neutral	0.0349	-0.0763	-0.00119	-0.117
	(0.193)	(0.179)	(0.212)	(0.203)
EU Positive	-0.144	-0.395	-0.197	-0.434
	(0.286)	(0.249)	(0.322)	(0.280)
After Shooting	0.620***	0.549**		
	(0.108)	(0.137)		
Police Just	0.367**	0.347**	0.319*	0.322*
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.111)
Police Efficient	0.261***	0.232***	0.302***	0.270***
	(0.0550)	(0.0499)	(0.0426)	(0.0412)
Office Holders Just	0.213*	0.143	0.232*	0.163
	(0.0917)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.117)
Office Holders Efficient	0.0973	0.0919	0.100	0.0904

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	(0.0691)	(0.0646)				(0.0759)	(0.0690)	
Security Concerns After Shooting						-0.0769		-0.0462
						(0.0543)		(0.0441)
Constant	2.389***	-1.498	0.0775	-1.062	2.184***	-0.493	0.0364	-0.141
	(0.176)	(0.710)	(0.149)	(0.710)	(0.0871)	(0.551)	(0.161)	(0.708)
Observations	307	307	307	307	266	266	266	266
R-squared	0.070	0.298	0.473	0.516	0.070	0.298	0.497	0.535

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition, for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting", for student status is "Fully State Funded", for locality of origin is "Big City", and for gender is "male". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Table 7: Confidence in the Courts

	Full Sample				After Shooting Only			
	(1) Conf. Courts	(2) Conf. Courts	(3) Conf. Courts	(4) Conf. Courts	(5) Conf. Courts	(6) Conf. Courts	(7) Conf. Courts	(8) Conf. Courts
Treatment 1	0.614*	0.373	0.434*	0.348	0.531*	0.298	0.403*	0.343
	(0.216)	(0.195)	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.228)	(0.226)	(0.168)	(0.182)
Treatment 2	0.125	-0.147	0.0782	-0.00534	-0.0548	-0.285	-0.00901	-0.0834
	(0.258)	(0.260)	(0.221)	(0.224)	(0.269)	(0.297)	(0.245)	(0.263)
Age		-0.0313		-0.0281		-0.0486		-0.0345
		(0.0377)		(0.0260)		(0.0396)		(0.0306)
Female		-0.140		-0.126		-0.119		-0.127
		(0.185)		(0.183)		(0.183)		(0.217)
Suburbs		-0.0812		0.0833		0.00735		0.213
		(0.258)		(0.210)		(0.294)		(0.201)
Small City		-0.0231		0.0764		0.110		0.201
		(0.296)		(0.192)		(0.336)		(0.204)
Village		0.123		0.123		0.244		0.274
		(0.307)		(0.210)		(0.392)		(0.233)
Other		-0.678		-0.770		-0.463		-0.594
		(0.721)		(0.733)		(0.686)		(0.649)

Conservative	-0.0866	-0.125	-0.0512	-0.0877	
	(0.0985)	(0.0786)	(0.108)	(0.0744)	
SJ Score	0.782***	0.439**	0.735***	0.401**	
	(0.149)	(0.113)	(0.156)	(0.129)	
Partially State-Funded	-0.347	-0.301	-0.290	-0.300	
	(0.370)	(0.334)	(0.399)	(0.389)	
Self-Funded	-0.00721	-0.169	-0.0656	-0.212	
	(0.207)	(0.139)	(0.224)	(0.167)	
EU Neutral	0.212	0.122	0.300	0.185	
	(0.235)	(0.242)	(0.251)	(0.280)	
EU Positive	0.101	-0.170	0.198	-0.0890	
	(0.303)	(0.234)	(0.331)	(0.262)	
After Shooting	0.163	-0.159			
	(0.0900)	(0.0821)			
Courts Just		0.535***	0.484***	0.512***	0.459***
		(0.0739)	(0.0733)	(0.0757)	(0.0692)
Courts Efficient		0.112*	0.109*	0.0998	0.0955
		(0.0466)	(0.0481)	(0.0500)	(0.0489)
Office Holders Just		0.0572	-0.0454	0.0762	-0.0275
		(0.0821)	(0.0892)	(0.105)	(0.127)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Office Holders Efficient			0.00333	0.00516			0.0260	0.0261
			(0.0916)	(0.0802)			(0.102)	(0.0858)
Security Concerns After Shooting						-0.0912*		-0.0464
						(0.0397)		(0.0464)
Constant	3.232***	2.228*	1.676***	1.924*	3.834***	3.599**	1.710***	2.322*
	(0.128)	(0.828)	(0.262)	(0.667)	(0.0980)	(0.879)	(0.366)	(0.825)
Observations	307	307	307	307	266	266	266	266
R-squared	0.105	0.245	0.359	0.406	0.114	0.265	0.357	0.406

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition, for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting", for student status is "Fully State Funded", for locality of origin is "Big City", and for gender is "male". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Table 8: Confidence in the Tax Authority

	Full Sample				After Shooting Only			
	(1) Conf. Tax	(2) Conf. Tax	(3) Conf. Tax	(4) Conf. Tax	(5) Conf. Tax	(6) Conf. Tax	(7) Conf. Tax	(8) Conf. Tax
Treatment 1	0.369	0.206	0.115	0.125	0.362	0.186	0.101	0.123
	(0.240)	(0.198)	(0.231)	(0.211)	(0.280)	(0.219)	(0.265)	(0.222)
Treatment 2	0.122	-0.105	-0.0957	-0.138	0.146	-0.0307	0.0150	-0.0147
	(0.253)	(0.248)	(0.253)	(0.225)	(0.286)	(0.268)	(0.283)	(0.241)
Age		0.0430		0.0580		0.0418		0.0607
		(0.0501)		(0.0436)		(0.0496)		(0.0453)
Female		-0.360		-0.414*		-0.225		-0.338
		(0.196)		(0.176)		(0.215)		(0.217)
Suburbs		-0.185		0.00990		-0.249		0.0171
		(0.255)		(0.242)		(0.270)		(0.270)
Small City		0.138		0.131		0.119		0.186
		(0.264)		(0.200)		(0.276)		(0.221)
Village		-0.0496		-0.158		0.0817		0.0812
		(0.402)		(0.335)		(0.472)		(0.324)
Other		-1.010*		-0.907		-0.809		-0.743
		(0.403)		(0.455)		(0.595)		(0.547)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conservative	-0.128		-0.129	-0.125		-0.137
	(0.0854)		(0.0677)	(0.0948)		(0.0731)
SJ Score	0.729***		0.344*	0.718***		0.369*
	(0.145)		(0.145)	(0.159)		(0.164)
Partially State-Funded	-0.0793		-0.288	0.101		-0.162
	(0.409)		(0.324)	(0.407)		(0.329)
Self-Funded	-0.0221		-0.112	0.0342		-0.0872
	(0.161)		(0.196)	(0.186)		(0.232)
EU Neutral	0.225		0.0649	0.180		-0.0454
	(0.162)		(0.150)	(0.177)		(0.160)
EU Positive	0.287		0.186	-0.00855		-0.141
	(0.215)		(0.246)	(0.135)		(0.135)
After Shooting	0.744***		0.840***			
	(0.0951)		(0.108)			
Tax Authority Just		0.299**	0.248*		0.332**	0.274*
		(0.0950)	(0.0923)		(0.0927)	(0.101)
Tax Authority Efficient		0.0879	0.101		0.0855	0.104
		(0.0460)	(0.0518)		(0.0545)	(0.0573)
Office Holders Just		0.284**	0.241**		0.242***	0.186**
		(0.0713)	(0.0739)		(0.0536)	(0.0510)
Office Holders Efficient		0.0457	0.0420		0.0765	0.0480

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	(0.0720)	(0.0677)					(0.0736)	(0.0664)
Security Concerns After Shooting						-0.125*		-0.0825
						(0.0499)		(0.0466)
Constant	1.918***	-0.419	0.00299	-1.378	2.783***	1.013	1.033***	0.0948
	(0.159)	(1.205)	(0.212)	(1.123)	(0.143)	(1.130)	(0.229)	(1.091)
Observations	307	307	307	307	266	266	266	266
R-squared	0.044	0.205	0.291	0.346	0.044	0.240	0.300	0.370

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition, for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting", for student status is "Fully State Funded", for locality of origin is "Big City", and for gender is "male". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Table 9: Support for the EU

	(1) Serbia in EU	(2) EU for Peace	(3) EU rule-based	(4) Nat identity loss	(5) EU deteriorating	(6) Living std better	(7) Living std better (young)	(8) EU views Index
Treatment 1	-0.177	-0.0535	-0.0252	0.0244	0.0117	-0.197	-0.327	-0.117
	(0.194)	(0.185)	(0.212)	(0.220)	(0.195)	(0.188)	(0.192)	(0.134)
Treatment 2	-0.199	-0.209	-0.142	0.147	0.0974	-0.288	-0.287	-0.196
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.213)	(0.205)	(0.192)	(0.198)	(0.195)	(0.129)
EU Negative	-2.236***	-1.597***	-1.225***	1.447***	1.381***	-0.914***	-1.286***	-1.441***
	(0.199)	(0.184)	(0.242)	(0.245)	(0.198)	(0.216)	(0.236)	(0.146)
EU Positive	1.644***	1.627***	1.234***	-0.979***	-1.162***	1.105***	1.164***	1.273***
	(0.196)	(0.200)	(0.197)	(0.204)	(0.208)	(0.187)	(0.162)	(0.133)
Conservative	-0.357***	-0.115	-0.156	0.463***	0.199*	-0.281**	-0.312**	-0.269***
	(0.0852)	(0.0856)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.0902)	(0.0982)	(0.0971)	(0.0614)
SJ Score	-0.0560	0.0344	0.125	0.198	0.238*	0.235*	0.0549	-0.00601
	(0.0884)	(0.0901)	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.0926)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.0703)
After Shooting	0.361	0.246	0.387	-0.0636	-0.331	-0.0478	-0.411	0.133
	(0.452)	(0.429)	(0.519)	(0.570)	(0.484)	(0.426)	(0.453)	(0.331)
Constant	4.839***	3.039***	4.245***	1.740**	3.179***	4.283***	5.680***	4.738***

	(0.438)	(0.453)	(0.563)	(0.632)	(0.504)	(0.477)	(0.410)	(0.347)
Observations	307	307	307	307	307	307	307	307
R-squared	0.625	0.513	0.320	0.421	0.401	0.350	0.427	0.623

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level

Table 10: Treatment Effects on Views Towards Officeholders

	(1) Office Holders Just	(2) Office Holders Just	(3) Office Holders Just	(4) Office Holders Efficient	(5) Office Holders Efficient	(6) Office Holders Efficient
Treatment 1	0.234	0.0143	0.164	0.186	-0.0434	0.134
	(0.209)	(0.133)	(0.216)	(0.185)	(0.143)	(0.209)
Treatment 2	0.515**	0.225	0.439*	0.419**	0.128	0.384*
	(0.157)	(0.137)	(0.164)	(0.139)	(0.189)	(0.165)
Age		-0.00903	-0.0436		-0.0104	-0.0412
		(0.0303)	(0.0277)		(0.0431)	(0.0422)
Female		0.192	0.133		0.158	0.0242
		(0.201)	(0.178)		(0.196)	(0.156)
Suburbs		-0.239	-0.176		-0.399	-0.390
		(0.215)	(0.199)		(0.256)	(0.272)
Small City		0.191	0.264		-0.153	-0.0824
		(0.223)	(0.227)		(0.166)	(0.172)
Village		0.120	0.478		-0.0949	0.350
		(0.297)	(0.286)		(0.383)	(0.400)
Other		-0.605*	-0.223		0.0255	0.501
		(0.253)	(0.401)		(0.833)	(0.971)
Conservative		-0.0233	0.0630		0.185*	

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		(0.0752)	(0.0639)		(0.0655)	
SJ Score		0.683***			0.630***	
		(0.107)			(0.107)	
Partially State-Funded		0.445	0.521		0.0414	0.120
		(0.267)	(0.322)		(0.181)	(0.256)
Self-Funded		-0.111	-0.104		0.0301	0.0539
		(0.180)	(0.236)		(0.194)	(0.235)
EU Neutral		0.0935	0.206		0.0809	0.0219
		(0.195)	(0.186)		(0.185)	(0.185)
EU positive		-0.174	-0.198		0.109	-0.230
		(0.160)	(0.214)		(0.249)	(0.219)
After Shooting		-0.765***	-0.514***		-0.258**	0.124
		(0.0633)	(0.0781)		(0.0828)	(0.0761)
Constant	2.661***	1.068	3.140***	2.578***	0.819	3.446**
	(0.124)	(0.773)	(0.607)	(0.108)	(1.029)	(0.906)
Observations	307	307	307	307	307	307
R-squared	0.147	0.328	0.198	0.108	0.242	0.128

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Reference category for the treatment variable is the control condition, for the perception on EU is "EU Negative", for the shooting is "Before Shooting", for student status is "Fully State Funded", for locality of origin is "Big City", and for gender is "male". All models include session FE and clustered standard errors at the session level.

Chapter 3

Appendix 7: Invitation and Information Leaflet and Experimental Instructions

Appendix 7.A: Invitation

Dear all,

A PhD student from the political science department at TCD will join our lecture on *date, hour and place* with the aim of conducting a research study as a part of his PhD dissertation. The study will be conducted *during/after* the lecture and it will take roughly 15 minutes to complete. Your participation in his study is completely voluntary which means that you do not need to participate in it if you do not want to.

If you decide to be a part of his research study, you will participate in an anonymous decision-making game and **get a chance to earn a gift card worth between 15 and 35 euros.** The amount on the gift card will depend on the decisions you make during the game. After you complete the game, a random draw will be made and **30 participants in total will receive a gift card.**

Ideally, you should bring your laptop if you have one. If not, you can participate in the study using a smartphone.

More information on this will be shared during the lecture.

Best regards,

Lecturer Name

Appendix 7.B: Information Leaflet

I would like to invite you to take part in a research study about decision making. Before you decide whether or not you want to participate in the study, it is important for you to understand what taking part in it involves.

If you decide to be a part of this research study, you will participate in an anonymous decision-making game and get a chance to earn a gift card worth between 15 and 35 euros for around 15 minutes of work. The amount on the gift card depends on the decisions you make during the game. After you complete the game, a random draw will be made and 30 participants in total will receive a gift card.

Your participation is completely voluntary which means that you do not need to participate in this study if you do not want to. If you decide to take part and enter the game and later on change your mind, you can stop playing the game at any time and you do not have to give a reason why you decided to do so. By playing the game, you will provide us data that will be completely anonymized and confidential and can only be used for research purposes.

In order for this research to be successful, it is essential that you read every page very carefully. Secondly, when the game starts, you will not be allowed to communicate with each other. If you do, you will be asked to stop playing and you will not be eligible for receiving a gift card.

By scanning the QR code [on a ppt slide in the lecture hall] you will enter the game.

Ideally, you should use your PC. If you are using your phone, please set the phone to landscape mode. This means that you should participate in the game by holding your phone horizontally.

I hope you enjoy the game and would like to thank you for participating in my study.

Appendix 7.C: Experimental Instructions
7.C.1: Instructions common for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2:

Instructions
Please read these instructions carefully. You will NOT be able to refer back to the instructions once you move forward to the next section of the game.

Imagine that you live in Country A. You will play multiple rounds of the game which represent multiple tax years. Throughout the rounds you will be paired with 4 other participants and each of you will receive 1000 points which is your income at the end of the tax year.

<div align="center">1000 points = 5 euros</div>

Your incomes at the end of each year are taxable and all participants will be required to fill in a tax return. Country A has a tax rate of 20%. This means that for every 1000 points each of you earn, you pay 200 points in tax. The 5 participants in your group constitute all taxpaying citizens of your county and are contributing to its budget.

To fill in the tax return, you simply have to declare your earnings. Given the amount of earnings that you declare, the computer will automatically compute the total amount of tax you will be required to pay.

Once you complete your tax form, the tax authority may choose to audit it. There is a 1 in 5 chance (or 20% probability) your tax form will be audited.

If you are NOT selected for tax audit:

Your earnings for that tax year will be equal to your initial income minus the tax you had paid on the reported earnings.

If you ARE selected for tax audit:

If you are audited and if you reported your income accurately, then nothing further will happen; your final earnings for the round will be the same as if you had not been audited.

If you are audited and if you reported less than your actual income, you will be required to pay the remaining amount of tax due to the authority. In addition you will pay a fine of 1 point for each point of underpaid tax.

<div align="center">Click NEXT for further instructions</div>

7.C.2. Instructions specific for Experiment 1[33]

By receiving 1000 points (5 euros) per each tax year, your earnings in this game are considered low.

Yet, not all countries are as poor as yours. At the same time you are making your decisions, another group of 5 participants in Country B are playing the exact same game where each participant is receiving 2000 points per tax year. This means that participants in Country B receive an initial income of 10 euros per each round. Their tax rate is also 20% and there is a 1 in 5 chance (or 20% probability) for audit.

You can emigrate and become a tax payer in Country B. All you need to do is to express your interest in emigration after the second round of the game and the taxpayers in Country B will decide whether or not you can emigrate.

Your final pay-off is based on the sum of your incomes from all tax years and it depends on the country you reside in. For example, if you emigrate to Country B, your final income will be calculated based on your income from Country A and your income in Country B combined. All collected tax will be used for further research purposes.

Note that the researchers and the tax payers in both Country A and B will not know how you behaved in any of the rounds of the game.

Click NEXT for examples and summary

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[33] Neither the Instructions under 7.C.2 and 7.C.3 were presented to participants in the control group playing the classic tax evasion game. This group read the common instructions under 7.C.1. and were guided to comprehension questions.

7.C.3. *Instructions specific for Experiment 2*

The officials in Country A are corrupt, which means that some portion of your tax contributions will be lost to you and spent by the officials for their private purposes. Yet, not all countries are as corrupt as yours. At the same time you are making your decisions, another group of 5 participants are playing the exact same game in Country B where its officials are not corrupt. This means that they are also endowed with 1000 points before each round, there is a 1 in 5 chance (or 20% probability) for audit BUT whatever they pay in tax is NOT lost and spent by their country officials for their private purposes.

You can emigrate and become a tax payer in Country B. All you need to do is to express your interest in emigration after the second round of the game and the taxpayers in Country B will decide whether or not you can emigrate.

Your final pay-off is based on the sum of your incomes from all tax years and it depends on the country you reside in. For example, if you emigrate to Country B, your final income will be calculated based on your income from Country A and your income in Country B combined. All collected tax will be used for further research purposes.

Note that the researchers and the tax payers in both Country A and B will not know how you behaved in any of the rounds of the game.

<div align="center">Click NEXT for examples and summary</div>

7.C.4. Print Screens of Visa Decision Page

Figure 1: Print Screen of a Visa Decision Page prior to Visa Decision

Please wait, the participants in Country B are deciding on whether to grant you a visa.

Figure 2: Print Screen of a Visa Decision Page after the Visa Decision (Restrictive Visa Treatment)

Please wait, the participants in Country B are deciding on whether to grant you a visa.

Unfortunately, your visa has been denied by the participants in Country B.

This means that you will remain in Country A until the end of the game.

Next

Figure 3: Print Screen of a Visa Decision Page after the Visa Decision (Liberal Visa Treatment)

Please wait, the participants in Country B are deciding on whether to grant you a visa.

Congratulations, your visa has been accepted!

The participants in Country B have decided to grant you entry to Country B **after the 5th round of the game.**

This means that you will remain in Country A until the end of the 5th round and emigrate to Country B in round 6.

Next

Appendix 8: Variable Description

Game related variables

Name	Description	Coding	Question
Full Compliance	Dummy indicating full compliance throughout all rounds	0: not complied 1: always complied	/
Compliance	Calculated as a ratio of reported income to endowed income in round t	0-1	/
Audited	Dummy indicating that the participant was audited in round t	0: not audited 1: audited	/
Fine	Dummy indicating that the participant was fined in round t	0: not fined 1: fined	/
Thermometer	Feelings thermometer towards participants in Country B.	10 item likert scale that has been standardised to go from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating warmer feelings.	Based on the following scale, how would you rate the participants in Country B? "Very cold" means that you don't care at all about them while "Very warm" means that you feel very favourable towards them.
Corruption Perception	Indicates corruption perception of	Likert scale	Based on the observed amount of

	the county A officials. Only in Experiment 2.	1 to 4: "Not Corrupt at all" "Mildly Corrupt" "Very Corrupt" "Extremely Corrupt"	tax embezzled by the officials in Country A, according to you, how corrupt or non corrupt were officials in Country A?

Personality related variables

Name	Description	Coding	Question(s)
SJ	General system justification measure adapted from Jost and Kay (2005) to fit the Irish context. This is an index based on 8 items.	Likert scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)	1) In general, you find society to be fair 2) In general, the Irish political system operates as it should 3) Irish society needs to be radically restructured (R) 4) Ireland is the best country in the world to live in 5) Most policies serve the greater good 6) Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness 7) Our society is getting worse every year (R) 8) Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve ● Items 3 and 7 are reverse-coded
BJW	An adapted measure of the index of the Belief in a just world (see Lipkus, 1991; Reich and Wang,	Likert scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)	1) I feel that most people in Country A got what

	2015 for original wording)		they are entitled to have.
			2) I feel that a person's efforts in Country A were noticed and rewarded.
			3) I feel that people in Country A earned the rewards and punishments they got.
			4) I feel that people in Country A who met with misfortune have brought it on themselves.
			5) I feel that people in Country A got what they deserve.
			6) I feel that in Country A, the rewards and punishments were fairly given.
			7) I basically feel that Country A is a fair place.
BIG5 personality traits Extraversion Agreeableness	A 10 item measure of the BIG5 personality traits by Rammstedt and John (2007).	Likert scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). See Rammstedt and John (2007) for details.	Please evaluate the following statements, to complete the sentence: "I see myself as someone who"

Conscientiousness			1) …is reserved
Neuroticism			2) …is generally trusting
Openness			3) …tends to be lazy
			4) …is relaxed, handles stress well
			5) …has few artistic interests
			6) …is outgoing, sociable
			7) …tends to find fault with others
			8) …does a thorough job
			9) …gets nervous easily
			10) …has an active imagination

Demographic information

Name	Description	Coding	Question(s)
Age	Raw age variable	Numeric	What is your age?
Gender	Categories "other" and "prefer not to say" were collapsed.	Categorical: "Female" "Male" "Other" "Prefer not to say"	What is your gender?
Race		Categorical: "White/Caucasian" "Irish Traveler" "Hispanic or Latino" "Black" "Asian" "Multiple ethnicity/Other" "Prefer not to say"	What race or ethnicity best describes you?
Exchange Student	Dummy indicating that the participant is an exchange student	0: not an exchange student 1: exchange student	Are you a visiting/exchange/erasmus student?
Irish Citizen	Dummy indicating that the participant is an Irish citizen	0: not an Irish citizen 1: an Irish citizen	Are you a citizen of the Republic of Ireland?

Immigration Background	A dummy indicating an immigration background.	0: "Neither of my parents/guardians immigrated to Republic of Ireland" 1: "One/Both of my parents/guardians immigrated to Republic of Ireland"	Did one or both of your parents/guardians immigrate to the Republic of Ireland from another country that is not the UK/Northern Ireland?
Naivety	A dummy indicating whether the participant has experience in playing decision-making games. Experience is coded as 1 when the responded said "yes" or "not sure"	0: without experience 1: with experience	Have you ever participated in a decision-making game similar to this one before?
Political Affiliation		Ordinal 1-7 with 1 being "very liberal and 7 being "very conservative"	Which of the following best describes your political orientation?

Appendix 9: Data Quality Check for Amazon Mechanical Turk Sample

I recruited the participants by inviting MTurk workers to complete the task which was called "Decision-making game with a chance to earn up to 3.5 $US bonus". This generic name has been used in order to avoid self-selection bias. Since all participants earned a 30 cents participation fee, the HIT title indicated the actual earning possibilities. I restricted the workers to be from the US, with at least 500 previous HIT approved and with at least 95% of HITs approved, following standard practice. Additionally, I included a custom grant qualification ID in order to prevent repeated entries. All sessions were conducted in English.

In total I have conducted 1 pilot session and 4 standard sessions on Amazon Mechanical Turk with the main difference being the inclusion of data quality checks. 78 participants in total completed the experiment successfully and all were paid. I have conducted three tests of data quality: two questions on attention check and possible VPN use, analysis of the open ended questions on the visa applications and the response times for instruction pages. I provide some details on each further below:

a) Attention checks and possible VPN use

After providing consent, all MTurk participants were requested to complete a general system justification measure (Jost and Kay, 2005). This is an 8-item measure and after the final question, I introduced an attention check: "To show that you are paying attention, please select 'Neither agree nor disagree' option as your answer." Out of 67 responses only one participant failed the attention check.

Despite the possibility of restricting the geographical location of the MTurk workers through the AWS interface, some workers might use VPN services to bypass the restriction (Agley et al. 2022). In order to account for this possibility, I have followed Agley et al. (2022) and asked the participants in the survey after the end of the experiment the following: "If you had an emergency, what telephone number would you dial?" with the available responses being "112", "911", " 000", and "119". Out of 67 responses, 59 responses, or 88% of the sample chose "991" thus indicating that roughly 12% of the respondents might have been located outside of the US.

b) Visa applications

In the pooled sample including the observations from all sessions, 25 respondents received the restrictive visa treatment, 27 the liberal visa treatment and 26 were in the control group playing the classical TEG (see Table 1). In the restrictive visa treatment, 72% expressed emigration motivation compared to 55% in the liberal visa treatment. The analysis of the visa application messages of these participants in both of the treatments suggests a very poor engagement as well as difficulties for some respondents to write meaningful sentences. Moreover, oftentimes the visa applications are nonsensical. Examples include: "I would learn so many thinks", "A decision has been made on your application and your documents are being returned to the Visa Application Centre (VAC).", "It was good and granted the decision making research study". Some visa applications were more meaningful: "I am passionate about that job and want to gain more knowledge in it. It was helpful to my family so please grant me the visa", "I am a hard worker and want to contribute in a community I think is fair for all." Taken together, the quality of responses is considerably low.

Table 1:

Emigration Decision Breakdown by Treatment of Amazon Mechanical Turk Respondents

Emigration Decision	Restrictive visa treatment	Liberal visa treatment	Total
No	7/28%	12/45%	19
Yes	18/72%	15/55%	33
Total	25	27	52

c) Response time for instruction pages

I collected response time data in seconds for each page. Since it is essential that the respondents in an experiment carefully read instruction pages, Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the number of seconds spent on the 6 key pages including the consent form, instruction pages and a page with comprehension questions. Following Brysbaert (2019) meta-analysis on the average reading speed, the data suggests that a vast majority of the respondents have not read the instruction pages properly and or were interrupted while they were doing so. According to Brysbaert (2019) study, an average person can read 238 words per minute. Given that all read-only pages (i.e those without an input requirement such as the case with the SJT questionnaire page and Comprehension questions page) have around 250

words or more, it is unlikely that the respondents made an effort to properly read and understand the content as the average number of seconds spent on each page is around a minute or considerably less (except in the case of Instructions 3 page). Furthermore, the standard deviations for all pages are extreme and the minimum and maximum amount of seconds spent on each page further suggest that some respondents were probably interrupted in some way and for whatever reason have probably done something else other than the experiment.

Table 2: Average Page Time

	N	Mean	SD	MIN	MAX	No. of words
Consent Page	74	61.7567	97.9062	9	735	430
SJT Questionnaire	74	47.2432	115.456	3	899	130
Instructions 1	50	26.3	58.9147	1	396	341
Instructions 2	50	35.2	104.671	2	743	239
Instructions 3	74	155.432	242.868	3	1310	275
Comprehension questions	74	36.9189	65.7937	4	474	135

Note: Values presented indicate the number of seconds spent on each page. Instructions 1 and Instructions 2 have a lower number of observations as the classic TEG control group does not have the additional instruction pages related to emigration.

Therefore, although the data on attention check was promising, the evidence from the open ended questions on visa applications and the data on the average page time suggest that the MTurk sample is of poor quality. Moreover, this is informative in its own right as it suggests that the attention check is not a sufficient method of checking data quality. Furthermore, the data seems to suggest that the MTurk workers have a high level of expertise in survey completion as they are able to easily locate and successfully complete attention checks while still providing poor data quality. Taken together, non-naivete of the MTurk workers in 2023 seems to be one of the biggest issues when conducting research over MTurk and requires further research.

Appendix 10: Treatment Randomization

10.A. Treatment Randomization for Experiment 1:

First, I conducted a series of one-way ANOVA tests for a set of continuous variables: age, self-positioning on a left-right scale, system justification score, and the scores on 5 personality traits. The ANOVA results show that the randomization of treatments across all variables was successful (see Table 1). Yet, openness is the only statistically significant variable ($p < 0.05$) indicating that the participants in the liberal visa treatment are more open than their counterparts in the control group.

Secondly, I conducted a set of chi2 analyses on a series of categorical variables: gender, race, whether the participant is an exchange student, an Irish citizen, has an immigrant background, and whether they have participated in a similar decision-making game. The results show that the randomization of treatments across all variables was successful (see Table 2) as no variable reached statistical significance.

The results from Table 1 and Table 2 were run on all participants, regardless of their emigration decision in the two treatments. As participants who decided to emigrate are my main point of interest, I conduct the same set of analyses on a subset of those participants who decided to emigrate after the second round. The results are very similar which confirms treatment randomization (see Tables 3 and 4). Openness remains significant ($p < 0.05$).

Table 1: One Way ANOVA-s; Full Sample of Participants in Experiment 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Age	P. Affiliation	SJ score	Extraversion	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Neuroticism	Openness
RVT	0.807	0.119	0.046	-0.198	0.085	-0.350*	0.411	0.144
	(0.820)	(0.271)	(0.191)	(0.213)	(0.191)	(0.180)	(0.251)	(0.206)
LVT	0.200	0.119	0.072	-0.058	-0.009	-0.265	0.178	**0.465****
	(0.830)	(0.274)	(0.193)	(0.215)	(0.193)	(0.182)	(0.254)	**(0.209)**
Observations	210	210	215	208	208	208	208	208
R-squared	0.007	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.003	0.018	0.016	0.034

Note: RVT stands for "Restrictive Visa Treatment" and LVT stands for Liberal Visa Treatment" while Classic TEG is the reference category. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2. Chi-Square Analyses; Full Sample of Participants in Experiment 1

	Total		Restrictive Visa Treatment		Liberal Visa Treatment		Classic TEG (Baseline)			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	Chi2	p
Gender									5.755	0.218
Male	70	33.33%	28	40.00%	32	45.71%	10	14.29%		
Female	136	64.76%	63	46.32%	54	39.71%	19	13.97%		
Other	4	1.90%	4	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%		
Race									7.05	0.854
Asian	2	0.95%	1	50.00%	1	50.00%	0	0.00%		
Black	6	2.86%	4	66.67%	1	16.67%	1	16.67%		
Hispanic/Latino	2	0.95%	2	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%		
Irish Traveller	1	0.48%	0	0.00%	1	100.00%	0	0.00%		
Multiple ethnicity/Other	14	6.67%	6	42.86%	6	42.86%	2	14.29%		
Prefer not to say	1	0.48%	1	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%		

White/Caucasian	184	87.62%	81	44.02%	77	41.85%	26	14.13%	
Exchange Student									5.691 0.058
No	203	96.67%	92	45.32%	85	41.87%	26	12.81%	
Yes	7	3.33%	3	42.86%	1	14.29%	3	42.86%	
Irish Citizen									3.216 0.2
No	50	23.81%	24	48.00%	16	32.00%	10	20.00%	
Yes	160	76.19%	71	44.38%	70	43.75%	19	11.88%	
Immigrant Background									0.603 0.739
No	181	84.19%	78	43.09%	76	41.99%	27	14.92%	
Yes	34	15.81%	17	50.00%	13	38.24%	4	11.76%	
Naivety									2.18 0.336
No	36	16.74%	15	41.67%	13	36.11%	8	22.22%	
Yes	179	83.26%	80	44.69%	76	42.46%	23	12.85%	

Table 3: One way ANOVA; Subset for Emigration Participants in Experiment 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Age	P. Affiliation	SJ score	Extraversion	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Neuroticism	Openness
LVT	-0.339	0.148	0.048	-0.038	-0.121	0.106	-0.379*	**0.379****
	(0.464)	(0.219)	(0.155)	(0.171)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.211)	**(0.155)**
Observations	133	133	135	132	132	132	132	132
R-squared	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.005	0.004	0.024	0.044

Note: LVT stands for "Liberal Visa Treatment" while RVT ("Restrictive Visa Treatment") is the reference category. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 4. Chi-Square Analyses; Sample of Emigrating Participants in Experiment 1

	Total		Restrictive Visa Treatment		Liberal Visa Treatment			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Chi2	p
Gender							4.472	0.107
Male	50	37.59	21	42%	29	58%		
Female	80	60.15	42	52.50%	38	47.50%		
Other	3	2.26	3	100%	0	0%		
Race							2.361	0.797
Asian	2	1.50%	1	50%	1	50%		
Black	3	2.26%	2	66.67%	1	33.33%		
Hispanic/Latino	1	0.75%	1	100%	0	0%		
Irish Traveller	1	0.75%	0	0%	1	100%		
Multiple ethnicity/Other	12	9.02%	6	50%	6	50%		
White/Caucasian	114	85.71%	56	49.12%	58	50.88%		
Exchange Student							0.356	0.55

No	130	97.74%	64	49.23%	66	50.77	
Yes	3	2.26%	2	66.67%	1	33.33	

Irish Citizen | | | | | | 1.11 | 0.292

No	33	24.81%	19	57.58%	14	42.42	
Yes	100	75.19%	47	47%	53	53%	

Immigrant Background | | | | | | 0.325 | 0.568

No	111	82.22%	53	47.75	58	52.25	
Yes	24	17.78%	13	54.17%	11	45.83	

Naivety | | | | | | 0.016 | 0.899

No	21	15.56%	56	49.12	58	51.11	
Yes	114	84.44%	10	47.62%	11	52.38	

10.B Treatment Randomization for Experiment 2:

I repeat the exact same procedure for the data gathered in Experiment 2 and present them in Tables 5 to 8. Overall, the results suggest successful treatment randomization. Yet, the only exception is conscientiousness in the subsample of those participants who decided to emigrate, which is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) and indicating that the participants in the liberal visa treatment are less conscientious than their counterparts in the restrictive visa treatment.

Table 5: One Way ANOVA-s; Full Sample of Participants in Experiment 2

	(1) Age	(2) P. Affiliation	(3) SJ score	(4) Extraversion	(5) Agreeableness	(6) Conscientiousness	(7) Neuroticism	(8) Openness
RVT	0.061	-0.618*	0.024	0.125	0.104	-0.196	-0.379	-0.047
	(0.662)	(0.337)	(0.245)	(0.262)	(0.202)	(0.207)	(0.251)	(0.222)
LVT	0.341	-0.642*	-0.297	0.118	-0.080	-0.216	-0.458*	0.094
	(0.665)	(0.339)	(0.247)	(0.263)	(0.203)	(0.208)	(0.252)	(0.223)
Observations	146	146	151	144	144	144	144	144
R-squared	0.003	0.027	0.023	0.002	0.011	0.008	0.023	0.005

Note: RVT stands for "Restrictive Visa Treatment" and LVT stands for Liberal Visa Treatment" while Classic TEG is the reference category. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 6: Chi-Square Analyses; Full Sample of Participants in Experiment 2

	Total		Restrictive Visa Treatment		Liberal Visa Treatment		Classic TEG (Baseline)			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	Chi2	p
Gender									4.3872	0.356
Male	60	41.10%	26	43.33%	29	48.33%	5	8.33%		
Female	82	56.16%	35	42.68%	31	37.80%	16	19.51%		
Other	4	2.74%	2	50.00%	1	25.00%	1	25.00%		
Race									9.9845	0.442
Asian	10	6.85%	5	50.00%	4	40.00%	1	10.00%		
Black	5	3.42%	2	40.00%	1	20.00%	2	40.00%		
Hispanic/Latino	2	1.37%	1	50.00%	0	0.00%	1	50.00%		
Irish Traveller	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%		
Multiple ethnicity/Other	6	4.11%	3	50.00%	1	16.67%	2	33.33%		
Prefer not to say	4	2.74%	1	25.00%	3	75.00%	0	0.00%		
White/Caucasian	119	81.51%	51	42.86%	52	43.70%	16	13.45%		
Exchange Student									2.6774	0.262
No	133	91.10%	57	42.86%	54	40.60%	22	16.54%		

									χ^2	p
Yes	13	8.90%	6	46.15%	7	53.85%	0	0		
Irish Citizen									5.5318	0.063
No	40	27.40%	11	27.50%	21	52.50%	8	20.00%		
Yes	106	72.60%	52	49.06%	40	37.74%	14	13.21%		
Immigrant Background									0.0086	0.996
No	124	82.12%	54	43.55%	51	41.13%	19	15.32%		
Yes	27	17.88%	12	44.44%	11	40.74%	4	14.81%		
Naivety									0.0353	0.983
No	33	21.85%	14	42.42%	14	42.42%	5	15.15%		
Yes	118	78.15%	52	44.07%	48	40.68%	18	15.25%		

Table 7: One way ANOVA; Subset for Emigration Participants in Experiment 2

	(1) Age	(2) P. Affiliation	(3) SJ score	(4) Extraversion	(5) Agreeableness	(6) Conscientiousness	(7) Neuroticism	(8) Openness
LVT	0.316	0.000	-0.360	-0.263	-0.197	**-0.392****	-0.044	0.066
	(0.436)	(0.283)	(0.219)	(0.233)	(0.186)	**(0.190)**	(0.248)	(0.219)
Observations	76	76	79	75	75	75	75	75
R-squared	0.007	0.000	0.034	0.017	0.015	0.055	0.000	0.001

Note: RVT stands for "Restrictive Visa Treatment" and LVT stands for Liberal Visa Treatment" RVT is the reference category. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8: Chi-Square Analyses; Sample of Emigrating Participants in Experiment 2

	Total		Restrictive Visa Treatment		Liberal Visa Treatment			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Chi2	p
Gender							0.5248	0.769
Male	27	35.53%	12	44.44%	15	55.56%		
Female	47	61.84%	25	53.19%	22	46.81%		
Other	2	2.63%	1	50.00%	1	50.00%		
Race							4.7273	0.193
Asian	6	7.89%	4	66.67%	2	33.33%		
Black	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%		
Hispanic/Latino	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%		
Irish Traveller	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%		
Multiple ethnicity/Other	2	2.63%	2	100.00%	0	0.00%		
Prefer not to say	2	2.63%	0	0.00%	2	100.00%		
White/Caucasian	66	86.84%	32	48.48%	34	51.52%		
Exchange Student							0.3958	0.529

No	64	84.21%	33	51.56%	31	48.44%	
Yes	12	15.79%	5	41.67%	7	58.33%	

Irish Citizen   3.2242   0.073

No	21	27.63%	7	33.33%	14	66.67%
Yes	55	72.37%	31	56.36%	24	43.64%

Immigrant Background   0.0027   0.958

No	65	82.28%	33	50.77%	32	49.23%
Yes	14	17.72%	7	50.00%	7	50.00%

Naivety   0.054   0.816

No	15	18.99%	8	53.33%	7	46.67%
Yes	64	81.01%	32	50.00%	32	50.00%

Appendix 11 Descriptive Statistics
Appendix 11.A Descriptive Statistics of the Sample in Experiment 1

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample in Experiment 1

		Full sample		Restrictive Visa Treatment		Liberal Visa Treatment		Classic TEG	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age		19.61905	3.86217	19.97895	5.45383	19.37209	1.38943	19.17241	2.18875
Gender									
	Male	0.3333333	0.47253	0.2947368	0.45834	0.372093	0.4862	0.3448276	0.48373
	Female	0.647619	0.47885	0.6631579	0.47514	0.627907	0.4862	0.6551724	0.48373
	Other	0.0190476	0.13702	0.0421053	0.20189	0	0	0	0
Race									
	Asian	0.0095238	0.09736	0.0105263	0.1026	0.0116279	0.10783	0	0

	Black	0.0285714	0.167	0.0421053	0.20189	0.0116279	0.10783	0.0344828	0.1857
	Hispanic	0.0095238	0.09736	0.0210526	0.14432	0	0	0	0
	Irish Traveler	0.0047619	0.06901	0	0	0.0116279	0.10783	0	0
	Multiple Ethnicity	0.0666667	0.25004	0.0631579	0.24454	0.0697674	0.25625	0.0689655	0.25788
	Prefer not to say	0.0047619	0.06901	0.0105263	0.1026	0	0	0	0
	White/Caucasian	0.8761905	0.33015	0.8526316	0.35635	0.8953488	0.3079	0.8965517	0.30993
Exchange Student		0.033333	0.17993	0.031579	0.17558	0.011628	0.10783	0.103448	0.30993
Irish Citizen		0.761905	0.42694	0.747368	0.43683	0.813953	0.39143	0.655172	0.48373
Immigration Background		0.1581395	0.36572	0.1789474	0.38534	0.1460674	0.35517	0.1290323	0.34078
Naivety		0.8325581	0.37424	0.8421053	0.36658	0.8539326	0.35517	0.7419355	0.4448

Political Affiliation	2.309524	1.2696	2.326316	1.224 24	2.325581	1.32347	2.206897	1.29227
N	215		95		89		31	

Appendix 11.B. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample in Experiment 2

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample in Experiment 2

	Full sample		Restrictive Visa Treatment		Liberal Visa Treatment		Classic TEG	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	20.12	2.66	20.02	1.24	20.30	2.45	19.95	5.21
Male	0.41	0.49	0.41	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.23	0.43
Female	0.56	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.73	0.46
Other	0.03	0.16	0.03	0.18	0.02	0.13	0.05	0.21
Asian	0.07	0.25	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.25	0.05	0.21
Black	0.03	0.18	0.03	0.18	0.02	0.13	0.09	0.29
Hispanic	0.01	0.12	0.02	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.21

Multiple Ethnicity	0.04	0.20	0.05	0.21	0.02	0.13	0.09	0.29
Prefer not to Say	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.13	0.05	0.22	0.00	0.00
White/Caucasian	0.82	0.39	0.81	0.40	0.85	0.36	0.73	0.46
Exchange Student	1.09	0.29	1.10	0.30	1.11	0.32	1.00	0.00
Irish Citizen	1.73	0.45	1.83	0.38	1.66	0.48	1.64	0.49
Immigration Background	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.39	0.18	0.39	0.17	0.39
Naivety	0.78	0.41	0.79	0.41	0.77	0.42	0.78	0.42
Political Affiliation	2.83	1.37	2.75	1.29	2.72	1.34	3.36	1.59
N	151		66		62		23	

Appendix 12: Data Quality Check

Appendix 12.A Data quality check for experiment 1

a) Visa application

The analysis of the visa application messages of participants in both of the treatments suggests a very strong engagement with the instructions. Taken together, the quality of responses is considerably high. Examples include:

1) "As a motivated hard-worker I am determined to contribute to the overall revenue by fairly paying my taxes as I have been in my previous country which unfortunately is not so developed."

2) "I wish to emigrate because I feel like my skills would be of great value in your country. I am an open person and would like to discover the culture of your country because I believe that it is fascinating. The economic growth of your country cannot be maintained without the help of immigrants and I believe that I have a lot to offer to your country. I have a university degree, I am well experienced on the job front so I will not require social welfare when I move, I plan on working straight away. Also, the current labour shortage in your country needs to be addressed with the acceptance of more immigrants."

3) "The low income I am earning is affecting my living standard and health in a negative way. I have skills which would be useful to Country B if I am allowed to emigrate there"

4) "My name is x, I would really like to move to Country B so as to achieve a better standing of living than my current country A for myself and my family. I'm an honest taxpayer who will continue to contribute to society after I move to your country. However, once in your country I will be able to pay my taxes at the official rate and still have enough money to live a more fulfilling life. I hope you will accept my application and let me become a part of your beautiful country."

b) Response time for instruction pages

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the number of seconds spent on the 6 key pages including the consent form, instruction pages and a page with comprehension questions. Following Brysbaert (2019) meta-analysis on the average reading speed, the data suggests that a vast majority of the respondents have read the instruction pages properly. According to Brysbaert (2019) study, an average person can read 238 words per minute. Given that all read-only pages (i.e those without an input requirement such as the case with the SJT questionnaire page and Comprehension questions page) have around 250 words or more, it is likely that the respondents made an effort to properly read and understand the content. Moreover, the average time spent on each page in comparison to the MTurk sample is always higher while the SD are considerably smaller suggesting a significant improvement in data quality.

Table 1: Response time for instruction pages in Experiment 1

	N	Mean	SD	MIN	MAX	No. of words
Consent Page	222	88.35135	40.84252	39	376	430
SJT Questionnaire	222	90.25225	35.11119	3	192	130
Instructions 1	191	55.50785	20.44579	2	113	341
Instructions 2	191	70.4712	34.73278	8	208	239
Instructions 3	222	113.3559	65.2162	15	706	275
Comprehension questions	222	19.86937	17.79486	4	156	135

Note: Values presented indicate the number of seconds spent on each page. Instructions 1 and Instructions 2 have a lower number of observations as the classic TEG control group does not have the additional instruction pages related to emigration.

Appendix 12.B. Data quality check for Experiment 2

    a) Visa application

Similarly to experiment 1, the analysis of the visa application messages of participants in both of the treatments suggests a very strong engagement with the instructions. Examples include:

1) "I wish to emigrate to Country B because I think corruption is the big bad. You should grant my visa because I want my taxed income to be used towards my community. I will be a good little citizen I promise."

2) "I want to guarantee that my tax money is being used to improve the living for all citizens living there. With how corrupt country A is, My tax money is not being used to improve our citizens' lives."

3) "I want to live in a country without corruption, I will be happier to pay all my taxes if I know that all my tax money will be used to improve the quality of life in my country (not to corrupted people)"

4) "I believe that paying taxes is fair and just and that those taxes should be put towards helping the general public. I have always declared my taxes fairly and will do so going forward."

b) Response time for instruction pages

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the number of seconds spent on the 6 key pages for participants in the second experiment. The results are largely the same as the results in the first experiment.

Table 2: Response time for instruction pages in Experiment 2

	N	Mean	SD	MIN	MAX	No. of words
Consent Page	162	73.37037	25.77685	9	173	430
SJT Questionnaire	162	70.78395	43.41147	1	211	130
Instructions 1	139	49.72662	31.67974	1	155	341
Instructions 2	139	63.57554	41.26408	2	220	252
Instructions 3	162	107.037	71.0407	2	513	367
Comprehension questions	162	23.2037	25.98928	2	180	135

Note: Values presented indicate the number of seconds spent on each page. Instructions 1 and Instructions 2 have a lower number of observations as the classic TEG control group does not have the additional instruction pages related to emigration.

Appendix 13: Determinants of Emigration Decision:

Appendix 13.A Experiment 1 Results

Table 1: Determinants of Emigration Decision for Experiment 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Demographic variables	Personality Traits	Combined
LVT	0.349	0.314	0.259
	(0.381)	(0.372)	(0.407)
Age	-0.047		-0.044
	(0.040)		(0.043)
Female	-0.870*		-0.457
	(0.471)		(0.526)
Black	-0.437		-0.304
	(1.092)		(1.138)
Hispanic/Latino	-0.925		-1.051
	(1.559)		(1.610)
Political Affiliation	-0.253*		-0.279
	(0.149)		(0.171)
Exchange Student	-0.605		-1.147
	(1.308)		(1.342)
Irish Citizen	-0.580		-0.599

	(0.565)		(0.586)
Non-naïve	-0.088		0.145
	(0.586)		(0.620)
Immigrant Background	0.316		0.117
	(0.595)		(0.639)
Session 2	-0.346	-0.023	-0.079
	(0.420)	(0.409)	(0.448)
Session 3	0.954*	1.067**	1.142*
	(0.558)	(0.497)	(0.594)
SJ		0.104	0.303
		(0.207)	(0.254)
Neuroticism		-0.200	-0.214
		(0.173)	(0.198)
Conscientiousness		-0.643***	-0.510*
		(0.237)	(0.265)
Agreeableness		-0.125	-0.141
		(0.224)	(0.242)
Extraversion		0.088	0.133
		(0.192)	(0.224)

Openness		0.256	0.159
		(0.206)	(0.220)
Constant	3.030**	2.288	3.775*
	(1.385)	(1.652)	(2.285)
Observations	162	179	160

Note: All models report the results of a logistic regression with session FE. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, p *<0.1 Reference group for LVT is RVT, for gender is male, for Race is White/Caucasian, for exchange student is non-exchange student for Irish Citizen is non-Irish citizen, for non-naive is naive, for immigrant background is non-immigrant background, and for session is session 1.

Appendix 13.B Experiment 2 Results

Table 2: Determinants of Emigration Decision for Experiment 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Demographic Variables	Personality Traits	Combined
LVT	0.24	0.17	0.26
	(0.45)	(0.40)	(0.49)
Age	0.04		0.00
	(0.14)		(0.16)
Female	1.56***		1.66***
	(0.53)		(0.63)
Other Gender	1.47		1.67
	(1.42)		(1.54)
Asian	0.38		0.73
	(0.97)		(1.03)
Multiple Ethnicity	-2.04		-2.09
	(1.31)		(1.27)
Prefer Not to Say	-1.73		-1.38
	(1.18)		(1.19)

Political Affiliation	0.09		0.21
	(0.18)		(0.20)
Exchange Student	3.49**		4.10**
	(1.52)		(1.69)
Irish Citizen	0.60		0.75
	(0.63)		(0.68)
Non-naïve	0.44		0.69
	(0.57)		(0.61)
Immigrant Background	0.62		0.33
	(0.70)		(0.74)
Session 2	-0.10	-0.92	-0.64
	(0.96)	(0.83)	(1.06)
Session 3	-0.19	-0.68	-0.77
	(0.79)	(0.66)	(0.89)
Session 4	-1.80	-0.50	-2.81*
	(1.48)	(1.04)	(1.64)
Session 5	-0.49	-0.63	-0.64
	(1.10)	(1.02)	(1.24)
Session 6	-1.69**	-1.50**	-2.61***

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(0.76)	(0.72)	(0.94)
SJ score		-0.22	-0.09
		(0.22)	(0.27)
Neuroticism		0.21	-0.03
		(0.21)	(0.28)
Conscientiousness		0.21	0.20
		(0.25)	(0.29)
Agreeableness		-0.01	-0.16
		(0.26)	(0.32)
Extraversion		0.32	0.37
		(0.23)	(0.28)
Openness		0.04	0.30
		(0.25)	(0.30)
Constant	-1.84	-0.60	-3.28
	(3.29)	(1.77)	(4.15)
Observations	120	122	119

Note: All models report the results of a logistic regression with session FE. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Reference group for LVT is RVT, for gender is male, for Race is White/Caucasian, for exchange student is non-exchange student for Irish Citizen is non-Irish citizen, for non-naive is naive, for immigrant background is non-immigrant background, and for session is session 1.

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