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Out of the Cave: Comparative Studies on the Themes of Unconcealment and Transcendence in Plato from a Heideggerian Perspective.



Submitted as a requirement for the degree of Ph.D., 2000

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Summary

In this dissertation I set out to establish a series of closely connected theses which will support the broad thesis of this work that Heidegger's thinking – especially in the period around *Being and Time* occupies a proximity with that of Plato. Some commentators have stated that Heidegger is hostile or antithetical to Plato and that his philosophy has a greater affinity with that of Aristotle. Here, I want to put this analysis to the test and argue for a greater affinity between the two thinkers.

There are broadly two areas where this productive comparison can be carried out. Heidegger states that any inquiry into beings must include the questioner. The scope of ontological inquiry is the whole and so the inquiry is always into the whole. The inquirer and that which is inquired into together form the whole. To this end I discover that both Plato and Heidegger can be richly compared here. Both thinkers carry out an existential analysis which is integral and organic to their conceptions of ontological inquiry. This theme runs throughout this dissertation and represents one strand of the main thesis – the proximity of Plato's and Heidegger's thinking of being.

The second strand broadly takes up the question of transcendence in Plato and Heidegger and again with the same goal in mind; to show an important congruence between Plato and Heidegger in their respective ontological researches. This involves an analysis of a number of related issues; the question of ontological difference in Heidegger and the concomitant difference between the Idea of the Good and the ideas. For Plato and for Heidegger the Idea of the Good and Being are the names for something unique. I also examine the issue of finitude in Heidegger and mortality and divinity in Plato in order to highlight some strong similarities and their significance. I want to argue for a fruitful application of Heidegger's analysis of transcendence and finitude with Plato's treatment of the *Epekeina* and its relationship to mortal limit.

I am able to demonstrate that Heidegger is not hostile to Plato, *contra* some critics, and that there is considerable grounds for saying that the two philosophers share a common conception of the scope and method of philosophical inquiry. I argue on two

main points for this thesis: 1. That both philosophers insist that existential analysis is an essential part of ontological inquiry, and, 2. That both philosophers preserve the ontological difference, i.e. the difference between being as such and the being of beings.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank everyone who supported me over the years; especially to John Dillon, my supervisor who was always there to lend every assistance and encouragement, and who introduced me to the world of the Platonic Demiurge, a truly amazing gift. I want also to thank my friends and colleagues; Klaus Corcilius, Christoph Helmig, and Dr. Vasilis Politis, who all made the academic year 1999-2000 the most memorable so far.

My thanks and heartfelt appreciation to my friends outside of academe, especially; to John Connolly, John Nugent, and Bill Collins. Very special thanks to Patrick Healy whose friendship and encouragement over the years has been inestimable. I also want to pay tribute to the memory of a friend who passed away in 1997, Gerald Doyle.

Finally, to my wife Anu and my three girls Olga, Sofia, and Lilja. No words could express what I owe them for making this possible, I dedicate this, and all my work to them.

Preface

In this dissertation I set out to establish a series of closely connected theses which will support the broad thesis of this work that Heidegger's thinking – especially in the period around *Being and Time* occupies a proximity with that of Plato. Some commentators have stated that Heidegger is hostile or antithetical to Plato and that his philosophy has a greater affinity with that of Aristotle. While it is beyond dispute that Aristotle is extremely important for Heidegger it is not at all certain that Heidegger could be described as hostile to Plato. Not only do I seek to criticise this view but I also set out to show that Heidegger's thinking is oriented in proximity to Plato's. Heidegger is involved in a life-long engagement or *Auseinandersetzung* with Plato which is highly productive for his broader philosophical project of effecting a retrieval or *Wiederholung* of the original scope and theme of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy which Heidegger takes as representing the summit of the ancient Greek meditation on being.

There are broadly two areas where this productive comparison can be carried out. Heidegger states that any inquiry into beings must include the questioner. The scope of ontological inquiry is the whole and so the inquiry is always into the whole. The inquirer and that which is inquired into together form the whole. Heidegger charges the Cartesian philosophy of the subject with partiality and a kind of dogmatism. Descartes exposes everything to a kind of skepticism except the subject or the *ego cogito*. This is never subjected to doubt - it is taken to be the most indubitable of all - and so is never placed forward as a theme for ontological inquiry, instead the *cogito* comes to take on the function of the *hupokeimenon* (primary substance). Descartes does not question *behind* the *cogito*. Heidegger says that the ancients maintained that any inquiry was also an inquiry into the questioner and that overcoming the philosophy of the subject will involve a restoration of the wholeness of inquiry. To this end I discover that both Plato and Heidegger can be richly compared here. Both thinkers carry out an existential analysis which is integral and organic to their conceptions of ontological inquiry. This theme runs

throughout this dissertation and represents one strand of the main thesis – the proximity of Plato's and Heidegger's thinking of being.

The second strand broadly takes up the question of transcendence in Plato and Heidegger and again with the same goal in mind; to show an important congruence between Plato and Heidegger in their respective ontological researches. This involves an analysis of a number of related issues; the question of ontological difference in Heidegger and the concomitant difference between the Idea of the Good and the ideas. For Plato and for Heidegger the Idea of the Good and Being are the names for something unique. I also examine the issue of finitude in Heidegger and mortality and divinity in Plato in order to highlight some strong similarities and their significance. I want to argue for a fruitful application of Heidegger's analysis of transcendence and finitude with Plato's treatment of the *Epekeina* and its relationship to mortal limit.

In Section one I take up some very general questions, but principally two. I raise some issues concerning Plato's text, specifically some of the special hermeneutical difficulties posed by his use of the dramatic dialogue form. I seek to show here how Plato's conception of philosophical writing indicates the provisional and open-ended nature of philosophical inquiry, and, how the dramatic dialogue successfully depicts the wholeness of philosophical inquiry by representing philosophy as an activity carried out by different types of people in concrete situations often, for example, taking as its starting point some common opinion or traditional saying. The dialogue effectively represents these pre-theoretical origins for philosophical questioning and their significance.

The next part of the section is devoted to a discussion of some basic concepts and hermeneutic principles that Heidegger uses in his own philosophy, but, also, to those he uses in his interpretations of ancient philosophy. I take a close look at his understanding of the terms *phenomena* and *logos* which together form the word phenomenology. This is important because Heidegger describes phenomenology as being *the* philosophical method. He says that it is not so much the innovative methodology of a modern philosophical movement going under the name 'Phenomenology' but the retrieval and

restoration of the original Greek comportment towards beings. I look closely at the issue of *logos* in Plato and how Heidegger interprets this, and I also suggest that Plato and Heidegger have a similar attitude to the phenomenon of tradition.

In section two I take up the question of existential analysis in the Platonic dialogues. Heidegger says that all metaphysical questioning is always a questioning into the whole and every question is itself always the whole. 'Every metaphysical question is also there within the question, that is, is placed in question' and he goes on to say that 'metaphysical inquiry must be posed as a whole and from the essential position of the existence that questions.' For Heidegger this necessitates an existential analysis of Dasein (human being) as a basis for ontological inquiry. I want to show that this is also what Plato is doing in the dialogues and that this is a very important common feature of their respective philosophies. I suggest that the character of Socrates in the dialogues can be understood as representing authentic Dasein and that discussions of an ethical nature as well as discussions of the soul are part of Plato's existential analysis. Most of all I suggest that the person of the character 'Socrates' is the basis of his analysis. For that reason I look closely at the *Apology* where Socrates speaks at length about the origins and the meaning of his philosophical life.

In section 3 I introduce a most important theme not only for Heidegger's understanding of the Greeks but for his own philosophy, and which remained a central theme of his thinking for his whole life. I look at Heidegger's analysis of *aletheia* in his essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* (1931) and at other texts from this period. I also discuss the objections to his thesis: that a transformation in the meaning of *aletheia* occurs with Plato. I argue that if there is an ambiguity in the meaning of *aletheia* – and I suggest that there is - then this can open up the Cave image from the *Republic* in a way that can effect a reappraisal of the Idea of the Good and the issues of transcendence and finitude. I seek to show that an alignment is possible here between Plato and Heidegger.

In section 4 I take up the image of the Cave directly and examine some of the elements use quite closely and seek to show the significance of these for this study. I am

especially interested in the significance of the image itself; what it refers to, of temporality within the cave, the two-foldedness or ambiguity of the Idea of the Good which is introduced earlier (509b), and the question of the *epekeina* or transcendence; its meaning for Heidegger and its possible meaning for Plato.

In the final section I take up the issue of finite transcendence and relate this to the question of the *a priori* and Platonic recollection. This section is largely taken up with investigating a claim that Heidegger makes in the course of a lecture in 1929 when he says, that the Platonic demiurge, or creative principle, is identical with the Idea of the Good. I look at the ancient evidence for this view and find that it is not eccentric to Heidegger. I investigate the implications of this, and in the absence of a detailed justification for this statement by Heidegger, I attempt to find a plausible explanation for the meaning of this suppose identity. Pursuant to this aim, I then move on to look at the concept of intuition that Kant puts forward and by taking up Heidegger's commentary on intuition in Kant, I discover a way of justifying Heidegger's assertion about this relationship of identity. I finish by reviewing the main points of this dissertation with particular emphasis on what I believe to be an original contribution to the relevant scholarship. Throughout, I am able to show that Heidegger is not hostile to Plato, *contra* some critics, and that there is considerable grounds for saying that the two philosophers share a common conception of the scope and method of philosophical inquiry. I argue on two main points for this thesis: 1. That both philosophers insist that existential analysis is an essential part of ontological inquiry, and, 2. That both philosophers preserve the ontological difference, i.e. the difference between being as such and the being of beings.

1.0: Introduction: Aims and Layout of this Section.

In this section I set out to present some general observations about Plato and Heidegger that will serve to supply a hermeneutic basis for the thesis proper. I raise questions about Plato's philosophical writings like; how are we to assess philosophical texts that take the form of dramatic dialogues; what is the meaning of the dialogue form and how does this relate to Plato's conception of philosophy? In the last number of years there has been a growing recognition of the importance of investigating the meaning of the dialogue form in any assessment of Plato's philosophy. There is now broad agreement that the form of the dialogue is philosophically significant and that disregarding the dramatic and dialogical aspect of Plato's writing will inevitably result in a lopsided interpretation of his philosophy. Much of my discussion of Plato in this introductory section will be concerned with setting out some of the details of this insight and taking note of some of the recent scholarship. When these matters have been presented I will then turn towards giving a presentation of some elements of Heidegger's philosophy which are relevant for this dissertation.

It will be necessary for this thesis to outline some of the main elements of Heidegger's philosophy especially for the period 1924 up to the early 1930's in this introductory section. This period begins with a lecture course on Plato's *Sophist* and continues through *Being and Time* (1927) and follows on to essays like *What is Metaphysics?* (1929), *On the Essence of Truth* (1930) and *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* (1931-32). The hub of this period is his great work *Being and Time*; everything leads into and out from this work and one can observe through his lectures of the 1920's the origin of many of the concerns that are given formal treatment in that incomplete *magnum opus*. The special interest here is in Heidegger's encounter with Plato and Aristotle and how this informs his own thinking in an extremely far-reaching way. One of the tasks in this section then is to set forth the main elements of Heidegger's philosophy at this time and to concentrate in particular on those elements which directly derive from Plato and Aristotle and which are relevant to this thesis. The abbreviated nature of such a presentation means that inevitably this exposition will be highly selective and should not

be taken as anything like a proper exposition of Heidegger's philosophy at this time. For the most part this will involve following Heidegger's analysis of the term 'phenomenology' into its constituent elements, *phainomena* and *logos*. I will also present here some of Heidegger's hermeneutic principles which bear on his Platonic interpretations in particular his controversial procedure whereby he gains access to Plato through Aristotle contrary to the usual practice of coming to Plato from the Presocratics. Another important consideration is the meaning of tradition and 'hermeneutic situation' in Heidegger's thought and again there will be an exposition of these related concepts, and, in particular, how we may detect a similar understanding in Plato of the meaning of tradition.

1.1: The Hermeneutic Situation: General Considerations Towards the Interpretation of Plato's Dialogues.

What follows here is a survey of a number of issues important to Platonic interpretation and to the study of ancient philosophy generally. How are we to interpret a Platonic dialogue (or indeed any ancient philosophical text for that matter) and why does Plato choose the dialogue form? Can we take these dialogues as repositories of the authors own doctrines or do they have some other function, propaedeutic as John Fisher suggests; the aporetic nature of the discussions dissolves any preconceptions and induces an understanding of the real nature of Socratic ignorance.[1] In this way the reader is brought into Socratic ignorance as the vital and primary condition for doing genuine philosophy. In this sense one could also speak about their cathartic function.

There is also the difficult question concerning the relation between Socrates and Plato: does the Socrates of the dialogues represent the historical Socrates, or to what extent does he represent him and to what extent does he fictionalise him? This raises the question of

[1] For a description of the dialogues as 'a propaedeutic to dialectic.', see John Fisher 'Plato on Writing and Doing Philosophy.' *Journal of the History of Ideas* 27 1966: pp. 163-72.

the *corpus* as a whole; how are we to understand the significant changes in content and dramatisation between the dialogues? The most commonly accepted method at the moment is to understand the *corpus* on the basis of a concept of development – that Plato develops from a more or less Socratic to a distinctly Platonic position – which in turn raises the question of the chronology of composition. This is by no means the only way in which to understand the *corpus* as a whole; the ancient tradition, for example, ordered the dialogues thematically. They do not seem to be concerned with Plato's development or the order in which he wrote the dialogues rather they order the *corpus* on the basis of subject matter but also on what they take to be the purpose of the dialogue.[2] In his general survey Diogenes divides the dialogues into two main categories; those for instruction and those for inquiry. He then further subdivides them – the latter into theoretical and practical. The theoretical is further divided into the physical and the logical while the practical divides into the ethical and the political. The instructive dialogues divide into the maieutic and the speculative. The controversial dialogues are divided into those which raise objections another which undermines the main position (III.49). I mention this because later, in Section 2 of this work, I suggest another way of understanding the *corpus* which does not depend on the contemporary development hypothesis. I do not propose a restoration of the ancient schemes but I do argue for a scheme that places more emphasis on theme than on a development hypothesis. In no way does Heidegger concern himself with these questions, these concerns relate only to the thesis that I am pursuing in this dissertation concerning the holism of Plato's questioning which I want to positively compare to Heidegger's, that is, always including the questioner (Dasein) in any questioning. In particular I will argue that understanding the *corpus* thematically and in comparison with Heidegger's division of inquiry, a new fundamental division will emerge; dialogues treating of existential analysis and dialogues treating of ontological inquiry as such. These categories could be further subdivided along the sort of lines that Diogenes (and indeed many contemporary commentators) employs, e.g. maieutic, aporetic, agonistic etc. The fundamental distinction I make above therefore would diminish concern for the compositional order of the dialogues, although

[2] Diogenes Laertius makes some general remarks about ordering and then discusses in detail the schemes of Thrasylus, Favorinus and Aristophanes the Grammarian; *Diog. Laert.* III. 49 – 62.

it might still be convenient to refer to dialogues as middle or late. The dialogues can certainly be understood thematically and even in thematic relation to each other – although of course there would also be exegetical problems here – but in the absence of any clear authorial signalling, or indeed enough secondary testimony, as to the order of composition, the solution to the question of chronology seems satisfactory settlement.[3] This opens the way toward treating of the early and some of the middle period dialogues – all those of a distinctly Socratic character – in terms of an existential analysis. The question of Plato's existential analysis is the theme of Section 2 of this work.

1.2: Why does Plato Write Dialogues?

One question that has received a great deal of attention in the last two decades has been the question of the dialogue form itself. This shift in attention towards the question of the dialogue form itself in its most modern form is largely due to the influence of two influential figures; Hans Georg Gadamer and Leo Strauss who were both Heidegger's students.[4] Gadamer as a former student of Heidegger's has carried on somewhat in the tradition of his teacher directing his attention to a comprehensive theory of hermeneutics and to a thoroughgoing re-interpretation of Plato and Aristotle that sets out a complete re-evaluation of the Plato- Aristotle relationship.

Due in part to their influence – and other factors - Platonic scholarship in the latter part of this century has seen a growing interest in what could be described as the hermeneutics

[3] New primary evidence could advance the quest for a solution to the question of chronology but the chances of such surfacing – the discovery of significant texts for example, seems remote. Ordering the dialogues thematically would not be without its problems either, most famously in modern times, the long running difficulties in establishing the theme of the *Phaedrus*.

[4] The structural identity of the dialogue form and the Platonic dialectic is made thematic by H. G. Gadamer in his collection *Dialogue and Dialectic* and many other works throughout a long career. One hundred years old now, Gadamer was formed in a world that is far away; late Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany: Paul Natorp was his Ph.D supervisor while Heidegger supervised his *Habilitationsschrift*. Gadamer continues to be a fresh and powerful influence in Platonic scholarship, taking an active interest in new developments despite his advanced years. Leo Strauss was also a student of Heidegger. Strauss had to leave Nazi Germany because of its murderous campaign against the Jews and he settled in America. Over the years he established himself as one of the leading political philosophers of pronounced conservative leanings. Though many of his students went on to become Platonic scholars his methods and ideas continue to have enormous influence in the Political Science departments of American universities. His best known students or scholars influenced by his work in Platonic scholarship, would be Allan Bloom, Stanley Rosen, Drew Hyland, and Zdravko Planinc

of the dialogical. An increasing body of work seeks to highlight and direct attention towards the significance and importance of Plato's decision to write in dialogue form rather than, say, the treatise or some form of poetic meter.[5] Much of this work is the result of a growing dissatisfaction with the various strategies that tended to take the dialogues as doctrinal expositions, that Socrates was more or less the spokesman of Plato, or that the dialogues contained Plato's 'philosophical system', a view that had a powerful influence in the 19th century especially amongst German scholars.[6] Whatever about the merits of the various positions being criticised or the criticisms themselves, this current of activity has certainly re-opened some basic questions about how we understand the dialogues: why did Plato choose to write philosophy in this way, are they expositions of Plato's philosophy in more or less systematic form or does Plato choose the dramatic mode in order to maintain a distance from what is being expressed? I think much of this could be reduced to a single question, which I now take up: what is the meaning of the dialogue form?

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[5] See especially the collection edited by Charles Griswold Jr. *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings* (NY, 1988) which could be read as a manifesto of the new directions and a challenge to the Anglo-American orthodoxy: it brings together the works of a wide group of scholars but perhaps one of the greatest strengths of this collection is in the way it opens a dialogue with orthodox scholars in the second part: Richard Kraut, Terence Irwin, Paul Woodruff, Kenneth Dorter, and Nicholas P. White each respond to critical readings of their works. The *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 1986 - .ed. John J. Cleary, are also very representative of a dialogical approach building on the work and influence of Hans Georg Gadamer and promoting dialogue between different interpretative traditions.

[6] Tigerstedt gives a good account of the 19th century in *PI*. On Socrates as Plato's spokesman, for example, Vlastos; '. . . in any given dialogue Plato allows the persona of Socrates only what he (Plato), at the time, considers true . . .' and on this principle he places the whole weight of his interpretation, 'This is the grand methodological hypothesis on which my whole interpretation of Socrates-in-Plato is predicated.' Gregory Vlastos *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Cambridge, 1991): 117 and n 50. Vlastos' methodology has an ancient lineage; Diogenes Laertius states 'His (Plato's) own views are expounded by four persons, Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger, and the Eleatic Stranger', *Diog. Laert.* III. 52. Gerald Press gives a thorough account of the background to this fundamental shift in later twentieth century Plato scholarship and gives a comprehensive overview of the state of Platonic research to date. Gerald A. Press 'The State of the Question in the Study of Plato' in *CA* Vol. I = *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 34 (1996), 507-32. Press fills in the gaps in Tigerstedt's account particularly for the post-war period.

1.3: The Hermeneutics of Silence: Plato's Philosophic Writing

In this subsection I want to consider the *meaning* of the formal dialogical presentation of Plato's philosophical inquiries and on the basis of these considerations draw a comparison between Plato and Heidegger which will establish that both thinkers understand philosophy to be intrinsically open-ended. As has often been noted about the dialogues, Plato nowhere speaks in his own voice, dramatic illusion is maintained throughout.[7] These considerations will have bearing on this thesis for Heidegger proposes a unified theme for the *Phaedrus* and invokes the *Seventh Letter* in his discussions that I introduce below. In literary terms these are dramatic pieces in which rounded characters enact philosophical scenarios where not only the arguments, but the *way* the arguments are put forward as well as the character of the speakers, the setting and the occasion, become determinations in the philosophical meaning of the text. Socrates speaks, for example, in a rather different way to Callicles than he does to Theaetetus, the character of his interlocutor is a crucial factor in the manner in which Socrates converses. Whatever else could be said about this, for certain, it is the character of these interlocutors which determines Socrates whole manner and approach to the matters at hand as the following passage from the *Phaedrus* will show. Even the Eleatic Stranger who appears more distanced than Socrates from his interlocutor states that his mode of discourse will be determined by the nature of his interlocutor (*Soph.* 217 d-e) but for Socrates what could be termed the psycho-erotics of his discourse is a central issue. In the *Phaedrus* Socrates says that one must have a familiarity with the different soul-types and that a λόγος must be tailored in such a way as to take into account the effect on the listener:

> 'Since the function of oratory is in fact to influence men's souls, the intending orator must know what types of souls there are . . . these are of a determinate

[7] Ludwig Edelstein's 'Platonic Anonymity' *AJP* 83 (1962), 1-22 deals specifically with the question of Plato's anonymity or what could be described as authorial absence.

number . . . their variety results in a variety of individuals . . . to the types of souls thus discriminated there corresponds a determinate number of types of discourse' (*Phaedr.* 271c-d)

Socrates repeats this requirement when he sums up the results of the preceding inquiry into rhetoric in order to elaborate the only legitimate rhetoric, that is, the philosophic rhetoric which aims at instruction and bringing the hearer closer to the truth (*Phaedr.* 277c; 277e-278d).

Even with the Letters – the question of authenticity being put to one side for the moment – there is authorial distancing when the subject matter is philosophical, notably in the *Seventh Letter*. In the *Seventh Letter* there is a structural resemblance to dialogue in the matter of σκοπός, or theme, and the use of digression as Robert Brumbaugh has noted.[8] Brumbaugh takes up a suggestion put forward by Egil Wyller and Jacob Klein that the main business of a dialogue occurs in the quantitative center of the piece, which, with the *Theaetetus* occurs with the digression as it does in the *Seventh Letter*.[9]

The myth of the origin of writing in *Phaedrus* 274b ff. and the discussion that follows, is a key passage that bears on this, as is the 'philosophical digression' in the disputed *Seventh Letter*.[10] With this passage from the *Phaedrus*, Plato provides us with the

[8]Robert S. Brumbaugh 'Digression and Dialogue: The *Seventh Letter* and Plato's Literary Form' in *PWPR*, 84-92.

[9]This is also true of the *Republic*, the middle occurs around 474b which commences a digression about the nature of the philosopher. At 484a, which marks the beginning of Bk. VI, Socrates describes the preceding section as a 'long way round'. This digression is of vital importance in that it sets up all that follows which is of course the introduction of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ beginning at 507b ff. As 474b ff is linked up explicitly with 484a ff. the great expository discussion of Bks. VI and VII can be taken as digressive and so according to Wyller's and Klein's hermeneutic principle comprises the real substance of the dialogue. Of course no matter how sound this insight it cannot take precedence over the philosophical interpretation which must remain primary.

[10] As for the Epistles, their authenticity is still very much in dispute and probably always will be. On the question of authenticity, each letter is usually considered on its own merits. The *Seventh Letter* is the one with the most defenders, and, because of its so-called 'philosophical digression' (342a-344e), also happens to be the one of greatest interest. Edelstein's monograph devoted to the *Seventh Letter*, the authenticity of which he rejects, makes the point that there is no extra-textual evidence against authenticity and that ultimately acceptance or rejection rests purely on interpretation (p.2.). His grounds for rejection, which in the final analysis seems the only convincing one, is that the 'philosophical digression' is too one-sided and dogmatic to be Plato; Ludwig Edelstein. *Plato's Seventh Letter*. Leiden, 1976. The weight of modern

hermeneutic key to understanding his conception of writing, its role and limitations.[11] Socrates disavowed writing throughout his philosophical career preferring the superiority of the spoken discourse for its 'unquestioned legitimacy'. This, according to Socrates, is the sort of discourse '...that goes together with knowledge, and is written in the soul of the learner, that can defend itself, and knows to whom it should speak and to whom it should say nothing.' Phaedrus agrees that this is '...no dead discourse, but the living speech, the original of which the written discourse may fairly be called a kind of image' (*Phaedr.* 276a-276b). Texts are mute, they cannot be questioned and they cannot be prevented from falling into the wrong hands; 'a thing put in writing...drifts all over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have no business with it; it doesn't know how to address the right people, and not address the wrong. And when it is ill-treated and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its help, being unable to defend or help itself. ' (*Phaedr.* 275e). The dialogue form, it seems, is Plato's way of overcoming the kind of ambiguous effects that writing, of its nature, produces and which are expressed by Socrates in the *Phaedrus*. Written words can do no more '...than remind one who knows that which the writing is concerned with' (*Phaedr.* 275d).

Regarding the authenticity of the *Seventh Letter*, two things seem fairly certain; either it was authored by Plato himself, or, by someone very close to him. Someone who was anxious to defend Plato against criticism for his involvement with Dionysius of Syracuse and, in Guthrie's words, '...to compress into a few pages the essence of his later philosophy'.[12] Although Edelstein offers the most formidable case against authenticity,

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scholarly opinion seems to favour authenticity: Hackforth defends the letter on philological grounds (cited in Edelstein *PSL* p.76 n14) while Guthrie in *History of Greek Philosophy.* Vol. V Cambridge, 1978: p.402 n.1 states '... no one but Plato could or would have written like this, and the passage (342a-344e) gives us no less than his own attempt to compress into a few pages the essence of his later philosophy, but Gulley *P* I, ch.5. rejects it on historiographical and philological grounds, while White tentatively accepts it, at the same time acknowledging that the 'philosophical digression' is the main obstacle to acceptance; White, Nicholas P. *Plato on Knowledge and Reality.* Indianapolis, 1976:p.200. Heidegger himself, it should be noted, accepts the authenticity of the *Seventh Letter.*

11 'Plato's decision to write, and to write dialogues, can be understood on the basis of the *Phaedrus* itself if the reader is prepared to compare what Plato has his characters *in* the *Phaedrus* say with the fact that they are "saying" it in a *written* text whose form is that of a dialogue.' Charles Griswold Jr., *Self- Knowledge in Plato's 'Phaedrus.'* New Haven, 1986: p.219.

12 Guthrie, *HGP* Vol. V. p.402 n.1.

this commentator comes down on the side of authenticity for it does not speak against the dialogues and has received eminent defence on philological grounds.[13]

One of the effects of the dialogue form is to render it difficult to straightforwardly identify the author's views with those of the leading character. This does not mean that the chief interlocutor does not play a vital role in introducing elements of the author's own views on certain questions. This has a twofold significance; it makes it difficult to speak with any certainty about the author's doctrine (the charge against Dionysius that he does), and this, in turn, shifts attention away from the author or main character and onto the matters themselves, cultivating a kind of objectivity. Plato's expressed concern in the *Seventh Letter* seems to be with the dangers of people pretending to philosophy yet sparing themselves the labours of philosophising and what the consequences of that would be. Dionysius is not only guilty of wearing borrowed plumes but of getting things wrong precisely because he has not worked through the matters himself, he merely glides along the surface of things.[14] At 341b Plato makes the point that we find in the *Phaedrus* concerning certain kinds of 'dead' discourse;

> 'I certainly did not set forth to him (Dionysius) all my doctrines, nor did (he) ask me to, for he pretended to know many of the most important points already and to be adequately grounded in them by means of the secondhand interpretations he had got from others' (*Ep.* VII, 341b; tr. Post).

Dionysius' 'philosophical knowledge' is entirely second hand, based on the interpretations he had heard or read by others of what they deemed to be Plato's own thinking. He has no familiarity with the matters themselves, he has not 'uncovered' the matters himself rather conceiving himself to be knowledgeable on the basis of other

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[13] See note 12 above. Also Wilamowitz and Friedländer cited in Tigerstedt *IP* pp. 46-47 and philosophical defenders like Gadamer in H.G. Gadamer. *Dialogue and Dialectic.* tr. P. Christopher Smith New Haven, 1986: pp. 93-123 and Zdravko Planinc *Plato's Political Philosophy.* Missouri, 1991: p.269 n.10, 'the digression is perhaps the best hermeneutical key available for unlocking the meaning of Plato's dialogues'

[14] In this Dionysius is involved in a form of what Heidegger calls *Gerede* or chatter, in this case, philosophical *Gerede*. I discuss this concept in Section 2 below.

people's intellectual digestive systems.[15] This could be part of the reason why Plato must writes dialogues, to prevent his writing, as far as possible, from being used a source of philosophical doctrines by the likes of Dionysius:

> 'One statement at any rate I can make in regard to all who have written or who may write with a claim to knowledge of the subjects to which I devote myself – no matter how they pretend to have acquired it, whether from my instruction or from others or by their own discovery. Such writers can in my opinion have no real acquaintance with the subject. I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way of putting it in words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when suddenly (ἐξαίφνης), like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining.' (*Ep.* VII, 241b-d)[16]

In these passage a great deal is revealed not only about the authorial decisions concerning the dialogue form but also about the conception of philosophy that underpins those decisions and the need for circumspection in the practice of philosophical writing.[17]

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[15] 'Uncovering' here refers to Heidegger's translation of ἀληθεύειν as it used by Aristotle in Book VI of the *Nicomachaean Ethics* where he examines the various modes in which this is carried out. There is an extensive discussion of this in section 3 below, 'Heidegger's Analysis of Ἀλήθεια in Plato and Aristotle'.

[16] I examine the significance of ἐξαίφνης further below in section 4.

[17] This authorial self-consciousness is certainly not a peculiarity of Plato's for example; Clem. Al. *Strom.* I. i. 15, 1 Clement says, 'There are some things which my work will speak in riddles; to some it will display in a hidden fashion, to show while keeping silence'. Talking about the notion of secrecy in ancient texts, especially the sacred, Bruns says this: 'What do you do when the text you are studying doesn't make sense? Answer; you are now in the presence of the book's most sacred portion: you have come upon one of its secrets, and must now begin to ponder in earnest - to search the scriptures.' Gerald L. Bruns. *Inventions: Writing, Textuality, and Understanding in Literary History.* New Haven, 1982: p.18. Leo Strauss has made this feature of pre-modern writing a matter of central importance if we are to divine a writer's true meaning. Leo Strauss *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Westport, Conn., 1973; originally published in 1952). Strauss talks about the difference between Plato and Socrates in this matter: 'The crucial difficulty was created by the political or social status of philosophy: in the nations and cities of Plato's time, there was no freedom of teaching and investigation. Socrates was therefore confronted with the alternative, whether he should choose security and life, and thus conform with the false opinions and the wrong way of life of his fellow citizens, or else non-conformity and death. Socrates chose non-conformity and death. Plato found a solution to the problem posed by the fate of Socrates, in founding the virtuous city in speech: only in that "other city" can man reach his perfection.' P.16. Strauss argues throughout his book, which discusses Maimonides and Spinoza, that this has been the situation right up to relatively recent times - the development of the liberal society - but that before, writers and thinkers had to be circumspect in how they

Further below in the section 'Heidegger's Analysis of Ἀλήθεια in Plato and Aristotle' with reference to Book VI of the *Ethics*, I trace how Heidegger finds the distinction in Aristotle between primary and secondary uncovering (ἀληθεύειν) denoting the difference between σοφία and ἐπιστήμη. Applying this Aristotelian distinction here could be useful; it is as if Dionysius is treating philosophy as an ἐπιστήμη. The danger Plato points out above is of the situation that arises if one regards philosophy as a job of learning, that one can learn off philosophy as if it were like learning mathematics (where the mathematician, in Aristotle's analysis, does not need to be able to give an account of the ἀρχαί of his objects, he does not need to re-discover them for himself before he can become a mathematician, they can be taken as given *Nic. Eth.* VI., 3 *passim*). The point, as Aristotle makes it in the *Ethics*, is that ἐπιστήμη can be *learned* without the learner performing a primary uncovering (ἀληθεύειν). Dionysius fancies that he has learned something about the ultimate object of philosophy on the basis of second-hand accounts, and ,it is this which Heidegger terms *Gerede* or 'chatter', the idle passing on from one to another of what has been heard or read; that which pushes out essential and uncovering discourse.[18] Plato's point here would surely be that the ultimate object of philosophy which is the meditation on being cannot be learned, cannot be taught, and perhaps cannot even be spoken about except perhaps to one who has also followed the arduous path up to the vision of that which lies ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσιας (*Rep.* VI, 509b). In this sense, which is at bottom a Plotinian standpoint, the doing of philosophy is of a preparatory nature, it is propaedeutic to the vision of the Good or the One. Plotinus tells us that at this point words, or language, fail:

> '. . . We do not state it; we have neither knowledge nor intellection of it . . . we can and do state what it is not, while we are silent as to what it is' (Plot. *Enn.* V.3.14f)

In this view how could Plato possibly commit the very essence of his philosophy to writing? All that can be achieved then, would be perhaps a description of the path the

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treated of sensitive matters. The situations of Gallileo and Bruno are perhaps the best known from early modern times.

way of philosophy but not the final goal as it were.[19] If this is the case then it is not so very far away from Heidegger's project; he constantly stressed the importance of beginnings, that we are always underway, and that what he wrote were not works but ways; "Ways – not works" is the motto the elderly Heidegger chose for his *Gesamtausgabe*.[20] Similarly – and because of the reasons given above – Plato cannot bring philosophy to closure for that would imply an account of the Good. Formally the dialogue has this quality of representing this open-endedness of philosophy. It is particularly well-suited to a questioning that preserves the undecidability of some matters that nevertheless heightens the question-worthiness of those very matters that must remain open to continuous questioning. This is so close to Heidegger's conception of philosophy that it is to be remarked as puzzling that commentators have not highlighted this more clearly.[21] To conclude this point; both Plato and Heidegger take philosophy to be an open-ended *activity* and philosophical writing can only be a description of ways as opposed to something like closed bodies of doctrine or systems.

1.4: Textual-Hermeneutical Situation of the Platonic Dialogues

The final point that I wish to make concerning the dialogue form in Plato concerns the matter of the wholeness of metaphysical questioning. In his inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1929 under the title *Was ist Metaphysik* Heidegger makes a key statement about the wholeness of metaphysical inquiry:

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[18] I discuss *Gerede* below in section 2.

[19] If by Platonic here we mean that Plato conceives of philosophy as a means to bring the practitioner towards a vision of the Good, which, if it is 'beyond being' cannot itself be accounted for discursively (*Rep* VI. 509b). I look closer at this theme in the section 4

[20] Kisiel, *GH*BT: 3

[21] It may be remarked here that Heidegger's decision not to include indices to the *GA* volumes has some bearing on this question. Heidegger was anxious that his work not be used as a source for 'Heidegger's philosophy'.

The dramatic dialogue with characters, setting of place and time, along with the main theme and digressions constitutes a kind of situatedness of inquiry. The dramatic dialogue form enables Plato to retain the wholeness of metaphysical questioning

In the inaugural public lecture given in Freiburg in 1929 under the title *Was ist Metaphysik?*

> 'First, every metaphysical question always encompasses the whole range of metaphysical problems. Each question is itself always the whole. Therefore, second, every metaphysical question can be asked only in such a way that the questioner as such is also there within the question, that is, is placed in question. From this we conclude that metaphysical inquiry must be posed as a whole and from the essential position of the existence (Dasein) that questions.'

This reiterates the thesis of *Being and Time* that a fundamental ontology must proceed from an analysis of Dasein, but it also points the way to a deeper understanding of the conception of philosophy and therefore philosophical writing that we have in the Platonic dialogues. Plato inaugurates metaphysical inquiry and he does so from the 'essential position of the existence that questions'. This, I suggest, would be a useful way in understanding the role of the 'Socrates' who does not know, who lives according to a divine command, who always begins with the 'common sense' view soon discovering its inadequacy, and who enters into dialogue with a wide range of different people about issues of an ethical, or, existential nature. This 'Socratic' aspect of the dialogues most of which are regarded as early or middle period dialogues I want to designate as belonging to Plato's existential analysis. The example of the *Phaedo* demonstrates the unity and wholeness of Plato's metaphysical inquiry. The *Phaedo* treats of such existential themes as mortality (Dasein's finitude) as well as ontology (the ideas hypothesis) in the same dialogue and such a way that one necessitates the other. The discussion about mortality leads to the introduction of the ideas. Conversely, many of the Socratic inquiries are

aporetic because the matters under discussion cannot be resolved without a more fundamental questioning at the ontological level.

Plato ensures that we never lose sight of the essential unity of beings; whenever we inquire into the being of something, the inquiry into the being of man or Dasein is always co-present. The disclosure of the being of beings in Plato occurs through λέγειν which involves a structuredness in the being itself but also in the disclosure in such a way that the structuredness of the being determines the manner of its disclosure for Dasein. The being of the being that questions, i.e. Dasein, is related to the being of the beings it encounters through the λόγος , so that each question derives from the whole range of questions and must be 'returned' to the whole from which it is drawn as, for example, in the *Sophist*, where the Eleatic Stranger warns against the isolation of elements in discourse and the meaninglessness that follows (here, of course, he is speaking specifically about the interrelatedness of the ideas):

> 'The complete separation (διαλύειν) of one thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse for our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas (ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν) with one another'
> (*Soph.* 259e;Loeb trans.)

Within the context of the dialogue as a whole, this is a crucial point for the very possibility of philosophy rests on this. Carrying this through further denies cover to the sophist but crucially establishes the λέγειν as not only the pre-condition of philosophy but also the possibility of human existence as Heidegger points out in his exposition of this same passage:

> 'Only if there is a possible conjunction of what is properly visible in beings, only if beings themselves allow something like a disclosure of themselves in the character of the "as", is there a λέγειν ('gathering'); and only if there is a λέγειν is human existence possible.' (*PS*: 400 = *GA*: 19: 577)

Heidegger extends this and makes a remark about the genuine logic, how it is associated with λέγειν and the being of man:

> 'If there is no philosophy, i.e., no λέγειν in the genuine sense, there is also no human existence . . . the anthropological question is thus ontological, and vice versa, and both questions center in the "logical" pure and simple, provided "logical" is understood as that which properly concerns λόγος, thus not understood in the sense of formal logic but in the Greek sense.' (*loc. cit.*)

This further underlines the need for something like an analysis of Dasein as a necessary and essential pre-condition for an ontological inquiry, that is, an ontology of the being that questions; what Aristotle calls the ζῷον λόγον ἔχον.[22]

1.5: Introduction to Heidegger's Philosophy and His Interpretations of Plato

Having treated of the question of the meaning of philosophical writing and textuality in Plato I wish to introduce some aspects of Heidegger's philosophy of the 1920's in order to contextualise some of his concepts and in particular those concepts which he employs and derives from his encounter with Plato.

Heidegger's philosophy is a radical philosophy in that he sets out to investigate the content of the philosophical tradition via a radical questioning that lays bare the decisive moments more essentially.[23] This radicality stems from and is guided throughout by one single and simple question that Heidegger spends his whole life trying to formulate: the

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[22] Heidegger takes issue with the traditional translation meaning of this – *animal rationale* – 'something living which has reason'. While it is not "false" it does cover up the phenomenal basis for the definition of Dasein (*BT*: 208-9. The traditional meaning also narrows the richness of the term λόγος and its cognates to one determinate meaning as discussed above.

[23] A phrase like 'Heidegger's philosophy' is deeply problematic not least because he sets out to place the very possibility of philosophy as a matter for radical questioning through an 'appropriation' of the whole tradition. We are too close to be able to speak with any confidence about 'Heidegger's philosophy'; only a future generation will have this possibility.

Question of Being (*Seinsfrage*) which hitherto, he claims, has remained submerged and forgotten (*Seinsvergessenheit*) throughout the tradition. Where and precisely when this happens is difficult to ascertain but the significant turning point is with Plato and Heidegger who he regards as the very highest pinnacle of the Greek meditation on being which is also the end of a tradition but at the same time the beginning of metaphysics. Yet, it could be contended, metaphysics is about nothing else but this question, the question of being, and this indeed is certainly the case: metaphysics, so-called from the title given to a work of Aristotle probably by Alexandrine scholars, is nothing less than the science of being, the ἐπιστήμη of ὄν ᾗ ὄν ((*Met.* G, 1003a 21). But herein lies the crux of the matter, for while metaphysics is most certainly the science of being, the question of being as such – the way that Heidegger conceives this whole matter – it is this understanding of being that recedes, while the manifold and ousiological manner of posing the question of being eventually becomes for the tradition, the *only* way in which the question of being is understood. Metaphysics is concerned with ὄν ᾗ ὄν, being *qua* being and the fundamental distinctions and determinations thereof and it is this that Heidegger terms, the 'ousiological reduction', that is, being, from Aristotle onwards, is always understood in terms of substance, in response to the question of the what-being. Following Brentano, it could be said that Aristotle broadly discovers four ways in which something can be said to be (ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς) and this more or less becomes defining for the metaphysical tradition, that is, being is understood in terms of the modalities of the being of beings. In time the question of being as such is eclipsed by the question of the being of beings and the modes of being. To trace the decisive moves in this would be beyond the scope of this dissertation, however it will be possible to discern some of the basic moments in Plato where the forgetting of the question of being as such can be seen in embryo. This major assertion by Heidegger does not charge the tradition with a complete obliviation of being. In *Being and Time* Heidegger adduces a few texts from the tradition to demonstrate the way in which Being is never taken up as a theme in itself. The text from Kant cited in *BT* is the clearest statement of the attitude towards being with which Heidegger characterises the tradition.

> '"*Being*" is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves' (Kant, *CPR*: 504; tr. Kemp-Smith)

On account of its clarity and importance, a discussion of its implications are in order. Kant rejects 'Being' as worthy of consideration on two grounds here; it is not a predicate, and it is present in any positing. Here Being is treated in a strictly ousiological way, that is, the question of Being is really the question of beings, of 'positings' (*Setzungen*) or determinations. As such there is no question of Being only of beings, i.e. metaphysics, and Heidegger's talk about Being is so much empty talk as his critics would have it.[24] Precisely because being as such cannot be determined beyond what Kant and Hegel have to say on the matter (n. 26) it does not constitute a proper field of investigation. Heidegger holds that it is a proper area for investigation, and, moreover, he says that it was the proper area of investigation for the ancient philosophers, namely Plato and Aristotle, but more clearly with the Presocratics. Here, I believe, there is further ground for fruitful comparison between Plato and Heidegger if we take Plato himself to be the target of Aristotle's criticism of the Good and if we allow for a comparison, provisional at least, between the Good in Plato and being in Heidegger.[25] Later in this dissertation I suggest the possibility of comparing the Idea of the Good in the *Republic* with Heidegger's Being in one or two respects at least. Here I want to suggest a very loose comparison between Kant's comments about Being and Aristotle's critique of the Good

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[24] Heidegger adduces the tradition for this; '*τὸ ὄν ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων*' (*Met.* B, 4, 1001a 21); *Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit* (*Ein Verständnis des Seins ist je schon mit inbegriffen in allem, was einer am Seienden erfaßt*; Heidegger's translation) Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologica* 11[1] Q. 94 art.2. (*BT*: 22 = *SZ*: 3). We can add to this Kant's statement from the *CPR*; '"*Being*" is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves' (Kant, *CPR*: 504; tr. Kemp-Smith). Hegel begins his logic with Being: 'Pure Being makes the beginning: because it is on the one hand pure thought, and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate; and the first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further determined.' (Hegel, (*Encyclopaedia*) *Logic*: § 86; tr. Wallace)

[25] Is it Plato Aristotle has in mind here or is it the Platonists, Xenocrates and Speusippus in particular? I cannot take up this question in detail here owing to the great and myriad difficulties surrounding the whole question of Aristotle's relation to Plato.

based on the presupposition that Plato and Heidegger can be compared in the manner suggested above, and again, loosely.

Heidegger sets out to raise anew the most basic questions which, he says, have been forgotten or distorted within the tradition. This involves, amongst other things, returning to the most basic concepts of the western philosophical tradition in order to rethink them and so liberate them from the encrustation of centuries of tradition, a move which will clarify the situation in order that the *Seinsfrage* itself may be raised. Originary here does not so much denote a historiological reconstruction, but rather indicates a re-discovery of the phenomena named in these concepts and re-experiencing the fundamental impulses of inceptual thinking by following them through to their very root. Throughout, Heidegger is guided by the theme of Being as such and the necessity of getting behind the ousiological reduction as a precondition for raising the question of Being.

It is because Heidegger carries out a full and detailed reading of a Platonic dialogue, that we actually have a detailed and developed Heideggerian Platonic hermeneutic available to us.[26] Heidegger devotes a great deal of attention to a preliminary preparation which is vital 'if we are to be guaranteed that our interpretation gets off on the right foot' (*PS*: 7 – 8 = *GA*: 11 - 12). Heidegger begins his expository course of lectures on Plato's *Sophist* by carrying out a double preparation: 'philosophical-phenomenological' and 'historiographical-hermeneutical'. Accordingly, in this introduction, I will follow Heidegger's division by presenting a brief summary of the 'double preparation' followed by additional commentary on the issues raised drawing on some later texts like *Being and Time*, particularly for an elaboration of what is meant by phenomenology, and, his conception of 'tradition' and 'historicality'.

[26] *GA* 19 only became available to us in 1992. It is the transcripts of Heidegger's lecture course of the Winter semester, 1924-5 at Marburg in which he conducts a detailed exegesis of Plato's *Sophist*.

1.6: Heidegger's Concept of the Hermeneutic Situation.

I have already used the term hermeneutic situation above but at this stage it needs to be explicated in some detail. For Heidegger the term 'hermeneutic situation' has a very determinate sense, it denotes the 'fore-having' which is presupposed in every interpretation:

> 'Every interpretation has its fore-having, its fore-sight, and its fore-conception. If such an interpretation, as Interpretation, becomes an explicit task for research, then the totality of these "presuppositions" (the hermeneutic situation) needs to be clarified and made secure beforehand, both in a basic experience of the 'object' to be disclosed, and in terms of such an experience' (*BT* 275 = *SZ* 232).

Here Heidegger is speaking primarily about interpretation in general; both ontological interpretation and the interpretation of Dasein, but this applies equally to philosophical texts for it is the philosophical text that preserves the interpretation of the phenomena of earlier philosophers.

The concept of hermeneutic situation does in some sense resemble the pre-theoretical understanding, what is called by Heidegger the 'vague average understanding of Being' (*BT*: 25 = *SZ*: 5). As Heidegger's conception of hermeneutics is a theory of interpretation in general, it therefore embraces the specific form of textual exegesis as one kind of interpretation. The problem of the hermeneutic circle which Dilthey re-formulated applies not just to texts but to the whole situation in which textual exegesis would be carried out – that is, texts which are themselves interpretations of the phenomena set in writing[27]. Dilthey exerted a deep influence on Heidegger which is tangible throughout *Being and Time* both in the way that Heidegger formulates the concept of the hermeneutic situation and in raising to the forefront the problem of historicality which

[27] This holds throughout; the historian, the literary critic, the judge must all work within a closely defined set of hermeneutic principles.

takes up the latter part of the work.[28] Dilthey may also be the most important source for Heidegger's own appropriation of Hegel.

One of the problems which Heidegger identifies and which is of direct bearing to Platonic studies is the matter of presuppositions. It is a familiar practice for scholars to advance their own interpretations of the text over others by claiming that they are returning to the text, or being guided only by the text, implicitly or explicitly suggesting that competing interpretations are weighed down by presuppositions, inherited prejudices or methodological commitments that intrude on the integrity of the text. But Heidegger says that such claims cannot but be hollow for it is the case that every interpretation is mediated by the kind of fore-having discussed in the passage above. Heidegger claims that a presuppositionless standpoint is simply not available to an interpreter. One of the preliminary tasks for the interpreter then, would be to clarify and set forth all the presuppositions that form the context of interpretive activity. This does not just include purely methodological matters but more fundamental philosophical questions concerning one's stance in relation to the phenomena.

Heidegger rules out the possibility of a 'presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us . . . when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, in the sense of exact textual interpretation, one likes to appeal to what "stands there", then one finds that what "stands there" in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption of the person who does the interpreting' (*BT*: 192 = *SZ*: 150).

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[28] Kisiel charts in detail the Diletheyian currents in *BT*, see esp. *GH*BT: 315-357. The degree to which the hermeneutic problematic is rooted in Schleiermacher's ground-breaking approach to Plato is well known. For Dilthey, as for Heidegger, the hermeneutic situation denotes primarily the interpretation of reality and the essence of historicality; see esp. 'The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies' in *W. Dilthey: Selected Writings* (*SW*) ed. and tr. H.P. Rickman Cambridge, 1976: 168-245; 'The germinal cell of the historical world is the experience in which the subject discovers himself in a dynamic relationship with his environment . . . In every part of the historical world there exists, therefore, the same dynamic connection between a sequence of mental events and an environment. . . The task of interpretation and understanding arises out of this situation so that criticism, interpretation and synthesis of the understanding of a historical process interlock' (*SW*: 203). This carries over to texts where the interrelationship of author and historical situation meets interpreter and his. Schleiermacher appeals to the common human nature that makes common speech and understanding among men possible (*SW*: 258) but then this clarifies the 'general difficulty for all interpretation'; the 'hermeneutic circle': 'The whole of a work must be understood from individual words and their combination but full understanding of an individual part presupposes understanding of the whole' (*SW*: 259).

Heidegger's remarks concerning fore-having are primarily addressed to philosophical interpretation of the phenomena but subsumed within this would be the practice of textual exegesis which will always involve a relation being forged between the author's and the interpreter's stance towards the phenomena; inevitably there must be this kind of comparison either explicit or implicit as part of the interpretive act. For philosophical inquiry as such, the hermeneutic situation necessitates the carrying-out of the Dasein analytic which dominates much of *Being and Time* in order to make all presuppositions available as a vital precondition for any inquiry into Being. An inquiry into the being of the inquirer (Dasein's unique essence), grounds the inquiry into Being as such: metaphysics must be founded on something like a Dasein analytic.[29] It is an element of the main thesis of this work, that Plato, like Heidegger, carries out such an analysis. This analysis largely informs the theme of the 'early' and 'middle' or 'transitional' dialogues and sets up the foundation for the ontological inquiry of the 'later' dialogues. I take up this question in greater detail in Section 2 throughout where I also make some provisional observations about the links between what I call 'Plato's existential analysis' and his ontology.

1.7: The Philosophical-Phenomenological Preparation

Following closely the development of Heidegger's hermeneutic principles in his exegesis of the *Sophist* lectures I will reproduce here the main elements of both the philosophical-phenomenological and the historico-hermeneutic preparations. The first preparation which introduces the term 'phenomenology' sets itself to gaining an 'orientation concerning how such peculiar objects as Being and non-being, truth and semblance, become visible at all: where things like that are to be sought in the first place, in order then to be able to deal with them' (*PS*: 5 = *GA* 19: 7). The second strand consist of the 'historiographical-hermeneutical' preparation where the task is to 'grasp in the right way the past which we encounter in Plato, so that we do not interpret into it arbitrary viewpoints and foist upon it arbitrary considerations' (loc. cit.).

[29] In the section 'Plato's Existential Analysis' I propose that both Plato and Aristotle carry out something like a Dasein analytic; the so-called Socratic dialogues and the *Nicomachaean Ethics* and others.

In the first preparation, Heidegger gives a brief indication of the meaning of phenomenological research and says that further elucidation of the method will be presented *en passant* in the course of the expository sections themselves. To start with, the 'phenomenon' is that which shows itself, but this is not to be confused with what is denoted by 'appearance' or 'semblance'. '"Phenomena" designates beings as they show themselves in the various possibilities of their becoming disclosed.' This really refers to the content of consciousness, the intentional object in Husserl's terms. The phenomena is always the intentional object as it shows itself to consciousness, and so even a theory in so far it can be an intentional object is a mode of phenomena. In no sense does phenomena mean something like the veil of appearances although they too would be phenomena but so also would be that which they conceal inasmuch as they would be intentional objects. This matter of 'disclosure' as a possibility is of primary importance - the first 130 pages of these lectures is taken up with an exposition of ἀληθεύειν, principally as it is dealt with in Bk. VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle.

Heidegger makes the vital point that the phenomenological method is nothing new but belongs in its essence to the fundamental stance of the Greeks towards Being and beings. It is Husserl who revives the phenomenological method of research under the now famous banner of *'Zu den Sachen selbst!'*[30] While phenomenological research must always take its bearings from the matters themselves, the greatest difficulty resides in the fact that there exists in each domain of being a rich history of research. In consequence then, each object of research "cannot be approached freely but instead come into view in each case through already determined perspectives and modes of questioning." This necessitates a constant critical attitude. There is also here an implicit reference to the existence and meaning of tradition.

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[30] Michael Murray gives a very succinct description of the situation: '"Phenomenology" is not only a Greek-based word, it signifies a Greek way of thinking. Yet within this Hellenic economy two affiliated currents appear that lead, at first, to a small difference and, then, finally, to a dramatic difference in the way phenomenology relates to the Greeks. The first current is represented by Husserl whose relation I shall call the constructing one, the second by Heidegger which I shall call the deconstructing one.' Murray, Michael

The second, historico-hermeneutic preparation, is carried out with the express purpose of justifying the hermeneutic principle that leads Heidegger to 'read' Plato back through Aristotle, but he begins by saying something about the 'past' and about 'history'. The past Heidegger says, is 'nothing detached from us lying far away'. On the contrary 'we are this past itself'. Philosophy and science live on these foundations so much so that we tend to forget this, 'the foundations have become obvious'. That which 'we no longer see', that which has become an everyday matter, was once 'the object of the greatest spiritual exertions ever undertaken in Western history.' Therefore to understand history 'cannot mean anything else than to understand ourselves - not in the sense that we might establish various things about ourselves, but that we experience ourselves as we *ought* to be.'

> 'To appropriate a past means to come to know oneself as indebted to that past. The authentic possibility to *be* history itself reside in this, that philosophy discover it is guilty of an omission, a neglect, if it believes it can begin anew, make things easy for itself, and let itself be stirred by just any random philosopher. But if this is true, i.e., if history means something such as this for spiritual existence, the difficulty of understanding the past is increased" (*PS*: 7 = *GA* 19: 10-11).

This passage is reproduced in full because of the important and programmatic nature of what it expresses. Heidegger is on the way to elaborating a set of related concepts like 'tradition', 'historicality', and the 'past' which receive their richest expression in *Being and Time*. Throughout his philosophical life Heidegger remains engaged with the 'tradition', an engagement that goes only deeper as he follows out the consequences of attempting to 'think Being' in a radically different way from the essentially 'ousiological' form that characterises and, indeed, defines the tradition. Heidegger stresses here, as he does elsewhere again and again, the unavoidable and necessary task of philosophy to engage with its own tradition, to fully illuminate its own origins and see in what way these origins remain immanent.

'Husserl and Heidegger: Constructing and Deconstructing Greek Philosophy' *The Review of Metaphysics* 41 (March 1988): 501-518

The difficulties mentioned above can be alleviated somewhat if we can be certain that the hermeneutic ground that we stand on is solid and not arbitrary, according to Heidegger. As mentioned above, the first 130 pages or so of the *Sophist* lectures are taken up with an exposition of the modes of ἀληθεύειν as they are presented by Aristotle in Bk. VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the introduction of various other concepts as they are treated by Aristotle. We must not lose sight of the pedagogic intentions of this lengthy exposition - Heidegger is introducing students to the basic concepts of Greek philosophy as a necessary propaedeutic to interpreting a Platonic dialogue - but why Aristotle? Why not derive such an exposition from Plato himself? The concept *qua* concept remains indeterminate hitherto. But the real justification for this move is grounded in a hermeneutic principle that ultimately derives from Aristotle himself and relates in turn to a fundamental conception of what philosophy is and what is meant when we talk about 'the history of philosophy'.

Heidegger states that in order to "penetrate into the actual philosophical work of Plato we must be guaranteed that *right from the start* we are taking the correct path of access." Of course this ultimately mean having immediate access to that which is not immediately before us as is the case with a Platonic dialogue.

Heidegger notes that it has been the previous practice (which remains pre-eminent) to interpret by proceeding from Socrates and the Presocratics; 'we wish to strike out in the opposite direction, from Aristotle back to Plato.' As touched on already, this is not a contrivance of Heidegger's but is grounded on a 'very old hermeneutic principle', namely, that 'we must proceed from what is clear to what is obscure'. More specifically this means, 'we will presuppose that Aristotle understood Plato'. 'No more than is to say in general on the question of understanding that the later ones always understand their predecessors better than the predecessors understood themselves' (*PS*: 8 = *GA*: 11). This looks very like Kant's famous remark concerning his own relationship to Plato.[31] Where

[31] 'I need only remark that is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself.' *KRV* A314; *CPR* (Kemp Smith), p.310.

Kant seems to mean that he takes a tendency in Plato's thought further than Plato could see himself, Heidegger means this in an explicitly historical sense, that our access to the past is always mediated through the decisive moments that are taken up productively.[32] Heidegger goes on to say that 'precisely here lies the element of creative research, that in what is most decisive this research does not understand itself'. This principle holds throughout and because no-one greater followed Aristotle it is to him that we must turn to gain an orientation, for 'what Aristotle said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and developed more scientifically' (*PS*: 8 = *GA* 19: 11-12). Later, when he has finished the preparation through Aristotle, Heidegger once again justifies the procedure of gaining access to Plato through Aristotle.

> 'There is no scientific understanding , i.e., historiographical return to Plato, without passage through Aristotle. Aristotle at first blocks, as it were, every access to Plato. This is obvious when we consider that we always issue from the later ones, and it is as ones who are still later that we go back to the earlier ones . . . in a historiographical return to the basic sources of our spiritual existence, we must rather adhere to the inner current of historical development
> . . . In this . . . this passage through an interpretation of Aristotle . . . we consider that Aristotle's own research is nothing else than a more radical apprehension of the same problems with which Plato and earlier thinkers had grappled' (*PS*: 131-132 = *GA* 19: 189-190).

Again Heidegger cites the hermeneutic principle of proceeding from the clear back into the obscure, from the 'relatively developed' to the 'confused' but confused not in a derogatory sense for in Plato the various directions of 'seeing and questioning' are intermingled on account of the 'difficulty of the very problems themselves' (loc. cit.).

[32] It refers to what is deemed decisive in a thinker's philosophy, what impacts on and is taken up by those who follow; in this case Aristotle takes up the ontological distinction of Plato and develops an ousiological metaphysics on the Platonic base. However, as will be seen, this move constitutes an occlusion of ontological difference, the beginnings of the forgetting of Being, which, I will suggest, belong more properly to Aristotle than to Plato precisely because he laid out the grounds of ontological research in such a programmatic and decisive manner.

'On the contrary' he continues, 'the fundamental question of Greek philosophical research is the question of Being, the question of the meaning of Being, and characteristically, the question of truth'. In the preparation through Aristotle, what was achieved was not just the determination of a method but the theme of research itself. The various modes of uncovering in Aristotle's *Ethics* are not just methodological considerations for they are the distinct modes in which beings show themselves in their determinacy as beings One could go so far as to say that in Book VI of the *Ethics* we find the method of phenomenology; a comportment toward beings in a manner, or stance, which is determined by those beings themselves. We are able to see a very real proximity between Heidegger's phenomenological methods of this period with the mode of research carried through by Plato and Aristotle.

1.8: The Determination of the Meaning and Range of *Λόγος* .

Logos in the *Sophist* Lectures: the Evidence of the *Phaedrus* and the *Seventh Letter*.

Logos is the other word in the term 'phenomenology' and Heidegger dwells carefully and at some length on this crucial Greek concept both in the *Sophist* lectures and in *Being and Time*. A great deal of Heidegger's thinking about Plato and the Greeks in general could be understood just on the basis of his analyses of this concept and so I will devote some space to reconstructing these. In the *Sophist* lectures Heidegger conducts an excursus on the question of *λόγος* . Heidegger stresses that 'the *Phaedrus* must be considered central for an understanding of Plato' (*PS*: 218 = *GA*19: 314) hence the necessity for an excursus with the intention of bringing this matter more clearly into view. Heidegger provides a short history of the modern reception of this dialogue with particular reference to Schleiermacher's great project. While he pays tribute to Schleiermacher's foundational work, and to the achievements of the philological-historical discipline that was founded in the period of F.A. Wolf, he outlines the various difficulties surrounding the attempts to establish the theme of the dialogue. Heidegger proposes a single theme for this dialogue:

'. . . the theme is speaking in the sense of self-expression and communication, speaking as the mode of existence in which one person expresses himself to an other and both together seek the matter at issue' (*PS*: 219= *GA* 315-316).

The best evidence for taking λόγος in this broad sense, and as thematic for the *Phaedrus*, is in the fact that the dialogue deals not just with the spoken word but with the written word as well; not only what is *said* but also what is expressed in written form, γράμματα. It could be objected that this does not quite explain the presence of ψυχὴ and ἔρως in the dialogue, but Heidegger aligns this with the general sense of λόγος as communication that he is elaborating here:

'. . . his [Plato] aim is not to present a psychology, not even a metaphysical one . . . his concern is to expose the basic determination of the existence of man . . . Dasein is seen specifically in its basic comportment to beings pure and simple. And the love Socrates speaks of, both the natural and the purified, is nothing else than the urge toward Being itself' (loc. cit.).

His last observation concerning ἔρως is of particular interest if we are to find an alignment between the Platonic concept of ἔρως and Heidegger's key concept of *Sorge*. This can only be done however, if we avoid any association of *Sorge* (Care, Concern) with its everyday sense as an attitude or disposition, rather, as a constitutive element of Dasein*'s* own being, that is, as an existentiale (*Existenzialien*).[33] Suprisingly, Heidegger does not cite the very first line of the dialogue - Socrates' question to Phaedrus: "Where do you come from, Phaedrus my friend, and where are you going" (*Phaedr.* 227a) - which entirely supports his suggestion that the theme of the *Phaedrus* is the 'basic

[33] Heidegger distinguishes two kinds of beings that one encounters: Dasein and every other kind. Existentiale are to Dasein what the categories are to every other kind of being. This is discussed in greater detail below in section 2.

determination of the being of man'.[34] This opening line is granted the sense we understand here (i.e., the knowledge of man's real being) through Socrates' clarification of his own calling which is an ever mindful hearkening to the divine injunction given at Delphi: γνῶθι σαὐτόν.[35] Heidegger paraphrases at length the passage 229 e5 ff which he regards as characteristic of Socrates in general and which clarifies the opening question to Phaedrus:

> "I have not been able to achieve self-knowledge, in accord with the Delphic injunction; I have not yet got so far. Therefore it seems to me to be ridiculous, as long as I am not yet advanced far enough there, hence am in ignorance about myself, to try to grasp what is alien to me and does not pertain to me. Therefore I leave that alone, and in all these things – nature and the like – I adhere to what people generally believe. In these matters I can indeed be satisfied with opinions; but as regards myself I want knowledge. I do not look into anything except myself, and in particular I investigate whether I am perhaps an animal like Typhon with a much confused form, and am just as monstrous or even more so, or whether I am tamer, a tamer and simpler animal, whose existence partakes somewhat of the divine.' (*Phaedr.* 229 e5 ff)

Clearly when Socrates talks about 'I' and 'myself' in this respect he means 'man' or Dasein and what obtains for all men.[36] Even the peculiarity of his own life has the full

[34] It is worth noting that Heidegger devotes a great deal of attention to the proem of the dialogue, finding in it the basic theme. This is very much in accord with the ancient Platonic hermeneutic principle which states that the σκοπός of the dialogue is a.) one, and b.) to be found in the proem. Indeed he goes so far as to say in this respect: 'The strength of the phenomenon of λόγος in this context of human existence is already evident in the first part . . . it is not at all necessary here to appeal to the second part.' (*PS* 219 = *GA* 316).

[35] The importance of the *Prooimia* of the dialogues was specifically noted by Proclus: 'The introductions (προοίμια) to the dialogues of Plato accord with their overall aim (σκοπός), and have not been invented by Plato for the sake of dramatic charm (for this manner of exposition is far beneath the exalted mind of the philosopher), nor do they aim at mere accurate narrative, as some have considered; for it is neither plausible nor at all possible that every event or saying in the order in which they happen should be selected with a view to the single end aimed at by the works of Plato' William O' Neill, *Proclus, Alcibiades I, A Translation and Commentary*, (The Hague, 1965) cited in John Dillon 'A Case-Study in Commentary: the Neoplatonic Exegesis of the *Prooimia* of Plato's Dialogues' in ed Glenn W. Most By determining one theme for this dialogue Heidegger follows the ancient Platonic practice.

[36] Socrates says this explicitly in the *Apology*. After his exhaustive search for someone wiser than himself after the oracle had pronounced that there was none, Socrates realised that it was not actually an ad hominem oracle at all (*Apol.* 23b). I take this up in detail in the next section.

character of the universal because the Delphic injunction is addressed to man as such. In the passage above Socrates intimates that essential knowledge is disclosed through λόγος. External matters are subject to opinion whereas the being of the soul is disclosed to itself through λόγος. As described later below, Heidegger charges philosophy with having neglected an ontological analysis of the questioner, i.e. man or Dasein, and this is precisely what Socrates is suggesting in those places where he disavows interest in external or physical phenomena. He is primarily concerned with the being of man, which is an essential precondition for any inquiry into being in general. Socrates is only unique amongst men because he takes the god *seriously*, which is to say he takes human being as a comportment towards the 'divine' seriously. Dasein is that being unique amongst all beings in that its own being is a question unto itself: it is the being that questions into being.[37] Socrates knows something: he knows that he does not know, but then what does this actually mean? Taking Socratic ignorance positively, what is involved in such a knowing? If Socrates claims to know only his own ignorance, he must have an understanding of what is involved in knowing and not-knowing. Socrates never gives an account of this kind of essential knowing; the only clue to this is in the autobiographical statements that he makes here and there; and, the direction which we are being pointed to is the daimonic.[38] Socrates 'knows' that man's unique and essential being is characterised by *Sorge*, which in Platonic terms is expressed variously as obedience to the Delphic oracle, concern for the souls of his fellow citizens (e.g., *Apol.* 30e), and an attraction to the real being of things (ἔρως). I take up these 'Socratic' issues in the next section and interpret them in the light of Heidegger's existential analysis in *Being and Time*.

Socrates expresses a disinterest in the countryside because there he can learn nothing. The fields and the meadows can teach him nothing, but, 'I can learn from the people in

[37] 'The essence of Dasein lies in its existence' which is always an issue for itself. Heidegger distinguishes sharply between Dasein and any other kind of being; Dasein is not an entity with 'properties' that is 'present-at-hand'; 'That Being which is an *issue* for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine' and so 'mineness' is characteristic of Dasein which is never a 'what' but always a 'who' *BT*: 67-68.

[38] *Apol* 31c explains to the court that he is subject to a divine sign that has come to him at times since childhood. Meletus disparages the sign in his indictment; the sign was no secret because Euthyphro mentions it to him as a probable motive for the prosecution brought by Meletus *Euthyph.* 3b. The sign

the city'. We discover that Socrates has been drawn into the countryside because Phaedrus has lured him there with the promise of speech, certainly, but written speech. Writing enables Socrates to leave the urban environment, the omnipresence of people, by means of a device that enables the preservation and transportation of λόγοι (*Phaedr.* 230d 4 ff). But it is only through a promise of speech that Socrates initially agrees to leave the city. The world of nature cannot teach him anything for it does not have λόγος, the difference between man and nature is intimated in this evocative pastoral scene: Dasein is unique in that it possesses λόγος and its own being is its ownmost concern (*Sorge*; ἔρως).

Heidegger leaves the proem and goes on to give a general interpretation of the second part of the *Phaedrus* which is articulated into three parts: rhetoric and truth, truth and dialectic, and rhetoric as ψυχαγωγία. Heidegger summarises as follows:

1. Plato shows that even rhetoric insofar as it aims at λόγος as πειθοῦς δημιουρός is possible only on the basis of some sort of insight into truthful speaking: "the multitude get their notion of probability as the result of a likeness to truth, and we explained just now that these likenesses can always be best discovered by one who knows the truth" (*Phaedr.* 273 d3 ff). Heidegger observes that 'for even εἰκός, ἀπάτη, deception, is possible, and can be genuinely carried out, only if one sees the truth.'

2. Seeing the truth is carried out through dialectic which Plato characterises in its two aspects: that it grasps in general that which is spoken about, the ζήτημα πρῶτον and, remains constantly oriented towards it. 'Dialectic shows what properly is and how undisclosed beings can be made visible.

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actually appears to him in the *Phaedrus* alerting him to the danger that his first speech may have been impious, *Phaedr.* 242c. I examine the sign more closely in the next section, 'Plato's Existential Analysis'.

3. It is only on the basis of founding rhetoric in this way, understanding it as standing in some relation to true speech, not limiting speech to courts and assemblies but referring to speech in general, then and only then can it be granted that a τέχνη of rhetoric is possible. Rhetoric then is a "know-how in guiding the existence of others by means of speaking with them" – τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων (*PS*: 221 = *GA* 318-319; *Phaedr.* 261 a7f).

This threefold characterisation, especially the final point, shows that Plato's treatment of λέγειν is not oriented to rhetoric as such, but, taken with Socrates' earlier self-portrait 'concerns human existence itself' (*loc. cit*). Turning from this 'positive appreciation' of λόγος, Plato puts forward a positive skepticism with regard to λόγος, especially in its written form, in the second part of the dialogue (*Phaedr.* 274b ff) and in the digression of the *Seventh Letter* (*Ep.* VII, 344c). This must all be connected up to the preliminary definitions of the sophist in the *Sophist* (221c – 236c) where the whole discussion at that point is permeated by the centrality of λόγος in any such inquiry into the real being of things as well as their concealment through misrepresentation.

1.9: The Determination of Λόγος in *Being and Time*

In *Being and Time* the exposition of the term 'phenomenon' is immediately followed by a treatment of the term λόγος. Heidegger proceeds to an exposition of what this term means through a recovery of the original senses.[39] At this stage Heidegger is still treating of λέγειν as a verb of speaking, but a speaking that must be rethought in its original usage by Plato and Aristotle, while in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* he deepens the enquiry to recover the sense of 'gathering' that λέγειν names.[40] Λέγειν names a kind of determinate laying and gathering. This gathering is not a heaping together willy-nilly but proceeds according to a structure and order. The collection is a 'one' composed of selected parts

[39] 'The Concept of the *Logos*' *SZ* 32-34 = *BT* 55-58

[40] The *LSJ* gives three main senses for λέγειν: to lay; to pick out, gather, pick up, choose for oneself, reckon up or count; to say, speak, speak to the point, to mean (like the Latin *dicere*).

and Heidegger adduces two examples that illustrate this very well; one from Homer the other from Aristotle:

> 1.) In the meeting in the underworld between Agamemnon and one of the suitors, Amphimedon, Agamemnon addresses him so; 'Amphimedon, what has befallen you that you have come down beneath the dark earth, all of you picked men and of like age? One would make no other choice were one to select (λέξαιτο) the best men of the city' (*Od.* XXIV., 109; tr. Murray).[41]
>
> 2.) In the *Physics* Aristotle says τάξις δὲ πᾶσα λόγος 'every order has the character of bringing together' (*Ph.* Θ, I, 252a13).

Heidegger asserts that the non-speaking sense of λέγειν pre-dates its signification of ordered speech but that it retained its original sense, '"the relation of one thing to another" long after it had come to mean discourse and assertion' (*IM*: 131-2 *passim*.). He observes the multiplicity of significations that λόγος has in Plato and Aristotle with none predominating. If we take the basic signification to be 'discourse' (*Rede*), we must then inquire into what is meant by 'discourse'. The 'real signification' of discourse is covered over by centuries of translation, i.e. interpretation, which renders it variously as 'reason' (*Vernunft*), 'judgement' (*Urteil*), 'concept' (*Begriff*), 'definition' (*Definition*), 'ground' (*Grund*), or, 'relationship' (*Verhältnis*). Heidegger concentrates on the sense of λόγος as assertion (*Aussage*), but assertion as 'judgement', as being a 'seemingly legitimate' translation but one which still misses the fundamental signification especially where 'judgement' is drawn from some 'contemporary theory of judgement'.[42] Λόγος does not mean judgement, particularly if this is taken as primary. The intention seems obvious here; by taking issue with one of the key Neokantian concepts, Heidegger is rejecting the fundamental basis for the Neokantian interpretation of Greek philosophy that was

[41] I have modified the translation slightly, substituting 'select' for 'pick'.

[42] Heidegger has Neokantianism in mind here especially Natorp where the 'doctrine of ideas' is interpreted through Kant's categories and transcendental ideas: true being (*to on*) is in the 'positings of thought' (c.f. Kant, *CPR*: 504), (*Denksetzungen*) and the ideas are 'pure objects of thought' (*reine Denkobjekte*). Being then, is 'positing in general' (*Setzung Überhaupt*) and λόγος is the positing of judgement. I would like to

dominant at that time. This is an important point when we come on to consider the substantial thesis of Robert Dostal's critique of Heidegger's reading of Bk. VII of Plato's *Republic* later on in this dissertation.[43]

Heidegger links λόγος with δῆλουν; to make manifest what one is talking about in discourse, and Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse as ἀποφαίνεσθαι.[44] In discourse as ἀπόφανσις, '*what* is said is drawn *from* what the talk is about' and this is the structure of the λόγος as ἀπόφανσις a discursive communication that makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus making it accessible to the other party. It is 'only *because* the function of the λόγος as ἀπόφανσις lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can the λόγος have the structural form of σύνθεσις'. Again, a criticism of the prevailing Neokantianism for Heidegger says that σύνθεσις is not to be taken as a 'binding and linking together of representations' or as a 'manipulation of psychical occurrences where the "problem" arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside'. Properly understood, the σύν- has a purely apophantic signification and means 'letting something be seen in its *togetherness* with something – letting it be seen *as* something' (*SZ* 32-33 = *BT* 56).

The λόγος as a 'letting-something-be-seen' is immediately related to ἀλήθεια in that any letting-something-be-seen can be true or false, but, we must steer clear of any conception of truth based on 'agreement'. Agreement is not the primary sense of ἀλήθεια; 'the "Being-true" of the λόγος as ἀληθεύειν means that in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι the entities *of which* one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness', and so one must let them be seen as something 'unhidden' (ἀληθής). Conversely "Being-false" (ψεύδεσθαι) is a kind of 'deceiving in the sense of *covering up* (*verdecken*) which is a

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express thanks to Natorp's translators Vasilis Politis and John Connolly for discussing the issues involved here (*Platons Ideenlehre*) with me and for allowing me to see drafts of their translation.

[43] Dostal suggests that Heidegger is still implicated in the Neokantian interpretation of Plato, but this, I suggest, is hardly possible when one considers the extent to which Heidegger sets out to overcome Neokantianism and ultimately Cartesianism in *Being and Time*. That work sets out to reaffirm the primacy of ontology over epistemology and how this is achieved, through supplanting the *res cogitans* (or 'epistemological subject') via the analysis of Dasein. At the time of writing Dostal did not have the benefit of Vol. 19 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (1992). Robert Dostal 'Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato' in *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments* Vol. 2 ed. Christopher Macann London and N.Y. 1992: 63-89

[44] Heidegger refers to *De Int.* 1-6; *Met.* VII, 4; *Nic Eth.* VI.

'putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off *as* something which it is *not*' this last characteristic we find in the *Sophist* in connection with a kind of non-being but also as a skill which the sophist possesses, an ability to pass things off as something which they are not.[45]

To reinforce this observation about the priority of truth as a character of phenomena, as opposed to statements about phenomena, Heidegger remarks that for the Greeks an αἴσθησις can be true and indeed more primordially true than the λόγος, for 'just as seeing aims at colours, any αἴσθησις aims at its ἴδια (those entities which are genuinely accessible only *through* it and *for* it) and to that extent this perception is always true'; seeing always discovers colours and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure νοεῖν is 'the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them by just looking at them'.[46] It is this νοεῖν which is the 'true' in the purest and most primordial sense . . . it merely discovers . . . in such a way that it can never cover up . . . it can never be false; it can at worse remain a *non-perceiving*, ἀγνοεῖν . . .'. This leads to a very important conclusion concerning the 'secondary' nature of truth as agreement:

> When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen *as* something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. The 'truth of judgements', however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up, a secondary phenomenon of truth, *with more than one kind of foundation*' (*SZ* 33-34 = *BT* 56-57).[47]

This 'founded' character of truth as agreement leads Heidegger to state that 'both realism and idealism have - with equal thoroughness – missed the meaning of the Greek

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[45] The question of ἀλήθεια in Heidegger is thematic to this dissertation and is treated throughout.
[46] If something is present at hand, i.e. actual – available to 'touch' (θιγεῖν) there can be no error for there is no κατάφασις or φάσις involved: it is either available or not; (*Met.* Θ 1051b 24-25).
[47] The terms 'secondary' or 'founded' are Husserlian and denote phenomena that are based on something else, that have a derived nature. The conception of 'founding' derives from Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (*Logische Untersuschungen*) Vol. II. (trans. note).

conception of truth, in terms of which only the possibility of something like a "doctrine of ideas" can be understood as philosophical knowledge' (*loc. cit.*).[48]

1.10: Rhetoric and Heidegger's concept of *Das Man*

Heidegger's analysis of *logos* includes a discussion of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* and particularly the way in which Plato discovers a positive rhetoric, a philosophical rhetoric, which is also the only legitimate rhetoric. In presenting this here I anticipate my discussion of *Gerede* in Section 2 but this is justified as it belongs to the analysis of *logos* which is being carried out here and it will act as a bridge to the next section where I take up the Socratic or existential theme in full.

When we look closely at this part of the *Phaedrus* discussion and Heidegger's discussion of it, it will be possible to bring what is brought into view there into apposition with Heidegger's conception of 'the They' (*Das Man*), 'Chatter' (*Gerede*), and 'Inauthenticity' (*Uneigentlichkeit*). These considerations anticipate the interpretation of the cave (*Rep.* VII 514a – 517b) where the 'positive skepticism' expressed in the *Phaedrus* concerning λόγος is presented in the image as corresponding to the animated debates that take place amongst the prisoners (516c-d). Public discourse is dominated by this mode of speaking: a speaking that takes its bearings from the opinions (δόξα) of the many (πλῆθος). After recounting the Myth of the cicadas (*Phaedr.* 259b –d), Socrates then reminds Phaedrus that the subject of their inquiry was the nature of good and bad speaking and writing and, therefore, good discourse is dependant on a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker (259e). Phaedrus again appeals to something that he has heard: '. . . the intending orator is under no necessity of understanding what is truly just, but only what is likely to be thought just by the body of men who are to give judgement;

[48] This last point about the 'doctrine of ideas' will become clearer below in the Section entitled 'Heidegger's Interpetation of Plato's Cave Image at Book VII of the *Republic*' where the whole emphasis is towards understanding the ideas ontologically. The dichotomy 'idealist/realist' is taken up below insofar as it impacts on the broad conception of the Greek philosophers that is sometimes subsumed under these categories in contemporary commentary.

nor need he know what is truly good or noble, but what will be thought so, since it is on the latter, not the former, that persuasion depends' (259e – 260a; tr. Hackforth); Heidegger summarises; 'the needs, demands, dispositions, inclinations, and cognitive horizons of the multitude are decisive, and they serve as the guidelines for the discourse' rather than a speaking 'in terms of beings, insofar as they are unconcealed' - *τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια* – (*PS* 225 = *GA* 325). Socrates goes on to extend this insight into rhetoric and *λόγος* to the complete range of possibilities and not just public speaking and writing, although Phaedrus, still on the basis of what he has heard, insists that the 'art' of rhetoric is confined to public business (261b); in other words, Phaedrus does not take his bearings from the matters themselves but from the opinions of others, while Socrates holds that any successful discourse, public or private, must, in order to be successful, take its bearings from the matters themselves, there must be a view to the unconcealed. Heidegger says about this; 'what Socrates here demands as a condition of the possibility of genuine self-expression is also a condition of the possibility of perfect deception and misrepresentation' (loc. cit.). This point is then developed further in the *Phaedrus*, 'the art of speech of one who has never seen things in their unconcealedness . . . will be ridiculous, no art at all (*ἄτεχνος*)' but the way in which truth is seen has still not been dealt with. That is why the question of dialectic must be raised, 'what does this *εἰδεναι ἀλήθειαν* properly accomplish . . . and which are the ways we can properly appropriate beings?' (*PS* 228 = *GA* 329). The answer is to be found in *διαλέγεσθαι*, the subject that Socrates turns to once he has established the primacy of the truth of the matter itself over opinion. I consider more fully the proximity of the related concepts *Gerede* and *Das Man*, with Plato's use of *τὸ πλῆθος* in the *Apology* in the next section.

1.11: The Meaning of Tradition in Plato and Heidegger

The concept of tradition is very important in Heidegger's thinking where the *Seinsfrage* is intimately bound up with the vicissitudes of a lengthy and complex tradition. The last consideration in this introductory section must be of Heidegger's concept of tradition, the meaning of tradition, and how we may find a very similar conception in Plato himself.

Plato too is acutely aware of the complex relation a thinker has with his predecessors, how he is at the same time indebted to them but obliged to overcome them as well.

In the matter of tradition there is another moment that allows of comparison between Plato and Heidegger in both its positive and negative aspects as it is analysed in *Being and Time*.[49] The text under analysis here is the pseudo-parricide of the *Sophist* and Heidegger's interpretation of it in his lectures where he interprets the passage by reference to the phenomenon of tradition. I will briefly exposit both before widening the discussion by including Heidegger's analysis of tradition in *Being and Time*. The immediate context for the excursus on the meaning of tradition is the pseudo-parricide in the *Sophist* (241d ff). Earlier in the discussion the Stranger announces to Theaetetus that with the question of τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι they have struck up against a matter of extreme difficulty (236e), on which hinges the very possibility of sophistry. Unless they can deal with this matter the sophist will escape once again; '. . . if we adhere to the principle of Parmenides, unshaken up to now, that non-beings are not, then there can be no sophist' (*PS*: 284 = *GA* 19: 410). The Stranger adverts to the phenomenon of tradition; '. . . the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse;

> Never let this prevail, he said, that non-beings are;
> But keep your mind away from this path of inquiry.[50] (*Soph*. 237a)

In order to prove the possibility of sophistry it is necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) for the Stranger to contend forcibly (βιάζεσθαι) with the λόγος of his philosophical father, Parmenides. Heidegger commentary on this addresses the very essence of tradition in its negative aspect and is worth quoting at length:

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[49] Heidegger's concept of tradition belongs to the wider question of temporality in *BT* which latter comprises the core of the unfinished investigation into being and time.

[50] οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα·
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήμενος εἶργε νόημα

'Thus we now see for the first time the meaning of the apparently merely scholastic definitions of the sophist.[51] They force Plato to chose either: 1.) further complicity with the well-established dogma of the school of Parmenides that non-beings are not. Accordingly, there is no ψευδὴς λόγος, and the ἀντιλέγειν περὶ πάντα is also impossible. It must be conceded then that there is no sophist, because there cannot be one. Complicity with the dogma of the school of Parmenides would thus amount to Plato's acknowledging the sophists as philosophers and renouncing himself. For there would be no distinction between what the sophists do and what he is attempting in opposition to them. Or, 2.) Plato can acknowledge the factual existence of the sophist and accordingly of μὴ ὄν, of the ψεῦδος and take the factual existence of deception, distortion, and misrepresentation as it is and so transform the theory of Being. Thus the alternatives are now given: either to allow the matters themselves their right and bind oneself on the basis of them to a ruthless opposition against all pre-established theory, or to adhere to the tradition simply because it is venerable and thereby renounce oneself and give up research, which is always research into the matters themselves.' (*PS*: 284-5 = *GA* 19: 411-2).

Heidegger broadens this matter out to embrace all of us who work in a tradition in the same way as Plato, and, in the same way that any genuine research is carried out; 'the situation Plato now faces is also one we face', though in a very different way, for we stand in relation to a different past than did Plato and Aristotle. They inaugurated what became a tradition; we stand at its completion. Heidegger warns against the romanticism that tempts some to bypass, or stand outside of tradition, thinking that they can 'step directly into the open space' making themselves free of history by 'a leap': 'Philosophical questioning – precisely the one intending to press on to the matters themselves – is not concerned with freeing us from the past but, on the contrary, with making the past free for us, free to liberate us from the tradition, and especially from the ungenuine tradition. For the latter has the peculiar characteristic that in giving, in *tradere*, in transmitting, it distorts the gifts themselves' and it is only by doing justice to

[51] The seven definitions that have preceded (*Soph.* 221c - 236c).

past research (philosophical questioning into the matters themselves), 'will we be able to grow in it' (*PS*: 286 = *GA* 19: 413-4). These reflections relate to Heidegger's conception of the nature of history and the past. Under the title of 'The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology' in *Being and Time* Heidegger takes up the interrelated questions 'history', 'historicality', and 'tradition'. History is not the past or even the story of the past, it is rather the relation to historicality which is that state of Being which is constitutive for 'Dasein's "historising" as such' and it is only on the basis of this historising is anything like 'world-history' possible at all. 'In its factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is "what" it already was. It *is* its past, whether explicitly or not . . . this is so not only that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along "behind" it, and that Dasein possesses hat is past as a property which is still present-at-hand and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein "is" its past in the way of *its* own Being, which, to put it roughly, "historises" out of its future on each occasion' (*BT*: 41 = *SZ*: 20). The past is always something that goes ahead rather than following behind. In this way the past is coming towards us from the future. What Heidegger has in mind here is the possibility of laying hold of the past as a futural determination, and this becomes the basis of historiological research through the discovery of tradition, the disclosure of what it transmits, and the 'how' of its transmission. Even if historiological inquiry remains absent, this does not alter Dasein's historicality; it merely indicates a 'deficient mode', a certain kind of bondage to the past, to mysterious forces. But Heidegger again alerts us to the pitfalls of tradition, and in this, makes some observations which bear directly on the state of research at any time. Specifically, these insights will help to clarify the state of affairs in Platonic research, to which this dissertation is a direct contribution. Heidegger refers to an element of the Dasein analytic when he says that not only is Dasein inclined to 'fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light, but also that Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold . . . this tradition keeps it from providing its own guidance, whether in inquiring or in choosing.' When tradition thus 'becomes master' it does so in such a way that what it transmits becomes concealed; 'tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial sources from which the

categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn.' And while Heidegger is speaking about the constitution of Dasein primarily, the immediate context of these remarks is the project of historiological (in its broadest sense) research.

Conclusion.

Having laid out some of the general elements which form the wider context for this dissertation, and, in particular having made the case for the centrality of existential analysis in both Plato and Heidegger, I have prepared the ground for the sections which follow. For Plato, what we can term ontological inquiry stems from the difficulties in raising ethical questions, hence the apoertic nature of many of the Socratic dialogues. I argue that the *aporiae* are due in main part to the difficulty of posing an essentialist question, e.g. what *is* courage? prior to the fundamental question concerning the meaning of being. The question inquires after the 'is' but hitherto – those very dialogues - the focus has been on the subject of the question rather than the attribution of being. The question must necessarily remain aporetic until question of being has been raised. It is clear from Socrates' disavowal of interest in physical phenomena that a fundamental distinction has been made between those beings that we could provisionally term physical and those which belong to constitution of man as such. This distinction is made explicit by Heidegger: beings categorial and beings existential. That is, those beings subject to the categories and those, belonging to the being of Dasein, which are expressed through the *Existentiales*. I argue that a strong comparison can be made here between Plato and Heidegger. Given the great importance of such a distinction I argue that a point of agreement here in the thinking of Plato and Heidegger establishes a much greater proximity in thinking than any differences between them which have been seized on by commentators. Concentrating on such differences – which are themselves important – carries the danger of overlooking the much more significant agreement that unites the two thinkers. It is most appropriate then that the next matter to be treated in detail is the question of existential analysis itself. In the next section I pursue specific points of comparison between Plato and Heidegger by aligning those distinctly Socratic elements with what Heidegger terms the *Existentiales*. The textual basis for this will be a

discussion based on the *Apology* and the relevant passages from *Being and Time* which deal with the existential analysis of Dasein.

2.0: Plato's Existential Analysis

In this section I want to indicate a parallel division of inquiry in Plato and Heidegger. I want to show how it is possible to compare Heidegger's division of the field of ontological inquiry into an ontology of Dasein and an ontology of the beings that make up the world, and, to attribute a similar division to Plato. More specifically, this means comparing the more Socratic, ethical, and aporetic dialogues with the analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time*. The thesis at issue here is this: Plato carries out something like an analysis of Dasein in the so-called early and middle works. According to this view, Socrates is taken fictively and he, the character of the dialogues, functions as a kind of cipher in Plato's writings. In purely Heideggerian terms, Socrates represents authentic Dasein, or, the will towards authenticity. An essential description of man's existential condition can be elaborated on the basis of these dialogues where fundamental existential questions are raised in the form of ethical concerns, that is to say, that here, the ethical points towards the existential. In the course of these inquiries "Socrates" is driven more and more towards aporiai that can only be clarified and cleared away on the basis of ontologising the matters at issue. The Ideas hypothesis set out in the *Phaedo* and the further elaboration of its consequences in dialogues like the *Republic*, the *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus* grows directly out of the original inquiry into the being of man. Ontology in Plato originates in the raising of basic questions like 'what is the good life' (or what is authentic Dasein) which itself is introduced dramatically by Socrates who explains his entire life's work as seeking to fulfill the sacred injunction of Delphi, 'Know Thyself!'. Heidegger's procedure is comparable. One of his basic criticisms of the Cartesian subject-object distinction which determines modern philosophy, the skeptical demand, and the turn to epistemology as first philosophy, is the failure to carry out an ontology of the subject.

These following remarks concerning the outline of Heidegger's investigations into the early formulation of ontological inquiry are of a general nature the purpose of which is to set a context for the existential theme of this section. The task that Heidegger sets

himself in *Being and Time* is to raise the 'question of Being' which is the necessary pre-condition for any and all ontologies (regional as well as fundamental):

> Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task (*BT* 31 = *SZ* 11)

Heidegger charges the western philosophical tradition with not having adequately treated of the meaning of Being on the very first page of *Being and Time* by way of commentary on the quotation from the *Sophist*, ' . . .are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression "Being"? Not at all' (*BT* 1 = *SZ* 1) and so *Being and Time* sets out to clarify the meaning of Being, which at the same time involves exploring the significance of our lack of perplexity.[52] Later, this inability is named as the forgetting of Being, a *Seinsvergessenheit*, where Being falls away into oblivion and the only sense in which Being is traditionally understood, in terms of the being of beings, is metaphysically.[53] This describes a double move whereby the question of Being is progressively conceived in terms of the being of beings by Plato and Aristotle which eventuates later in the tradition in an occlusion of the ontological difference. At the same time the question of Being as such recedes into the background, although it is never explicitly formulated to begin with: when the question is formulated explicitly for the first time, i.e. in Plato's *Sophist* and in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; the inquiry into Being takes the character of an inquiry into the Being of beings; being is manifold. The manifold ways in which Being can be said of something represents a differentiation introduced into the single question as to what is Being, but as a result Being as such recedes. Within the ancient Platonic tradition this problematic takes a dual form: the One and the Many, or, indeterminate Dyad, and the related question of Participation and Separation. For Aristotle, the question of Being is formulated along manifold

[52] The very first line of *Being and Time* is taken directly from the *Sophist*: For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "*being*". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed' (*Soph.* 244a)

ousiological-categorial lines, and Heidegger takes this to be the more decisive conception of Being for the entire philosophical tradition.

But before any enquiry into the meaning of Being can proceed, according to Heidegger, there must first take place an inquiry into the meaning of the being (Dasein) that understands Being; the 'Being of truth is connected primordially with Dasein', that is, '. . . only because Dasein is constituted by 'disclosedness' (that is, by understanding - *Verstehen*), can anything like Being be understood' (*BT* 272 = *SZ* 230). So only on the basis of an investigation that sets out from a prior understanding, i.e. self-understanding, of that unique being that questions, can a question of Being make any sense at all.[54]

Perhaps one of the consequences of this integrated inquiry – the existential and ontological being always co-present in any inquiry – is to shed further light on the authorial decision to write dialogues. One of the effects of the dialogue is in the way it represents the wholeness of inquiry in the sense described here. They are conversations between characters in specific situations where the ontological discussion often emerges from an ethical problem or description. Heidegger picks up on this when he draws the distinction between being systematic and having a system. Like Plato, Heidegger does not have a system: 'Every philosophy is systematic, but not every philosophy is a system' (*STEHF* 29). Heidegger makes a distinction between 'systematic' and 'system' and does so with direct reference to Plato:

> 'If we scrutinise the traditional configuration of Plato's philosophy as a whole we notice that it consists of particular conversations and areas of discussion. Nowhere do we find a "system" in the sense of a unified structure planned and executed with equal compartments for all essential questions and issues.' (*N* I, 190)[55]

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[53] In the post-*Being and Time* period, for example *Nietzsche I* 194. See the discussion above in the introductory section.

[54] Self-understanding as mentioned here anticipates the discussion of γνῶθι σαὐτόν below

[55] Tigerstedt, E.N. *IP* 1- 20 *passim* Tigerstedt surveys the question of "Plato's system", the result of "bad Hegelianism", which dominated the scholarship in Germany in the 19th century and directly led to the 'athetising mania' which at its lowest moment had reduced the *corpus platonicum* to 6 dialogues!

He goes on to say that this is also true for Aristotle and for Greek philosophy in general. Greek philosophising proceeds on the basis of questioning from different points of view and following through each level in order to develop lines of inquiry. 'Nevertheless', Heidegger says, 'a certain basic way of proceeding prevails in Plato's thought. Everything is gathered into the guiding question of philosophy – the question as to what beings are.' (*loc. cit.*) If everything is 'gathered into the leading question' in Plato (and in Heidegger) then there could not be a system, for one reason, the content of any Dasein analysis will always be determined historically. The absence of system in Plato and Aristotle could be explained in terms of the kind of phenomenology that Heidegger attributes to them. Heidegger does not have a system and moreover he says neither do Plato and Aristotle. All three, though, conduct philosophical inquiry systematically. The description of phenomenology that I give in Section One emphasises the importance of showing. That things are described exactly as they show themselves is one of the tenets of phenomenological method; phenomena is anything that shows itself in whatever manner. The manner of a showing will determine the appropriate disposition towards the phenomenon in each case. In this way inquirer and the inquired after are always mutually determining. Hegel expresses this as the identity of subject and object. Heidegger goes a step further than Hegel in this regard because he in effect sees that the subject and object are thereby overcome (certainly in their purely pre-Hegelian and Cartesian form). It is out of this overcoming that Heidegger fashions the distinction between Dasein and all other beings and the associated set of concepts used to describe these beings; the *existentiales* and the categories. It is Heidegger's major claim throughout his work of this period, that he has effected a recovery of this ancient stance towards being and that what he is doing is not something completely new but more in the manner of a re-configured restoration of the original scope of inquiry which he says always embraced the whole – questioner as well the questioned.

2.1: The Analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time* and the Meaning of Plato's 'Socrates'

Most if not all Heidegger scholarship or Heidegger-inspired studies of Plato have concentrated on the aletheic-ontological content and have sought out the 'productionist' tendencies that Heidegger detects in Plato, while very little attention has been paid to the possibilities of interpreting the dialogues in the context of the analysis of Dasein and the 'existentiales', or rather, establishing the points of proximity between the existential analysis of man in the world and the so-called 'Socratic' element in Plato's writings. The following section is a contribution towards this neglected possibility which will greatly add to the visibility of this proximity in the thinking of Plato and Heidegger.

A number of reasons for this neglect could be suggested: the analysis of Dasein carried out in *Being and Time* recedes into the background in Heidegger's work in the period after its publication, his attention is now directed towards the projected 'history of Being', the recovery and *Destruktion* of the western metaphysical tradition and the 'turn' (*Kehre*) of the early to mid-thirties. Much of the terminology of the Dasein analysis is never used again, terms like Falling, Care, Curiosity. Also, of some account, must be the fact that much of the relevant material has only been published relatively recently whereas Heidegger's relationship to Aristotle has long been known and has generated a substantial body of literature. Many of the first generation of studies relied accounts of lectures given by former students and associates, for example; H.G. Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, Werner Marx, Otto Pöggeler, and Karl Löwith.[56] Many Heidegger scholars have not conducted detailed independent readings of Plato and Aristotle themselves and so there is a tendency to reproduce certain 'truisms' about Heidegger and the Greeks; that he 'appropriates' Aristotle and that he is hostile to Plato, but independent studies of Plato by Heidegger scholars will increasingly be able to show a somewhat different and more

[56] The people named here are authors of some of the best works on Heidegger, but what I am trying to highlight is the mediated nature of much of our knowledge of Heidegger's lecture courses before the recent publishing spate in the *Gesamtausgabe*. This brought about the rather odd situation of establishing a doxagraphical tradition. Jacques Taminiaux, for example, relies for the most part on Hannah Arendt's account of the 1924-5 lectures on the *Sophistes* in his chapter entitled 'The Reappropriation of the *Nicomachaean Ethics*' in his *HPFO*, pp 111-137 but adds an appendix in the light of student transcripts which he has subsequently seen. Added to this, it must be said, we are still too close to Heidegger for a proper assessment to be made.

nuanced picture as more and more of his relevant lectures enter the public domain to aid this task.[57]

The project of a fundamental ontology proceeds in two stages; an ontological analysis of Dasein followed by an exposition of the various meanings of Being which all in all serves the broader purpose of raising anew the question of the meaning of Being itself; read in this way *Being and Time* is largely devoted to carrying out this existential analysis in the analysis of Dasein and a critical re-thinking of the nature of time as being. The Dasein analysis itself is determined in broad terms by the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity. This has led some commentators to overestimate the derivation of the Dasein analytic from Aristotle's *poiesis/praxis* distinction in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[58]

2.2: Heidegger, Aristotle and the 'Ontology of Dasein'

Heidegger's use of Aristotle is well known, particularly as it bears on the Dasein analytic and the relationship to the *Nicomachaean Ethics*.[59] In a recent study of Heidegger and Aristotle, Ted Sadler has called into question the orthodoxy that has emerged on this question which broadly states that Heidegger 'appropriates' Aristotle.[60]

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[57] For example, John Sallis *Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues* and *Chorology: On Beginnings in Plato's* Timaeus Bloomington, 1999. Sallis is one of the few Heidegger scholars in the English speaking world who has established a truly independent relationship to the ancient texts.

[58] Taminiaux, for instance, says; this difference (the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity) came to Heidegger from the Greek distinction investigated by Aristotle in Book Theta of the *Metaphysics* and in Book VI of the *Nicomachaean Ethics*'. He bases this on a remark made by Heidegger in a letter to William J. Richardson; ' a renewed study of the Aristotelian treatises (especially Book IX of the *Metaphysics*, or Theta, and Book VI of the *Nicomachaean Ethics*) resulted in the insight into ἀλήθεια as a process of revealment, and in the characterisation of truth as non-concealment, to which all self-manifestation of beings pertains', William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* The Hague, 1967: pp. x – xiii, cited in J. Taminiaux *HPFO*: 116.

[59] For this see Franco Volpi '*Being and Time*: A "Translation" of the *Nicomachaean Ethics*?' in Kisiel and van Buren edd. *RHS* : 195-211; Walter Brogan 'The Place of Aristotle in the Development of Heidegger's Phenomenology' in Kisiel and van Buren edd. *RHS*: 213-227; Jacques Taminiaux *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology* tr. and ed. Michael Gendre NY, 1991: 111-143; Theodore Kisiel *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time Berkeley & L.A., 1993.

[60] Ted Sadler *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being* London, 1996: 145-50. According to Sadler, Heidegger's reception has been much influenced by Gadamer (read 'through Gadamerian spectacles'), especially in the English speaking world. Sadler charges Gadamer with being fundamentally out of sympathy with Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* which I would agree with but c.f. a 1992 interview between Alfons Grieder and H.G. Gadamer; 'When Heidegger expounds temporality, and being as time, I am really with

If we take our hint from Heidegger's characterisation of the *Nicomachaean Ethics* as an 'ontology of Dasein' and then take this characterisation of 'ethics' and combine it with the universal designation of certain dialogues of Plato as being 'Socratic' or 'ethical' then we are in a position to read those dialogues in the following ways:

1. The 'Socratic' dialogues, 'ethical' in theme, inscribe an 'ontology of Dasein' in its existential aspects.
2. The 'Socratic dialogues' are the necessary underpinning of a fundamental ontology.
3. It then becomes possible to see how both the existential and ontological analyses are, as it were, mutually determinative of each other.

This also describes the hermeneutic circle which Dilthey analysed in terms of textual interpretation. But it also applies to human existence – as inquirers we are always already part of what is inquired into. This means that the hermeneutic circle as an aspect of human existence rather than just a theory of exegesis.[61] This understanding of the hermeneutic circle, then, extends towards philosophical inquiry as well.

In the previous section it had been noted that Heidegger draws many of his fundamental concepts from Greek philosophy especially from Aristotle. It was also shown how Heidegger's very conception of philosophy itself in the *Being and Time* period is founded on Greek philosophising. In this section I set out to try and substantiate these claims more concretely by drawing out the parallels by way of a comparative exposition of the concepts that Heidegger introduces, attempting to locate their 'source' in Plato and Aristotle.

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him' 'A Conversation with Hans-Georg Gadamer' *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology* Vol. 26, No. 2, (May, 1995): 116-126)

[61] In hermeneutic theory it is expressed as a problem of access to texts but this is also true for investigations into phenomena; 'the whole of a work must be understood from individual words and their combination but full understanding of an individual part presupposes understanding of the whole.' Wilhelm

Terms like 'The They' (*Das Man*), 'Chatter'(*Gerede*), 'Authenticity' (*Eigentlichkeit*) and 'Care'(*Sorge*) can be compared to some of the characteristics that we associate with Socrates like care for the soul and Socratic ignorance. In this section I want to discuss these concepts in direct relation to the manner in which the content of these concepts are treated by Plato. The terms specified above derive from the analytic of Dasein which is not to be treated like any other kind of being. As categorial being relates to the objects we encounter in the world, so the existentiales equivalently apply to Dasein. Dasein is not to be treated categorially for it is not like those beings that it encounters in the world.[62]

We start from the Dasein analytic because in the Platonic dialogues, especially those we regard as 'Socratic', the taking up of any question, or the initiation of any inquiry, is always done from the existential and everyday perspective, that is, pre-theoretically. Socrates converses largely with non-philosophers and always proceeds from the opinion of the many, from tradition, statements by sophists, or reports of things heard. In other words the inquiry always begins from what we might term now the 'pre-theoretical'. It is only in the dialectical-ontological dialogues, where often Socrates is not the main speaker, the setting is private or semi-private, and the interlocutors are philosophers or philosophers to-be (Theaetetus) or scientific types (Theodorus; Simmias and Cebes), does the discussion begin, more or less, at the 'theoretical' level.

2.3: Dasein's Fundamental Disposition

Once the basic determinations, the existentiales, of Dasein have been presented here it will be possible to open up a comparative discussion of these with their 'equivalents' in

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Dilthey. 'The Development of Hermeneutics.' in *Selected Works of Wilhelm Dilthey*. Edited, translated and introduced by H.P. Rickman Cambridge, 1976: p.259. (*Gesammelte Schriften* Vol. V, pp.317-37).

[62] Again, the Cartesian context is important - Heidegger is all the time dedicated to overcoming the subject –object dichotomy, i.e. the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*; Heidegger banishes 'things' from his philosophy.

the Platonic dialogues, for example, ψυχὴ, ἔρως and the person of 'Socrates' who, as it were, represents, in Heideggerian terms, 'authentic' Dasein.[63]

The fundamental definition of Dasein, that feature that decisively sets man apart from every other kind of being and becomes a starting point for further specification, is set out at the beginning of the Dasein analytic in *Being and Time* (*BT* 67 ff = *SZ* 41 ff): 'We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is *in each case mine* . . *Being* is that which is an issue for every such entity. "Existence" (*Existenz*) is a term that will only be used to designate the Being of such an entity whereas the term "presence at hand" (*Vorhandenheit*) will denote the being of those beings which are not Dasein, i.e., the beings that Dasein encounters in the world'. Dasein*'s* Being is essentially different from every other kind of being hence the characteristics of this entity are not 'properties' a term that can only be applied to beings that are present at hand; hence the inapplicability of categories to Dasein, the correlate is, 'existentiales'. '*The essence of Dasein lies in its existence*' and its existentiales are 'in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that'. Heidegger is at pains to stress that Dasein must never be understood in the terms reserved for beings present-at-hand (*vorhanden*): 'That Being which is an *issue* for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand'.[64] This rules out any kind of categorial inquiry into the being of Dasein.

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[63] Socrates in quotes because it is the Socrates of the dialogues, especially of the Socratic dialogues, who we are talking about here.

[64] Heidegger's distinction between *zuhanden* and *vorhanden* is reserved exclusively for those beings that are not Dasein. To oversimplify somewhat, present at hand denotes those beings that are there prior to any specific determination of use or possible use by Dasein while present to hand denotes those beings which man has to do with insofar as he has some determinate relationship with them, for example the things of nature are present at hand insofar as they are the things of nature, they are there, but as soon as man has to do with them they take on the character of to-handedness, so, that forest is just there, but that forest as a lumbering opportunity becomes present to hand as raw material, as potential use value. When something is present to hand it is, as it were, unnoticed – the kettle boils water, we do not notice it as such, but when the kettle breaks down, when it loses its function, it obtrudes and shows itself as a thing. Its mode of presence changes radically. Parked cars do not attract our attention whereas the wreck stands out. Guignon is right to criticise Zimmerman's analysis of authenticity when the latter says that 'it is natural for us to objectify ourselves since we live in a world of objects' (Michael Zimmerman *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity* Ohio, 1981: 47) for this is based on a misunderstanding of worldhood in *Being and Time*; as Guignon points out, 'for Heidegger, we do *not* live in a world of objects: we live, for the most part, in a "ready-to-hand" context of equipmental relations organised into a web of means/ends

Heidegger moves on to determine the way in which Dasein can be authentic (or not), 'in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another . . . Dasein has always made some decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine' because in each case Dasein '*is* its possibility, and it "has" this possibility but not, of course, as a 'property'. Furthermore, 'because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it *can*, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only seem to do so'. This is the immediate context in which he introduces the concept of 'authenticity' (*Eigentlichkeit*) and 'inautheniticity' (*Uneigentlichkeit*) although the German terms suffer (like many of Heidegger's terms) in the translation; the relation of *eigentlich* as 'real' and *eigen* as 'own' is entirely lost with the term 'authenticity'. Dasein only insofar as it can be something which can be 'authentic', i.e. something real and ownmost, can it have 'lost itself and not yet won itself'. Having said this, inauthenticity is not to be taken as 'lesser' Being or a lower form of Being. [65] Rather, it means that 'even in its fullest concretion' Dasein can be characterised by inauthenticity; 'when busy, excited, interested, ready for enjoyment'.[66] Even the philosopher is subject to the 'pull' towards inauthenticity for the philosopher lives in the world too and the demands that being-in-the-world makes on one.

The basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness, Heidegger terms the 'Falling' (*Verfallen*) which should not be taken in a negative and pejorative sense and certainly not in any sense associated with the religious doctrine of the Fall. This Falling denotes a kind of absorption in the business and demands of the everyday; this has the effect of putting Dasein, as it were, 'alongside itself'; 'Being-lost in the publicness of the They',

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relations' Charles B. Guignon 'Heidegger's Authenticity Revisited' ('HAR') *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (Dec. 1984): 321-339.

[65] This is crucial when we come on to the interpretation of the cave image from Book VII of the *Politeia* when the state of the prisoners is discussed. The condition of being a prisoner is to be interpreted here in terms of authenticity and so we cannot take their condition as being existentially 'less real' than the state of the liberated prisoner outside.

[66] Zimmerman rightly describes inauthenticity as 'egoism' but is quite wrong to describe *Being and Time* as a voluntaristic-individualistic interpretation of authenticity' *ES*: 47; 199. Heidegger is dedicated to overcoming subjectivity throughout. The authenticity of Dasein is best understood in terms of Socratic self-knowledge where the 'self' refers to Dasein as such and not to the unique individual called Socrates. This section as whole sets out to demonstrate this thesis.

an absorption in 'Being-with-one-another' insofar as this state is determined by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Heidegger is at pains to stress that these inauthentic modes do not denote any kind of 'lesser being', illusory being, or a badness which a progress in culture could dispel (*BT*: 220 = *SZ*: 176-7). Falling has to be conceived of ontologically, that is, as *a priori* to any further determinations which may or may not pass ethical judgement on these modes, or, rather, how Dasein should deal with its situation. Falling denotes a sort of law of gravity which inheres to human nature. The claims that the public world makes upon us sets up this force of attraction which can result in loss. Dasein can become lost to itself through its absorption in the They (*das Man*) which is no more than the worldhood, or 'publicness', of such a public world but which has an *attraction*: 'The supposition of the They that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine "life", brings Dasein a *tranquility*, for which everything is "in the best order" and all doors are open' (*loc. cit.*). But contrary to what one might expect, this tranquilising effect of inauthenticity does not induce a torpor, or stagnation; quite the contrary, it stimulates hustle and bustle – being busy. The tranquilising effect of the Falling merely aggravates this busyness, and in this way Dasein becomes lost in the cares of the world and this describes a kind of alienation. This phenomena of Falling describes a movement, a downward plunge (*Absturz*). Dasein 'plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness'. Yet this plunge remains concealed from Dasein, covered over by the way things are 'publicly interpreted . . . so much so that it gets interpreted as a way of "ascending" and "living concretely".

Heidegger intends to raise the question of the everyday existence of man as the essential starting point for any ontological account of man and to bring this to the foreground in a detailed analysis of the 'structure of existentiality' of Dasein. This comes out in Plato in the various discussions of soul. Dasein determines itself as an entity in the light of a possibility which it *is* itself and which it somehow understands, 'but this tells us that if we are to interpret this entity *ontologically*, the problematic of its Being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence'. Dasein ' . . . should not be interpreted with the differentiated character of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most

part.' Here, Heidegger states that any ontology of Dasein must proceed initially from the existential, i.e. pre-theoretical description of man's being rather than interpreting man's being in accordance with some kind of anthropological, psychological, theological, or historiological theory of man (*BT*: 71-77 = *SZ*: 45 – 52). Following the analysis of the Platonic texts I return to some specific aspects of the Dasein analytic as they relate directly to Socratic characteristics. Firstly, I make some distinction between the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of 'theory' and 'praxis'.

2.4: The Question of *Theoria* and *Praxis* in Plato and Aristotle

The relationship between the 'theoretical' and the 'practical' is an issue that Heidegger focuses on again and again in his readings of Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger explores the significance of the conception of θεωρία as being the very highest form of praxis. I base much of the following discussion of this point on the *Republic* and the *Nicomachaean Ethics* and Heidegger's interpretations of these texts in the *Sophist* lectures and in *Being and Time*.[67]

Already it has become clear that it has become a truism to say that Heidegger derives much of the Dasein analytic from Aristotle's conception of practical philosophy, but it has also been shown how there must be an important caveat advanced in respect of this, as has been most pointedly suggested by Ted Sadler when he criticises the tendency amongst some Heidegger scholars to speak about his 'appropriation' of Aristotle's practical philosophy. They suggest that Heidegger takes up the scope and intent of Aristotelian praxis and accepts the practical paradigm of the φρόνιμος as such. In Sadler's critique these commentators tend to overlook Heidegger's radical critique of Aristotle; that ultimately Heidegger sets out to overcome metaphysics which is sometimes characterised as 'Aristotelianism' or 'Platonism' as a kind of shorthand. Of key importance to the Dasein analytic is the encounter with the Pauline conception of kairological time and the important influence of Luther and Kierkegaard. Sadler has

[67] There is a more complete exposition of Heidegger's analysis of the *Ethics* below in the section entitled 'Heidegger's Analysis of Ἀλήθεια in Plato and Aristotle'.

shown how this aspect of Heidegger's Dasein analytic is actually anathema to Aristotelianism and that a thesis of straightforward 'appropriation' is untenable. This becomes very apparent if we take account of the influence of Paul-Luther-Kierkegaard on Heidegger at this time, and, how these three figures, and what holds them in common, really are incompatible with 'Aristotelianism'.[68]

The idealist – realist distinction is not necessarily the best way of assessing the differences between Plato and Aristotle, some scholars prefer to stress the continuity between the two thinkers, and Heidegger would certainly lean more in that direction.[69] In the present context a difference that should be pointed out, though, is the way that Aristotle clearly separates the 'theoretical' from the 'practical' which we find in Book VI of the Ethics and how he then effects the move towards θεωρία as the highest possibility of praxis. One way is to regard this as a positive advance on Plato where the distinction is not sharply visible or, indeed, has not been made and Heidegger clearly regards Aristotle as having made such an 'advance'.[70] The other way of looking at this is to pose the question of fundamental conceptions. Is there something in Plato's conception of philosophy that requires the integration of the theoretical and the practical, and, tied to this; would this point up a very different basic stance between Aristotle and Plato, once

[68] For this see John van Buren 'Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther' in *RHS* and especially John D. Caputo '*Sorge* and *Cardia*: The Hermeneutics of Factical Life and the Categories of the Heart' also in *RHS*. For Luther's attitude to Aristotle see Martin Luther 'Disputation Against Scholastic Theology' in edd Harold J. Grimm and Helmut T. Lehmann *Luther's Works* Vol 31, Philadelphia 1957. For example: 'Thesis 41 Virtually the entire *Ethics* of Aristotle is the worst enemy of grace. This in opposition to the scholastics' and, 'Thesis 50. Briefly, the whole Aristotle is to theology as darkness is to light. This in opposition to the scholastics' (the 'whole' here means the scientific writings that came into circulation after the 'organon' which was well known in the Middle Ages). Luther contended that the Scholastics misunderstood Aristotle when they thought that they could assimilate him to Christian theology, his hostility is not towards Aristotle as such but to the inappropriate combination of Aristotle and Scripture. Luther's attitude to Plato seems to be more open to the possibility of a fruitful interaction. In the Heidelberg Disputation of 1518 he advances these two propositions: 'Thesis 36. Aristotle wrongly finds fault with and derides the ideas of Plato, which are actually better than his own' and 'Thesis 37. The mathematical order of material things is ingeniously maintained by Pythagoras, but more ingenious is the interaction of ideas maintained by Plato' (op. cit. P.42). An interesting line of research would be to fully investigate the Platonism of Luther.

[69] Heidegger's hermeneutic principle of coming to Plato through Aristotle evidences a stress on continuity. H. G. Gadamer is perhaps the leading current proponent of this view, exemplified in his work *The Idea of the Good in Plato and Aristotle*. Gadamer has long advocated seeing a continuity between Plato and Aristotle and of holding that the differences between them are not fundamental.

[70] The question must be asked, however, as to how much of this is strategic positioning in respect of the projected History of Being on the part of Heidegger.

again re-opening the vexed and difficult question regarding the relationship between the thinking of those two great philosophers?

Günter Figal, who also sees in Heidegger and Plato a certain proximity, draws attention to a kind of two-sidedness in Aristotle's philosophical achievement, on the one hand he is the phenomenologist par excellence while he is at the same time the founder of scholasticism which runs counter to phenomenological method. In the early stages of his Aristotle readings, which Figal rightly sees as no mere appropriation, Heidegger turns to Plato as an ally. Figal says that Heidegger later becomes critical of Plato but in the early period, particularly during the period of the *Sophist* lectures and *Being and Time*, Heidegger takes up the anti-scholastic possibilities of the dialogues; 'Plato's dialogues show what it is like to philosophize, to live one's life in the world by being there as a philosopher, they show how philosophy emerges from life as its authentic articulation' sometimes by elucidating the falseness of other modes of being, like sophistry in the *Sophist*. Figal is able to say on the basis of these early readings that Heidegger 'actually philosophised in close vicinity to Plato', although he sees this as a phase, a transitory moment on the way to a more critical stance towards Plato which comes after the period of the '*Kehre*'.[71] Figal's intention in his paper is close to that of this dissertation, that is, to commend Heidegger's early relationship to Plato, what he calls his 'transitory Platonism', as philosophically plausible.

We can see that the lack of a clear differentiation between the theoretical from the practical in Plato is not necessarily a weakness at all and may very much be bound up in the premier role that Plato accords to dialectic; 'dialectic is the only way (μέθοδος μόνη) in which hypotheses are 'disposed of', bringing us to the originating-determination (ἀρχή) 'Why are there beings at all rather than nothing?' (*IM*: 1; trr. Fried and Polt).[72] Detachment of the 'theoretical' and 'practical' at this point would be the beginning of scholasticism. I suggest a little further on here that Aristotle is interested in 'science' and

[71] Günter Figal, 'Refraining from Dialectic: Heidegger's Interpretation of Plato in the *Sophist* Lectures (1924/25)' in edd. Sallis and Scott

[72] The term 'on the way' as in a pathway (*Wegmark*) – Heidegger uses many variations of the word *Weg* in the sense Plato uses it here throughout his writings.

it is *this* which leads to the closure of difference (*contra* Heidegger) and not the distinction Plato draws in various places (e.g. *Rep.* VI, 509b) because Plato does, after all, preserve difference while Aristotle takes up the modalities of being and a ground-laying of the sciences.[73] Plato, in Heideggerian terms, constantly moves within the orbit of the kind of question Heidegger poses above although it is never explicitly stated in this way for the closure of difference has not taken place.[74]

In Aristotle's practical philosophy, the highest possibility in praxis is to be a φρόνιμος, or, one adept at 'affairs' be they of state or of business whereas in Plato, if we treat the *Republic* as a source for this comparison, the highest possibility for praxis is the philosopher who has become ruler (or the ruler who has become a genuine philosopher), and the highest possibility for the philosopher here is to be one who has partaken of the vision of the Good and has successfully completed the rigorous formation process. It seems that in the *Ethics* it is possible to be a φρόνιμος without being a σοφός, although Aristotle clearly gives primacy to the σοφός (*Nic. Eth.* 1141a 9), but, he says that a φρόνιμος can be more effective in praxis than a σοφός precisely because he has a sharper eye for the particular. In the *Republic* however it is clear that until the political community is ruled by the philosophers there will never be real justice, although Aristotle does not suggest that justice will come via the agency of the φρόνιμος. When we turn to Aristotle's definitions of justice in Book V of the *Ethics* and make a comparison with the definitions we find in the *Republic* we discover a quite different underlying stance and intent. It is clearly stated that anyone who wishes to act mindfully (ἐμφρόνως πράξειν) in public *or* private must have sight of it (ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) (*Rep.* VII, 517c). Unlike for Aristotle, praxis is clearly determined by the highest theoretical disposition and this should count as an important difference between the two thinkers.

Clearly both thinkers have a very different intent in their descriptions of the political community and the intellectual 'virtues'. Aristotle pragmatically describes the world as it

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[73] And yet, if I have understood Heidegger's conception of the 'decisive' correctly, that distinction, especially in its thematic form in the *Sophist*, becomes the starting point for Aristotle. In taking up the question of being the way he does, Aristotle is not radical enough, that is, he takes up from Plato. I anticipate the later sections where I investigate the preservation of difference by Plato.

[74] It has not become an issue the way it does for Heidegger. Plato stands at the beginning, on the cusp of the metaphysical tradition, Heidegger at its end.

is encountered and the skills and qualities necessary to navigate successfully through this world, qualities he seems to approve of - 'smug' and 'comfortable' is how Russell has described his ethical vision - and he largely derives his analysis of the constitution of the polity on historical and contemporary examples.[75] In this sense Aristotle analyses actual practices and from this analysis derives, for example, his theory of justice. For Plato, however, these may all be just examples of inauthentic πόλεις and practices, all the various modes or degrees of ἀδικία as they actually pan out in the world. For Plato though, the structure of a world not created by the philosopher ruler is systemically unjust. In the *Republic* Socrates sets out to describe the πόλις essentially, describing what it actually is, that is, the concrete manifestation of justice in the full awareness that such a place does not *exist* and probably never will and yet maintaining that this actually *is* the πόλις. So the actual historical polity will always fall short of itself – the copy will be an imperfect instantiation of the paradigm. It is in this sense that Plato is describing 'reality' as it 'really is' but not as it exists, although, of course, both philosophers are describing reality, Aristotle takes his bearings from phenomenological descriptions of the actual based on the observation of practice; and while Plato too practices a kind of phenomenological description it is one that regards the ἰδέα, the 'look', illuminated by the good in itself, as the phenomenon. What is then perceived in the actual world of praxis is juts a poor copy or approximation of the 'really real', the true πόλις. Aristotle sets out from the world of experience and describes what is actually happening in human affairs and deriving any excellences (adeptness in the business of the 'world' or 'worldliness') that he can identify as exemplifications of human action governed by a principle of balance. An excellence consists in neither a lack nor an excess of any quality but of a

[75] For example, a work like *The Constitution of Athens*; also, Diogenes Laertius mentions a collection of constitutions from 158 states arranged according to type, i.e. democratic, oligarchical, tyrannical, and aristotcratic, *Diog. Laert.* V. 27). This worldliness has come in for criticism by others, notably Russell who lambastes Aristotle's worldly ethics, and I reproduce the passage in full for it seems to express quite powerfully something of the gulf that separates Aristotle's ethics from Plato's erotic and maniacal philosophy; 'There is an emotional poverty in the *Ethics* which is not found in the earlier philosophers. There is something unduly smug and comfortable about Aristotle's speculations on human affairs; everything which makes men feel a passionate interest in each other seems to be forgotten. Even his account of friendship is tepid. He shows no sign of having had any of those experiences which make it difficult to preserve sanity; all the more profound aspects of the moral life are apparently unknown to him. He leaves out, one may say, the whole sphere of human experience with which religion is concerned. What he has to say is what will be useful to comfortable men of weak passions; but he has nothing to say to those

balance between the two. A balance that is necessary for the preservation and continuation of the world-order. From the Aristotelian point of view it could be said that Plato is wrong-footed from the start for he subordinates all beings to an allegedly untenable fundamental principle, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, for when we seek this 'good in itself' we come up against specific goods none of which can be adequate for the task that Plato sets for no specific good is sufficiently broad to encompass the whole. Such a critique as we find in the *Ethics* Book I, 6 (1096a 12 ff) rejects the idea of the good for it does not square with the scheme of being and categoriality which Aristotle has drawn up on the basis of the ἀρχαί. The same charge as has been leveled at Aristotle in his account of earlier thinkers probably applies equally in the case of the Platonic good. But in this very matter have we not struck upon something crucial for the question of ontological difference as I touched on above? If we can show that Plato has preserved ontological difference, placing him on the very cusp of metaphysics, and, if we can do this through an interpretation of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, in other words, difference in Plato depends on how we understand the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, where then would this leave Aristotle's critique? Is it then possible to read this rejection by Aristotle as evidence of the closure of difference? If this were so then it is to Aristotle that we should look for the early move towards the *Seinsvergessenheit.* A more detailed discussion of this comes further below in the section dealing specifically with the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.[76]

I turn now to a discussion of the Platonic texts, especially the *Apology* in order to identify and extract the existential theme, explicate some of its elements, then return later below to some more specific aspects of Heidegger's Dasein analytic and making a productive comparison of this, with what is distinctly 'Socratic'.

2.5: Aspects of Socrates as They Relate to Plato's Existential Analysis

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who are possessed by a god or a devil.' Bertrand Russell *History of Western Philosophy* London, 1946: 195.

[76] It is not possible here to pursue this question as it relates to Aristotle. If the Good can be reappraised in a way that saves it from the 'two-worlds' charge, and if it can then be understood on the basis of ontological difference then this will render the question of the origins of the forgetting of being more ambiguous and in need of specific and thoroughgoing research. This of course applies here to Plato and Aristotle.

This theme is of such magnitude that it would require a complete reassessment of the Platonic Socrates in order to explicate it fully. What follows here and throughout this section is merely a preliminary contribution towards such a reassessment and as such is highly selective.

Socrates' claim to be the greatest statesman in Athens is no mere ironic ploy: this is a serious claim.[77] If we understand this claim literally we can also grasp the meaning of the communistic society sketched out in the *Republic*, we see then how the essence of the πόλις is determined entirely by the ἰδέα, more particularly, by the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ because it alone grants all beings their being, thus the just πόλις too receives its being from the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

In a number of passages Socrates claims to be the true statesman while at the same time he disavows participation in the actual political processes of his city. In the *Gorgias*, immediately following one of the many authorial allusions that Plato makes to Socrates' fate (*Gorg.* 521d), Socrates advances this apparently bold claim: 'I think I am one of very few Athenians, not to say the only one, engaged in the true political art, and that of the men of today I alone practice statesmanship' (*loc. cit.*).[78] Only an apparently bold claim because if we understand what the 'true political art' is that Socrates is talking about here then we will see that there is not a scintilla of exaggeration or 'irony' in his claim.[79] Socrates hints at the reason for this; '. . . when I speak on any occasion it is not with a view to winning favour, but I aim at what is best', that is, he contrasts the practice of the

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[77] The recent literature on this is enormous and largely arising from the preeminence given to Socrates and Socratic irony by Gregory Vlastos. While this commentator is out of sympathy with Vlastos' philosophical approach in general, one cannot but pay tribute to him for his life-long commitment to placing the question of Socrates in the fore-front of scholarly attention (rightly, I believe); this must surely stand as his greatest achievement. On the question of irony I am largely guided by Kierkegaard and, more recently, Alexander Nehamas who discusses both Kierkegaard and Vlastos in respect of irony: Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates* tr. Lee M. Capel (London, 1966); Gregory Vlastos *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Cambridge, 1991); Alexander Nehamas *Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Socrates* (New Jersey, 1999), especially 'Voices of Silence: On Gregory Vlastos's Socrates' pp. 83 – 107. I do not take up the question of Socrates' irony directly here.

[78] The authorial allusion is of course to his trial and death; '. . . I know well, that if I am brought into court to face any such danger as you (Callicles) mention, it will be an evil man who prosecutes me' (*Gorg.* 521d)

[79] The sense of irony in this passage is palpable but like many instances of Socratic irony misleading. The insinuation of irony into the interlocutor/reader often allows Socrates to make straight claims under the guise of apparent irony.

'politically' active which is guided by self-interest, with that of the philosopher, who is guided solely by the truth. The negative definition emerges; self-interest falls short of the truly political which is characterised by the good of the whole. But here we must avoid all later connotations suggested by the use of the word 'political' for that would involve imposing the entirely modern distinction between civil society and the state, i.e. political society. The rhetors and factionalists of the assembly are given over to the business of trying to make sectional interest appear as the universal good. The art of politics concerns the universal and the true πόλις is a single community and not the simulacrum which is the extant polity, the historical Athens represented in the dialogues or any other polity for that matter.[80] The true statesman is the one whose every action refers to the theoretical moment of 'having seen' the paradigm of *community*. Indeed the historical πόλις is no πόλις at all as Socrates says to Glaucon, 'Happy (εὐδαίμων) you to be able to think of any community as worthy of the name 'πόλις' other than the one we are building here' (*Rep.* IV. 422e). The actual state of affairs falls far short of manifesting the essence of the πόλις rather it is a πάμπολλαι, a multitude of πόλεις masquerading or playing at being (παίζω) a πόλις. The basic division is into two, the rich and the poor and then further subdivisions within each class (*Rep.* 423a –b); and if we follow Socrates meaning here right through to its conclusion, this imitation πόλις is ultimately just a collection of individuals in competition with each other.[81]

Socrates claim to be the only statesman in Athens must rest, then, on his ability to withdraw from interest, hence, factionalism, his ability to see the whole, rather than

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[80] Just as we are not interested here in the 'historical' Socrates neither are we interested in the 'historical' Athens for such is an historiographical problematic. Vlastos criticises this practice when he comments on Gerasimos Santas' book on Socrates, *Socrates* (London, 1979). Santas' study is about the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues, the fictional Socrates; Vlastos speaks about the temptation to bypass the 'bugbear of Platonic studies, the so-called "Socratic Problem" . . . why not let the historians have the Socrates of history all to themselves?' Vlastos argues that Platonic interpreters cannot evade this question because of the existence in the dialogues of two Socrates. The portrait of Socrates that Plato lovingly presents in the 'early' period gives way to a Socrates who starts to introduce distinctly Platonic doctrines; Vlastos, *SIMP*: 45. Vlastos is of course right – but only if one subscribes to the developmental theory of Plato. Throughout I am suggesting a kind of textuality that distinguishes 'world' and 'text'; one which does not refer to anything outside the text (Xenophon and the doxagraphical tradition) but which includes the concept of intertextuality. The reference to the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (*Apol.* 18d; 19c) is just such an example of intertextuality, that is; the Aristophanic text in some sense 'becomes' part of the Platonic text.

[81] Anticipating Hobbes' anthropology; the war of all against all.

confounding a part with the whole, in short: Socrates represents the universality which in its concrete realisation is called the πόλις but which taken *a priori* is the Being of man.

2.6: Socrates and Dasein, Τὸ Πλῆθος and *Das Man* in the *Apology*

The *Apology* is something of an oddity within the *corpus platonicum*; it is not a dialogue as such although there is a short question and answer sequence between Socrates and Meletus (*Apol.* 24d f); of all the Platonic writings it is perhaps the only text which can be taken seriously as a document, and it is the only text which has Socrates addressing a large gathering of people at length. In this reading it is proposed to sharply distinguish between the documentary value of the *Apology* and its status as a philosophical text. Where reference is made to sources external to the text, for example, contemporary Athenian judicial practice, this is done by way of supplying the context rather than as pursuant to historical reconstruction of the event that was the condemnation and death of Socrates. It is usual now to regard the *Apology* as perhaps Plato's first philosophical text but, in keeping with the principles established in the Introduction to this dissertation, the matter of dating is deemed of no real importance here.

Like any Platonic text the *Apology* too resists closure, we cannot possibly exhaust the hermeneutic possibilities here because if we divine Plato's 'intentions' correctly, that is his authorial decisions as guided by a fundamental conception of philosophy, then the dialogue form, its resistance to definitive interpretation, to systematisation, its recalcitrance in the face of any attempt to elaborate a system of dogmas and doctrines, its preservation of the essential 'openness' of the philosophical undertaking, lead to a reaffirmation of the earlier assertion that philosophy is always underway, always beginning.[82] We interpret the *Apology* using Heideggerian concepts not as a form of straight-forward allegoresis or imposition (which might amount to the same thing) but in the conviction that Heidegger as a 'beginner' in philosophy re-discovers, in an entirely different context, and, at an entirely different moment in the tradition of beginnings, the

[82] '. . . every dialogue shows Plato underway' (*PS*: 9 = *GA* 19: 14) 'The philosopher is always a beginner' *GA* 61: 13. This accords with Heidegger's own self-understanding epitomised in his motto 'Ways not works'.

fundamental insights into human existence that we find preserved in the dialogues of Plato, that is, both Plato and Heidegger come to the truth of the things themselves. When we speak of parallels or proximity this should not be taken to mean straightforward appropriation or 'influence' or a thinking derived from interpretation, rather, it is suggested that there is a proximity inherent in their thinking, in their fundamental disposition towards the phenomena.[83] The dangers here are obvious: it would be all too easy to slide from the delicate matter of 'proximity' to the suggestion of identity.

The *Apology* of Plato is the only Platonic text that records an address by Socrates to a large assembly of citizens. The following preliminary observations are, of course, obvious but need to be stated for the full exposition of this particular thesis: Socrates is here addressing a very large gathering of citizens of all classes, ages, professions, and capabilities, in other words, a random cross-section of the city. It is because this large assembly of listeners is so representative that we are entitled to regard them as representing the public as such, or the 'world', it would be premature at this point to say that Socrates as philosopher represents philosophy because that would imply that at this stage we know what that means although this representation is indeed the right one. The listeners to whom Socrates is addressing have been tasked with judgement over him. They are to hear the speeches of those who seek to condemn Socrates, listen to the rebuttal speech and then pass judgment on him: is he to be condemned or not.

The public trial of the philosopher is the public trial of philosophy if we understand Socrates in the impersonal sense suggested so far: here it is the world that passes judgement on philosophy, finds it guilty of subverting the public good and does away with it. All well and good but what does this really mean? What does it mean to say that philosophy is on trial? In what sense can philosophy be tried? Surely what is at issue here is the matter of whether the named individual, Socrates, is guilty of specific charges that have been brought against him by his fellow citizens, exercising their right under Athenian law to bring prosecutions on behalf of the πόλις? Yet in trying Socrates for the

[83] All along this suggestion rules out any question of 'comparing doctrines' for neither thinker authored doctrines, both thinkers share an nondogmatic temper; they both think through and over the tradition.

specific charges of corrupting the youth of the city and introducing new deities, it is precisely philosophy that is on trial because this is the denotation that Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon give to the activity in which Socrates was engaged. They do not like what Socrates is about and they are determined to have him publicly condemned. As non-philosophers they are necessarily anti-philosophers for it is a thesis here that philosophy, as conceived here in the *Apology*, is an offence against common sense and decency and everything that society holds in high regard.[84] The issue of philosophy's standing in the eyes of the world only becomes an issue here because of the highly public nature of Socrates' philosophising. It is probably well for philosophy that the world perceives it as either an obscure, abstract, and highly complicated affair done behind the high walls of academe, or, on the other hand, as something useful contributing all sorts of ideas with practical application; the solving of ethical dilemmas, drawing up of political constitutions, contributing to the theory of scientific praxis and so on.

The *Apology* represents an ἀγών for here we see two conflicting claims being aired before the world. This contest is not of Socrates' choosing, it was initiated by his prosecutors, who avail of their right to mount prosecutions on behalf of the city. This is an extremely important observation for everything that transpires; we must bear in mind that Socrates has not initiated these proceedings. By taking up the prosecution Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon are claiming that they know what is best for the city and, indeed, they are so certain of this that they act on this 'knowledge' in such a way that they seek the death of another in order that the good of the city may be served. By making this a life and death issue, these three leave no room for doubt or interpretation, these are three men who 'know' exactly what is what and can 'act' on it. The degree to which such 'qualities' are held in high esteem by the 'They' (*Das Man*) will come out as this reading develops: where the public admire 'resoluteness', the 'man of action', regardless of whether the 'action' is prudential or not. What needs to be stressed here is the absolute self-assurance of these characters which we take from their determination to make this a life and death issue.

[84] Philosophy in the Socratic-Heideggerian sense is the counter-tendency to the tranquilising effect of the Falling discussed above. Later in this section passages from the *Gorgias* and the *Theaetetus* will be adduced to add to this reading.

Socrates observes that public perception of him has been formed before many of the gathering were even born by poets and comedians (*Apol.* 18c). Tarrant makes the very pertinent observation that Socrates takes up six Stephanus pages discussing the charges of the poets and how it forms public opinion but only four pages to the actual indictment brought by Meletus and Co.[85] For the charge is no more that a formalisation of the common perception of Socrates, it is, so to speak, the formalised *Gerede* about Socrates. By dwelling longer on the received views than on the charges themselves Socrates highlights the inauthentic manner in which opinion is formed and how dangerous it can be. Meletus and Co. are merely re-cycling the *Gerede*; by bringing such charges they merely personify this *Gerede*: they are its executable element. There is no point in tackling the formal charges and those who lodged them, for insofar as they are the executability of τὸ πλῆθος (*Das Man*) they are the mere ciphers of the accumulated and endlessly passed-on *Gerede* about Socrates, that is, the real cause of Socrates predicament. We cannot help recollecting the situation of the prisoners in the Cave image of the *Republic* for here we come upon one of the numerous moments of intertextuality in Plato. The returning ex-prisoner who has seen the source of being and 'seeing' runs the risk of being put to death by the prisoners because he now appears to them to be incomprehensible and outrageous (*Rep.* VII, 517a). Socrates will attempt to discuss the matters themselves while the prosecutor and enough of the jury are only interested in re-establishing the blather about Socrates which, on the basis of the verdict, is held to be more important that the matters themselves. Socrates here, is like the returned philosopher who has outraged and scandalised the cave dwellers beyond endurance with his talk about 'what *is*', rather than showing willingness to behave and speak like any other normal decent citizen. By concentrating on the received wisdom about himself, Socrates highlights the importance of public δόξα/*Gerede* as determination of these events rather than the actual charges brought by these public-minded gentlemen. Their charges are wholly derived from the conventional blather about Socrates, they

[85] Harold Tarrant in his introduction to *The Last Days of Socrates* translated by Hugh Trendennick and Harold Tarrant, Harmondsworth, 1993 (revised ed.): 33

bring forward no insights of their own and no observations that they have made themselves, and are, accordingly, not worth taking seriously. It is the formation of δόξα that is Socrates' only concern at this point.

Socrates tells the court about the origin of his activity, which is also an explanation for his high public profile. He tells how Chaerophon a friend and devotee of Socrates (and whom Socrates describes as something of a *Schwärmer* - ὁρμήσειεν - 21 a4) actually went to the oracle at Delphi to ask if there was anyone wiser than Socrates and the answer - that there was none - put Socrates into a most interesting dilemma: Socrates knows that he is not wise but he also knows that the god does not lie (*Apol.* 20e – 21b). The characterisation of Chaerephon as a *Schwärmer* raises an interesting contrast: Socrates is governed by an opposing principle, that of daimonically induced reticence (31d). It is Chaerephon's eagerness to establish the reputation of his friend's wisdom that leads to all the trouble in the first place. It is as if Socrates' public mission was foisted on him by the circumstance of his friend's boundless energies and the disturbing disclosure of the oracle. Disturbing in two ways; the content of the oracle controverts Socrates' self-opinion, and, the oracle makes of him a public man. Philosophy becomes public-ised through the evangelical zeal of a non-philosopher. Philosophy, it seems, cannot stand the glare of publicity.

The word of god and Socrates' own assessment of himself come into apparent conflict. A conflict of knowing which is very interesting in one who professes ignorance. In a way then, Socrates still lacks self-knowledge. By professing knowledge of his *lack* of knowledge about things in general, combined with his conviction that the statement; 'that there is none wiser than Socrates', seems to be wrong; Socrates still lacks a vital element in his own self-knowledge. He 'knows' that the god is always right, or, to put it another way, the utterances of the god are taken as true absolutely. The conflict centers around what Socrates 'knows' about himself, and the unshakeable authority he grants each and every utterance of the god. His mission is born of this conflict. He sets out to test the oracle: if he can find just one person wiser he will have disproved the oracle, so convinced is he of his own shortcomings in the matter of wisdom: does this aspect of his

mission not skirt very close to the edge of impiety? Impiety it would be if it were not for his absolute faith in the pronouncements of the god, for the effect of the oracle is to destabilise his 'self-knowledge', revealing it to be merely a matter of conviction, for at 21 b9 Socrates tells the court that he was in a state of ἀπορία, and for some 'considerable time'. His mission, then, is guided by a great need he experienced to break out of his ἀπορία. Pursuant to this he sets about interviewing people who have some reputation for being σοφός. Over and over again he discovers that prospective candidates, like those who are wise according to tradition; like the poets, or, by common opinion, well-known public figures, or, experts in special technical fields, show themselves all to be lacking – but with one important difference; Socrates now *knows* that he lacks σοφός, because he now *knows* what it *means* when the god says that there is 'none wiser' than Socrates:

> '. . . real wisdom is the property of the god, and this oracle is his way of telling us that human wisdom has little or no value. It seems to me that he is not referring literally to Socrates, but has merely taken my name as an example, as if he would say to us, "The wisest of you men is he who has realised, like Socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless."' (*Apol.* 23a –b)

The conflict is made sharper and more determinate in its character. It turns out that Socrates does 'know' something albeit negatively. Socrates is the living embodiment of the dialectical principle of determinate negation which is given formal exposition in the *Sophist*.[86] 'He' is the pure principle of negation by which a κάθαρσις is effected. This purification is initially, and always as it turns out, an auto-purification. Socrates, as authentic Dasein, carries out the κάθαρσις on *himself* through his public mission to elucidate the meaning of the god, that is, for Dasein to enter into the realm of the self-showing of Being as Being, Being as such, must turn away from the endless interplay of entities and the involvement in entities: *Gerede*, then, is a kind of ontic prattle. It misses the being of beings, fastening on instead to the peculiar characteristics of entities – the projections onto the wall of the cave in Book VII of the *Republic*. Only the god can truly

[86] Again, stressing the fictional nature of this Socrates, the 'textual' being of this character.

posit, only the god can grant being to beings; man, or Dasein more properly, must settle for 'second best', the δεύτερος πλοῦς of the *Phaedo* (*Phaed.* 99d).[87]

This self-interpretation by Socrates also allows us to take the hermeneutic decision to read Socrates as 'Socrates'; as a cipher. The real subject of the *Apology* is not the historical individual Socrates but rather 'man' or Dasein and, moreover, authentic Dasein. Is this what Plato the author is intending? Did the author compose a biographical sketch of his great mentor or did he compose a philosophical text? Or is this evidence yet again of the author's supreme literary art in that he can compose both texts in one text? Surely what we have here is the clearest possible evidence of what Hegel calls the exoteric and the esoteric Plato but with an important difference: Hegel's distinction refers to the difference between the surface 'doctrine' and the inner doctrine, the *Apology* is exoterically a documentary record while esoterically, I suggest, it is a founding text.[88]

The second best of the *Phaedo* also follows on from an aporetic situation; the inadequacy of all hitherto attempts to give an account of Being. The initial enthusiasm fuelled by Anaxagoras' promise to explain everything in terms of νοῦς is quickly dashed by the realisation that Anaxagoras merely pays lip service to νοῦς as a principle, because he lapses into the same old mechanistic accounts that amount to explaining entities by reference to other entities (*Phaed.* 98b – 99d).

[87] The point where Socrates advances the hypothesis at *Phaedo* 99a ff – I am *assuming* the existence of Beauty in itself and Goodness and Largeness and all the rest of them' (100b). Later on in the discussion of the Timaean δημιουργός, I introduce Kant's theory of intuition and Heidegger's commentary on this where he emphasises the difference between 'divine' and 'human' intuition. This will explicate further what is meant by the statement; 'Only the god can truly posit . . .'

[88] In his treatment of the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* and the dismissive attitude of contemporaries towards these crucially important dialogues, Hegel said '... the esoteric is the speculative, which even though written and printed, is yet, without being any secret, hidden from those who have not sufficient interest in it to exert themselves.' G.W.F. Hegel *Lectures on the History of Philosophy.* tr. E.S. Haldane Vol. II. London, 1894: p.68.

2.7: The Philosopher, the World, and the Business of the World.

The disavowal of public address in favour of private speech at 31c f. Socrates explains by reference to his δαίμων which, like the claim to lack knowledge, is a negative determination. The δαίμων does not propose action, it inhibits it. His δαίμων has prevented him from participating in public life. Here, the δαίμων has, uniquely, not inhibited Socrates from public speech, and so, for the first time it is possible for Socrates to address a large group in a public institutional context. Socrates never says that he does not want to speak or do certain things only that the δαίμων has always prevented him from taking certain courses of action that suggested themselves to him. Socrates narrating his two rather unpleasant experiences of political life, observes that if he had participated in politics actively, he would not have lasted very long. This is echoed by Machiavelli, a later master of the distinction between appearance and real being, in the public sphere at least.[89] In both private and public life Socrates has always sought to do what was right, something that would prove fatal if carried on in the public sphere. If he had entered public life, we may infer, he would have had to give up philosophy and learn the ways of the world, or, he would have perished very quickly. But actually, either way would have been the road to ruin: through wickedness or foolishness. The 'world' as the world is precisely what is at issue both here and in the cave itself; at the bench, where prisoners vie enthusiastically which each other in identifying and discussing the stream of appearances. The 'rulers' know this well, but so do the philosophers. It may be that in this, we have a clue to the identity of the scene-shifters in the cave, those who hold and move the silhouettes that are passed up and down.[90] They are the ones who maintain the world of the cave, the *de facto* rulers. They understand that what appears on the cave walls is produced by shapes and fire and noises, because they are the ones producing these events. But they too are prisoners because while they may control the illusion, they

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[89] '. . . many writers have imagined for themselves republics and principalities that have never been seen nor known to exist in reality; for there is such a gap between how one lives and how one ought to live that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation: for a man who wishes to profess goodness at all times will come to ruin among so many who are not good' Niccolò Machiavelli *The Prince* tr. Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa (Oxford, 1984): 52

[90] 'Picture men carrying a variety of objects, shapes of men and animals made of wood, stone . . . some are talking, some are silent' (*Rep* VII, 514c – 515a). Significantly, Plato uses φθέγγομαι (I render as 'talking') which could take the translation, *Gerede*.

too are in darkness, ignorant of the space and light that lies behind them, cut off from the vision of the fully real. Their whole existence is absorbed in maintaining the interplay of shapes and sounds. Machiavelli's rulers must strenuously devote themselves to maintaining everything the people hold dear but without believing in it himself for that would be ruinous; and yet they too succumb to a kind of illusion: they believe that all is illusion but power.[91]

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger introduces the theme of conscience and its connection with death. Socrates makes a very important comparison between the philosopher and the soldier. He compares his own obedience to the orders of his officers at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, to his obedience to the god in carrying out his divinely appointed public mission. He compares his lack of fear of death to that of Achilles who in avenging the death of Patrolcus, his beloved, knows that he will die too, but that nevertheless his fear of ignoble action outweighed his fear of death (*Apol.* 28b f.). Socrates' fearless attitude to death can also bear comparison to what Heidegger says about the connection between death and authenticity which will be presented below. Heidegger binds the issue of anxiety with that of death as the final possibility of Dasein in a way that is directly comparable to the treatment of these very same issues in the *Phaedo*. In both thinkers at both ends of the tradition we find the same implicit teaching concerning the fundamental nature of human existence.

Where are the criteria for the possibilities and modes of authentic existence to be found if not from Dasein itself? This demands the introduction of conscience ' . . . an authentic potentiality-for-Being is attested by the conscience' (*BT* 277 = *SZ* 234). The connection with death is now made clear:

> ' . . . conscience, as a phenomenon of Dasein, demands, like death, a genuinely existential Interpretation. Such an Interpretation leads to the insight that Dasein has an authentic potentiality-for-Being in that it *wants*

[91] This, perhaps, summarises what is at the heart of Thrasymachus' speech in Book I. I cannot conduct a more detailed analysis of Book I for that would constitute a digression away from the ontological theme that I am mainly pursuing here.

to have a conscience. But this is an existentiell possibility which tends, from the very meaning of its Being, to be made definite in an existentiell way by Being-towards-death.' (loc. cit.)

While the primordial ontological basis for Dasein's existentiality is *temporality* and this remains the broader context for the Second Division, this account must remain incomplete for it is the question of death and conscience as the basis for authentic existence which must remain our focus here as we attempt to interpret the *Apology* in these terms. However some remarks are necessary in order to try and counterbalance the inevitable lopsidedness that will emerge from a partial recapitulation of what is an absolutely crucial set of analyses for Heidegger's ontology of Dasein.

In the light of the advance that has been gained by considering Dasein*'s* existentiality in terms of temporality as the primordial ontological basis Heidegger indicates a return to the previously articulated modes of Dasein's Being in their ontological structures which must now be conducted in reference to their temporal meaning. Everydayness (*Alltaeglichlkeit*) reveals itself as a mode of temporality and the recapitulation of these analyses will also reveal something about temporality and, once this is achieved, it becomes 'intelligible' why Dasein is historical 'in the basis of its Being':

> 'If temporality makes up the primordial meaning of Dasein's Being, and if moreover this entity is one for which, in its Being, *this very Being* is an *issue*, then care (*Sorge*) must use 'time' and therefore must reckon with 'time'.

Heidegger also draws a very important distinction between *Angst* and 'fear' which are basic moods. The various moods (*Stimmung*) are ways of disclosing the world, one's 'thrownness' in the world, and the 'involvement of entities in it', our 'having to do with' is bound up with mood. Earlier in *Being and Time*, Heidegger treats of fear and *Angst* but here we are concerned only with *Angst*, and *Angst* as a fundamental 'mood'. The

various moods like *Angst*, or boredom are distinctive ways in which Dasein is disclosed. Dasein's 'absorption' in the 'world', its trials and tribulations, has something of the character of a 'fleeing' of Dasein in the face of itself. We must now go on to draw out the relationship between *Angst* and death on the one hand, and boredom and authenticity on the other, how both of these sets of relations are bound up with an experience of Being/Nothing, and then relate all of this to the present reading of the *Apology*

The more authentically Dasein resolves – and this means that in anticipating death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost possibility – the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by accident. Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and 'provisional' possibility driven out. Only Being-free *for* death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one – those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly – and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its *fate* (*Schicksals*)' (*BT* 435 = *SZ* 384).

Authenticity and conscience are bound together here by death, or, being-towards-death. The δαίμων of Socrates turns out to be conscience. But this is meaningless as it stands for it presupposes that we know what conscience is in this context. For Socrates, the δαίμων has an inhibitory function, it does not give positive counsel, it merely intervenes to prevent Socrates from certain undertakings, like, public life, that is absorption in the inauthenticity of the 'world'. He would 'lose' himself if he were to do that; Dasein looses itself when it preoccupied with 'business'. From the point of view of 'the ordinary busy man', the δαίμων, the daimonic, 'is "excessive", "astounding", and at the same time "difficult"' (*P*: 100 = *GA* 54: 149). It is even something to be mocked and scorned by τὸ πλῆθος; '. . . I am subject to a divine or supernatural experience, which Meletus saw fit to travesty in his indictment' (*Apol.* 31c-d). The daimonic is contrasted to the norms:

'what is current, what a man is doing and what he pursues, is for the most part without difficulty for him because he can always find, going from one being to the next, a way of escape from difficulty and an explanation. The many and the all too many pursue only the beings that are current: for them, these are real, if not precisely "the" reality. But in mentioning "reality", the throng attests that, besides what is currently real, it has something else in view, which, to be sure, it does not clearly see.' (loc. cit.)

This 'something else' directly refers to τὸ πλῆθος. It would be a drastic misconception to interpret Plato's use of this concept (τὸ πλῆθος) as evidence of his 'snobbery' or disdain for the great unwashed; nothing could be further from the truth. Heidegger expresses what is going on here succinctly:

'The essence of the πολλοί, the many, does not consist in their number and mass, but in the way "the many" comport themselves toward beings. They could never be busy with beings without having Being in view. Thus "the many" see Being and yet do not see it. But because they always have Being in view, although not in focus, and only deal with, and calculate, and organise, beings, they ever find their way within beings and are there "at home" and in their element. Within the limits of beings, of the real, of the "facts", so highly acclaimed, everything is normal and ordinary' (*P*100-101 = *GA* 54: 149-150).

Socrates, i.e., the philosopher of authenticity, represents the counter-tendency to this normality. His daimonism heralds the *Unheimlichkeit* - the "unhomeliness" that threatens to disrupt the "at homeness" of τὸ πλῆθος; Socrates is accused of introducing new divinities into the city. Philosophy, as conceived here, is the daimonic, driven by the θαυμάζειν which is its source, as seizure or possession, which will undermine the very fabric of the city and threaten to suck into its vortex any who wander too close – 'corrupting the youth of the city'.[92]

[92] The daimonic seizure or possession interprets the four types of divine madness described at *Phaedrus* 244a ff: prophetic, healing, poetic, and philosophic.

In this section I have been able to show that both Plato and Heidegger see an existential analysis as the basis for any inquiry into being. Heidegger's charge is that the philosophy of the subject does not carry out an ontology of the subject and falls into dogmatism for this reason.[93]

[93] Guignon has one of the best accounts of this in Guignon, Charles, *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* Indianapolis, 1983; esp. Ch I, p.p. 11 – 38.

3.0: Heidegger's Analysis of Ἀλήθεια in Plato and Aristotle

One of the most important questions of Heidegger in his analyses of Greek philosophy was that of ἀλήθεια. In this section I want focus exclusively on Heidegger's analysis of ἀλήθεια; how he comes to understand this word in terms of unconcealment, what the consequences of this are for his overall understanding and retrieval of Greek ontology and for his understanding of Plato in particular. Through an exposition and analysis of Heidegger's understanding of ἀλήθεια and how he came to it, I will be in a position to open up the question of the Idea of the Good, ontological difference, transcendence, and the demiurge in Heidegger's analyses of Plato during the period of *Being and Time*. Heidegger's analysis of ἀλήθεια would be the natural place to start because of the great importance it occupies in his thinking throughout his life and that his understanding of Plato is to a great extent determined by his analysis of ἀλήθεια.

This section is largely taken up with a detailed reading and discussion of the issues that arise in Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's Cave from the *Republic* in the essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* (*Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*) and the earlier essay *On the Essence of Truth* (*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*). I propose to demonstrate how Heidegger takes up the question of the essence of truth because of his basic insight that the canonical definition of truth operative throughout most of the Western philosophical tradition is a derived meaning and therefore not fundamental enough because it does not express the essence of truth. The theory of correspondence which governs propositional truth is shown to be ungrounded; thus Heidegger sets out to recover the ground, that is, the essence of truth. In other words, correspondence is an epistemological understanding of truth; what is required is the recovery of its primary ontological sense which was there for the Greeks in the word ἀλήθεια. He takes up the meaning of ἀλήθεια in Plato and Aristotle from an early stage and discovers that this term retains a basic sense of 'unconcealment' even in Aristotle where a propositional sense is explicitly formulated. In the Plato essay Heidegger charts a historical transition that is found to be deeply problematic but nevertheless discloses an ambiguity in Plato's understanding of truth

which holds unconcealment and correctness in tension. I review the way in which a controversy grew up around this essay largely due to the criticisms of Paul Friedländer. Although many of his criticisms are not tenable – and I review these extensively – Friedländer opened up a long-running and important debate which has been highly productive in the revising and refining of Heidegger's analysis of ἀλήθεια.

3.1: The Treatment of Truth in *Being and Time:* Section 44: 'Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth

In Section 44 of *Being and Time* Heidegger immediately sets out the ontological essence of truth with reference to Aristotle's discussion of Parmenides and the Presocratics where Aristotle describes the method of phenomenology:

> αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν (*Met.* A, 984a 18)
>
> 'they have, under the guidance of the things themselves, been compelled to inquire further' (my trans.)

and then,

> ἀναγκαζόμενος δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς φαινομένοις (*Met.* A. 986b 31)
>
> [Parmenides] 'was compelled to follow those things that showed themselves as themselves' (my trans.).

Philosophy is described as the ἐπιστήμη τῆς ἀλήθείας (*Met.* a, 993b 20) and as the inquired into possibility of an ἐπιστήμη of ὄν ᾗ ὄν (*Met.* G, 1003a 21).[94] This is his starting point and it is clear that for the Greeks truth was bound up with ontology; 'if truth rightfully has a primordial connection with *Being*, then the phenomenon of truth comes within the range of the problematic of fundamental ontology (*BT*: 256 = *SZ*: 213). As Tugenhadt aptly points out, the decisive step in Heidegger's treatment in *Being and Time* is in the discovery that the originary meaning of truth is disclosiveness and that

[94] Tugendhat sees the *BT* discussion as the basis for everything that follows in Heidegger's long meditations about truth, '. . . all the various aspects of his position have not yet been developed and the conception as a whole experiences a characteristic modification later through the so-called *Kehre*. But the essential decisions, those which remain fundamental for everything that follows, are already taken here and can therefore best be grasped here'. Ernst Tugendhat, 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth' in ed. Macann *Critical Assessments* III: 79 – 92.

'once this is conceded, everything else follows almost deductively'.[95] The *Being and Time* analysis takes its 'departure from the *traditional conception of truth*, and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations of that conception' in order to expose the primordial phenomenon of truth and then be in a position to show how the traditional conception of truth has been '*derived* from this *phenomenon*' (*BT*: 257 = *SZ*: 214). Both here and in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* Heidegger traces out the history of the concept of truth. In *Being and Time* though, Heidegger sees Aristotle as the source of the prioritising of truth as correspondence, whereas in the Plato essay it is Plato who is said to have effected a transformation.

3.2: Heidegger's Essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*

The main thesis of the essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* is that a fundamental change in the meaning of ἀλήθεια occurs with Plato and this transformation can be observed, through interpretation, in the cave image and commentary in Bk. VII of the *Republic*. In summary the transformation has the following character: ἀλήθεια originally meant 'unconcealment' but undergoes a change in essence to mean 'correctness'. 'Correctness' means the correctness of propositions - the identity of λόγοι with that of which they are λόγοι - an account of something is in some sense identical with something of which it is an account. There is much that is to be criticized in Heidegger's account here, and indeed the assertion of a transformation in the meaning of ἀλήθεια was controverted by Paul Friedländer, stimulating a debate that lasted on and off for thirty years, and which resulted in both Heidegger and Friedländer conceding important points to the other.

It would be very useful to render an account of this whole matter here because of the radical implications of what Heidegger is suggesting concerning ἀλήθεια and Plato's use of this word. What follows is an exposition of the content of *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* with reference to other coterminous remarks about ἀλήθεια elsewhere, particularly in *On the Essence of Truth*, a review of the Heidegger-Friedländer debate with particular attention to the final 'result', i.e. that on which they were both agreed, and in conclusion,

[95] Tugendhat, loc. cit.

a review of how truth understood 'aletheically' comes to be another way of speaking Being for Heidegger, and it is this 'new' understanding which returns truth or ἀλήθεια to its originary meaning which was not explicitly thought by the early Greek thinkers, although this insight only comes later, in the 1950's.

3.3: The Transformation in the Meaning of Ἀλήθεια

An Introduction to Heidegger's Understanding of Ἀλήθεια as *Unverborgenheit*

The origin of Heidegger's understanding of truth as unconcealment, or unhiddenness, is a story that cannot be fully told pending the complete publication of his *Gesamtausgabe*, but many of the elements are available to us now, and a reasonably detailed account can now be given. The first known appearance of ἀλήθεια as unhiddenness is a brief reference during the *Kriegsnotseminar* (Emergency War Semester) of 1919, but the first detailed treatment is in the introduction to a work on Aristotle which was written in support of his candidature for a chair at Marburg and Göttingen.[96] Later in life Heidegger was to identify Franz Brentano's *On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle* (1862) as a major influence on his philosophical development; 'the chief help and guide of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy' for it is this work more than any other that directed Heidegger's attention on to the question of being:

> 'The following question concerned me in quite a vague manner: If being is predicated with manifold significance, then what is its leading, fundamental signification? What does Being mean?'[97]

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[96] Included in *GA*-61. The best studies of Heidegger's early phase are Theodore Kisiel *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time (*GHBT*) and John van Buren *Rumours of a Hidden King: The Young Heidegger* Kisiel's work is the product of ten years intensive work in the Heidegger archive tracing out the complex series of steps and influences that led to *BT*. Interestingly, Paul Natorp, in his lectures, was translating ἀλήθεια as 'unhiddenness' from 1917, see Kisiel *op. cit.* p. 270.

[97] *SD*: 81 cited in D. Farrell Krell *Intimations of Mortality* Pennsylvania, 1986: 68-9. Farrell Krell gives a good summary of the context in which Brentano worked through Aristotle's ontology. Brentano was to become highly influential for Carl Stumpf, Alexius Meinong and, of course, Edmund Husserl. Brentano, Franz *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1862 edited and translated by Rolf George as *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* Berkeley, 1975

Brentano's book is guided throughout by the statement Aristotle makes at *Metaphysics* Zeta 1: *Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς* which Brentano takes as the motto for the book.[98] Brentano surveys the various ways in which Aristotle addresses the manifold senses of being and extracts from this four main senses in which being may be said. In the various places that Aristotle states this he enumerates the various senses and there are slight differences between each account but Brentano takes the list at *Met.* E 2, 1026a 33ff as forming the basis for his inquiry:

1. Accidental or inessential being (*συμβεβηκός*)
2. Being in the sense of being true (*τὸ ὂν ὡς ἀληθής*) as well as falsity as non-being (*μὴ ὄν ὡς ψεῦδος*)
3. Being categorially
4. Being potential and actual (*τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν*)[99]

Brentano also discovers that each sense also contains within itself a manifold of senses, for example, movement, which turns out to have as many senses as being and, for the purposes of this study, being true turns out to have a number of meanings as well.[100] In *De Anima* 3 we find this: 'Imagination is different from assertion and denial; for what is true or false involves a synthesis of thoughts' while in the *Metaphysics* there is a statement that seems to accord with this when, in the context of discussing contradiction, Aristotle locates truth and falsity in the locus of assertion and denial; 'If that which it is true to affirm is nothing other that that which it is false to deny, (it is impossible that all statements should be false)'. But in *De Anima* III Aristotle endows sensation with truth; 'sensations are always true, imaginations are for the most part false' and a little further on; 'Perception of the special objects of sense is never in error or admits the least possible

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[98] *Met.* Z 1, 1028a 10 but also *Met.* E 2, 1026a 33 *ἀλλ ἐπεὶ τὸ ὂν ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον λέγεται πολλαχῶς* and *Met.* G 2, 1003a 33 *τὸ δ' ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς*

[99] Brentano sees being categorially as the most important sense and takes issue with the view (Trendelenburg) that the categories are derived from grammatical structures instead insisting that they actually denote real being; he devotes two thirds of the book to categorial being, Farrell Krell op. cit. 70

[100] Aristotle is explicit about this in respect of movement *Phys.* III, 1, 201a 9. 'Brentano hopes to resolve the apparent contradiction – that truth and falsity reside *only* in judgement or predication *but also* in things, in imagination and the senses, in the mind (*νοῦς*) and in definitions (*λόγοι*)- by distinguishing several senses of "true" and "false"' Farrell Krell, op. cit. 71. One of the aims in this section is to highlight the manifold sense of *ἀλήθεια* that comes through in the Cave passage and in Books VI and VII of the *Republic* as such.

amount of falsehood' (*De An.* III, 3 428a 11; 428b 18ff) although perception can never grant understanding, for the senses perceive the particular while the understanding grasps the universal (*Post. An.* I, 31 87b 29).

Kisiel draws our attention to an early clue for a later development in Heidegger's *Habilitationschrift* on the doctrine of transcendentals in Duns Scotus; 'in the *Habilitation*, transcendental *verum*, being as knowable and intelligible and in this sense "true", is located in the realm of simple encounter at the interface of the order of knowing and being' and so already at this early stage we can observe the recovery of the ontological primacy of the meaning of truth in Heidegger's thinking. The breakthrough occurs with his interpretation of Book VI of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* in 1922 and again in 1924 in the lectures on Plato's *Sophistes.* In the Aristotle lectures of 1922 Heidegger says that the 'Allegory of the Cave' shows us that philosophy is more originally 'illuminative' than 'cognitive' in its fundamental comportment, and adds later on that 'the movement of life as well as of philosophy is a movement of illumination'.[101] Here we can read 'epistemological' for 'cognitive' and 'ontological' for 'illuminative' and note that here again the basic theme is being worked through: that the ontological is prior and hence more fundamental. We move now to Heidegger's analysis of ἀλήθεια in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* given in preparation for his interpretation of Plato's *Sophistes* and then to an exposition of ἀλήθεια as a fundamental element of Dasein as it is given in *Sein und Zeit.* It needs to be stressed again that Heidegger's reading of Plato is so determined by his reading of Aristotle that it is necessary to look closely at his interpretation of Aristotle in order to secure the context in which Heidegger reads Plato and that will involve a fairly detailed treatment of certain aspects of his Aristotle readings.

3.4: *Nicomachean Ethics* Book VI as an 'Ontology of Dasein'

[101] *GA*-61 pp. 54, 135 cited in Kisiel *GHBT* p.238. Also Introductory section to this thesis where Heidegger's recovery of the ancient conception of philosophy as a way of life is discussed.

The first one hundred and thirty pages of the *Sophist* lectures are taken up with an explication mainly of Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* but also reference to other works of Aristotle with the purpose of gaining:

1. an orientation regarding the possible ways open to Greek Dasein to experience and interrogate the beings of the world,
2. a preview of the diverse regions of Being which are disclosed in the various modes of ἀληθεύειν as well as a preview of the characteristic determination of their Being, and
3. a first understanding of the limits within which Greek research moved. (*PS* 16 = *GA* 22)

These three considerations will prepare the way for a participation on the possible ways open to Plato for his research into Being. Heidegger has already indicated the hermeneutic principle by which he undertakes to interpret Plato through Aristotle. Preliminary to the division according to the modes of ἀληθεύειν Aristotle says ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχή while in the *Sophistes* we read ἡ ἐπ' ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένη ψυχή (*Soph.* 228c - Heidegger's paraphrases), 'the soul sets itself by itself on the way towards truth, towards beings insofar as they are unconcealed' (*PS*: 16 = *GA*: 22). So Heidegger detects in Plato the same orientation as in Aristotle, which means that we can presuppose in them the same position with regard to the basic questions of Dasein. An understanding of Aristotle becomes useful in this respect for he thematically explicates that which must be interpreted with difficulty in Plato because of the special hermeneutic situation of the dialogues. Almost paradoxically, though, we understand Plato through Aristotle because the fundamental issues have been laid out there; but this grants us the real possibility, then, of understanding the differences between them. Heidegger then states that this basic comportment (ἀληθεύειν in its various modes of 'uncovering') of Dasein towards the world and to itself in which beings 'are present in conformity with the way they are' is 'objectivity (*Sachlichkeit*) properly understood' but that this must not be taken to mean universal validity. Something can be universally valid or binding without necessarily being true – most prejudices and things taken as obvious have this character – while

something can be true in this sense but not universally valid, for instance something pertaining to an individual person. Truth in this sense means a conformity to the matter at hand rather than conformity to a 'determinate concept of scientificity' (op. cit. 17/23) and because uncovering occurs in the soul, the most immediate kind to be encountered is in speaking. Now herein lies the possibility of falling into inauthentic speaking as opposed to a primary uncovering which we do for ourselves.[102] In its most basic sense λόγος means speaking but it also means that which is spoken, λεγόμενον, and insofar as it is λόγος which can perform ἀληθεύειν, then the λόγος qua λεγόμενον is ἀληθής. But a λόγος as a λεγόμενον becomes a proposition in its loosest sense and acquires an existence of its own so that something (knowledge in its most ordinary sense) is preserved therein. Ordinary conversation takes this course, wherein all sorts of information is preserved and conveyed along from one to another without any of the preliminary uncovering taking place. For example, one can receive and convey the information as true that the government is taking certain measures without plowing through all the relevant documentation and legislation first hand or interviewing each and every member of the government and so on. For the most part we do not secure our speech in the ground of primary research into the matters of which we speak. We do not establish an original and immediate relationship with the subject of each and every λεγόμενον and yet these λεγόμενα nevertheless take on a certain existence of their own, they become 'true' in this sense, they are those things of which we say 'everyone knows that' or 'it's common knowledge'. This kind of speaking about things 'has a peculiar binding character, to which we adhere inasmuch as we want to find our orientation in the world and are not able to appropriate everything originally' (op. cit. 18/25). This kind of speaking Heidegger terms *Gerede*, which can variously be translated as 'chatter', 'idle talk' or even 'prattle', and which receives a full determination in *Being and Time* as part of the analysis of Dasein. This is extremely important for our understanding of the Platonic dialogues in general, where again and again Plato initiates an inquiry by taking as his starting point the substantive content of contemporary *Gerede* and the way it is passed on; for example, a popular truism, its attribution to Solon and the way it is propagated from generation to generation. Socrates invariably begins his elenctic questioning by

[102] See Introduction for the discussion of λόγος in Plato according to Heidegger.

taking issue with a specific 'proposition' drawn from popular opinion, tradition, poetry, or sophistic pronouncement, he takes issue with precisely that which never becomes an issue 'because everybody knows that'.

Aristotle conducts an enquiry into the modes of uncovering as something that occurs in the soul and through speech by *κατάφασις* and *ἀπόφασις* (affirmation and denial), be it in its scientific modes or in its everyday modes, which are five in number and are gathered under the two basic modes of *λόγον ἔχον* or 'having speech'; the *ἐπιστημονικόν* and the *λογιστικόν* (*Nic. Eth.* 1139 b 13-17). The *ἐπιστημονικόν* differs from the *λογιστικόν* in that it treats of those beings that cannot be otherwise, while the *λογιστικόν* has in view those beings which can be otherwise . To the *ἐπιστημονικόν* belong *σοφία* and *ἐπιστήμη*, to the *λογιστικόν*, *τέχνη* and *φρόνησις* (*Nic. Eth.* loc. cit.). Heidegger points out that it would be wrong to regard the twofold distinction above, which he terms the 'initial and most primitive ontological distinction', as marking out two regions of Being, the distinction arises from natural Dasein itself and articulates the world (*PS* 20 = *GA* 29). Aristotle treats of the individual modes, beginning with what is most visible, and we discover here something of the first importance. Aristotle raises the question of the *μάλιστα ἀληθεύειν*, or, which is that mode of uncovering which uncovers to the highest degree, which on each of these two parts is the *βελτίστη ἕξις*, or 'its most genuine possiblity to uncover beings as they are and to preserve them as uncovered' (*Nic. Eth.* 1139a 15f; *PS*: 21 = *GA*: 30)? For the highest possibility lies in *σοφία*, in the *λογιστικόν* it lies with *φρόνησις*, but Aristotle treats of them not according to their ranking but to their 'visibility'. His analysis is not 'a matter of invented concepts of knowledge and know-how' but an effort to grasp and sharpen what these terms ordinarily mean and furthermore the initial distinction of the five modes 'is one that takes its orientation from the actual beings which are disclosed' or, we might say, it is essentially phenomenological insofar as this is precisely what determines the phenomenological method. It s not necessary to recapitulate Aristotle's analysis of the five modes and Heidegger's exposition of this in full, but it is a matter of great importance to explicate clearly why *σοφία* is the higher mode of uncovering than *ἐπιστήμη* and so only that which furthers this end will be treated here.

Aristotle sets out that which is distinctly characteristic of ἐπιστήμη, leaving aside that which it has in common with other forms of 'knowing'.[103] This kind of knowing is determined by its object which is incapable of being otherwise; it is not going to change when it is no longer in our sight, thus it is of necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) and those things that are of necessity are not subject to generation or decay and are therefore eternal (ἀίδιον). Heidegger makes an important observation on this mode of uncovering, that it is a wholly determinate mode which grounds the possibility of science not only for the Greeks but for 'the entire future development of science and today's theory of science (which) take their orientation from this concept of knowledge'. What is truly remarkable here is that 'beings are determined with regard to their Being by a moment of time'; the knowable is that which must necessarily be as it is, it must always be so, it was never otherwise and will never be other than as it is; the everlasting characterises beings with regard to their Being. This will become significant for the conception of Being as presence which is the fundamental ontological determination for Greek ontology. At this point Heidegger introduces a number of other texts to explicate this crucial distinction that Aristotle makes. Referring to the ἀίδιον of the discussion in *Physics* Theta and relating it to ἀεί and αἰων which also means 'lifetime' understood as full presence (*De Caelo* A 9, 279b 22) Heidegger draws out the sense of presence that inheres to this concept. Every living thing has its αἰων, even the world, which according to Aristotle did not come into being and is imperishable. The ἀίδια 'are πρότερα τῇ οὐσιᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν "what always is is, with regard to presence, earlier than what is perishable" (*Met.* Theta, 8, 1050b 7) earlier than what once came into being and hence was not present' therefore 'καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ τὰ ἀΐδια (Heidegger's paraphrases of *Met.* 1051 a 19f), the ἀίδια are what form the beginning for all other beings' (*PS*: 23 = *GA* 19: 34). For the Greeks being means presence, being in the present and so that which always dwells in the now is most properly a being and is the ἀρχή of the rest of beings. Heidegger is at pains to stress this link between being and time if we are to grasp what is involved in ontology in its inception. The discussion shifts to the *Physics* where the nature of time and eternity is at

[103] Ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη are sometimes used interchangeably in ordinary usage; Aristotle is concerned here with that which is distinct in each case.

issue: "That which always is, insofar as it always is, is not in time" (*Phys.* Delta, 12, 221b3ff) and Aristotle maintains that the heavens are eternal, but eternal in the sense of *sempiternitas* rather than *aeternitas*. So to be in time is precisely determined by Aristotle as 'to be measured by time with regard to being' (*τὸ μετρεῖσθαι τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου*), Heidegger comments; 'something is measured by time insofar as its nows are determined: now and now in succession. But as to what always is, what is constantly in the now – its nows are numberless, limitless, *ἄπειρον*' and so this leads to the very important distinction that while the eternal is not in time insofar as it cannot be measured, this does not put it outside of temporality, 'what is not in time is for Aristotle still temporal, i.e., it is still determined on the basis of time – just as the *ἀίδιον* which is not in time, is determined by the *ἄπειρον* (and) we have to hold fast to what is distinctive here, namely, that beings are interpreted as to their Being on the basis of time' (*PS*: 23-4 = *GA* 19: 34-35). Already we see the Platonic-Aristotelian derivation of being and time as the fundamental theme of ontology, which is the basic issue in the 'recovery' (*Wiederholung*) Heidegger sets up in *Being and Time*, pursuant to raising the question of the meaning of Being itself (*Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*).

The other crucial determination of the *ἐπιστητόν* that Aristotle makes and which Heidegger takes up is its demonstrability/teachability/learnability for it is here that we discover why *ἐπιστήμη* cannot be the highest mode of uncovering for the *ἐπιστημονικόν*. And in this we discover something of the nature of the scientific project and why it cannot lay claim to be the highest possibility of man's being, why epistemology cannot supplant ontology as 'first philosophy'. Aristotle says:

> '. . . every science is thought to be capable of being taught, and its object of being learned. And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in the *Analytics* also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction (*επαγωγή*: Heidegger translates as a 'leading towards something') and sometimes through deduction (*συλλογισμός*). Now induction is of first principles (reading *ἀρχής*) and of the universal and deduction proceeds *from* universals' (*Nic. Eth.* 1139b 26 ff).

In συλλογισμός one proceeds from something known by the audience to be binding and universal to something particular whereas ἐπαγωγή proceeds from a particular matter leading towards the universal, the true object of knowledge. It is in the *Posterior Analytics* that Aristotle gives a fuller determination of this συλλογισμός which is especially characteristic of the way mathematics proceeds where the mathematical axioms are of this character, the deductions can be carried out without the mathematician needing to have genuine understanding of the axioms and Heidegger observes that even though modern mathematics has a theory of axioms mathematicians attempt to treat the axioms axiomatically; 'they seek to prove the axioms by means of deduction and the theory of relations which itself has its ground in the axioms' but this procedure will never elucidate the axioms.[104] Ἐπαγωγή, on the other hand, elucidates what is already familiar at the outset, it is clearly the beginning, i.e. that which discloses the ἀρχή; '*it* is the more original, not ἐπιστήμη (because) it leads more originally to the καθόλου, whereas ἐπιστήμη and συλλογισμός are ἐκ τῶν καθόλου' (*PS*: 25 = *GA* 19: 35-36; *Pos. An.* I,1 71a1ff; *Nic. Eth.* VI, 3, 1139b29). This 'out of what is known at the outset' (ἐκ προγιγνωσκομένων *Post. An.* 1, 1, nn71a1-2) is the mode in which ἐπιστήμη is communicated. Every ἐπιστήμη then is διδασκαλία 'it always presupposes that which it cannot itself elucidate as ἐπιστήμη . . . it is ἀπόδειξις, it shows something on the basis of that which is already familiar and known' that is, it always makes use of an ἐπαγωγή which it itself did not, properly speaking, carry out itself, 'ἐπιστήμη, hence, as ἀπόδειξις, always presupposes something, and what it presupposes is precisely the ἀρχή, (which) is not properly disclosed by the ἐπιστήμη itself'. This leads Heidegger to conclude the following:

> '. . . .since ἐπιστήμη cannot itself demonstrate that which it presupposes, the ἀληθεύειν of ἐπιστήμη is deficient . . . it does not disclose the ἀρχή . . .

[104] Husserl was originally a mathematician before he turned to philosophy and so had thoroughly worked through the problems of the mathematical sciences e.g. *The Crisis of the European Sciences* (even though this is his last work, his basic insight in this matter was shaped much earlier and was an impetus to philosophise). There is evidence to suggest that Heidegger also had a strong independent understanding of mathematics over and above what he learned from Husserl.

it is not the βελτίστη ἕξις of ἀληθεύειν. It is rather σοφία that is the highest possibility of the ἐπιστημονικόν.'

For Aristotle then, the more complete forms of ἀληθεύειν are always those that uncover the ἀρχαί, something which ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη cannot do. Heidegger's reading of τέχνη as a mode of uncovering gives vital clues for his understanding of Plato, especially the suggestion of identity between the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ and the δημιουργός in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. This is of such crucial importance for an understanding of Heidegger's reading of the cave image and of Plato generally at this time as to merit a quite detailed exposition of its own which is given in the section below.[105] Heidegger draws from Aristotle the way in which the questioning into Being ultimately comes from factical life itself. Aristotle sets out the two basic possibilities of the ψυχὴ as κρίνειν and κινεῖν and from this he draws the higher determination of man's being as *praxis*, that is, κινεῖν in the sense of κρίνειν, a distinguishing of things in speech: the ζωή of man is πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου; 'it is characterised by πρᾶξις καὶ ἀλήθεια, . . . by acting and by the uncoveredness of Dasein itself as well as of the beings to which Dasein relates in its actions' and further on Heidegger concludes that '*Every* comportment of Dasein is thus determined as πρᾶξις καὶ ἀλήθεια (*PS*: 27 = *GA* 19: 38-39; Heidegger paraphrases of *Nic. Eth.* VI, 2, 1139a18).

Like ἐπιστήμη (and indeed all the modes of ἀληθεύειν), τέχνη takes its determination from the kinds of beings to which it relates. Τέχνη is directed towards that which is to be produced, that which is not yet, therefore that which can be otherwise (*Nic. Eth.* 1140a1-24). The θεορεῖν of τέχνη is not speculative but is rather focussed on the thing in terms of 'for which' and 'in order to', it is instrumental. In terms of the λογιστικόν, τέχνη, like ἐπιστήμη in respect of the ἐπιστημονικόν, cannot be its superior mode of uncovering because in τέχνη the ἀρχή of the being lies outside itself, it resides in the mind of the producer; ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι. Heidegger illustrates this situation by introducing the φύσει ὄντα as a point of comparison. These differ from the τέχνη ὄντα in that their ἀρχαί reside in the producer as well as in the produced (*Nic. Eth.* 1140a 15) whereas in the case of

τέχνη the ἔργον resides beside, παρά, the activity and as a finished work it ceases to be the object of ποίησις. The shoes are completed and insofar as the τέλος constitutes the ἀρχή then, in τέχνη, it must be said, the ἀρχή is on some sense unavailable and this shows 'that τέχνη is not a genuine ἀληθεύειν'. This comes after a discussion of the three possibilities of those beings that come to be in *Metaphysics* VII, 7 (beings by φύσις, by τέχνη, and by τύχη) which Heidegger uses to elucidate the passage in the *Ethics* which identifies a common element in τέχνη and τύχη.

Leaving aside the analysis of the φρόνιμος for now and turning to the determination of σοφία, Heidegger introduces the matter of νοῦς, 'the phenomenon which causes (Aristotle) the most difficulty' and enumerates certain features. Aristotle shows how ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις, and σοφία are μετὰ λόγου but that the ἀληθεύειν of νοῦς is ἄνευ λόγου if λόγος means κατάφασις and ἀπόφασις; the λόγος of νοῦς is altogether of a different kind. *Noûs* is 'not a possibility of the Being of man' yet insofar as 'intending and perceiving are characteristic of human Dasein, νοῦς can still be found in man; Aristotle calls this ὁ καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς, the "so-called" νοῦς, which means a non-genuine νοῦς (*PS*: 41 = *GA* 19: 58-59; *De An.* III, 4, 429 a 22ff). Heidegger comments; 'this νοῦς in the human soul is not a νοεῖν, a straightforward seeing, but a διανοεῖν, because the human soul is determined by λόγος . . . the assertion of something *as* something', that is, 'νοεῖν becomes διανοεῖν' and, significantly, apart from νοῦς there is no other ἀληθεύειν which in a proper sense is an uncovering of the ἀρχαί (*loc. cit.*). On this basis Aristotle is able to characterise σοφία as νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, that is, an ἀληθεύειν that combines the ἀληθεύειν of νοῦς with the scientific character of the uncovering peculiar to ἐπιστήμη.

Heidegger summarises the situation so far established before moving on to a closer consideration of the highest modes of ἀληθεύειν. He is anxious to dispel any back projection of the Kantian distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy on to σοφία and φρόνησις, for such a distinction carries within it the sedimentation of a complex manifold of influences. Heidegger anticipates the results of his reading as follows:

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[105] 'The Demiurge in Plato: A Heideggerian Perspective'

1. that σοφία is the other highest possibility of ἀληθεύειν, the second βελτίστη ἕξις, beside φρόνησις, and
2. that it has a priority over φρόνησις, such that this ἀληθεύειν constitutes a

proper possibility, and the genuine possibility of Dasein: the βίος θεωρητικός, the existence of scientific man (*PS*: 42 = *GA* 19: 59).[106]

Heidegger also wants to stress that Aristotle's determinations here are not his own conceptions or dogmatic interventions, he did not invent the conception of σοφία as the highest possibility of Dasein, he only made it explicit from the 'natural understanding of Greek Dasein itself' (*PS*: 43-44 = *GA* 19: 62-64).

These various modes of 'uncovering' (ἀληθεύειν) are not mere 'intellectual virtues' but rather phenomenological expositions of the modes of human *being*, hence Heidegger's description of Book VI of the *Ethics* as Aristotle's analysis of Dasein. What follows is a turn from the specific modes of ἀληθεύειν to a consideration of ἀλήθεια itself, particularly as it is conceived in Plato and Heidegger's interpretation of that conception.

3.5: The Essay: *The Essence of Truth*

The essay *The Essence of Truth* was written at the same time as the Plato lecture was being given. The Plato lecture provides what Bernasconi describes as Heidegger's 'most sustained attempt to detail an historical transition', whereas the truth essay directly addresses the question of the essence of truth itself. He lays out the various changes that have taken place in the conception of truth while outlining the manifold ways in which truth has been traditionally understood. Here Heidegger is determined to get behind the hitherto canonical and operative understanding of the essence of truth as correspondence to a more fundamental sense of truth as a showing in openness, how this is also the

[106] Heidegger gives a very short history of the term *theoria* linking it etymologically with *thea* as sight and its connection with spectacle. He points out that by the time of Plotinus it has come to mean 'looking on the divine' because of the relationship in the stem to *theos/thea*. *Theoria* becomes in Latin *speculatio*. McNeill devotes a whole section to this in his new book 'Originary Theoria' in *GE*: 241-339

essence of freedom, and how truth (ἀλήθεια) and Being are bound up with each other. Nowhere does Heidegger attempt to invalidate truth as correspondence, truth as a property of judgement despite the accusations of detractors who misrepresent Heidegger on this point.[107] What he does do is to show that correspondence does not adequately express the essence of truth and that a more primordial understanding must be reached. In this sense then, correspondence as *the* essence of truth is insufficiently grounded for it conceals the full essence and is thus partial through the claim of fullness and this is certainly the case from Descartes onwards, for it is he who rules out any other possibility but that which resides in the correspondence of mind and thing.[108]

Both here in the *Essence of Truth* and in the Plato essay Heidegger focuses on the determinate and primary sense of truth as correspondence of knower and known which is taken in its double sense. On the one hand the accord of an object with what is previously supposed in respect of it and the accordance of what is expressed in a statement with that of which it is a statement about. The classic formulation of this from the middle ages is *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus* which expresses an identity but an ambiguity as well. In what way can mind and object be said to achieve identity? This is the key question for Kant which results in the critical turn and underpins the solution he proposes in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Traditional metaphysics, according to Kant, had been hamstrung by clinging to a conception of intuition based on the tenet that knowledge must conform to its object, a situation Kant proposes to remedy through the

[107] Outside of Heidegger scholarship it is believed by some that Heidegger rejects rationality or opts for the irrational, that he rejects logic or that for him 'the authority of the intellect has to be destroyed'. This last comment is based on a mistranslation by Philipse: *Herrschaft der Logik* – which becomes 'authority of logic'. *Herrschaft* can in no way bear such a translation for *Herrschaft* means 'lordship' or 'dominion' which may be a fact but in no way implies legitimacy in the way that 'authority' certainly does, for we speak of an author(ity) as possessing a legitimacy which, say, a tyrannical baron or king does not (even though he exerts dominion) hence the deposition of kings and later the doctrine of tyrrannicide during the medieval and early modern period. This mistranslation perverts the sense of Heidegger's statement (made in the lecture *Was ist Metaphysik?*) in a dramatic and pernicious way which is entirely in keeping with the general hostility of Philipse's book throughout; Hermann Philipse, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation* N.J., 1998: 9-15. This failure to distinguish between domination and authority is at the core of the arguments put forward by Thrasymachus in Book I of the *Republic* and sets up the whole problematic to which the dialogue addresses itself, that is, the possibility of justice. In *What is Metaphysics?* Heidegger shows that the dominant position of logic in philosophy is ungrounded and therefore lacking in 'authority' although he does not use a word like *Autorität*.

critique that reason will conduct of itself in order to establish the absolute limits and possibilities of knowledge, that is, what can be known prior to any and all experience in order that reason may secure the ground for the synthetic *a priori* proposition and hence knowledge as such. Kant proposes that if the intuition were made to conform with what is known already then it will finally become possible to raise metaphysics to the status as a science, and the supreme science at that. Supreme, because at that point metaphysics will have established and determined all the conditions of knowledge itself.

As Heidegger points out, the Kantian conception is possible only on the basis of the subjectivity of the human essence, but the correspondence of the pre-critical period, i.e. pre-Kant, is of essentially of the same character. In the Mediaeval period correspondence was determined in relation to the idea in the mind of the creator. The fundamental division here is that between creator and creature; all things except God are created: hence creatures. Each and every creature is instantiated by the creator in accordance with the idea. The human creature is unlike any other creature in that it partakes of the divine insofar as it possesses understanding and becomes itself in accordance with its idea insofar as the human understanding conforms with the idea that is in the matter at hand, i.e., the creature. Heidegger analyses this; '*veritas* as *adequatio rei (creandae) ad intellectum (divinum)* guarantees *veritas* as *adequatio intellectus (humani) ad rem (creatum)*' (*ET*: 139 = *WW*:76). The conformity of the creature with the idea of its creator underpins the correctness of the human understanding's propositions concerning the creaturely. Here the determination of the essence of truth is surely 'ontological' but only insofar as God is understood in terms of Being, that is 'onto-theologically', with God as the supreme being, and thus correctness is anchored in this conception of truth. But here the question of Being has been covered over in the main currents of scholasticism where God is conceived of as a being, the supreme being, but a being nonetheless. Kant's reversal, says Heidegger, does not constitute as dramatic a change as would seem. The reversing from conformity of mind to thing to that of thing to mind preserves and secures the possibility of correctness. The idea in the mind of god has now

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[108] *Veritatem proprie vel falsitatem non nisi in solo intellectu esse posse*, Descartes, *Regula VIII, Opuscula posthuma* X, 396; "Truth or falsehood in its proper sense can be nowhere else but in the intellect alone", cited in Heidegger *PDT*: 178-9 = *PLW*: 138-9).

become a concept in the human understanding and the thing, now conceived as object is still taken as being in conformity with its idea and so in both cases correctness is still taken to be the essence of truth. The question of truth is taken in isolation from the question of the Being of beings and so takes on an obvious quality, especially on account of its consonance with the ordinary understanding of truth. It becomes equally obvious that truth has an opposite, untruth or falsity, which does not partake in the essence of truth, i.e., truth as correctness. Having discerned the relationship of propositional truth to material truth in its Mediaeval foundations as being ontological, Heidegger proposes to penetrate further into the essence of truth by setting aside the theological determination and taking up the ancient origins of propositional correctness (ὁμοίωσις) and the relation between λόγος and that of which it is a λόγος. Heidegger opens up the matter of the more original ground of the proposition and hence correctness as the essence of truth. How can statement and thing be in correspondence seeing as they are fundamentally unlike? Correspondence must refer to a *relation* that obtains between the statement and the thing about which the statement expresses something. This relation, Heidegger observes, takes the form of a presenting, where the statement presents something in a way that says something about something and in accordance with the way in which that something shows itself. It presents itself as something standing opposed, as object.[109] This standing takes place in a field of opposedness that preserves the standing over of that which stands opposed. This field of opposedness occurs within a region of openness that is not created by the presenting but rather grants the possibility of such a presenting:

> 'The relation of the presentative statement to the thing is the accomplishment of that *bearing* that originally and always comes to prevail as a comportment. But all comportment is distinguished by the fact that, standing in the open region, it in each case adheres to something opened up *as such*. What is thus opened up, solely in this strict sense, was experienced early in Western thinking as "what is present" and for a long time has been named "being". (*ET*: 141 = *WW*: 80)

[109] This is clearer in German where *Gegenstand* denotes 'object' in this particular sense, that is, something 'standing over and against'.

The open region named here is the region in which man comports himself as such and which grants the possibility of any and every human activity. In the comportment towards each and every kind of being as it stands in the openness such as it is, the openness grants the possibility of the presenting statement which speaks of the as-such of beings; 'a statement is invested with its correctness by the openness of comportment; for only through the latter can what is opened up really become the standard for the presentative correspondence' (op. cit. 142/80). This standing in the openness provides the directive the presentative statement receives in order to conform to the object and is freedom. 'The essence of truth, as the correctness of a statement is freedom' (op. cit. 142/81). Heidegger is well aware of the strangeness of such a proposition and clarifies in what way this is not to be taken as suggesting a lack of impediment in the formulating of statements (empty talk or *Gerede*) but rather being free for what is opened up in the region of openness. This will have considerable importance in the Plato essay because the image of the cave reveals something of the essence of freedom which has rarely if ever been commented on outside of Heidegger's essay and which merits the closest examination. What follows is a brief presentation and discussion of Heidegger's association of the essence of truth and freedom in order to create the full context for the issues raised in the Plato essay, particularly the issue of freedom as it arises in Book VII of the *Republic*.

By putting forward freedom as the essence of truth Heidegger is well aware of the oddness of such a claim, but, as I hope to show later in this section, the conception of freedom put forward by Heidegger can be compared to the conception of freedom that can be read from the cave passage. The freedom that Heidegger introduces as openness of a comportment is further determined in terms of this openness, i.e., the freedom for what is opened up in the region of openness, as letting beings be but not as neglect or indifference but as a special mode of engagement. Moreover this is not an engagement that seeks to manage, preserve, or order the beings that are encountered; rather it means allowing beings to show themselves as they are in the region of openness. It is this region of openness that in the beginning was called ἀλήθεια, that is, unconcealment. This letting beings be exposes itself to the standing out of beings as what they are in the region

of openness and it is this that constitutes freedom. This freedom is more original than conceptions of negative and positive freedom or liberty, and certainly has nothing to do with notions of subjective autonomy; essential freedom is the possibility of letting beings be as they are. This open region is the ek-sistent and is the 'there', the Da of Dasein, it is character of man's existence, which means the possibility of beings showing themselves as beings. Heidegger goes on to say that 'ek-sistence of historical human beings begins at the moment when the first thinker takes a questioning stand with regard to the unconcealment of beings by asking: what are beings?' (op. cit. 145/85).[110] History proper only begins when beings are gathered up into their unconcealment and conserved in a conservation that is effected on the basis of a questioning: 'the originary disclosure of beings as a whole, the question concerning beings as such, and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur together in a "time" which, itself is unmeasurable, first opens up the region for every measure' (loc. cit.).

It is this freedom (which is not a property of human beings) which grants the possibility of letting beings be that also makes it possible for beings to be covered over or distorted. Humans in this way ek-sist and only become historical on this basis, that is, as a 'property' of this freedom, and so untruth as such does not arise as a result of a human failing. Untruth as such belongs to the essence of truth when it is seen how the correctness of statements cannot fulfill the essence of truth. If so, it follows that incorrect judgement cannot be the essence of untruth.

In the openedness where beings as a whole show themselves lies the possibility of concealment as well, a possibility which has the character of necessity, for when Dasein stands in comportment towards the unconcealment of beings *as such*, beings as a whole fall away. From the perspective of everyday life this 'as a whole' appears incalculable and incomprehensible, but any letting be will always let beings be in a particular comportment that relates to their being and this involves the concealment of beings as a whole. In this way Heidegger is able to say that the concealment of beings as a whole is untruth proper and that this is more primordial than every openness of this or that being.

[110] Ek-sistence being the translator's rendering of *Existenz*

It is this concealment that brings about the forgetting of Being, or rather, this kind of comportment towards beings, the being of beings (metaphysics), which involves a falling into abeyance of the question of beings as a whole, i.e., Being. The concealment that comes about is itself subject to a forgetting. The covering over that occurs happens within a context of the presenting of beings as such and where beings as such are taken as they appear with this becoming decisive. Human comportment always takes its bearings from beings and in relation to beings to what is 'readily available and controllable even where ultimate matters are concerned' and where changes, assimilations and efforts to secure the openness of beings take place they do so under the guidance of already available needs, impulses, and intentions (*ET*:149 = *WW*: 90). Uncertainties and limitations are experienced then as internal to the problematic of the investigative moment within the comportment towards beings as such, concealment poses a kind of "challenge" to the penetrative gaze of the metaphysical comportment towards beings as such but concealment of beings as a whole, itself, falls in to forgottenness. This forgottenness does not mean disappearance, 'the forgotten mystery of Dasein is not eliminated by the forgottenness; rather, the forgottenness bestows on the apparent disappearance of what is forgotten a peculiar presence'. This leads Heidegger on to display something of the consequences of this forgetting; how it entails a fall into 'errancy', and it is here that we detect another aspect of Heidegger's thinking which can be discerned in Plato, for in Plato too we can find an errancy which has its roots in a comportment towards beings as such. Plato introduces ontological questioning as essential to the resolution of what we might call 'ethical' matters. He does indeed hold open a kind of ontological difference although it is not named as such because Plato stands on the very cusp of metaphysics. It is the view taken here that Plato's writings preserve the difference but this involves diverging from Heidegger's schematising of the relationship between Plato and Aristotle not because it is at fault but rather as a matter of emphasis. Heidegger is continually looking for that which is decisive in a thinker, a search that is conducted from the perspective of one who comes at the end of metaphysics, one is able to follow metaphysics from its inception to its completion. Such a perspective is only possible from the standpoint of one who comes after. The metaphysical tradition becomes on this reading a kind of palimpsest, but this discussion

must be deferred for the section on the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ for it is a thesis here that in Plato we find an ambiguity between the comportment towards beings as a whole but also towards beings as such. If this can be established, perhaps another thesis follows; one concerning the openness of Platonic writing and the undecidability that we find in the dialogues as evidence that difference is held open if we take the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ as the naming of transcendence as ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσιας (*Rep.* VI, 509b).

The errancy that Heidegger introduces relates to Dasein's comportment to beings as such, '*As ek-sistent,* Dasein *is in-sistent*'. Being insistent means being turned towards beings as they are readily available which means turning away from beings as a whole, turning away from the mystery, 'the disclosure of beings as such is simultaneously and intrinsically the concealing of beings as a whole' (*ET*: 150 = *WW*: 92). As ek-sistent human beings are insistent and this errancy is not a state into which humans fall occasionally but rather belongs to the inner constitution of Dasein; 'the concealing of concealed beings as a whole holds sway in that disclosure of specific beings, which, as forgottenness of concealment, becomes errancy' (loc. cit.). The essence of untruth is errancy as the ground and site of error. Incorrectness of judgement is only one kind of error; wasting time, going astray in one's decisions, making fundamental mistakes in life and so on, these too belong to errancy. Yet within errancy there is the possibility of experiencing errancy as such and so not being led astray.

3.6: The Essay: *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*

Introduction: the Signification of the Elements in the Cave Image

Heidegger begins his analysis of the cave image (*Rep.* VII, 514a - 517a) and Socrates' commentary on it (*Rep.* VII, 517a - 518d) with a hermeneutic prelude where he draws a distinction between knowledge and thinking, specifically scientific knowledge:

> 'The knowledge that comes from the sciences usually is expressed in propositions and is laid before us in the form of conclusions that we can grasp and put to use.

But the "doctrine" of a thinker is that which, within what is said, remains unsaid, that to which we are exposed so that we might expend ourselves on it.'

Scientific knowledge is propositional in the full sense of an accumulation of 'true' propositions about the object, whereas thinking is a matter of meaning, of truth, and is not susceptible to strict propositional expression. In order to 'experience and to know for the future' what a thinker leaves unsaid, Heidegger continues, 'we have to consider what he said'. To properly meet this requirement would entail a full analysis of the entire *corpus platonicum* but as this is impossible 'we must let a different path guide us to the unsaid in Plato's thinking' (*PLW* 109 = *PDT* 155). There follows a substantial reproduction of the passage *Republic*, VII, 514 a2 - 517 a7 with bracketed additions by Heidegger which serve to explicate the text. It will be hardly necessary to provide an exposition of the cave image here; rather it will suffice to refer to and reproduce passages as they bear on the overall presentation.

The cave-like abode is the "image" for 'the place of our dwelling which (in an everyday way) is revealed to sight as we look around', the fire in the cave is an "image" of the sun, while the vault of the cave represents the dome of the heavens. People live in this environment and the constitution of this environment and how it concerns them is, for them, the real, *das Wirkliche*, and here they feel they are "in the world" and at home.[111] In contrast to this the things that are mentioned as being 'visible' outside the cave are the image for the proper being of beings, *das eigentlich Seiende des Seienden*, or in Plato's words the ὄντως ὄν.

This is where and how things show up in their 'visible form' which is no mere aspect but which for Plato is the way that beings show or present themselves and the term for this is εἶδος or ἰδέα and so the things outside the cave represent the 'ideas'. It is only through the ideas that anything is perceived at all and yet to most, to the dwellers in the cave, the individual objects are the real and the ideas are not even apprehended - this is

[111] See the section of this work entitled 'The Cave Image at Book VII of the *Politeia*' where I take up this theme and compare the cave environment with Heidegger's concept of Worldhood as presented in *Being and Time*.

the condition of being in the cave. The cave dwellers are prisoners of the fleeting, the shadowy, the simulacra without knowing it - and it is this absence of awareness that is crucial.

The experience of looking back or being forced to look back would be a disruption of 'customary behaviour and current opinion'. Yet they are so passionately wedded to this version of reality that they are not even aware that the fire exists immediately behind them, let alone in making the vital observation that the fire is man-made and they, moreover, do not even feel the slightest need to alter the direction of their gaze. Heidegger points out that identifying the elements within the image is merely a starting point to an interpretation of the image and that the full force and significance of the image is to be found in the movements and transitions that are described. Heidegger raises a series of questions: 'What happens in these movements of passage? What makes these events possible? From what do they derive their necessity? What issue is at stake in these passages?' (*PLW* 122 = *PDT* 165).

In the transitions, from within all the way out and back again, the eyes need to be accustomed to the changes, and this acclimatization is experienced as confusing and painful: διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμμασιν (518 a2), two kinds of confusion with two causes. Heidegger says that this means there are two possibilities: that people can leave their hardly noticed ignorance and 'get to where beings show themselves to them more essentially' while conversely 'people can fall out of the stance of essential knowing and be forced back into the region where common reality reigns supreme but without their being able to recognize what is common and customary there as being real.' Just as the eyes need to adjust to the radical change from darkness to light, so too the soul must adjust in its transitions - the process is slow because this 'turning around has to do with the one's being and thus takes place in the very ground of one's essence.' This process is what Plato calls παιδεία and which cannot really be translated with '*Bildung*' or 'education', although the former would, according to Heidegger, come closest. Book VII opens with this: Μετὰταῦτα δή, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον τοιούτῳ πάθει

τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας; so the theme of what is to follow is clearly stated right at the beginning, and so, by interpreting the cave image as being the locus of a transformation in the meaning of *ἀλήθεια* 'are we not', Heidegger asks, 'burdening the "allegory" with something foreign to it?' It seems that such an interpretation risks doing violence to the text. Heidegger says that such an impression will have to stand until the analysis is complete, but that it should be understood that if the "allegory" not only illustrates the essence of 'education' but at the same time 'opens our eyes to a transformation in the essence of "truth", then it will be shown that 'an essential relation holds between 'education' and 'truth' and in fact such a relation does hold. This relation consists in the transformation in the meaning of 'truth' being the condition for the possibility of education as Plato sets out in the *Republic*, education as a 'turning away from and towards', the *περιαγωγὴ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς* which is the conversion of the soul, what Heidegger describes as 'removing human beings from the region where they first encounter things and transferring and accustoming them to another realm where beings appear' (*PLW* 124 = *PDT* 167). So at this stage we can draw the following conclusion: the cave is the domain of 'things', while the open space is the domain of 'beings', the *εἶδος* or *ἰδέα*, then, denotes the real being of things.

3.7: *Ἀλήθεια* as 'Unhiddenness

Heidegger discerns four stages in the transition as 'specific gradations of up and down'. The unhidden, which the word *ἀλήθεια* names, designates at each point 'what is present and manifest in the region where human beings happen to dwell' and there are different kinds of *ἀληθές* normative at each level:

> 1st. Level: People living underground, chained, and engrossed in what is immediately encountered - *παντάπασι δὴ . . . οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἄν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθές ἢ τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς* (515 c1-2) - they do not consider anything to be unhidden except the shadows cast by the artifacts. They consider that which is least real to be the only reality.

2nd. Level: The first change occurs. Without the chains the prisoner is free to move his head, to realign his sight to something else. It is now possible to see the props that cast shadows and those in this position are now 'somewhat closer to what is' - μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος (515 d2). However, even though the possibility now holds to perceive things closer to their being, the prisoner will be disoriented and confused by his new vista and will consider the previous views, the shadows, to be more unhidden than what is now shown - ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὁρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα (515 d6). However, being at liberty does not mean being free. Freedom is really only attained in the third level.

3rd. Level: This is the transition to the domain of real illumination itself which is also the attainment of freedom. One of the important insights in Heidegger's interpretation concerns the nature of freedom as it is presented in the image. Out in the open things disclose their real nature as beings, that is, as εἴδη which constitute the essence in whose light each individual being shows itself as this or that, and only in this self-showing does the appearing thing become unhidden and accessible. As this is the domain of the unhidden as such Plato says τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν (516 a3). This is the ἀληθέστερον, although as Heidegger points out, Plato does not use the word here. At the beginning of Book VI of the *Republic* he mentions; οἱ . . . εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες (484 c5 ff.), 'those who gaze upon the most unhidden' Heidegger paraphrases.[112] Real liberation, Heidegger says, consists in the 'steadiness of being oriented toward that which appears in its visible form and which is the most unhidden in this appearing. Freedom exists only as the

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[112] In full the passage reads:
Ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐνα ργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκ εἶσε ἀεὶ
ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷον τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ
ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σῴζειν;

orientation that is structured this way'.[113]

Heidegger at this point emphasises the dynamic nature of παιδεία by concentrating attention on the περιαγωγὴ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς, particularly the περιαγωγὴ as 'insofar as it is such a turning around, it constantly remains an overcoming of ἀπαιδευσία'. This is a 'constant overcoming of lack of education'. Having seen the real, matters don't just stop there; there is an abiding tendency to fall back, and this is best illustrated in the fourth stage, which is the return.

> 4th. Level: The return effects the second kind of disorientation, the first being the confusion and pain at the initial unfettering in the second level. The word ἀληθές is not used here but unhiddenness is still at issue. Previously what was seen in the cave was taken as the most unhidden, the most real, but now it can really be seen as unhidden. That is to say the reality of the cave is seen to be the *least* real. The lesser reality of the cave is essential to the showing of the really real. Heidegger says here; 'two factors are essential to the unhidden: not only does it in some way or other render accessible whatever appears and keep it revealed in its appearing, but it also constantly overcomes a hiddenness of the hidden', again emphasising the dynamic nature of reality for Plato.

Having exposited the image of the cave itself Heidegger moves on to the substantial, and controversial, interpretation of the transformation of the meaning of ἀλήθεια that Plato brings about. By stressing the dynamic nature of the process Heidegger wishes to focus attention on the intensity of spiritual labour involved in the movement towards the really real; 'The unhidden must be torn away from a hiddenness, it must in a sense be stolen from hiddenness' (*PLW* 129 = *PDT* 171). This tearing away, or stealing, is a wresting of things from their inherent tendency to fall away into oblivion, into λήθη.

[113] Freedom as subjective autonomy as belonging to the subjectivity of the subject and is not what is meant here.

'Originally for the Greeks' he continues, 'hiddenness, as an *act* (my emphasis) of self-hiding, permeated the essence of being and thus also determined beings in their presentness and accessibility ("truth")'; thus what the Romans called *veritas* and which we call truth, or *Wahrheit*, was for the Greeks distinguished by the alpha-privative, thus ἀ-λήθεια, truth, is a revealing of a hiddenness that takes various forms like 'closing-off, hiding away, disguising, covering over, masking (and) dissembling' (*loc. cit.*), and for this reason, the work of wresting, the movement out of the cave and into the light, is a 'life and death struggle', a struggle for reality and truth, where man, or Dasein, truly attains his own essential nature. The very choice of the cave in the image testifies to this unhiddenness that must be wrested from the hidden. The underground chamber is, to be sure, a *locus* for a revealing but it is hidden away from the light of the sun which is the source of reality and intelligibility. However, another sense of ἀλήθεια 'pushes itself forward' while the originary sense of unhiddenness is preserved. Heidegger again emphasises the dynamic nature of the image; our attention should be focused on the elements of movement up and down, of flickering flames and radiating sunlight; '. . . what are essential are the movements of passage, both the ascent from the realm of the light of the man-made fire into the brightness of the sunlight as well as the descent form the source of all light back into the darkness of the cave' (*op. cit.* 130 = 172), and, 'for Plato, the expository power behind the images of the "allegory"' is concentrated on the various gradations of light in the image, 'everything depends on the shining forth of whatever appears and on making its visibility possible' (*op. cit.* 131 = 172).

Heidegger arrives at the combined elements of 'shining forth' and the possibility of this shining forth and with this, to the very substance of his interpretation: what is important for Plato here is not the unhiddenness itself but how unhiddenness serves to let things show themselves, it is the 'how' of each shining forth, the manner and specificity of the revealing; what is called the ἰδέα - the visible form of a something. Plato is focused on the appearing of the visible form, reflection aims at the ἰδέα and the ἰδέα is 'the visible form that offers a view of what is present'. Certainly it is not as an *Erscheinung*, an appearance that represents something that is behind it, the ἰδέα *is* the something itself. The idea enables the presence of a being, it is the coming to presence of a being and 'a

being becomes present in each case in its 'whatness', and so for Plato, the proper essence of being consist in 'whatness'. This distinction or definition of being will hold throughout the metaphysical tradition into our own era as the primary sense of being: '*quidditas*, and not *existentia*, is true *esse*, i.e. *essentia*' (*loc. cit.*). Now, the unhidden is that which is grasped by itself and antecedently, 'the ἰδέα is that which is known (γιγνωσκόμενον) in the act of knowing (γιγνώσκειν)'. It is in this 'Platonic revolution' that νοεῖν and νοῦς 'first get referred essentially to the "idea"'. The consequences of this are determinative for the western philosophical tradition: 'The adoption of this orientation to the ideas henceforth determines the essence of apprehension and subsequently the essence of "reason" (*Vernunft*)' (*loc. cit.*). Here Heidegger is drawing out metaphysics in its origin, the essential move that becomes the foundation of metaphysics, the science of ontology, occurs with Plato and is taken up by Aristotle and made explicit. It is this shift from unhiddenness itself to *what* is unhidden which characterises metaphysics as such and the shift towards ontology, although the essential ambiguity or 'difference' is still preserved by Plato and Aristotle.[114] Only much later will unhiddenness itself fall away leaving only correctness as the meaning of truth.

In his interpretation Heidegger shifts attention from what is seen and the possibility for being seen, i.e. the ἰδέα, to the act of seeing. Earlier, towards the end of Bk. VI of the *Republic*, when Socrates introduces the analogy of the Sun, the question is raised concerning the possibility of seeing and being seen. What is it that grants this possibility? What makes this act of seeing and being seen what they are in their relation? What 'yoke'- ζυγόν (508 a) - holds them together? Heidegger says that 'the "allegory of the Cave" was written in order to illustrate the answer. As the sun provides light by which all things are seen as they are, so too is there something that makes all things apprehensible in their shining forth. 'Visibility' is granted by the sun-like 'idea of "the good"':

> τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι

[114] But perhaps less so with Aristotle, esp. his rejection of the Platonic Good

(*Rep.* VI, 508 e1 ff.)

'This then which gives out of itself unconcealment as its ownmost possibility within the openness of seeing (i.e. the ψυχή of those who 'recognise'), shows itself as the idea (look) of the good' (my trans.)

The 'good', pursuing the sun analogy, is that which grants visibility but is itself the last thing to be seen and even then only with great difficulty: ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι (517 b8). Now, Heidegger takes issue with the practice of attributing the sense of 'value', the modern meaning of 'the good', to the word τὸ ἀγαθόν and shows that it is as recent as the 19th century; he describes it as the 'last and at the same time the weakest offspring of ἀγαθόν' (*op. cit.* pp. 132 - 133 = 174). This value sense is connected to the modern conception of truth, and here he mentions Nietzsche and his project of the 'transvaluation of all values' and how this makes him the 'most unrestrained Platonist in the history of Western metaphysics'. The difference between Nietzsche and his contemporaries however lies in the nature of value itself. For Nietzsche value is posited by 'life itself' which, according to Heidegger, means that he held on more faithfully to the 'essence of ἀγαθόν with much less prejudice than those who go chasing after the absurdity of "intrinsically valid values"' (*op. cit.* 133 = 174). Against this modern meaning of 'the good' which finds a highest value in itself residing within an 'idea' (idea as 'subjective representation'), Greek thought expresses in τὸ ἀγαθόν 'that which is capable of something and enables another to be capable of something'. The idea is the shining forth of a something, its coming to presence as what it is and so that which enables every idea to be an appearing, that which grants the idea its possibility is itself the idea of ideas, the supreme enabling of the presence of any and all beings, hence Plato calls this, τὸ ἀγαθόν, 'that which most shines of beings': τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον (518 c9). Only when sight of the highest idea is attained can one see that it is the source (*Ur-sache*) of all that is right and fine; συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία (517c), and anyone who wants to be able to act prudentially in private or public matters needs to have had sight of this: ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ

(517 c4/5) and so the essence of παιδεία 'consists in making the human being free and strong for the clarity and constancy of insight into essence' and because the cave image is supposed to illuminate the essence of παιδεία it must also recount the ascent to the vision of the highest idea (*op. cit.* 135 = 176).

Heidegger wants to stress that the image of the cave does not deal explicitly with ἀλήθεια and yet the image is 'grounded in the event whereby ἰδέα gains dominance over ἀλήθεια'; the "allegory" tells us that the idea of the good is the 'yoke' that binds the idea as presence with the 'look' that sees the idea and further adds to the sense of the idea's dominance when its is described as αὐτὴ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη (517 c4), the 'mistress who bestows unhiddenness (on what shows itself) and at the same time imparts apprehension (of what is unhidden)' (*op. cit.* 136 = 176) with this ἀλήθεια comes under the yoke of the idea and the essence of truth gives up its fundamental trait of unhiddenness.

Another meaning of ἀλήθεια pushes forward, one that expresses the expresses the identity of the relation between idea and the look that apprehends it: πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερον βλέποι (515d 3-4), the movement of passage is one where the gaze becomes more 'correct' - ὀρθότης - where apprehending is the conforming of the gaze to what is to be seen. The result of this is an agreement of the act of knowing and the thing known - ὁμοίωσις - 'truth becomes ὀρθότης, the correctness of apprehending and asserting. This change in the essence of truth brings about at the same time a change in the locus of truth; 'as unhiddenness, truth is still a fundamental trait of beings themselves, but as the correctness of the "gaze", it becomes a characteristic of human comportment towards beings'. Heidegger stresses that for Plato, unhiddenness as such still remains a feature of being and truth but that the focus is now on the appearing being and the act of 'seeing' and the correctness of the seeing and being seen and for this reason there is a 'necessary ambiguity' in Plato's doctrine. This ambiguity is in the fact that whereas ἀλήθεια is named it is ὀρθότης that is meant. The ambiguity can be seen in two statements made concerning the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. On the one hand it is described as 'the original source, the enabling of essence, of everything correct as well as of

everything beautiful' - *πάντων ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία*, on the other, it is 'the mistress who bestows unhiddenness as well as apprehension' - *κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασκομένη*. These passages show that corresponding to what is correct and correctness itself, there is correct apprehension while corresponding to the beautiful is the unhidden for the essence of the beautiful lies in being *εκφανέστατον* (*Phaedrus*). Heidegger points out that the same ambiguity is present for Aristotle.[115]

Henceforth, according to Heidegger, truth as this correctness becomes normative for the entire Western philosophical tradition. By the Mediaeval period the ambiguity is completely lost and correctness remains the canonical definition of truth into the present - *veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei* and in Thomas we find: *veritae proprie invenitur in intellectu humano vel divino*.[116] Not only is there a transformation of the essence of truth occurring in this image which sets forth the essence of *παιδεία* with respect to man's nature but something else is transformed which bears on the very origin of metaphysics and the origin of philosophy.

This transformation of the essence of truth, if we are to follow Heidegger, marks the beginnings of what, in later times, is called metaphysics. Unhiddenness as such gives way in emphasis to the unhiddenness of beings in their being through looking towards the idea. There is in the cave a kind of *σοφία* - *ἡ ἐκεῖ σοφία* (516 c5) - which is supplanted by another *σοφία*, a *σοφία* that 'desires to reach beyond what is immediately present and to acquire a basis in that which, in showing itself, perdures.' This *σοφία* is an attraction and 'friendship' towards the ideas: outside the cave what was previously the normative *σοφία* gives way to a *philia* - *σοφία* or philosophy. This looking towards the ideas, towards the stable and enduring, towards the abiding presence of something - its being - is philosophy, and, according to Heidegger, the word 'metaphysics' itself is prefigured in

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[115] In *Metaphysics* Theta 10 1051 a 34 ff. unhiddenness is 'the all-controlling fundamental trait of beings' while at *Met*. Epsilon 4 1027 b2 5 ff. can say that the true and the false are not in things themselves . . . but in the intellect'. See the beginning of this section for the discussion of this in Brentano

[116] Heidegger traces the history of the concept of truth into the modern period showing how the ambiguity is not only lost but that correctness as the *only* meaning of truth receives affirmation along the way. For the sake of completeness I have included this survey at the end of this work as Appendix I

the cave passage. At 516 c3 we read ἐπὶ ταῦτα . . .μετ' ἐκεῖνα.[117] Heidegger interprets this as the thinking that goes beyond what is perceived immediately out towards the being of these things, namely, the idea. According to Heidegger the beginning of metaphysics so understood is also the beginning of Humanism. Humanism in this context means that man attains to a centrality amongst beings without at the same time becoming the highest being. Man becomes the *animal rationale* within a metaphysically defined scheme of reality which gives priority to man's development as a moral being, to the salvation of his soul, to the full cultivation of his creative powers and the awakening of civic sense. What happens in each case is a 'metaphysically determined revolving around the human being' (142 = 181). This process, which inaugurates the history of metaphysics, underlies the identification of a hierarchy of being which originates from a fundamental principle or idea of ideas, with a scale of value which originates from an ultimate source of value which is the idea of ideas.

This interpretation of the cave with its thesis concerning the transformation of the essence of truth was disputed by one of Heidegger's contemporaries, Paul Friedländer, who maintained that the meaning of ἀλήθεια had always been correctness or verisimilitude. For this he conducted a survey of the early written evidence which is included in his 3 volume study of Plato. Following is a summary of Friedländer's arguments reproducing his evidence and the salient points of his criticism. After that follows a discussion of some of the scholarship on Heidegger's essay and the dispute over its content. This section will conclude with a summary describing the conclusion of the dispute with the retractions and modifications that both parties made in their respective positions. Although misdirected, Friedländer's critique was very important for opening up a debate on Heidegger's thesis which caused him to revise and refine his thesis about the meaning of ἀλήθεια in Plato. Heidegger later relinquished his claim that a transformation occurs but this led to a deeper insight about the nature of truth and particularly the early Greek conception of ἀλήθεια.

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[117] In the Cambridge edition of *Pathmarks* the text of *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* has εἰς ταῦτα which is not in the text of the *Republic*. I have been unable to ascertain the source of this error, i.e. is it in Heidegger's manuscript? The same error is in the 1947 German edition of the text; *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit mit*

3.8: The Reception of Heidegger's Thesis Concerning Ἀλήθεια: The Heidegger-Friedländer Debate

Heidegger's interpretation of the cave did not find ready acceptance with at least one contemporary, the Platonic scholar Paul Friedländer. The dispute that arose was still alive in 1962, a good twenty years after the publication of *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*; although by then it had reached a resolution of sorts. Indeed it could be asked whether it was resolved at all, for it is a thesis of this work that Heidegger conceded more than was perhaps necessary in the period of the late 1950's and early 1960's in this dispute.

Friedländer was at one time a colleague of Heidegger's at Marburg and is best known for his large two-volume study of Plato. In the 1958 edition Friedländer takes issue with Heidegger's assertions in the essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* concerning the transformation in the essence of truth in Plato. His objections are contained in a supplementary volume of his *Plato* which serves as an introduction to the work as a whole which gives a dialogue by dialogue interpretation. First it is necessary to summarise Friedländer's position before moving on to a discussion of the specific points raised.[118]

He begins by suggesting that Heidegger attributes 'degeneration' and decay' to this transformation that occurs but this is slightly misleading for Heidegger does not use pejoratives at all in his description of the process. The transformation in the essence of truth does involve a falling away from an original sense, that this falling away is part and parcel of the forgetting of the question of Being, the *Seinsvergessenheit*, but Heidegger is more interested in giving a description of this move than in making some kind of value judgement. Implicit in Heidegger's account is a recognition of the necessity of the

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einem Brief über den «Humanismus» , Francke Verlag (Bern und München, 1947; 1975): 48 suggesting that the source is Heidegger himself or at least the text he is using.

[118] Paul Friedländer, *Plato I: An Introduction*, tr. Hans Meyerhoff, 1958 (*P I*) another Marburger of the time Gerhard Krueger also rejected Heidegger's thesis about ἀλήθεια.

tradition of metaphysics as it unfolds and that the history of metaphysics as the essential history of the West is destinal.[119]

Friedländer doubts that the etymological derivation of ἀλήθεια as ἀ-λήθεια which is 'generally accepted today' is as 'unshakeable' as it appears, that is, it was not always felt to be a 'pure negative'.[120] The Greeks themselves 'from Homer on' linked ἀληθής with *lath-*, *leth-*, and *lanth-* and he mentions by name Sextus Empiricus and Olympiodorus, the latter appealing for the authority of his etymology to Plutarch. Friedländer discusses some passages from Hesiod and Homer in order to show that in early times ἀλήθεια has the sense of correctness as well as unhiddenness. In the 1958 edition of his work Friedländer denied that the alpha of ἀλήθεια is a privative and that the word signified unhiddenness. In the second edition of 1973 he retracts this and confines his disagreement on this point to Heidegger's suggestion that the sense of 'correctness' is a Platonic innovation. Now, he wants to demonstrate that correctness, of speech for example, was always the primary sense but now he no longer opposes 'unhiddenness' as a sense. Friedländer detects three interconnected senses for the word ἀληθής amongst the early Greeks. Heidegger never says that ἀλήθεια never had any other meaning than unhiddenness only that it *essentially* meant unhiddenness. The examples that Friedländer produces from Hesiod and Homer, some of which he highlights as examples of ἀληθής as ἀ-ληθής, seem to support his assertion that their specific employment describes someone 'who does not forget or neglect or does not lose something out of sight or mind', in short, the "correctness of perception" that Heidegger attributes to a later period, i.e. Plato's time. Hesiod is clearer in this than Homer on Friedländer's account. Citing *Theogony* 233 he concedes that for Hesiod ἀληθής does primarily mean ἀ-ληθής, but in this context it means someone who does not forget, neglect or lose of out of sight or mind.[121] The

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[119] Heidegger discusses just this point in connection with ἀλήθεια in *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected Problems of "Logic". GA - 45. see discussion below*

[120] Friedländer, *P I*, 221-222.

[121] The passage from Hesiod *Theogony* 233 –236:

Νηρέα δ' ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα γείνατο Πόντος
πρεσβύτατον παίδων· αὐτὰρ καλέουσι γεροντα,
οὔνεκα νημερτής τε καὶ ἤπιος, οὐδὲ θεμίστων
λήθεται, ἀλλὰ δίκαια καὶ ἤπια δήνεα οἶδεν·

Homeric examples are harder to interpret. It is 'extremely difficult to find even one or two passages in which the object of the assertion could be (let alone must be) the "unhidden".' He does, however, produce two, both from the *Iliad*, one from Book VI and the other from Book XXIII. In the first Hector orders the maids to 'Tell what does not miss the mark, the unerring, what does not go wrong!' to which one of the maids answers, 'You have ordered us to tell the unhidden, what does not conceal'; and , in the second, at the funeral games of Patroklos, Achilles assigns Phoenix to stand at the end of the course 'in order that he remember the races and tell the unforgotten, the unhidden.'[122] The poet in these examples is expressing the double sense of ἀλήθεια here, unhiddenness and correctness of speech or perception. This, according to Friedländer, shows that the dual sense of the word ἀλήθεια was present in the earlier period *contra* Heidegger's thesis that it is a later development. In a survey of the later uses amongst the historians, tragedians and orators - leaving out the philosophers - he finds that three senses can be adduced for ἀληθής and ἀλήθεια:

1. The correctness of speech and belief that does not conceal but reveals.
2. The unhidden reality of being.
3. The unforgetting, undeceiving truthfulness and honesty of the individual or character - 'existence' in the present sense, i.e., 'the truth which I am myself' (Jaspers).[123]

He then lists the 'opposites' to these:

1. Lying, deception, error, gossip, concealment, on the side of speech and belief
2. On the side of being, that which is unreal, play, dream, imitation, or fake.
3. On the side of human existence, dishonesty, deceitfulness, and unreliability.[124]

In his commentary West emphasises the prophetic and oracular connotations of ἀψευδέα and ἀληθέα in the early literature. Also for a Heideggerian study of these very issues in Hesiod see Piero Pucci *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry* (Baltimore, 1977)

[122] ibid. 223

[123] A reference to Karl Jaspers

[124] ibid. 224

He discusses Parmenides and Heraclitus before moving on to the 'allegory of the cave'. Parmenides represents a 'central point' in the history of Greek philosophy and hence in the history of the concept of truth. His doctrine of the One 'does not permit of a concept of truth that refers to a separately existing world of the real, or of a concept of reality that is grasped by a truth opposite to or separate from it'. For Parmenides the 'truth of thinking and reality of being' are identical, united in the One, 'outside of which there is nothing real, nothing but the unreality and untruth (or half-reality and half-truth) of that which is *only* opinion and *only* appearance.

In Heraclitus, Friedländer discovers the tripartite sense where the fragment begins, 'This λόγος . . .' and man's inability to grasp it . . .thus ἀλήθεια may be for him both the uncovering clarity and truth of his λόγος and the clarity and truth of the being which this λόγος uncovers'. While Friedländer sees the tripartite senses (see scheme above) in Heraclitus as well it is 'though in the more enigmatic manner that is typical of Heraclitus'.

Finally Friedländer addresses the Heidegger cave essay itself but before moving on to a summary of this final and substantive section of his critique a critical review of the foregoing is in order. Friedländer implicitly attributes an exclusive account to Heidegger, he charges him with holding that the sense of ἀλήθεια as veracity of assertion is entirely absent in the pre-Platonic period. This is not the case at all and Heidegger's text does not give grounds for such a charge. Heidegger never says that prior to Plato ἀλήθεια carries no sense of 'speaking the truth' in its common usage i.e., in a non-philosophically determined way. Heidegger is only concerned with an essential account of ἀλήθεια and does not discuss the pre-Platonic evidence. The passages that Friedländer discusses all illustrate the three senses that he can discern in the meaning ofἀλήθεια, but the problem with this, and indeed his whole account, is that he fails to address the question of the *essence* of ἀλήθεια which is the only matter that is at issue in Heidegger's essay, instead he carries out a philological – historical survey which is interesting in itself, especially his discussion of early and epic occurrences, but which never looks to the essence of truth for the early Greeks. He has not established at all what is meant by Heidegger's phrase

'correctness of perception' despite there being a detailed account of this in the Heidegger essay, he leaves out of account the context for this which is the idea, and this most certainly is Plato's great discovery and is the ultimate theme of *Plato's Doctrine of Truth.*

To backtrack a little, he says concerning Hesiod's *Theogony* 233 that '. . . although ἀληθής was understood as ἀ-ληθής [by Hesiod], it has nothing to do with the hiddenness of being, but rather designated a person who does not forget or neglect, or does not lose something out of sight or mind. It meant, in short, exactly the "correctness of perception" which Heidegger, in his sketch of the history of the words ἀληθής and ἀλήθεια, attributes to a later period of Greek thought, the Platonic period.' But this has nothing to do with 'correctness of perception' in Heidegger's account and has everything to do with concealment and, in fact, could serve as a very good example illustrating the essence of ἀλήθεια as unconcealment. Correctness of perception as we saw earlier refers to the relationship that obtains between the noetic 'look' that one gives something and the 'look' of that 'thing' and how this possibility is granted by, and, hence grounded in, the supreme idea, the idea of the good. Concealment takes many forms and Heidegger mentions a few of them in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* whilst naming the essence of ἀλήθεια as it was for the early Geeks: 'Originally for the Greeks (Heraclitus fr. 123) hiddenness, as an act of self-hiding, permeated the essence of being and thus also determined beings in their presentness and accessibility ("truth"); and that is why the Greek word for what the Romans call "*veritas*" and for what we call "truth" was distinguished by the alpha-privative (ἀ-λήθεια)' and this hiddenness from which the truth must be 'wrested' or 'stolen' can be of various kinds: 'closing off, hiding away, disguising, covering over, masking, dissembling' (*PLW* 129 = *PDT* 171).

This example of forgetfulness from Hesiod that Friedländer cites perfectly illuminates what is essential in the concealment that ἀλήθεια strives against, in particular, that kind of primary concealment that is 'forgetting'. In a later study Heidegger concentrates attention on what is negated in ἀλήθεια and makes a particularly detailed study of the essence of λήθη as oblivion or forgetting (ἐπιλανθάνομαι) as being a primary form of

concealment for Dasein.[125] It could be said that Heidegger should have been clearer on this point in the Plato essay and would probably have avoided engendering a misunderstanding; the *Parmenides* lectures, by taking up the question of λήθη, offers the vital element that would have clarified matters.

Again, the critique fails to engage with the essential meaning of ἀλήθεια which is Heidegger's exclusive interest for the three senses and their 'opposites' that Friedländer identifies (see schema above) are all in harmony (insofar as they do not contradict what he is striving for in his interpretation) with what Heidegger is trying establish about the nature of concealment and unconcealment. Friedländer's scheme proceeds by binary opposition; each positive quality has its opposite, but a will be shown below this is a flawed conception, flawed, for this thinking in opposites occludes the possibility of thinking through to the essence of something, that is, dialectically; a productive thinking through contradiction and opposition which liberates the essence letting it show itself as such in speech.[126] The first sense; 'the correctness of speech and belief that does not conceal but reveals' leaving aside the extreme imprecision of this formulation - what is a 'correct' belief – does he have in mind the notion of 'correct belief' that is put forward in the *Theaetetus*? It seems unlikely. Does this more probably mean a speaking that is not at odds with the mind of the speaker, for if we look to its 'opposite' we find lying, gossiping, deception and error enumerated. A speaking that is at one with the mind of the speaker, devoid of mendacity, represents the mind of the speaker; but the mind of the speaker and therefore his speech can be in 'error'. This means that Friedländer's first sense, necessarily, contains its contrary thus abolishing the opposition he sets up. The second sense is equally problematic; the 'unhidden reality of being' as opposed to the 'unreal, play, dream, imitation or fake'. Plato often uses the term ὄντως ὄν or various cognates to denote the really real, 'the most unhidden', that which is a being as such as opposed to a particular thing caught up in generation and matter. But what should be

[125]Later in this section we shall turn to that study in order to complete the understanding of ἀλήθεια, λήθη, the modes of concealment and wresting out of concealment that Heidegger discusses throughout his texts of this period.

[126] This has been noted by others: Peperzak in ed. Sallis *RH*: 265 'Friedländer replaces Heidegger's "ambiguity" (*Zweideutigkeit*) by the bipolarity (*Zweiseitigkeit*) of an equilibrium'. Also Bernasconi *QLHHB*: 21.

rejected here is the implicit affirmation of the 'two-worlds' Plato, a super-sensible realm that is 'real' and a sensible, particular world that is unreal. A reading of the cave that takes its cue from the movement back and forth cannot permit such a view. The whole direction of Heidegger's reading in this respect is towards the movement back and forth. The image expresses this movement very well in the physical journey of the philosopher-to-be from bench to sunlight and back to bench. There is no sense here of two worlds and Heidegger's reading recapitulated above demonstrates, by the by, the inappropriateness of the 'two-worlds' theory, which has its source in an uncharitable, and ultimately, disingenuous construction put on the χωρισμός by Aristotle.[127] The movement up and down inscribes the spectral nature of reality. The prisoners know *only* what they see as the whole of reality but any disruption in this state of affairs reveals that what was previously taken as a whole should now be seen as only a part. The passage up and down again is a progressive uncovering of the real in its wholeness. The difference between the flickering images and the things outside the cave is in their being. The idea is the real being of something while the thing that is apprehended 'aisthetically' is an instantiation of the being in the world, i.e. a refraction of the idea.[128] To know the thing is to look right through it beyond, to its idea, its real being. This is the finite transcendence of Dasein: that Dasein surpasses any and all things and even beings for it looks beyond each and every being towards Being as such.[129] What has already been said about the first two points must also apply to the third, the truthfulness of the individual opposed by mendacity. The flaw in this critique centers on the dualism that Friedländer reaffirms despite the fact that he can adduce numerous examples from the literature to illustrate each point, a Heideggerian reading could achieve a similar result. But this procedure cannot be decisive for it leaves out what is essential.

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[127] Taking Plato at face value in this way can foist all sorts of absurdities upon him, for example, taking the Timaean demiurge in this way produces similar results; I discuss this issue below in section 5.

[128] 'Aisthetically' rather than 'aesthetically': I have chosen this spelling to accentuate its proximity to the Greek αἴσθησις rather than to the modern discipline of Aesthetics.

[129] The question of the ἐπέκεινα is dealt with in section 4 below entitled 'The Significance of the Elements of the Cave Image'. The finitude of Dasein is a Kantian theme that Heidegger takes up. I return to this at the end of section 5 in the context of the contrast Kant makes between divine and human intuition. Also the 'looking beyond' mentioned above.

Let us turn now to that part of Friedländer's critique that deals directly with Heidegger's interpretation of the cave. Friedländer presents an abstract of 11 theses from Heidegger's essay which he opposes with counter-theses and he lays stress in his critique on Heidegger's 'historical construction'. Heidegger states that a transformation occurs which shifts the essence of truth over to the idea from unconcealment, thus advancing the idea as the locus of truth, and the relationship between the matter itself and the apprehending mind is mediated by the idea as real being. This leads Heidegger to describe the idea as a ζυγόν and the correspondence of mind and 'thing' (now the idea as the real being) is understood in terms of 'correctness' (ὀρθότης) and that this meaning pushes forward but Friedländer objects to this saying that both senses are always operative in Plato:

> 'the reality of being and correctness of apprehension and assertion – and, in addition, the truthfulness of the *Nous* who directs this cognisance upon that reality. Instead of *Nous* one might say: existence.' (Friedländer, *P*: 227)

But is this not restating what Heidegger is criticising? How is the correspondence of the 'reality of being' and the 'correctness of apprehension' to be understood if there is not a connection or relationship of some kind between mind and 'being' - and this is certainly how Plato describes things when he speaks about the 'yoke' and the 'mistress'? *Contra* Friedländer, Heidegger does not eliminate unconcealment from Plato's account of truth, he points out that now ὀρθότης has come forward as the primary essence of truth as it is understood. The elimination of unconcealment occurs much later in the history of philosophy. Friedländer wants to eliminate the ambiguity here, preferring *Zweiseitigkeit* to Heidegger's *Zweideutigkeit*; 'Plato's doctrine is unambiguous' and he rejects the statement that when Plato says ἀλήθεια he is now meaning ὀρθότης; 'Heidegger's false approach here appears most clearly: both aspects have equal status for Plato' (Friedländer, 228). But how could this be so? Friedländer states that the yoke is one of 'conjunction' rather than 'subjection' effected through the 'highest idea'. The conjunction is granted by the idea of the good, the highest idea and yet this is what Heidegger is criticising: the conjunction is of mind and idea (the real being) which is

referred to the 'highest idea', the idea of the good. Truth is now located in the noetic glance – the ideas and the highest idea – and no longer as unconcealment as such; and yet the meaning of ἀλήθεια that Heidegger is striving for is to be found in presence as such, a presence that reveals and is not dependent on noetic 'seeing', rather, the noetic 'seeing' is dependent on presence or being as such as we find in *The Essence of Truth* discussed above. On this basis we can reaffirm the ambiguity that Heidegger detects as opposed to a 'two-sidedness' where all ambiguity is expunged.[130]

Friedländer concludes his critique by retracting his earlier opposition to the interpretation of ἀλήθεια as unhiddenness on the basis of discussions with Heidegger himself but says that 'what stands unchanged is my criticism of Heidegger's historical construction' which is 'faulty'.[131] Friedländer states that the most 'astonishing part' of this interpretation is the thesis that a transformation occurs but asks; 'Where? In the history of the human mind, or in Plato's thought which has a place in this history?' This brings us to the reason why it has been necessary to dwell so much on Friedländer's critique; the matter of Heidegger's concessions.

In the strongest element of his critique Friedländer focuses on the 'henceforth' in the thesis about a transformation – that 'henceforth' the essence of truth no longer unfolds as the essence of 'unhiddenness' but is transposed to the essence of the idea. It is precisely this 'henceforth' that Heidegger later retracts conceding that some form of correspondence had always been understood as bound up with the essence of truth from earliest times. Heidegger's later retractions have been seen by various commentators as perhaps a bit excessive; he renounces that part of his thesis which even critics like Friedländer came to accept. He not only retracts the thesis concerning a transformation

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[130] Suggesting that Plato has as unambiguous a doctrine as Friedländer suggests does seem to go against what we understand about Plato's reticence about over-determining matters and even of disclosing his real thinking on anything if we have understood the *Phaedrus* and the *Seventh Letter* correctly in this. The view here is that Plato retains the ambiguity precisely because of the enormous difficulty of the matter itself. See the introductory section where these things are dealt with in detail.

[131] 'In my discussion with Martin Heidegger, I have learned that my earlier opposition to the interpretation of ἀλήθεια as unhiddenness was unjustified' p. 229 In the Preface to the 1973 edition he says; 'It has become clear that the aspect of unhiddenness most stressed by Heidegger was present very early, but so were the elements which later combined in Plato's lofty concept of ἀλήθεια'.

in Plato but goes as far as to say that for the early Greeks ἀλήθεια was never understood as unconcealedness for that essential meaning remained unthought:

> 'The natural concept of truth does not mean unconcealment, not in the philosophy of the Greeks either. It is often and justifiably pointed out that the word ἀληθής is already used by Homer only in the *verba dicendi*, in statements, thus in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment' (*EPTT*: 447)

The matter of Heidegger's retractions and modifications concerning his original theses and the growing importance of ἀλήθεια in his thinking is too large a subject to be dealt with here to any satisfaction. However, it is still necessary to indicate the ways in which this debate developed if we are to be clearer as to what is involved in coming to understand Plato's conception of truth.

Heidegger addresses this matter twice in the 1950's; in *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* (1954) and in *Hegel and the Greeks* (1958) when Heidegger's thinking about technology and instrumentality as the essence of metaphysics reaches its peak. He calls attention to the ground of illumination in Plato and the Platonic nature of the western metaphysical tradition in a comment that echoes A.N. Whitehead's famous comment about Plato:

> 'All metaphysics, including its opponent, positivism, speaks the language of Plato. The basic word of its thinking, that is, of its presentation of the Being of beings, is εἶδος, ἰδέα: he outward appearance in which beings as such show themselves. Outward appearance, however is a manner of presence. No outward appearance without light – Plato already knew this. But there is no light and no brightness without the clearing (*Lichtung*). Even darkness needs it. How else could we happen into darkness and wander through it?' (*EPTT*: 444)

Here Heidegger is pointing to something prior to the unconcealment of beings (ideas), prior even to the source of this illumination, to what he more and more refers to as the

Lichtung or the 'clearing of presence' and this clearing of presence has remained unthought from the beginning of philosophy although it is named at the beginning in what Heidegger describes as the first explicit reflection on the Being of beings 'which still today, although unheard, speaks in the sciences into which philosophy dissolves', Parmenides hears the call:

> '. . . χρεὼ δέ πάντα πυθέσθαι
> ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
> ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής

> '. . . but you should learn all:
> the untrembling heart of unconcealment, well-rounded,
> and also the opinions of mortals
> who lack the ability to trust what is unconcealed.' (*EPTT*: 444; tr. Farrell Krell)[132]

Here ἀλήθεια as unconcealment is named and called well-rounded 'because it is turned in the pure sphere of the circle in which beginning and end are everywhere the same.' Here Parmenides is speaking about Being and unconcealment, as the clearing of presence and that which is prior to everything whatsoever, that is, the path upon which thinking traverses the clearing with its single and ownmost concern; 'we must think ἀλήθεια, unconcealment, as the clearing that first grants Being and thinking and their presencing to and for each other' and it is only this experience that gives Plato's determination of presence as idea or Aristotle's interpretation of presencing as ἐνέργεια their 'binding character' (*EPTT*: 445). But as long as truth is thought in terms of correspondence, i.e. epistemologically, ἀλήθεια can never be heard as unconcealment in the sense of clearing, and even though every kind of knowing already moves within the clearing of presence; '. . . ἀλήθεια, unconcealment in the sense of the clearing, may not be equated with truth . . . unconcealment thought as clearing, first grants the possibility of truth' (*EPTT*: 446). It is on the basis of this insight, that unconcealment is named on the basis of being

[132] Fr. 1 (Diels und Kranz).

experienced (Parmenides) but not thought explicitly as such that leads Heidegger to 'retract' his thesis about a transformation in the meaning of ἀλήθεια in Plato:

> ' . . . we must acknowledge the fact that ἀλήθεια, unconcealment in the sense of the clearing of presence, was originally experienced only as ὀρθότης, as the correctness of representations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is from unconcealment to correctness, is also untenable' (loc. cit.)

But Heidegger goes beyond this formulation in a way that seems to restore 'unconcealment' as a recognisable sense for the Greeks but one that is deprived of its full essence for it misses the vital element that ensures that ἀλήθεια is actually experienced as ὁμοίωσις. If it were always so the question then must be as to why this is so? Why has ἀλήθεια always been experienced in terms of ὁμοίωσις (without ruling out unconcealment as such) without regard for the clearing of presence that grants the possibility of ὁμοίωσις in the first place? Is it, as Heidegger asks because 'man's ecstatic sojourn in the opening of presencing is turned only towards what is present and the presentation of what is present?' Heidegger is really asking here: is metaphysics as the science of the being of beings the only way that man can address being? What is behind this comportment that affects the destiny of man; is it a historical accident or chance happening or is it, as Heidegger suggests, to do with the essence of unconcealment itself. This self-concealing, this λήθη, belongs to ἀ-λήθεια not as an add-on element or as an opposition but as part of its essence: concealment belongs to the essence of unconcealment *necessarily*: 'if this were so, then the clearing would not be the mere clearing of presence, but the clearing of presence concealing itself, the clearing of a self-concealing sheltering'.[133] What then would this mean for *ratio*, νοῦς, *Vernunft* and all apprehending as the ground or principle of principles, or, for our present purposes, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ even when conceived as the idea of ideas? Heidegger poses the question: 'Can this ever be sufficiently determined unless we experience ἀλήθεια in a Greek manner a unconcealment and then,

above and beyond the Greek, think it as the clearing of self-concealing?' (*EPTT*: 448).[134] We can see from this how Heidegger still attributes an understanding of unconcealment to the Greek conception of ἀλήθεια but without thinking it in combination with λήθη, that is, the full essence of ἀλήθεια was not thought through by the Greeks. A transformation occurs - but later - and we can only 'fix' it during the mediaeval period in the formulation of the *adequatio*. On this reading the Greeks preserve the ambiguity which only remains an ambiguity because they have not thought the 'clearing of self-concealing' as belonging to the essence of ἀλήθεια which must necessarily remain an unconcealment of that which shows itself within the clearing of presence, i.e. the being of beings. We would then be able to read the cave passage from Plato's *Republic* aletheically, as it were, and ascertain, if possible, how things stand in respect of unconcealment but also with unconcealment as a self-concealing.

We have seen how Friedländer's critique served to focus the question of ἀλήθεια right down to that crucial 'henceforth' which allowed Heidegger to think through the consequences of such a transformation not having taken place in Plato, in other words, to a more profound understanding of what is involved in thinking through unconcealment. Another critique of Heidegger's Plato interpretation in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* comes at it from a different perspective and raises some questions which must be formulated in the context of a full discussion of the cave passage.

Conclusion

In this section I have tried to focus on the importance for Heidegger of the question of truth, that is, the recovery of a more originary sense of truth as opposed to the derived sense that is correspondence. It would be no exaggeration at all to say that the question of truth remains an abiding concern for Heidegger from beginning to end in that it is also the question of Being. The 'forgetting of Being' and the 'transformation' in the meaning of ἀλήθεια are two aspects of the same move, that is, the founding moment of

[133] This is taken up in his interpretation of the Myth of Er in Book X of the *Republic* where he reads against the tradition somewhat, in order to focus on λήθη as a field rather than as the river itself: τὸ τῆς λήθης πεδίον (612 a3)

[134] Heidegger poses this in the context of a possible charge of 'irrationalism'.

metaphysics, the turn from Being as such to the being of beings as the sole manner in which the question 'what is being?' is understood. While Heidegger eventually withdraws his suggestion of a Platonic transformation, what must certainly remain standing in his thesis concerns the nature of the ambiguity which is certainly present in the Cave image, an ambiguity which, in Plato, testifies to the penetration of his thinking, but which, in the course of a tradition of metaphysics, becomes lost leaving only one single determinate meaning of truth, which is correspondence. In order to pursue this question at a deeper level it is necessary to shift attention on to the Idea of the Good itself and take up the challenge posed by another critique of Heidegger's Plato interpretation which charges him with neglecting that aspect of the Idea of the Good which is described in the *Republic* as being ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας (*Rep.* VI. 509b), the question of transcendence, and to also consider what is involved in Heidegger's identification of the Idea of the Good and the δημιουργός within the context of his broader thesis that Plato's philosophy is 'productionist'.[135] The next section takes up the Idea of the Good with special reference to Dostal's critique. It is only at the conclusion of that section where it will be possible to propose a fuller explanation of what may be happening when Heidegger leaves out of account the matter of the ἐπέκεινα in his Plato essay. That Heidegger himself later withdraws that aspect of his thesis that sees a transformation in Plato points more towards the preservation of the two-foldedness in the concept of truth in Plato; an early form of the correspondence theory of truth, grounded in the more fundamental understanding of truth as unconcealment. In the next section I move on to consider in what way the matter of two-foldedness bears on the Idea of the Good, and how the Idea and the nature of truth should be understood as being of aspects of the same question, which is, the question of the preservation of difference.

[135] The critique set out by 'Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato' in *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments* Vol. 2 ed. Christopher Macann London and N.Y. 1992: 63-89.

4.0: The Significance of the Elements of the Cave Image

In the previous section I looked closely at Heidegger's interpretation of ἀλήθεια as unconcealment, some of the background to how he arrives at this understanding while focussing mainly on the essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* which contains important material for understanding Heidegger's attitude towards Plato in the *Being and Time* period. I also looked at the controversy that has arisen over this essay and made a contribution towards that debate. One of the main conclusion that should be drawn from this is that for Heidegger ἀλήθεια is another way of naming being and that a two-foldedness belongs to the question of truth in much the same way as it does for being. Broadly speaking this works in the following way: the correspondence theory of truth involves a forgetting of the aletheic (unconcealment) sense of truth which I detail in the previous section – the correspondence theory is therefore a derived theory of truth that does not express the essence of truth.[136] Similarly, the question of being comes to be understood as the question of the being of beings while the more fundamental question of being as such passes into the background and thence into forgetfulness within the western tradition. For Heidegger the question of being and the question of ἀλήθεια are one and the same. If we assume that Heidegger is largely correct in his analysis of ἀλήθεια in the Cave image; that ἀλήθεια means unconcealment, that there is a two-foldedness in the meaning of ἀλήθεια in Plato's image – unconcealment as such, and the beginnings of a correspondence theory of truth, and, if we follow Heidegger in speaking of ἀλήθεια as another way of naming being, then what is the situation with core of the image, indeed the core of the triple image of Sun, Line and Cave: the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ? In the Sun image there is clearly a two-foldedness attributed to the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ which is descried as being the supreme idea or the supreme being of beings yet at the same time it is described as being 'beyond being' (509b). Can this ambiguity be accounted for in terms of Heidegger's analysis of ἀλήθεια where a two-foldedness is discovered? If ἀλήθεια is another name for being then it would follow that we should look at the ambiguous Idea (509b) in the same way. In this section I propose to look at the Cave

[136] This is the substance of Heidegger's analysis in the essay *On the Essence of Truth*.

image in this way: by way of a discussion of Heidegger's various interpretations and comments on the image, and, by way of an independent analysis of some of the key elements in the image.

Later, in Section 5 I examine Heidegger's claim that the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ and the δημιουργός are identical. This is an important claim for it relates to Heidegger's general characterisation of Platonism as productionist. It is made as passing remark in a lecture course he was presenting in 1928 without exegesis or justificatory argument which is remarkable considering the deep implications that this suggestion carries. The suggestion in itself is important enough to merit consideration but that it implies a substantial implication of productionism – a cornerstone of Heidegger's understanding of western metaphysics – makes it a crucial task to address this point.[137] Here, in Section 4 I want to lay out some of the groundwork for this later task by taking a closer look at the Cave passage with the insights gained already into ἀλήθεια and to shift attention over to the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ and to the question of the ἐπέκεινα and transcendence. This bears directly on the criticism of Robert Dostal for it is largely on the issue of the ἐπέκεινα that he founds his critique of Heidegger's Plato.

Before coming to the discussion of the ἐπέκεινα and transcendence I want to present an analysis of the Cave passage which concentrates more on the image itself and some of the language used. In this way I hope to be able to show that Heidegger's interpretations of the Cave passage can be supported by a detailed reading of the linguistic and imagistic content of this text. I also hope that by doing this I will be able to make a contribution to our understanding of this remarkable image in its own right. Here I am especially interested in the use of place – the Cave and Hades, of darkness and light, and the significance of temporality in the image and its narration. I want to begin my own analysis of the Cave image with some general remarks before moving on to some of the specific elements that are crucial to the image as a whole.

[137] Heidegger sometimes interchanges the term 'Platonism' with 'western metaphysical tradition' because for him western philosophy is Platonic in essence. By Platonism he never means the Platonic tradition of antiquity and the Renaissance, i.e. the self-understood Platonic Schools.

4.1: The Image of the Cave *Republic* VI , 514a ff: Some General Remarks

The most well known image in philosophical writing may also be the most obscure considering the extent of disagreement after all there is not even agreement on how to name that portion of Plato's *Republic* where the image of a cave is presented. A minor point perhaps but an indication of the wide ranging differences of approach and emphasis that surround this text. This passage is variously described as a 'simile', a 'metaphor', an 'allegory'...[138] The disagreement begins over its very naming and carries through over every aspect of this text - which is not in the least bit surprising given the enormous range of interpretations that Plato's writings have engendered, particularly from the period that inaugurates the dissolution of the orthodox, Platonic interpretation - the earlier part of the eighteenth century.[139] Throughout this work I refer to the Cave passage as an image (εἰκών) without further trying to determine what that involves.

Within the mainstream interpretation the Cave is understood in relation to the preceding illustration of the Line which is given a cognitive and epistemological emphasis in keeping with the broad tendency in contemporary philosophy to conceive of epistemology as the 'first philosophy' or at least its central theme; the problem of knowledge. For mainstream commentators the Line sequence is the substantial element of the three images which is supplemented by the Sun and the Cave which act as illustrations of the epistemological theme of the Line. It follows that the direction of their reading is to cross-reference the Line and the Cave with the Sun as the initial positing of intelligibility as such. The four moments in the passage - back and forth - are related to the four points on the Line.[140] Those commentators adduce the remarks of Socrates at the

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[138] Desmond Lee describes it as a simile, Plato *The Republic*, Harmondsworth, 1955 as do Cross and Woozley, R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley *Plato's 'Republic': A Philosophical Commentary* London, 1964; for Cornford it is an allegory, F.M. Cornford *The 'Republic' of Plato* Oxford, 1941; Annas begins by calling it a 'figure', p. 243, then later says 'The whole Cave is an image, an extended metaphor pp. 255-256 Julia Annas *An Introduction to Plato's 'Republic'* Oxford, 1981.

[139] Jacob Brukker's *Historia Philosophiae Critica* of 1742 represents a clear disjunction with the orthodoxy when he departs from and criticises the traditional, Platonic reading - Tigerstedt. *IP*: p.66.

[140] Cross and Woozley describe this 'parallelism' as 'central' to the orthodox view, p. 208. Lee states it as a fact: 'This is a more graphic presentation of the truths presented in the analogy of the Line . . .' p.316 etc.

end of the Cave image, 'this must connect up with all that has preceded it' (517b) and interpret this as an explicit signal from the author to make the analogy, but it is not clear at all that this is the sense to be taken. Strictly speaking, all that has preceded means the whole dialogue including the Sun and the Line. In other words 'all that has preceded' does not rule out the whole dialogue, its too ambiguous for that, whereas the phrase, on account of its very ambiguity, does not grant license at all to an interpretation that would tie the cave *only* to the previous images of Sun and Line although Socrates' words that follow do mention the parallels between elements of the Cave and the Sun and the Line. The scholars that do project an epistemology onto Plato in this way and take the cave as being connected directly to the Line in terms of its specific content, have problems accounting for all the elements in each.[141] Undoubtedly there is a connection between the Cave and the Line – this must be beyond dispute – but to read the Cave image as being supplemental or illustrative of the Line, that is, epistemologically would be to ignore or diminish important differences between the Cave and the Line, it would produce an over-determined interpretation of the entire sequence (Sun, Line, and Cave). The problem of knowledge is certainly an issue here but only insofar as it belongs to the more fundamental ontological significance of the whole sequence. It is in this way that Heidegger is able to understand the issue of ἀλήθεια in its ontological rather than its derived and epistemological sense. This is especially so when we consider that the sequence as a whole occurs, as it were, within the soul of man. I examine this aspect in greater detail below with reference to the conversion of the soul as the passage from the bench to the outside in the Cave image.

Some commentators have taken up the question of the integrity of the image of the Cave in psycho-political terms, that is, in reference to the theme of the dialogue as a whole. Ferguson in his classic 1926 article rejects the epistemological reading shifting emphasis on to a primarily political reading – this is after all the dialogue concerning the nature of the political community. This is surely why Plato introduces such images; precisely to stimulate a multi-layered reading which in itself represents the variegated

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Cornford thinks that the best way to understand this image is to replace 'the clumsier (sic.) apparatus' of the cave with that of the cinema.

[141] That is, drawing all the parallels in a satisfactory way.

levels of reality.[142] Myth and pictorial representation precisely mitigate against exclusive interpretations or abstractions and open up the hermeneutic; this meaning of this kind of image (myth also) cannot be grasped by the abstract understanding. There is no conflict between a political interpretation of the cave image and one that focuses on the ascent to the intelligible, but any interpretation must be grounded at the ontological level for indeed, anticipating this interpretation, the image of the cave is the differentiation of reality according to a fundamental ontological principle. When Plato poses a question such as 'what is δικαιοσύνη' or 'what is piety', the question is something like this: 'what is the real being (ὄντως ὄν) of δικαιοσύνη?' The inquiry is deepened in a dialogue such as the *Sophist* where the guiding question concerns Being (τὸ ὄν) itself. The question then becomes this: what is it to say that something *is* or *is not* - what is being?' There can be no genuine inquiry into the being of δικαιοσύνη, for example, that does not also include within it the question of being *and* the question of the being of that being which inquires into Being. That is, [the being] that is the condition for the possibility of such a question as 'what is . . .?', the self-questioning questioner, or, Dasein. This directly bears on Heidegger's critique of Cartesianism which, he says, fails to put the questioner into question – Descartes places everything into question *except* the *cogito*, the 'I am' which then becomes the basis for being and knowledge. Heidegger praises the ancients precisely because for them any inquiry always includes the questioner and this is why he is able to call Aristotle a phenomenologist.[143] This is especially true for Plato and the Cave passage demonstrates this because here, the whole inquiry is grounded in a phenomenological analysis of the soul. I would like to argue very strongly for this understanding of the *Republic* – that the strictly theoretical question like what is justice is being worked through on the foundations of an existential analysis of man's being-in-the-world (the business of the first five books). This then opens up the inquiry onto the ontological level and the exposition of the fundamental principle of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Perhaps for this reason the *Republic* might very well be Plato's most perfect work: it contains an existential analysis of man – which is also the description of a world – and a

[142] In order to represent, as only such an image or myth can, the totality of the political, ethical, psychological (not psychologistic), epistemological and ontological modes of man's being, or the being of Dasein.

[143] Aristotle as phenomenologist as opposed to Phenomenologist

fundamental ontology, and a demonstration of how they are connected, that is, the existential analysis must be ontologically grounded *and* vice versa. It is to the description of man's emergence from ignorance, the conversion of the soul from appearances to essences, from the murky artificial light of the cave to the ultimate celestial source of light and how this analysis leads directly to the unveiling of the fundamental principle of intelligibility and being, that I now turn.

4.2: *Παιδεία* and *Ἀπαιδευσία*

The very first indication of a theme or, what Proclus calls, the σκοπός of this text, comes almost immediately, in the very first line of Book VII when the terms παιδεία and ἀπαιδευσία appear. Here, a contrariety is announced but not an opposition - a something and an absence of that something, and, moreover, this presence and absence bears on something essential to man's being: ἡμετέραν φύσιν. But this is the dialogue about the πόλις, the *Republic*, the σκοπός of which can only be asserted at this point: the πόλις as determination of man's essence (the interpretation put forward in Heidegger's 1942 *Parmenides*.). In the Parmenides lectures Heidegger indicates a nexus of concepts revolving around the πόλις which are defining of Greek being-in-the-world: what is at issue when we say that Greek Dasein was 'defined or determined by the πόλις'? I have suggested above that we understand the πόλις of the *Republic* in terms of Heidegger's concept of 'world' or being-in-the-world and that is the interpretative position adopted here.

So, in the context of a dialogue which investigates the nature of the πόλις this section of Book VII deals with παιδεία as being somehow central to the essence of man as determined by the πόλις and vice versa. In the matter of translation, 'education' for παιδεία is no more helpful than is 'Republic' for *Politeia*, the real title of this dialogue. In refusing the term 'education' we avoid overlaying the Greek conception of παιδεία with that of the Roman practice of *educare*, while at the same time avoiding the definite dangers of assimilating παιδεία to contemporary conceptions of 'education'.

The Cave passage then, opens with a statement of the theme of inquiry – the question of *παιδεία* - as man's emergence from bondage. The released prisoner is not alone, his situation contrasts with that of his fellows who remain bound and indeed the persons operating the shapes that pass up and down, and as such should not be taken in isolation from the others; his liberty and their bondage sets the context out of which an understanding of the nature of freedom can emerge.

4.3: The *Τόπος* of the Image

The cave as the place of divine showing is as old as mankind.[144] To recapitulate, the opening lines of Bk. VII indicate what is to come: a discussion of man's *φύσις* with respect to *παιδεία* and, in the terms of presence and absence. Following this in the second line (514 a3) Socrates immediately invokes the ocular sense - *ἰδὲ* - see or, more fluidly, 'picture with your mind's eye' men living below ground (*ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκήσει*). There are two spaces in this image - one is beneath the earth, *Γῆ*, the other, later space, is on the surface of *Γῆ*, beneath *Οὐρανός*. Why *κατὰ γῆς*? Why not say 'men living in a cave'? By invoking the subterranean, Plato directly invokes the chthonic realm, that which is concealed by the surface of *Γῆ*, the author explicitly locates this domain beneath *Γῆ*. This word *Γῆ* refers to something quite different to the Roman term *terra* as Heidegger shows in the *Parmenides* seminars of 1941.

It would be most useful here to discuss this differentiation that Heidegger makes for in the Greek conception of the natural world and that of the Roman lies a significant world of difference which in no small measure contributes to the difficulties. The Latinisation process as it affects the philosophical tradition is a very complex matter indeed and no attempt to offer a history of that is being made here but perhaps an example that Heidegger uses could suffice to illustrate the what is at stake here. In the context of a discussion about the transformation of the meaning of *ἀλήθεια*, via translation, to *veritas* - and this is of central importance in this reading of Book - Heidegger suggests that the

[144] J. H. Wright conducts a very informative study of the background to the Cave image from the historical and archaeological perspective, looking also to the literary precedents. He also reproduces the magnificent story told by Aelian and Olympiodorus of the baby Plato being taken up by his parents to be consecrated

terms *Γαῖα* and *Γῆ* differ essentially from the Latin terms of *tellus* and *terra.* This is brought out in the identification of the earth as being the *τόπος* of concealment and thus the 'location' of *Ἅιδης*:

> 'The *Illiad*, XXIII, 244, speaks of *Ἄϊδι χύθωμαι*, of being ensconced in *Ἅιδης*. Here the earth itself and the subterranean come into relation with sheltering and concealing. The essential connection between death and concealment is starting to appear. For the Greeks, death is not a 'biological' process, any more than birth is. Birth and death take their essence from the realm of disclosiveness and concealment. Even the earth receives its essence from the same realm. The earth is the in-between, namely between the concealment of the subterranean and the luminosity, the disclosiveness of the supraterranean (the span of heaven, *Οὐρανός*). For the Romans, on the contrary, the earth, *tellus*, *terra*, is the dry, the land as distinct from the sea; this distinction differentiates that upon which construction, settlement, and installation are possible from those places where they are impossible. *Terra* becomes *territorium*, land of settlement as realm of command. In the Roman *terra* can be heard an imperial accent, completely foreign to the Greek *Γαῖα* and *Γῆ*.' (*P*: 60 = *GA* 54: 88)

The 'voice' of the imperium is heard even more clearly in the history and the meaning of the word 'false' which covers over the meaning of *ψεῦδος*, takes away the unity of concealment and unconcealment which belongs to the essence of *ἀλήθεια*, and introduces a polarity into the essence of truth which is not originary. Like the previous example, this occurs in the course of the *Parmenides* seminars of 1941. The imperium is a mode of domination, of holding sway over beings, and so distorting them in the process. This has an important bearing on Heidegger's understanding of the Greek city state and in how he would want to stress the difference between the Greek polity and Roman imperium.

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outside a cave dedicated to the nymphs, Pan, and Apollo on Mt. Hymettus see J.H. Wright 'The Origins of Plato's Cave' in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 17, 1906: 130 – 142.

Glaucon is not being asked to 'picture' men living in the space between *Γῆ* and *Οὐρανός*, the realm of concealment and unconcealment which is, according to traditional myth, their true abode (some examples will be adduced here) but rather men who dwell underground (*κατὰ γῆς*) - in the realm of concealment cut off from the heavenly source of illumination, *ἥλιος*.

As noted, the use of *κατὰ γῆς* indicates the chthonic realm and suggests *Ἅιδης*, but then we cannot rest with this as if we already knew what the chthonic realm signified. It is interesting to note that Glaucon is being asked to picture, *ἰδὲ*, the underground dwellers, i.e. those who live in *Ἀ-ιδες*, the realm of invisibility or concealment. Socrates is here describing the worldhood of the world as partaking, somehow, in the essence of *Ἅιδης*.

4.4: The Meaning of *Ἅιδης* with Reference to the *Republic*

The very image and setting itself points to *Ἅιδης* before his name is even explicitly mentioned. The cave of the image is itself, of course, a chthonic setting, it is described at the start as *κατὰ γῆς*, the *τόπος* beneath the ground, populated by inhabitants whose world is one of flickering images and endless discourse concerning the interplay of inconstant multiplicities. In Book VII there are two explicit references to the chthonic domain of *Ἅιδης*. The first reference names Homer while the second names *Ἅιδης* himself. At 516d Socrates suggests to Glaucon that the former prisoner returning from the illuminated realm outside the cave is alienated from the world of the cave dwellers and feels some pity for them. He can no longer partake in their animated discourse about unrealities and would not be moved at all by the honours and rewards that are given to those who excel in this discourse. He would " . . . feel with Homer and greatly prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a landless man, and endure anything rather than opine with them and live that life" (*Rep.* 516d). This is of course an allusion to the *νέκυια* in Book XI of the *Odyssey* (*Od.* XI. 489-91) where Achilles appears to Odysseus in the sacrificial blood to tell of the unendurable semblance of life that is the underworld and that he, the great Achilles, would prefer the life of a serf than continue with this shadow existence.

The second mention is at 521c where the bringing-up of the potential philosopher into the light is compared to the fables of those who have ascended from Ἅιδης to the gods (ἐξ Ἅιδου . . . εἰς θεούς) . This introduces the section that gives detailed consideration to the question of how the philosophical, i.e. authentic, παιδεία will be effected. It is not our intention to examine the details of the παιδεία here, the aim being only to point up the presence of Ἅιδης within the image and proceed on to an inquiry into the essence of Ἅιδης and its meaning for the understanding of παιδεία. Once we have gained an understanding of the essence of Ἅιδης we will be in a position to interpret its presence within the cave image, and, indeed, to understand why the image itself is located within a chthonic τόπος.

We should try to avoid thinking of Ἅιδης as a place or purely as a god, or even as a god primarily and his place.[145] If we can recover the archaic, Homeric meaning of Ἅιδης as the god and his domain and take these as an inseparable unity, despite the separation in classical times, we will be able to see that Ἅιδης is not the presiding divinity of the kingdom of the dead because his nature is that of death but rather that death is in his domain because something essential about death participates in the essence of Ἅιδης. What is that essential unity between death and Ἅιδης? Particularly for us here what has this essential unity to do with the essence of παιδεία which is presented by Plato?

4.5: The Myths of Ἅιδης

The three brothers Zeus, Poseidon and Ἅιδης originally cast lots over the division of the domains: Zeus, the first born received the heavens, Poseidon the sea, and Ἅιδης the underworld 'engulfed in haze and night'. Olympus and the surface of the earth was to be their common domain (*IL.* XV 197 ff). "Ἅιδης' means 'unseen' or 'invisible' which is to say his name is *-ides* prefixed by an aspirated alpha-privative. This is of the highest significance when we view the ascent from the cave as a gradual and progressive process

[145] In Homer both the god and his kingdom are expressed by the single word Ἅιδης. In the classical period "Ἅιδης' always refers to the god, never to his realm. Robert Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* NY, 1985: 49

of unconcealment as in Heidegger's reading of the Cave. We will then be in a better position to work through the relations between Ἅιδης, ἰδέα /εἶδος, ἀλήθεια, and λήθη.

In Book V of the *Iliad* Athena borrows the 'cap of Ἅιδης' in order to deceive Ares (*Il.* V. 844-45). As the name suggests the cap grants invisibility to any who wears it. Apollodorus mentions that Hermes wears it during the Γιγαντομαχία but as Ganz points out, there is no instance in the surviving literature of the cap ever being used to deceive mortals.[146]

For this study what is most interesting are the various references to Ἅιδης as a kind of 'other Zeus' which occur right through into the Latin literary tradition. This will become significant in the section below on the δημιουργός in Plato and the Platonic interpretation beginning with Xenocrates which discerns a bipartite and then tripartite division of the demiurgic divinity and how this relates to the ancient tradition of a tripartite Zeus. Homer mentions the 'Zeus under the earth' (*Il.* IX. 457) while Aeschylus refers to the 'other Zeus' (*Suppliants* 231.), 'the earthly, the much visited Zeus of the dead' (*Suppliants* 156-58.), the 'chthonic Zeus' (fr. 273a R) and the 'Zeus who is beneath the earth' (*Ag.* 1386-87.). This theme survives and comes up in Seneca (*Herc. fur.* 724-5.) as *uultus est illi / ouis, sed fulminantis* - 'he hath Jove's own look, but Jove's when he doth thunder'. The notable addition here is the attribution of a wrathfulness to Ἅιδης that is absent from the Greek conception. For the Greeks, Ἅιδης is, if anything, indifferent; he does not concern himself with punishment or retribution, he merely prevents his charges from ever leaving his domain. Finally, another detail that reveals something of the

[146] Worth mentioning here is also the use of Plouton as an alternative name for Ἅιδης. The earliest written appearance of the word *may* appear in a list of gods from an early fifth century inscription at Eleusis but its first certain appearance is in Sophocles' *Antigone* (1200). In the *Cratylus* (403a), Ploutos is etymologised as the giver of wealth that lies within the earth and there follows a discussion of the etymological

essence of Ἅιδης and which helps us to understand the full significance of Heidegger's use of *Abendland* when he speaks about 'the West', particularly in his later period, is the supposed geographic location of the House of Ἅιδης. It is somewhere in the west, beyond the stream of Ocean in the land of the Cimmerians, a people who never see the sun. Set in a grove of poplars and willows sacred to Persephone stands the House of Ἅιδης while nearby are the Gates of the setting sun and the country of dreams.[147] So dreams belong to the domain of Ἅιδης, or, in the terms used here, share in the essence of Ἅιδης for we find in the mythic tradition that Θάνατος and Ὕπνος are siblings (Hesiod, *Theog.* 759).[148] Clearly then, Ἅιδης, through his association with death, dreams, and the chthonic realm is associated with oblivion or λήθη and on account of this belongs to the essence of ἀλήθεια.[149] The insight of the later Heidegger into ἀλήθεια becomes significant for this when he discerns a concealment within unconcealment which taken together constitutes the originary essence of truth.[150] Perhaps with this we have found the missing element in Heidegger's reading of the Cave. By overlooking the strong presence of Ἅιδης in this passage – and indeed throughout the dialogue – he misses the possibility of attributing to Plato an understanding of ἀλήθεια very close to that which he elaborates in the 1950's when he retracts the thesis about transformation. This movement of concealment within unconcealment which we detect in Plato restores the motility to the

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differences between Ἅιδης and Ploutos but it is a discussion that has no bearing on these inquiries. Ganz, P. 71; 72 and note.

[147] Rose, H.J. *A Handbook of Greek Mythology* 6th ed. London, 1964: p.18; p. 79.

[148] They are the Νυκτὸς παῖδες: all the children - the 'whole brood' as West calls them - are named at 211 ff.

[149] See West's commentary to his ed. of the *Theogony* on the appearance of λήθη at 227 (ψεύδεα appears at 229): 'not the oblivion of death, but "forgetfulness" or "negligence"', here at least, but, 'The meaning of the word may have been influenced by its often felt antithesis ἀλήθεια.' West: 230-231

[150] This refers back to the section on ἀλήθεια above where the later Heidegger says this about the presence of concealment within unconcealment: 'if this were so, then the clearing would not be the mere clearing of presence, but the clearing of presence concealing itself, the clearing of a self-concealing sheltering'.

Platonic concept of truth and throws us back to the opening statement of Book VII which sets up the following inquiry in terms of 'our nature' (*ἡμετέραν φυσιν* – *Rep.* VII., 514a). The *φύσις* of man, i.e., the being of Dasein, must be defined in terms of concealment/unconcealment, hence the whole image of the Cave which inscribes unconcealment as a movement of the soul (*περιαγωγὴ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς*; 518c).

Another fruitful possibility of comparison emerges here between Plato and Heidegger with the underworld trope. If we take the Cave image on the psycho-political plane and treat it as an essential description of the worldhood of the world then I suggest we cold compare some of theses elements with Heidegger's Dasein analytic, especially with reference to concepts like Fallenness and Inauthenticity. Plato likens the world of doxa, of everydayness, to a kind of kingdom of the dead. Ignorance of essences, of the real being of things is a deprived state for Plato, and one of the tasks of the philosopher is to return to the world and to help his fellow citizens by trying to lift them out of this state. The philosopher will at least try to lead his fellows out of the gloom and into the light. Here Plato seems to assign to philosophy a kind of therapeutic end that is effected on the political plane. Heidegger also shares this conception of philosophy that he claims to have recovered through his re-appropriation of the tradition. It is a consequence of his demand that any ontological inquiry must always include the questioner. Throughout I have argued that Heidegger detects this same conception of philosophy in Plato and Aristotle and that he sees himself as merely restoring philosophical inquiry to its original theme through the completion of the classical metaphysical project. The restoration he

has in mind is not a revival but a new beginning which starts from where classical metaphysics leaves off.

4.6: The Situation of the Prisoners

I want to turn now to look at the prisoners in the cave; what is there situation, what kind of men are these underground dwellers, these men who dwell beneath the earth? I have shown above what the chthonic signifies in this image, now I want to look at some particular facets of their existence as prisoners.

We can immediately rule out any suggestion of 'man' or 'mankind' in the essential sense for these cave dwellers are 'situated', they inhabit a determinate world. The men here are those whose determination is that of the πόλις, they are the actual historical πόλις. If we connect the situation of the cave with that of the second πόλις described in Book II we can rule out the dwellers of the first kind, the 'city fit for pigs' as Glaucon calls it, they are not the kind of people we find in the cave.[151] The narrative continues with a description of their physical situation. The prisoners and indeed the scenery movers signify the second community which is described in Book II, they are the πόλις as it is in practice. We may assume then that Plato is immediately describing his own city – or any city for that matter.

The people are ἐν δεσμοῖς - shackled, fettered - ἐκ παίδων - from childhood by τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας - by the legs and the neck. This image is so familiar that we are inclined to glide over it on our way to the 'philosophical content'. But, lingering with this description and establishing the nexus of semantic relations within each element reveals a set of quite remarkable puns. The *LSJ* entry for τὸ σκέλος states that it is the leg 'from the hip down' and hence the fettering of the legs - τὰ σκέλη - prevents ambulatory

[151] Which raises an interesting question about the nature of the first community: if they are substantially different from the cave dwellers are they really human at all as Glaucon seems to suggest in his outburst? Are we to understand them as some un-fallen kind of humanity? The empirical existence of comparable communities (i.e. most pre-modern subsistence communities, for example, Long House societies in SE Asia that have a subsistence economy and live a kind of primitive communism) should prevent us regarding the first community as purely mythical.

movement. Perfectly straightforward and in accordance with the traditional understanding of the image. However the same lexicographical entry goes on to state that the plural form, i.e. the form as it appears in Book VII, was a common way of referring to the walls that stretched either side from Athens itself to the Piraeus, indeed, like a pair of legs. The word ὁ αὐχήν which simply means neck or throat may be related to the verb αὐχέω (ἡ αὔχησις) which means to boast or plume oneself.[152] Where we might expect to see the construction *ta skele kai ton auken-* we actually read ...*tous aukenas.* The normal expression would be something like "there they were fettered by the legs and neck" whereas ". . . legs and necks" allows for the pun to work: they were fettered by the walls and by boasts or boastings otherwise, with the singular form, it could hardly work

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The pun on τὰ σκέλη - if indeed there is one - reminds us that the dramatic setting for the *Republic* is the house of Cephalus in the Piraeus and so we should dwell awhile on the significance of place, of τόπος, because, after all, the cave *is* a place. Right from the opening words of the dialogue an identification is set up between the Piraeus, the cave, and Ἅιδης, these are three images for the same 'place'. There is also here a clear moment of intertextuality: a reference to the *Gorgias*. At *Gorgias* 518e - 519a, in the course of his argument with Callicles, Socrates criticises the 'great statesmen' of the past laying responsibility for the present woes of the πόλις at their feet he says; ". . . men say it is these who have made our city great, never realising that it is swollen and festering through these statesmen of old. For they have paid no heed to discipline and justice, but have filled our city with harbours and dockyards and walls and revenues and similar rubbish . . .".[153] The Piraeus mediates between Athens and its maritime empire; through

[152] I cannot prove this or adduce textual evidence, or philological opinion that may support (or reject) this suggestion. What, then, are my grounds for making this suggestion? There is a common expression used in contemporary idiom; 'he has a hard neck' or 'he has some neck' which denotes someone (always a man) who is over-confident, someone who is not shy in advancing himself, someone with *chutzpah*. It seems to me that the Greek verb αὐχέω and its various cognates expresses something essential which is common to the contemporary idiom. It compliments the dual sense of τὰ σκέλη (legs and city walls) and sets up a very nice pun at this point in the text, especially in reference to the *Gorgias* passage quoted below and the scornful description of all the trappings of civic life mentioned in Book II, e.g. 'delicacies, scents, perfumes, call-girls and confectionery' *Rep.* 373a.

[153] A full intertextual reading of the *Gorgias* and Book VII of the *Republic* is neither possible nor necessary, it will suffice, at this point, to indicate that the reference to the *Gorgias* must put us in mind of

it flows naval and mercantile power outward bound, inbound comes the tribute and booty which finances the great public works and increases the wealth of those who derive profit from empire. The δῆμος, through its support for the various competing figures and factions within the βουλή clearly identify their interests with those of empire (Book II, 373b –e, on the essence of imperialism). So the Piraeus, the dramatic location for this dialogue is that space which is the locus of corruption, or, a symbolic conduit of ἀδικία and is analogous with Ἅιδης.[154] The place of inflow/outflow, the place of exchange and of maritime and military power in some sense symbolises ἀδικία when read with Socrates' comparison of the two communities at Bk. II of the *Republic* (368a 374e). The earlier community is self-sufficient and represents the satisfaction of need while the second community is destabilised by the entry of a kind of perverted desire which is identified as greed or acquisitiveness in general. Desire becomes fixed on entirely inappropriate objects.[155]

The turning point, quite literally (περιάγειν), in the cave image comes with the disruption of the norm of continuous absorption in the flickering images that are projected before the prisoners on the bench. One of the prisoners is suddenly free to move, he is on his feet, he can walk and he looks up directly at the light (of the fire) and because of this feels pain and disorientation.

This event is presented as something that occurs according to φύσις if one of the prisoners is freed. The sense being established here in the form of a hypothesis is this; if a prisoner is freed this is what follows according to φύσις. This is a reminder of the opening sentence that introduces the image at 514a: that what follows is a consideration of man's φύσις in respect of παιδεία and ἀπαιδευσία. The condition of being fettered is in

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rhetoric and demagoguery. The men are fettered by the boastfulness that comes from identifying the good of the πόλις with its splendid achievements both at home and abroad.

[154] The opening line of the *Republic* evokes the descent of the philosopher back into the Cave. This was clearly a crucial matter for Plato; see the story in Diogenes Laertius about the numerous drafts of that very first line that were discovered in Plato's literary remains. *Diog. Laert.* III., 37-38.

[155] In this respect we could understand the *Symposium* as an analysis of desire which leads to the discovery of the highest – because most appropriate – object of desire, that to which all desire is ultimately directed. In this way we should understand the vision of beauty itself as another mode of showing for the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good, so, is also supremely beautiful and the ultimate source and end of desire

some sense the state of ἀπαιδευσία although at this stage it is not clear as to what the latter is precisely. Already in the first line we are being told something about the nature of man and, in some sense, anticipating this interpretation, we are told that philosophy is the fulfillment of man's essence. If a man can be prised or prises himself away from the world of opinion and appearances he can truly become himself and it is, then, in this sense that philosophy becomes man's path to self-fulfillment or completion.

One moment the man is fettered and seated, a prisoner like all the others, the next moment he is on his feet, free. This radical transformation, this περιάγειν (. . . περιάγειν τὸν αὐχένα; 515c) occurs ἐξαίφνης, in an instant. This word - ἐξαίφνης - occurs seven times in the *Republic* and is deeply significant in Plato's vocabulary elsewhere. In the *Symposium* and in the *Seventh Letter*, at moments which must be connected up to the liberation of the prisoner in the cave image, ἐξαίφνης denotes the manner in which clear comprehension is reached - sudden enlightenment - after a long and arduous preparation. The two uses of ἐξαίφνης in the cave image act as brackets in the process of παιδεία. The process begins ἐξαίφνης but the final revelation occurs οὐ. . . ἐξαίφνης. The launch onto the path (ὁδός) of enlightenment occurs suddenly but the final vision of the sun itself can only take place after a painful period of adjustment. I want to look more closely at this suggestion of suddenness as a way into the temporality of the image in order to show that all of the elements of the passage from the cave wall to the sun should not be understood sequentially, but rather as a continuous movement between being and time.

4.7: The Meaning of ἐξαίφνης in Plato

The significance of Plato's use of this adjective requires no advocacy, it is well understood in the tradition of Plato interpretation, it signifies instantineity. In its significant usage, the word occurs three times in the cave image, four times in the *Symposium*, and once in the *Seventh Letter*. It is used on twenty-five other occasions in the *Corpus Platonicum*, but in its more ordinary sense. What follows is an examination of its use in the Cave image but also those other significant usages in the *Symposium* and the *Seventh Letter*.

The initiate into the mysteries of ἔρως in the *Symposium* views each aspect of the beautiful in succession until suddenly (ἐξαίφνης) the wondrous (θαυμαστὸν) vision comes upon him all at once (the wonder that becomes a question: 'why are there beings rather than nothing?').[156] The neophyte philosopher of the *Seventh Letter* has the same experience (it is essentially the same vision). After long application and study, all the elements suddenly fuse and philosophy ". . . like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark . . . is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining." (*Ep.* VII, 341c).

There are a number of elements in these two passages that should be noted in detail: the temporal frame that is used and the sense of sight. In the *Symposium* the initiate views each aspect *successively* one after the other, that is, in the consecutive passage of time. The final vision itself occurs *out of time* in a moment of aletheic vision and is experienced as something wondrous – θαυμαστὸν. Again, in the *Seventh Letter*, the vision occurs after "a period of attendance" - activity within the phenomenological experience of temporality as time moving in consecutive moments one after the other. The final vision itself occurs outside of the temporal frame and the moment is expressed as the leaping spark that ignites the soul with a self-perpetuating fire. Both these accounts of the suddenness of vision differ from the account of the release and the ascent in the *Republic*. In the Cave passage the release from bondage is described as sudden but the ascent to the vision of the sun occurs consecutively through the stages that describe the aletheic essence of παιδεία; the situation is reversed. How is this to be accounted for? One way would be to place no importance on Plato's use of this adjective here but this would be dangerous. It is hard to accept that in one of the most important passages in all of Plato's dialogues, a term of great significance would be used innocuously like that, particularly as it occurs within the context of a Platonic image or myth. The problem only arises if we read each stage of the ascent and descent consecutively, that is, if we allow the meaning of the image to be determined by spatio-temporal relations. But this can only occur if we remain bound to the *pictorial* content of the situation. I propose another way of reading this which is based on granting the use of ἐξαίφνης here the same significance as in the *Symposium* and the *Seventh Letter*.

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[156] Heidegger opens the *Introduction to Metaphysics* with this question. *IM*: 1

The ascent and the descent begins and ends with the prisoner/philosopher being in the company of his fellows. At first he is a fellow-prisoner believing in the same things as they sharing the same experience of life as they. On his return, however, everything has changed. What has actually changed is that his soul has 'turned around' (*περιαγωγή*) from absorption in multiplicities towards the real being of things and the source of their being. The ascent to the sun describes moment by moment the turning-around, the motion of soul and phenomena which is called *ἀλήθεια*. The philosopher's return to the cave symbolises his being-in-the-world and with others but also his being apart for now he inhabits the region of beings as opposed to things. The suddenness draws attention to his continuing presence in the community. What occurs in the Instant is the transition from *ἀπαιδευσία* to a vision of the good. The Instant in this case upholds the narrative integrity suggesting a physical journey from bench to sun and back again but signals us not to press the image too far as to render our interpretation dependent on spatio-temporal categories; similarly, 'movements of the soul' should alert us here; the *περιαγωγή* should not be taken as a description of movement. Leave aside the image altogether for one moment, and consider the situation of one who is drawn towards the real through philosophy. Why is it that if philosophy is the path to human self-realisation – the concrete fulfillment of the Delphic commandment to self-knowledge – is the philosopher an exception rather than the rule? Why is it that one and only one prisoner is released because not only do the multitude remain behind but they also resist the returning philosopher's attempts to lead them to the real? The image of the cave must command our attention for another reason that is rarely if ever mentioned in the literature: the initial attraction of the neophyte or ex-prisoner to philosophy.

Both Plato and Aristotle tell us that philosophy has its origins in *θαυμάζειν*, a sense of wonder, and in the *Symposium* we are told that the vision of the beautiful itself bursts upon one as *a* wonder (*θαυμαστὸν*).[157] Now, if the originary 'impulse' to philosophise comes out of a sense of wonder then in some sense the philosopher to be must have had

[157] *θαυμάζειν*; 'wonder' or 'astonishment' is the origin of philosophy: *Theaet.* 155d; *Met.* 982b

some sight of the wondrous. In terms of the cave image the question could be put like this: what effects the unshackling from the chains that bind the prisoners to the bench?[158] The release passage at 515c carries strong resonances of the kind of purification Socrates speaks about when he describes philosophy as a kind of training in dying (*Phaed.* 67c – 68c).[159] This signifies the withdrawal from the purely empirical and the turn towards the *a priori*.[160]

In the *Parmenides* the adjective ἐξαίφνης is substantivised into a noun as τό ἐξαίφνης, the instant, and expresses a temporal notion. The whole passage requires reproduction in full:

> The word 'instant' (τὸ ἐξαίφνης) appears to mean something such that *from it* a thing passes to one or other of the two conditions. There is no transition *from* a state of rest so long as the thing is still at rest, nor *from* motion so long as it is still in motion, but this queer thing, the instant, is situated between the motion and the rest, it occupies no time at all, and the transition of the moving thing to the state of rest, or of the stationary thing to being in motion, takes place *to* and *from* the instant. Accordingly, the one since it is at rest and is motion, must pass from the one condition to the other - only so can it do both things - and when it passes, it makes the transition instantaneously; it occupies no time in making it and at that moment it cannot be either in motion or at rest. (*Parm.* 156c ff)

In this text from the *Parmenides* the Instant (τὸ ἐξαίφνης) is understood as the supra-temporal configuration of the one.[161] The 'one', 'motion' and 'rest' are at issue here. The one is both at rest and in motion insofar as these modes of being are present. Presence is experienced as both motion and rest yet presence is neither motion nor rest

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[158] The release passage at 515c surely carries echoes of the *Phaedo* discussion of purification.
[159] The release of the soul from the shackles of the body allows the soul to find itself in its desired state, free to contemplate essences and this anticipates the final release of death. At *Phaed.* 82c philosophy is associated with 'care' for the soul which gains through philosophy a liberation and purification
[160] In the concluding section of this dissertation, Section 5, I look more closely at the question of the *a priori* and how it may compare and differ to Platonic recollection.

but both are subsumed by presence, that is, if we read here 'presence' for τὸ ὄν . The 'one' transits from movement to rest and from rest to movement through the mediation of the instantaneous, the transition is not direct. The transition itself occupies no time at all as 'it cannot be either in motion or at rest.' This compares to the statement about being in the *Sophist* where being is said to be neither motion nor rest but both, that is, a third thing. In this context though we must ask whether we are entitled to understand the instantaneous as it refers to the nature of the prisoner's initial liberation, which is still not freedom, and the experience of being or are we overburdening the text at this point? Such a comparison presupposes that we understand the image of release, ascent, and descent in existential terms as well as ontologically. In the *Sophist* motion and rest are contenders for 'being'.

The quality of supra-temporality attaches to Plato's use of ἐξαίφνης, and in the three texts mentioned here (*Republic*, *Symposium* 210e and the *Seventh Letter*, 341c), the adjectival form, ἐξαίφνης, is used to indicate the temporal frame of enlightenment. Standing out of the temporal frame is also a standing-out from the spatial frame (the prisoner goes from being seated to being stood up - ἐξαίφνης). There is a standing-out from the spatio-temporal domain which is the abode of man. Spatio-temporality is the determination of man's being in the world. This 'standing out' is a standing out into the domain of the *a priori*, through the momentary negation of time, being as such shows itself, and the multiplicity that is generated by time falls away to reveal an originary unity. This can account for the difference between the ideas and the Idea of the Good itself; the difference is generated by time. The 'place' or 'space' is the soul that has been purified from its enmeshment with the endless proliferation of instantiations which arise and fall away. The 'philosopher', or, Dasein, is, after all, not so much the 'spectator of Being' but rather the privileged site of Being. It is in this sense that we can understand the Da- of Dasein (Being-There); ψυχὴ is the 'place', the 'There' into-onto which –Sein projects. The place of the cave and the place of the exterior are both imminent to the ψυχὴ if we understand them as signifying concealment and unconcealment and the two

[161] Cornford, though, denies the relationship of the Instant in the *Parmenides* with the 'sudden' vision of the beautiful in the *Symposium*: 'Plato's business-like account of the instant cannot be correlated with the sudden vision of the Beautiful' *PTK*: 203

together as a perpetual movement of the ψυχὴ.[162] This is the meaning of the ἀγαθόν which projects the being of beings, and, the visibility of the being of beings (*Rep.* 509b). The ἀγαθόν is the visibility of the projection but not the source. It is the discernible end and origin as it can be approached through its refracted light, i.e. through the ideas. The ultimate source remains beyond the projecting of the being of beings, it withdraws in order for a world to open up, it conceals itself in order that it may grant the possibility of unconcealment. It generates through a kind of contraction which is the play of concealment and unconcealment. For it to be perceived immediately would require a negation of time and place, it would imply the perspective of a god.[163] It is the projecting of a unity in difference, producing a world that is known through the ideas; differing produces a world. This 'active' projecting-differing is what Plato calls the demiurge in the *Timaeus* where the production of world is the theme. In Section 5 I take up the issue of the demiurge on these lines in order to complete the analysis of the Cave.

The opening line of Bk. VII of the *Republic* states that what is to follow is to be an inquiry into the essence (φύσις) of man with regard to παιδεία and ἀπαιδευσία. The condition of the men fettered on the bench represents an undifferentiated apperception of motion and rest at the purely aesthetic and unreflected level as a pre-theoretical construction of 'world' and 'reality'. It is this prevailing life-world that determines the πόλις problematic which is the theme of the *Republic*. Only with the aletheic revelation is it finally understood that the hidden essence of the πόλις has all along been in danger of complete oblivion. Circulating between the life-world of the πόλις and the essence of the πόλις there is a dense fog of floating signifiers which reappears at the end with the Myth of Er. The blanket of non-referential (that is, and strictly, essential speech) signification is what Heidegger terms *Gerede*, a kind of ontic prattle – in Platonic terms it is the substance of rhetoric and sophistry which functions as a psycho-manipulative strategy within the polity. We know that the signification of *Gerede* is non-referential because again and again bold claims are exposed as groundless in the Socratic ἔλεγχος. Another

[162] I can only touch on this matter here, the whole question of spiritual motion is beyond the scope of this present study.
[163] In Section 5 I discuss Kant's concept of intuition and Heidegger's comments on this with reference to the Platonic question of the Idea of the Good and the ideas.

aspect of ἀπορία emerges as a disjunctive zone between the over-worked 'signifier' and the obliviated 'signified': that which falls into λήθη.

The transition from the seated-fettered to the standing-free position occurs in the opening of the supra-temporal. The moment of liberation and what follows is posited as a hypothesis that takes φύσις as its principal determination. The moment of liberation *if* it comes follows a course according to φύσις as it bears on the passage from ἀπαιδευσία to παιδεία. The 'being stood up' occurs according to φύσις and ἀνάγκη and in this sense ἀνάγκη is the self-emerging emergence of φύσις in accordance with itself as the presence of that which cannot be otherwise. As this whole image of the underground dwelling place is concerned with ἀπαιδευσία and παιδεία and the process of transition from the former state to the latter, then the process, contingent on an initial unfettering, is essential to man's being (φύσις).

One of the conclusions to be drawn from the image at this stage is that when man is in a state of ἀπαιδευσία he is less than himself (φύσις). This text is suggesting that man fulfills his true nature in philosophy, that is, man and not just those with a 'talent' or 'draw' towards the theoretical life.[164] This would provoke a question which could hardly be taken up here, so far-reaching is its implications: why is not everyone a philosopher?[165]

By analysing some of the elements of the Cave image closely I have been able to show that place of the image is the ψυχὴ of man and that the whole image concerns a movement of the ψυχὴ which concerns the real being of man. I have shown how this

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[164] The immediate objection to this is of course the whole process of selection based on suitability and the division according to types as in the myth of the gold, silver, and bronze (*Rep.* III, 415 a-c). But it is precisely its mythic presentation that should put us on our guard against taking this at face value. Is this not a 'physiognomy' of the soul? The types corresponding to the tripartite division of the soul bear comparison to the metal types and the definition of justice as each element minding their own business (433d) can also refer to a rightly ordered soul.

[165] Crombie suggests that the mysterious nature (of the liberator of the prisoner) may express Plato's belief that true philosophers arise unpredictably, by 'divine chance'. I. M. Crombie *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* London, 1962: 114. This is only a start rather than an explanation although it may turn out to be beyond explanation, a mystery indeed. It could be argued on the basis of this Platonic text that in some

movement involves an interplay of unity and multiplicity which is not so much a passage from one state to another but an abiding interweaving of the two out of which a world can emerge and I have understood the image, then, in terms of being and time. The image presents us with an important statement by Plato on the essence of man by describing the being of man, or Dasein, in terms of this place of disclosure; ψυχὴ as the place where being comes to pass.

4.8: Criticisms of Heidegger's Interpretation of Plato's Cave Image: Robert Dostal

Of all the criticisms of Heidegger's reading in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*, the one carried out by Robert Dostal is one of the most detailed and engaged with Heidegger's thinking in this matter. Unlike some other critics Dostal engages very closely with Heidegger's reading and situates his critique within the context of Heidegger's broader project. There is one aspect of his criticism that would seem to merit especially close and serious attention and that concerns the matter of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, and in particular, Dostal's charge that Heidegger altogether neglects the character of the ἐπέκεινα which clearly belongs to the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ as much as its designation as idea, supreme idea maybe but idea nonetheless. By opening an examination of Dostal's critique I want to open up the discussion of transcendence which will conclude this section and lay the basis for the final section of this dissertation where I take up the question of the Platonic demiurge and some suggestive comments by Heidegger.

The insights gained from this analysis will be brought forward into the later discussion of the δημιουργός and the Idea of the Good, and Heidegger's suggestion of their identity with each other. The problem with this, as Dostal points out, is that unlike *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* which follows *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* a good four years later, in *Basic Problems* the character of the ἐπέκεινα is very much in the foreground, not only in explicit reference to Plato but as a general theme. Does this absence of an explicit treatment in the later essay betoken a substantial change in Heidegger's interpretation of

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sense everyone is a philosopher, at least, a nascent philosopher. Then the dialogues could also be read as the stories of successful and unsuccessful philosophers.

Plato and the origins of ontology, or, must this apparent anomaly be explained in some other way?[166]

The charge of one-sidedness that Dostal makes against Heidegger in his reading of the Idea of the Good in *PDT* raises the core issue of the ideas, and the idea of the Good in particular, not only for Heidegger's interpretation but for the tradition of commentary stretching right back to the Old Academy. Here the focus must be, for the most part, concentrated on Heidegger's interpretation.

There are a number of ways in which the Idea of the Good could be broadly discussed in the context of Dostal's critique:

1. Dostal's observation that the ἐπέκεινα is neglected in favour of a transcendental reading.
2. Overlooking the ontological dimension of the Cave image in *PDT*.
3. The meaning of transcendence in Heidegger's thinking.
4. The relationship of the Idea of the Good to the δημιουργός.

Dostal interprets Heidegger along developmental lines when he sees a transition from an earlier to a later Heidegger centering on the *Kehre* which, in turn, he sees in terms of an abandonment of the transcendentalist project of *Being and Time*. For the purposes of this dissertation he advances the thesis that Heidegger and Plato think in proximity to each other but Heidegger is not sufficiently aware of this to the same extent as his pupils, many of whom go on to carry out influential readings of Plato, for example, Gadamer, Strauss, and Krüger. Much later Heidegger comes around to a recognition of his own proximity to Plato's thinking. There is much in Dostal's thesis that should be endorsed but I would take issue with him on one or two significant points. The thesis here is that Heidegger's thinking does not 'develop' (in the sense that Dostal suggests, implying

[166] This implies the issue of the *Kehre* Heidegger's thought which is still quite a controversial matter within Heidegger scholarship.

revision, radical departure) and that Heidegger's thinking remains in proximity to Plato's throughout, albeit critically and in unexpected ways, and not in a way that can be shown through straightforward comparison. My argument on this is that Heidegger's view of Plato changes only insofar as he is changing perspective. The changes, I would suggest, are due to perspectival shifts rather than basic revisions of fundamental commitments.

4.9: Analysis of the Criticisms Presented by Dostal

Dostal's article is one of the originating factors for this whole work particularly in respect of some of the criticisms that he levels at Heidegger's Plato interpretation in the essay on ἀλήθεια but also to the general attitude of Heidegger towards Plato. This project was initially driven by the need to investigate the criticisms against Heidegger for it seemed that much that is important for our understanding of Plato is to be found in the matters Dostal raises and in this Dostal is closer to Gadamer in this than to Heidegger.

The charges that Dostal lays against Heidegger's relationship to Plato can be summarised as follows:

1. For Heidegger metaphysics is Platonism and his 'attack' on metaphysics is an 'attack on Platonism' and so Heidegger carries out an 'unrelenting critique of Plato'.
2. Heidegger's relationship to Plato can best be understood as a response to the Neokantian Plato of Paul Natorp.
3. There is an 'almost consensual critique of Heidegger's Plato interpretation' that he neglects the ἐπέκεινα in *PDT*, ignoring the ontological dimension of Plato's conception of ἀλήθεια.
4. That Heidegger lacks 'recognition of the proximity of his own position to that of Plato' and that the recognition of this by his students accounts for their 'perceptive' as opposed to the teacher's 'short-sighted' interpretation of Plato.

The first observation to be made about Dostal's article is that it was written before the publication of numerous important volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* which have enabled a different understanding of Heidegger's Plato to emerge, one not so dependent on the testimony of his students as was previously the case. For example, in 1992 Volume 19 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (the *Sophist* lectures) was published thus affording us the opportunity of observing Heidegger conducting a very close reading of a Platonic dialogue. Moreover Volume 19 invalidates much of what Dostal infers about Heidegger's relationship to Natorp's Plato. What strikes the reader initially is the degree to which this interpretation represents a radical departure from the Neokantian orthodoxy of the time and which was Heidegger's own philosophical background. This is not to say that Heidegger is not indebted to Natorp in a variety of ways but it is to say that in the course of these lectures Heidegger virtually rejects through critical destruction, every tenet of the Neokantian Plato, for example, he explicitly rejects the 'Theory of Ideas', the very cornerstone of Natorp's interpretation instead discovering a Plato who is more phenomenological that transcendentalist.[167]

The first and the fourth criticisms are related; Heidegger's 'attacks' on Platonism, his 'unrelenting critique of Plato' is tied to his alleged lack of acknowledgement of his own proximity to Plato's thinking. I will argue here that the first part of this charge is unsustainable and the second point, the matter of proximity, is inaccurate for Dostal does not distinguish between Plato and Platonism whereas Heidegger does and with good reason. If and when this aspect of his criticism is met we are left with the matter of the ἐπέκεινα which Dostal presents and this is indeed the most substantial and productive aspect of his critique for here the charge of a 'neglect' in Heidegger's *PDT* interpretation of the Cave must be taken seriously. I will conclude this section with some suggestions to account for this seeming lacuna which if correct can meet off the charge of neglect.

[167] *PS*: 310 = *GA*: 19; 'we need to uncover and elaborate the *milieu* in which ontological research can and has to move in general. Without this disclosure and rigorous elaboration of this *milieu*, ontology remains no better than the epistemological theory of the Neokantianism of the past. To raise the question of Being does not mean anything else than to elaborate the questioning involved in philosophy in general.'

What complicates the issues here is that Dostal understands Heidegger developmentally and so he sees a kind of disjunction between the 'early' Heidegger and the 'later' Heidegger divided by the *Kehre* which signifies the beginning of a final abandonment of metaphysics.[168] There is a lot at stake in this: if metaphysics has come to completion technologically, in the proliferation of sciences, if it is at its end in the sense of completion, then Heidegger, by raising questions about philosophy's future, and speak of a release towards thinking, then, there can be no talk about abandonment, we must instead speak about an 'overcoming'. Three interrelated issues need to be taken up here:

1. Dostal's critique of Heidegger's treatment of the Idea of the Good.
2. The contrast in the way that the Idea of the Good is treated in the two Heidegger texts adduced here.
3. Heidegger's identification of the Idea of the Good and the δημιουργός.

Returning to the issue of 'Plato' and 'Platonism', it is by no means accurate to conflate the two when talking about Heidegger's interpretations. For Heidegger there are actually three elements involved here: Plato the author of the dialogues and founder of the Academy; the Platonists as a name for those who followed in the Academy, and Platonism as another term for the 'metaphysical tradition' that is inaugurated by Plato and Aristotle. For Heidegger, the philosophical tradition as Platonism is so a broad a concept is this, that even Positivism is drawn into the history of philosophy-as-Platonism.[169] In *Nietzsche* Heidegger is explicit about this; 'We say "Platonism", and not Plato, because here we are dealing with the conception of knowledge that corresponds to

[168] 'With the turn, however, Heidegger abandons the incomplete project of *Being and Time*, abandons metaphysics, and abandons science.' Dostal *BBHP*: 70. The distinguished Heidegger commentator Fr. Richardson, for example, speaks about Heidegger I and Heidegger II, in, William J. Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague, 1967). Those who reject a 'developmental' Heidegger would be for example David Farrell Krell, Otto Pögeller, and Karl von Hermann as the most influential representatives. Part of the difficulties, which are progressively alleviated as more of the *Gesamtausgabe* is published, is that both Richardson and the latter commentators all had a relationship with Heidegger which brings to their work an added authority, and yet there is disagreement over the question of the *Kehre*.

[169] Positivism stands opposed to Platonism but could hardly exist without it – the Positivists correspond to the Giants of the *Gigantomachia* of the *Sophist*. In *Nietzsche* Heidegger compares the two in respect of the concept of truth: Platonism is opposed by Positivism in that the former regards the supersensuous as the really real the former acknowledges only the sensible – see *N* I: 151-161. I take this up in the body of the text further below.

that term, not by way of an original and detailed examination of Plato's works, but only by setting in rough relief one particular aspect of his work' (*N*, I: 151). Heidegger singles out one element of Plato's work which we are to understand becomes the basis of 'Platonism': that Being is to be determined on the basis of the Ideas. The ideas are the what-being of things, not representations or positings but the real being itself and it this most basic tenet which characterises the western philosophical tradition and it is this which enables us to subsume Positivism under the category of Platonism in the widest sense because the former only arises on the basis of a real distinction that is drawn in a Platonic dialogue albeit the formulation of a 'disposition' or comportment identified by Plato and others and thematised in the *Sophist*. Heidegger invokes the discussion of the *Sophist* in this:

> 'For Platonism, the Idea, the supersensuous, is the true, true being. In contrast, the sensuous is μή ὄν. The latter suggests, not nonbeing pure and simple, οὐκ ὄν, but μή – what may not be addressed as being even though it is not simply nothing. Insofar as, and to the extent that, it may be called being, the sensuous must be measured upon the supersensuous; nonbeing possesses the shadow and the residues of Being which fall from true being.' (*N*. I: 154)

Positivism involves a reversal of Platonism. For Positivism only the sensuous and the tangible are the really real – facts. In this sense Positivism is the shadow of Platonism. While this might describe Platonism and its mirror image Positivism, is this necessarily the best way to understand Plato himself? Does it amount to an interpretation, which we can trace back to Aristotle, that gives rise to a 'two-worlds' theory? This is important here because throughout this dissertation one of the ultimate aims is to forestall attributing a 'two worlds' theory to Plato himself suggesting rather a more dialectical Plato who sees reality as spectral rather than bi-polar. This, I suggest is the underlying driving force behind Heidegger's Plato interpretations throughout where he is constantly seeking to distinguish between tradition and origin between Platonism and Plato. I offer the earlier analysis of the Cave image in support of this thesis. By showing how the singularity of the Idea of the Good must be refracted into multiplicity for there to be a

world and this is the relation of being and time in the Cave. If we adopt Heidegger's insight into the nature of ἀλήθεια as a revealing which is also a concealing we have the means to over-come the two-worlds Plato. For if ἀλήθεια is another way of naming being then there is only the one world here and this single world is that which emerges from this generative two-foldedness of being and time.

Heidegger says very little about the tradition within antiquity that we call Platonic. It is something to be regretted that he never carried out a detailed reading of Plotinus comparable to his Plato and Aristotle readings, although such a reading was projected.[170] These considerations are apposite because of the criticism of neglect of the ἐπέκεινα made by Dostal. He suggests that Heidegger's interpretation in *PDT* which disregards or neglects the ἐπέκεινα is a Heideggerian eccentricity but this is far from being the case.[171] In leveling such a criticism Dostal back-projects a later canonical interpretation of the Idea of the Good onto Plato's text unproblematically. He overlooks a long and by no means homogeneous tradition of Platonic interpretation in antiquity which did not automatically understand Book VI of the *Republic* in terms of the transcendence Dostal talks about. Mathias Baltes has surveyed the interpretation of the ἐπέκεινα which developed in antiquity and argues that prior to Plotinus it was not understood in terms of transcendence.[172] Baltes cites an impressive selection of fragments from a period of six hundred years or so to show that a straightforward transcendent interpretation is difficult to demonstrate from the sources but that a transcendental or theologising of the Idea of the Good seems to be the norm for many Platonists especially in the Imperial period. Plutarch, Iustinus Martyr, Celsus, and Numenius amongst others are all shown to have discussed the Idea of the Good as a being, an ὄν, although some of the evidence could equally be cited as proof of a hyper-consciousness of the inadequacy of language for

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[170] Kisiel,*GH*BT: 192 – 200 for a full discussion of this course which was to treat of Plotinus and Augustine.

[171] 'The slighting of the difference of the Good from the other ideas is surprising in the context of the classical tradition wherein Neo-Platonism makes this distinction fundamental' Dostal: 69. Sadler repeats the charge; ' the unsubstantiated remark . . . a claim which runs counter not only to Neoplatonic interpretations . . . but also to the views of most contemporary commentators' Sadler *HA*: 137.

[172] Baltes, M. 'Is the Idea of the Good in Plato's *Republic* Beyond Being' in ed. Mark Joyal *Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition: Essays Presented to John Whitaker* Aldershot, 1997: 3-23.

giving an account of that which is beyond being.[173] Their discussions of the Good are, on the face of it, not so very different from the reading Dostal charges Heidegger with carrying out in *PDT*, and tend to bear out his theses concerning the productionist nature of metaphysics and the ontotheologising of the question of being when, for example, the Christian Origen formulates the question of whether God is beyond οὐσία or is himself οὐσία.[174] This arises from a very interesting discussion that was going on in the circle around Ammonius Saccas concerning the nature of the First Hypothesis in the *Parmenides*, and results, according to Baltes' reading, in Plotinus' transcendent interpretation of the Idea of the Good.

Despite the possible problems with Baltes' Kantianising interpretation of the evidence (the rejection of transcendence) it is clear that Heidegger's focus on the Idea of the Good in *PDT* as an idea of ideas is not eccentric in the ancient context and there are certainly plenty of contemporary interpretations which have dispensed with a transcendent reading, beginning with Kant. This certainly shows that Heidegger is not eccentric in his views of transcendence in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*. Dostal further says that Heidegger pays very little attention to Plato during the Marburg years but this is simply wrong: the *Sophist* course of 1924 represents the best part of an academic year of intensive exegesis of that Platonic dialogue. The original projection of a double reading; *Sophist* and *Philebus*, added to the explication of the *Phaedrus* which is part of the *Sophist* course point to a deep and direct engagement with Plato's texts themselves. We know as well that Heidegger spent the best part of a decade intensively reading Aristotle which can only mean Plato as well.[175] The projection of a course on Plotinus which was cancelled at the last minute and replaced with a course on Augustine, Paul of Tarsus, and the notion of

[173] Iustinus Martyr describes it as an ὄν which is he cause of all νοητά but which is unutterable and inexpressible but is grasped by the soul driven to its vision by ἔρως: Iustinus, *Dialogus* 4.1 cited in Baltes.
[174] Cited in Baltes, 21. This also raises the issue of the Gnostic rejection of the generated world as something evil, and the creator as indifferent *contra* the goodness of the world and the concern shown by God for the world in Platonism; the creation is described as the 'fairest of creations' and the demiurge as 'the finest of causes', denying this would amount to blasphemy; *Tim.* 29a; the gods are not indifferent, they care for all things great and small, *Leg.* 900c-d. See Dillon, *MP*: 384-396 for a general account of the extremely obscure matter of Gnosticism. Obscure in the highly complex nature of its ideas but also because many of the texts are still being edited (the Nag Hammadi find) and it is probably too soon for a proper evaluation of the phenomenon of Gnosticism.
[175] Kisiel covers this in great detail between p. 227-301 in *GH*BT.

kairological time also evidences a thorough engagement with the later Platonic tradition. The publication of Heidegger's collected edition is still incomplete, and this, combined with the unusual conditions of secrecy surrounding the Heidegger archive render such definitive statements as Dostal makes about what Heidegger was reading or not reading in this period rather risky.[176]

4.10: Heidegger's Concept of Transcendence.

If we turn to another text from the period of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* we get an explicit statement on the meaning of transcendence in Heidegger with particular reference to the ἐπέκεινα. If we are to treat the ἐπέκεινα as meaning transcendence and if we have discovered that this meaning did not spring out of the Platonic dialogues fully developed as Baltes has set out to demonstrate there should be then a preliminary indication as to how transcendence has come to be understood in the philosophical tradition. We can discern three basic meanings which emerge out of each distinct epoch in the tradition: the ancient doctrine which reaches its highest formulation in Plotinus, the Christian doctrine of *transcendens* and the *transcendentalis*, and the distinction of transcendence and transcendental in Kant. Leaving aside the ancient reflection on transcendence for a moment, we tend to interpret transcendence ontotheologically because of the central importance of this doctrine to medieval scholasticism which held that whatever went beyond the Aristotelian categories was classed as a transcendent; being, truth, unity and goodness; and these surpassed each and every genus. For Kant the transcendent is that which surpasses experience and therefore the understanding while the transcendental refers to the conditions for the possibility of our experiential knowledge - but he does not, according to Heidegger, explain what transcendence as such is. In the essay *On the Essence of Ground* (1929) Heidegger addresses the question of transcendence (*Überstieg*) and states that transcendence is definitional of Dasein: '(transcendence is the) fundamental constitution of this being, one that occurs prior to all

[176] It should be said in fairness to Dostal that the *Sophist* lectures only became available in 1992 – nine years after the publication of his article. However Heidegger's activities in that period have always been well known in Heidegger circles through the testimony of former students and colleagues (Gadamer, Loewith, Arendt etc), it was only the texts and hence the details which were unknown.

comportment' (*EG*: 108). Transcendence describes the fundamental structuredness of 'Dasein as "subject"'. Dasein is always in a world but as such surpasses all the constitutive elements of the world, indeed, worldhood describes this surpassing which is a surpassing of beings: '*What* is surpassed is precisely and solely *beings themselves*, indeed every being that can be or become unconcealed for Dasein, thus *including precisely* that being as which "it itself" exists' (loc. cit.). Transcendence constitutes the selfhood of Dasein but as such surpasses itself in that Dasein is always aware of other beings that are not Dasein and precisely as beings which are surpassed. It is the self-surpassing that initially directs Dasein towards beings which are other than itself which goes towards constituting a world:

> 'We name *world* that *toward which* Dasein as such transcends, and shall now determine transcendence as *being-in-the-world*. World co-constitutes the unitary structure of transcendence: as belonging to this structure, the concept of world may be called *transcendental*' (*EG*: 109)

Later in the essay Heidegger takes up the ἐπέκεινα as an explicit expression of transcendence but at this point in the text of the second edition of 1931 Heidegger puts: 'No! Da-Sein not at all comprehended, and not experienced. Ἐπέκεινα not transcendence either, but ἀγαθον as αἰτία'. This comment occurs at the same time as he is delivering the very first drafts of the Plato essay where the ἐπέκεινα is left out of account. Heidegger has not revised his own definition of transcendence rather he has come to the conclusion at this point that the ἐπέκεινα falls short of transcendence. This is a rather strange for the interpretation that follows in the 1929 edition detects in Plato an understanding of transcendence that is extremely close to his own. At this stage, i.e. 1929, he interprets the τὸ ἀγαθόν in terms of the transcendence of Dasein:

> 'The problem of the ἀγαθον is merely the culmination of the central and concrete question concerning the chief and fundamental possibility of the *existence of Dasein* in the πόλις'.

I suggest that we can understand πόλις in the *Republic* as 'world' in Heidegger's sense, and δικαιοσύνη as the authentic being of Dasein in accordance with δίκη which I take as the inner structuredness of the 'world' in accordance with our nature (ἡμετέραν φυσιν) (*Rep.* VII. 514a) which as the whole image of the cave shows contains the possibility of inauthenticity as well.[177] Δίκη in this sense names the bonds of ἀνάγκη which, guided or 'persuaded' by νοῦς structures the world as κόσμος.[178] Heidegger still at this stage reads Books VI and VII holistically: 'For the ἀγαθον is that ἕξις(sovereign power) that is sovereign with respect to the possibility (in the sense of the enabling) of truth, understanding, and even being, and indeed all three together in their unity'. It is because the ἀγαθόν is irreducible in terms of content, i.e. transcendent, that it defeats efforts at imposing a precise determination on it be they rationalistic or mysteficatory. The essence of the ἀγαθόν 'lies in its sovereignty over itself as οὗ ἕνεκα– as the "for the sake of . . .", it is the source of possibility as such' and possibility is higher or, rather, wider than actuality, hence it is μειζόνως τιμητέον (*Rep.* VI, 509a).[179] Heidegger sees that this οὗ ἕνεκα becomes precisely problematic at this point but that this situation is covered over almost immediately by the charge of creating a ὑπερουράνιος τόπος which in turn leads to the 'two worlds' orthodoxy: 'the task is merely to secure (the ideas) as the most objective of objects, as that which *is* in beings, without the "for the sake of" showing itself as the primary character of world so that the originary content of the ἐπέκεινα might come to the fore as the transcendence of Dasein'. This tendency gives rise to a related and converse interpretation which conceives of the ideas as innate to the "subject". In both cases, which are two sides of the same issue – the orthodoxy of interpretation – 'the ideas count as more objective than the objects and at the same time as more subjective than the subject'. The task in this 'fleeting recollection of the still concealed history of the original problem of transcendence must have the growing insight that transcendence cannot be unveiled or grasped by a flight into the objective, but solely through an

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[177] Book VII opens with the question that we must consider how things stand in respect of παιδεία and ἀπαιδευσία in accordance with 'our nature'.

[178] I anticipate the correlation with the *Timaeus* here. I understand δίκη as a cosmic principle in the sense that it is a world determining principle, and δικαιοσύνη as its existential correlate.

[179] The use of this Aristotelian term is justified because of the way Heidegger interprets τὸ ἀγαθον as that to which a thing tends toward of its nature, e.g. the 'good' of a hammer is driving in nails. The hammer fulfils its good to the extent that a. It is able for this (well-designed) b. That it is actually used for its intended function; hence the 'good' as 'that for the sake of which . . .', i.e. οὗ ἕνεκα

ontological interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject, an interpretation that must constantly be renewed and that actively opposes "subjectivism" in the same way that it refuses to follow "objectivism" (*EG*: 124-5 *passim*.). In trying to overcome the philosophy of the subject which is very much a concern in *Being and Time* Heidegger's thinking the being of the subject – Dasein analysis – places him four-square with Plato and Aristotle insofar as they too include the questioner in ontological inquiry.

Through this view we gain an initial clue as to the later neglect of the ἐπέκεινα in his Plato interpretation. Heidegger does not seem to be addressing the text of Plato directly, rather he is taking issue with the interpretations that have grown up around the text and the philosophising that occurs hitherto. The issue here is tradition; an interpretation and handing on that covers over the 'text' whilst at the same time preserving and passing it on. Heidegger makes it quite clear in his interpretations of Plato and previous thinkers in general, that we cannot understand them the way they understood themselves, we are shut out from the text in this way, so much so, that even the most scrupulous exegesis of a past text cannot but project a later understanding of the problem on to its earlier formulation. We gain access to the text and the issues from out of a context and *through* a tradition – reception and transmission become, as it were, two sides of the same act - so that the practice of critique proceeds by negation; by criticising the tradition, only after a thoroughgoing appropriation, we may free up the originary texts in such a way that they may 'speak' differently to us, or, to put it differently, each generation may be reading a slightly different text. But if this were so, then should Heidegger have been clearer about his intentions, because, as interpretations of the text go (and text here in the wider; sense as embracing the problematic, the matters themselves), what he presents in *On the Essence of Ground* and in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* demonstrates a greater degree of straightforward proximity between his own thinking and that of Plato than the problematic reading of the Cave passage given later in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*.

What must also be taken into account here is the hermeneutic principle that Heidegger sets out at the beginning of the Plato essay and which is discussed in the introductory section of this dissertation and in the section on ἀλήθεια above; that the doctrine of a

thinker is what is left unsaid in his text. If we are to take this up then it must apply equally to Heidegger himself and we must try and read beneath the text to discover what is happening in the Plato essay.

Having looked at the Cave image from a number of perspectives and considered Heidegger's various commentaries on this passage, a number of issue have been clarified. I have been able to show that 'place' in the image signifies ψυχὴ and that by extension, everything that occurs in the Cave concerns the essence of man or Dasein, for ψυχὴ in the *Republic* is not unlike Dasein. The question at the start concerns man's being with respect to παιδεία and ἀπαιδευσία, which we discover is a conversion of the soul (περιαγωγὴ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς; 518c) towards the really real which also constitutes a fulfillment of the human essence, man coming to his real being through philosophy.[180] Through comparing the state ἀπαιδευσία to that of prisoners shackled beneath the earth, of comparing them to the souls in Hades – gray, wraith-like figures, of Hades signifying a kind of oblivion or invisibility, both Plato and Heidegger are as one in the general import of their existential analyses. Both thinkers seem to conceive one of the effects of philosophy as being illuminative of man's nature which both thinkers take to be in a fallen state; for Plato it is tied in to a disordered eroticism and ἀπαιδευσία. In Heidegger's terms conditions like Fallenness and Inauthenticity are characteristic of this imperfect state. Both thinkers in that respect saw an active political role for the philosopher but both of their respective forays into political praxis had disastrous and sobering consequences.[181]

By focussing on the question of temporality within the image and the highly significant use of the term ἐξαίφνης I have been able to open up the question of transcendence (the ἐπέκεινα) in the image. By discovering a singularity of place within the passage up and down, i.e. ψυχὴ, and relating this to the two-foldedness that belongs to unconcealment it is possible to challenge the two-worlds interpretation of Plato. This will become even

[180] Fulfilling the Delphic command to Know Thyself.

[181] Plato's ill-fated relationship with Dionysius of Syracuse and Heidegger's unfortunate involvement with the National Socialists. Both of these missions were born of a belief that philosophers could exert a direct formative influence in the affairs of state, or, as in Heidegger's case, in the actual formation of a state.

clearer if we follow Heidegger's analysis of transcendence within the philosophical tradition as a surpassing and then apply this to the ἐπέκεινα as a surpassing of all beings. By constantly keeping to the fore-front, the insight gained, that the place of the image is ψυχὴ then the transcendence or surpassing is an essential characteristic of man's being. In this sense, then, transcendence belongs to finitude. Finitude is characteristic of Dasein, or, to put it in Greek terms, man is mortal, subject to death, the ultimate limit. The surpassing that belongs to this finite being – Dasein – refers to the insight gained above: that ψυχὴ is the 'place' of presencing.

In the next and final section I want to take up this question of transcendence and finitude with particular reference to recollection and the *a priori*. The main focus of the next section will be on the demiurge as the 'activity' of presencing, the source of the productionist character of Platonic ontology, and as the vital explanatory element for the One and the Many problem within Platonism. I conclude by taking up Heidegger's analysis of intuition in Kant as a helpful analogy to the question of productionism in Plato's thinking.

5.0: The Identification of Idea of the Good with the *Δημιουργός*: A Heideggerian Perspective

In the last section I built on the interpretation of the Cave passage that Heidegger carries out in part to prepare the ground for an examination of Heidegger's suggestion that the Idea of the Good and the Demiurge are identical – the theme of this section. Heidegger himself merely states this without elaboration, and so the task here is to examine this claim from a number of different angles in order to discover the meaning and plausibility of this suggestion.

Heidegger carries out two readings of the cave myth from Plato's *Republic* and both occur within the same period and within a few short years of *Sein und Zeit,* accordingly both readings can be considered and interpreted in tandem. The first interpretation occurs towards the end of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and concentrates on the temporal aspects of the cave myth; the second and better known interpretation takes the form of an essay arising out of a lecture given in the early 1930's which advances the thesis that a transformation in the essential meaning of truth takes place in the cave and is the subject of the section above 'Heidegger's Interpretation of *Ἀλήθεια* in Plato and Aristotle'. Later again, in 1942, Heidegger carries out an interpretation of the Myth of Er from Book X of the *Republic* which provides further clarification of the meaning of *ἀλήθεια* but now from the perspective of concealment which is contained in the word itself *ἀ-λήθ-εια*: the oblivion of *λήθη*.

What follows here is a summary of the 'demiurgic' interpretation of the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* put forward by Heidegger in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* which will set up the discussion of Heidegger's broader thesis that the end of metaphysics is technological thinking therefore its techno-scientific character can be discerned in its origin, i.e. with Plato and Aristotle. This becomes relevant because of the generative nature of the demiurge in the *Timaeus*; the word itself in Greek means craftsman. In this text Heidegger is already interpreting Greek ontology in terms of production and this

guides the overall interpretation that he carries out here. To anticipate the conclusion of this section, the direction that these analyses takes is to explain the suggestion Heidegger makes that the Idea of the Good and the Demiurge are identical. Heidegger does not really go on to say what he means by this so it seems an important task to try and construe a plausible explanation of what Heidegger might mean by this.

5.1: Heidegger's Reading of the Cave in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*

Within the context of a group of lectures on temporality in *BPP*, Heidegger again returns to the theme of pre-ontological understanding, understanding in general and the projection of being, the stated aim of which is to 'give a fundamental clarification of the possibility of the understanding of being in general' (*BPP*: 281). This involves articulating the ontological difference (the being of beings and being as such), the unity of 'whatness' and 'howness' (*essentia* and *existentia*), and the manifold modes of being. He locates the necessary condition for any comportment towards beings only if those beings can themselves be encountered in the brightness of the understanding of being. 'Being itself . . . must somehow or other be projected upon something', but only this, pure and simple, without implying any objectification, definition, or conceptual comprehension, in other words, pre-theoretically; 'it is understood as yet pre-conceptually, without a λόγος, we therefore call it the pre-ontological understanding of being' (loc. cit.). While this experience of beings is not dependent on any explicit ontological understanding of beings, the pre-conceptual sense of being is a condition of possibility that being could become an object of conceptualisation at all. Every science as well as philosophy always takes up something objectified that has always already been uncovered in some way. This is the fore-having that is presupposed in any inquiry whatsoever.

This guides the ontological inquiries of Plato and Aristotle who always begin from the pre-conceptual, be it popular opinion (itself a kind of pre-theoretical understanding of

beings) or the phenomenon as it is encountered immediately as a self-showing.[182] This comes down to a difference between an inquiry into beings and the inquiry into being as such. But in our time, according to Heidegger, this has simply been forgotten with the specialised regional ontologies and derived problems about which philosophy concerns itself. As the quote from the *Sophist* used on page one of *Being and Time* has it we are (still) not even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression "Being". This leads Heidegger to remark, that if we pose the question of being as such we discover at the same time that 'philosophy has not made any further progress with its cardinal question than it had already in Plato' (*BPP*: 282).

Heidegger goes on to say that it is in Hegel that philosophy, that is, ancient philosophy, is thought through to its end. Heidegger indicates the need for a new beginning, for Hegel completes philosophy because he completes the circle of philosophical problems, but 'the circling in the circle forbids him to move back to the center of the circle and to revise it from the ground up.' Heidegger proposes this radical revision through the founding of a fundamental ontology conditional on the raising of the question of being as such, this project does not get carried through for there comes the 'turn' (*Kehre*) and the very possibility of such a project is allegedly thrown into doubt.[183] Heidegger must return to the beginnings to see whether Hegel truly exhausted all the possibilities that were there, which always must come back to the question of being, specifically the question of the meaning of being:

> 'No extensive demonstration is needed to make clear how immediately, in our attempts to get beyond being to the light from which and in which it itself comes into the brightness of an understanding, we are moving within one of Plato's fundamental problems' (*BPP*: 282)

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[182] The neglected *Laches* is a good example of a dialogue that never gets beyond the pre-theoretical. Socrates canvasses two highly experienced old soldiers, Laches and Nicias, about the nature of courage (bearing in mind that Socrates had more than proved himself in the line: Laches pays tribute to the courage he showed at Delium, 181a-b). Much of the discussion could be characterised as a kind of attempted phenomenological description with Socrates encountering great difficulties in moving the inquiry away from examples and on to the question about the essential. The dialogue is aporetic for they never get the question properly formulated; it remains at the pre-theoretical level.

[183] The meaning of the *Kehre* is much discussed in the Heidegger scholarship.

In this text Heidegger is quite explicit about the chief importance of this engagement with Plato. It becomes necessary to demonstrate this in order to dispel any view that conceives of the fundamental ontological problem as accidental, arbitrary, or eccentric. Heidegger goes on to introduce the problem via a summary of the Sun and the Cave image at Book VI and VII of the *Republic*. Seeing requires three elements, the object to be seen, the eye that sees, and light to effect the seeing. The eye can only see in the light of something and similarly all noetic apperception can unveil being 'only if it has being's *specific illumination*' and 'as sensible cognition is ἡλιοειδής, so correspondingly all γιγνώσκειν, all cognition, is ἀγαθοειδής, determined by the idea of the ἀγαθον'. At perhaps the most famous passages of all in Plato, 509b, Socrates says:

> τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον οἶμαι τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.
>
> ("You will, I believe, also say, the sun furnishes to the seen not only the possibility of being seen, but gives to the seen, as beings, also becoming, growth, and nurture, without itself [the sun] being a becoming") (*BPP*: 283)

and this, as it applies to the aisthetic realm, has a correspondence in the noetic realm:

> καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.
>
> ("So then you must also say that the known not only receives its being known from a good, but also has it from thence *that* it is and *what* it is, in such a way indeed that the good is not itself the being-how and being-what, but even outstrips being in dignity and power") (*BPP*: 283-4)

He distinguishes here between the knowledge of beings as positive science and the knowledge of being as philosophical knowledge and that which grants the illumination that effects the uncovering in each is itself no being at all. The understanding of being is 'rooted in a projection of an ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσιας'. Heidegger is at pains to stress the utterly *a priori* nature of the illumination that grants understanding, scientific or philosophical, and that also by the same token grants all beings their being. The Cave then must be understood here as the context for noetic apperception. The Cave is a description of man's existence 'living on the disk of earth arched over by the sky, is like a life in the cave' for 'all vision needs light, although the light is not itself seen' and so Dasein's coming into the light means attaining to an understanding of truth as such and the understanding of truth is the essential precondition for any access to the actual. We see here a clear anticipation of the theme of his reading of the Cave in the 1940 essay – the meaning of ἀλήθεια - but unlike that text, here, Heidegger concentrates on the ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσιας, whereas in *PDT* it is not mentioned at all, it is treated as the 'idea of ideas'. This brings forth the criticism from several quarters of a one-sided reading all the more perplexing in the light of the reading he gives here where the ἐπέκεινα is very much the main focus: 'What we are in search of is the ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσιας?' (*BPP*: 285)

He follows this with a synopsis of the Cave image which locates the insight about cognition within the context of the being of Dasein. The flickering images on the wall stands for the impossibility of perceiving the actual on the basis of the perception of multiplicities: 'If the cave dwellers were to see more clearly for all eternity only what they now see on the wall, they would never gain the insight that it is only shadows' because the 'basic condition for the possibility of understanding the actual *as* actual is to look into the sun' (*BPP*: 285).

Heidegger concludes his reading of Books VI and VII of the *Republic* here with a set of questions which are connected to his analysis of ancient ontology as being derived from production; how the ἐπέκεινα is to be understood and defined, in what way the good is to be interpreted as that which makes knowledge and truth possible and in what sense, with

respect to his major thesis about ancient ontology, does the idea of the good have something to do with production? These questions he summarises and then makes this suggestion:

> Without entering further into this matter, we offer only the hint that the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is nothing but the δημιουργός, the producer pure and simple. This lets us see already how the ἰδέα ἀγαθόν is connected with ποιεῖν, πρᾶξις, τέχνη in the broadest sense. (*BPP*: 286 = *GA*-24: 405-6)

Heidegger does not explain what he means here but rather leaves it to the reader to grasp the significance of this.[184] He also prefaces these remarks with a strong note of caution against being overconfident in interpreting Plato on these points: 'How the ἐπέκεινα must be defined, what the "beyond" means, what the idea of the good signifies in Plato and in what way the idea of the good is that which is supposed to render knowledge and truth possible – all this is in many respects obscure' (*BPP*: 286 = *GA* 24: 405).

One way to interpret this comment about the δημιουργός is by looking to the context in which it is made and by reading the *Republic* in combination with the relevant passages in the *Timaeus* and bringing this into apposition with Heidegger's thesis concerning the productionist character of the Greek ontology which permeates the lecture course and the works of this period.[185] Within the tradition of Platonic philosophy and commentary

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[184] *BPP* was a course of lectures for undergraduates and so Heidegger's omissions should be understood as arising from pedagogical exigencies. In antiquity a tradition developed that identified the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ of the *Republic* and the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, and the *Demiurgos* of the *Timaeus* with a First and Second god respectively. The first was conceived of as a passive self-reflective nature while the second was a dynamic and active divinity. Later again with Pythagorean figures like Moderatus of Gades and Numenius of Apamea there evolves a tripartite fundamental theology which probably built on what preceded it with the addition of the *World Soul* as the third; in John Dillon *The Middle Platonists* (*MP*): 344-351; 361-377.

[185] Heidegger's familiarity with the early Greek thinkers, Plato, and Aristotle is well known but he was also familiar with the later philosophical traditions of antiquity especially in regard to his work of the early 1920's on the concept of kairological time in Paul of Tarsus and Augustine of Hippo. In 1921 Heidegger was to give a semester course on Augustine and Plotinus but the reading did not get beyond Augustine. Something similar happens with the *Sophistes* course; originally he was to read this dialogue with the *Philebus* (Kisiel, *GHBT* 195-6). We also know that Heidegger was quite familiar with the Aristotelian commentators, see *On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle's* Physics *B*, I in ed. McNeil, Heidegger *Pm*, 1998, 183-230.

itself we have struck upon one of the most difficult and perhaps most commented on questions of all: the meaning of the δημιουργός.[186] It would be impossible therefore, given the vastness of the subject to offer anything like a comprehensive interpretation of the δημιουργός in what follows.[187]

At this point I want to shift over to the text of the *Timaeus* in order to explicate something about the δημιουργός and refer this back to the discussion of the previous section where the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ was the main focus.

5.2: The Δημιουργός of the *Timaeus*

The passages that introduce the δημιουργός have been schematised in a detailed analysis by Runia and I reproduce his basic plan here which will guide the interpretation:

1. Fundamental philosophical *principles* (27d-28b):

(a) the division into the realm of being and the realm of becoming (27d5 – 28a4);

(b) whatever comes into being requires a cause (28a4-6);

(c) the degree of excellence of the product is determined by the nature of the model to which the demiurgic creator looks (28a6-b2).

2. *Application* of the principles to the cosmos (28b-29a):

(a) the cosmos has come into being (28b4-c2);

(b) thus it comes into being by means of a cause (there follows a brief excursus on the nature of this cause) (28c2-5);

(c) the δημιουργός must have looked to the eternal model (28c5-29b1).[188]

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[186] Sallis describes the *Timaeus* as the 'most continuously and directly effective' dialogue of all. Not only is there a vast tradition of commentary beginning with the heirs of Plato but it has continued right into our time to exert a powerful influence, 'the *Timaeus* was to remain decisive even in Schelling's great work on the essence of human freedom'. Sallis, John *Chorology: On Beginnings is Plato's* Timaeus Bloomington, 1999: 2. It should also be mentioned that the Quantum physicist Werner Heisenberg vested the dialogue with great authority, seeing in it a great proximity to his own physics.

[187] The basic guide in this has been Archer-Hind's introduction and drawing on Taylor and Cornford.

[188] David T. Runia *Philo of Alexandria and the* Timaeus *of Plato* Leiden, 1986: 91-2.

The δημιουργός as such is introduced in the *Timaeus* in its basic and ordinary meaning: a craftsman.[189]

> 'Now whenever the maker of anything (δημιουργός) looks to that which is always unchanging and uses a model of that description in fashioning the form and quality of his work, all that he thus accomplishes must be good. If he looks to something that has come to be and uses a generated model, it will not be good.' (*Tim.* 28a; Cornford)

Dillon observes the difficulties in straightforwardly identifying the δημιουργός of 28a with the cosmic creator mentioned shortly after because we have moved from a straightforward description of the craftsman as such, an 'image', to the introduction of a cosmic creator, as a 'fact':

> 'Now if this world is good and its maker is good, clearly he looked to the eternal; on the contrary supposition (which cannot be spoken without blasphemy), to that which has come to be. Everyone, then, must see that he looked to the eternal; for the world is the best of things that have become, and he is the best of causes.' (*Tim.* 29a)

Between the first passage cited and the second comes a 'hint' or reservation about what is to follow in that 'the maker and father of the universe it is a hard task to find, and having found him it would be impossible to declare him to all mankind' (*Tim.* 28c).[190]

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[189] Mansfeld surveys the history of the δημιουργός from the early thinkers up to the time of the Gnostics, Mansfeld, Jaap 'Bad World and Demiurge: A "Gnostic" Motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo' in *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions (Presented to Gilles Quispel on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday)* edd. R. Van den Broek and M.J. Vermaseren Leiden, 1981: 261-314. The basic meaning of δημιουργός as craftsman should be emphasised; Dillon, J. 'The Riddle of the *Timaeus*: Is Plato Sowing Clues?' in ed. Joyal *SPPT*: 25 – 42. Here Dillon warns against treating this description as if it were the introduction of the divine craftsman as Cornford does, c.f. F. M. Cornford *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937):25. This is important for Plato here is introducing basic concepts like *poiesis* and giving a description of one who possesses such skills and what is entailed in their employment.

[190] Vlastos inappropriately takes this as a value judgement describing the 'retrograde turn which Plato gives to cosmological inquiry when he converts so blatantly preconceptions of value into allegations of fact'; surely the point here is that Plato is trying to adduce purpose from the cosmic order, something that cannot be derived from a study of the facts. As Heidegger demonstrates in *PDT*, associating a theory of value with

Dillon takes up the testimony of Xenocrates and Speusippus in this matter in order to put forward the following observations about the nature of the δημιουργός:

1. The ideas are paradigmatic but there is also inherent in them an efficient or creative function, an executive element projecting, through geometric modalities, on to the substratum.
2. For the purposes of exposition this principle needs to be dramatised as a divinity 'who' creates the world out of 'his' prior contemplation of the eternal paradigm.

It is necessary to read the *Timaeus* in this way in order to avoid the kind of difficulties that follows if one read this image at face value; a god creating the universe piece by piece and consecutively, a reading that originates with Aristotle.[191] Through passages such as the one beginning at 39 e8 where Plato momentarily uses the term νοῦς when speaking about the δημιουργός and variously he is described as 'thinking' or 'devising'.[192] This leads Dillon to propose that 'not only must the δημιουργός be possessed of intellect, he must actually *be* an intellect'. Why must this be so? In order to avoid the problems that would arise otherwise for at 30b it is said that 'it is impossible for intellect to be present to anything without soul' and at 34b he is said to be, in the mythic register, the 'creator' of soul and so must be prior to soul. From this it must follow that

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the *agathon* is a much later development – during the modern period. By good here is meant as close as possible to the παράδειγμα: something is most itself when it tends towards its principle (ἀρχή). The good of a hammer is in its function, i.e. driving nails, its good is relative to its efficiency in fulfilling its function. We say about unhealthy food, 'there's no goodness in it'; the good of food is nourishment. Vlastos here and throughout his account of the δημιουργός insists on reading it literally. Gregory Vlastos *Plato's Universe* Oxford, 1975: 29-30.

[191] Mansfeld's note on this; 'Aristotle takes the *Timaeus* story of the demiurge as a cosmogony *Cael.* AI 10-12 which was accepted by Theophrastus., *Phys. Op.* Fr. 10 and Fr.11 Diels. Xenocrates, Fr. 54 Heinze, and Speusippus, Fr. 54b Lang, argue that Plato did not say what he meant, since what he really meant was that the universe can no more have a beginning than an end. From this it would follow that Plato did not tell his pupils how to interpret the *Timaeus*, i.e. literally (Aristotle) or allegorically (Speusippus-Xenocrates' in Mansfeld, *Studies.*

[192] Dillon, *RTim*: 31. The passages where thinking is attributed to the δημιουργός; 30a5 and b1; 34a8, and 37c5.

the δημιουργός is pure intellect engaged in contemplation-projection in geometric modalities.[193]

All this tends to flesh out Heidegger's thesis that Plato's philosophy is productionist and so carries within it the seed of technological thinking which is characteristic of our own times. Plato looks to the example of human production and derives therefrom the essence of production itself. As it was shown above the introduction of the δημιουργός in the *Timaeus* (28a) is the introduction of the craftsman as such without any divine connotations or distinguishing features that would set him apart from the human adepts of ποίησις. This much can be shown to be fairly unproblematic. I have also shown how the occlusion of difference occurs probably belongs with Aristotle in the way that he takes up the question of being, as Plato has initially determined it, but then dispenses with the altogether with the transcendent element (the rejection of the idea).

What does this all mean? If generated things are strictly unknowable because matter is unknowable, then real knowledge of the physical universe is not possible. But if real knowledge of the ideas is possible and if the ideas are the real being of a being, then a knowledge of the principle of generation would be possible. Now if the principle of generation is itself not subject to change – and this must be the case if it is a genuine principle or idea – then the cosmic order is itself eternal. The empirical universe may have come into existence and may pass away (whether it does or not) but this would be in accordance with the principle which is eternal, not subject to change. If an essential knowledge of production is possible, and if the physical universe is generated because it shares some of the characteristics of fabrication, then what other kind of production could there be? There can, then, be either production from something, some material or other, or from nothing. This brings us to the very great problem of matter in the Platonic-

[193] Guthrie objects to the demythologisation in this reading; the δημιουργός is not in sole and absolute control, but must bend to his will a material that is to some extent recalcitrant. Otherwise, being wholly good himself, he would have made a perfect world (29d-30a).' Guthrie rather strangely says this is 'philosophy not myth' and so 'those who demythologise him away . . . are at least left with a universe whose fundamentally rational structure is infected with an irreducible element of imperfection and waywardness inherent in its bodily structure' (Guthrie, *HGP*, Vol. V: 253. This does not make sense; if it were perfect it would not exist, for in order to exist it needs generation and corruption, therefore time, and so it is always incomplete because always becoming itself in accordance with the paradigm.

Aristotelian tradition which cannot be taken up in any great detail here, the focus at the moment must remain on the productive or demiurgic element. The use of the demiurge or craftsman image must give us a clue as to Plato's thinking on this matter. Plato implicitly suggests that there is one principle of production that governs human and cosmic production. In this way Plato assimilates human technical production to cosmic production albeit in the form of a story. There is further evidence to strengthen this view when Socrates describes the philosopher-ruler as a kind of demiurge in the *Republic*. It is to that which I now turn with the suggestion that perhaps the recapitulation of the *Republic* story at the beginning of the *Timaeus* should put us in mind of the production of polities as one kind of demiurgic activity.

5.3: The Philosopher-Demiurge in Book V of the *Republic*

Even the philosopher and the philosopher in his true political role as ruler is a kind of δημιουργός. In the *Republic* we have the clearest expression of this in the inquiry into the philosopher ruler beginning in Book V. There is an anticipation of this when Socrates meets the question of implementation, the Third Wave which comes as a 'sudden attack' from Glaucon. He points out that the task they had set themselves was to discover what justice is and therefore what the just man would be like and not how this πόλις could be brought about for it is clear now that the description of the state given so far has been a kind of paedogogic or investigatory device into the nature of justice. It is the παράδειγμα of δίκη that is the object of their ζήτημα, to as it were gain sight of the πόλις, and not to address themselves to the matter of practical implementation which is of no concern at all in such an inquiry: all that is required is that the παράδειγμα is seen and described (*Rep.* V 472c-d) and he compares this to the painter who paints the 'finest man' and asks; do we reproach the painter for not being able to show that such a man actually exists? Of course not, he answers, and the same argument must hold for the portrait of the best πόλις that has hitherto been described. Socrates then puts forward this question in respect of the relationship between 'theory' and 'practice':

'Is practice ever in accordance with the λόγος of the matter? Is this the situation: that according to nature, as opposed to how it seems, practice is less able to bring about the unconcealment of that which it is concerned with than its λόγος? Glaucon's agreement to this is expressed within the terms of the 'proposition' that Socrates has set forth: ὁμολεγεῖν, that is, he is at one with this λόγος. The primacy of unconcealment is asserted here, and moreover, an unconcealment that occurs in speech. Unconcealment primarily takes place not in action but in speech, and that action must be governed entirely by the unconcealment that takes place in speech. Plato is here expressing the conviction that speech, as διαλεγέσθαι is the exclusive way in which beings disclose themselves as beings, in this case the *real* πόλις, that is the true or unconcealed πόλις. It is only against this emphasis of the παράδειγμα that Socrates following remarks can be understood. Socrates makes the astonishing announcement that a πόλις such as has been described will never come into existence until philosophers become rulers or the present rulers become genuine philosophers but astonishing as this may sound it entirely follows on from what has been said about the relationship between theory and practice (*Rep.* V, 473c-e). Only one who has seen the παράδειγμα can bring it forth in practice no matter what it happens to be; the cobbler with shoes, the painter with the portrait, or the philosopher with the best πόλις. The priority is given to what is seen, what is most unchanging is the most present while the things that are subject to change are less so and tend to only allow for opinion to be formed about them. In the wake of this announcement concerning the political duties of the philosophers attention now turns to the philosopher himself. The love of specialised knowledge or knowledge of that which pleases one is ruled out for the philosopher is in love with the whole range of possible knowledge (*Rep.* V, 474d – 475c). Glaucon interjects with a distinction: those who are curious about all sorts of things.[194] Further on in Book VI, having discussed a variety of topics such as the impediments to philosophic natures coming to philosophy (*Rep.* VI., 490a ff), the reasons that true philosophers withhold themselves from political praxis (*Rep.* VI., 496b-e), and the bad public perception of philosophers (*Rep.* VI., 487ff),

[194] This refers to the discussion in the previous section about those who run around from festival to festival, the dilettantes and 'culture-vultures'.

Socrates gets Glaucon to agree that the πόλις they have described hitherto is of the kind that a philosopher *could* take part in, and, moreover, shine publicly in his true aspect. It is in these passages beginning at 497a, which are preparatory to the introduction of the great tripartite images of Sun, Line and Cave, that Socrates now compares the philosopher to the artist, or, rather, reveals the artistic-demiurgic nature of the philosopher. Three moves are involved here: purification (κάθαρσις), having seen the παράδειγμα, and, re-structuring the πόλις in accordance with the παράδειγμα; all three aspects are introduced at 500b f. The philosopher is a kind of ποιητής creating the blessed and happy (εὐδαίμων) πόλις according to a divine παράδειγμα, a project that cannot go ahead until there has been an initial κάθαρσις. This κάθαρσις involves, for example, the expulsion of people over the age of ten but in line with the drift and intention of the schema that Socrates adumbrates we should not get fixed on the imagistic presentation of what is meant here. The historical πόλις is determined by psychic imbalance, specifically, a disordered ἔρως which is set out in Book II of the *Republic* where the cause of the second city is acquisitiveness.

Socrates locates the origin of community in a kind of lack; the individual as such is not capable of securing for himself the possibility of his own existence (*Rep.* II, 369b). It concerns the very being of *Dasein* and as such opposes the doctrine that individuality is the 'natural state' of *Dasein* and that community represents a kind of compromise for the sake of survival. This view – that of mutually competitive individuals, the 'war of all against all' - becomes the dominant anthropology for many of the early modern bourgeois philosophers, notably Hobbes and Locke.[195] This is a crucial difference because here we find a different originating impulse to community being put forward: it is in accordance with man's nature to be part of a 'world'. This is basic to the analysis of *Dasein* that Heidegger pursues in *Being and Time* where Being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*) is an existential of *Dasein* characterised as 'Being-with' (*mit-Sein*) Others (*Andere*):

[195] By bourgeois here I mean philosophers whose orientation is that of the early modern commercial class; Locke wrote extensively on money and commerce, as did Hobbes who was also a director of the Virginia Company. For these reasons their anthropology was opposed to the Platonic view which is communitarian rather than individualistic.

> 'Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one's own *Dasein*; *Dasein*-with characterises the *Dasein* of Others to the extent that it is freed by its world for a Being-with. Only so far as one's own *Dasein* has the essential structure of Being-with, is it Dasein-with as encounterable for Other.' (*BT* 157 = *SZ* 121)

This basically describes the structure of worldhood in its broadest sense and it must be pointed out that there is a prior *Umwelt*, consisting of things present *at* and *to* hand (*Vorhandenheit* and *Zuhandenheit*),that is, the environmental world of all those beings that are not *Dasein*.[196] Heidegger then connects this with the core existential, *Sorge* or Care:

> 'If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then, like our circumspective dealings with the ready-to-hand within-the-world . . . it must be Interpreted in terms of the phenomenon of *care*; for as "care" the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined.' (*loc. cit.*)

It would be tempting to correlate Care with the ἐπιμέλεια of the *Apology* but Heidegger himself does not do this in *Being and Time*; for him the correlation is in the consistent manner in which he translates ὄρεξις as *Sorge* most notably in his translating of the opening line of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* when *Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει* is rendered as *Im Sein des Menschen liegt wesenhaft die Sorge des Sehens* . What is conventionally translated as 'All men of their nature desire to know' becomes 'The Care for seeing is essential to man's being' (*BT* 215 = *SZ* 171).[197] Care, being the fundamental existentiale, constitutes what is essential to *Dasein* and is characterised here as a 'seeing'. The conventional translation suggests this 'desire' as a faculty or disposition of man's nature while the Heidegger translations makes it constitutive of the

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[196] A more detailed discussion of these aspects of the *Dasein* analytic are covered earlier in the Introduction and in 'Plato's Existential Analysis'. It will suffice here to once again emphasise the distinction between the existentiales and the categories: the existentiales are to *Dasein* as the categories are to the things that *Dasein* encounters in the world as *vor- und zuhanden*. Heidegger substitutes these concepts for the Cartesian philosophy of the subject.

[197] Of course Aristotelian ὄρεξις can be compared with Platonic ἔρως.

very essence of man, so man could be said to be: that being, the essence of which is to 'see'. Heidegger is closer here for his translation accords closest to Aristotle's doctrine that the highest possibility for man is the βίος θεωρητικός. This means that the life of pure seeing is not the highest in the sense of the best possible lifestyle available but rather it is the highest because it is the manner in which man comes to himself as man.[198]

It is this very 'Care for seeing' that gives rise to the *Republic* project, the inquiry into δικαιοσύνη, which is the highest praxis. Socrates puts this forward after the company have agreed that the best way to secure their inquiry into δικαιοσύνη, i.e. the just man in this case, is to 'project' their inquiry from the individual to the gathering of the individuals, the community, thereby driving on to 'behold' justice as it shows itself to be what it is (ἰδέα), and this 'beholding the being of something', as a possibility, underpins and drives on the whole inquiry into δικαιοσύνη (368e - 369a). The disclosure of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, then, is the actual beholding of the possibility of any beholding whatsoever of the real being of anything, like, for example, δικαιοσύνη. Right here there are three moments being inscribed; a 'looking', a 'look', and a 'driving' that enables the 'looking' at the 'look', and the ostensible inquiry into the origin of the community anticipates the dialectic of being, beings, and showing (ἀλήθεια) which governs the cave image. It is well to note that the projection of the inquiry into δικαιοσύνη up to the level of community is taken up by Aristotle in his ranking of δικαιοσύνη as the highest excellence in the *Ethics* because its exercise is dependent on *another*, that is, a universal excellence for it embraces both individual (private) and communal (political) excellence.[199]

This 'projecting' is in essence demiurgic for the 'construction' of the πόλις that Socrates and his companions are engaged in depends on this 'looking', and, the unfolding

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[198] As against instrumentalist conceptions of the "good life" e.g. John Stuart Mill's *Utilitarianism* (1863) which posits pleasure/pain as the highest possibility for man and where the βίος θεωρητικός must inevitably be trivialised into being merely the highest form of pleasure. This view and variations of it guide the 'Eudamonistic' interpretations of Socratic-Platonic 'ethics' which conceives of εὐδαιμονία in terms of pleasure/pain.

[199] Aristotle's discussion of δικαιοσύνη in the *Ethics* is treated in the section headed 'Plato's Existential Analysis'.

of this πόλις throughout the dialogue is always carried out on the basis of this looking. Socrates suggests that by watching (θεάομαι) this πόλις 'coming into being' (γίγνομαι) [in λόγος] we will be able to watch δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία 'coming into being' [in it] (369). This passage is the key to why this first self-sufficient community is unable to satisfy the requirements of the inquiry: δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία cannot be observed in its structure. Socrates expresses some difficulty in discerning any elements of δικαιοσύνη or ἀδικία in their picture of the self-sufficient community and Adeimantus echoes this. The picture is completed only to be rejected forcefully by Glaucon who dismisses the whole construction as a community 'fit only for pigs', appalled by the austerity of Socrates' portrait. Glaucon's rejection is not based on the inadequacy of this community for disclosing something about the essence of δικαιοσύνη but on sensual grounds. It is this introduction of the sensual that opens to view the 'sight' of δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία. The demand for comforts heralds the arrival of a great variety of sensual delights and the personnel associated with each, in short, the full external trappings of civilisation. This desire that Glaucon gives voice to, gives rise to needs associated with the satisfaction of these desires; the introduction of these raise the population of the πόλις dramatically generating a requirement for spatial expansion if this lifestyle is to be maintained. This new space can only be gained at the expense of another πόλις, which if it is governed by the same desires will be following the same program and this will inevitably lead to war (373d). This kind of πόλις comes about on the basis of acquisitiveness and with this, the principal cause of ἀδικία comes to light: acquisitiveness is a disordered ἔρως. This is not mentioned explicitly here but the whole dialogue centers on this πόλις - ψυχὴ analogy where the entry of unrestrained acquisitiveness into the πόλις compares to the imbalance of the ψυχὴ as exemplified in Book VIII. There the analogy is explicitly stated and worked through directly in the identification of ψυχὴ types and their corresponding πόλις-type.

In Book II Socrates expresses support for the first kind of πόλις which is healthy while the second is inflamed, and, in his affirmation of the first as being the truest, that is, the most unconcealed in respect of δικαιοσύνη, indicates that the nature of δικαιοσύνη has actually been disclosed but his interlocutors are unable to see it, especially Glaucon

(372e).[200] It is their inability to see this which draws forth the creation of the πόλις in the books that follow beginning with a description of a πόλις that corresponds with the historical Athens. This πόλις building works on at least two levels; firstly the building in speech which is a description of the building of the πόλις in a possible *praxis*, which will be less *than* but aiming *for* the πόλις in speech, and secondly, the relation of the πόλις unveiled in speech by Socrates to its source disclosed in Book VI as the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, i.e. the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ as source of the παράδειγμα. It would be off track if we were to think of the *Republic* as just a contribution to political theory for here we are presented with the totality of community, indeed nothing less than a 'world', for outside the πόλις there is no distinctly human existence only the immediate forces of nature, a kind of chaos; this is why the term political is too narrow for in this we understand it as pertaining to political society, i.e. the people *qua* citizens. The building of the πόλις is the demiurgic act *par exellence* for the artist-philosopher-ruler imposes form and order on to an ever threatening primal chaos, an order that he refracts from the pre-seen παράδειγμα. The πόλις is not just set up as if creation followed a sequence of historical events, that is, as if the creative act was a singular event within a temporal frame. The building in speech that dominates the dialogue unfolds element by element because its structure is narrated, that is, it 'comes upon' the ψυχὴ of the non-artist-philosopher-ruler but when we read the image of the cave (517b ff) carefully we see that the vision of the good unites each and every element supratemporally in itself as it simultaneously dispenses them.[201] This double 'move', as it were, beyond (ἐπέκεινα) the temporal modality of time that it enables, discloses the very essence of the Platonic dialectic itself, it is the determining self–determined, that is, freedom and the world it creates.

In the previous section I introduced the issue of temporality in the Cave image and once again this theme comes back to us through the matter of the παράδειγμα which I take to be none other than an aspect of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. The temporal nature of the παράδειγμα is that of eternity; it is before or prior to the visible cosmos, and it is not subject to change. It is now appropriate to introduce the matter of recollection as it

[200] Glaucon is clearly the individual who corresponds to such a πόλις.

pertains to the discussions so far. This will bring in some issues from Kant, especially his conception of intuition (*Anschauung*) and some comments Heidegger makes on this. This will enable me to unite the demiurgic reading of the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* with the question of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ and how the identity suggested by Heidegger is significant for his thesis concerning the productionism of Plato's metaphysics. These insights and everything that has been examined so far concerning the preservation of difference in Plato, will contribute towards showing, by way of a conclusion, that while Plato's 'metaphysics' are productionist, the preservation of difference prevents his thinking from becoming 'technical' as such. Thinking only becomes 'technical' or technological when difference is forgotten: it is one of the consequence of the forgetting of Being.

5.4: *Ἀνάμνησις* and the *a priori* with reference to Kant

During the first decades of the twentieth century, the Neokantian interpretation of Plato was the dominant orthodoxy in Germany and indeed it was the dominant philosophical and methodological orientation in Germany and provided the philosophical basis for much of the research in the humanistic disciplines (*Geisteswissenchaften*) of the time.[202] The Neokantian project, in its broadest outline, was to discover a common basis for all scientific methodologies – both natural and humanistic - and resolve the epistemological problems attendant on such a project. The fundamental precept of the Neokantian interpretation of Plato, following Kant himself, was that the ideas are transcendentals and that even the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, the ἐπέκεινα not withstanding, was transcendental and not transcendent.[203] For Paul Natorp such a solution undercuts the Aristotelian critique at a stroke so that no longer can one speak of an ideational replication of the world, because,

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[201] Much the same applies to the way we read the *Timaeus*: if we take it literally terrible confusions will follow as Dillon shows above.

[202] One of the best accounts of this is in Herbert Schnädelbach *Philosophy in Germany: 1831-1933* tr. Eric Mathews, Cambridge, 1984.

[203] Paul Natorp, the leading exponent of the Neokantian interpretation of Plato, takes this up in his great work, *Platons Ideenlehre* where he says that the ITA nevertheless remains in the realm of the thinkable: '*Auch für uns gibt es hier Einiges zu verwundern . . . Aber hier sollen wir uns gar etwas denken, das über*

for Natorp, the epistemological question takes priority over the ontological and the ideas are not the beings themselves, rather they are explanatory principles. But such a solution clearly involves a brushing aside of the whole question of the ἐπέκεινα and, indeed, in a later (1922) edition of his book Natorp modifies his position towards the transcendent element in Plato's philosophy and is especially interested there in the derivation of plurality from the One as well as issues of Platonic psycho-erotics. Natorp was highly influential on Heidegger and for a time they were colleagues at Marburg. In his interpretations of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger is overcoming the dominant Neokantian Plato of his time through a rehabilitation of Aristotle and a critique of the transcendental Plato which he may also be accused, to some extent, of perpetuating through a lack of clarity in the essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* on the status of the ἐπέκεινα. One of the criticisms leveled by Dostal against Heidegger is that he has not sufficiently freed up the Platonic texts from the Neokantian interpretation and hence his own neglect of the ἐπέκεινα in the essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*. This criticism is certainly well placed because Heidegger's reading of the Cave is most puzzling on this point. Why does he unproblematically assimilate the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ to the ideas in general as merely the idea of ideas or the supreme idea? There is in the cave passage itself - and even more clearly in the earlier similie of the Sun - an ambiguity surrounding the real nature of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

It is suggested here that the parallels in Plato and Kant should be located in the matter of the *a priori* and the 'doctrine' of ἀνάμνησις. This is not to try and identify them because this would be most incorrect but rather to suggest that both are solutions to the same problem – the question of recognition. What follows here is an examination of the *a priori* as it is developed by Kant and the 'doctrine of ἀνάμνησις' presented in the *Phaedo*. Here, both Platonic ἀνάμνησις and Kant's *a priori* are both treating of the same matter but with the important caveat that for Kant the *a priori* is bound up with transcendental subjectivity. However it will not be possible to present here more than a provisional indication of this theme.

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beides, das Denken und das Gedachte Sein hinaus liegt. Aber doch wiederum liegt es im Bereiche, in der Gattung des Denkbaren.' Platons Ideenlehre p. 191.

In *Basic Problems* Heidegger interprets the movement out of the cave in anamnetic/ a prioristic terms:

> 'The liberation of the fettered cave dwellers from the cave and their turning around to the light is nothing but a drawing oneself back from this oblivion to the recollection of the *prius*, in which there lies enclosed the enabling of understanding being itself.' (*BPP*, 326-7 = *GA*-24: 465)

What is this 'drawing back'? What is being drawn back from - and does this drawing back intimate the meaning of ἀνάμνησις which is mentioned in various places within the *corpus platonicum*? Do we draw back into the realm of what is common to all, to what is essential to *Dasein*? Are we entitled to associate Heidegger's conception here with the Platonic notion of ἀνάμνησις? I suggest that we can and that understood in this way this 'drawing back', taken in terms of Platonic ἀνάμνησις, involves an 'entry' into the domain of the *aei on*, the 'area' bathed in the pure light of the sun, or, the 'place' of purest intelligibility, the place that is granted by the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ .[204] The 'drawing back' signifies the disengagement from the fluctuating phenomena of the cave which altogether signifies the conversion of the soul - περιαγωγὴ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς (Heidegger's paraphrase; *Rep.* VII, 518c, c.f. 518d; 521c) - the bringing around of the whole soul from that which is less real to that which is more real - the key terms in describing this progress are variations of the word ἀλήθεια in its comparative and superlative forms. The reality of the flickering images on the cave walls is at no point denied, rather a spectrum of reality by degrees has been introduced which ultimately will also explain the reality and necessity of the flickering images. There is no disjunction in the passage from the cave images to the sun-illuminated domain of pure intelligibility outside. The two domains are linked by a passage which can be traversed in both directions. The chamber of the cave and the place of illumination outside and the connecting passage are *different* places or different positionings within 'place' as such. The philosopher to-be comes from the cave and as a philosopher he returns to the cave, albeit reluctantly, to assist his fellows.

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[204] I consider this comparison (ἀνάμνησις and the *a priori*) in more detail below.

To make progress here with the whole matter of the δημιουργός this issue will be exposited in its elements. The subject or *cogito* of Cartesian provenance is the forerunner of the transcendental subject insofar as Descartes effects the fundamental shift in the place of the *subjectum* of scholastic philosophy. For that reason I want to stress the difference between Platonic recollection and Kant's *a priori* whilst also pursuing their congruencies. It should also be kept in mind that on Heidegger's reading of the tradition, Descartes retains strong links with the ancient problematic, a much stronger link than has sometimes been recognised, that is, Descartes takes up the question of being ousiologically and thus cannot be viewed as a *fundamental* break which is the way he is sometimes understood. Taminiaux puts it like this: 'Fundamental ontology charges Descartes in the end with having remained prisoner of the Greeks, that is, of the unquestioned privilege given to νοεῖν and to an unquestioned concept of Being, *Vorhandenheit* (presence-at-hand)' and this becomes clear if we interpret νοεῖν here in terms of *cogito* and presence at hand in terms of the *subjectum* which is none other than the ὑποκείμενον '.[205] In practice this means that there can be no assimilation of ψυχὴ to the *cogito* as subject although it must be recognised here that ψυχὴ does belong to the history of the subject.

5.5: Some Aspects of Temporality and the *a priori* in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and *Being and Time*

The section on temporality and the *a priori*, which concludes *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, discloses something essential about the phenomenological method of ontology itself and is conducted in the context of a discussion about Kant and some lengthy passages from the *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo* and then a comment on the ascent from the Cave.[206] By reviewing this section with particular emphasis on the Platonic ἀνάμνησις we

[205] Taminiaux, J *HPFO*: 171.

[206] In *Being and Time* the existential analysis is based on the *a priori* nature of the being-in-the-world, and worldhood as such has an *a priori* character; 'Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural

can set up a more detailed study of recollection, temporality, and the understanding of being. At that point I will be in a better position to interpret Heidegger's remarks about the δημιουργός, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, and the productionist character of the ancient ontology.

This last section in *Basic Problems* (*BPP*) begins 'because they are assertions about being in the light of time properly understood, all ontological propositions are Temporal propositions' and he further clarifies this; '[it is] only because ontological propositions are Temporal propositions that they can and must be *a priori propositions*' (*BPP*: 324; translator's capitals for temporal). And it is only because ontology is a temporal science that the *a priori* appears in it; *a priori* meaning 'from the earlier', and 'earlier' is obviously a time-determination. Heidegger cites Kant "Now to recognise something a priori means to cognize it from its mere possibility", the *a priori* grants things their possibility to be as such, their 'what' and their 'how'.[207] But if this *a priori* is understood as what there is already, that means beings, the recognition of being as such comes later if at all but in no sense is this 'earlier' to be taken as something 'extra-temporal' or 'supra-temporal', but such an 'earlier' even if its constitution were discovered to be eternal would still be a temporal modality. So here, eternity is a temporal determination. Heidegger points up a tendency which evidences a neglect of the more fundamental ontological questions which he is trying to set forth; there are extensive controversies over the question of whether the *a priori* can be known but it has never 'occurred to the protagonists to ask first what could really have been meant by the fact that a time-determination turns up here and why it must turn up at all' while there are those who dogmatically deny that the *a priori* has anything to do with time. Heidegger is pursuing what is on the face of it a Kantian theme and indeed throughout the text this Kantian theme is operative as he tries to free up and raise a more originary sense of time, temporality, and the *a priori*. This is crucial to the overall project, which is *Being and Time*, that is, to raise anew the question of the *meaning* of being which entails,

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wholes any special "worlds" may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the *a priori* character of worldhood in general' (*BT*: 79 = *SZ*: 53; *BT*: 93 = *SZ*: 65).

[207] *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturswissenschaften*, Kant, *Werke* (Cassirer), Vol. IV: 372 cited in *BPP*: 324

necessarily, the question of time. Heidegger becomes quite explicit at this point: '*Time is earlier than any possible earlier* of whatever sort, because it is the basic condition for an earlier as such' (*BPP*: 325). Time as the ultimate *prius*, for Dasein, the factically forgotten *prius*. But in order for anything to become an object of inquiry it must be objectified first, made ready for cognition, by referring it back to what was originally understood in the fore-having. Heidegger attributes the discovery of the *a priori* to Plato who characterised it as ἀνάμνησις or recollection. He cites the passage from the *Phaedrus* on this:

> 'For a soul which has never seen the truth, which does not understand the truth in general as such, can never take on the human form; for man, in conformity with his mode of being, must understand by addressing that which *is* in regard to its essence, its being, in such a way that starting from the multiplicity of perceived [beings] he draws it back to a single concept. This conceptual cognition of beings in their being is a recollection of what our soul saw previously, that is, precursorily – what it saw when following God and thus taking no notice of what we now, in everyday existence , call that which is, and in this disregard raising up its head above beings toward the true being, toward being itself. Therefore, it is just that the thinking of the philosopher alone is truly fitted with wings, for this thinking, as far as possible, always stays with the things in which God, abiding, is for that very reason divine.' (*Phaedr*. 249b-c; tr. Hofstader's translation of Heidegger's translation).

The full context, which Heidegger does not introduce into the discussion, is the description of the fourth kind of higher *mania*, the philosophic *mania*, which sets the philosopher apart and makes him appear to τὸ πλῆθος as out of his mind; '. . . he is rebuked by the multitude as being out of his wits, for they know not that he is possessed by a deity' (*Phaedr*. 249d: tr. Hackforth).[208] Put another way, it is the drawing closer

[208] Earlier in the section of this work entitled 'Plato's Existential Analysis' the theme of philosophy as offensive to common sense was introduced and discussed in relation to the attitude of the prisoners towards the returning philosopher and Callicles outburst in the *Gorgias* concerning the inverted nature of the world consequent if Socrates is right – c.f. Hegel's *verkehrte Welt*.

towards beings as beings which appears to the many as sheer craziness and neglect, instead of losing himself in the unreality of *das Man* and its concerns and priorities, the philosopher turns away towards the real showing complete disregard for the business of the 'world'. This is operative in the Cave image where the liberation of the prisoner and his turning around to the light 'is nothing but a drawing back from this oblivion (the endless play of multiplicities) to the recollection of the *prius*, in which there lies enclosed the enabling of understanding being itself' (*BPP*: 327). Before coming on to the question of the δημιουργός itself it would be useful to dwell a while with some aspects of ἀνάμνησις in the context of Heidegger's identification of the *a priori* and recollection.

Socrates introduces three interconnected matters into the discussion of the *Phaedo*: immortality of the soul, ἀνάμνησις, and the idea. Nothing like a comprehensive interpretation of this most difficult dialogue can be attempted here so what follows is of a highly selective nature and suffers from being assertive rather than demonstrative.[209] The failure to persuade Simmias and Cebes on the basis of ἀνάμνησις is a significant matter that needs to be explained and not just in terms of its dramatic function (the failure) which necessitates the introduction of the idea.

Socrates introduces recollection by asking his interlocutors to consider what happens when something reminds us of something else. He draws attention to the symbolic power that certain artifacts possess:

> '. . . you know what happens to lovers when they see a musical instrument or a piece of clothing or any other private property of the person they love. When they recognise the thing, their minds conjure up a picture of its owner. That is ἀνάμνησις.' (*Phaed.* 73d)[210]

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[209] There is quite a detailed Heideggerian reading of the *Phaedo* in chapter 4 *'Phaedo: Faith, Authenticity and Death' in Wolz* Wolz's reading focuses on an existential reading which does not connect this to the ontological founding that takes place and so his treatment is incomplete – a full Heideggerian reading of this crucial dialogue is yet to be carried out. Durigon's thesis treats the *Phaedo* as a basic text in his study of Platonic parallels in the later Heidegger of the *Beitraege zur Philosophie*.

[210] There is a discernible anticipation here of the θεωρία that Socrates introduces at 99d ff. This ocular emphasis is there in the opening of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: *Pantes anthropoi oregontai phusei* which Heidegger renders as *Im Sein des Menschens liegt wesenhaft die Sorge des Sehens* – 'The care for seeing is

The way it is presented here initially, the trigger artifact acts like a *σύμβολον* in the sense that the *σύμβολον* is a kind of presence and absence.[211] The *σύμβολον* acts in a business arrangement as a kind of proxy presence. It authenticates and validates the *representative* (the bearer of the *σύμβολον*). Through the presentation of the *σύμβολον* the sender is able to say to the receiver; 'treat the bearer *as if* it were I in person'. The bearer *qua* individual is not present in the same way that the sender is present even though he is physically present to the receiver. So the bearer is re-presentative of the sender; the bearer is a representation. The artifacts that Socrates mentions here are comparable to the *σύμβολον* and act in the same way; they affect the perceiver. The example he offers and the direction that the discussion takes is determined by experience – a having-seen - and this guides the conversation. The unconvincing nature of the proofs offered by Socrates up to the introduction of the hypothesis can never be cleared away while the discussion centers on experience and endowing material things with real being. The discussion as it follows discovers the necessary *ἀπορία* that arise from an attempted materialist account of *ψυχὴ*, because Socrates must first purify the *ψυχὴ* of body which means he must overcome the dualistic accounts of the Pythagorean Simmias and Cebes. The account of *ψυχὴ* cannot be dependant on any kind of material principle like attunement or longevity. The problem with the symbolic presentation of *ἀνάμνησις* at this point and only at this point is that it implicitly suggests an original *ἐμπειρία* of some kind. The *σύμβολον* is only effective because the parties to its use recognise each other through its presentation, even if neither of them are physically present. They must have seen each other, they must have come to a formal agreement about symbolic identification in order for such an object, sign or password to *become* a *σύμβολον*. Even an allegorical symbol can only be such on the basis of experience, in this case it must be a cultural referent: we can only understand the final request of Socrates that a cock be sacrificed to Asclepius because we

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essential for man's being' (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson). 'All the senses are loved for themselves but none more than sight' (*Met.* A 980 a21; a23): but of all the senses smell is the most evocative, the sense appropriate to memory but it is the sense of sight which is closest in correlation to recollection, anticipating the introduction of *θεωρία*.

[211] Coulter traces the origin and uses of the word *σύμβολον* derived from the verb *συμβαλεῖν*, to throw together, to join. The *σύμβολον* originates in the use of a split die or disc to prove identity. Coulter is especially interested in its later literary and rhetorical importance, for example, in *allegoria*: in Coulter, James A. *The Literary Microsm: Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonism* Leiden, 1976: 61

have already become familiar with the Greek practice of giving thanks to the god when a cure has been effected. All of this falls within the sphere of experience; the *a priori* as such has not as yet been reached. The σύμβολον (artifacts associated with the loved one) can only be taken analogically for Socrates' ultimate goal here is to bring his interlocutors towards the *a priori*. To thoroughly purge ἀνάμνησις of its entramellment with memory Socrates introduces the hypothesis beginning at 97a with his "intellectual biography". It is precisely on the rock of unreconciled oppositions that the discussion has so far foundered and calls for recourse to νοῦς. The σύμβολον works on the basis of presence in absence, the representation of something by something that is unlike, and the attempt to give an explanation of recognition on the basis of representation must fail for it will always refer to an object of experience which is precisely the criticism Socrates brings against previous accounts, even that of Anaxagoras who claims to explain things according to νοῦς; they end up trying to explain entities by referring to other entities (*Phaed.* 98c-e). Hitherto the account being implicitly and explicitly criticised can only attain to the 'how' of things as if this also at the same time explained the 'what'; thus Socrates' outburst – 'Fancy being unable to distinguish between the reason for a thing, and the condition without which the reason couldn't be operative!' (*Phaed.* 99b; trr. Tredennick and Tarrant). When he announces the hypothesis of 100a ff, Socrates has entered into the *a priori* proper and is able to separate ἀνάμνησις from memory for memory as such involves experience. Socrates separates the element of experience from memory to reach ἀνάμνησις proper.

The pervasive mood of anxiety that dominates the dialogue will determine the course of the whole discussion as Socrates struggles to dispel the fears of his interlocutors and in so doing open them up to the possibility of authentic existence. He must purge the dualism from the λόγος of the ψυχή by disentangling the *a priori* from experience. In short Socrates must overcome the dualism that follows from treating ψυχή as an entity or, to put it in Heidegger's terms, treating ψυχή (Dasein) categorially as if it were a being at hand (*Vorhanden*). Simmias and Cebes are, broadly speaking, materialists and their fears of death come from projecting and treating of ψυχή as an entity like any other: Socrates' proofs up to the introduction of the idea is put in terms that they will recognise whilst

purging the experiential from the *a priori* in order to prepare them for this extraordinary revelation: for at the end of that and to show how really distant this dualism is from the noetic foundation that is now being laid, and, having just introduced *θεωρία* into the account, Socrates perceives their extreme incomprehension at this announcement; '. . . at present I don't think that you understand.' To which they respond 'No, indeed I don't', said Cebes, 'not a bit.' This will lead Socrates to re-present the matter, but this time on the basis of the hypothesis and by the use of myth.

5.6: *Θαυμάζειν*, *Θεωρία*, and 'Having seen': Further Aspects of *Ἀνάμνησις*

In a very recently published study William McNeill has conducted a detailed appraisal of Heidegger's account of *θεωρία* with particular reference to Aristotle.[212] Coming at it from a slightly different angle from the approach adopted here, McNeill formulates the question of the *a priori* in terms of *θεωρία* and the *θαυμάζειν* out of which it originates. The opening line of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle receives an extended commentary by McNeill which focuses on Heidegger's distinction between wonder and curiosity in, for example, the passage cited at the beginning of this section but most emphatically stated in *Being and Time*: 'Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marvelling at them – *θαυμάζειν*' (*BT*: 216 = *SZ*: 172). McNeill discusses the distinction between curiosity and wonder on the planes of sensible and noetic seeing. Curiosity wants to have seen, literally, with the 'eyes' (eyes here embracing all the senses) while the noetic philosophical seeing or wanting to have seen is the noetic apperception of the being of beings. McNeill poses the question as to whether this second, philosophical desire to have seen is a reflection or repetition of ordinary curiosity for both, in his reading, share in common the 'desire to have seen'.[213] He draws attention to this 'unsettling similarity' in a passage in Book V of the *Republic* demarcating the legitimate spirit of philosophical inquiry from the dilettantism of the 'cutlure-vultures'.

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[212] McNeill, William *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Arsitotle, and the Ends of Theory* NY, 1999. This substantial contribution to the study of Heidegger and the Greeks came into access too late for me to benefit from it fully in this dissertation. Any uses made of it here are based on a less than thorough appreciation of this work.

Glaucon: 'They run around the city and country Dionisia, never missing a festival, as if they were under contract to listen to every performance' - surely these cannot be considered to be philosophers. Socrates agrees but points out a similarity which becomes clear when the comparison moves to the distinction between sense perception and intellectual perception. The art-lovers are enchanted by beautiful things while the philosopher only has 'eyes' for beauty itself and he has the advantage over the art-lover in that he sees not only the beautiful things but beauty itself; he sees that beautiful things are beautiful because they partake of beauty in itself (*μετεχεῖν*). Curiosity corresponds to seeing with the eyes (shorthand for all the senses) while *θαυμάζειν* corresponds with the 'seeing' of the soul (*ὄμματα τῆς ψυχῆς*).

In *Basic Questions of Philosophy* (*GA* 45) Heidegger again returns to the forgetting of Being from the perspective of the craving (*Gier*) for knowledge in distinguishing *θαυμάζειν* from curiosity (*Neugier*) and linking this to a pressing need that made itself felt and which underpins the *Republic*, a need which was occasioned by the false claims of sophistry. The problem of *δικαιοσύνη* is occasioned by the appearance of *ἀδικία*, the essence of which is a disordered desire (*Rep.* II). This disordered desire is nothing less than the turning away from Being towards beings. The task of philosophy here is the restoration of the *πόλις* and it is in this sense that philosophy is conceived instrumentally:

'. . . the craving (*Gier*) to acquire knowledge and to be able to calculate takes the place of the fundamental attunement of astonishment (*θαυμάζειν*). Philosophy itself now becomes *one* undertaking amongst others; it is made subordinate to an end that is all the more dangerous the higher it is set – as, for example, in Plato's *παιδεία*, a word that is poorly translated as 'education' (*Erziehung*). Even the fact that in Plato's *Republic* the "philosophers" are called upon to be the highest rulers, the *βασιλεῖς*, is already an essential demotion of philosophy. As the grasping of beings, our acknowledging them in their unconcealment, unfolds into *τέχνη*, those aspects of entities that are brought into

[213] McNeill *GE*: 4-5.

view in such grasping – the "ideas" – inevitably and increasingly become that which alone provides the measure of things. Grasping becomes a knowing familiarity with ideas, and this requires conformity to these ideas . . .' (*GA* 45: 180-181, tr. McNeill). But what is important for present purposes is to note the painter analogy and the emphasis on the priority of the παράδειγμα for the productive element.

The vision of the good is also at the same time the vision of the παράδειγμα which is not a 'form' but rather, and more originally, the source of beings. The beings of φύσις are of themselves self generating generation according to the παράδειγμα - 'self-emerging emergence' or 'upsurgence'.[214] But the being of man as man, that is, the nature of man, which is at issue in Book VII of the *Republic*, the world which man projects as a world, is also demiurgically produced, but now it is through the agency of the one who has gazed upon the παράδειγμα, the vision of the good. The world he projects may never be instantiated, it may for ever remain a 'blueprint stored up in heaven', and yet it is a 'good' construction in accordance with a perfect vision.

5.7: Finite Transcendence and Divine Intuition

At this stage I want to gather everything that has gone before in this section and conclude by way of reference to Heidegger's reading of a passage from Kant where the question of intuition is at issue. While it resembles and is the precursor, Platonic recollection is not Kant's *a priori* for as Heidegger says in the *Sophist* lectures that a difficulty arises,

> 'only from carrying the position of Kantianism over to the cognition of the *a priori*. But we should not see in this Greek elucidation of the cognition of the *a priori* the difficulties that would be introduced by the Kantian position, which

[214] 'Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16)' in *Early Greek Thinking* tr. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (N.Y., 1975): 102-123.

places the phenomenon of the *a priori* in the closest connection with subjectivity' (*PS*: 342 = *GA* 19: 495).

This is precisely what must be excluded because ψυχή should in no way be interpreted in terms of subjectivity for when ψυχή is present the *a priori* is being grasped on the same level as the ontical. But, it seems that in Kant there is a more prior moment to any determinations of the understanding or sensibility and that is what Kant calls *Anschauung* or intuition, and indeed this is substance of the very first line of the *Critique* when he introduces this:

> 'In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. This again is only possible, *to man at least*, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way' (Kant, *CPR*, B34: p.65, Kemp-smith).

There is no way that this matter can be treated here in the way that it should, space simple does not permit, and so this presentation is rather drastically de-contextualised, but I believe that it is worth the risk of distortion for what may be offered us here by way of another means for understanding the Platonic δημιουργός and Platonic recollection. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929) where Heidegger interprets the *Critique* as a work concerned with ontology primarily, Heidegger makes comments on the above passage; 'In order to understand the *Critique of Pure Reason* this point must be hammered in, so to speak: knowing is primarily intuiting. From this it at once becomes clear that the new interpretation of knowledge as judging (thinking) violates the decisive sense of the Kantian problem. All thinking is merely in the service of intuition.' What then, binds together thinking and intuiting; there must be an intrinsic relationship that makes the binding possible? 'This relationship, this descent from the same class (genus), is expressed in the fact that for both of them *"representation* in general is the species"' (*KPM* 15-16 = *GA* 3: 22-23; Kant *CPR* A 320, B376). To move ahead – 'knowing is a thinking intuiting' it turns out from Heidegger's reading here, that this first sentence from

the *Critique* is no longer definitional of knowing as such, but rather constitutes the determination of the essence of human knowledge. Heidegger paraphrases, 'On the other hand, any knowledge of what concerns man [in distinction from 'God or another higher spirit'] consists of concept and intuition' (*CPR* A 271, B327 ; *KPM* 16-17 = *GA* 3: 24-25). For now we come to the distinction that we find in Plato and which inscribes the difference which seems, on this reading, to be there in the text, that is, between the One and the indeterminate Dyad, between the δημιουργός, and the plenitude of his creation, which wells up out of an ultimately hidden and mysterious source. Here Heidegger seems to have found a way back to a more primordial sense of the *a priori* in the matter of how we understand intuition here, I cite the passage in full:

> 'The essence of finite human knowledge is illustrated by the contrast between it and the idea of infinite divine knowledge, or *intuitus originarius* (B 72). Still, divine knowledge is intuition – not because it is divine but because it is knowledge in general. Now the difference between infinite and finite intuition consists in the fact that the former, in its immediate representation of the individual, i.e., of the unique, singular being as a whole, first brings this being into its Being, helps it to its coming-into-being (*origo*). Absolute intuiting would not be absolute if it depended upon a being already at hand and if the intuitable first became accessible in its "taking the measure" of this being. Divine knowing is representing which, in intuiting, first creates the intuitable being as such. But because it immediately looks at the being as a whole, simply seeing through it in advance, it cannot require thinking. Thinking as such is thus already the mark of finitude. Divine knowing is "intuition (for all its knowledge must be intuition and not *thinking*, which always shows itself to have limits) (B 32)"' (*KPM* 17 = *GA* 3: 24-25).

This analysis of the kinds of intuition here looks remarkably like the difference within the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ as it is initially presented in the Sun passage at 509b. One the one hand it grants being to beings through its power while at the same time it is beyond beings, it surpasses all beings – even, it would seem, itself, hence the ambiguity of

expression in the text. So the difference between the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ and the ideas can probably best be explained by the intuition analogy above. The ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ appears as a single principle but a single principle that generates multiplicity through the ideas – which is also the core problematic for the ancient Platonists; the question of the One and the Many. The exposition at 509b is a manner of expression but it is to this text that we should look for the clue to the derivation of the many from the one. This would correspond to the act of divine intuition – the creative act – described above and the emergence of multiplicity belongs to the essence of human intuition. One of the differences between divine and human intuition are the twin elements of time and limit. They belong together for time is the essence of Dasein's existence and precondition for a world and time is also the mortal limit where Dasein comes to its own completion in death. Time is the mortal limit and as such the essence of Dasein's finitude.

Thinking, then, is properly a sign of finitude as Heidegger states in the passage above, and ontological inquiry belongs to the essence of the Dasein. The creative or generative act is the divine act which is beyond thinking and beyond being. Being, then, to come to presence as a world requires something like a finite temporal being. If as it has sometimes been said, most notably by Berkeley, that the ideas are the thoughts of God, then it should be added that this is indeed so but that it is Dasein that thinks them.

Conclusion

In conclusion I will briefly review the foregoing section. I began by taking up from the previous section where I was able to raise the theme of temporality and transcendence, or, finite transcendence. On that basis I introduced Heidegger's temporal understanding of the *a priori* and compared it to Platonic recollection. This in turn pointed towards the question of the demiurge and how that concept functions in Plato's philosophy. The issue here was one of the absolute priority of the paradigm and its relationship with a generated world bound by time. This is the old Platonic problem of the One and multiplicity, between a single generative principle and a world, a complex. The matter of temporality and priority, of recollection and priority tied into the suggestion made by Heidegger that the Idea of the Good and the Demiurge are one and the same posed an

interpretive problem to which I have offered a solution; that we understand this with the help of Heidegger's comments on Kant's theory of intuition and the distinction he draws between human and divine intuition. This comes down to the difference between finite transcendence and an absolute transcendence that is generative of all beings.

It must be said at this point that a very deep point of proximity can be found here between Plato and Heidegger. Both thinkers have placed absolute importance on always including the questioner in any inquiry into the whole because all questioning and thinking is a mark of finitude, its is the unique defining essence of Dasein: the being that's own being is a question to itself, while for Plato this is expressed by the character of Socrates and his restless and tireless quest to fulfill the Delphic injunction. On the basis of the foregoing analyses I feel confident that I have been able to demonstrate that when Heidegger talks about Dasein being 'the privileged site of being' we may productively compare this to Plato's analysis of *ψυχὴ* in Book VI of the *Republic* (and elsewhere): *ψυχὴ* is the 'place' where the ambiguity of presence and absence is played out; *ψυχὴ* is the privileged site of being.

6.0: Concluding Review

At this point I want to conclude by restating the theses of this dissertation and to outline in what why I think they have been demonstrated satisfactorily.

The translator's of Heidegger's 1924-5 course on Plato's *Sophist* made the observation that *Being and Time* is to a large extent derived from his analysis of that dialogue. *Being and Time* begins with a line from the *Sophist* and of this the translators say that *Being and Time* can be seen as 'a single protracted meditation revolving around this one sentence from Plato.'[215] This thesis takes up this statement as a clue to the importance of Plato for Heidegger. Instead of taking up a study of that lecture course I felt it more productive to come at this from the perspective of the later work, *Being and Time*. The translator's go on to say that *Being and Time* is no mere repetition of the *Sophist* analysis because in the later work he 'engages in the ontological problem by taking a more thematically determined route, namely, the path of a hermeneutical analysis of Dasein (human being insofar as it is the place where Being reveals itself).'[216] The theme of existential analysis from *Being and Time* has determined which Platonic texts I have used to pursue a thesis that argues for a closeness in thinking between Plato and Heidegger.

I started by stating a broad thesis: that contrary to criticism Heidegger is not hostile to Plato and that moreover his conception of philosophy is very close to Plato's in the *Being and Time* period. I argue throughout that Heidegger effects a retrieval or recovery (*Wiederholung*) of the original theme of philosophy which is the question of being. I show how this recovery amounts to a restoration of the wholeness of metaphysical inquiry; that any inquiry into being is an inquiry into the whole. This means that the questioner – Dasein – is always included in any metaphysical inquiry. The way that Heidegger does this is through what he terms existential analysis, or, the Dasein analytic. He makes a fundamental distinction about the kinds of beings there are. There is Dasein

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[215] The line from the *Sophist* is 'For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "*being*". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.' *Soph.* 244a quoted in *Being and Time*: 1. Translator's foreword, *PS*: xxv.

[216] *PS*: xxv – xxvi.

and every other kind of being, and Dasein is characterised as the being for which its own being is a question for itself. Specifically, I suggested, this amounts to a restoration of the Socratic philosophical mission. Socrates answers the injunction of the Delphic Oracle to 'Know Thyself!' and this original command is at the basis of Socrates' philosophical life. At a more abstract level it expresses the view that Heidegger puts forward that any ontological inquiry must begin on the foundations of an analysis of Dasein – the subject to whom the Oracle is addresses. Drawing this comparison between the 'Socratic' element of Plato's philosophy and existential analysis is, as far as I know, an entirely original suggestion. However to fully do justice to this theme would require a full scale study of the Platonic dialogues – of the early and middle periods – with existential analysis as its central driving theme. In this work I have merely sketched out the ground for this kind of study because there is the broader question of Heidegger's relationship with Plato at issue here.

When we turn to look for the necessary connection between existential analysis and ontological inquiry into beings that are not Dasein in Plato, Books VI and VII are a rich source for here, especially in the Cave image, we can see how Plato ties in questions about the being of man with the fundamental principle of being and intelligibility. For Heidegger the concept of *aletheia* is the core concept of Greek philosophy and for his own philosophy, it is a life-long concern. Heidegger's thesis that *aletheia* primarily means unconcealment has had a wide influence but it seems fairly certain that his suggestion that Plato effects a transformation in the essence of *aletheia* from unconcealment to an early form of correspondence is untenable – he himself admits as much later on. If we accept that in Plato, especially in the Cave image, which is the subject of the essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* both meanings of truth are present then this can open up the image to further analysis along the existential-ontological theme. For truth can be understood here as pertaining to the essence of Dasein – as unconcealment – and, as pertaining to propositions about beings other than Dasein, or rather, propositions in general.

The other main strand to this thesis concerns the question of ontological difference. Heidegger discovers the difference between the question of being as such and the question of the being of beings which latter, he says, is the traditional business of metaphysics. For the metaphysical tradition, he says, has forgotten the question of being as such. For Heidegger being (in this sense) is a unique name. If Plato preserves the ambiguity or two-foldedness in the essence of truth, and if truth understood in this way is primarily ontological in essence rather than epistemological, then is this grounds for saying that Plato, too, preserves ontological difference? I think it does and the second strand to my thesis sets about demonstrating this. If Plato preserves difference – and the question of Aristotle has had to be put to one side, i.e. does he contribute significantly to the closure of difference – then difference in Plato has some implications for my thesis. It would reinforce what Heidegger says about his own project; that he effects a recovery, however it should not mean that the seeds of this forgetting are not also there in Plato – which is something Heidegger emphasises at the risk of being deemed hostile to the early philosopher.

I carry out an analysis of the Cave image in order to discover the main elements at issue in that image. I focus here on the theme of place and the soul; that the place of the cave signifies the soul and therefore the content of the image occurs within the soul of man. On this basis I am able to approach the question of the *epekeina* as indicative of finite transcendence and according to this understanding the visible element of the sun, which is the source of light but not itself light, corresponds in some ways to the concept of transcendence that Heidegger details by reference to the tradition. I look at the temporality of the image with reference to the earlier insight that the place of the cave and the open space outside is nothing less than man's soul as the place where being comes to presence.

I moved on then to look at the question of the *a priori* and Platonic recollection from the perspective of their temporality before taking up a very suggestive statement that Heidegger made in the course of a lecture to undergraduates. He said that the Idea of the Good and the Platonic Demiurge are one and the same. I took this up, with Heidegger's

later critique of technological thinking in mind, and discovered that not only is this a plausible suggestion but that there is evidence that the ancient tradition where aware of this position. The Demiurge could be understood in terms of the Cave image. The radiative power of the sun is analogous to the generative power of the Demiurge because both refer to a prior principle or paradigm. I highlighted the earlier discussion in the *Republic* where the philosopher-ruler is also a demiurge, producing a true and just polity according to the paradigm which he sees. This is the Idea of the Good (Sun) which he glimpses outside the Cave but is this not also the paradigm that the Timaeun demiurge works from? I then looked at Heidegger's commentary on a passage from Kant on the intuition and found an insight that is extremely useful for understanding the Demiurge. Heidegger discovers two distinct forms of intuition in Kant: human and divine. Human intuition is characterised by thinking and understanding, therefore temporality, while divine intuition brings things into being, that is there cannot be a divine thinking. I suggest that generation involves a withdrawal – Heidegger calls this the play of concealment and unconcealment which are always together - I likened it to a perduring contraction which discloses a world. Thinking is a mark of finitude, and the essence of Dasein is its own existence which is one of finite transcendence. In Plato too there is this same insight and again it comes through most clearly in the Socratic element. I suggest, finally, that for Plato as for Heidegger *psuche* or Dasein is the privileged site of being. Worldhood arises on the basis of *psuche* or Dasein and is an essential characteristic of mortality, as the Greeks would say, or, of finite transcendence as Heidegger would say.

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