

1 **The contribution of whole-genome sequencing to our understanding of the**  
2 **epidemiology and control of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus***

3  
4  
5 **Hilary Humphreys<sup>a,b</sup>, David C. Coleman<sup>c</sup>**

6  
7 <sup>a</sup>Department of Clinical Microbiology, the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland and the

8 <sup>b</sup>Department of Microbiology, Beaumont Hospital, Dublin Ireland.

9 <sup>c</sup>Microbiology Research Unit, Dublin Dental University Hospital, Trinity College Dublin,  
10 University of Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

11  
12  
13  
14  
15 Address and contact details: Department of Clinical Microbiology  
16 RCSI Education and Research Centre  
17 Beaumont Hospital  
18 Dublin D09 YD 60, Ireland  
19 Phone +3531 8093710/3708  
20 Fax +3531 8092871  
21 Email [hhumphreys@rcsi.ie](mailto:hhumphreys@rcsi.ie)

22  
23  
24  
25  
26 Running title Whole genome sequencing and MRSA Control

27 **Abstract**

28 In recent years, approaches to tracking the spread of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*  
29 (MRSA) as part of outbreak management have used conventional DNA-based methods including  
30 pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and *spa* typing. However, when a predominant clone is  
31 present, these methods may be insufficiently discriminatory. We conducted a literature search to  
32 highlight how whole genome sequencing (WGS) has revolutionised the investigation of  
33 outbreaks of MRSA, including intra-hospital spread and MRSA in the community, and to review  
34 its future potential. Whole genome sequencing provides enhanced isolate discrimination, as it  
35 permits the entire genomic DNA sequence of isolates to be rapidly determined and compared.  
36 Many software packages used for the analysis of WGS data are becoming increasingly available.  
37 To date WGS has been more sensitive in confirming outbreaks, often persisting for prolonged  
38 periods, previously undetected by conventional molecular typing. The evolving dynamic of  
39 spread from the community to hospitals, within and between hospitals, and from hospitals to the  
40 community, is only becoming clear with WGS studies, and is more complex and convoluted than  
41 widely appreciated. Also, WGS can exclude cross-transmission, when isolates are different. The  
42 challenges now are to make WGS technology more amenable for routine use and to develop an  
43 evidence-based consensus for sequence difference thresholds for isolates that they are deemed  
44 part of the same outbreak, including protracted outbreaks. Using such data in a timely way will  
45 provide increased sensitivity in detecting cross-transmission events earlier with the potential of  
46 preventing outbreaks to positively impact on infection prevention and control.

47

48 **Keywords:** Whole genome sequencing, MRSA, bioinformatics, MRSA clones, outbreaks,  
49 spread, acute hospitals, community, long stay residential units.

50

## 50 **Background**

51 *Staphylococcus aureus* is a common cause of healthcare-associated infection (HCAI). In a recent  
52 European study in children, *S. aureus* was responsible for 11% of infections and was second only  
53 to coagulase-negative staphylococci as a cause [1]. In a four-country prevalence survey of HCAI  
54 in the UK and Ireland, methicillin-resistant *S. aureus* (MRSA) was responsible for 15.8% of all  
55 HCAs [2]. In addition to causing serious infection in acutely ill patients in hospital, MRSA can  
56 spread to and between residents in long stay residential units (LSRU) and day units, as  
57 increasingly the elderly population is managed outside acute hospitals.

58  
59 Infections caused by MRSA have been prevalent in many countries for decades even if in recent  
60 years, the prevalence of some serious infections, such as bloodstream infections (BSI), have  
61 declined [3,4]. Data from the UK and Northern Ireland from 2010-2014 derived from mandatory  
62 reporting of *S. aureus* bloodstream infection has shown that the proportion of BSI due to *S.*  
63 *aureus* has fallen from 16.2% to 8.9% with a downward trend in all four countries [3]. Molecular  
64 typing is important to track spread, indicate the possible origins of outbreaks, and confirm the  
65 efficacy of outbreak control measures and track the emergence or evolution of new clones in the  
66 outbreak and endemic setting.

67

## 68 **Conventional molecular typing of MRSA**

69 Routes of MRSA transmission and spread in healthcare settings have traditionally been  
70 investigated using targeted DNA-based typing methods including pulse-field gel electrophoresis  
71 (PFGE), *spa* typing, conventional multilocus sequence typing (MLST), and more recently, the  
72 application of DNA microarray technology [5,6,7]. In many cases these approaches provide  
73 valuable insights into the relatedness of clinical isolates when combined with relevant

74 epidemiological data and the expertise and insights of infection prevention and control staff.  
75 However, conventional molecular typing approaches frequently struggle to discriminate between  
76 isolates in the healthcare setting where a particular or limited number of MRSA clonal lineages  
77 predominate. In many countries MRSA responsible for HCAs frequently belong to a relatively  
78 small number of clones; for example, in Ireland and the UK multilocus sequence type (ST) 22  
79 has predominated among MRSA responsible for bloodstream infections and carriage for almost  
80 two decades [7-9]. Isolates belonging to this lineage are particularly recalcitrant to discrimination  
81 by conventional molecular typing approaches, making detection of all or even major patterns of  
82 spread problematic [7, 10,11]. Consequently, there is a need for more discriminatory methods to  
83 distinguish clonal isolates to track spread.

84

## 85 **Brief overview of whole genome sequencing of nosocomial pathogens**

### 86 *Next generation sequencing*

87 Table 1 provides a list and explanations of commonly used terms relating to WGS and its  
88 analysis. Over the last decade the development of next generation sequencing (NGS) to  
89 determine the entire genetic sequence of microbial pathogens, especially bacterial species, has  
90 revolutionised molecular epidemiology. In contrast to Sanger sequencing, NGS permits the high-  
91 throughput and rapid determination of whole genome sequences of pathogens at an affordable  
92 cost. A variety of NGS approaches have been developed that utilise innovative sequencing  
93 chemistry methods in tandem with small footprint automated bench top sequencers [12-15].  
94 These approaches involve fragmentation of genomic DNA into short segments of a few hundred  
95 nucleotide bases in length, tagging of the fragments with adapters to generate genome fragment  
96 libraries, immobilisation of the libraries on a solid interface, followed by PCR amplification of

97 the DNA fragments. The DNA sequence of each fragment is determined during complementary  
98 strand synthesis using a variety of approaches depending on the NGS platform being used. This  
99 allows millions to billions of DNA fragments to be sequenced in parallel.

100

101 Two of the most widely used NGS platforms, also known as second generation sequencers or  
102 short read sequencers, include the Illumina sequencing systems (Illumina, Eindhoven, The  
103 Netherlands) and the ion semiconductor systems (Thermo Fisher Scientific) [12,13,16]. In recent  
104 years, most studies reporting NGS of bacterial pathogens have used Illumina short read  
105 sequencers. In contrast, third generation DNA sequencers yield much longer sequencing reads  
106 (i.e. > 10 kb) and can sequence single DNA molecules without the requirement for DNA  
107 amplification. Examples of third generation sequencing platforms include the Single Molecular  
108 Real-Time (SMRT) sequencing platforms manufactured by PacBio (Menlo Park, CA, USA) and  
109 the nanopore MinION sequencers manufactured by Oxford Nanopore Technologies (Oxford UK)  
110 [12]. The error rates generated by third generation sequencers are relatively high compared with  
111 second-generation sequencers, but the long-read lengths generated by the former are very  
112 advantageous for sequencing entire genomes and especially for plasmids. However, PacBio  
113 platforms are currently relatively expensive and are not suitable for the high-throughput rapid  
114 analysis or the processing of many clinical isolates. In contrast, Oxford Nanopore sequencers are  
115 inexpensive and can yield very long sequence reads, but bioinformatics analysis of sequence data  
116 is more challenging. Nonetheless, a growing range of nanopore bioinformatics tools are being  
117 developed, which soon will make this technology more readily applicable to clinical isolates  
118 [17]. A combination of short read sequences generated by NGS platforms such as Illumina  
119 MiSeq and long read sequences generated by nanopore sequencers can be used to rapidly and

120 accurately map relatively large genomic regions such as the staphylococcal cassette chromosome  
121 *mec* (SCC*mec*) region and other large genomic elements such as the arginine catabolic mobile  
122 element (ACME) in *S. aureus* and coagulase-negative staphylococcal species. Typically, the  
123 DNA sequences of such elements are spread across several contiguous sequences in genome  
124 assemblies generated from short read sequences and usually require extensive PCRs to  
125 accurately refine the assemblies. This can be overcome by generating hybrid assemblies of both  
126 short read and long read sequences [18,19]. A number of recent reviews have provided  
127 comprehensive overviews of whole genome sequencing (WGS) platforms and technology and its  
128 applications for microbial epidemiology [12-15].

129

### 130 *Genome assembly and bioinformatics*

131 The volume and complexity of data generated by WGS platforms requires the application of a  
132 variety of bioinformatics tools to determine the quality of the sequence data and to transform  
133 unrefined sequencing read data into more useful or meaningful forms. Software algorithms are  
134 used to clean up and organise sequence data, to assemble genome sequences from overlapping  
135 sequence reads, and to identify genomic variants, for genotyping and for phylogenetic analysis.  
136 For the non-bioinformatician, the terminology and application of bioinformatics is daunting in  
137 this rapidly developing field. A recent review by Carriço *et al.* (2018) provides an excellent  
138 overview of bioinformatics as applied to WGS data for the non-expert [20]. Some of the more  
139 frequently used bioinformatics approaches and software for microbial genome assembly and  
140 subsequent analysis have been recently reviewed [20,21,12]. Many software packages used for  
141 the analysis of WGS data are freely available and several commercially available and easy to use

142 software packages including BioNumerics (Applied Maths, Ghent, Belgium) and SeqSphere  
143 (Ridom GmbH, Münster, Germany) are widely used for this purpose [12,14,16]

#### 144 **Applications of WGS data for epidemiology**

145 Whole genome sequencing data can be used for a variety of purposes in investigating outbreaks  
146 of infection and in tracking the sources and spread of infection in hospitals as well as in  
147 investigating more regional and global aspects of the emergence of specific clones of particular  
148 pathogens. Conventional targeted molecular typing of pathogens (e.g. PFGE or conventional  
149 MLST) generates a genotype barcode or molecular fingerprint of each isolate based on a  
150 relatively small portion of the genome [7, 12, 14]. Isolates with identical or similar genotypes  
151 linked by epidemiological data are presumed to represent linked cases of infection. In contrast,  
152 WGS enables the entire genome of isolates to be compared, which significantly enhances  
153 resolution. As with conventional molecular typing, the genomes of isolates recovered from an  
154 outbreak or cluster of infections are likely to be closely related.

155

#### 156 *Single nucleotide variation analysis*

157 All microorganisms accumulate changes in their genomes over time, often through random  
158 mutations. These include alterations to single nucleotide bases (single nucleotide variations or  
159 SNVs). When an SNV becomes fixed within a population it is referred to as a single nucleotide  
160 polymorphism or SNP. Other types of changes to the genome include gene acquisition by  
161 horizontal transfer (e.g. plasmid acquisition or lysogenisation with a bacteriophage), small  
162 insertions and deletions, gene duplication and genome rearrangements.

163

164 SNV analysis is frequently used to type isolates based on WGS data in an outbreak scenario and

165 has been used extensively using data generated by short read sequencers such as those  
166 manufactured by Illumina [12-15, 22-24]. This approach involves mapping sequence reads or  
167 larger contiguous sequences (known as contigs) assembled from overlapping short read  
168 sequences to a reference genome by core genome alignment. Specific software filtering tools can  
169 be used to exclude sequence stretches of high variability. Curated collections of reference  
170 genomes for particular species (including *S. aureus*) are available for SNV analysis. However,  
171 SNV analysis yields the best results when a reference genome that is closely related to the  
172 samples under investigation is used. In the case of an outbreak, isolates are likely to be closely  
173 related and one isolate sequence can be used as a reference against which other outbreak isolates'  
174 sequences can be mapped. The alignment of isolate sequences can then be used for phylogenetic  
175 analysis to determine the relationships between the isolates based on the identification of bases  
176 that differ in the test samples relative to the corresponding bases in the reference genome.

177

#### 178 *Extended multilocus sequence typing*

179 The genetic relatedness of isolates can also be investigated using extended versions of  
180 conventional MLST. Conventional MLST typically involves the sequencing of segments of a  
181 small number of selected housekeeping genes that accumulate genetic changes relatively slowly  
182 because the encoded proteins are functionally constrained [25]. Such genes encode segments that  
183 are amplified by PCR using specific primers and the amplicons sequenced by conventional  
184 Sanger sequencing. Combinations of allelic variants in the selected genes are used to define a  
185 sequence type (ST) for a particular microorganism. The advent of WGS has enabled the  
186 establishment of whole genome (wg) and core genome (cg) MLST schemes that enable a  
187 comparison of test sequences with large curated sets of predefined genes for a particular species



188 [26,27]. Publicly available curated gene sets can include hundreds to thousands of genes  
189 depending on the scheme and analysis can be undertaken with easy to use software packages  
190 such as BioNumerics and SeqSphere [14]. The use of curated cgMLST schemes facilitates good  
191 interlaboratory reproducibility.

192

### 193 *Thresholds of isolate relatedness*

194 Establishing SNV and cgMLST thresholds of relatedness for a microorganism can be  
195 problematic. Genomic variability increases over time and it is vital that this consideration is  
196 borne in mind when attempting to assess the relatedness of isolates based on WGS data. There  
197 are no definitive rules for determining isolate relatedness or what constitutes a significant  
198 difference between isolates. Judgements on similarity or significantly different should be made  
199 separately according to the facts of each case. Meaningful thresholds of relatedness can be  
200 developed by investigating epidemiologically linked and unrelated isolates. However, proposed  
201 thresholds should always be interpreted in conjunction with epidemiological data.

202

203 A recent study that investigated several outbreaks of *S. aureus* using WGS suggested that in an  
204 acute short-term outbreak, there will be insufficient time for diversity to accumulate [23] and  
205 therefore establishing thresholds in this scenario should be less problematic. Schürch et al.  
206 (2018) recently detailed a list of current suggested SNV and cgMLST relatedness criteria for  
207 some representative clinically significant bacterial species [14]. It is worth bearing in mind that  
208 clonality thresholds may vary within particular clones of a particular pathogen.

209

### 210 **The use of WGS for investigating MRSA outbreaks**

211

212 The more widespread availability of WGS in recent years has enabled us to study in more detail  
213 patterns of spread, including detecting previously undocumented transmission, as well as the  
214 overall and detailed evolution of strains of MRSA [28,29]. A study of Danish isolates using *spa*  
215 typing and Sanger sequencing found a 97% agreement between both these methods, and WGS  
216 [30]. As the technology becomes increasingly available and costs reduce, WGS will be no longer  
217 confined to research or reference laboratory facilities but become increasingly more available in  
218 routine clinical laboratories to inform infection prevention and control strategies, as well as  
219 outbreak management in real time [30-32].

220

221 Price and colleagues in 2013 outlined the potential of WGS, discussed some recent applications  
222 and highlighted its potential for the future [33]. We undertook to update that and highlight  
223 important findings relating to the detection of outbreaks, their evolution over time, and inter-  
224 hospital spread, and how this could potentially benefit preventative measures for MRSA in the  
225 community. We did not set out to cover aspects of WGS and MRSA as they relate specifically to  
226 antimicrobial resistance and global molecular epidemiology. A literature search was undertaken  
227 of articles in PubMed, Embase, the Cochrane Library and Web of Science for articles up to the  
228 end of August 2018. Search terms included MRSA, WGS, outbreaks, clinical, infection,  
229 prevention and control. In total, 588 items were found, and with duplicates removed, and having  
230 reviewed all titles and abstracts for relevance (e.g. excluding those related purely to the  
231 veterinary setting), those cited focus on the value and relevance of WGS to MRSA in terms of  
232 prevention and control and outbreak investigation. We excluded studies where the focus was  
233 purely on clonal evolutionary trends and were not germane to infection prevention and control  
234 practitioners. What follows is a discussion of the transmission of MRSA and especially outbreak

235 management. Studies that refer to and or include methicillin-susceptible *S. aureus* (MSSA) are  
236 included were MRSA isolates were also included, and or, where the findings might equally apply  
237 to outbreaks or settings involving MSSA.

238

239 Young and colleagues have looked at the evolutionary dynamics of *S. aureus* from carriage to  
240 disease, i.e. a patient who carried *S. aureus* in the nose and who subsequently developed  
241 bloodstream infection (BSI) [34]. Just eight mutations accompanied the transmission from  
242 carriage to infection [34]. However, during an outbreak which occurs over a matter of weeks or  
243 even months, much of the literature seems to agree that up to approximately 30 SNPs may be  
244 allowed between isolates before the isolates are considered different, i.e. transmission may have  
245 occurred between two patients if their isolates differ by less than 30 SNPs [11, 14]. Such  
246 conclusions are predicated on the assumption that the epidemiological findings are supportive.

247

## 248 **Epidemiology and control**

### 249 *Neonatal and paediatric units*

250 The occurrence of MRSA amongst neonates has potentially devastating consequences. Hence,  
251 many studies of WGS and MRSA have focussed on neonates or paediatric units, because of the  
252 serious clinical consequences. Whole genome sequencing has been used to track the spread of  
253 MRSA and to assist in early intervention measures [26, 35-43].

254

255 Köser and colleagues investigated a putative MRSA outbreak in the UK and WGS revealed a  
256 distinct cluster with clear separation between outbreak and non-outbreak isolates, amongst a  
257 collection of ST22 isolates [37]. When using less-discriminatory methods of typing, the extent of  
258 an outbreak may be exaggerated. In a neonatal unit outbreak involving 17 neonates, *spa* typing,

259 PFGE and WGS were used. All 17 isolates belonged USA-300 isolates according to PFGE.  
260 However, while five isolates were involved in recent transmission events, 12 (70.5%)  
261 represented genetically unique isolates according to WGS and were therefore believed not to be  
262 part of the outbreak [37]. This finding is important as it suggests that there was no obvious  
263 deficiency in infection prevention measures by healthcare staff because there may be have been  
264 multiple independent introductions of USA-300.

265  
266 Earls and colleagues investigated two protracted outbreaks (2009-2011 and 2014-2017) in the  
267 neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) of an Irish hospital involving clonal complex (CC) 88-  
268 MRSA isolates belonging to *spa* types t186 and t786 [42]. Isolates were recovered from 20  
269 separate neonates during the outbreaks, together with two isolates recovered two years apart  
270 from the same healthcare worker. Whole genome sequencing and subsequent wgMLST analysis  
271 revealed that both outbreaks were caused by the same CC88/ST78-MRSA-IVa strain. All the  
272 isolates formed a large cluster, exhibiting 1–71 pairwise allelic differences in a wgMLST-based  
273 minimum spanning tree (MST). The maximum distance observed between any two directly  
274 linked nodes was 32 alleles, detected between two t186 isolates, which were recovered almost  
275 three years apart during outbreak one. All other directly linked isolates exhibited 1–19 allelic  
276 differences [42]. This indicated a high degree of relatedness between all isolates within the  
277 cluster network. There were no apparent sub-clusters based on *spa* type and the one direct link  
278 within the MST between *spa* type t786 isolates and *spa* type t186 isolates corresponded to an  
279 allelic difference of 18. The two t786 isolates recovered from a healthcare worker two years  
280 apart exhibited 20 allelic differences and differed from other t786 isolates by 10-21 and 9-37  
281 allelic differences, respectively, indicating the involvement of the HCW in the outbreak

282 transmission. Unfortunately, no information on whether the HCW was persistently or transiently  
283 colonised with the CC88/ST78-MRSA-IVa strain during the two year period was available or if  
284 attempts to decolonise the HCW were undertaken. This study also demonstrated the spread of the  
285 ST78-MRSA-IVa strain to two other Irish hospitals. A cgMLST-based comparison with  
286 international comparator isolates showed that the outbreak strain was most likely imported from  
287 Australia, where it is among the prevalent MRSA clones.

288

289 The French national staphylococcal reference laboratory used WGS to retrospectively investigate  
290 MRSA isolates amongst four separate clonal complexes (CC1, CC5, CC8, CC30) involved in  
291 community and hospital outbreaks, which included 41 CC5 isolates from new-borns [43]. Even  
292 though the *spa* type was different, isolates from Limoges and Bordeaux, which are separated by  
293 approximately 180 km, differed by less than 22 SNPs suggesting that despite the geographical  
294 difference, they could be part of the same transmission pattern [43]. The value of WGS in this  
295 setting, are outlined in Table 2.

296

#### 297 *Other hospital outbreaks*

298 Studies have shown the value of WGS in teasing out some of the subtleties of general and  
299 hospital outbreak evolution and development [11,16,23,44-50]. The isolates from three separate  
300 outbreaks were studied, including one in a hospital, resulting in a total of 42 isolates; 15 of 16  
301 isolates from a burns unit formed a single cluster but 12 isolates from a post-surgical unit were  
302 more diverse; the authors concluded that those with less than eight SNPs should be considered  
303 related, and those between nine to 29, as being possibly unrelated [16].

304

305 We have assessed the variability amongst MRSA isolates collected from patients and the  
306 environment in a prospective study that involved 41 patient and environmental isolates that were  
307 sequence type 22 [11]. We traced the isolates in terms of the geographical location and the time  
308 when they were recovered. Far more combinations of isolates, i.e. patient-patient or patient-  
309 environment, indicating potential transmission links, were detected by WGS compared with  
310 conventional molecular typing using *spa*, *dru* and or PFGE typing or a combination of all three  
311 [11]. The *dru* region is a noncoding DNA segment consisting of imperfect 40-bp variable-  
312 number tandem repeats (VNTRs) located in the hypervariable region between *mecA* and  
313 IS431*mec* of SCC*mec* [7,11].

314

315 In a study on a Dutch oncology ward involving an asymptomatic nasal colonized healthcare  
316 worker, WGS MLST showed similarities between MSSA and MRSA isolates involved in an  
317 outbreak and the authors hypothesised that a fusidic acid resistant isolate of MSSA acquired a  
318 SCC*mec*, and subsequently caused an MRSA outbreak suggested a genetic link [46]. Miller and  
319 colleagues were concerned about the patterns of MRSA BSIs in a specific hospital in England,  
320 involving a clonal variant of EMRSA-16. Isolates causing BSI between 2000 and 2001, and 2006  
321 to 2007 were investigated [48]. The clonal variant was largely confined to that hospital unlike  
322 isolates causing BSIs acquired elsewhere, and infections caused by this clone were significantly  
323 associated with increased peripheral white cell and neutrophil count, suggesting increased  
324 virulence [48]. Similarly, a retrospective review of isolates in 2004-2014 was undertaken in  
325 Switzerland to reconstruct transmission pathways [49]. Tracking the geographic locations of  
326 patients who were colonised or infected together with WGS data, enabled the researchers to  
327 assess patterns of spread, which included a network of hospitals and overlapping periods of

328 hospitalisation. In one case, an outbreak lasted several months in an orthopaedic ward, but was  
329 only retrospectively detected using WGS. Looking at isolates from the same patient over time,  
330 the authors concluded that there was one SNP every 8.9 weeks or 0.016 per day [50].

331  
332 Tong *et al.* (2015) used WGS to investigate the genetic diversity of ST239 MRSA isolates from  
333 patients over a three-month period in two ICU units of a 1000 bed hospital in Thailand where  
334 transmission was common [22]. Phylogenetic analysis revealed a flux of distinct ST239 clades  
335 (or groups of isolates) over time in each ICU. Analysis of WGS data confirmed intra-ward and  
336 inter-ward transmission events and revealed that one patient in each ICU was the source of  
337 numerous transmission events. The mean pairwise SNP differences between the five ST239  
338 clades identified was  $\geq 197$  SNPs, indicating that each clade was distinctly different.

339  
340 *Community and wider patterns of spread*

341 While the focus of the hospital infection prevention and control team is to largely prevent and  
342 analyse outbreaks within the hospital, these may sometimes arise from outside the hospital, i.e.  
343 from patients admitted from other hospitals or from LSRU as well as potentially from patients  
344 who have been abroad, especially if hospitalised there. Hence, the analysis of a wider range of  
345 isolates can inform preventative strategies and highlight the innate capacity of *S. aureus* to  
346 spread and evolve.

347  
348 The ST8 USA300 MRSA clone emerged shortly after 2000 and subsequently became the leading  
349 cause of skin and soft tissue infections in the United States (US). The origin of USA300 in  
350 Pennsylvania region of the US and its subsequent range expansion was recently investigated in

351 detail using genome sequences from 357 isolates from 22 states and territories and seven other  
352 countries [51]. USA300 is now common internationally. Fluit and colleagues compared one  
353 well-characterised strain from the US with those from Europe [52]. There was a difference of  
354 144 SNPs between the US isolate and those from Europe, the gene content showed 21 regions of  
355 difference, and the European strains were resistant to fewer antibiotics. However, the SNP data  
356 suggested a common ancestor around two decades ago [52]. This clone is an important pathogen  
357 internationally, even if not as common in Europe as in the US, but that could change with spread  
358 via ongoing international travel.

359

360 An outbreak of ST97-IVa involving 25 patients, originating from a surgical ward, over a four-  
361 year period in Denmark, a country with a low prevalence of MRSA, was investigated by WGS  
362 [53]. Eighteen patients had been admitted to the surgical ward of which 13 overlapped in terms  
363 of admission periods. Two HCWs and two patient family members were also involved in the  
364 outbreak. All except two isolates were *spa* type t267 and belonged to ST97. In this outbreak,  
365 WGS linked nine initial isolates to 16 previous isolates, resulting in 23 patients being involved  
366 with the suggestion that a healthcare worker with undetected carriage may have caused the  
367 outbreak [53]. The authors noted that with shorter lengths of stay, patients may not be identified  
368 as being colonized with MRSA carriers while in hospital but on follow up in the community after  
369 discharge from hospital [53].

370

371 Modern healthcare requires patients to be transferred between hospitals as specialist and tertiary  
372 facilities are centralised. A comparison of EMRSA-15 within the UK and Ireland using WGS  
373 showed that the hospitals within the same referral regions had similar MRSA populations but



374 transmission within a hospital arose from patients having been transferred from another hospital  
375 [54]. Furthermore, frequent patient admissions to multiple hospitals results in ward-based  
376 transmission within a hospital, as detected by a study in two NHS hospital groups and a district  
377 general hospital in South-East London, involving ST22 MRSA isolates [55].

378

379 As the age of the population increases, patients are discharged more quickly than before from  
380 acute hospitals to LSRU, such as to nursing homes. Sometimes these patients require re-  
381 admission and there is constant flux between the acute and long-stay sector. Many studies have  
382 highlighted this dynamic in terms of the acquisition and transmission of MRSA between these  
383 sectors [56-62]. Furthermore, there has been interest in the role of carriage, including enteric  
384 carriage [44,50]. In a long-term outbreak involving 1,600 patients and where WGS was used to  
385 determine the origin, a single clonal variant of ST228 was responsible but that this clone was  
386 more frequently recovered from the groin and rectal swabs [50].

387

388 In Singapore, where 1700 hospital patients and LSRU occupants were screened for MRSA over  
389 a 6-week period, MRSA prevalence was lowest in acute healthcare facilities, i.e. 11.8%  
390 compared with intermediate or long-term care facilities, 29.95 and 20.4%, respectively [56].  
391 Furthermore, LSRUs had the greatest diversity of MRSA clones. Stine and colleagues examined  
392 the transmission of MRSA from resident-to-resident in LSRUs using WGS. Multiple sites from  
393 residents were screened over a 12-week study [59]. Isolates from multiple body sites were  
394 usually closely related and many residents living together often harboured closely related strains  
395 [59].

396

397 Following a protracted hospital outbreak between June 2013 and June 2016 caused by multidrug  
398 resistant ST1-MRSA-IV isolates belonging to *spa* type t157, a collection of 89 isolates from the  
399 outbreak hospital, 16 other hospitals and four other healthcare facilities and the community in  
400 Ireland were investigated by WGS [61]. Fifty of the isolates including 40 from the outbreak  
401 exhibited high-level mupirocin resistance mediated by a *iles2*-encoding plasmid conjugative  
402 plasmid [61]. Pairwise SNVs exhibited by healthcare-associated and community-associated  
403 isolates indicated recent transmission of ST1-MRSA-IV within and between multiple hospitals,  
404 healthcare facilities and communities in Ireland [60]. This has implications for current MRSA  
405 prevention and control guidelines, which are very much focused on measures in the acute  
406 hospital sector. More recent studies have identified the multidrug resistant ST1-MRSA-IV clone  
407 as a novel CC1-MRSA-IV clone that has recently emerged in several European countries (see  
408 section on the identification of emerging MRSA clones below).

409  
410 When developing guidelines, the question of what measures to take within households where  
411 there is an MRSA-positive individual, often arises. Current Irish recommendations are to  
412 highlight personal standards of hygiene and cleanliness and to minimise  
413 disruption/inconvenience in a home, as intra-familial spread is not considered common [63]. A  
414 retrospective study of isolates collected between 2008 and 2010 in Chicago and Los Angeles  
415 found very little genetic variation amongst USA300 isolates within households but that  
416 transmission did occur where the index patient had skin and soft tissue infection [64]. In  
417 England, where USA300 is less common than in the United States, a 12-month prospective  
418 observational study of 2283 screening and clinical isolates from 1465 patients collected between  
419 April 2012 and April 2013 from the community and hospitals, found USA300 in only 24 cases

420 (1.6%). There were also three groups of closely related isolates with a maximum genetic distance  
421 of 6, 59 and 9 SNPs, respectively, amongst epidemiologically linked cases [65]. The authors  
422 concluded that international travel may have played a role in the introduction of this clone into  
423 England.

424

425 Over the last decade, it has been increasingly recognised that some patients without a recent  
426 history of healthcare contact who develop MRSA may have done so via contact with livestock,  
427 i.e. livestock-associated MRSA (LAMRSA). This has been particularly well described in those  
428 countries with a low background prevalence of hospital MRSA such as Denmark. Larsen and  
429 colleagues analysed human cases of LA-MRSA during 2010-2015 in Denmark [66]. Seventeen  
430 cases of BSI, 700 cases of skin and soft tissue infection and 76 cases of other infections due to  
431 LAMRSA, were studied. Overall, 32% of the LAMRSA were from individuals with no contact  
432 with livestock. Whole-genomes sequence analysis suggested that most isolates were closely  
433 related to Danish pig isolates [66]. A study of CC398, commonly LAMRSA, was assessed in  
434 human and pig isolates in Norway [67]. A human case was identified in 2009 but by the end of  
435 2014, there were a total of 84 human cases. Epidemiological links placed these individuals in  
436 three clusters and all farms had farm workers originating from other European countries where  
437 MRSA is more prevalent [67]. Interestingly, while the farm workers and other possible human  
438 carriers may have been non-Norwegian, none of the farms had imported pigs from abroad, and  
439 the transmission of this clonal complex may have been by human introduction via migration  
440 rather than through the importation of pigs. The results of this study would seem to justify the  
441 Norwegian control strategy of targeting the screening of personnel before working in pig herds

442 as part of national surveillance [65]. Contact with livestock is therefore a potential risk factor to  
443 be considered and not just in countries with a low prevalence of MRSA in acute hospitals.

444  
445 National surveillance systems together with key performance indicators increasingly drive  
446 reductions in serious infections due to MRSA, particularly BSI. In the UK, a “zero tolerance”  
447 approach has been advocated but there may be a portion of MRSA BSIs that are not preventable.  
448 In one instance, WGS assisted in determining if an outbreak was preventable through infection  
449 prevention and control measures. A study in Cambridge, UK, focussed on a cluster of five  
450 MRSA BSIs between September 2011 and August 2012. The researchers used detailed  
451 epidemiological methods and WGS analysis of isolates and found that there were varying  
452 degrees of overlap in admission to the wards of these cases [68]. A comparison of isolates  
453 indicated that each patient was infected by their own carriage isolate. Amongst four of the  
454 patients, isolates differed by between 122 and 168 cgSNPs [68]. A wider analysis of all patients  
455 with MRSA, whether colonised or infected was undertaken including the cases of MRSA BSIs.  
456 Three of the five BSI episodes were associated with skin conditions and two were attributable to  
457 intravascular catheters. From an analysis of the WGS data, it was concluded that these cases  
458 were not due to inter-patient transmission [68]. In this setting, WGS suggested that there was no  
459 deficiency of infection prevention and control services in preventing these five cases of BSI, and  
460 that some or all these cases of BSI were probably not preventable.

461

#### 462 *Identification of emerging MRSA clones*

463 A study by Earls *et al.* (2019) used WGS to investigate the recent emergence of multidrug-  
464 resistant Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL)-negative CC1-MRSA-IV isolates in multiple Irish

465 hospitals and the community and in two hospitals in the German City of Regensburg between  
466 2016-2018 where it was also identified in the community [69]. Phylogenetic analysis grouped the  
467 isolates into a large clade, where no isolate differed from any other isolate by more than 130  
468 cgSNVs. Clade isolates harboured an SCC $mec$  type IVa element with a characteristic 4710  
469 nucleotide insertion in the downstream constant segment (*dcs*) adjacent to *orfX* and harboured  
470 the same allelic variants of the SCC $mec$  genes, *ccrA2* (1350 bp) and *ccrB2* (1629 bp). Overall,  
471 clade isolates exhibited genotypic characteristics which differed comprehensively from those  
472 associated with other previously well characterised CC1-MRSA-IV clones including Western  
473 Australia (WA) MRSA-1 and USA400. Five MRSA isolates recovered in a Romanian hospital  
474 between 2010 and 2012 and 10 CC1 MSSA isolates recovered in the same Romanian hospital  
475 between 2009 and 2012 also grouped into the novel CC1 clade. Earls *et al.* (2019) designated the  
476 multidrug resistant MRSA isolates as a novel European clade of CC1-MRSA-IV and  
477 hypothesized that this clade likely recently emerged from CC1 MSSA in Romania or a  
478 neighbouring country [69]. Interestingly, isolates of this emerging European CC1-MRSA-IV  
479 clone were also recently identified in an Italian paediatric hospital [24].

480

#### 481 *Routine applications*

482 Having data interpreted within two to three days or less, will enhance infection prevention and  
483 control measures and may prevent the use of disruptive measures such as the closing of units or  
484 wards. Eyre and colleagues used rapid benchtop sequencing to investigate two outbreaks of *S.*  
485 *aureus* within five days of a positive culture result [70]. One involved ten MRSA isolates from  
486 eight patients in an intensive care unit and the other involved six patients over three months in  
487 the south of England with Panton-Valentine leucocidin positive MRSA. Within clusters or

488 outbreaks, most isolates were indistinguishable, and all were within three SNVs [70]. On a  
489 broader public health front, WGS may be used to track community and hospital-acquired isolates  
490 within and between countries. A total of 308 invasive isolates collected across Europe identified  
491 predominant clones, e.g. clonal complexes 5 and 22, with the latter representing EMRSA-15  
492 originally from the UK [71].

493

## 494 **Conclusions**

495 The application of WGS has greatly expanded our knowledge of clinical and epidemiologic  
496 aspects of MRSA infection and colonization, including transmission, the commonality of clones  
497 in the community as well as the evolution of resistant determinants. Subsequent studies will  
498 further inform our understanding of transmission patterns and guide what interventions are most  
499 important and when they should be applied. The use of WGS in day-to-day practice will be  
500 facilitated by improvements in our capacity to interpret the data and apply it appropriately, in a  
501 timely manner. This may in many instances confirm low level but ongoing clusters and cross-  
502 transmission of MRSA, which if acted on, may assist in preventing larger outbreaks. The  
503 availability of WGS data may also suggest considerable patient-to-patient transmission of a  
504 single clone or that an outbreak is due to the simultaneous emergence of different clones even if  
505 patients are temporally and geographically linked. Alternatively, an outbreak may arise from  
506 MRSA being carried into a hospital, from either other hospitals or a LSRU.

507

508

509

510 Future priorities include agreeing parameters for deciding whether isolates are closely related or  
511 otherwise enhanced data analysis and ensuring IT systems can share WGS data between  
512 hospitals, between countries and further afield. As this field continues to mature and evolve,  
513 WGS may potentially have a significant role in informing measures to prevent transmission  
514 through the provision of critically important molecular epidemiological information in real time.

515

516

517

517 ***Declaration:*** HH has been in receipt of research funding from Pfizer and Astellas and has  
518 provided educational sessions or advice to Pfizer and Cepheid in recent years.

519 ***Funding:*** The preparation and drafting of this review was not supported by any external funding.  
520 However, the authors would like to acknowledge recent research funding from the Irish Health  
521 Research Board (grant number HRA-POR-2015-1051) and previously from Scientific  
522 Foundation Ireland for research on MRSA in recent years. We also acknowledge and thank Paul  
523 J Murphy for assistance in the literature search.

524



524 **References**

- 525 1. Zingg W, Hopkins S, Gayet-Ageron A, Holmes A, Sharland M, Suetens C for the ECDC PPS  
526 study group. Health-care-associated infections in neonates, children, and adolescents: an  
527 analysis of paediatric data from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control  
528 point-prevalence survey. *Lancet Infect Dis* 2017; 17: 381-89.
- 529 2. Smyth ETM, McIlvenny G, Enstone JE, Emmerson AM, Humphreys H, Fitzpatrick F, *et al.*  
530 Four country healthcare associated infection prevalence survey 2006: overview of the  
531 results. *J Hosp Infect* 2008; 69: 230-248.
- 532 3. Guy R, Geoghegan L, Heginbothom M, Howe R, Muller-Pebody B, Reilly JS, *et al.* Non-  
533 susceptibility of *Escherichia coli.*, *Klebsiella spp.*, *Pseudomonas spp.*, *Streptococcus*  
534 *pneumoniae* and *Staphylococcus aureus* in the UK: temporal trends in England, Northern  
535 Ireland, Scotland and Wales. *J Antimicrob Chemother* 2016; 71: 1564-1569.
- 536 4. Mizuno S, Iwami M, Kunisawa S, Naylor N, Yamashita K, Kyratsis Y, *et al.* Comparison of  
537 national strategies to reduce methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* infections in Japan  
538 and England. *J Hosp Infect* 2018; 100: 280-298.
- 539 5. Monecke S, Slickers P Ehricht R. Assignment of *Staphylococcus aureus* isolates to clonal  
540 complexes based on microarray analysis and pattern recognition. *FEMS Immunol Med*  
541 *Microbiol* 2008; 53: 237–51.
- 542 6. Monecke S, Jatzwauk L, Müller E, Nitschke H, Pfohl K, Slickers P, *et al.* Diversity of  
543 SCC*mec* elements in *Staphylococcus aureus* as observed in south-eastern Germany. *PLoS*  
544 *One* 2016; 11(9): e0162654. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0162654.
- 545 7. Shore AC, Rossney AS, Kinnevey PM, Brennan OM, Creamer E, Sherlock O, Dolan A, *et al.*  
546 Enhanced discrimination of highly clonal ST22-methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*  
547 IV isolates achieved by combining *spa*, *dru* and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis typing data.  
548 *J Clin Microbiol* 2010; 48:1839–52.
- 549 8. Holden MT, Hsu LY, Kurt K, Weinert LA, Mather AE, Harris SR, *et al.* A genomic portrait  
550 of the emergence, evolution, and global spread of a methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus*  
551 *aureus* pandemic. *Genome Res* 2013; 23:653–64.
- 552 9. Grundmann H, Schouls LM, Aanensen DM, Pluister GN, Tami A, Chlebowicz M, *et al.*  
553 ESCMID Study Group on Molecular Epidemiological Markers, European Staphylococcal  
554 Reference Laboratory Working Group. The dynamic changes of dominant clones of  
555 *Staphylococcus aureus* causing bloodstream infections in the European region: results of a  
556 second structured survey. *Euro Surveill* 2014; 19(49):pii\_20987.  
557 <http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=20987>.
- 558 10. Creamer E, Shore AC, Rossney AS, Dolan A, Sherlock O, Fitzgerald-Hughes D, *et al.*  
559 Transmission of endemic ST22-MRSA-IV on four acute hospital wards investigated using a  
560 combination of *spa*, *dru*, and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis typing. *Eur J Clin Microbiol*  
561 *Infect Dis* 2012; 31: 3151-3161.
- 562 11. Kinnevey PM, Shore AC, MacAogáin M, Creamer E, Brennan GI, Humphreys H, *et al.*  
563 Enhanced tracking of nosocomial transmission of endemic sequence Type 22 methicillin-  
564 resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* type IV isolates among patients and environmental sites by  
565 use of whole-genome sequencing. *J Clin Microbiol* 2016; 54: 445-448.
- 566 12. Tang P, Croxen MA, Hasan MR, Hsiao WW, Hoang LM. Infection control in the new age of  
567 genomic epidemiology. *Am J Infect Control* 2017; 45:170–9.

- 568 13. Besser J, Carleton HA, Gerner-Smidt P, Lindsey RL, Trees E. Next-generation sequencing  
569 technologies and their application to the study and control of bacterial infections. *Clin*  
570 *Microbiol Infect* 2018; 24:335-41.
- 571 14. Schürch AC, Arredondo-Alonso S, Willems RJL, Goering RV. Whole genome sequencing  
572 options for bacterial strain typing and epidemiologic analysis based on single nucleotide  
573 polymorphism versus gene-by-gene-based approaches. *Clin Microbiol Infect* 2018; 24:350-  
574 4.
- 575 15. Peacock SJ, Parkhill J, Brown NM. Changing the paradigm for hospital outbreak detection  
576 by leading with genomic surveillance of nosocomial pathogens. *Microbiol* 2018; 164:1213-9
- 577 16. Cunningham SA, Chia N, Jeraldo PR, Quest DJ, Johnson JA, Boxrud DJ, et al. Comparison  
578 of whole-genome sequencing methods for analysis of three methicillin-resistant  
579 *Staphylococcus aureus* outbreaks. *J Clin Microbiol* 2017; 55: 1946-1953
- 580 17. Leggett RM, Clark MD. A world of opportunities with nanopore sequencing. *J Exp Bot*  
581 2017; 68:5419-29.
- 582 18. Lemon JK, Khil PP, Frank KM, Dekker JP. Rapid nanopore sequencing of plasmids and  
583 resistance gene detection in clinical isolates. *J Clin Microbiol* 2017; 55:3530-43.
- 584 19. Baig S, Johannesen TB, Overballe-Petersen S, Larsen J, Larsen AR, Stegger M. Novel  
585 SCC*mec* type XIII (9A) identified in an ST152 methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*.  
586 *Infect Genet Evol* 2018; 61:74-6.
- 587 20. Carriço JA, Rossi M, Moran-Gilad J, Van Domselaar G, Ramirez M. A primer on microbial  
588 bioinformatics for nonbioinformaticians. *Clin Microbiol Infect* 2018; 24:342-9.
- 589 21. Oakeson KF, Wagner JM, Mendenhall M, Rohrwasser A, Atkinson-Dunn R. Bioinformatic  
590 analyses of whole-genome sequence data in a public health laboratory. *Emer Infect Dis* 2017;  
591 23:1441-5.
- 592 22. Tong SY, Holden MT, Nickerson EK, Cooper BS, Köser CU, Cori A, et al. Genome  
593 sequencing defines phylogeny and spread of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* in a  
594 high transmission setting. *Genome Res* 2015; 25:111-8.
- 595 23. Gordon NC, Pichon B, Golubchik T, Wilson DJ, Paul J, Blanc DS, et al. Whole-genome  
596 sequencing reveals the contribution of long-term carriers in *Staphylococcus aureus* outbreak  
597 investigation. *J Clin Microbiol* 2017; 55:2188-97.
- 598 24. Manara S, Pasolli E, Dolce D, Ravenni N, Campana S, Armanini F, et al. Whole-genome  
599 epidemiology, characterisation, and phylogenetic reconstruction of *Staphylococcus aureus*  
600 strains in a paediatric hospital. *Genome Med* 2018; 10(1):82 doi: 10.1186/s13073-018-0593-  
601 7.
- 602 25. Enright MC, Day NPJ, Davies CE, Peacock SJ, Spratt BG. Sequence typing for  
603 characterization of methicillin-resistant and methicillin-susceptible clones  
604 of *Staphylococcus aureus*. *J Clin Microbiol* 2000;38: 1008-1015.
- 605 26. Leopold SR, Goering RV, Witten A, Harmsen D, Mellmann A. Bacterial whole-genome  
606 sequencing revisited: portable, scalable, and standardized analysis for typing and detection of  
607 virulence and antibiotic resistance genes. *J. Clin. Microbiol* 2014, 52, 2365-70.
- 608 27. Roisin S, Gaudin C, De Mendonça R, Bellon J, Van Vaerenbergh K, De Bruyne K. et al.  
609 Pan-genome multilocus sequence typing and outbreak-specific reference-based single  
610 nucleotide polymorphism analysis to resolve two concurrent *Staphylococcus aureus*  
611 outbreaks in neonatal services. *Clin Microbiol Infect* 2016; 22:520-6.
- 612 28. Gilchrist CA, Turner SD, Riley MF, Petri Jr WA, Hewlett EL. Whole-genome sequencing in  
613 outbreak analysis. *Clin Microbiol Rev* 2015; 28: 541-563.

- 614 29. Croucher NJ, Didelot X. The application of genomics to tracing bacterial pathogen  
615 transmission. *Curr Opin Microbiol.* 2015; 23:62-7.
- 616 30. Bartels MD, Petersen A, Worning P, Nielsen JB, Larner-Svensson H, Johansen HK, *et al.*  
617 Comparing whole-genome sequencing with Sanger sequencing for *spa* typing of methicillin-  
618 resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*. *J Clin Microbiol* 2014; 52: 4305-4308.
- 619 31. Quainoo S, Coolen JPM, van Hijum SAFT, Huynen MA, Melchers WJG, van Schaik W,  
620 Wertheim HFL. Whole-genome sequencing of bacterial pathogens: the future of nosocomial  
621 outbreak analysis. *Clin Microbiol Rev* 2017; 30:1015-1063.
- 622 32. Harris SR, Feil EJ, Holden MTG, Quail MA, Nickerson EK, Chantratita N *et al.* Evolution  
623 of MRSA during hospital transmission and intercontinental spread. *Science* 2010; 327: 469-  
624 474.
- 625 33. Price JR, Didelot X, Crook DW, Llewelyn MJ, Paul J. Whole genome sequencing in the  
626 prevention and control of *Staphylococcus aureus* infection. *J Hosp Infect* 2013; 83: 14-21.
- 627 34. Young BC, Golubchik T, Batty EM, Fung R, Larner-Svensson H, Votintseva AA, *et al.*  
628 Evolutionary dynamics of *Staphylococcus aureus* during progression from carriage to  
629 disease. *PNAS* 2012; 109: 4550-4555.
- 630 35. Nübel U, Nachtnebel M, Falkenhorst G, *et al.* MRSA Transmission on a neonatal intensive  
631 care unit: epidemiological and genome-based phylogenetic analyses. *PLoS* 2013; 8(1):  
632 e54898. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0044898
- 633 36. Layer F, Sanchini A, Strommenger B, Cuny C, Breier A-C, Proquitté H, *et al.* Molecular  
634 typing of toxic shock syndrome toxin-1- and enterotoxin A-producing methicillin-sensitive  
635 *Staphylococcus aureus* isolates from an outbreak in a neonatal intensive care unit. *Internat J*  
636 *Med Micro* 2015; 305: 790-798.
- 637 37. Köser CU, Holden MTG, Ellington MJ, Ellington MJ, Cartwright EJP, Brown NM, *et al.*  
638 Rapid whole-genome sequencing for investigation of a neonatal MRSA outbreak. *N Engl*  
639 *Med* 2012; 366: 2267-75.
- 640 38. Harris SR, Cartwright EJP, Török ME, Holden MTG, Brown NM, Ogilvy-Stuart AL, *et al.*  
641 Whole-genome sequencing for analysis of an outbreak of methicillin-resistant  
642 *Staphylococcus aureus*; a descriptive study. *Lancet Infect Dis* 2013; 13: 130-136.
- 643 39. Azaraian T, Maraqa NF, Cook RL, Johnson JA, Bailey C, Wheeler S, *et al.* Genomic  
644 epidemiology of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* in a neonatal intensive care unit.  
645 *PLoS One* 2016; 11(10): e0164397. doi:10.371/journal.pone.0164397.
- 646 40. Azarian T, Cook RI, Johnson JA, Guzman N, McCarter YS, Gomez N, *et al.* Whole-genome  
647 sequencing for outbreak investigations of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* in the  
648 neonatal intensive care unit: time for routine practice? *Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol* 2015;  
649 36(7): 777-785.
- 650 41. Ugolotti E, Di Marco E, Bandettini R, Biassoni R. Genomic characterisation of a paediatric  
651 MRSA outbreak by next-generation sequencing. *J Hosp Infect* 2018; 98: 155-160.
- 652 42. Earls MR, Coleman DC, Brennan GI, Fleming T, Monecke S, Slickers P, *et al.* Intra-hospital,  
653 inter-hospital and intercontinental spread of ST78 MRSA from two neonatal intensive care  
654 units outbreaks established using whole genome sequencing. *Front Microbiol* 2018;  
655 9:1485. doi: 10.3389/fmicb.2018.01485.
- 656 43. Durand G, Javerliat F, Bes M, Veyrieras J-B, Guigon G, Mugnier N, *et al.* Routine whole-  
657 genome sequencing for outbreak investigations of *Staphylococcus aureus* in a national  
658 reference center. *Front Microbiol* 2018; 9:511. doi: 10.3389/fmicb.2018.00511.

- 659 44. Kong Z, Zhao P, Liu H, Yu X, Qin Y, Su Z, *et al.* Whole-genome sequencing for the  
660 investigation of a hospital outbreak of MRSA in China. PLoS ONE 2016; 11(3): e0149844,  
661 doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0149844.
- 662 45. Price JR, Cole K, Bexley A, Kostiou V, Eyre DW, Golubchik T, *et al.* Transmission of  
663 *Staphylococcus aureus* between health-care workers, the environment, and patients in an  
664 intensive care unit: a longitudinal cohort study based on whole-genome sequencing. Lancet  
665 Infect Dis 2017; 17: 207-14.
- 666 46. Weterings V, Bosch T, Witteveen S, Landman F, Schouls L, Klutyman J. Next-generation  
667 sequence analysis reveals transfer of methicillin resistance to a methicillin-susceptible  
668 *Staphylococcus aureus* strain that subsequently caused a methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus*  
669 *aureus* outbreak: A descriptive study. J Clin Microbiol 2017; 55: 2808-2816.
- 670 47. Long WS, Beres S, Olsen RJ, Musser JM. Absence of patient-to-patient intra-hospital  
671 transmission of *Staphylococcus aureus* as determined by whole-genome sequencing. mBio  
672 2014; 5(5): e01692-14.doi.10.1128/mbio.01692-14.
- 673 48. Miller RR, Price JR, Batty EM *et al.* Healthcare-associated outbreak of methicillin-resistant  
674 *Staphylococcus aureus* bacteraemia: role of a cryptic variant of an epidemic clone. J Hosp  
675 Infect 2014; 86: 83-89.
- 676 49. Moore G, Cookson B, Gordon NC, Jackson R, Kearns A, Singleton J, *et al.* Whole-genome  
677 sequencing in hierarchy with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis: the utility of this approach to  
678 establish possible sources of MRSA cross-transmission. J Hosp Infect 2015; 90: 38-45.
- 679 50. Senn L, Clerc O, Zanetti G, Bassett P, Prod'hom G, Gordon NC, *et al.* The stealthy  
680 superbug: The role of asymptomatic enteric carriage in maintaining a long-term hospital  
681 outbreak of ST228 methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*. mBio 2016; 7(1): e02039-  
682 15.doi.10.1128/mBio.02039-15.
- 683 51. Challagundla L, Luo X, Tickler IA, Didelot X, Coleman DC, Shore AC, *et al.* Range  
684 expansion and the origin of USA300 North American epidemic methicillin-resistant  
685 *Staphylococcus aureus*. MBio 2018; 9(1):e02016-17. doi: 10.1128/mBio.02016-17.
- 686 52. Fluit, AC, Carpaij N, Majoor EAM, Weinstein RA, Aroutcheva A, Rice TW, *et al.*  
687 Comparison of an ST80 MRSA strain from the USA with European ST80 strains. J  
688 Antimicrob Chemother 2015; 70: 664-669.
- 689 53. Rubin IM, Hansen TA, Klingenberg AM, Petersen AM, Worning P, Westh H, *et al.* A  
690 sporadic four-year hospital outbreak of a ST97-IVa MRSA with half of the patients identified  
691 in the community. Front Microbiol 2018; 9:1494. doi: 10.3389/fmicb.2018.0194.
- 692 54. Donker, T, Reuter S, Scriberras J, Reynolds R, Brown NM, Török ME *et al.* Population  
693 genetic structuring of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* clone EMRSA-15 within  
694 UK reflects patient referral patterns. Microbial Genom 2017; 3: e000113.  
695 Doi.10.1099/mgen.0.000113.
- 696 55. Auguet, OT, Stabler RA, Betley J, Preston MD, Dhaliwal M, Ioannou A, *et al.* Frequent  
697 undetected methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* ward-based; transmission linked to  
698 patient sharing between hospitals. Clin Infect Dis 2018; 66: 840-8.
- 699 56. Chow A, Lim VW, Khan A, Pettigrew K, Lye DCB, Kanagasabai K, *et al.* MRSA  
700 transmission dynamics among interconnected acute, intermediate-term, and long-term  
701 healthcare facilities in Singapore. Clin Infect Dis 2017; 64: S76-S81.
- 702 57. Toleman, MS, Watkins ER, Williams T, Blane B, Sadler B, Harrison EM *et al.* Investigation  
703 of a cluster of sequence type 22 methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* transmission in a  
704 community setting. Clin Infect Dis 2017; 65: 2069-2077.

- 705 58. de la Gandara MP, Garay JAR, Mwangi M, Tobin JM, Tsang A, Khalida C, *et al.* Molecular  
706 types of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* and methicillin-sensitive *S. aureus*  
707 strains causing skin and soft tissue infections and nasal colonization, identified in community  
708 health centers in New York City. *J Clin Microbiol* 2015; 53: 2648-2658.
- 709 59. Stine, OC, Burrowes S, David S, Johnson JK, Roghmann M-C. Transmission clusters of  
710 methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* in long-term care facilities based on whole-  
711 genome sequencing. *Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol* 2016; 37: 685-691.
- 712 60. Auguet TO, Betley JP, Stabler RA. Evidence for community transmission of community-  
713 associated but not health-care-associated methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* strains  
714 linked to social and material deprivation: spatial analysis of cross-sectional data. *PLoS Med*  
715 2016; 13. Doi.10.1371/journal.pmed.1001944.
- 716 61. Earls MR, Kinnevey PM, Brennan GI, Lazaris A, Skally M, O'Connell B, *et al.* The recent  
717 emergence in hospitals of multidrug-resistant community-associated sequence type 1 and *spa*  
718 type t127 methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* investigated by whole-genome  
719 sequencing: Implications for screening. *PLoS ONE* 2017; 12;  
720 e0175542. doi.10.1371/journal.pone.0175542.
- 721 62. Harrison EM, Zudden C, Broderick HJ, Blane B, Brennan G, Morris D *et al.* Transmission of  
722 methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* in long-term care facilities and their related  
723 healthcare networks. *Genome Med* 2016; 8: doi 10.1186/s13073-016-0353-5.
- 724 63. National Clinical Effectiveness Committee. Prevention and control of methicillin-resistant  
725 *Staphylococcus aureus*. National Clinical Guideline No.2. Department of Health, Dublin,  
726 Ireland, September 2013. [http://www.hpsc.ie/a-](http://www.hpsc.ie/a-z/microbiologyantimicrobialresistance/infectioncontrolandhai/guidelines/File,14478,en.pdf)  
727 [z/microbiologyantimicrobialresistance/infectioncontrolandhai/guidelines/File,14478,en.pdf](http://www.hpsc.ie/a-z/microbiologyantimicrobialresistance/infectioncontrolandhai/guidelines/File,14478,en.pdf)  
728 (accessed 26<sup>th</sup> January 2019).
- 729 64. Alam MT, Read TD, Petit III RA, Petit III RA, Boyle-Vavra S, Miller LG *et al.* Transmission  
730 and microevolution of USA300 MRSA in U.S. households: Evidence from whole-genome  
731 sequencing. *mBio* 2015; 6(2): e000-54-15. Doi.10.1128/mBio.00054-15.
- 732 65. Toleman MS, Reuter S, Coll F, Harrison EM, Blane B, Brown NM, *et al.* Systematic  
733 surveillance detects multiple silent introductions and household transmission of methicillin-  
734 resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* USA 300 in the East of England. *J Infect Dis* 2016; 214:  
735 447-453.
- 736 66. Larsen J, Peterson A, Larsen AR, Sieber RN, Stegger M, Koch A, *et al.* Emergence of  
737 livestock-associated methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* bloodstream Infections in  
738 Denmark. *Clin Infect Dis* 2017; 65: 1072-1076.
- 739 67. Grøntvedt, CA, Elstrøm P, Stegger M, Skov RL, Andersen PS, LARssen KW, *et al.*  
740 Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* CC398 in humans and pigs in Norway: A "One  
741 Health" perspective on introduction and transmission. *Clin Infect Dis* 2016; 63: 1431-1438.
- 742 68. Török, ME, Harris SR, Cartwright EJP, Raven KE, Brown NM, Allison MED, *et al.* Zero  
743 tolerance for healthcare-associated MRSA bacteraemia: is it realistic? *J Antimicrob*  
744 *Chemother* 2014; 69: 2238-2245.
- 745 69. Eyre DW, Golubchik T, Gordon NC, Bowden R, Piazza P, Batty EM, *et al.* A pilot study of  
746 rapid benchtop sequencing of *Staphylococcus aureus* and *Clostridium difficile* for outbreak  
747 detection and surveillance. *BMJOpen* 2012; 2: e001124. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2012-  
748 001124.

- 749 70. Earls MR, Shore AC, Brennan GI, Simbeck A, Brachert WS, Vremeră T, *et al.* A novel  
750 multi-resistant PVL-negative CC1-MRSA-IV clone emerging in Ireland and Germany likely  
751 evolved in South-Eastern Europe. *Infect Genet Evol* 2019; 69:117-126.
- 752 71. Aanensen DM, Feil EJ, Holden MTG, Dordel J, Yeats CA, Fedosejev A, *et al.* Whole-  
753 genome sequencing for routine pathogen surveillance in public health; a population snapshot  
754 of invasive *Staphylococcus aureus* in Europe. *mBio* 2016; 7(3): e00444-  
755 16.doi:10.1128/mbio.00444-16.
- 756  
757  
758

**Table I.** List of commonly used terms relating to whole genome sequencing and analysis

<b>Term</b>	<b>Explanation</b>
Next generation sequencing (NGS)	The high-throughput and rapid determination of whole genome sequences. Millions to billions of DNA fragments are sequenced in parallel.
Sequencing platform	DNA sequencing system consisting of sequencing equipment (i.e. sequencer) and methodology to sequence target DNA. Examples include the Illumina MiSeq, the PacBio Single Molecular Real-Time (SMRT) and the Oxford Nanopore MinION sequencing platforms
Sequence read	A continuous DNA sequence determined from a target organism (e.g. bacterium)
Short sequence reads	A continuous DNA sequence determined from a target organism ranging between approximately 100-600 bp. For example, the Illumina MiSeq sequencing platform yields short sequence reads
Long sequence reads	A continuous DNA sequence determined from a target organism generally > 10 kb. For example, the PacBio SMRT sequencing platform yields long sequence reads
Sequence read error rate	The proportion of sequence reads containing sequencing errors
Contigs	Contiguous sequences assembled from overlapping smaller sequence reads that represent a consensus region of DNA
Single nucleotide variation (SNV)	A variation in a single nucleotide base that occurs at a specific position in the genome of an organism of interest without implying how often this variation occurs in a population
Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)	A variation in a single nucleotide base that occurs at a specific position in the genome of an organism of interest and is relatively common in a population
SNP analysis	Strain typing by mapping SNPs in sequence reads or assembled contigs against a reference genome(s). Reference genomes that are closely related to the sequenced samples are best
Core genome	A set of conserved genes present in virtually all isolates of a species.
Accessory genome	A variable set of genes present in some but not all isolates of a species. Examples in <i>S. aureus</i> and other staphylococci include SCC $mec$ and arginine catabolic mobile elements (ACME)
Multilocus sequence typing (MLST). Also known as conventional MLST	A method that determines the sequences of internal fragments of up to seven housekeeping genes. The different sequences within a bacterial

<p>Multilocus sequence typing (MLST). Also known as conventional MLST</p>	<p>A method that determines the sequences of internal fragments of up to seven housekeeping genes. The different sequences within a bacterial species are assigned as distinct alleles and, for each isolate, the alleles at each of the loci define the allelic profile or sequence type (ST). Curated MLST databases exist for many bacterial species including <i>S. aureus</i>. Conventional MLST has largely been replaced by WGS-based MLST schemes for <i>S. aureus</i> and other important bacterial pathogens due to significantly enhanced resolution</p>
<p>Whole genome MLST (wgMLST).</p>	<p>A typing method that uses WGS data from the core genome and accessory genome to perform MLST on a genome-wide basis and permits gene-by-gene comparisons of very large numbers of genes amongst a group of isolates. The presence/absence of each target locus is determined from WGS data, as are allelic variants. Very high resolution can be achieved</p>
<p>Core genome MLST (cgMLST)</p>	<p>A typing method that uses WGS data to perform MLST on a predefined set of conserved genome-wide core (can be &gt; 1000 genes) that are present in the vast majority of isolates of a bacterial species. Very high resolution can be achieved across large groups of isolates by core genome comparisons. The approach is highly reproducible across data sets</p>
<p>Genome assembly</p>	<p>The entire DNA sequence of an organism can be reassembled from overlapping sequence reads which first are assembled into larger contigs. Any remaining gaps between contigs can then be</p>



**Table II. Studies using whole genomic sequencing (WGS) of MRSA in the neonatal/paediatric setting**

<b>Country (Ref)</b>	<b>Study Details</b>	<b>Main Conclusions</b>	<b>Comment</b>
Germany (35)	Retrospective case control study of neonates and staff	28 isolates formed a predominant strain with two other strains present Staff involved in transmission	Only one isolate per neonate/staff analysed and greater variability may have been present
Germany (36)	Outbreak of toxic-shock syndrome & enterotoxin-A producing MSSA	26% of neonates positive; 19.5% of staff 21 related isolates confirming PFGE analysis $2.8 \times 10^{-6}$ mutations per nucleotide per year	Prolonged duration of outbreak suggests that staff member may have been reservoir as far back as 2-3 years ago
UK (37)	Retrospective investigation of outbreak in neonatal intensive care unit	Distinct cluster of outbreak isolates and clear separation with non-outbreak isolates.	Value of WGS in real time for MRSA control in hospitals
UK (38)	Outbreak in neonatal unit with isolates compared to other clinical strains in the hospital or community	11 MRSA infants identified ST2371 predominated Similar isolates in emergency department, out-patients & general practice	Mother-to-mother transmission outside hospital & staff carriage allowed outbreak to persist
USA (39)	Retrospective analysis of isolates from screening neonates, 2008-2010	Colonised infants had lower birth weight, gestational age and length of stay 70% of colonization due to events within the NICU. Transmission varied by strain	Useful longitudinal analysis of strains with evidence of significant within-unit spread and dynamic changes in strain predominance
USA (40)	Temporal cluster of USA 300 identified on PFGE and analysed with WGS & <i>spa</i> typing	17 neonates acquired MRSA in unit 12 unique isolates with 5 in two clusters	WGS excluded cross-transmission in most cases, suggesting multiple and independent introduction of MRSA strains
Italy (41)	Isolates from putative outbreak in NICU & PICU	10/12 isolates ST625; 2xST8 A maximum 1.7% phylogenetic distance amongst ST625 A staff member isolated with ST625	Genetically related isolates but temporal analysis of isolates did not confirm an outbreak
	Isolates from two	Considerable homogeneity between 28	Highlights the importance of travel in the

Ireland (42)	outbreaks of MRSA ST78 in a neonatal intensive care unit	isolates with likely importation from abroad and involvement of healthcare worker	spread of MRSA and the value of WGS in tracking local spread and determining the origins of clones
France (43)	Isolates from two geographically separate NICUs	41 CC isolates from Limoges and Bordeaux with less than 22 SNPs difference	WGS is useful to determine relatedness but also to track bacterial evolution

MSSA; methicillin-susceptibility *Staphylococcus aureus*, PFGE; pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, NICU, neonatal intensive care unit, PICU; paediatric intensive care unit, CC, clonal complexes, SNPs, short nucleotide polymorphism.