# Lucian's Self-conscious Fiction:
# Theory In Practice

# LUCIAN'S SELF-CONSCIOUS FICTION: THEORY IN PRACTICE

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D.

BY

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
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# SUMMARY

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

I set forth the principle that a relation exists between self-consciousness and self-commentary, which can then evolve into meta-commentary. Lucian's works in general show that he is a highly self-conscious artist; he projects a literary *persona* into his work, writes frequently about his own literary enterprise and methods, and presents himself as an experimental innovator in genre especially. My thesis, therefore, that when Lucian writes fiction, he is interested in exploring, playfully, *how* fiction works, is consistent with our overall impression of this mercurial artist.

## CHAPTER 1: *PHILOPSEUDES*

As a dialogue on the subject of lies, containing embedded fictional narratives, I argue that the *Philopseudes* is both thematically and structurally concerned with fiction. I examine the importance of the dialogue as the frame in which the stories are embedded. I explore the dense intertextuality with Plato's works in the dialogue preamble especially, showing how the Platonic atmosphere evoked in this section establishes a suitable framework for speculation on the nature of fiction in the stories that follow. At the same time, the intertextuality draws attention, metaleptically, to the fictive status of the dialogue itself, thereby drawing the *Philopseudes* into the problematics of truth, lies and fiction that preoccupy the characters within the text. The subversive anti-conversion rhetoric used in the work, and the ambiguity of the principal speaker, Tychiades, means that this dialogue is itself an enactment of the dialogic tension inherent in reading fiction.

## CHAPTER 2: *TOXARIS*

As a dialogue involving a story-telling competition with ten embedded stories, the *Toxaris* is self-consciously about fiction. Once again, the dialogue frame is crucial, as Toxaris' *ekphrasis*, which is a *mise en abyme* representation of the dialogue, evokes a metaliterary reading of the work. The interlocutors, Mnesippus and Toxaris, as alternating narrators and narratees, function as authors and readers in the text, underpinning Lucian's role as extra-dialogic

author, and ours as extra-dialogic readers respectively. Their in-text commentary on the plausibility of their narratives may therefore be read as implicit theory on how fiction 'works'. Furthermore, the novelistic nature of the *topoi*, themes, narrative techniques and structure of many of their stories means that this implicit theory may usefully be applied to ancient novelistic narrative more generally. Finally, Mnesippus and Toxaris may provide us with an insight into the profile of contemporary readers of the ancient novels.

## CHAPTER 3: *VERAE HISTORIAE*

I examine in detail the proem (VH 1. 1-4) as a subversive frame to the fictional narrative. By the extraordinarily dense intertextuality in the proem, Lucian evokes Platonic, Aristotelian and Strabonian speculation on truth, lies and fiction, but evolves this theory in a striking new direction – a justification for fiction that is liberated from the question of content, and based instead on an explicit contractual understanding between author and reader. Once again, the proem sets the tone for a metaliterary reading of the narrative; I explore how the author draws attention to the textual surface of the narrative, by playing with textuality (e.g. fantastic inscriptions, letters, lost texts), and by using an array of metaleptic techniques, such as *mise en abyme* and frame-breaking. In the final section of this chapter, I contextualize the *VH* by seeing how it 'fits in' with contemporary literary trends for more ludic fiction, fantasy, and Homeric revisionism.

## GENERAL CONCLUSION

The 'marginality' of Lucian's works of fiction can now be seen as purposeful – reflecting the author's speculative and experimental interest in the concept and dynamics of fiction - rather than as an indication of paucity of talent or writerly stamina. I propose finally that these extraordinary works could be considered as ancient analogues to the post-modern branch of literature known as *metafiction*. As well as being highly entertaining works of literature, as practical theory on fiction, these texts are immensely valuable to scholars of ancient fiction, including the novel.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# GENERAL INTRODUCTION

## SELF-CONSCIOUS FICTION AND PRACTICAL THEORY

Descartes' famous dictum - *I think, therefore I am* - is meaningful also in reverse; the statement 'I am' reflects the self-conscious knowledge that one exists, and this self-consciousness is in turn germane to cognition - 'I am, therefore I cogitate - on my existence, and on myself.' This surely explains why, during adolescence - the time when we become most acutely self-aware - we begin to develop ideas and questions about our own ontology, which eventually allow us to extrapolate certain truths about the human condition in general. In literary terms, in a similar way, once a work reveals that it is knowing and self-conscious, it evolves into a performative commentary - theory in practice - on the principles and dynamics of its own construction. The author of such a work 'becomes involved in exploring his own symbolic system. His concern is not just to depict a coherent reality but to question the symbolic discourse and the aesthetic means that enable him to create the world his characters inhabit.'[1] His ideas may then become relevant to other fictional works too.

Broadly speaking, that is the business of this thesis. Having chosen four Lucianic works of fiction, I will first demonstrate how this fiction is self-conscious, and then I will explore the self-commentary and theory that is embedded in them. My conclusion will suggest ways in which this practical theory might have been realised by authors and consumers of fiction in antiquity, and might be meaningful to modern readers and scholars of this fiction as well. I will also suggest that one of the reasons why Lucian's fictions are notoriously difficult to classify, alongside the bulk of ancient narrative fiction, is because they are works of *meta*fiction; in fact, the *Philopseudes, Toxaris, Verae Historiae* and *Navigium* are, at times, surprisingly close in spirit to the modernist and post-modernist metafictions of our own era.

Why Lucian? John Morgan and others have done excellent work to show how the theory of fictionality is encoded in the work of the ancient novelists.[2] Lucian was working at the time when the novel was itself enjoying its acme; he is roughly contemporaneous with the sophistic novelists Longus and Achilles Tatius, who were themselves self-conscious artists in their tradition. His fiction is related,

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[1] Segal 1982: 222. His remarks, made specifically with reference to the self-conscious dramatist Euripides, are more broadly relevant to artists in other genres as well.
[2] See, for example, Morgan 1993, Laird 1993.

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but also different to theirs. Lucian shares their artistic self-awareness and knowingness, but although a skilled writer of narrative fiction, he is not a novelist; whereas the novelists wish primarily to construct believable and consuming make-believe worlds, Lucian's primary motive for writing fiction seems to spring from a more cerebral interest in fictional discourse. At least amongst the works ascribed to him with certainty, his fiction is always subordinated to some broader frame of speculative inquiry. Lucian explores the philosophy and epistemology of fiction, and plays games with the discourse of truth and lies. More than any other ancient author, except perhaps Plato, Lucian shows an understanding that fiction and make-believe offer a philosophical insight into the ways in which we 'construct' reality and truth; in Lucian's case, this insight is founded on the unsettling (and curiously post-modernist) realisation that 'reality' and 'truth' can in fact be 'fictional', in the sense that they can be constructed out of text - an equation which he exploits with imaginative abandon in creating the fantasy worlds of the *Verae Historiae* especially - some of which are, as we shall see, literally and explicitly textual.

Lucian was amongst those authors from the Second Sophistic whom Jack Winkler so aptly described as 'theoreticians-in-practice'[3] - a phrase which I have adapted for the second part of my title for this thesis. To use a term from modern literary theory, he might also be regarded as a 'fabulator', meaning a self-conscious teller of fictional tales, who rejoices in the form as well as the content of his tales, and whose storytelling can teach the reader something about fiction, and even about the way in which fiction and reality relate to one another - the way in which text is used to construct realities.[4] Lucian is himself a highly self-conscious author; he writes about writing, about his own work, and about himself as an author. [5] He treats his role as author in a ludic manner in the *Philopseudes* and *Verae Historiae* especially. Works such as the *De Historia Conscribenda* and *Verae Historiae* show that he was interested in how different discourses - mainly historiography in this case - work. He was also sensitive to and experimental with genre, as he himself tells us.[6] He was highly conscious of his artistic medium, referring playfully to the more literal and physical aspects of this as well, such as

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[3] This phrase is attributed by Bartsch (1989: 14, with n. 13) to Jack Winkler, who used it to describe Lucian, the Philostrati, and other important sophists of the period.
[4] The terms 'fabulator' and 'fabulation' were first employed as terms in literary theory by Robert Scholes; see Scholes 1979 1-4. On the distinction between the novelist and the fabulator, see Scholes (1979: 3): 'Delight in design, and its concurrent emphasis on the art of the designer, will serve in part to distinguish the art of the fabulator from the work of the novelist or the satirist. Of all narrative forms, fabulation puts the highest premium on art and joy...'.
[5] See, for example, p. 66 ff..

the wax and wood and other materials onto which he inscribes his art, and even the words and letters themselves, which are in fact animated in one work of metaliterary fantasy, the *Iudicium Vocalium*.[7] The narrative fictions of such a sophisticated and self-conscious fabulator can no longer be dismissed, in terms however well-meaning, as 'the best of the rest', [8] on the grounds that they are atypical, marginal, do not 'fit'. As readers still on the cusp of one millennium and another, we ought surely to recognise that liminality has its own virtues; it is time to ruminate, explore, and reclaim texts, like Lucian's fiction, that revel at the shimmering interface between truth and lies, belief and disbelief, world-creation and deconstruction.

The works I explore in this thesis - the *Philopseudes*, *Toxaris*, *Verae Historiae* and *Navigium* share much in common - mainly, of course, the prominent component of narrative fiction, presented in a self-conscious manner.[9] Storytelling, and issues of truth and plausibility (often in a polemical context) are also important features in each of these works. Lucian portrays characters composing and reacting to fiction in a way that reflects and figures his own role as author, as well as ours as readers of his work. In the following chapters, I will explore the ways in which these works enact, problematize, and thematize different responses to fiction, and how the thinly veiled presence of the authorial persona in each case draws the in-text commentary across the dramatic frame, to enclose the text itself, in implicit self-commentary, or metafiction. Ultimately, I will show that the practical theory offered by these self-conscious fictions is

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[6] *Bis Acc.* 33.

[7] This sophistic *tour de force* is a neglected work, probably on account of the notorious difficulty of translating it, and also because its authorship is considered suspect by some editors. Consciousness of letters as the abstract signs that constitute the textual fabric of 'reality' is a concern of post-modernist writers. Obviously, I do not wish to suggest that there is any direct connection between Lucian's animation of letters in the *Iud.Voc.*, and his insight into the textual artificiality of the fictional worlds which he himself constructs in the *VH*, for example. Nevertheless, his defamiliarization and animation of the letters is richly suggestive; it not only provokes us to think of language and writing in a new, metaphoric way, but it also hints at the autonomy and world-creating power of these abstract and inanimate signs - an idea I intend to explore more fully elsewhere. On Lucian's reference to the material media on which he writes, see Romm's superb article (1990).

[8] This phrase is from Swain 1999a: 32.

[9] I decided to exclude the *Onos* from my discussion in this thesis, largely on account of the necessary constraints of space in this particular project, although there are other circumstances that render the *Onos* unique, and provide more compelling reasons for treating it separately too – such as the uncertainty of authorship, its (problematic) relationship with the *Ass* novel, and the unframed nature of the fiction, an important point in which the *Onos* differs from the works I am examining here, and which certainly warrants further critical attention. For bibliography on the *Onos*, see Macleod 1994: 1384-5. Anderson (1976b: 34-67) devotes two chapters to the *Onos* in his critique of Lucian's comic fiction. For the relationship between the *Onos*, the *Metamorphoses* ascribed to Lucius of Patrae, and the *Ass* novel, see Sandy (1994: esp. 1518 ff.) and Mason (1994).

evidence that a developed concept of fiction did indeed exist in antiquity, and that Lucian is amongst the most sophisticated thinkers on the subject from the ancient world.

The first two chapters here are concerned with the *Philopseudes* and *Toxaris* respectively, as the dialogue structure of these two works demonstrates most clearly the issues of framing and self-consciously presented fiction which are central to my thesis. This is important also in the *Vera Historia*, although Lucian frames the fiction there by a different method, with a subversive prologue. Because of the structural uniqueness of the *VH* in the Lucianic *corpus*, therefore, and because, in contrast with the other two works, it has benefited from rather more generous modern scholarly attention, especially in recent years, I treat this work in my final chapter, where I consider also its connections – clearly signposted by Lucian – with the *Philopseudes* itself. Without further ado, therefore, I begin with the *Philopseudes*, an excellent starting point, as it showcases many of the themes and authorial techniques that are crucial to the *Toxaris* and *Vera Historia* as well.

## INTRODUCTION: TRUTH, LIES, AND WHAT LIES BETWEEN...

The *Philopseudes* contains a series of charming *novelle*,[1] some of which still captivate modern imagination in a variety of media, such as orchestral arrangements, opera and animated film,[2] while others resonate with that fascinating sub-genre of modern folklore narrative, the urban legend.[3] However, the fascination of the stories has tended to eclipse the importance of reading the *Philops.* as an organic work, i.e. a series of *novelle* embedded within the framework of a dramatic dialogue between two interlocutors (Philocles and Tychiades), a compositional structure which clearly resonates with Plato's philosophical dialogue.[4] To ignore the framing dialogue is to miss what I will argue is the *point* of this work - not just to deliver some intensely exciting fiction, but to explore and problematize our readerly response to fiction.

The *Philops.* thematizes important questions such as: How do we gauge our response to narratives which purport to be true, but which we may suspect to be actually false? What aspects of narrative technique influence us in modifying our response between outright conviction, and outright scepticism? *Why* do we delight in listening to stories which we know, in part of our brains, cannot be true - and why does our knowing participation in the pretence that they are true enhance that *frisson* of delight? By inscribing into his text a primary narrator whose

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[1] For a comprehensive survey of the *novella*, see Cataudella 1957: 7-172 (p. 94 ff. are especially relevant, as Cataudella discusses the *novella* in paradoxographical literature here); see also Perry 1967: 64f. and 79-83, who notes that the *novella* was always subordinated to a larger context, and consequently had no independent development of its own (340, n. 18). Trenkner (1958: xiii) defines a *novella* as 'an imaginary story of limited length, intended to entertain...an event concerned with real-life people in a real-life setting.' Its defining characteristic is its realism, although Trenkner points out that the sense of what constitutes realism is relative (xiv). The *anecdote* is characterised mainly by its brevity (xiii). Trenkner (xiii) also distinguishes between the categories of *fable* (story involving instructive comparison), *legend* (story based on events of historical past), *myth* (narrative concerning the gods) and *Märchen* ('fairy-story', whose content is marvellous). The narratives embedded in the *Philops.* qualify on these terms as *novelle* on the grounds of their relative length and their intended realism at the diegetic level (their narrators purport to be telling *real* events, and attempt to *historicize* them). Anderson (1982: 62) also describes the *Philops.* (and the *Tox.*), as 'collections of novellae'; however, he revises this idea later, when, in addressing the issue of whether the stories in the *Philops.* should be categorized as fairytale or novella, he concludes that 'the prevailing atmosphere of magic and ghosts...justifies the former label' (Anderson 2000: 11): for further discussion, see n. 186.

[2] I am thinking, of course, of the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' story: see n. 194.

[3] See n. 186.

[4] See further p. 11ff..

allegiance to the truth is ambiguous, as well as several readers whose response to the stories is in conflict, and by incorporating a range of metaleptic *effets de création* (to use Maeder's terminology)[5] which remind us of the artificial nature - the fictionality - of the text, Lucian compels us, as extra-textual readers, to question *our* response to the fiction *we* are reading (namely the *Philops.* itself). It is the purpose of this chapter, therefore, to show that the *Philops.* is not simply a compendium of delicious fictions; it is one of the works in which Lucian self-consciously and self-reflexively fictionalizes, to produce a practical demonstration or *performance* of the theory and dynamics of fictionality.

My arguments in this chapter lay the groundwork for the chapters that follow. Much of this chapter is concerned with exploring the extremely rich and variegated intertextual web connecting the *Philops.* with works such as the *VH*, and the works of Plato, particularly the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Charmides* and *Phaedrus*. I discuss how the 'presence' of the *VH* within the opening section of the *Philops.* is transgressive, inscribing the subversive authorial *persona* of the *VH* – the self-conscious liar - into the dialogue, and functioning also as an *effet de création*, which foregrounds the textuality and fictionality of this work. In a similar way, I consider how the distinctly Platonic atmosphere evoked by Lucian colours his exploration of truth, lies and fiction in the *Philops.*, and also how it too functions metatextually as a sign of the *authorial* presence in the dialogue, marking the dialogue *as fiction*. This in turn makes Lucian's exploration of fictionality in the *Philops.* self-reflexive, as the themes of the dialogue then acquire a relevance to the dialogue itself, *qua* fiction.

The *Philops.* is a dialogue *about storytelling*; this clearly reflects, and is necessarily affected by, the dialogue's status as self-conscious (and self-reflexive) fiction. Lucian inscribes several readers into the text, whose responses to the stories are in mutual conflict. By withholding any single authoritative in-text reader with whom the extra-textual reader might securely identify, however, Lucian *problematizes* the reading of fictional narrative. At the same time, by exposing the fictionality of the *Philops.* itself, the *extra*-textual reader of the dialogue is drawn into the conflict too, as he is engaged in the very act of reading.[6]

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[5] The term *effet de création* denotes a technique, which draws attention to the textual surface of the narrative, i.e. to its *literal* rather than its *referential* dimension; the term was coined by Maeder, on the model of Barthes' *effet de réel*; see Maeder 1991: 1, n.1.

[6] In a forthcoming article on the *Heroicus*, which the author very kindly permitted me to read, Tim Whitmarsh shows how Philostratus problematizes the issue of reader-response to Homeric tales in his dialogue: '...this dialogic text, so far from validating a single, reified "meaning"...*performs* the very process of meaning-making. It engages the reader's sense of self, asking what kind of person you would be if you believed or disbelieved...the text *makes a issue of* interpretation.' These

John Morgan, writing about the ancient novel, states that 'fiction also entails an awareness of its untruth', and shows that 'in monitoring a novel's believability, the reader is in a continual process of moving backwards and forwards between the world of fiction and the world of reality, checking that the correlation is sufficient to allow the game to go on.'[7] In the *Philops.*, as we shall see, the author enacts this, having actually pre-fabricated a double frame of reference within which the reader can oscillate, continually interpreting and re-interpreting.

Lucian also inscribes *authors* in the text, at two levels. One one level, there are the obvious storytellers Eucrates, Arignotus and the others, who seek to convince the sceptical in-text reader, Tychiades, of the veracity of their stories by their narrative technique. Within their narratives, however, are embedded clear *Lügensignale* which expose their fabrication even as they strive to cover it. Given the self-reflexive fictionality of the work, these in-text authors of fiction function as *mise en abyme* representatives of the extra-textual author, Lucian; their narrative techniques, therefore, have important, and subversive, implications for Lucian's own authorial techniques, as I will show.[8]

In the layered structure of this dialogue, the roles of author and reader appear to be strangely mutable: readers are authors and *vice versa*. The products of authorship and readership, although essentially the same, are subtly different each time, even when dealing with the same basic narrative. The 'text', which was the product of Eucrates' and the others' authorship, appears, essentially, to be the same text which is the product both of Tychiades' readership, and subsequent authorship. Yet each reproduction is also subtly and differently nuanced, as it is focalized through different percipients. Even the text which is 'authored' by Tychiades is not wholly identical to the text which we read, for it is mediated through the extra-textual author, Lucian, who, as we will see, makes us aware of a slight but critical distance between the authorial *persona* operating behind the mask, as it were, of the dialogic author, Tychiades. Lucian seems to imply that in our reading of the *Philops.* we too will participate, figuratively, in the authorial act, because we will mentally reconfigure (re-authorize) the text according to our own

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comments are clearly relevant to what Lucian is doing in the *Philops.* too. Branham (1989: 65-123) makes similar observations about the plurality of meaning in the *Lucianic* dialogue, as opposed to the Platonic dialogue, where one voice (usually Socrates') is authoritative.

[7] Morgan 1993: 226.

[8] The *Philops.* is, like the *VH*, self-ironic on a number of levels: 'Aimed simultaneously at the deceivers and the deceived, much of their humor derives from the author's own entry into the game and his ability to surpass the fantasies of others.' (Jones 1986: 46).

particular readerly perspective (whether we are sceptics like Tychiades, or lovers of lies, like Eucrates and his associates).

Finally, I will demonstrate how Lucian grasps towards positive ways of thinking about fiction in the *Philops.* as well, both by appropriating Gorgianic imagery (especially about the irrational power of tragic illusion and the *logos*), and by developing or alluding to metaphors that are more distinctly his own. Statues and hybrid monsters acquire metapoetical status as metaphors, which Lucian uses polemically, to reflect the self-conscious mimeticism and hybridity that characterises his work.

# TRUTH-GAMES IN THE *VERAE HISTORIAE* AND *PHILOPSEUDES*

I am shortly about to argue that there is a complex intertextuality between the *Philops.* and Plato's works, but there is also one crucially important Lucianic text that must be in the reader's mind as he reads the *Philops.*, and that is the *VH*. These two Lucianic works form a pair, which deal explicitly with issues of truth, lies and plausibility in narrative. For the modern reader, it is impossible to consider one without reference to the other; the author clearly signposts an intertextual relationship between them. In the opening section of both works, there is an allusion to subversive literary precedents who were (in)famous for their literary fabrications: Herodotus and Ctesias of Cnidos in both cases.[9] Avery has shown how clear verbal echoes like this one between both works evince the author's intention that they be connected. There is also the connection that both texts obviously deal with similar issues of truth, fiction, lies and plausibility, and *act out* the interpretive difficulties that arise when these categories overlap: in other words, they engage the extra-textual reader actively in a practical exploration of the dynamics of reading fiction, although in different ways, as I will show.[10]

In both the *Philops.* and the *VH*, it is acknowledged that lies can produce a pleasing effect.[11] While Tychiades concedes fiction's power to enchant feeble minds such as children: παίδων ψυχὰς κηλεῖν δυνάμενα,[12] the corollary of this argument implies that those whose critical faculties are better developed ought to be able to render themselves immune to the charms of mendacity.[13] The authorial persona of the *VH* takes a stance, not against lying *per se*, but against an author attempting to pass off lies as truth in truth-bearing texts, *while expecting to*

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[9] *VH* 1.2.6 - 1.4.1; *Philops.* 1.8-12 and 2.11-17; Avery 1996: 53 ff.; for further discussion of the *Philops.* passage, see p. 23 ff.. Odysseus is described (ironically) as a just and sensible man at *Cal.* 28.

[10] Jones (1986: 46) connects the *VH* and the *Philops.* together as works in which Lucian parodies 'conventional narratives'. It seems to me that the *VH* represents the more audacious practical experiment in fiction. In the *Philops.*, the framing dialogue and the inscribed readers, while ambiguous, at least provide the reader with some optional footholds to help him plot his response, whereas the fictional games of the *VH* make much greater assumptions about readerly sophistication and 'knowingness'.

[11] *VH* 1.3: Iambulus'travelogues are said to be enjoyable, in spite of (or, one suspects, because of) their mendacity, and the explicitly fallacious narrative is offered as entertaining reading material for the educated reader.

[12] *Philops.* 2; Lucian uses the same or similar language of magic to describe the enchanting influence of history or literature – for a survey, see Avery 1996: 43-44; cf. my discussion of the imagery of magic at p. 59 ff.. For the association of children and fiction, see n. 161.

[13] Presumably this is one of the reasons why the *VH* is explicitly designed for the *educated* reader: *VH* 1.2; cf. p. 136.

*remain undetected.* In the *Philops.*, however, Tychiades attacks this desire to fabricate at its source, denigrating people who, for no good reason, show preference for lies, even when they might equally tell the truth.[14] Therefore, whereas the fallacious narrative of the *VH* is offered as mental recreation for scholars (presumably because, *as* scholars, they can safely be exposed to the contagion of lying), conversely, the appetite for mendacious tales demonstrated by the in-text narrators and readers in the *Philops.* is described in medical terms as a disease or infection: love of lying is 'ingrained' (ἔμφυτος), an evil contagion with which people are infected (ἑαλωκότες).[15] Not even the primary narrator, Tychiades, is immune; at the end of the dialogue, Tychiades says that the gross lies he has had to digest have left him swollen and in need of an emetic.[16] The infection of the disease spreads to everyone who listens to these lies, as from the bite of a rabid dog; truth and reason are the antidote to the poison of falsehood.[17] Given that the extra-textual reader has also (presumably), like Eucrates, Tychiades and the other lovers of lies, *chosen* to read this fictive text (instead of, say, a more 'edifying' work of serious philosophy or historiography), these remarks also directly involve him: Lucian makes an issue of the *voluntary choice* to read fiction.

It is clearly ironic that a work which claims to abhor such mendacity should feature as its main interest, indeed its *raison d'être*, a series of stories which are fascinating for the very reasons that the narrator eschews. Tychiades emerges as a deeply ambiguous narrator, who on the one hand claims to be disgusted by these lies, and shows that he is perfectly aware of their contaminating effect, but participates in their dissemination nonetheless, thereby assisting in the spread of the dreaded infection. Tychiades' ambiguity is reflected also in the extra-textual reader's *knowing* indulgence in the fiction of the *Philops.*.

Given the Platonic intertextuality that also operates within the dialogue at large (as I am about to demonstrate), it is tempting to read this as an ironic reflection of the way in which the Platonic Socrates on the one hand professes mistrust of Homer's poetry, yet on the other, cites and quotes his poetry for the purpose of articulating philosophical truths.[18] This is just one of the ironies of Platonic narrativity that Lucian exploits in his commentary on fictionality in this dialogue.[19]

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[14] *Philops.* 1.
[15] *Philops.* 2.
[16] *Philops.* 39.
[17] *Philops.* 40. For medical imagery and its significance in this dialogue, see p. 65 f. below.
[18] See p. 24 f..
[19] See p. 64f..

# PLATONIC PRESENCES IN THE *PHILOPSEUDES*

In form, the *Philops.* is distinctly Platonic, a flavour imparted even in the paratext, which contains a 'Platonic' double title: Φιλοψευδής ἢ ᾿Απιστῶν.[20] The *Philops.* is one of Lucian's so-called 'Platonic suite', along with the *Navigium* and *Convivium*.[21] These works show philosophers behaving badly, in a Platonic setting that is incongruous and clearly ironic. Anderson has shown that it is typical of Lucian to compose a work whose central section contrasts with its frame; for Anderson, this is an important means by which Lucian achieves variety, but he also hints at a more purposeful intertextuality: 'in his 'Platonic' pieces he begins with clear hints of a well-known dialogue, but the treatment that follows turns out to be a travesty of the original.' He alludes to the *Philops.* as an example, noting how it begins with a bedside scene that is based on the *Phaedo*, 'but the περὶ ψυχῆς which follows is a collection of ghost stories.'[22] Elsewhere, he makes a general observation about Lucian's 'pastiche' of Platonic elements from the *Phaedo*, *Charmides*, and *Symposium* in the framing dialogue of *Philops.*.[23] As it is not his purpose, however, to pursue a large-scale exploration of the complexity, dynamics and effects of this intertextuality, Anderson more or less leaves the matter there. There is more, much more, to be said.[24]

The work that the scenario of the *Philops.* most clearly evokes is probably the *Phaedo*, where a homodiegetic narrator (Phaedo) relates to Echecrates the discussions that took place among the company of philosophers that gathered in Socrates' prison cell on the last day of his life. The gravity of the Platonic scene is parodied in the *Philops.*, where companions gather to visit the venerable old philosopher, Eucrates, not because he is awaiting execution for his ideals, like

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[20] The manuscripts offer Φιλοψευδής (nominative singular) as the initial word in the title, but this has been corrected to the nominative plural by Rothstein, presumably on the grounds that 'lover of lies' is a more appropriate description of the guests at Eucrates' house, while the second adjective, 'unbeliever', more properly describes Tychiades' attitude. However, I prefer to retain the original manuscript reading, in the belief that the singular form φιλοψευδής refers to Tychiades as well as ἀπιστῶν; the title then expresses perfectly the *ambiguity* of Tychiades' response to the stories he has heard. For further discussion of *apistia*, cf. n. 110 below.
[21] Anderson 1976a: 165; Anderson notes that the same characters, Ion and Cleodemus, appear in both the *Philops.* and *Conv.*.
[22] Anderson 1976a: 162. He also refers to the 'mock-serious' framing dialogue of the *Philops.*, likening it to the *Tox.* (1976b: 12).
[23] 1976b: 25, n. 53.
[24] Ebner's more recent essay on Lucian's parody of Plato in the *Philops.* (Ebner *et al* 2001: 57-9) has some interesting details, but it brief, and deals only with the *Phaedo* and (very briefly) the *Symposium*.

Socrates, but because he has been laid up with gout, as the result of overindulgence![25] The pain in Socrates' leg, which causes him to remark on the close proximity of pleasure and pain, thereby initiating the philosophical discussion, finds a parallel in the affliction in Eucrates' gouty feet, which sparks the discussion of cures in the *Philops.*.[26] The *Phaedo* contains Socrates' solemn doctrine on the fate of the soul - περὶ ψυχῆς - but Lucian transforms the theme into a gleeful discussion between credulous old fools, about ghosts and the supernatural.[27]

Lucian's parodic transformation of the Platonic hypotext is evident in more minute details as well. Whereas Socrates, in a painful scene in the *Phaedo*, is visited by his lamenting wife and children, Eucrates (notably, whilst reading the *Phaedo*!) is visited by his wife's angry ghost.[28] Socrates send his children away from the prison, but Eucrates involves his sons in his macabre tale.[29] Both works contain visions of the 'other world'; the one is sublimely eschatological, whereas the other (which features a bald and pot-bellied Socrates in the underworld)[30] is ridiculous - right down to the detail of Cerberus' barking, and the hounds of Hecate, bigger than Indian elephants.[31] In this context, Eucrates' confession - 'because he must tell the truth' - that he didn't recognise Plato in the underworld is a sly hint at *Phaedo* 59 b, where Phaedo states that Plato was not present, because (Phaedo thought) he was ill.[32]

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[25] *Philops.* 6. 19-22 (where it is hinted that Eucrates was not quite as poorly as he pretended); at 8. 6-9 Tychiades wryly observes that the physician's advice to eat a healthier diet and abstain from wine was being ignored. For the possible connotations of Eucrates' rheumatism, see n. 212. Helm (1906: 267) thought that the character Eucrates was meant to remind us of Socrates, given the similarity in their names; Ebner (Ebner *et al.*: 57, n. 57) finds this questionable, however.

[26] *Phaedo* 60 b; *Philops.* 6.17-18. Anderson (1976a: 128) cites this as one of the Socratic episodes on which the context for the discussion in the *Philops.* was modelled; he also mentions Socrates' cure for Charmides' headache at *Charm.* 155 bff.. For the relation between the *Philops.* and the *Charmides*, see p. 13 f. below.

[27] See Anderson's comment, p. 11 with n. 22.

[28] Socrates is visited by his wife, Xanthippe, for the last time at *Phaedo* 116B (she is not named here, as she is at 60A, but she should probably be included here among the οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες, especially given that Socrates' youngest child was brought: see Burnet 1911, note *ad loc.*). At *Philops.* 27, Eucrates relates how he was visited by his wife's ghost. I wonder if Demainete's nagging reflects Xanthippe's shrewish reputation?

[29] At *Philops.* 27.1 ff., when the two boys come in, Tychiades surmises that their arrival reminds Eucrates of their mother, hence the story of her ghost. Eucrates swears by his sons that he is telling the truth (27. 5-7), and refers to one of them during his narrative, in order to render it all the more vivid (27. 14-16). Ebner (Ebner *et al.* 2001: 57) compares Eucrates' gesture in caressing his son's hair (*Philops.* 27), with Socrates' caressing of Phaedo's hair in *Phaedo* 89b.

[30] *Philops.* 24.

[31] *Philops.* 24. 1-4; at 23. 5-6, Tychiades expresses his disgust at the way in which the venerable philosophers were agape at 'this incredible colossus, a woman half-a-mile tall, a sort of giant bugaboo': see p. 66 ff..

[32] It might even be a clever allusion to the 'invisibility' of Plato's authorial presence in his own works. Plato is absent also from the festivities on the Isle of the Blessed at *VH* 2.17, where the motif

In the *Philops.*, Platonic philosophers - those who claim they perceive the world of the forms - are classed alongside those who claim to see spirits.[33] There are several indications in the *Phaedo* that the company sorely wanted Socrates to go on talking, dreading the approach of sunset;[34] he concludes his speech with great dignity, his friends standing about him in silence until he is dead. In the *Philops.*, on the other hand, Tychiades, when he can no longer endure Eucrates' babbling, gets up unceremoniously and leaves while he is in full flow.[35] Even the dreaded hemlock which Socrates drinks in the final scene of the *Phaedo* makes an appearance figuratively at the end of *Philops.* as the poison of lies, for which Tychiades requires either an emetic, or an antidote![36] Whereas Socrates' departure from life is seen as *healthful* (hence his injunction to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius, *Phaedo* 118a), when Tychiades departs from the company, he is afflicted with mental *illness* (*Philops.* 39f.).[37]

The *Philops.* contains echoes of other Platonic works as well. The manner in which the discussion springs from a comparative evaluation of cures for Eucrates' gout is similar to the opening scenario of the *Charmides*, where Socrates suggests a headache-cure as an excuse to strike up a conversation with the handsome Charmides. Both Tychiades and Socrates also theorize briefly on the appropriate medical treatment of internal ailments; Socrates appears to favour a holistic approach, while Tychiades speculates on the ludicrousness of hoping to cure an internal malady by applying external cures.[38] *Charmides* also contains details about magical cures and charms, just like *Philops.*; for instance, at *Charm.* 156 d, Socrates claims to have learned a charm to cure headache from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, and at 158 b, he alludes again to the spells of

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is connected to Lucian's joke about the Academicians' indecision (cf. *Vit.auct.* 17): see Stengel 1911: 65. I notice that von Möllendorff makes this observation too, in his review of Ebner *et al.* 2001 (*Plekos. Periodicum onLine zur Erforschung der Kommunikationsstrukturen in der Spätantike* 4, 2002, 1-10 (http:// www.plekos.uni-muenchen.de/2002/rebner.html): p. 4.

[33] *Philops.* 16. 15-17.

[34] *Phaedo* 85B: ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἐῶσιν ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα; 115A: ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἱμαρμένη; at 116E, Crito, observing that the sun has not set fully yet, urges Socrates to take more time before drinking the poison.

[35] At *Philops.* 5. 2-4, Tychiades tells Philocles that he has just left while Eucrates was still talking, because he was no longer able to bear the exaggeration. At *Philops.* 39, he records the others' relief at the departure of this ἀντισοφιστής τῶν ψευσμάτων (39).

[36] *Philops.* 39-40.

[37] See Ebner *et al.* 2001: 58-9; see discussion at p. 64 ff..

[38] *Charmides* 156 bf.; *Philops.* 8. It is interesting, that while Socrates advocates the use of an incantation to affect a cure, Tychiades explicitly rejects such methods. For further discussion of this section, see p. 64 ff., esp. n. 270.

Zalmoxis and of Abaris the Hyperborean.[39] At *Philops.* 13-14, Tychiades reports the story that the Platonic philosopher Ion told about 'the Hyperborean magician,' who, among his other miraculous feats, had the ability to fly.[40] Later on in the *Charmides*, Socrates talks about the science of prophecy (ἡ μαντική), and the need to distinguish between charlatans (ἀλαζόνες) and those who are true prophets (ὡς ἀληθῶς μάντεις);[41] this is the topic under discussion when Tychiades finally decides to leave at *Philops.* 38.[42]

There are also similarities between the *Philops.* and Plato's *Symposium*. Caster suggested that Lucian composed the *Philops.* on a literary model, probably Plato's *Symposium*, noting the similar motif of the 'belated guest' – Alcibiades and Arignotus - in both works,[43] and also how Lucian was indebted to Plato's doctor Eryximachus as a model for his Antigonus.[44] It is humorous that Lucian's physician has, in comparison with his Platonic predecessor, so little to say. Antigonus contributes only two very brief anecdotes to the discussion of the supernatural. In both cases, his stories serve largely to corroborate the claims of other speakers, and both are connected to his profession as a physician.[45] Since his more pragmatic medical opinions are ignored, Antigonus seeks to glamourize his profession in the eyes of the philosophers present; however, despite his obvious willingness to participate in their discussion, and to subscribe to their belief in the

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[39] Herodotus (4.36) mentions Abaris the Hyperborean (see also next note). Later in the same book (4. 94-96), Herodotus also mentions the Thracian charismatic Zalmoxis; his report of the claim that Zalmoxis lived underground for three years studying magic may have given Lucian the idea for his Egyptian magician's lengthy subterranean apprenticeship of twenty-three years (!), learning magic from Isis (*Philops.* 34).

[40] Philostratus (*V.A.* 7.10) mentions Abaris' reputed ability to fly. The fourth century historian, Heraclides Ponticus, who is thought to have influenced Lucian in *Philops.*, also wrote a work on Abaris, apparently depicting him as a philosopher/holy-man: see n. 220, and also n. 224.

[41] *Charm.* 173c.

[42] This was a favourite topic in educated circles of this era - see Plutarch *On the Oracle at Delphi* and Lucian's own *De Astrologia*.

[43] Caster 1937: 323. Arignotus enters at *Philops.* 29; Alcibiades arrives at Plato *Symp.*212 c 6. Lucian's own *Symposium* also features the late arrival of the uninvited Alcidamas (*Conv.* 12). The 'belated/uninvited guest' is a motif of literary *symposia* (Caster 1937: 323, n. 36). For a survey of the themes and motifs characteristic of such literature, see Hug 1932. For such motifs in Plato's *Symp.*, see Rutherford 1995: 179-180; on Plutarch's *Sept. Conv.*, see Mossman 1997: 128.

[44] The doctor too appears to be characteristic of literary *symposia*: '...depuis Eryximaque, le médecin est de rigeur dans les réunions des philosophes' (Caster 1937: 323). Lucian appears to have parodied Eryximachus with the figure of the doctor Dionicus in his own counter-*Symposium, Conv.* 20: Anderson (1976a: 147) shows how the doctor Dionicus with his racy story in Lucian *Conv.* 20 is quite clearly the 'reverse' of the Platonic Eryximachus (*Symp.* 186 a ff.) and his 'dull abstractions'.

[45] *Philops.* 21 (the statuette of Hippocrates) is calculated to lend support to Eucrates' claims about the statue of Pellichus; *Philops.*26 (a patient who revived after twenty days!) corroborates Cleodemus' story about his near-death experience: on this latter tale, see n. 222.

supernatural, he does not seem to share the philosophers' talent for story-telling.[46] Dickie speculates that Antigonus represents a type, ie. the doctor who 'crosses over the not very clearly defined line between medicine and magic', a figure who is less well-documented in antiquity than the type of the philosopher/holy-man, represented in the *Philops.* by Arignotus.[47] In the *Symposium* too, Eryximachus is caricatured to a certain extent in a similar way, as the doctor who rather pompously believes his medical training qualifies him to talk about Eros.[48]

Another similarity between these two works is the presence of the medical metaphor in each. Eryximachus' definition of Eros as the skill of achieving harmonious balance between opposites, akin to what the physician tries to do with regard to the diseased and healthy appetites of the body,[49] foreshadows Aristophanes' characterisation of Eros as the iatric force which offers humans a way to heal their primeval wound.[50] Alcibiades' description in the *Symposium* of being 'bitten' by philosophy, as if by a snake, inducing a painful 'philosophic madness and frenzy' in him, is clearly analogous to the many references in the *Philops.* to the 'mania' of lying, the poison of lies, and the virulent contagion of

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[46] When he is first mentioned at *Philops.* 8.15-19, where he approves of Tychiades' scepticism, it looks as though he will prove an ally to Tychiades in his abhorrence of lies and superstition. Tychiades also only contributes one short anecdote to the company, at *Philops.* 32 (Democritus in the Tomb): see p. 50.

[47] For Antigonus as the type of 'credulous doctor', see Dickie 2001: 209. For rogue doctors in general in Lucian's works, see Anderson 1976a: 173. For further discussion of Arignotus' character, see n. 165.

[48] *Symp.* 186a 3-6: ὅτι δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις...καθεωρακέναι μοι δοκῶ ἐκ τῆς ἰατρικῆς λέγων, τῆς ἡμετέρας τέχνης...; *Symp.* 186b 2-3: ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς λέγων, ἵνα καὶ πρεσβεύωμεν τὴν τέχνην. For doctors and philosophy, see Galen's proposition that 'the best doctor is also a philosopher' (see Lloyd 1983: 214). For a more wry opinion, see Athenaeus 15. 666a: εἰ μὴ ἰατροὶ ἦσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν γραμματικῶν μωρότερον.

[49] *Symp.* 186 b-e.

[50] *Symp.* 191 d 1-3: ὁ ἔρως ἔμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας φύσεως συναγωγεὺς καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν ποιῆσαι ἓν ἐκ δυοῖν καὶ ἰάσασθαι τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην. Aristophanes' speech culminates in the great hope Eros offers mankind: εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἐλπίδας μεγίστας παρέχεται...καταστήσας ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν καὶ ἰασάμενος μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι (*Symp.* 193 d 2-5). Cf. p. 64 ff. below.

lies.[51] In this way, Lucian draws an implicit analogy between philosopy and lies - a connection he is fond of making elsewhere too.[52]

There is also a similar air of theatricality in both works. The dramatic occasion of the *Symposium* is a party to celebrate the tragic poet Agathon's first victory at the Lenaea (416 B.C.); both tragic and comic poetry are represented at the gathering, by Agathon and Aristophanes respectively, while the element of the satyr play is represented both allusively by Alcibiades' portrayal of Socrates' 'satyric' nature, and explicitly in Socrates' rejoinder.[53] The final scene of the *Symposium* features a prolonged debate between the two poets and Socrates, with Socrates arguing that the same person can compose both tragic and comic poetry.[54] A vein of theatrical imagery runs through the *Philops.* also.[55]

Finally, both the *Symposium* and the *Philops.* feature the language of magic in treating their respective subjects. In the *Symposium*, Eros is described as a γόης, and similar language is used to convey the seductiveness of Socrates' personal charisma.[56] In the *Philops.*, Tychiades, as he listens to Eucrates'

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[51] *Symp.* 217 e 6 - 218 b 4. This imagery occurs elsewhere too, for example at *Phaedr.* 228 b 7-8, Socrates describes himself as a man 'infected with the love of listening to speeches': ὁ νοσῶν περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν. Socrates also famously states that poetry is inspired by madness sent from the Muses (*Phaedr.* 245 a). For Lucianic images, one might compare the imagery of the snakebite in the Dipsades, which is a metaphor for Lucian's desire to perform. For a discussion of this imagery in the *Philops.*, see p. 64 ff. below.

[52] For the Lucianic *topos* of the mendacity and hypocrisy of philosophers, see Hall (1981: 151-193), Anderson (1994: 1433), and cf. n. 13 above (re. *Philops.* 16.15-17 - Ion's eyesight!). For similar imagery in the *Nigrinus*, cf. n. 255.

[53] *Symp.* 215 b 3 ff.; Alcibiades compares Socrates to the satyr Marsyas, both in his physical appearance and his nature. At 222 d 3-4, Socrates laughingly says he sees through Alcibiades' σατυρικόν δρᾶμα. For the significance of the theatrical air in the *Symp.*, see Rutherford 1995: 182 and 204-5, and Gera 1993: 139-141.

[54] *Symp.* 223 c 2- d 8. Whereas Tychiades walks out of the conversation, Socrates in the *Symp.* outlasts all other speakers. From another perspective, given the Socratic resonance of Eucrates' character, it is humorous that Tychiades, one of his interlocutors, loses patience with him and walks out.

[55] See p. 62 ff. below, where I argue that much of the theatrical imagery in the *Philops.* is metatextual, calling attention to the *textual* artifice of the narrative, and thereby infringing transgressively on the fictional illusion. It may be worth comparing this sort of metatextual effect in Lucian's dialogue, with similar, if subtler, effects in Plato's *Symposium*. When Diotima's reported speech refutes arguments that have been made by the other guests, her status as a 'real' character is problematized. (Socrates is, of course, very likely speaking tongue-in-cheek here, and does not mean his fellow-guests to take her historical status seriously - it is characteristic of his elegant politeness and his εἰρωνεία (for which see *Symp.* 216 e 2-6 and 218 d 6 ff.) to invent a 'spokesperson' to refute his friends - but the point stands nevertheless ). For metatextual elements in Plato's myths, see Gill 1993: 62-64.

[56] Alcibiades apeaks of Socrates' charisma in terms of enchantment, *Symp.*215 c ff, likening him to the musician Marsyas, or the Sirens. At 203 d 8, 'Diotima' describes Eros (who is a philosopher suspiciously similar to Socrates) as a δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεύς καὶ σοφιστής. See de Romilly 1975: 25-43, 'Plato and the Conjurers', for an interesting analysis of magical imagery in Plato's works within a literary/rhetorical frame of reference. In Philostratus' *Heroicus*, the enchantment of stories is compared to the magical allurement of the Sirens' song (8.13; cf. 34.4, for

fabrication, wonders if he might be a γόης, having deceived him about his true nature all along, and lying itself is described as a φάρμακον - a word which may mean *magic potion* as well as drug.[57]

This brief survey of the Platonic resonances within the opening passages of the *Philops.* will serve as an introduction to the general idea that there is a relationship of hypertextuality between the *Philops.* and Plato's work. The relationship is in fact much more textured, and more finely nuanced than this initial survey suggests, and carries implications of the utmost importance for the interpretation of the *Philops.* as a whole - implications which have, until now, not been observed. It is now time to explore in greater detail the *meaning* of these Platonic presences in the *Philops.*.

In the opening section of the *Phaedrus*, Plato presents Phaedrus and Socrates in pleasant conversation as they wander outside Athens' city walls, looking out for a cool spot by the Ilissus, where they may sit and discuss Lysias' speech in comfort.[58] As they stroll, Phaedrus notices a place by the river that strikes him as an eminently suitable location for girls to play; this prompts him to ask Socrates if that is the place where, according to the myth, Oreithyia was snatched by Boreas. Socrates acknowledges the story, but says that the actual place where the incident happened is further downstream, where there is an altar of Boreas.[59]

Phaedrus and Socrates speak like tourists about the local legend attached to the place they pass on the road.[60] Socrates' confirmation of the geographical location for the story then leads to Phaedrus' question about the truth-value of the tale:

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the dangerous allure of untrustworthy stories, where the image resonates with Plato, *Rep.* 602c - 608b). For further discussion of this imagery, see p. 59ff..

[57] *Philops.* 1.10 and 5.12-14. I discuss the metapoetical aspect of the imagery of magic in the *Philops.* at p. 65 f..

[58] On the popularity of the *locus amoenus* in Second Sophistic literature, see Trapp 1990; he does not, however, refer to its occurrence in the *Philops.*. In a forthcoming paper, I explore the link between fiction and *atopia,* both in the literal sense of being *out of place* and the figurative sense of *liminality.*

[59] *Phaedr.* 229 b 4-c 3.

[60] In fact, the comparison with tourists is made explicit in the text. At *Phaedr.* 230 c6 - d1, Socrates, delighted with the spot that Phaedrus has chosen, says that he has 'been an excellent tour-guide': ἄριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε. Phaedrus exclaims that Socrates seems out of place in the countryside, 'just like a tourist being guided about, and not like a native': ἀτεχνῶς γάρ, ὃ λέγεις, ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας.

ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες· σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἀληθὲς εἶναι;[61]

But tell me, for heaven's sake, Socrates, do *you* believe that this story is true?

Socrates' reply is most interesting. He begins by saying that it would not be strange, if, *like the intellectuals*, he *distrusted* the literal truth of the tale. Despite this, he claims he *does* believe such stories in their literal sense, but he acknowledges that there are other ways of interpreting them too; he specifically mentions the sort of euhemeristic allegory favoured by intellectuals, whereby one could interpret the story about the rape of Oreithyia by Boreas as a poetical and allusive way of saying that the girl had been blown over the rocky precipice by a blast of the north wind. Socrates concedes that such interpretations have a certain charm which appeals to him, but they are rather laboured. Also, he says, if one reads one myth allegorically in this way, it then becomes necessary to interpret all other myths - *all those tales of Hippocentaurs and Chimaeras and Gorgons and Pegasuses* [62]- in the same way. This would not only require a lot of time, but, Socrates suggests, this sort of scepticism and literal analysis is a rather *pedestrian and unsophisticated approach*:

ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴην· εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην ἂν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσαν ὦσαι, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον γεγονέναι. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός, κατ᾽ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ᾽ αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αὖθις τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, [63] πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει.[64]

Socrates clearly distinguishes two basic ways of interpreting a story here; first there is the 'traditional' response (τό νομιζόμενον - 230 a2), which means engaging with and accepting the story's literal meaning, despite the obvious incongruity with the laws of natural probability (in which case, in modern terms, it

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[61] *Phaedr.* 229 c 4-6. All translations in this thesis are my own.
[62] For the Lucianic echo of this particular phrase at *Philops.* 2.22 f., see p. 28 below.
[63] Cf. *Rep.* 607b, where Socrates envisages Poetry convicting them of 'crassness and *rusticity* (ἀγροικία)' for rejecting her from the ideal state.

would belong to the genre of the marvellous). Alternatively, one can choose to regard its literal content with scepticism (ἀπιστῶν), and read it therefore as significant of some other latent 'truth' (genre of the fantastic).[65] The latter response, Socrates says, is explicitly favoured by intellectuals (οἱ σοφοί; σοφιζόμενος), and this is the one which Phaedrus clearly expected Socrates to advocate. The fact that Socrates, a renowned intellectual himself, professes himself to be satisfied with the traditional, avowedly less sophisticated response, comes as a surprise,[66] and his explanation for it is, from the perpective of anyone interested in ancient theory about fiction, disappointing: Socrates is simply not interested enough to pursue any other line of interpretation, because he does not believe it can yield any information relevant to his quest for self-knowledge:

> ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή· τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, ὦ φίλε, τούτου τόδε· οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν· γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται, τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ ἐμαυτόν...

> But I don't have the leisure for them [these matters, ie. allegorical interpretations] at all, and the reason for this, my friend, is as follows: I am not yet able to 'know myself' in accordance with the Delphic inscription. It seems, then, ridiculous to me, while I am still ignorant about this, to examine external affairs. And that's why, saying farewell to these matters, and trusting in the traditional opinion about them - which I have mentioned just now - I examine, not these things, but myself...[67]

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[64] *Phaedr.* 229 c7- e4.

[65] Todorov (1970) distinguishes between the genre of the *fantastic* and the neighbouring genres of the *strange* (*étrange*) and the *marvellous* (*merveilleux*). Laird (1993: 161) defines the genre of the fantastic by 'its capacity to cause the reader to waver in his view of whether what is described is true, and to hesitate between giving a natural or supernatural explanation for the events the narrative presents.' Fantastic literature therefore 'invites philosophical speculation', whereas the genre of the marvellous is read as a chronicle of actual events, however extraordinary they seem to be (Laird 1993: 170). I do not believe it is entirely anachronistic to speak in terms of an ancient genre of the fantastic/marvellous; on the contrary, our evidence for *apista*-literature (incorporating, at different places on the 'spectrum of fictionality', the genre of paradoxography and the more sustained fictions of authors like Antonius Diogenes, Antiphanes of Berge and others) suggests that ancient authors did have a concept of literature which played on and exploited the crepuscular zone between 'truth' and 'lies'; cf. Morgan 1993: 196. I believe that Lucian's emphatic use of the adjective *apistos* (and its cognates) was predicated on this literary genre, to aquire the force of a quasi-metapoetical term; see p. 31 below, esp. n. 110 and n. 112.

[66] It may be surprising, but it is, of course, in keeping with his εἰρωνεία. At *Symp.* 221 e4 - 222 a6, Alcibiades remarks on how deceptively simple his speech appears to be, but warns that, despite the apparent lack of sophistication, the sentiments it contains are 'divine'.

[67] *Phaedr.* 229 e4 - 230 a4. Socrates then, having rejected *allegoresis* as a profitable line of inquiry, humorously applies its principles to his ethical quest, saying that he wishes to ascertain if he is 'a creature more convoluted and more furious than Typhon...' (230 a4-5). For discussion of this passage, see Ferrari 1987: 9-12.

It is important to note, then, that Socrates does not offer any positive qualification for advocating the traditional, literal belief in myths; for him, it is the best option by default, and this in itself implies that there is something less than satisfactory about such a response.

There is a striking intertext with this passage from the *Phaedrus* in the opening section of the *Philops*... Tychiades and Philocles are discussing the ethics of tour-guides' practice of recounting local legends to tourists in order to enhance their locality as a tourist destination.[68] This passage must remind us of Phaedrus and Socrates' discussion, in the context of their 'tourist expedition' outside the city walls, of the veracity of the local legend about Oreithyia. In fact, Tychiades alludes directly to this very legend at *Philops*. 3.7-13:

> ὃς δ᾽ἂν οὖν ταῦτα καταγέλαστα ὄντα μὴ οἴηται ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμφρόνως ἐξετάζων ταῦτα Κοροίβου τινὸς ἢ Μαργίτου νομίζῃ τὸ πείθεσθαι...Ωρείθυιαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἁρπασθῆναι..., ἀσεβὴς οὗτός γε καὶ ἀνόητος αὐτοῖς ἔδοξεν οὕτω προδήλοις καὶ ἀληθέσι πράγμασιν ἀπιστῶν·

> Whoever does not believe, then, that these stories - which are utterly ridiculous - are true, but, by examining them intelligently, decides that it is the hallmark of a Coroebus or a Margites to believe that...Oreithyia was raped by Boreas, this man at any rate appears to them to be impious and witless, for distrusting things which are so obvious and true.

The intertextuality is confirmed by an obvious verbal echo between *Philops*. 2.22f. ('all those Pegasuses and Chimaeras and Gorgons and Cyclopes and all those sorts of things, many strange and monstrous fables...'),[69] and *Phaedrus* 229 d5 - e2 ('after this, one must explain the form of the Hippocentaurs, and then the Chimaera, and then a host of such Gorgons and Pegasuses comes flooding down, and crowds of other impossible creatures, and weird, monstrous natures.'). Both of these allusions occur in a passage where the veracity of legends, local or literary, is under discussion. This draws attention to the two customary responses to such stories, as outlined with a touch of irony by Socrates, namely the traditional

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[68] Lucian alludes to this same practice in a self-ironizing manner in *De Electro*; see Nesselrath 1990: 125-9.

[69] The Greek text for the *Phaedrus* passage is quoted on p. 18 above; the text for the passage from *Philops*. is printed on p. 25. Cf. *Herm.* 72, where Lycinus tells Hermotimus that his pursuit of philosophy was in vain - a pursuit of phantoms and daydreams: ἐπεὶ ὅ γε νῦν ἔπραττες καὶ ἐπενόεις, οὐδὲν τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων καὶ Χιμαιρῶν καὶ Γοργόνων διαφέρει, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ὄνειροι καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ γραφεῖς ἐλεύθεροι ὄντες ἀναπλάττουσιν οὔτε γενόμενα πώποτε οὔτε γενέσθαι δυνάμενα. (The latter part of this sentence is relevant to the fantasy-fiction of the *VH* also; cf. p. 133 ff.) At *Herm.* 71, Hermotimus protests that Lycinus has revealed his 'treasure' to be nothing but coal – cf. *Philops*. 32; both the *Herm.* and the *Philops*. represent 'anti-conversions;' cf. n. 255.

response which treats them as marvellous tales, or a more sophistic scepticism, which tends towards a rationalising interpretation. As I have argued before, it is possible that Lucian hints at both of these responses in the title to this work.[70]

There is more evidence to suggest that Lucian is exploring the question of fictionality in the *Philops.*. Tychiades, just arrived from Eucrates' house, is frustrated by the flagrant lying he witnessed there. He sets the tone for the dialogue by beginning with a philosophical question for his companion, Philocles; what motivates so many people to tell lies? To Philocles' mind, there are many circumstances which might incite some people to tell lies, for utilitarian purposes.[71] Tychiades himself concedes this point, declaring that people who use lies and deception for a greater good are pardonable, even praiseworthy.[72] It is not, however, these people he is asking about; what he finds more ethically worrying are those people who, without any apparent justifiable reason, actively value falsehood far above the truth, and waste their time with it, simply because they enjoy (ἡδόμενοι) telling lies:

> ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνων, ὦ ἄριστε, φημὶ οἳ αὐτὸ ἄνευ τῆς χρείας τὸ
> ψεῦδος πρὸ πολλοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας τίθενται, ἡδόμενοι τῷ πράγματι
> καὶ ἐνδιατρίβοντες ἐπ᾽ οὐδεμιᾷ προφάσει ἀναγκαίᾳ. τούτους οὖν
> ἐθέλω εἰδέναι τίνος ἀγαθοῦ τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν.[73]

This immediately locates their discussion of truth and lies within the Platonic framework, with special reference to Plato's theory of the noble lie. This is confirmed by Philocles' incredulous questioning of the claim that there are people in the world in whom such an unqualified love of lying is ingrained. When

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[70] Trapp (1990) explores the appropriation of the *Phaedrus* in the literature of the Second Sophistic, but he does not connect it with authors' flaunting the ontological status of their own texts. In passing, therefore, it is worth noting that Apuleius also evokes this same scene from the *Phaedrus* in a passage of the *Metamorphoses* (Aristomenes' story, 1.18) where he too is dealing with the questionable veracity of tales of the supernatural (*Met.* 1.20); see Smith & Woods 2002, esp. p. 184 ff.. The *locus amoenus* of the *Phaedrus* is also evoked in connection with self-conscious fictionality in Achilles Tatius, *L&C* 1.2.1-3 and Philostratus, *Her.* 3-5; see Martin 2002: 158-160. On the *Her.*, see also Hodkinson (unpubl. M.A. thesis, Exeter 2003: 22 ff.), with an excellent analysis of Philostratus' reworking of the Phaedran location. Hodkinson interprets the Phaedran setting as an incentive to the reader to speculate about the nature of the *logoi* to follow. 'Given the various traditions of Phaedran reworkings, once the reader recognises the first allusion there will be an expectation of some kind of *logoi*, and also a challenge to look for clues as to what kind of *logoi*.' (*op. cit.*: 26). Given that the *Phaedrus* is concerned with the nature of good and bad *logoi*, with rhetoric, truth, and writing itself, an evocation of this text should be considered as a strong metaliterary presence; in the case of the *Her.*, the intertext clearly signals the metaliterary theme of the discussion, as Hodkinson notes (2003: 36); cf. Hunter 1994: 1069. The same is true for the *Philops.* and *Nav.*, with their Phaedran evocations too. (I am most grateful to Owen for permitting me to read his dissertation on the *Heroicus*.)
[71] *Philops.* 1.1-6.
[72] *Philops.* 1.8-12.
[73] *Philops.* 1.12-16.

Tychiades again affirms their existence, Philocles arrives at the inevitable conclusion that the only reason there can be for their lying is that they are in ignorance - for why else would they deliberately choose the worst course over the best?

τί δ' οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ἄνοιαν χρὴ αἰτίαν εἶναι αὐτοῖς φάναι τοῦ μὴ τάληθῆ λέγειν, εἰ γε τὸ χείριστον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίστου προαιροῦνται;[74]

The Platonic resonances of this sentiment are clear. In distinguishing carefully between pleasure in sheer gratuitous lying - which must be attributed to faulty understanding, or ignorance - and lying for some greater good, Lucian is alluding to the Platonic dichotomy between 'true falsehood' or 'falsehood in the *psyche*' (which is a source of far greater ethical concern for Plato), and mere 'falsehood in words', a reflection (μίμημα) of the former, but not so reprehensible, as it is the type of falsehood which can, paradoxically, convey a higher truth.

The first type of falsehood involves being deceived in one's very perception of things; it is ignorance:

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ' ἄν...τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἡ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· [75]

But indeed, it would be most correct to call this 'true falsehood', that is the ignorance in the soul of the one who is deceived.

As it is the most dreaded and hated type of deception, no-one, Plato argues, willingly accepts it:

τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι...τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.[76]

No-one is willingly prepared to be deceived about the most important things, in the most important place of himself; rather the affliction in that place is feared the most by everyone. For deception in the soul about reality, and being deceived and ignorant, and holding and possessing falsehood in that place - that's what everyone would show the least acceptance for, and that's what they hate most in that case.

[74] *Philops.* 2.4-6.
[75] *Rep.* 382 b6-8; for discussion of this terminology, see p. 155 ff..
[76] *Rep.* 382 a6-b5.

As Gill has pointed out, this is related to the Platonic idea, expressed elsewhere in the *Republic*, that no-one errs willingly: οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει;[77] in the *Philops.*, this is the reasoning which leads Philocles to the conclusion that gratuitous liars, if they exist, must operate out of ignorance.

The second t, pe of lying - 'falsehood in words' - is not as ethically worrying, as far as Plato is concerned, because it does not spring from a fundamental error in the *psyche*; it is merely an *image* or *reflection* of this:

> τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος.[78]

> But [falsehood] in words is a mere imitation of the affliction in the soul, and an image that occurs subsequently, not a very pure falsehood.

Furthermore, Socrates points out, 'falsehood in words' may, under certain circumstances, be useful, for example against enemies; it may even be used as a 'remedy' (φάρμακον) to rescue friends from their madness and ignorance when they attempt to do wrong - further testimony to the theory that no-one does wrong willingly:

> τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἆρ' οὐ πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται;[79]

This is precisely the sentiment expressed by Tychiades at *Philops.* 1.8-12, where he states that lying may be justifiable if it serves a greater good. Tychiades cites exactly the same circumstances too, ie. to deceive one's enemies, or to secure the safety both of oneself, and one's friends; he also, like Socrates, expresses the usefulness of this sort of lying with a medical metaphor; it is a 'remedy' (φάρμακον).

> συγγνωστοὶ γὰρ οὗτοί γε, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἐπαίνου τινὲς αὐτῶν ἄξιοι, ὁπόσοι ἢ πολεμίους ἐξηπάτησαν ἢ ἐπὶ σωτηρία τῷ τοιούτῳ φαρμάκῳ ἐχρήσαντο ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, οἷα πολλὰ καὶ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐποίει τήν τε αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν ἀρνύμενος καὶ τὸν νόστον τῶν ἑταίρων.

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[77] Gill 1993: 54. Gill shows that Plato's argument is based on the assumption that there exist certain objective truths, and that there are objective standards which allow us to determine whether a belief is 'true' or not. Lucian, however, is a relativist; in the *VH* especially, he plays with the idea that all truth is text-bound: see Chapter 3, n. 193.

[78] *Rep.* 382 b8-c1.

[79] *Rep.* 382 c5-d1.

For these people at least may be pardoned; moreover, some of them are even worthy of praise - those who either deceive enemies, or use this sort of remedy in dire straits - the sort of thing Odysseus used to do too, when securing his own life and the return of his companions.

Something curious has happened here. Tychiades' choice of Odysseus as his model for someone who tells a noble lie is rather incongruous, for two reasons. First of all, Odysseus the liar is a fictional character himself, the product of the Homeric literary creation. There can be no doubt that it is specifically this literary Odysseus that Lucian has in mind; the line τήν τε αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν ἀρνύμενος καὶ τὸν νόστον τῶν ἑταίρων is a reminiscence of Odyssey 1.5:

ἀρνύμενος ἥν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἑταίρων.[80]

Now, given the Platonic intertextuality at this point, we are surely invited to consider this in the light of Plato's doctrine on poetry, and his thoughts on Homer's poetry in particular.[81] Socrates famously rejected most poetry from his ideal state,[82] largely because poetry is false - not in the sense that its content is fictional, but because the poets do not have a true understanding in their souls of the nature of what they write about, and as a consequence, their literary representations, which are in themselves three steps removed from the truth, are useless either for imparting ethical information, or for implanting the clear understanding of the nature of things, both of which were aims of the the state's educational programme.[83] Homer's poetry constituted a particular danger for the citizens of the ideal state, because of its uncommonly strong poetical appeal. Socrates concedes that Homer is 'the most poetic' of all the poets,[84] and that his poetry exercises a sort of 'enchantment' over listeners;[85] consequently, he argues,

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[80] For an assessment of Lucian's poetical composition, see Bowie 1989: 253 ff.; on Lucian's appropriation of Homer in general, see Bouquiaux-Simon 1968 and Mal-Maeder 1992.

[81] The relevant passages for Plato's discussion of poetry in Rep. are: 376e-392b and 595a-608b; for discussion, see Janaway 1995: 133-157 and Fuchs 1993: 197 ff. (with reference to the concept of fiction).

[82] Rep. 607a: he is prepared to make an exception for hymns to the gods, and for poetry which praises good men, as these are the only types of poetry that are useful to the state, as well as pleasurable.

[83] See Gill 1993: 42-51. Gill argues sensibly that Plato's point here is not to define the fictional quality of poetry, but to argue its unsuitability in the ideal state's programme for ethical education: 'to rewrite his argument in terms of 'fiction' is to superimpose a different conceptual framework.' (51). For the connection between this aspect of Plato's art-theory and statues, p. 68 ff..

[84] Rep. 607a.

[85] Rep. 607d: ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλεῖ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι' Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν; For the enchantment of poetry in general, see 607c (ξύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς). See also 601b (poetical 'apparatus' such as rhythm, metre, harmony etc. have a μεγάλη κήλησις); 602d (where poetry, by the analogy of painting, is

the citizens of the ideal state must chant over and over again to themselves the reasons he has outlined for spurning poetry, as a sort of counter-spell to this bewitchment, lest they 'fall back again into 'the childish love shared by the multitude'.[86]

Socrates also objected to much of what he considered to be immoral content in poems, on the grounds that it would foster moral laxity in the citizens of the state, as they became accustomed to hearing such tales (especially in connection with the gods and heroes).[87] Examples of the sort of poetic material Socrates considered immoral are crimes perpetrated by and on members of the same family - he mentions the castration of Uranus for instance - and arguments within the family.[88] He also considers the following themes morally unsuitable: the battles of the giants, metamorphoses of the gods, ghost stories, tales about the terrors of Hades, and stories about the gods indulging their sexual passions.[89]

Now, there are compelling reasons to believe that Lucian is following the Platonic tradition here, not only on the strength of the intertextuality that has already been identified, but also because these are exactly the themes which Tychiades rejects as well:

> ἐμοὶ γοῦν πολλάκις αἰδεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔπεισιν, ὁπόταν Οὐρανοῦ τομὴν καὶ Προμηθέως δεσμὰ διηγῶνται καὶ Γιγάντων ἐπανάστασιν καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἅιδου πᾶσαν τραγῳδίαν...ἔτι δὲ Πηγάσους καὶ Χιμαίρας καὶ Γοργόνας καὶ Κύκλωπας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, πάνυ ἀλλόκοτα καὶ τεράστια μυθίδια παίδων ψυχὰς κηλεῖν δυνάμενα ἔτι τὴν Μορμὼ καὶ τὴν Λάμιαν δεδιότων.[90]

> For my part, at least, I frequently feel ashamed of their poems on their behalf, whenever they tell stories about 'Uranus' cut', or 'Prometheus' chains' and 'the Giants' revolt', and the whole show in Hades...and Pegasuses and Chimaeras and Gorgons and Cyclopes[91] and all those sorts of things, very strange and monstrous tales that can bewitch the minds of children who are still afraid of Mormo and Lamia.

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a type of 'sorcery and trickery' - γοητεία, θαυματοποιία) and 598d (where Homer, by implication, a γόης). Compare *Laws* 840c; *Protag.* 315 a-b. For Socrates as a *goēs*, and the relevance of this to Lucian's adoption of a *Socratic* air to deliver fiction, see n. 243 and p. 70 ff.. For the connection between fiction and *thaumatopoeia* in Strabo, see p. 147 with n. 115.

[86] *Rep.* 608a. For children's susceptibility to fiction, see n. 161.

[87] *Rep.* 391e-392a. Xenophanes fr. 1 (Campbell); cf. Cronos' own indignation over the poets' stories about him in Lucian *Sat.* 5-6; see also *Sacr.* 1; *Luct.* 2; *J. Trag.* 39; *D. Mort.* 16. For Lucian as a satirist of religion, see Hall 1981: 194-220.

[88] The Castration of Uranus is mentioned at *Rep.* 378a; family arguments are mentioned at *Rep.* 378 c.

[89] He mentions gigantomachies at *Rep.* 378c; divine metamorphoses at 380 dff.; ghost stories at 381e; and frightening tales about Hades at 386b ff.; and the sexual indiscretions of the gods at 390cff..

[90] *Philops.* 2.17-24. For further discussion of this passage, see p. 66 ff.. and p. 156 f..

[91] See *Phaedr.* 229 c7- e4; see p. 18 above.

Within this Platonic context, therefore, it would be difficult to conceive of a more *in*appropriate model for the 'noble liar', than the Odysseus of Homer's poem.[92]

Tychiades' choice of Homer's Odysseus as his *exemplum* for the justified liar in the opening to the *Philops.* jars not only with Plato's expressed opinions about poetry in general and Homer's poetry in particular, but also with the status attributed to the figure of Odysseus elsewhere in Lucian's own works.[93] Avery, writing about Herodotean presences in Lucian's works, addresses the irony of adducing as a witness a figure like Herodotus, whom Lucian, in other texts, characterises as a liar. Even if the audience was not aware of these Lucianic intratexts, he argues, Herodotus' veracity was impugned by others in antiquity as well.[94] The same could be said of Tychiades' reference to Odysseus in the *Philops.* too; even if, despite the obvious clues, Lucian's learned audience missed the intertextuality with Plato and the *VH* at this point, there was still enough of a tradition in antiquity, especially in the revisionist literature of the Second Sophistic, which held Odysseus as the archetypal rogue liar, to reflect ironically on Tychiades' citation here.[95] This irony is in turn subversive to Tychiades' own reliability as a speaker and narrator.[96]

Homer's Odysseus, then, may, according to Tychiades, be excused - even praised - for the lies he told, since he was motivated by a greater cause; Tychiades wants to know what motivates people to tell lies *without* any such cause. When Philocles replies, after Plato, that such wanton mendacity must be attributed to ignorance, Tychiades is forced to disagree, for, he says, there are many such people, who are highly intelligent, but who nonetheless evidently enjoy deceiving themselves and others - for example the great literary deceivers, Herodotus, Ctesias and Homer:

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[92] Lucian may mean to reflect the irony of Socrates' method of quoting from Homer in order better to express his philosophical speculation, even though he believes Homer's poetry is counter-productive to the inculcation of truth which is the aim of the educational system in his ideal state. It is also ironic that Socrates choses fictive *mythoi* in his effort to attain to truthful understanding, and that there is a strong fictional element in the form of the dramatic dialogue, which Plato himself exploits in order to record Socrates' inquiry. However, for the argument that it is anachronistic to suppose that Plato (or any other ancient author) conceived of fiction as a determinate discourse, see Gill 1993: 79-87.

[93] See n. 9.

[94] Avery 1996: 29. For Herodotus' ancient reputation as a liar, see Plutarch *De Herodoti Malignitate* (*Mor.* 854 e), and Hartog 1988: 295-309.

[95] For the mendacity of Odysseus, see Philostratus *Heroicus*; Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 11.

[96] Lucian's praise of the poet Aristophanes in the *VH* as 'a wise man and true, who was undeservedly distrusted for what he wrote' (*VH* 1.29) has the same effect of subverting his own narratorial claims to veracity and reliability. Cf. p. 194 ff..

ἐπεὶ πολλοὺς ἂν ἐγώ σοι δείξαιμι συνετοὺς τἆλλα καὶ τὴν γνώμην
θαυμαστοὺς οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἑαλωκότας τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ καὶ
φιλοψευδεῖς ὄντας, ὡς ἀνιᾶσθαί με, εἰ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἄριστοι τὰ
πάντα ὅμως χαίρουσιν αὐτούς τε καὶ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας
ἐξαπατῶντες. ἐκείνους μὲν γὰρ τοὺς παλαιοὺς πρὸ ἐμοῦ σὲ χρὴ
εἰδέναι, τὸν ʿΗρόδοτον καὶ Κτησίαν τὸν Κνίδιον καὶ πρὸ τούτων τοὺς
ποιητὰς καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον αὐτόν, ἀοιδίμους ἄνδρας, ἐγγράφῳ τῷ
ψεύσματι κεχρημένους, ὡς μὴ μόνους ἐξαπατᾶν τοὺς ἀκούοντας
σφῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρις ἡμῶν διικνεῖσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἐν
καλλίστοις ἔπεσι καὶ μέτροις φυλαττόμενον. [97]

For I could show you many people who are intelligent in other matters, and
possess wonderful discernment, who are somehow caught up in this rot, and
are lovers of lies; the upshot of it is that it annoys me, if these sorts of men,
who are excellent in every respect, nevertheless take pleasure in deceiving
both themselves, and those who encounter them. For you must know those
ancient predecessors of mine - Herodotus, and Ctesias of Chidos, and before
them the poets and Homer himself - men of high renown who used the
written lie, with the result that they not only deceived the people who
listened to them at that time, but their lies have come down in succession to
our own time, preserved in the finest words and rhythms.

The fact that Tychiades exonerates Homer's fictional character Odysseus from the
charge of wanton lying, while at the same time finding Homer himself culpable of
this charge, suggests that Tychiades' criterion for judgement is the *ethics* of lying,
rather than the actual veridical status of what is said.[98] Odysseus' actual fictional
status appears not to be an issue for him at all; regardless of whether or not he
'really' did what Homer says he did, the fact that an altruistic motive is attributed
to him frees him from blame, in Tychiades' view, whereas the fact that Homer
fabricated lies for no apparent reason other than for pleasure, renders him morally
culpable. This might lead us to conclude that Lucian in the *Philops.*, like Plato in

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[97] *Philops.* 2.11-17.

[98] Cf. p. 171 below. In Gill's view, this would be axiomatic for the ancient conceptualization of
fiction in general. Gill claims that there was no assertion in antiquity of the supremacy of the
aesthetic value of a text, independent of its ethical and veridical status, which would lead to a
positive recognition of fiction as a genre (Gill 1993: 73 and 81); he argues that this is a modern way
of thinking: 'There is [in the ancient world] lacking the set of special cultural and intellectual
preconditions that would lead them to give a positive value to non-judgemental imaginative
identification with fictional figures as a means of extending one's subjective world-view...ideas
about fiction don't appear in Plato, or...in other ancient authors.' (*ibid.*: 84). While Gill's argument
is valuable as a corrective to over-zealous claims about ancient conceptions of fiction, I cannot
agree with his assertion that a positive value of fiction is non-evident in *all* ancient writers; it seems
to me that this is *precisely* what Lucian proclaims, in the preface to the *VH*, where he expresses his
expectation that the text will be attractive to his readers 'for the way in which I have related a
variety of lies in a convincing and plausible way': ὅτι ψεύσματα ποικίλα πιθανῶς τε καὶ
ἐναλήθως ἐξενηνόχαμεν (*VH* 1. 2.7-8). Cf. n. 118 and p. 153 f..

the *Republic*, is not dealing with the question of fictionality *per se*, then, but with the ethics of fiction.[99] Or is it as simple as that?

A closer look at the passage quoted above reveals a striking metatextuality, as the author intrudes into his own text. When the narrator, Tychiades, identifies Herodotus and Ctesias, and, before them, Homer and his fellow poets, as ancient literary precedents for gratuitous lying, he defines them as 'those ancient *predecessors of mine*': ἐκείνους... τοὺς παλαιοὺς πρὸ ἐμοῦ .[100] He therefore locates himself within the same tradition and the same literary pedigree as those authors who 'used the written lie, with the result that they not only deceived the people who listened to them at that time, but their lies have come down in succession to our own time, preserved in the finest words and rhythms'.[101] But Tychiades is not *writing* anything - he is merely conversing with Philocles! It is therefore *Lucian* who locates himself in the same tradition as Herodotus, Ctesias and Homer, for passing on the lies enshrined in his written fiction. Lucian thereby gives the game away to his audience; Tychiades is merely a *persona* which he uses in order get away with composing his own literary fictions, whilst maintaining a sophisticated, sceptical distance from them. The *Philops.* is only ostensibly a 'Platonic' discussion on the ethics of truth and lies; in actual fact, Lucian means to indulge his flair for storytelling, and he advertises, metatextually, the fact that he is writing fiction, alerting his readers to the literary-fictional nature of the work. This is obviously very similar to what he does in the preface to the *VH*, except that the metatextuality in the *Philops.* is less blatant, and on a smaller scale.[102]

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[99] It is clear from what Plato says about 'falsehood in words' and 'the noble lie' (*Rep.* 382 b-d) that he at least partially understood the concept of what we call fictionality, at least within an ethical framework. Gill (1993: 55) concedes that 'the status which is ascribed to the 'falsehood in words' (as regards *muthologia*, for instance), and to the noble lie, is, in our terms, 'fictional', at least in the sense that the relevant type of narrative is consciously made-up or fabricated (though not in the sense that the audience is meant to be aware of this status.)' I believe it is legitimate to infer also from Plato's use of the word μίμημα in this context - the same word he uses when referring to literary imitation - that he understood the concept of fictionality as a dynamic of literary creation, even if he did not pursue a semiotic analysis of this, perhaps because, like Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, he was not interested in it. See also n. 66 and n. 67.

[100] Von Möllendorff (2000: 433 ff., especially 435, n. 38) notices the incongruity here, and rightly comments on its subversive effect for Tychiades' sceptical pose: 'So...reiht sich Tychiades von vornherein persönlich in die Reihe der von ihm geschmähten Lügner ein...das Verhältnis zwischen Tychiades und den Lügenfreunden [ist] nicht so eindeutig...' He does not, however, perceive the intrusion of the *author* at this point, and he therefore misses the metatextual nature of the passage, and its significance as an index for how Lucian meant the *Philops.* to be read.

[101] *Philops.* 2. 14-17, quoted on p. 14 above. Note again how the emphasis on *writing* draws attention to the *textual* surface of the dialogue. There is a similarity here with the Platonic irony of Socrates' eschewal of writing in the *Phaedrus* (274 b6 – 277 a5).

[102] Avery perceives the irony in the *Philops.*, but he does not observe that Lucian actually adverts his readers to what he is doing: 'Lucian's activity in *Philopseudeis* is much the same as in *Verae*

Of course, it is not possible to extricate author and narrator entirely, and although it makes logical sense to include only Lucian the author in this tradition of literary liars, Tychiades the narrator (who is, after all, assigned these words) is co-opted into the tradition as well. Once again, the effect is to subvert Tychiades' reliability;[103] he is not all he claims to be - or else his scepticism is tongue-in-cheek - for how else can we reconcile his professed distaste for non-utilitarian lying, with his self-confessed literary pedigree? One thing is clear; we can no longer accept what Tychiades says at face value; despite his apparent objections, Tychiades participates in the transmission of fiction with as much relish as the philosophers he scorns.[104]

The *Philops.*, as well as being concerned with the ethics of fiction, contains at its heart an exploration of the nature and dynamics of literary fiction. This is made clear in the preamble, not only in light of the literary pedigree which the author and narrator invoke for themselves, but also by a verbal echo which connects the tales Tychiades heard, with the literary fictions fabricated by his ancient predecessors. At *Philops.* 5, Tychiades finally explains the point of his inquiry, telling Philocles that he has just come from Eucrates' house, having been driven out by the sort of fantastical stories the company were telling:

> ἀλλά με ὥσπερ αἱ Ἐρινύες ἐξήλασαν *πολλὰ τεράστια καὶ ἀλλόκοτα* διεξιόντες.[105]

> But they drove me out, like the Furies, by telling *many stories, monstrous and strange.*

These words strike a clear resonance with the formula Tychiades used in an earlier passage to define the sort of fictions written by ancient authors like Homer, Herodotus and Ctesias:

> ἐμοὶ γοῦν πολλάκις αἰδεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔπεισιν, ὁπόταν...διηγῶνται...Πηγάσους καὶ Χιμαίρας καὶ Γοργόνας καὶ Κύκλωπας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, *πάνυ ἀλλόκοτα καὶ τεράστια* μυθίδια παίδων ψυχὰς κηλεῖν δυνάμενα ἔτι τὴν Μορμὼ καὶ τὴν Λάμιαν δεδιότων.[106]

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*Historiae*, entertaining by means of fantastic lies, except that in the former his primary speaker criticises those who lie, while in the latter he admits that this is his plan.' (Avery 1996: 59).

[103] See n. 68.

[104] This clearly has implications for the *extra*-textual reader too: see p. 52 ff. and p. 64 ff..

[105] *Philops.* 5. 4-5. Plutarch uses the adjective ἀλλόκοτος to describe the ghost that appears to Brutus (*Brut.* 36. 3-4). The ghost that appears to Dion is described in similar terms, and likened to the appearance of the Erinyes in tragedy: μέγα καὶ τερατῶδες...εἶδε γυναῖκα μεγάλην, στολῇ μὲν καὶ προσώπῳ μηδὲν Ἐρινύος τραγικῆς παραλλάττουσαν (Plutarch, *Dion* 55.1.2).

[106] *Philops.* 2. 17-24 (quoted with translation on p. 25).

There are a number of interesting points in this brief passage. First of all, one should note the metaleptic nature of this verbal echo, which co-opts these 'oral' stories, which Tychiades heard and now reports, into the same class as *literary* fiction. Lucian has an eye here on the extra-textual reader of the *Philops.*, for whom these stories do indeed constitute literary fictions; they cannot be literary for the in-text character, Tychiades. Tychiades' verbal echo therefore breaches the narratorial order, which serves to 'unmask', metatextually, what is going on - that behind Tychiades' ostensibly oral report, the author Lucian is writing fiction, just like Homer, Herodotus and Ctesias did, and that he expects us to read it as such. This echo, then, is of the same order as Tychiades' statement of his literary predecessors, although, embedded within the discourse of Tychiades' speech, it is more oblique.

But there is more. Tychiades' reference to the fabulous Erinyes is curiously inappropriate - in much the same way as his incongruous citation of the Homeric character, Odysseus, as an exponent of the Platonic 'noble lie'.[107] In the passage just quoted, Tychiades expressed his embarrassment at ancient authors' stories about such fabulous creatures - Gorgons, Chimaeras, Pegasuses and the like; now he himself refers to creatures who are similarly fabulous. The irony may well be intended to contribute to the ambiguity of Tychiades' authority as narrator - Lucian is muddying the waters again, and not allowing us to decide whether Tychiades is *really* the lie-hater he claims to be, or not - but the reference itself may also hold greater significance. I believe that Lucian - tentatively at this point - is saying something about the dynamics of fiction-reading. The Erinyes, who were featured in several tragic plays, famously drove one mad; could this reference therefore connote the 'madness' that was associated with stage illusion in general in antiquity?[108] As the dialogue progresses, this motif is developed, culminating in Tychiades' explicit remarks upon the 'mania' of lying at the dialogue's close. The precise type of 'lying' Lucian has in mind is clarified here in the opening sequence: it is the madness of what is (now unfashionably) known as 'suspension of disbelief'. The figurative madness which was only narrowly avoided by Tychiades in listening to the philosophers' tales therefore mirrors the madness which threatens to engulf the extra-textual reader, in consciously lending credence to

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[107] See p. 23 ff..
[108] Cf. p. 64 ff.. Of course, the Erinyes, as recipients of cult, were goddesses (unlike the Gorgons, Chimaera etc.); this makes the suggestion that they do not really exist all the more audacious, it seems.

texts which he knows to be false - in other words, the 'madness' of entering the contract of fiction.

By attributing his seductive fictions to a narrator whose speech is peppered with warning-signals that what he says is not true, and by inscribing into the text readers, whose response to these fictions are (especially in the case of Philocles and Tychiades) highly ambiguous, Lucian highlights the irrationality of the reader's instinctive indulgence of these lies, and therefore problematizes the readerly response to fiction.

## READERS IN THE TEXT

'Reading', and the appropriate readerly response to fiction is itself thematized in this text. The characters introduce their narratives in a quasi-metatextual manner by using words such as διήγησις (*Philops*. 37), and the verb διηγέομαι (*Philops*. 11, 14, 22; twice in 33).[109] The word πίστις and its cognates appear as a *leitmotiv* in the text, especially in the opening section,[110] inscribing the readers' response to these narratives in terms of a process of negotiation between truth and lies.[111] The term is almost metapoetical, as it is used especially in the Second Sophistic to denote explicitly fictitious texts.[112]

It could be argued that Lucian is not really concerned with the dynamics of fiction, and that he is not dealing with fictionality here, since he is actually talking about people who *take such stories for the literal truth*. The speakers in the *Philops.*, are not really, *pace* Anderson, quite the same as those who gather around campfires, amusing themselves with ghost-stories.[113] Those people understand, at least intuitively, the contract of fictionality which allows them to experience vicariously the thrill of fear, in imagining what it would be like if there really were

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[109] This is what Müller (1932: 38 and *passim*) refers to as *propositio*.

[110] It occurs first in the title: ἀπιστῶν (cf. n. 20 above), and many instances follow: ἀπιστῶν (3.13); τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ μυθώδη (5.2); ἀξιόπιστός τις ὁ Εὐκράτης ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ πιστεύσειεν...(5.6-7); ἐπιστώσατο (5.11); τὸ πρᾶγμα οὕτω πιθανώτερον (7.9); ἄπιστον (8.12); πιστεύειν (8.15); πιστεύειν (10.2); ἀπιστότερος (13.4); ἐπίστευσα (13.7); εἰ ταῦτα εἶδες, ὦ Τυχιάδη, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἠπίστησας (15.1f.); ἀπιστῶν (16.1); ἀπιστήσεις, ἀπιστήσαιμι (17. 8-9); ἀπιστήσει (20.6); ἀπιστεῖν (28.1); πιστεύω, ἐπίστευον (30.5-6); ἀπιστοῦντος (32.3); πιστεύεις, ἀξιοπιστότερον (32. 9, 11); ἐπίστευε (32.21); ἀπιστήσεις, ἄπιστον (38. 5, 8). Cf. n. 65.

[111] Whitmarsh *forthcoming* examines the use of the language of belief in Philostratus' *Heroicus*, and connects it to the *logos protreptikos*: cf. n. 255.

[112] For Lucian's evocation of *apistia* as a response to traditional myth in the *Phaedrus*, see p. 18 ff. (esp. p. 20f.). For the metapoetical status of the word, see n. 65 above; cf. also Chapter 2, n. 150; Chapter 3, p. 190 with n. 298.

[113] Anderson (2000: 11) compares the tales of the *Philops.* to 'ghost stories around the fireside'.

an axe-murderer on the loose, while remaining (reasonably) assured that this is not the case, *because it is only a story*. Granted, there is the hint of the possibility that the intellectuals trading stories at Eucrates' house might be enjoying these stories as fiction, because of their 'thrilling' response, twice cited (Eucrates at *Philops.* 22.16 ὁρᾶτε...ὅπως ἔφριξα...μεταξὺ διηγούμενος; and Eucratides at 27.16f. ὁ δὲ αὐτίκα ἔφριξε μάλα παιδικῶς, καὶ πάλαι ἤδη ὠχρὸς ὢν πρὸς τὴν διήγησιν.) The noun φρίκη was associated with the thrill (*frisson*) of horror experiences, for example, by tragic audiences; the use of this word each time in connection with the word for a story (διήγημα) arguably elicits this interpretation as the response appropriate to *fiction*. But Tychiades' point in the *Philops.* is that these philosophers and intellectuals - ostensibly at any rate - seriously believe the stories, to the extent that they are offended by Tychiades' scepticism, and moved by their evangelical fervor to attempt to convince him of the error of his thinking. On the diegetic level at least, therefore, it could be argued that Tychiades does not deal with fictionality at all, but with gullibility and extreme credulity, in people who ought to know better.

However, it is not as straightforward as that. When Tychiades gives examples of various types of φιλοψευδεῖς - intelligent people who understand the truth, but who nevertheless chose to lie - he names Herodotus, Ctesias, and before them, Homer and the poets, and of course, he includes himself (*Philops.* 2.7 ff.). However, at *Philops.* 3.1, he refines his argument, with the enigmatic remark that perhaps the poets might be excused: καίτοι τὰ μὲν τῶν ποιητῶν ἴσως μέτρια... Some understanding of the concept of fictionality is implicit in this remark; Tychiades does not qualify his statement, nor is he explicit about why the poets may be granted a degree of freedom with the truth, but he implies that it is because they are writing poetry, and poetry has its own laws about truth and lies, and whatever lies between.[114] The fact that he uses the poets' example as a foil to complain about mendacious tour-guides (who are *not* writing literature, but talking about the real world surrounding them) also suggests a degree of perceptiveness for the different contracts of fictionality allowed to different media

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[114] This may be implicit in Tychiades' vaguely apologetic remark that the poets handed down their lies 'preserved in the most beautiful phrases and metres' (*Philops.* 2.16-17). If Herodotus and Ctesias, by virtue of being prose authors, are not meant to be included in this special *proviso* for the poets, it is arguably due to the general discomfort felt in antiquity, and problematized by Lucian himself in the *VH*, about how to regard equivalent fabrications in prose, because prose was conventionally the medium for truthful discourse, analysis and information. 'Verse highlights a text's distance from ordinary speech, its artificiality, its status as linguistic construct, the fact that it

or genres, in other words, that a lie, in the context of literature, may acquire the status of a fictional truth, but outside that context, it potentially remains a lie.[115]

Philocles adopts a different approach; he acknowledges the pleasure-principle of lies, and by asserting that poets (as well as tour-guides) may use lies in order to enhance their texts, claims for these mendacities an aesthetic value independent of their literal truth status - a response which goes some way to showing an appreciation of fictionality.[116] One way or the other, it is made very clear that the butt of Philocles and Tychiades' ridicule are people who are intelligent beings but who - *without* the need for aesthetic embellishment or *without* the justification that they are writing poetry, without any such excuse whatsoever - nevertheless choose to tell lies; these are the sort of people exemplified by Eucrates and his friends, as Tychiades goes on to show:

ΦΙΛΟΚΛΗΣ
οἱ δὲ μηδεμιᾶς ἕνεκα αἰτίας τοιαύτης ὅμως χαίροντες τῷ ψεύσματι παγγέλοιοι εἰκότως δοκοῖεν ἄν.
ΤΥΧΙΑΔΗΣ
εὖ λέγεις· ἐγώ γέ τοι παρὰ Εὐκράτους ἥκω σοι τοῦ πάνυ, πολλὰ τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ μυθώδη ἀκούσας... [117]

Lucian, therefore, takes pains to show that, at the diegetic level, his speakers are *not* talking about fiction. But to leave the matter there is only to appreciate one dynamic of the *Philops.*; the text also operates outwardly in a conscious manner on the extra-textual reader, and it is on this level that Lucian *is* concerned with fiction. This is justified by the fact that Lucian aligns himself with the very authors whose fictional licence has just been ackowledged, and by the fact that he indicates that he is writing literary prose fiction in the *Philops.* within that tradition. In the diegesis, the various speakers tell tales and accept them, apparently, as *literal truth* (or in Tychiades' case, he dismisses them as literal lies); in other words, the diegetic characters do not participate - primarily - in the game of *fiction*. But on the extradialogic level, Lucian has alerted readers to the fact that these are *written, literary fictions*, texts which oscillate between the status of truth and lies,

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is not real. Prose, on the other hand, carries implicit claims to factuality.' (Morgan 1993: 178). On this idea, see *Hist.co.* 8.
[115] See Morgan's disctinction between what is 'fictionally true' as opposed to 'factually untrue', and the difference between believing a fiction, and believing a lie. 'There are two defences for fiction against the charge of lying: the first is to pretend that the fiction is not untrue at all, the second to deny any intention to deceive...but a novelist and his readers seem to be able to have it both ways.' (Morgan 1993: 225).
[116] *Philops.* 4. 1-4: ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ποιηταί, ὦ Τυχιάδη...συγγνώμης τυγχάνοιεν ἄν...τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μύθου τερπνὸν ἐπαγωγότατον ὂν ἐγκαταμιγνύντες τῇ γραφῇ, οὗπερ μάλιστα δέονται πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροατάς...

and which exercise the reader's complaisance in the contract of fictionality. Through these metatextual and metaleptic remarks in the opening dialogue, therefore, the author activates the contract of fictionality with us, the extra-textual readers. Although we identify largely with Tychiades as the primary reader in the text, the identification is not complete; Lucian shifts our response almost imperceptibly into a different frame of reference to the one to which the intra-dialogic characters apply.

## AUTHORS IN THE TEXT: MAKE-BELIEVE AND MAKE BELIEVE

It is a widely acknowledged fact that ancient literary criticism (at least, in so far as our evidence shows) is manifestly lacking any systematic theorizing on the nature of fiction.[118] However, J.R.Morgan has shown that one should not infer from this that ancient readers and writers lacked sufficient understanding of the phenomenon of fictionality. 'The dynamics are clearly written into the novels themselves, which both proclaim and pretend to conceal their fictionality, both make-believe and make believe.'[119] Morgan's study includes a survey of the principal conventions exploited by the novelists in order both to conceal *and* reveal the fictionality of their texts in this way.[120] What Morgan says here about the novelists can be applied to the *Philops.* too. Each of the metadiegetic stories which Tychiades reports is delivered in such a way as to induce credence (make believe), but the text is also studded with authorial intrusions to remind the reader of their fictional status (make-believe). The narrative techniques of the in-text authors, which are put on ironic display through the focalization of Tychiades, interlock with the techniques exploited also by the author of the dialogue, Lucian. The hidden author of the fiction of the *Philops.* is glimpsed and refracted in the mirror-image of the ironic authors of fiction created by him within his own text; in a textual analogue of Velásquez' celebrated painting, *Las Meniñas*, they allow us privileged insight into the processes of their own creation.

The first important feature to notice is how Lucian pretends to 'abjure artifice' by presenting these fictional stories within the framework of a dialogue, which he presents as *impromptu*. The whole dialogue arises, we are led to believe,

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[117] *Philops.* 4.8 - 5.2.
[118] Laird (1993: 154-5) comments on the 'scant framework for criticizing fiction, as we understand it, in ancient terms', but suggests that certain remarks made by Quintilian (*Inst.Or.* 10.1.46) and Macrobius (*In Somn. Scip.* 1.2.8) 'would be considered as adequate definition of fiction as we conceive it nowadays.' Cf. n. 98.
[119] Morgan 1993: 197.
[120] Morgan 1993: 211-224.

from Tychiades' reflections on lies and people who tell lies, which leads him back to the conversation at Eucrates' house which motivated these reflections in the first place.[121] The progression from his initial questions to his narrative appears quite natural, even casual - this is the force of the particle γέ τοι at *Philops.* 5.1, where Tychiades introduces his narrative by way of affirming but correcting Philocles' statement[122] - and we might be induced to believe this is a veridical report (make believe), were it not for the fact that Lucian intrudes onto the text by having Tychiades align himself with ancient literary predecessors (thereby casting doubt on his quasi-philosophical motivation), and also the fact that the obvious Platonic intertexts highlight the text's artifice (make-believe).

One of the most effective methods to induce credence for fiction is to use what Elam (with reference to the semiotics of drama) called deictic, actualizing language, which imparts the impression of an autonomous diegetic plane of existence, and substantiates (by circular logic) the status and claims of the fictional speaker. 'For its inhabitants, a possible world is 'actual' to the extent that it can be referred to as the spatio-temporal *here and now*. Deictic definition is the crucial marker of the present context as opposed to remote 'theres' that one can imagine or describe... Deixis allows the dramatic context to be referred to as an 'actual' and dynamic world already in progress.' [123] Elam identifies deictic language as the necessary condition for dramatic 'world-creating discourse'.[124] Laird discusses the similar world-creating dynamic of narrative fiction, and shows how the fictional text encourages the reader 'to construct for himself, and to construct quite actively, a *world* in which the story takes place'.[125] One way the text achieves this is by referring to 'circumstantial detail which serves to strengthen the credibility of a story without being directly relevant to the events recounted';[126] this creates what Said calls the effect of 'depth.'[127] A few examples from the *Philops.* will show how Lucian uses the world-creating power of deictic language and reference to such circumstantial details in the service of 'make believe'.

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[121] This is, of course, circular logic, as Tychiades' reflections are osensibly the *result* of this experience at Eucrates' house.

[122] See Denniston 1954: 114 ff., especially 132 (the particle γε used in answers, both to affirm, and limit or correct) and 550 (for the lively and limitative force of the combination γέ τοι).

[123] Elam 1980: 113 and 139.

[124] Elam 1980: 139.

[125] Laird 1993: 151.

[126] Laird 1993: 150, n. 4; cf. Winkler's 'evidential accountability' (Winkler 1985: 66-7); for Philostratus' use of the technique in his *VA*, see Francis 1998: 434 ff..

[127] Said 1994: 162; cf. p. 171.

Tychiades introduces his narrative by using deictic language: ἐγώ γέ τοι παρὰ Εὐκράτους ἥκω σοι τοῦ πάνυ (*Philops.* 5). I have already drawn attention to the use of the particle combination γέ τοι, the force of which implies an audience, thereby 'substantiating' Philocles' presence, an effect which is then more fully brought out by the dative σοι.[128] One should also notice how Tychiades speaks in the present tense (ἥκω), to denote an action which has *just* happened; this suggests that he is operating within an autonomous diegetic *tempus*, relative to which the diegetic acts take place.[129] The fact that Tychiades names Eucrates first without any introduction implies that he is an autonomous person known to these two speakers within their diegetic world; the fact that he is unknown to *us* suggests that *we* are in ignorance, that the diegesis exceeds our own perspective as readers, and is therefore an autonomous world, independent of our reading experience. In one brief and casual sentence, therefore, Lucian lays the foundations of his story-world, complete with its own spatio-temporal dimensions, and populated by its own host of characters.[130]

He does much the same thing a little later, when Tychiades is actually about to embark on his narrative. In order to account for his presence at Eucrates' house, Tychiades explains that he used to visit him *previously*, when he had leisure, but *today* he wanted to meet *Leontichus* - *a friend of his* - and he was told by *Leontichus' slave* that *he had gone to visit Eucrates because he was ill*, so Tychiades went to Eucrates' house for these two reasons, both to meet Leontichus, and to visit Eucrates, for *he had not known* that he was ill.

> εἰώθειν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε, ὦ Φιλόκλεις, φοιτᾶν παρ' αὐτόν, εἴ ποτε
> πολλὴν τὴν σχολὴν ἄγοιμι, τήμερον δὲ Λεοντίχῳ συγγενέσθαι
> δεόμενος - ἑταῖρος δέ μοι, ὡς οἶσθα - ἀκούσας τοῦ παιδὸς ὡς παρ'
> Εὐκράτην ἕωθεν ἀπέλθοι νοσοῦντα ἐπισκεψόμενος, ἀμφοῖν ἕνεκα,
> ὡς καὶ τῷ Λεοντίχῳ συγγενοίμην κἀκεῖνον ἴδοιμι - ἠγνοήκειν γὰρ
> ὡς νοσοίη - παραγίνομαι πρὸς αὐτόν. [131]

Now, the reader does not actually need any of this information in order to be able to understand Tychiades' story; indeed Tychiades' explanation - almost laboured in its details - complicates matters, if anything. But that is the point of it. In his

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[128] Denniston 1954: 537.

[129] The present tense is deictic, 'the fictional *now* proposed by the dramatis personae - the temporal deixis which "actualises" the dramatic world' (Elam 1980: 117).

[130] Tychiades' references to literary figures such as Homer and Ctesias, and to the Athenians, Thebans and their well-known local legends inscribe him as a person within reader's world, which in turn wins credibility for what he then tells us (evidential accountability; cf. p. 35, with n. 126).

[131] *Philops.* 6.

study on the 'linguistics of lying', Weinrich showed that there are numerous devices which a person employs when lying, in order to impart an impression of truthfulness. Of the most important of these, the first is the addition of superfluous detail. 'Everything essential for the lie is open to suspicion, but when it comes to non-essential details the audience cannot see any sense in these having been made up nor can they credit another human being with so much criminal energy.'[132] By adding in the two extra characters (Leontichus and his slave), about whom we know nothing, Lucian creates a more densely-textured diegesis, suggesting a world full of details that are actually superfluous to our requirements as readers, but the super-abundance itself connotes autonomy.

The second of Weinrich's characteristic *topoi* is the liar's 'admission' of his own ignorance; it is 'essentially a ploy of conceding one point in order to take the wind out of the sceptic's sails on everything else.'[133] This appears in a somewhat attenuated form in Tychiades' 'admission' above that he *did not know* that Eucrates was ill.[134]

Finally, the analeptic reference to 'past' events (ie. events prior to the diegesis) has itself an important world-creating function, as Elam explains: '"Backward-looking" anaphoric reference is particularly significant as a means, at the beginning of the play or of individual acts and scenes, of creating the sense of a world *in medias res*...[it has] the role of suggesting that the spectator is "discovering" a world...already in progress.'[135] This is helped by the fact that Leontichus, although unknown to us, appears to be familiar to Philocles.[136]

The very fact that Tychiades so scrupulously attempts to justify his presence at Eucrates' house characterises him as a narrator who is concerned with truthful precision, a styleme calculated to win the reader's credence for his story - ironically - regardless of the fact that he (the reader) cannot verify or corroborate

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[132] Fehling 1989: 120. Pooh-Bah expresses his suspicion of this specious narrative ploy scathingly in Act Two of W.S. Gilbert's *Mikado*: 'Merely corroborative detail, intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative.' I am grateful to Prof. J.M. Mossman for this reference.

[133] Fehling 1989: 121.

[134] For a clearer example of this technique, see *Philops.* 24 and p. 40 f.. Said (1994: 155) compares the same technique at *VH* 1.13 (Lucian's ostensible embarrassment about the στρουθοβάλανοι) and *Gallus* 17 (where the cock, who was a Trojan in a previous incarnation, 'admits' that he did not know Achilles - because he was based in a different camp). These devices are important weapons in the ethnographer's arsenal; for Herodotus' use of them, see Fehling 1989: 87-161 (and for parallels outside Herodotus, see *ibid.*: 161-174). For Lucian's parody of this styleme in the *VH*, see Fusillo 1999: 360 ff. and Chapter 3, p. 166 with n. 199. On the conversion of *Beglaubigungsstrategien* such as this into *Fiktionalitätssignale*, see n. 139.

[135] Elam 1980: 153. Elam is, of course, speaking about drama, but his remarks are relevant to the dramatic dialogue too; substitute 'reader' for 'spectator', for our purposes.

any of his claims.[137] Similar to this ploy is the way in which Tychiades introduces another authority into his account; that of Leontichus' slave, who, he says, told him about Eucrates' indisposition. By adducing the authority of an external and purely circumstantial figure in this manner, Tychiades may wish to create for Eucrates' illness the status of objective fact, verifiable by reference to independent testimony. This implies that he is scrupulous about the possible deficiency of his own testimony, and recognises the need for corroboration, an effect which wins him further credece as the narrator (make believe). Paradoxically, however, *if the device is recognised* - by being 'over-used', say (and Tychiades recognises the obvious use of such devices by the other speakers) - then it acquires the status of a *Fiktionalitätssignal*, and the narrator's credibility comes under suspicion (make-believe).[138]

It is all a matter of balance. Fehling talks of these devices 'whose ostensible purpose is to enhance the credibility of a story in the eyes of an unsuspecting reader. For them to function as lie-*signals*, however, that is, as deliberate 'give-aways', these devices have to be laid on so thick as to have the opposite effect. The reader himself then becomes the author's confidant and accomplice.'[139] The fine line which Tychiades treads between use and overuse of these 'lie-signals' contributes to his ambiguity as narrator; does he mean to convince us that what he is saying is true, or signal to us that it is all made up - lies - but lies in which we are meant to be accomplices, and therefore fiction?

I have examined Tychiades' methods here at some length because they are paradigmatic: the storytellers at Eucrates' house exploit the same or similar 'signals' to obtain credence for their own tales. Cleodemus provides a good example when he introduces his story about how he procured Hyperborean's magical aid for his pupil Glaucias, who was besottedly in love with a married woman, Chrysis (*Philops.* 14). Cleodemus adds all sorts of details which are, strictly speaking, superfluous to requirements for understanding the story, but

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[136] One might compare here the way that Pancrates, the Egyptian sorcerer of Eucrates' last story, is 'recognised' by Arignotus as his former mentor (*Philops.* 34).

[137] In the *Philops.*, this cross-referencing is 'centripetal' (in the sense that the diegesis is substantiated by references to other fictive elements *within itself*); it is predicated upon what is called 'realistic fallacy', or 'literary superstition', i.e.'any belief based on a lack of appreciation that literature is words, e.g. the belief that these *insubstantial* beings have an existence or a *psychology* as *people*.' (Dällenbach 1989: 129, with n. 31). Lucian exploits this styleme ironically in the *VH*: see Chapter 3, p. 161 ff., esp. n. 198.

[138] For Tychiades' response to Eucrates' stories, see below, p. 41 and 43.

[139] Fehling (citing Weinrich) 1989: 120. To use more precise terminology (it is inaccurate to speak of *mendacity* in the context of *fiction*), *Beglaubigungsstrategien* become *Fiktionalitätssignale*: cf. Fuchs 1993: 224: 'Eine Beglaubigungsstrategie, die vom jeweiligen Verfasser mit der Absicht

which serve to 'flesh it out' and make its characters seem more 'real', e.g. his contention that Glaucias would have excelled as a Peripatetic, had he not been so infatuated, for even at eighteen years old, he had already completed the course in natural philosophy... Cleodemus' scrupulousness when it comes to the details of the financial transaction (deposit of four minas as an advance towards the cost of victims; sixteen minas to be paid in full, should the love-magic work.) may in part serve Lucian's favourite joke about the Peripatetics' love of money, but it also characterises Cleodemus ostensibly as a narrator who is careful about getting his facts right.

Eucrates also illustrates the point. When he wishes to introduce his story about the statue of Pellichus, whose nocturnal migrations terrorize the household, he emphasises that the story was common knowledge, applying to the objectivity of 'fact' and inviting corroboration from independent witnesses:

> τὸ γοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, ἦ δ᾿ ὃς ὁ Εὐκράτης, ἅπασι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας ὅσαι νύκτες φαινόμενον καὶ παισὶ καὶ νεανίαις καὶ γέρουσι, τοῦτο οὐ παρ᾿ ἐμοῦ μόνου ἀκούσειας ἂν ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἁπάντων.
> ποίου, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ, ἀνδριάντος;[140]

The elliptical manner in which he refers to the story itself suggests it was common knowledge, and in no need of further elucidation. This has a 'world-creating effect', but it is also a cunning psychological move that places Tychiades (and, by a process of readerly identification, us) in a position of inferior information; he must voice the same question that is in our minds - what sort of statue? When Eucrates claims that *everyone* in the house knows about it, emphasises the *frequent recurrence* of the act, cites as wide a spectrum of witnesses as he can - children, youths and old men, and reiterates his claim that *anyone of his household* could tell the tale, he is practically bullying Tychiades into belief. Further credence is sought by the lengthy excursus, the ostensible purpose of which is to identify the relevant statue in Eucrates' sizeable collection (*Philops.* 18f.). There is much circumstantial detail here, but the digression serves to enhance greatly the impression of Eucrates' scrupulousness (and, consequently, his reliability), and also our impression of a realistically textured diegetic world.[141]

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verwendet wird, daß der Leser mit ihrer Hilfe den Text als erfunden identifiziert, wird somit zum Fiktionalitätssignal.' Cf. p. 166.
[140] *Philops.* 18.
[141] See Said 1994: 154, who considers this passage as an example of Lucian's parody of ethnographic method. For a metatextual interpretation of this passage, see p. 68 ff..

Eucrates' methods when introducing his story about the apparition of Hecate (*Philops.* 22) are comparable. His use of an imperative with particle (ἄκουε τοίνυν) immediately courts a narratee who will be complicit in his fiction. He vouches for the truthfulness of his tale by claiming again that there were witnesses (τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ μαρτύρων), specifying that it is an autoptic report (εἶδον),[142] locating it precisely in time (five years ago, during the harvest season, about midday) and introducing a variety of circumstantial details with 'world-creating' effect (he wandered off by himself, leaving the labourers to continue the vintage, was deep in his own thoughts, heard sound of dogs, presumed his son, Mnason, must be hunting with his friends...etc.).[143]

However, almost in the same breath, Eucrates undercuts his carefully built-up make believe. Tychiades, asking him to be more specific about the size of Hecate's hounds, offers him enough proverbial rope to hang himself, and Eucrates, gleeful at the interest he thinks he has aroused, reveals that they were 'taller than *Indian* elephants!'.[144] The notion is clearly ridiculous, and rendered even more so by his continuing scruple about detail (*Indian* elephants, no less!), which is now revealed for the meaningless sham it really is.[145] Eucrates, however, apparently unable to stop himself, makes increasingly wild claims, the absurdity of which grows in proportion to his attempts to remain credible as a narrator. The result is incongruous and funny. When the earth opens up in a vertiginous chasm beneath him, Eucrates coolly records how he held onto a tree so as not to fall in.[146] Upon peering into the underworld, he claims to have discerned his own father among the dead (still wearing the same clothes in which he was buried, of course), and he can definitely confirm the presence of a bald and pot-bellied Socrates in the underworld - but, with great restraint, refuses to be drawn on the issue of whether

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[142] Said 1994: 155 studies parodic claims to autopsy in Lucian, particularly in the *VH* and *Icar.*; 'le "j'ai vu" est systématiquement utilisé pour corroborer les affirmations les plus invraisembables.' She also notes how vision in Lucian is often connected with what is miraculous/ wondrous.

[143] The liminal location in which Eucrates has this experience, as well as his vaguely Socratic air (he is lost in his own thoughts) both have implications for this fictionality of his narrative: cf. p. 71 f.. Eucrates' state of profound mental preoccupation would, according to modern parapsychology, render him more susceptible to hallucination; cf. n. 184.

[144] *Philops.* 24.

[145] Eucrates' claim here functions in an analogous way to Cleodemus' specification that the flying wizard in his story was a *Hyperborean* - as if his nationality, rather than his remarkable flying ability, might be open to dispute. The comic touch is apparently lost on Schwartz, who notes, straightfacedly (1951 *ad loc.*), that 'l'éléphant d'Asie (*elephas indicus*) est plus grand que celui d'Afrique; les deux variétés étaient connues des Anciens.'

[146] The association between the aperture in the earth, and the appearance of ghosts, may remind us of Odysseus at the trench in *Od.* 11, especially given that Eucrates, like Odysseus, sees the ghost of a parent there.

or not Plato was there 'because one must, I suppose, tell the truth to friends.'[147] Finally, he tells how the chasm closed up, but not before the arrival of some of his servants - one of whom, Pyrrhias, is present to corroborate the report. Tychiades actually pokes fun at the circumstantial details about the 'fire and barking' which the slave throws in in order to oblige his master - showing that both he and the author are aware of this technique of make-believe, and including us, the extra-textual readers, in this superior knowledge.

Eucrates' story about his wife's ghost (*Philops.* 27) shows the same incongruous mixture of the supernatural and the banal. Demainete's ghost appeared to him as he lay on *this* couch (deictic), stood just where his son Eucratides was standing (deictic), seven days after her funeral (note his precise attention to details).[148] The purpose of this other-worldly visitation, however, is so that Demainete[149] can nag her husband (ἡτιᾶτό με) about a particular gilt sandal, which he had neglected to cremate with her, because it had fallen in underneath the chest![150] Their conversation is brought to an abrupt end by the yapping of the little Maltese lapdog from beneath the couch, which frightens the ghost away.[151]

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[147] *Philops.* 24; cf. p. 37 with n. 134.

[148] It is not clear from Lucian's text, *pace* Bernand (1991: 400) that Eucrates fell asleep, but cf. n. 151.

[149] The name Δημαινέτη is attested in antiquity, but Lucian may also have chosen it here because of its similarity to the verb δειμαίνω (I am afraid) and its cognate noun τὸ δεῖμα, -ατος (terror), which he uses elsewhere in the dialogue to refer to the preternatural forces that were haunting the house at Corinth, ἀοίκητος ἦν...ὑπὸ δειμάτων (*Philops.* 31.2); see also his use of the adjective ἀδείμαντος to describe the house, once Arignotus has exorcised the spirit (*Philops.* 31. 23). (One might compare Eucrates' similar play on the words ἀδαμάντινος / δαίμονες at *Philops.* 29.13-14.) Demainete is, therefore, a suitable name for a ghost. There is, of course, an element of humour in the discrepancy between this ghost's terrifying name, and her rather banal intentions, and also the fact that she is scared off by a little dog's bark! For the use of significant names in the haunted house story n. 167 and n. 177.

[150] Felton (1999: 80) proposes that by referring to a single sandal, Lucian is 'most likely' satirizing monosandalism, a status which was attributed in antiquity to beings of liminal status, such as gods, heroes and persons engaged in ritual (e.g. initiates on procession to Eleusis wore only one sandal). As a symbol from the realm of religion and magic, it befits the ghost here. 'Lucian has satirized yet another folk-belief by losing it behind the furniture, considering monosandalism as ineffectual for spiritual enlightenment as amulets are for medicine.' While I agree with her that the detail of the single sandal in this story, like that of the Maltese dog, may indeed be 'deceptively trivial', I believe, rather, that the purpose of the detail here is to add a note of calculated banality to the story, further characterizing Demainete as an over-exacting ghost, who won't let anything go - even after death! Lucian is also clearly parodying Herodotus' account of the enormous communal sacrifice of clothing made as restitution to the ghost of Melissa. For the motif of shape-shifting in the story, see n. 228.

[151] The little dog's barking seems to fulfil a role that is traditionally reserved for the morning cockerel: compare Philostratus, *VA* 4.11 and 16 (Apollonius' interview with the ghost of Achilles is cut short when, at cock-crow, the ghost vanishes 'in the traditional manner'); Apuleius' *Met.* 2. 26 (it ends Thelyphron's eery watch over the corpse, under threat from witches); cock-crow also puts an end to the nocturnal love magic at *Philops.* 14. Modern parapsychological studies show that visions of ghosts are often the result of the subconscious mind's activity during a liminal state of

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Tychiades' hint at *Philops.* 2.11 ff., that he is following the literary tradition of Herodotus, among others, should alert the reader to possible intertexts, and indeed this novella is a parody of the macabre tale about Melissa's ghost in Herodotus 5.92, as other scholars have observed.[152] Anderson's conclusion that Lucian 'has merely adapted the story of Melissa to a more trivial setting'[153] does not, however, do full justice to Lucian's treatment. Avery shows how details in Lucian's story, such as Eucrates' couch, the sandal and the dog, are keys to how Lucian has parodically transformed the 'grotesque features' of the Herodotean tale into a domestic setting.[154] Others have read the story with a different emphasis. Felton, for example, sees less of an intersection with Herodotus' text here, than a parallelism with it.[155] 'These stories are more likely relatively independent variations on a more general theme, that of ghosts requesting proper burial, with each author adapting that theme for a particular purpose: Herodotus to illustrate a tyrant's excess, and Lucian to satirize the trendy fascination with magic and superstition in his time.'[156] There are, however, problems inherent in Felton's analysis, not the least of which is that, by diminishing the importance of the Herodotean presence here in this way, we lose an ironic touch which Lucian has carefully contrived, as I will show.[157]

When he has finished his story, Eucrates, who has become increasingly frustrated by Tychiades' stubborn scepticism, challenges him to say that he does not believe in such matters - when they are everyday occurrences:

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consciousness, between sleep and full wakefulness; a sudden distraction, such as the noise from the little dog's barking, could well break the mood in which such hallucinations take place; the 'ghost' then 'disappears': see Russell 1981a: esp. 126 ff. (the phenomenon of 'the return of the repressed'); see also n. 184.

[152] Anderson 1976b: 25 and 27; Jones 1986: 50.

[153] Anderson 1976b: 27.

[154] Avery 1996: 231ff., especially 233.

[155] See Felton 1999: 78-81, for her analysis of Eucrates' story.

[156] Felton 1999: 81. In keeping with this view, she interprets the detail about the little Maltese dog as a satirical allusion to the folk tradition of animals' sensitivity to the supernatural. For contemporary satire in the *Philops.*, see Hall 1981: 215-220. Hall notes that magic was taken very seriously at the time, as is clear from texts such as Apuleius' *Apologia*, Celsus' κατὰ μάγων and Philostratus *VA* (7. 39) and *VS* (590). Some contemporary Roman emperors were also known to have dabbled in magic; Hadrian in particular was associated with an Egyptian figure called Pachrates (who may be the figure behind Pancrates in the Sorcerer's Apprentice tale – see Appendix I), and Marcus Aurelius brought an Egyptian magician with him on his Marcomannic campaign (for further discussion, see Dickie 2001: 202 ff.). Jones (1986: 51) argues that much of the detail in the *Philops.* may be interpreted as satire on contemporary philosophers. Philosophers in Lucian are, like Eucrates, quite frequently featured in connection with Maltese dogs; a particularly spoiled and pampered specimen (who also possesses an annoying bark) features memorably at *De Merc.Cond.* 34, where it reminds the hired scholar vividly of his place in the household hierarchy by urinating on him! The clown Satyrion calls the Cynic philosopher Alcidamas a 'Maltese lapdog' at *Conv.* 19. The little lapdog forms a comical doublet with Hecate's elephantine hounds of hell; cf. p. 55 ff..

ἔτι ἀπιστεῖν τούτοις, ὦ Τυχιάδη, ἄξιον ἐναργέσιν οὖσιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην φαινομένοις; [158]

Tychiades' response is telling:

μὰ Δί’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· ἐπεὶ σανδάλῳ γε χρυσῷ ἐς τὰς πυγὰς ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία παίεσθαι ἄξιοι ἂν εἶεν οἱ ἀπιστοῦντες καὶ οὕτως ἀναισχυντοῦντες πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. [159]

'No, by Jove,' said I, 'since those who doubt them and show such shameful disrespect for the truth would deserve to be whipped like whelps on the backside - with a gilt sandal!

It is significant that he again picks out the very narratorial device that was calculated to induce belief (make believe) - such as Eucrates' attention to the detail about the sandal here - and uses it in a way that makes it ridiculous, in order to disrupt the spell of the fiction (make-believe); this is all part of Lucian's game of exploring the mechanics of how fiction works.[160] Here again too, the connection is made between unqualified belief (in fiction) and the response expected of children.[161]

When the formidable Pythagorean Arignotus arrives, he is appalled to learn of Tychiades' sceptical attitude to the supernatural,[162] and, like Eucrates and the rest, he seeks to convince him by claiming that such occurrences are part of the fabric of everyday existence, experienced by many.[163] He then introduces an account of his own personal encounter with a demon - in Lucian's version of the famous haunted house motif.[164] Deborah Felton's analysis of this narrative shows how Lucian caricatures Arignotus as a *magus gloriosus*, to use Anderson's

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[157] For the irony of the Herodotean intertext here, see p. 51 f.; cf. p. 105 with n. 123.

[158] *Philops.* 28; in view of Eucrates' comments here, one should perhaps also construe his attention to detail in his narrative as a calculated effort on his part to achieve vividness (ἐνάργεια) as well as a deliberate sense of domesticity or even banality, to show that the supernatural is not really extraordinary. Eucrates almost gives himself away by calling attention to the ἐνάργεια of his account, for that is one of the qualities much-prized in *literary composition*; cf. p. 87.

[159] *Philops.* 28.

[160] Compare his ridicule of Pyrrhias' claims about 'the barking and the fire' at *Philops.* 24 (see p. 41). Avery (1996: 233) observes that the gilt sandal in the story provides the material for Tychiades' jibe, but he does not draw any conclusions from this.

[161] Cf. *Philops.* 2 and 23 (credulous old men are like babies); Philostratus, *Heroicus* 7. 10 and 8. 2 (stories about heroes are *not just the stuff of tales told to children by their nurses*). For the significance of the connection between children and fiction, suggesting a hierarchy of literature, which ranks prose fiction near the bottom, see Morgan 1993: 194-5. See also n. 283. It is interesting to compare Plato, *Rep.* 598c (children and fools are deceived by paintings) in this connection.

[162] *Philops.* 30.

[163] *Philops.* 30: οὐδέν σοι τούτων γίγνεσθαι δοκεῖ, καὶ ταῦτα πάντων, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὁρώντων;

[164] *Philops.* 30ff.. Caster (1937) discusses this tale at pp. 317-8. For a lively analysis of this motif, and a comparative study of the haunted house stories of Plautus, Pliny, and Lucian, see Felton 1999.

phrase.[165] Arignotus, for example, is the only narrator who attributes magical powers *to himself*; the rest describe the magical feats of *other* people instead.[166] By making him an autodiegetic narrator, Lucian ensures that the focus remains firmly on Arignotus as the protagonist, and by adding hyperbolic descriptions of shape-shifting and magical mumbo-jumbo, he heightens the excitement and magnifies the impressiveness of his feat.

Like his counterpart Eucrates, Arignotus also adopts the technique of meticulous attention to detail in order to lend his tale an air of veracity; the haunted house in question belongs to one *Eubatides*, is located in *Corinth*, *beside the Cherry Grove*, and the doorman is called *Tibius*.[167] None of these details is of particular relevance to the story, but they serve cumulatively to create a credible setting for the incredible events in the story he is about to relate.

ἀλλά, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἤν ποτε εἰς Κόρινθον ἔλθῃς, ἐροῦ ἔνθα ἐστὶν ἡ Εὐβατίδου οἰκία, καὶ ἐπειδάν σοι δειχθῇ παρὰ τὸ Κράνειον, παρελθὼν εἰς αὐτὴν λέγε πρὸς τὸν θυρωρὸν Τίβειον ὡς ἐθέλοις ἰδεῖν

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[165] Anderson 1976b: 28. According to Jones (1986: 48), Lucian makes Arignotus 'the paradigm of philosophic credulity.' Felton (1999: 83) describes Arignotus' narrative as a 'self-centred story about his own courage.' (For my interpretation of the significance of Arignotus' particular narrative technique, see n. 240.) In Felton's view, Lucian uses the character to kill two birds with one stone: 'In the egocentric character of Arignotus, Lucian has taken the opportunity to satirize not only popular superstition but philosophy as well - two objectionable items combined in one character.' (Felton 1999: 88). Dickie (2001: 204-5) describes him as a recognisable type, the θεῖος ἀνήρ, or the 'philosopher whose interests coincide with those of the magician'. The fact that Arignotus is said to be an adherent of the Pythagorean sect is appropriate, as Lucian elsewhere characterises Pythagoras in particular as a γόης (*Gall*.4; Socrates is also characterised as a γόης in Plato's *Symp*.: cf. n. 243). His very name, meaning 'far-famed', is appropriate both to the type of philosopher/ holy man; Dickie (2001: 204, n. 5), notes the appropriateness of the name for a Pythagorean philosopher, as Pythagoras reputedly had a daughter called Arignote. For a discussion of Arignotus' depiction as a Pythagorean, see Gascó 1991.

[166] Dickie 2001: 204.

[167] Bompaire 1958: 459, n. 6 declared that Lucian transposed Pliny's haunted house story from Athens to Corinth, 'capitale de la géographie ménippéenne'. The Cherry Grove appears to be a standard feature of Corinthian topography in Lucian; cf. *Hist.co*. 29. The name Tibius appears at *Merc.Cond*. 25.3, as a typical slave name. 'Arignotus', of course, means 'far-famed'. It is tempting to read in the name Eubatides a pun involving the Hebrew tiyaB, *construct form* ty"B, meaning 'house'; the name in that case would translate as something like 'Mr. Goodhouse' - obviously ironic, given that his property is haunted (compare *Euthymus*, 'Mr. Good-Cheer', the name of the Olympic boxing champion who defeats the malevolent ghost of the hero at Temesa (Pausanias 6.6.7-11; cf. Russell 1981b: 194). Such recondite word-play as this is not unique; the novelist Iamblichus, who was a contemporary of Lucian, and came from the Syrian east as well, also indulges in what appears to be a translinguistic pun on his heroine's name Sinonis, evoking the Akkadian *sinuntu*, Aramaic *senunit*, meaning swallow (Iamblichus, *Bab*. 78a39; see Stephens & Winkler 1995: 199, with n. 42). On the question of Lucian's Semitic background, and his possible acquaintance with a Semitic language (largely concerned with the reference in *Bis Acc*. 27), see Millar 1993: 454-6; Swain 1996: 298-308; Adams *et al*. 2002: 14-15 and 304 ff. (bilingualism in general in North Syria). On bilingualism in *Tox*. and the Greek novel, see Chapter 2, n. 21, and p. 116 f.. For significant names in Plautus' haunted house story, see n. 177 below, and Felton (1999a: 128 n. 9).

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ὅθεν τὸν δαίμονα ὁ Πυθαγορικὸς ᾿Αρίγνωτος ἀνορύξας ἀπήλασε καὶ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν οἰκεῖσθαι τὴν οἰκίαν ἐποίησεν.[168]

'But', said he, 'if ever you go to Corinth, ask where Eubatides' house is, and when it's pointed out to you, beside the Cherry Grove, enter in and tell the doorman Tibius that you'd like to see the spot from where the Pythagorean Arignotus dug up and drove out the demon, and made the house habitable for all time.'

We saw the effect of Eucrates' elliptical introduction to his account of the walking statue (*Philops.* 18.1-5);[169] Arignotus exploits a variant method here, and introduces his tale by prolepsis, ie. he tells Tychiades the outcome, in barest detail, *before he actually relates the story*, thereby creating a sense of mystery and suspense, because we know what the end result is, in advance of how it was accomplished. As in the case of Eucrates' ellipsis, Arignotus' words here also elicit a question from a curious narratee. There is a definite air of pomposity in this climactic introduction; it starts with a sweeping flourish, 'if ever you go to Corinth...', and then narrows down gradually to ever finer details: city, house-owner, location in city, name of house-owner's employee. The technique of introducing oneself in the third person also has a rather grandiose effect, implying that Arignotus is, as indeed his name suggests, widely known to all; the pomposity is magnified further by the way in which he identifies himself first as '*the Pythagorean*', only subsequently adding his personal name. This is as much in keeping with Tychiades' description of his formidable appearance and his weighty reputation when he first joins the conversation (*Philops.* 29. 1-3), as with his self-portrayal as a *magus gloriosus* - the star actor in his own heroic tale.[170] Once again, by alluding to external witnesses, like Eubatides and Tibius, Arignotus implies that his account is comprised of objective fact.

The tale about the haunted house is a rather special case in some ways, as Lucian seems to have developed it along the lines of an archetypal model, most probably a widely known oral tale in its original form, which is represented in our extant literature by Plautus (*Mostellaria* 476-505), Pliny (*Ep.* 7.27) and Lucian, here.[171] Pliny's version appears to be the purest of these,[172] whereas both Plautus

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[168] *Philops*.30.

[169] Cf. p. 39 above.

[170] On the character of Arignotus, see above n. 165.

[171] There have been some attempts to ascertain a morphology of the haunted house story. Radermacher (1902: 205 ff.) traces it back to Philemon's play Φάσμα in the fourth century B.C., but suggests that it has its roots in the philosophical speculations of Pythagoras and Heraclitus about the fate of the soul after death. Given that the Stoic Chrysippus assembled a 'collection of reports' on the topic, Radermacher concludes that Philemon was 'hardly likely' to have been working from an oral tradition (206-7). However, his comparative analysis of our three main

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and Lucian handle the archetypal plot in a more creative manner.[173] Of course, in using terms such as 'pure' and 'creative' here, of course, I do not wish to attach any value judgement to the various treatments of the haunted house tale, but merely to indicate that different authors treat the same basic material differently, in accordance with their own genres and purposes. Plautus' treatment of the story for the comic stage, for example, will obviously differ from Pliny's account, which is presented as a topic for intellectual and philosophical speculation to L. Licinius Sura, to elicit his opinion on the question of whether ghosts exist or not.[174] Pliny also wishes to entertain and stimulate his readers, of course, but his *prima facie* concern is to present the account as lucidly possible, for Sura's judgement.[175] Much of the entertainment value of the Plautian version, on the other hand, derives from the fact that Plautus plays with the audience's familiarity with the motifs of the haunted house story, manipulating their expectations for comic effect, as Felton has shown.[176] Plautus' interest is not focused primarily on the haunted house story *per se*, but he exploits it as a diversionary tactic, concocted by the *seruus callidus* Tranio, to keep the old man Theopropides away from the house where his son has been engaged in debaucherous revelry.[177] Lucian, like Plautus,

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examples from antiquity is superficial, and he concludes that Lucian's version is basically the same as Pliny's, with only a change in characters and location (205). Felton (1999: 38-49) develops Radermacher's ideas, but refines his archetypal paradigm, and explores the importance of folklore themes for the haunted house story. Her comparative study of the Plautian, Plinian and Lucianic tales greatly improves on Radermacher's, although her analysis of Lucian shoud be read with caution, as she tends to ignore the importance of the dialogue-frame. For signs in Pliny's version of an oral source, possibly a 'migratory legend', see Felton 1999: 65. For a survey of other versions of the haunted house motif in antiquity, including Christian literature, see Nardi 1975-6; see also Collison-Morley 1912: 19ff. (now dated).

[172] 'The story in many ways...preserves what might be considered an archetypical narrative structure of the haunted-house legend...' (Felton 1999: 65).

[173] Felton 1999: 88.

[174] At the beginning of his letter, Pliny couches his topic in a philosophical and speculative context. 'Et mihi discendi et tibi docendi facultatem otium praebet. Igitur perquam uelim scire, esse phantasmata et habere propriam figuram numenque aliquod putes an inania et uana ex metu nostro imaginem accipere.' This introduction contains a brief reference to the two major schools of thought on the subject of apparitions, namely the materialist theory of Democritus and Lucretius, which held that apparitions represent physical emanations which impact on our sense organs, and the physiological/psychological theory favoured by Aristotle and Pliny himself, which sought an explanation in the visionary's state of mental and physical health: see Sherwin-White 1966: note *ad loc.*, with relevant bibliography. Pliny actually cites three examples of hauntings in this letter for Sura's contemplation, ie. the apparition of Africa which appeared to Curtius Rufus (*Ep.* 7.27. 2-4) and the story of the mysterious barbers (*ibid.* 12 ff.). This is an application of the *lex scholastica*, which again points to the academic nature of the letter. For the possibility of ancient proto-parapsychical research, see Russell 1981b: 203 ff., and cf. n. 190.

[175] In her analysis of Pliny's story, Felton (1999: 65-73) detects both 'comical' and 'realistic' elements.

[176] Felton 1999: 50-61, and 1999a.

[177] Plautus chooses significant names for some of the characters involved in this story, for example 'Theopropides', meaning 'son of prophecy', for his *credulus senex*, and 'Diapontius', from the Greek διά and πόντος, translating into Latin 'Transmarinus', a name that is (rather too) obviously

also manipulates the haunted house theme in certain ways, largely in order to satirize the pompous Arignotus. There is some justification, then, in the claim that Lucian's haunted house story resembles Pliny's more closely in detail and structure, but is closer in spirit (as it were) to the Plautian version.[178]

Owing to this story's rather special status, therefore, one must be careful about which details in the narrative one attributes to the narrator's personal input, and which details are in fact manifestations of archetypal motifs. When Arignotus alludes, parenthetically, to his vast collection of Egyptian books on magic (*Philops.* 31. 6-7), this is calculated partly to explain what he meant by 'the books' he says he took with him, and partly to give himself expert status, which is consistent with his general boastfulness. The detail about the lamp which he also took with him, however, is a good illustration of how we should exercise care in this story. Arignotus mentions the lamp twice at *Philops.* 31, first to describe how he took it with him on his first entry into the house (ἐγὼ δὲ λύχνον λαβὼν μόνος εἰσέρχομαι), and then to say that he set it down in order to provide himself with reading light (ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ οἰκήματι καταθεὶς τὸ φῶς ἀνεγίγνωσκον). Now, we might construe this attention to detail as a sign of narratorial scrupulousness, if not for the fact that lamps feature in both of our other haunted house stories as well. Athenodorus, the intrepid philosopher of Pliny's account, also ensures that he has a lamp with him, and uses it to follow the beckoning ghost outside into the yard, where the ghost vanishes. In Apuleius' story, Thelyphron is furnished with a lamp for his nocturnal watch over a corpse, during which time he is visited by dread witches in bestial form.[179] It is noteworthy, too, that the revenant Philinnion is first revealed by lamplight to the servant in Phlegon's famous ghost story.[180] More telling still is the presence of a lamp in Tranio's story at *Mostellaria* 487; this is the real giveaway to the lamp's archetypal status

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appropriate for the traveller who was, according to Tranio, murdered in the house sixty years previously (the joke is that Tranio is making the whole thing up, as the rather transparent pun threatens to reveal!): see Felton 1999a: 128 n.9, and 140 n. 35. It is very likely that some of these names point to Plautus' Greek sources (we know that the *Mostellaria* was based on a Greek comedy called Φάσμα, by Philemon, as we have seen), and it is also possible that Lucian knew the story from its appearance as a theme of New Comedy (Anderson 1976b: 24; Felton 1999: 88). Lucian also uses punning names for characters in his haunted house story - see n. 167.

[178] 'Plautus achieves his comic effects by deviating from what seems to have been one fairly popular narrative structure for haunted-house stories, whereas Lucian achieves his satirical effects by exaggerating that same structure.' (Felton 1999: 88). For the possibility that Lucian's haunted house story might be a parody of Pliny's, see Felton 1999: 87.

[179] Apuleius, *Met.* 2. 24 ff..

[180] Phlegon *Mirabilia* I. 2-3: καιομένου τοῦ λύχνου καθημένην <ἐ>ῖδεν τὴν ἄνθρωπον παρὰ τῷ Μαχάτῃ· Phlegon was also writing in the second century A.D.. This story influenced Goethe's 'Bride of Corinth'.

because, as Felton has pointed out, the ghost in the Plautian tale is merely a *dream* ghost, and therefore the need for the presence of a lamp is not a logical requirement.[181] The lamp is there because Tranio's story is manifestly made up, and predicated on details that were *characteristic of this sort of story*. In his urgent need for a convincing yarn, Tranio works on the old man's superstitious and credulous nature, and squeezes in as many recognizable details as he can. The resulting tale is in fact riddled with illogicalities and loopholes, which is part of the comedy, and further enhanced by the fact that Theopropides swallows it.[182]

Besides the lamp, there are also other details in Arignotus' account that correspond with motifs which seem to be characteristic of the haunted house tale. One might note, for example, that the ghost in these tales tends to appear to an educated individual (a philosopher in both the Plinian and Lucianic tales);[183] it usually manifests itself to this individual while he is engaged in scholarly activity (as is the case in Pliny and Lucian),[184] and the point of the haunting is usually to reveal an ancient crime and seek proper burial (this is the point of the haunting in Pliny's version; Plautus also incorporates the motif, and Lucian alludes to it).[185]

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[181] Felton 1999: 55-6, and 1999a: 131ff.. According to Felton (1999: 55), the lamp detail 'suggests that in haunted-house stories from antiquity, a lighted lamp needed to be present for a ghost to appear.' The lost souls haunting houses were thought to be drawn towards light (Felton 1999a: 131). Felton explores the connection between lamps and ghosts in ancient times, pointing out that lamps are commonly found among ancient grave goods, and also explaining that ancient ghosts (contrary to modern fashion) tended to be dark (as is Arignotus' nemesis at *Philops.* 31); light was therefore needed to be able to see them. On the dusky appearance of ancient ghosts, in contrast with the pallor that is generally associated with them in modern thought, see Russell 1981b: 195-6.

[182] Felton (1999: 56ff.) explores the problems inherent in Tranio's story.

[183] Felton (1999a: 125) shows that this theme is implicit in the Plautian version of the story, because Tranio, who wants at all costs to *stop* Theopropides entering the house, is counting on him *not* being such a man.

[184] Felton (1999: 68ff.) points to parallels for this motif from the Old Testament, for example where Rabbi Nehemiah wards off the Angel of Death by reading the Talmud, and King David by remaining intent upon the Torah. Of course, the point of these stories in the rabbinic texts, as Felton shows, is that the texts they are reading are *sacred*; it does not seem to be the act of study itself that keeps the spectre at bay, as in our Greek examples. In fact, modern parapsychological research suggests that the opposite is the case, and that being deeply engrossed in reading may render one *more* susceptible to hallucination: see Russell 1981a: esp. 116ff. (scholars' 'creative dreams') and 126 ff. (the 'return of the repressed', facilitated by a dreamlike state).

[185] It has not, to my knowledge, been fully realised how two other stories in the *Philops.* also tap into the characteristic morphology of the haunted house tale. Demainete's ghost, for example, appears to the *philosopher* Eucrates *while he is reading* Plato, in order to make a request concerning her *proper burial*. Tychiades' own story about Democritus in the tomb is a parody of this story-type, and it plays on similar motifs; the tomb is substituted for the house here, and of course, the haunting is a practical joke, but once again we are presented with a *learned* individual, visited by 'ghosts' *while he is intent on his books*. According to Plutarch, the Stoic Brutus was visited by his own δαίμων κακός when he was in a solitary and reflective mood (*Brutus* 36. 3-4; Shakespeare's version (*Julius Caesar* 4.3.274 ff.) was clearly influenced by Plutarch's account, but features the ghost of Caesar instead). Kemper (1993: 20), discussing the relationship between ghosts and philosophers, recognises the presence of the haunted house motif in the story of Democritus in the tomb, and describes it as the Epicurean counterpart to Arignotus' Pythagorean tale. While he acknowledges that 'the popularity of the theme of the 'haunted house' in ancient times

It is clearly ironic that details in Arignotus' tale correspond so closely to the traditional haunted-house story. Lucian would expect his ancient audience (much as Plautus did) to recognise the signs of a well-known folkloric tale (an ancient 'urban legend', say), and by presenting the report in this manner, he cleverly undermines Arignotus' claims to a genuine personal experience, showing up instead his relish for well-worn themes.[186] One can press the argument further, and interpret the incorporation of traditional motifs as a method for encoding the fictivity of the tale. Speaking about the Greek novels, Morgan has drawn attention to the variety of implicit 'conventional clues' embedded in these texts, whose function is to alert readers to the fact that it is a *novel* they are reading; a good example is the way in which Chariton designates the subject-matter of his story as a πάθος ἐρωτικὸν, or how Heliodorus begins his novel, in the manner of epic, *in medias res*. One might compare the 'once upon a time...' formula, which served in antiquity, as in modern times, to indicate that what followed was a fictional story.[187] Such devices 'are there to draw attention to the textual surface and the artfulness of the artefact, and which thus locate the reader precisely as *reader*...'.[188] By alluding in this manner to motifs that were obviously recognisable as belonging to the ghost-story-type, Lucian informs and influences the reader's

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is evident by its occurrence in various comedies' (20), he does not favour the view that a distinctive ghost story genre existed in antiquity (17). However, in light of the additional evidence I have cited from Lucian, this position is difficult to defend. There must have been a sense of a distinctive ghost-story-type in antiquity, because it is this which gives the *piquance* to Lucian's (and indeed Plautus') transformation of it. Democritus, of course, was one of the ancient philosophers who attempted a rational explanation for ghosts - see n. 190.

[186] Lucian is aware of the tendency of certain types of stories to be riddled with clichés; at *Merc.cond.* 1, for example, he lists the clichés typical of shipwreck stories. An awareness of the hackneyed (and suspiciously fictitious) nature of this particular theme may partially account for Mnesippus' scrupulous narrative technique in *his* shipwreck story: he must work harder to secure credibility (see p. 103 with n. 106). In an as yet unpublished article, J.H.D. Scourfield explores the idea that one of the embedded narratives in the *Cena Trimalchionis* (the tale of the unbreakable glass, *Sat.* 51), can be read as an ancient urban legend. In my view, some of the more minor stories of the *Philops.* can also be classed as examples of urban legend – an idea I mean to explore more fully elsewhere. Anderson (2000: 11) thinks that 'the prevailing atmosphere of magic and ghosts' requires the stories to be classed as fairy-tales (cf. n. 1 above). However, unlike fairy-tales, the stories in the *Philops.*, despite their supernatural content, are told *as if true*, refer to recent times, involve people who are known to the narrator (often the *friend of a friend* – or F.O.A.F. – that is characteristic of the urban legend) rather than fairy-tale types, and are *realistic*; all of these aspects are typical of the urban legend: see Brunvand 1981: 16-17 and 22-23 especially; for Lucian's refashioning of the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' tale, see Appendix I. Although they are 'realistic', urban legends often feature elements of the supernatural, the intrinsically unlikely, or the macabre; for the ghost story as a species of urban legend, see Felton 1999: 1-4.

[187] Laird (1993: 149, n. 2) cites Aristophanes *Wasps* 1182 as an example of the use of this formula to introduce a fable (the play is dated to 422 B.C.); the scholiast's comment shows that it was recognised as a conventional device.

[188] Morgan 1993: 215

response. For Tychiades, this narrative explodes any illusions he previously held about the character, worthiness and reliability of Arignotus:

τὸ γοῦν τοῦ λόγου ἐκεῖνο, ἄνθρακες ἡμῖν ὁ θησαυρὸς πέφηνε.[189]

But just like in the proverb, our treasure has turned out to be nothing but coal.

Tychiades finally fights back with a 'haunted-house story' of his own to counter-balance Arignotus' impressive tale, only this time, the 'haunting' is revealed to be merely a practical joke.[190] The tone of this narrative is quite different; it is anecdotal,[191] and pertains to a figure whom everyone present (including the extra-textual reader) recognises as a historical figure, Democritus of Abdera. Consequently, it requires oa lot less play for plausibility on the narrator's part than the other tales. Ironically, however, the story, however, is dismissed out of hand, Democritus being described in scathing terms as an ἀνόητος ἀνήρ, just like his supporter Tychiades.[192] The in-text audience's rejection of this story, which is objectively the most 'realistic' and believable tale, but also the one that least engages their morbid imagination, shows that the criteria for approval are not standards of objective credibility, but the quality of the fiction - in other words, who can tell the most thrilling story. These intellectuals' professed interest in objective 'proof' is only a thin veneer disguising their appetite for the macabre, the horrifying, the 'strange but true.'[193]

Eucrates, determined to be believed, embarks upon his final story, the tale of the Sorcerer's Apprentice, which is arguably the most famous story from the *Philops.*,[194] and also the most humorously specious. Various attempts have been made to determine the extent to which this tale is a product of Lucian's own

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[189] *Philops.* 32; cf. p. 55.

[190] For this story about Democritus as an Epicurean doublet of Arignotus' tale, see n. 185. Diogenes Laertius (9. 38) also refers to Democritus' habit of frequenting lonely places and tombs in an attempt to experiment with his sense-perceptions. Russell (1981: 204-5) construes this activity as a possible attempt at 'some kind of psychical research', which could then be used to explain paranormal phenomena rationally; cf. n. 174.

[191] For a definition of this terminlology, see n. 1.

[192] *Philops.* 32: τοῦτο φής, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Εὐκράτης, ἀνόητόν τινα ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον γενέσθαι, εἰ γε οὕτως ἐγίγνωσκεν; cf. Tychiades at *Philops.* 8. 4-5: δῆλοι ἦσαν κατεγνωκότες μου πολλὴν τὴν ἄνοιαν; and *Philops.* 32. 2-3: οὐδεὶς ἦν ἔτι τῶν παρόντων ὃς οὐχὶ κατεγίγνωσκέ μου πολλὴν τὴν ἄνοιαν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀπιστοῦντος.

[193] Cf. p. 31 ff..

[194] Jones 1986: 48. The story inspired Goethe's *Zauberlehrling*, Dukas' *L'apprenti sorcier*, and the famous sequence involving Mickey Mouse and a broom in Walt Disney's *Fantasia*. For discussion of the *Nachleben* of Lucian's ghost stories in European literature, see Ribbat's essay in Ebner *et al.* 2001: 183-194; cf. p. 5.

invention, a question I discuss in Appendix I. Eucrates certainly takes a lot of trouble to enhance the impression of veracity, but such scruples can conspire against him, as we have seen, and betray, ironically, a fear on his part of being discredited.[195]

He locates the story in the time of his youth, and carefully accounts for his presence in Egypt:

> ὁπότε γὰρ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ διῆγον ἔτι νέος ὤν, ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπὶ παιδείας προφάσει ἀποσταλείς... [196]

> For while I was living in Egypt, when still in my youth, having been sent there by my father for the purposes of education...

Eucrates introduces his story circuitously, with a casual air. He says that he took the notion (ἐπεθύμησα) of going up to Coptos to visit the Colossi of Memnon (a popular tourist destination since the Hadrianic era) to hear their famous sunrise salute.[197] While there, he claims to have had an uncommon experience; whereas most people only hear a 'meaningless utterance' issuing from the statue, he claims that Memnon himself actually opened his mouth and delivered him a personalized oracle in seven verses, which he would gladly repeat for the company, were it not too much of a digression![198]

Several things are happening here. First of all, Eucrates depicts himself as a Herodotean traveller and explorer; his emphasis on the intellectual purpose of his travels (ἐπὶ παιδείας προφάσει), the Egyptian context, and the digressive narrative technique are all suggestive of the Greek historiographer.[199] By emphasizing his personal experience of these events (ἤκουσά; μοι...ἔχρησεν), Eucrates clearly means to impart greater authority to his tale (although a sensitive reader might detect a subversive note in the Herodotean subtext, in light of the Candaules' famous claim that things *seen* are mightier than things *heard*).[200] His decision to *withhold* the vital evidence at this point (also a technique used by Herodotus) paradoxically lends texture and 'depth' to the story that follows, inasmuch as it conveys the impression of an abundance of information, which

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[195] See discussion at p. 34 ff. above.

[196] *Philops.* 33.

[197] Compare the motif of Demetrius' and Antiphilus' trip to Egypt in *Tox.* 27-34; see Chapter 2, p. 103 ff., esp. n. 108.

[198] *Philops.* 33.

[199] This echoes Hdt. 1.29, on Solon, who travelled to Egypt and the East κατὰ θεωρίης προφάσιν.

[200] Herodotus 1.8.2; cf. Heraclitus B 101 a DK; Lucian attributes this saying to Herodotus himself at *Salt.* 78 (see also *De Domo* 20, *Hist.co.* 29). For discussion, see Avery 1996: 30 ff.; Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 58.

exceeds the purview of the narrative.[201] This technique also serves to foreground for special attention any information that the narrator subsequently *does* choose to disclose.[202] By dismissing the incredible oracle-story in parenthesis - as if it were indisputable fact, and too mundane to waste time on - the narrator implicitly authenticates the subsequent (but equally incredible) story about the magician Pancrates.[203] Arignotus' immediate recognition and naming of the magician Pancrates also helps to confirm Eucrates' status as an ostensibly truthful narrator (evidential accountability).[204]

Not surprisingly, after his tale about how he animated the pestle by memorizing and repeating the magician's incantation, one of the more credulous inscribed 'readers', Deinomachus, is curious to find out if he can still use it. This should be Eucrates' ideal opportunity to prove beyond all doubt that the story he has told is true - but he declines the opportunity to perform the spell, on the eminently plausible grounds that he knows only *half* of the spell, and therefore, once accomplished, he would be unable to reverse it.[205] Paradoxically once again, by *not* producing evidence, and by implying the deficiency in his own knowledge, Eucrates authenticates his narrative, at least in the eyes of ready believers like Deinomachus. For the more sceptical inscribed reader, Tychiades, however, Eucrates' claims about the spell is (like his claims about Memnon's oracle) are a specious ploy, which reveals his story to be a mere fabrication.[206]

As I will argue presently, the in-text readers' conflicting responses to the story constitutes a *performance* of the various ways of 'reading' fiction; [207] as the extra-textual reader can, and is encouraged to, identify with *both* types of response, a sort of readerly schizophrenia is induced within him, which is an *enactment* of the theoretical response to fiction. This duality is reflected at the metatextual level also, in a game between extra-textual author and extra-textual reader. By incorporating *effets de création* into his text, Lucian appeals to a

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[201] See p. 37 ff..

[202] For Herodotus' manipulation of the formula 'I have nothing to tell of X, but the following story is told of Y…', see Fehling 1989: 127.

[203] Even the fact that this little digression is superfluous to the main story serves as an authenticating device for it; this is one of the features of Weinrich's *Lügenlinguistik*; see p. 36 ff..

[204] Cf. n. 126.

[205] *Philops.* 36. 15-19.

[206] This is analogous to Lucian's technique of citing unavailable material evidence in the *VH*, such as Endymion's presents, which he *could* have produced, had they not all been lost in the belly of the whale (*VH* 1. 27). Odysseus uses a similar motif in his pseudo-autobiographical tale (*Od.* 14. 341-3); cf. p. 166. It is the negative of the ethnographer's method of citing material sources to lend support to his claims: see Said 1994: 160ff..

[207] See, for example, p. 65 f..

critically distanced reader, and forces us into an awareness that the stories, and indeed the dialogue itself, *are fabricated*. It is towards an analysis of these *effets de création* that I now wish to turn.

In the *Philops.*, Lucian employs a repertoire of more or less metaleptic writerly devices which betray the traces of authorial contrivance and control, effects such as doubling other patters in plot or structure, intertextuality and allusiveness, and metatextual devices such as metaleptic imagery (especially from the world of the theatre), and *mise en abyme*. Such devices 'invite response to the textual surface and so subvert the illusion of a self-narrating mimesis.'[208] They are therefore essential to the *author's* game of drawing the reader into his fiction, while at the same time showing him that it is contrived, leaving him to oscillate on the border between make-believe and make believe, thereby activating, at the metatextual level also, the problematics of readerly response to fiction: 'a text cannot at once refute and confirm, or simultaneously affirm the positive and the negative, without, precisely, marking itself as fiction.'[209]

The first obvious sign of authorial control (which is metaleptic, given that it betrays the presence of the extra-textual author, Lucian, operating *via* the in-text author, Tychiades) is the ubiquitous presence of narrative doublets.[210] In the introduction, Tychiades speculates on the nature of those who love lying in terms that connote the infection of a disease; now, at the end of his narrative, both he and Philocles joke that they have been bitten by the same bug, and are infected with the same poison as those whom they derided, with the result that they are now in need of the antidote of truth:

> τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ Φιλόκλεις, παρὰ Εὐκράτει ἀκούσας περίειμι νὴ τὸν Δία ὥσπερ οἱ τοῦ γλεύκους πιόντες ἐμπεφυσημένος τὴν γαστέρα ἐμέτου δεόμενος. ἡδέως δ' ἂν ποθεν ἐπὶ πολλῷ ἐπριάμην ληθεδανόν τι φάρμακον ὧν ἤκουσα...τέρατα γοῦν καὶ δαίμονας καὶ Ἑκάτας ὁρᾶν μοι δοκῶ.[211]

> This is the sort of thing, Philocles, that I heard at Eucrates' place, and by Jove I'm now left with a swollen belly, in need of an emetic, just like people who drink new wine. But I'd gladly buy from somewhere, even for a high price, some sort of draught of oblivion for what I've heard...for I actually think I'm seeing monsters and demons and Hecates!

The reference to swelling and wine-drinking connects Tychiades' present figurative condition with Eucrates' state of health at the beginning or the dialogue,

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[208] Morgan 1993: 220.
[209] Dällenbach 1989: 130.
[210] For narrative doublets as a mark of self-conscious artifice in the *VH*, see Chapter 3, p. 165.

his feet swollen with gout (or rheumatism); the parallel is confirmed by the emphasis on the deleterious effects of *wine* in both cases.[212] There may even be a subtle connection with Socrates in the underworld, whom Eucrates recognised by his protruding belly (προγάστωρ);[213] Tychiades' wish to obtain a draught of oblivion connotes the waters of Lethe and the gloomy abode of the dead, and his reference to the 'Hecates' he is seeing recalls the giant specimen who manifested herself to Eucrates on that same occasion of his vision of Hades.[214] The figurative wine which Tychiades has imbibed, therefore, is none other than the intoxicating draught of Eucrates' fiction.[215]

The mention of Hecate, who, as well as being associated with the underworld in antiquity,[216] was connected also with dogs and madness, furnishes Philocles with the following image, in which he likens the lying-fever he feels with the bite of a rabid dog; just as a person who has been bitten by an infected animal can himself spread the infection to someone else, so Tychiades, by repeating the wild stories he heard, has himself infected Philocles: love of such lies is a species of madness.[217] This imagery of medicine and madness, present in both the

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[211] *Philops.* 39-40; cf. *Philops.* 2; see p. 25 ff. above.

[212] By referring to the mendacious conversation as a 'feast' of lies or a musty wine, in which he has overindulged, consequently requiring an emetic, Lucian connects the idea of gastronomic indulgence with mendacity. It is significant, in this connection, that Eucrates is advised to curb his rich diet in order to relieve his illness (*Philops.* 8. 7-9); the swelling in Eucrates' gouty feet, caused by his gourmandizing, is equivalent to Tychiades' figurative tumescence here. This idea resonates with Plato *Rep.* 518 e - 519 a, where rhetoric (one of the false arts) when used in political life, causes an *unhealthy swelling*. For similar rhetoric, see also Maximus of Tyre, *Orat.* 25. 5-7 (people who are take pleasure in empty rhetoric, not recognizing its deceptiveness, are compared to fevered patients, who gorge themselves on food and drink against the physician's advice).

[213] *Philops.* 24. At *Nek.* 11, Menippus sees Socrates in the underworld; his legs are still swollen from the poison.

[214] *Philops.* 22ff..

[215] Compare the medicated, care-dissolving wine provided by Helen as accompaniment to the convivial story-telling in *Odyssey* 4. 219 ff.. Warren Smith (writing on the prologue to Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*) notes that 'it became a sophistic commonplace to compare a delightful story with the effects produced by those Egyptian drugs', and cites parallels from Philostratus *VS* 480, and Julian *Orat.* 8. 240c (Smith 2001: 90). Wine is also associated with fiction in Philostratus' *Heroicus* (the *vine-grower* entertains the Phoenician traveller with tales of Homeric heroes - significantly - in the vintage season (*Her.* 3.2; for a rather different interpretation of the significance of the season in this work, see Whitmarsh *forthcoming*); see also Dio, *Orat.* 11. 42-3, for an analogy between poetry, which encourages people to listen to lies, and wine, which encourages them to get drunk. Significantly, liberal wine-drinking, and an encounter with the seductive Vine-Women, marks the beginning of the fantastic adventures of the *VH* (see Georgiadou & Larmour 1997: 206), and Lucian's ship is explicitly described as an ἄκατος, a word which also denotes a type of wine-cup: cf. Chapter 3, n. 195. Of course, given the intertextuality with Plato's *Symp.*, we should hardly be surprised at the prominence given to wine-metaphors in the *Philops.*.

[216] For a survey of Hecate's chthonic associations, see Henrichs' article on the goddess in *OCD*.

[217] The verb used here for madness, λυττάω, is connected to the noun λύττα. It has been postulated that this word has its roots in wolf-imagery (see Lincoln 1975), and it is therefore the *mot juste* for a case of rabies. There was, of course, a connection in antiquity between wolves and sorcerers, (*OCD* s.v. 'Lycanthropy'; for the wolf in Greek thought, see Buxton 1987) which means

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introductory and concluding sections of this dialogue, therefore forms a doublet, giving the work an artistic symmetry that betrays the author's presence, and reminds us in this way too that *this is a text*.[218]

Many other examples of doubling can be found throughout the dialogue. Eucrates and Arignotus, for instance, clearly form a pair; Lucian underlines the parallelism by ascribing the same 'philosophical look' to them both, and by the way in which Tychiades expresses his disappointment in both of them by using a proverb.[219] The first two narratives concern foreign magicians, a Babylonian (*Philops.* 11-12) and a Hyperborean (13-14) respectively.[220] There are two stories about moving statues in the dialogue; Pellichus (19-20) and Antigonus' little statue of Hippocrates (21).[221] There are also two stories based on near-death experiences - Cleodemus' tale, which is a version of a well-known folktale (25), and Antigonus' testimony about a patient who came to life twenty days after his burial (26).[222] There are also two visions of the underworld; the one which is afforded to Eucrates (24), as well as Cleodemus' brief experience (25). Hecate makes two separate appearances along with her hellish canine companions, first when she is summoned along with Selene as part of a ritual of erotic magic (14),[223] and next in

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that this is the appropriate disease to describe the sickness resulting from succumbing to the enchanting effects of tales of *magic and wizardry*. Lucian uses strikingly similar imagery to describe people's gullibility with regard to charlatan philosophers in *Nigrinus* 35-8; cf. p. 61, with n. 255.

[218] For the Gorgianic resonance of this imagery with reference to fiction, see Segal 1962 and see p. 59 ff. below.

[219] *Philops.* 5 and 32.

[220] It is possible that Lucian's accounts of the snake-charming Babylonian and this flying Hyperborean magician were influenced by Heraclides Ponticus' treatise on the Hyperborean wizard Abaris, whom he described as a holy man, with the ability to draw snakes out of their holes (*FGH* II. 197ff.; cf. Plut. *Quom.poet.aud.deb.* 14e); see Herzig 1940: 18 n. 52. For parallels from modern folklore, see Müller 1932: 42 ff. and Ogden *forthcoming*.

[221] On this particular passage, see Schwartz 1951: 48. For a survey of tales involving moving statues in the ancient world, see Radermacher 1902, and Kassel 1983. Wooden 'Daedalic' statues reputedly had the ability to move; for my argument that Lucian is playing with the Socratic associations of these statues here, see discussion at p. 68 ff.. Nardi (1975-6: 95) interprets the moving statues in the *Philops.* as signs of poltergeist activity, but this must be viewed with caution; see Felton 1999a: 138 with n. 130. Dodds (1973: 158) considers the ancient evidence for poltergeist activity. The motif of animated statues in the *Philops.* finds a parallel in the animated pestle of the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' story; the Graeco-Roman tradition of animated statues might be compared to the *golem* of Jewish tradition: for discussion of these issues, see Appendix I.

[222] For the folktale of the man who dies 'by mistake', see Radermacher 1905: 316-7; it is also a popular motif in modern film, e.g. *Here Comes Mr. Jordan* (1941) and *A Matter of Life and Death* (1946), for a fascinating discussion of which, see Ogden *forthcoming*. The Myth of Er at Plato *Rep.* 614b ff. is probably the *locus classicus* for this motif of coming back from the dead, and relating one's experiences of death. The story as told by Cleodemus may represent an ancient 'urban legend': see n. 186.

[223] Herzig (1940: 15-19) argues that Lucian's representation of this ritual of erotic magic contains many authentic details. On ancient literary representations of magic, see Graf 1997: 175-204. Graf describes the ritual in the *Philops.* as an ἀγωγή, a ritual designed to bring the object of one's desire to oneself (187). On erotic spells and ἀγωγαί in general, see Winkler 1991, esp. 223-6, where he

her epiphany to Eucrates (22ff.).[224] There are two haunted house stories; the one involving Arignotus is meant to be a genuine case (31f.), whereas the other, involving Democritus in the tomb (32), is a hoax. There are two spectral visitations; Eucrates' wife, Demainete (27), and the anonymous spectre who haunts the house at Corinth (31). The tales also feature two magical rings; the jewelled ring given to Eucrates by 'the Arab', which he uses to ward off Hecate (24), and a holy ring engraved with the image of Apollo, which Eucrates claims speaks to him (38).[225] Finally, a parallel may also be drawn between the animated clay πάρεδρος in the love-ritual for Glaucias (14), and the animated pestle in the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' story (33-36).[226]

There are also less immediately obvious examples of doubling, some of which I have already noted. Hecate's elephantine and swarthy hounds find a humorous counterpart in Eucrates' yapping Maltese; in both cases, the dogs signal the departure of a spirit (24 and 27). The shape-shifting motif also appears twice in the stories;[227] the goddess Selene, when summoned down from her celestial abode to aid the Hyperborean with his love spell, is a πολύμορφόν τι θέαμα who changes rapidly from a woman, to a bull, to a puppy (14). Arignotus in turn boasts about how the ominous spectre haunting the house at Corinth changed into a dog, a bull, and then a lion, in a sequence of increasing fearsomeness that is almost the exact reverse of Selene's metamorphosis (31).[228] Finally, there are two stories involving oracles; the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' tale, where Eucrates says he received

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notes that this is the second literary picture of an *effective* ἀγωγή (the first is in Apuleius' *Met.* 2.32 and 3.15-18).

[224] Herzig (1940: 18, with n. 52) argues that Eucrates' tale about the epiphany of Hecate is a parody of Heraclides Ponticus' report about Empedotimus (*FHG* II: 197ff.; the substance of this tale is provided by Proclus *in Rem.* II, 119); cf. Radermacher (1902: 203-4) and Schwartz (1951: 49 note *ad loc.*). Admittedly, the stories do share some significant points in common, for example, the hunting motif and the time of day, although one should bear in mind that midday (siesta time) is the appropriate time for a Mediterranean ghost story (Sherwin-White 1966: note on Pliny *Ep.* 7.27.2; see also Felton (1999: 33) for noonday crisis apparitions).

[225] Herzig (1940: 29-32) surveys the evidence for the prophylactic and divinatory use of rings in antiquity. The magic ring motif occurs in the Platonic myth of the Ring of Gyges (Plato, *Rep.* 3. 359d - 360d). For an interesting exploration of the fictionality of this Platonic story, see Laird 2001. For other magic rings in Lucian, see *Nav.* 41-43 (see Appendix II).

[226] See Appendix I.

[227] Cf. p. 67.

[228] Herzig (1940: 17) also makes this association, explaining that this ability is the property of a god or demon, especially nocturnal spirits (who shift their form like in dreams); he cites the example of the shapechanging Empousa at Aristophanes *Frogs* 293 ff.. Anderson (1976b: 28) dismisses the shapeshifting of Lucian's ghost in his haunted house tale as an 'irrelevant display.' Felton (1999: 85-6), however, shows that this is part of the Lucianic hyperbole in the story, which enhances Arignotus' status as a *magus gloriosus*. Comparing the evil shapeshifting demon at Ephesus in Philostratus *V.A.* 4.10 (who metamorphosed into a huge, rabid hound, as big as lion), she also reads this as a mark of the ghost's liminal status (*ibid.*: 94).

an oracle from the Colossi of Memnon (33),[229] and Eucrates' final (unfinished) account of his experience of the oracle of the hero Amphilochus at Mallus (38). Tychiades leaves *e mediis rebus*, just as he had arrived *in medias res*.

Eucrates has just finished telling a story that was set in Egypt (the famous 'Sorcerer's Apprentice tale, *Philops.* 33-36), and is now about to embark on another supernatural tale about the oracle at Mallus (*Philops.* 38-39); Tychiades says that he leaves him 'still sailing across from Egypt to Mallus':

ἀπολιπὼν αὐτὸν ἔτι διαπλέοντα ἐξ Αἰγύπτου εἰς τὴν Μαλλόν.[230]

This is an example of metalepsis, a transgressive figure, which breaches the boundaries separating extradiegesis from diegesis (or metadiegesis from diegesis) with a disturbing effect – often of absurdity, or the surreal.[231] The strangeness in this case is caused by the intrusion of metadiegetic elements (i.e. the locations for Eucrates' narratives) into the diegetic world, where Eucrates is addressing his audience; by using metalepsis in this way, Tychiades breaks down the boundaries of narrative logic that separate the world of the diegesis (Tychiades' narrative) from that of the metadiegesis (Eucrates' narrative), the incongruity of which highlights the *fictive nature* of the metadiegetic world, and implies the fictivity of the diegesis as well.[232]

The really worrying thing about metalepsis is that it involves us too, as we are safely reading the *Philops.* in the knowledge that is is just a fictional text. It challenges our intuitive grasp of where the boundaries of story-worlds are situated, and by suggesting that these boundaries are permeable, threatens to collapse all levels of diegesis, including extradiegesis, into one fluid text. 'These inversions suggest that if the characters of a fictional work can be readers or spectators, we, its readers or spectators, can be fictitious.'[233] The effect is particularly clear in a dramatic dialogue, because by collapsing diegetic boundaries, it threatens to suck the mimetic framing dialogue into the *diegesis* as

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[229] Anderson (2000: 104, with n. 7) speculates that this detail, appended to the main story, may represent the vestige of a folktale where the magician, having reversed the deleterious spell, is turned to stone.

[230] *Philops.* 39. 3-4. Lucian identifies Egypt with the art of prophecy at *De Sacr.* 14.

[231] See Genette 1980: 234 ff..

[232] '...any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator or narratee into the diegetic universe (or by diegetic characters into a metadiegetic universe, etc.), or the inverse...produces an effect of strangeness that is either comical...or fantastic.' (Genette 1980: 234-5). Metalepsis itself does not verify or refute the ontological status of a story, but it draws attention to the artificial manner in which the stories are presented in the text.

[233] J.L. Borges (quoted in Alter 1973: 1); cf. Genette (1980: 236): 'The most troubling thing about metalepsis...lies in this unacceptable and insistent hypothesis, that the extradiegetic is perhaps always diegetic, and that the narrator and his narratees – you and I – perhaps belong to some narrative.'

well. Because we, as extra-textual readers, identify with the interlocutors in this framing dialogue, by analogy, this makes us question our *own* ontological status too; no-one, no matter how extra-textual he may believe himself to be, is safe from the reaches of metalepsis. By using the figure of metalepsis in this way, Lucian may wish to emphasize one of the ethically worrying features of fiction, namely that it threatens to 'swallow' one up, to immerse the reader in a world that is illusory.[234]

Another transgressional figure occurs at *Philops.* 27. Eucrates relates how his wife's ghost visited him in the days following her funeral, *while he was reading Plato's* Phaedo:

> ἑβδόμη δὲ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ἡμέρᾳ ἐγὼ μὲν ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τῆς κλίνης ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκείμην παραμυθούμενος τὸ πένθος· ἀνεγίγνωσκον γὰρ τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος βιβλίον ἐφ' ἡσυχίας· ἐπεισέρχεται δὲ μεταξὺ ἡ Δημαινέτη αὐτὴ ἐκείνη καὶ καθίζεται πλησίον ὥσπερ νῦν Εὐκρατίδης οὑτοσί...

> On the seventh day after her death, I was lying here on the couch, just as I am now, consoling my grief, for I was quietly reading Plato's book about the soul. In comes that selfsame Demainete in the meantime and sits down nearby, just like Eucratides here is sitting now...

Here, Lucian is not only playing a variation on the motif of a ghostly visitation to a learned man while reading,[235] but by inscribing the act of reading Plato into his text, he alerts readers to the intertextuality with Plato in the dialogue. More particularly, as Anderson has shown, it points to the *parodic* intertextuality with the *Phaedo*, Plato's book περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, as Lucian's work (and particularly this story) is concerned with a very different type of ψύχη - namely with a ghost.[236] This passage therefore constitutes an example of the sophisticated narrative device known as *mise en abyme*, which Dällenbach defines as 'any aspect enclosed within a work that shows a similarity with the work that contains it,' noting that 'the function of *mise en abyme* is to bring to light the way in which the writer constructs his text'.[237] The in-text representation of reading invites us as extra-textual readers to reflect upon *our* act of reading (i.e. reading the *Philops.*) in a self-reflexive way; it therefore constitutes another *effet de création*, which draws our attention to the *textual* nature of the dialogue. 'As a secondary sign, the *mise en abyme* not only emphasizes the signifying intention of the primary sign (the

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[234] The *Nav.* is the best illustration of this: see Appendix II, esp. p. 223 ff..
[235] Cf. n 184 and n. 185 below.
[236] Cf. p. 11, with n. 22.

narrative that contains it), it makes clear that the primary narrative is also (only) a sign, as any trope must be - but with added power, according to its stature: *I am literature, and so is the narrative that embeds me.*'[238]

## GORGIANIC METAPHORS FOR FICTION: MAGIC, THEATRE, MADNESS

### Magic

Eucrates' character in the *Philops.* embodies the dichotomy between appearance and reality. Descibed as a venerable old man, sporting the long beard of a philosopher, he gives the impression of being a man of truth, but is also shown supporting the most sensational lies. Much the same may be said of Eucrates' doublet in the dialogue, the Pythagorean Arignotus, another man with the long hair of a philosopher and a formidable reputation for wisdom.[239] Arignotus represents the type of philosopher/holy-man, a well-documented type in the ancient world who was a charismatic, often learned figure, and was credited with supernatural powers.[240] Tychiades actually says that Arignotus was given the title ἱερός.[241] Contrary to his formidable appearance and reputation, however, Arignotus, like Eucrates, proves that he is really as sensational, and as much of a *fabulateur* as the rest, when he tells the story of how he exorcised a spirit who was haunting a house at Corinth.[242]

Eucrates' true nature is so markedly different from his outward appearance, that Tychiades sums him up as 'a *sorcerer*...wrapping a ridiculous monkey in a lion's skin':

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[237] Dällenbach 1989: 8 and 15 respectively. For *mise en abyme* in *Tox.* and *VH*, see p. 88 ff. and p. 163 f. below respectively.

[238] Dällenbach 1989: 57.

[239] On Arignotus, see n. 165. For the 'philosophical look', which featured a long beard, see *Gall.* 10, *Icar.* 5 and 10; *Pisc.* 11 and 31; *Bis Acc.* 11; *De Merc.Cond.* 25; a long, venerable beard is also the mark of the necromancer, Mithrobarzanes at *Nek.* 6. The Pythagoreans in particular favoured this long-haired look; see *Vit.Auct.* 2. For the hybridity of these characters, see p. 67.

[240] For Arignotus as the type of θεῖος ἀνήρ, see n. 165. I wonder if, by attributing this θεῖος ἀνήρ with an *autobiographical* narrative, the veracity of which is highly questionable, Lucian could be poking fun at literary biographies of such holy men, which were in vogue at the time? The most famous representative of this genre is, of course, Philostratus' *VA*, the fictionality of which has proven notoriously difficult to interpret: see Bowie 1978 and Francis 1998. Lucian himself experimented playfully with the genre, in works such as the *Peregrinus* and the *Alexander*. Goldhill (1991: 54ff.) analyzes the truth-implications of the first-person narratives framed within the third-person narrative of the *Odyssey*; see esp. p. 55: '...the narrative within the narrative may be thought to raise for the reader or listener a series of questions about (self-)representation and authority in story-telling.' On the relationship between the *Philops.* and Philostratus' *VA*, see Anderson 1976b: 89-94; Hall 1981: 216; Gascó 1986.

[241] *Philops.* 29.

[242] *Philops.* 30-31; cf. p. 43ff..

γόης ὢν...τουσοῦτον χρόνον ἐλελήθει με ὑπὸ τῇ λεοντῇ γελοῖόν τινα πίθηκον περιστέλλων.[243]

This connection between lies and magic was already made implicitly in the opening of the dialogue, where Tychiades used the term φάρμακον to describe the practice of telling falsehoods:

συγγνωστοὶ γὰρ οὗτοί γε...ὁπόσοι ἢ πολεμίους ἐξηπάτησαν ἢ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῷ τοιούτῳ φαρμάκῳ ἐχρήσαντο ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς[244]

The word φάρμακον can of course have the neutral sense of 'means' or 'expedient', but its primary meaning is 'drug', 'potion' or 'poison', and this must elicit further associations.[245] I will discuss presently the Platonic and Gorgianic resonance of the word; for the moment, I will demonstrate how, in the sense of a magical potion or charm, the word connects Eucrates' lies and his deceptive appearance to the theme of magic.

The connection between fiction (or more generally, storytelling) and enchantment was a popular motif in antiquity, and one which Lucian also exploits;[246] the association also had a distinctly Platonic pedigree.[247] The connection between fictional embellishment and the practice of magic is made

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[243] *Philops.* 5; cf. *Pisc.* 32 and 46; *Adv.Indoct.* 23. Hall (1981: 573-4) discusses the possibility that this image may have its roots in one of the fables from the *Jātakas*, the birth-stories of Buddha (no. 189: the ass in lion's skin). For the influence of this material on the Sorcerer's Apprentice tale, see Appendix I. Lucian is fond of using language associated with magic to describe charlatan philosophers: see *Icar.* 8 (θαυματοποιοὶ ἄνδρες); *Pisc.* 14 (γόητες); at *Bis Acc.* 11 Pan complains about the way in which people are 'enchanted' (κεκηλημένοι) by these unscrupulous characters. Magic was, of course, practically a by-word for counterfeit practice (*LSJ* s.v. μάγος), but in the context of *philosophers*, Lucian's imagery acquires an extra edge, as a travesty of Plato's famous description of the magical allurement of Socrates' personality and words (*Symp.* 215 c ff.; *Meno* 80 a2 – b7); cf. n. 56 above. The language of magic is also important in the discourse of fiction (cf. p. 147, n. 115).

[244] *Philops.* 1. The Platonic resonance of this metaphor is discussed at p. 23 ff..

[245] LSJ attests the following meanings for 'φάρμακον': '**I** *a drug*, whether healing or noxious; *a healing remedy, medicine; an enchanted potion, philtre*, and so *a charm, spell, incantation, enchantment; a poison*; **II** generally, *a remedy, cure; a means of producing* something; **III** *a dye, paint, colour*.' Similarly, φαρμακεύς may denote a 'poisoner, sorcerer', or a 'druggist, apothecary'; it therefore connotes both the medical and magical strands of imagery in the *Philops.*. For more on these terms, see Lloyd 1979: 44, with n. 184.

[246] See de Romilly 1973: 156ff. and 1975: 14ff. on the magic of poetry especially; see also Avery's survey of magical language used to describe literary entertainment, pp. 10-13. The spell of poetry was a common enough metaphor, but Lucian used it also of the performance of prose texts; for an account of his portrayal of Herodotus as an entertainer, using similar imagery, see Avery 1996: 22 and 34 ff., especially p. 43, where he gives a list of examples where Lucian represents the historian as 'enchanting' his audience (the verb κηλέω), thereby rendering explicit once again the connection between lies or fiction, and magic. De Romilly 1975: 81ff. shows that there was a revival for the idea of the magic of rhetoric in the second sophistic, particularly in the works of Philostratus, for whom 'the irrational part in oratory has recovered its importance' (*op.cit.*: 83).

[247] For the imagery of magic that pervades book 10 of the *Rep.* especially (where Socrates discusses the mimetic arts), see Janaway 1995: 142-3.

explicit by Tychiades at *Philops.* 2.23-24, where he speaks scathingly of 'stories that have the power to *enchant* the minds of children': παίδων ψυχὰς κηλεῖν δυνάμενα.[248] This association is then further elicited by a subsequent comment from Philocles:

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ποιηταί, ὦ Τυχιάδη, καὶ αἱ πόλεις δὲ συγγνώμης εἰκότως τυγχάνοιεν ἄν, οἱ μὲν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μύθου τερπνὸν ἐπαγωγότατον ὂν ἐγκαταμιγνύντες τῇ γραφῇ, οὗπερ μάλιστα δέονται πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροατάς, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ Θηβαῖοι καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι σεμνοτέρας ἀποφαίνοντες τὰς πατρίδας ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων.[249]

But the poets, Tychiades, and the cities may well be forgiven - those who mix in with their writing the charming quality of the story, *since this is highly seductive*, and this is what they most need for their audience – the Athenians and the Thebans, and anyone else who shows off their native country in a statelier light by such means.

The adjective ἐπαγωγός,-όν connotes the ideas of allurement and bewitching; Lucian uses it elsewhere in the context of literary criticism.[250] The adjective is itself reminiscent of the Greek term for a magical spell or incantation (ἐπῳδή) or the erotic attraction spell known as the ἀγωγή, which features in one of the stories.[251] It also connotes ψυχαγωγία, a term used to denote the act of necromancy, but which Lucian also uses for 'diversion/ entertainment/ mental recreation'.[252] It is clear, then, that Lucian couches the truth/falsehood polemic of the *Philops.* in the language of magic, something he does elsewhere too.[253] On a macrocosmic scale as well, the *Philops.* can be seen to embody the same principle, as the dialogue's exploitation of this connection between fiction and magic is reflected thematically in the stories about feats of magic and the supernatural.[254] This is also the language of the *logos protreptikos* or conversion speech.[255]

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[248] For the Platonic resonance of the notion of the 'enchantment' of literature, see p. 24 f. with n. 85.
[249] *Philops.* 4.
[250] Lucian uses the adjective in the preface to *VH*: see p. 142 f. and cf. Avery 1996: 58 f..
[251] Cf. n. 223.
[252] At *VH* 1.2, Lucian claims that the wit and charm of his narrative will provide 'pure entertainment' – ψιλή ψυχαγωγία - for readers. For the conflation of ideas of enchantment and fiction in this noun, see Laird 1993: 166 ff..
[253] *Jup.Trag.* 39 (poets aren't concerned with the truth; they seek only to 'enchant'); *Pisc.* 20 (he who is μισογόης is also μισοψευδής).
[254] De Romilly (1975: 13 and 16) observes that in texts such as Theocritus *Idyll* 2 and Virgil *Eclogue* 8, the enchanting form and effect of the language itself, with its incantatory repetitions etc., reflects the magical subject-matter of the poems; this is similar to the claim I am making for the *Philops.* here.
[255] Compare *Nigr.* 3ff. and 35-8, with Clay 1992: 3424-5. Whitmarsh (*forthcoming*) discusses the language of conversion fervour in Philostratus' *Heroicus*; cf. Maclean & Aitken 2001: lxxx-lxxxi. For conversion-rhetoric in the prologue and epilogue of Apuleius' *Met.*, see Smith 2001. Cf. n. 51.

## Theatre

Lucian regularly exploits the theatre for images that connote pretence or sham.[256] In the *Philops.* too, the dichotomy between appearance and reality is expressed with the language and imagery of the theatre – the location *par excellence* where the boundaries of reality and illusion are problematized.[257] Lucian evokes the theatre from the very start, where Tychiades lists a repertory of literary fabrications produced by Greek authors, one at least of which we recognise as the subject of ancient drama, for when he refers to the tale of Προμηθέως δεσμά, it is difficult not to think of Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound.*[258] Tychiades refers to the Hades *topos* itself by using a theatrical metaphor: ἡ ἐν Ἅιδου πᾶσα τραγῳδία.[259]

Tychiades uses theatrical imagery throughout the dialogue to reflect the dubious veracity of the various stories. He presents Eucrates as something of an actor when he reveals that he *feigned* weakness when Tychiades arrived, despite the fact that he could be heard shouting robustly before he came in:

> καθέζεσθαι οὖν με παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῆς κλίνης ὁ Εὐκράτης ἐκέλευεν, ἠρέμα ἐγκλίνας τῇ φωνῇ εἰς τὸ ἀσθενικὸν ὁπότε εἶδε με, καίτοι βοῶντος αὐτοῦ καὶ διατεινομένου τι μεταξὺ εἰσιὼν ἐπήκουον.[260]

The theatricality of the scene in general is re-emphasised later, when Tychiades, with heavy irony, reports how he welcomed the late but fortuitous arrival of the sage, Arignotus, as a *deus ex machina*, who would inject a much-needed dose of rationality into the conversation:[261]

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[256] Good examples can be found at *Icar.* 29; *Nigr.* 9ff. and 31; *Jup.Trag.* 4; *Gallus* 26; *Charon* 4-5; *Pisc.* 29 ff.; *Nek.* 16. For the role of the theatre in the subversive Lucianic ideology of the city, see ní Mheallaigh *forthcoming*.

[257] The very structure of the dramatic festival at Athens in a sense problematized the illusion of the plays, as the comedies at the end of each day, with their metatheatrical element, exposed the dramatic artifices of the tragedies, which had been staged previously, drawing the audience's attention to the illusion (Padel 1981: 127-128). For a study of tragedy's reflections on its own constructs and conventions, specifically with reference to Euripides' *Bacchae*, see Segal 1982, esp. 269: '...tragedy is itself a liminal space within the enclosure of the polis where conventional norms, judgements, and sympathies are suspended.' For the Gorgianic resonances of this idea, see p. 65 f..

[258] *Philops.* 2. 17.

[259] *Philops.* 2. The noun τραγῳδία and its cognates acquired a special new meaning in the literature of the second sophistic; it is used widely in the ancient novels, especially Heliodorus, for example. The word connotes exaggeration/ literary embellishment (Sidwell *forthcoming*). Lucian also uses the term at *Tox.* 56, where it is carries important implications, as here, for the veracity of the story: cf. p. 109 ff..

[260] *Philops.* 6.

[261] I have already noted that Arignotus' late arrival is reminiscent of the late arrival of the drunken Alcibiades in Plato's *Symposium* (see p. 14, with n. 43); Agathon's party was itself a theatrical occasion.

καὶ τὸ τοῦ λογου, θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς ἐπεισκυκληθῆναί μοι τοῦτον ᾦμην ὑπὸ τῆς Τύχης·

And, as the saying goes, I believed this fellow had been wheeled in by Tyche as my *deus ex machina*.[262]

One effect of this theatrical metaphor is to draw attention to the discrepancy between Arignotus' promising outward appearance and his disappointing true nature. However, by emphasizing the theatricality of the scene which he himself is describing, Tychiades ironically draws attention to the embellished nature *of his own narrative*. The theatrical imagery then becomes a metatextual comment on the implied fictionality of the *Philops.* itself. This is made clearer by the pun on the name of the goddess of fortune, *Tyche*, who brings in Arignotus figuratively, and the name of the narrator, *Tychiades*, who introduces him in the metatextual sense, as the narrator constructing the narrative. Having almost given the game away at the beginning when Tychiades, the ostensible narrator, admitted he was *writing fiction* just like Homer and Herodotus before him, he now teases us with the suggestion that Tychiades, ostensibly merely the reporter, is in fact the authorial creator of a fictional world. In this way, Lucian implies that the world is product of the text, rather than the text a product of the world, which is the usual impression the author of fiction strives hard to make.[263] The reference to *stage machinery* in the image - both the *mēchanē* and the *ekkyklēma* – also reinforces the metatextual force of the metaphor, drawing the reader's eye towards the writerly substructure underpinning the mimetic illusion of the narrative. By making the authorial presence felt rather insistently here, Lucian pushes the limits of readerly acquiescence in the game of fiction.

Tychiades also incorporates a theatrical metaphor into the end of his narrative. When he reports how he parted from the company in disgust, he says that he left just Eucrates was embarking on a great 'dramatic tale' about oracles:

τοῦτα ἔτι τοῦ Εὐκράτους λέγοντος ἰδὼν οἷ τὸ πρᾶγμα προχωρήσειν ἔμελλε καὶ ὡς οὐ μικρᾶς ἐνήρχετο τῆς περὶ τὰ χρηστήρια τραγῳδίας... [264]

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[262] *Philops.* 29. The name of the goddess Τύχη is usually translated into the English 'Fortune', but I have left it in its Greek form in order better to reflect Lucian's pun on the name, which is also the root of the name Tychiades. The theatrical air with which both Eucrates and Arignotus are introduced into the text is a further signal of their mutual connection: cf. p. 55. On the hybridity of this mixed metaphor, see n. 285 below.

[263] Cf. Said 1994: 167ff., where she discusses Lucian's inversion of ethnographic discourse, and observes how in Lucian's works, reality becomes a reflection of fiction (168).

[264] *Philops.* 39.

While Eucrates was still saying these things, seeing where the thing was heading, and that it was no small dramatic tale about oracles he had begun...

Once again, the noun τραγῳδία reflects the dramatic or sensationalist nature of Eucrates' story, but it also hints subversively at the fictive status, not only of Eucrates' narrative, but Tychiades' too. This is reinforced by the striking instance of metalepsis which follows, a passage I have already discussed.[265]

## Madness

Related to the theatrical in the dialogue, is the strand of imagery associated with madness. One of the principal symptoms of madness is the confusion of illusion and 'reality'; madness was therefore closely associated with the experience of the tragic theatre in antiquity.[266] At *Philops.* 40, Lucian uses the word λύττα to denote the paradoxical belief in fiction - stories one knows cannot be true – which is analogous to participation in the experience of tragedy. This word is itself evocative of the theatre, and of Hecate, the goddess associated with madness.[267]

In this context, however, given the intertextuality with Plato's work, especially the *Symposium* (where Alcibiades' *mania* for philosophy is expressed in terms of a *snake-bite*), and given also the conversion-fervour which motivated the storytelling in the first place, it is clear that Lucian is also playing with the imagery typical of the *logos protreptikos*.[268] Tychiades, it seems, has not only been 'converted,' despite himself, but he has also 'converted' Philocles; he thus refers tongue-in-cheek to the insidious seductive powers of fiction.

It is also significant that the speakers in Plato's *Symposium* strive to outdo one another in speeches about *Eros*, whereas the *pepaideumenoi* of the *Philops.* are driven by their *eros* for lies to outdo one another in telling stories.[269] Lucian is clearly playing games here with the extra-textual reader, flaunting what one might

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[265] Cf. p. 57 f..

[266] See Padel 1981: 109. This idea is clearly present in the *Philops.*, because Tychiades' madness consists of *seeing things that are not there* (*Philops.* 39). Padel explains the connection between madness and the theatre: '...madness is apt for tragedy because it involves illusion. Madness is taking illusion for reality, which is what a play's audience must do...' (1981: 126); cf. Padel (1995: 239 ff., esp. 240): 'The theater's truth is illusion, which you treat as reality: doing that is madness.' On Dionysus as the god of alternative states of consciousness (including madness), and theatrical illusion, see Padel 1981: 128 and 1995: 240-241.

[267] Λύττα is the word most commonly used for madness in fifth-century tragedy (Padel 1995: 17f.). The word's wolfish/canine associations connect it with the goddesses of madness, the Erinyes and Hecate (one of whose cult-names is *Kyno*): see Padel 1992: 102-6; 69, n, 72; 124-5. It was also the medical term for rabies; cf. n. 217 above.

[268] Cf. n. 255 above.

[269] Erotic language: ἔρως ἔμφυτος (*Philops.* 2; cf. p. 15 f., esp. n. 50), φιλοψευδεῖς; ἐπαγωγότατον (*Philops.* 3; cf. p. 61).

call, *après* Halperin, the 'erotics of fictionality', especially in light of the erotic connotations of the imagery of madness in this Platonic atmosphere, and the erotic language that Lucian uses to describe the passion that afflicts his storytellers and in-text 'readers.'[270] This is the same madness and passion which seduces the extra-textual reader – you and me – to read any fictional text, including the *Philopseudes* itself - a *mise en abyme* problematization of fiction which also has a distinguished Platonic pedigree.[271]

So, what do we make of these threads of imagery, micro- and macrocosmic, associated with with magic or medicine (φάρμακον), with the theatre, and with madness (λυττάω)? In my view, this confluence of associations strongly evokes the famous Gorigianic statements about the paradox of tragic illusion, and the persuasive power of speech. In fr. 23 DK, Gorgias famously states that the man who succumbs to the deception of the tragic illusion is in fact *wiser* than the man who does not; this is usually construed as a sophisticated understanding of the *fictionality* of tragedy.[272] It is appropriate, therefore, that Lucian should tap into this Gorgianic ideology in a work that constitutes a practical exploration of the dynamics of reading fiction; moreover, I suspect that this paradoxical notion might also be in the background of the *Phaedrus*, a work which permeates the *Philops.*, as we have seen.[273] Here, Lucian turns the Gorgianic equation on its head: those who succumb to the superstitious fictions of the *Philops.* are *mad*. As I pointed out above, one of the characteristic symptoms of madness is an inability to distinguish 'reality' from illusion; this reflects the ambiguity of Tychiades, who both eschews and succumbs to the fiction. Gorgias also uses the metaphors of

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[270] On Plato's manipulation of the 'erotics of narrativity', inviting the reader to interpret, but also frustrating all attempts to do so, see Halperin 1992, esp. 128, n. 51: 'Perhaps Plato wished to demonstrate to his readers the futility of interpretation, but - if so - the lesson he wished to teach us is one we can only learn by failing. Like Alcibiades, who had to fall in love with Socrates in order to discover (if he ever did) how misguided it is to love Socrates as an individual, we can only realize how futile it is to interpret a Platonic text by trying to interpret it. Plato, on this view, does not want us to fall in love with his texts and so he invites us to fall in love with his texts so as to cure us homoeopathically, as it were, of our folly.' Halperin's language here resonates strikingly with the medical discussion that is a prelude to the stories in the Philops. (6-10).
[271] See Halperin 1992: 109 ff..
[272] See de Romilly 1975; Laird 1993: 170-173. Morgan (1993: 180f.) suggests a more cautious interpretation of the fragment, on the grounds that 'Gorgias' stress on ἀπάτη denies the premiss of fiction'; in other words, Gorgias is saying that one is wiser *as a result of* succumbing to the deception (tragedy as a learning experience), not *because one chooses* to succumb to it. Against this, however, it is worth noting that Plutarch seems to supports the latter, more usual interpretation (*Mor.* 348c). Lucian himself expresses a similar idea at *Salt.* 82-4, where - significantly - he extends the analogy to dance, from literature (λόγοι).
[273] I suspect, for example, that Gorgias may be lurking behind Socrates' argument in the *Phaedrus* that the philosopher is mad (245 bff.); see further Janaway 1995: 41 ff..

magic (*goeteia*) and drugs/ potions (*pharmaka*) to convey the persuasive power of speech in his vindication of Helen's actions (*Encomium of Helen*, DK fr. 11. 10 and 14),[274] just as Lucian uses this imagery to describe the seductive and deceiving power of lies and fiction in the *Philops.*.

As I will show, the *Philops.* is not the only work in which Lucian does this,[275] nor indeed was Lucian the only ancient author to appropriate Gorgias in this way; Plato more than likely had the sophist in mind when he described the processes by which people are (unknowingly) decieved as 'theft and witchcraft.'[276] The famous voyeuristic scene in Apuleius *Met.* 3.21-22, where Lucius witnesses Pamphile's metamorphosis into a bird, contains similar motifs of enchantment and intoxication, leading Andrew Laird to the conlcusion that this 'conjunction of elements...[may] bring us closer to an idea of what the ancient conception of fiction might be than we first realized.'[277] Gorgianic imagery is therefore a crucial instrument in Lucian's exploration of fiction, but it is not the only one; in the following section, I will show that he also coins new metaphors to encapsulate some of the strange and paradoxical qualities of fictional discourse.

## LUCIANIC METAPHORS FOR FICTION: HYBRID MONSTERS AND SOCRATIC STATUES

In the *Bis Acc.*, Lucian famously describes his literary technique as an odd hybrid blend of Platonic dialogue, comedy, and a pinch of Cynic diatribe, for extra bite.[278] It has now been fairly widely acknowledged that Lucian uses the image of the hybrid monster metapoetically, as a metaphor for his own peculiar literary technique.[279] This has been acknowledged especially with reference to the numerous hybrids populating the pages of the *VH*;[280] but it is also evident from the recurrence of the metaphor in various forms in the so-called *prolaliae*, where Lucian tends to write more explicitly about his authorial *persona*, his aspirations

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[274] See Segal 1962.

[275] See esp. Chapter 2, p. 109 ff., and Chapter 3, n. 115 and n. 143.

[276] Plato *Rep.* 413 b-c; see Gill 1993: 54 with n. 36.

[277] Laird 1993: 173.

[278] *Bis Acc.* 33. On Lucian's hybridization of literary genres, see Korus 1986.

[279] The fullest general recent studies are Romm 1990 and Camerotto 1998, esp. 76 ff.; see also following note. The metaphor resonates with Horace's programmatic image of the hybrid painting (*Ars Poetica* 1-5), but it also has a Platonic pedigree: Plato, *Phaedrus* 264 c: ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα πρέποντ᾽ ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα.

[280] See Georgiadou & Larmour 1994: 1500, and cf. Chapter 3, p. 166 f. below, with n. 203.

and his compositional techniques.[281] Here, we find programmatic significance attached to hybrids such as Zeuxis' female centaur, the serpentine Dipsads, hippocamps and tragelaphs, Dionysus' hybrid forces in the *Bacchus* etc..[282]

In the *Philops.*, the motif surfaces when Tychiades is referring to the stories of Eucrates and the others. It occurs first within the intertext with the *Phaedrus* at *Philops.* 2. Tychiades here refers scathingly to the unbelievable stories of myth, such as Zeus' amatory metamorphoses and *all those Pegasuses and Chimaeras and Gorgons and Cyclopes* (hybrid creatures all!) - and all those sorts of stories, strange and monstrous (πάνυ ἀλλόκοτα καὶ τεράστια μυθίδια), which have the power to scare children who are still afraid of Mormo and Lamia (hybrids again).[283] A little later, Tychiades echoes the same phrase, this time to refer to the specific stories he himself heard at Eucrates' house; once again, the hybridity suggested in the phrase itself is fortified by reference to mythical hybrid beings - this time the Erinyes (*Philops.* 5).[284] Hybrids and shape-shifting is also a prominent motif in several of the fictions themselves. Eucrates himself is described in terms of a hybrid (a monkey in lion's skin, *Philops.* 5), in a way that reflects his deceptive outward appearances, but also suggests his propensity towards fiction.[285] Hecate, Cerberus, and the shape-shifting moon-goddess all feature in Cleodemus' story (*Philops.* 14). A statue of rather hybrid artistic design is the subject of Eucrates' story (*Philops.* 18).[286] A snakey-haired Hecate, who is also described as a μορμολύκειον, features in *Philops.* 22-23,[287] and there is also the shape-shifting demon who haunts the house of Arignotus' tale (*Philops.* 31).[288] Several hybrid elements occur in the Sorcerer's Apprentice tale; Pancrates is an Egyptian who speaks Greek, albeit falteringly (*Philops.* 34), and there are also

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[281] On the relevance of the *prolaliae* to Lucian's authorial *persona*, see Branham 1985 and Nesselrath 1990.

[282] Compare also the image of Geryon in the *Tox.* 62: see Camerotto 1998: 84 and Chapter 2, n. 56.

[283] The adjective τεράστιος, used here to describe the fictions, itself connotes a prodigy (τέρας). Mormo and Lamia were ssociated especially with wolves and nocturnal birds such as the screech owl or *strix*. They were child-snatchers, possibly the ancient Greek equivalent of the folkloric night witch, and were sometimes associated with nightmares as well (see Gordon 1987). Lucian uses these hybrid figures to connote childish credulity in fiction: cf. n. 161 above. Mormo is again alluded to in *Philops.* 22-3 (see n. 287 below).

[284] Cf. p. 29.

[285] One might compare the *mixed* theatrical metaphor which Tychiades uses to refer to Arignotus, *Philops.* 29; cf. p. 62 f.. Like Eucrates, Arignotus' true nature is a disappointment; they are the opposite of Alcibiades' description of Socrates, whose external appearance conceals the treasure within (*Symp.* 215 b and 216 d - 217 a).

[286] Cf. p. 68 ff..

[287] The oblique reference here to Mormo, in conjunction with the reference to the old men's *childish credulity*, clearly evokes Tychiades' earlier remark about children's susceptibility to fiction, *Philops.* 2: cf. n. 161 above.

[288] Cf. n. 228 above.

animated brooms, bars and pestles, dressed as men (*Philops.* 35f.). Finally, Tychiades jokes that these stories have filled his mind with so many ghostly visions, he thinks he himself is seeing *Hecates* (*Philops.* 39); once again, Lucian connects the stories themselves and their effect with hybrid creatures.[289]

The idea of hybridity is, on one level, clearly meant to reflect the bizarre subject-matter and the incredible nature of the stories. It could also suggest the hybrid pedigree of the stories: as with all oral narratives (and these are *ostensibly* oral), they represent an amalgam from various sources. However, an awareness of Lucian's metapoetical use of this sort of metaphor in other works means they would also function as metatextual triggers in the reader's mind, subtle reminders that these ostensibly oral narratives are in fact fictional Lucianic texts. This is consistent with the games Lucian is playing with the ontological status of his text in the *Philops.*, as we have already seen.

The second metaphor for fiction which Lucian develops in the *Philops.* concerns the statue of Pellichus I have just mentioned. Once again, the status of statues as metapoetical signifiers has been recognized, not only in Lucian's work, but in other authors of the Second Sophistic too.[290] The idea clearly resonates with Platonic art theory, which is fitting here, given the pervasive intertextuality with Plato in the *Philops.*. However, this particular statue in the *Philops.* has deeper resonances, which have not yet been explored, and which are significant for Lucian's articulation of the paradox of fiction in this dialogue, and also for a broader understanding of the particular authorial *persona* he projects in works where the fictional element is dominant.

The passage I am concerned with here is *Philops.* 18-20, which contains the description of Eucrates' collection of statues, each of them copies of famous originals by the great masters such as Myron and Polycleitus. This *ekphrasis* is introductory to Eucrates' story about how one of his statues, the one called Pellichus, comes to life at night, wanders about the house, singing and humming to himself and splashing about in the bath, as befits a generally benevolent spook.[291]

There are several points of interest here. Firstly, there is a marked discrepancy between the copies of the classics, such as works by Myron,

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[289] The plural *Hecates* recalls the intertext with the *Phaedrus*; cf. p. 17 ff..

[290] See below, esp. n. 297. The art of sculpture is also used as a metaphor for literary technique by Pindar (e.g. *Nem.*5.1-5, where he boasts of the superiority of song to sculpture), and by Horace as well (*Ars Poetica* 32 ff.).

Polycleitus and the Tyrant-Slayer group, which we glide past in our reading, and the much more obscure portrait of Pellichus, executed in a non-classical, veristic style. In fact, in a reverse of the expected hierarchy, these other sculptural classics are introduced merely as a *foil* to Pellichus. [292] It may be possible to interpret this as a reflection of the humbler nature of the story about the moving statue, i.e. that it is *folkloric*, rather than literary. By the same logic, it may also be possible to extrapolate a reflection of the *migratory* nature of the story, from the fact that the statue to which the story pertains is a *moving* statue.

From a different perspective, it may also be possible to detect signs of a literary manifesto here. Lucian was writing during the Second Sophistic, an era of cultural revival in which the cultural élite looked back to glory days of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.., with its classic masterpieces in the fields of art, architecture, and literature. James Romm has shown how Lucian appropriates the language of sculpture in order to explore and characterise his own literary techniques;[293] by passing over the classic *objets d'art* in this *ekphrasis* of Eucrates' gallery, therefore, Lucian may be signalling his artistic choice to turn away from sterile emulation of classic ideals, in favour of a new aesthetic (but one which is still compared to the masterpieces of the classical age). Demetrius, who is (somewhat uncertainly) identified as the statue's sculptor, appears himself to be an incongrous mixture; the artist himself belongs to the late classical era (ca. 400-360 B.C.), but his veristic statue seems to belong to a much later date.[294] There is also a degree of uncertainty concerning the identity of the portrait's subject, tentatively identified as the obscure Pellichus.[295] Placed alongside the great classics of Eucrates' gallery, this statue appears to be something of a hybrid, and difficult to pin a label on. I would like to suggest that this makes it an ideal metaphor for Lucian's own fictional composition.

There are some points of curiosity here too. First of all, why this description of the *other* statues in Eucrates' home? These other statues have nothing to do with the story of Pellichus, which is the point of Eucrates' description. The passage

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[291] Bath-houses were felt to be especially susceptible to haunting in antiquity: see Plutarch's story about the haunted bath-house at Chaeronea (*Cimon* 1.6); cf. Felton 1999: 111, n. 63.

[292] Stewart (1990: 275) argues from the opposite angle: 'Described by a notorious liar and only 'thought' to be Pellichus, the statue appears in the middle of a satiric dialogue, accompanied by Myron's Diskobolos, the Diadoumenos, and the Tyrannicides, as a comic foil to these acknowledged masterpieces of classic beauty, all supposedly in the liar's own private collection.'

[293] Romm 1990.

[294] On Demetrius and his (unflatteringly) veristic style, see Quintilian *Inst.Or.* 12. 7-9, and Stewart 1990: 274-5.

[295] See Felton 2001: 78, n. 11.

is striking for its attention to details, which then appear to be surplus to requirements - so what is going on here?

One way to explain this may be that this description of the statues constitutes a nod to *iconistic* literature on statues which was in vogue at the time. This class of literature is represented most famously by Philostratus' *Imagines*, but Lucian's own *Imagines* and *Pro Imaginibus* are a playful variation on the theme as well.[296] I suggest that Lucian uses this description of statues in the *Philops.* as another *effet de création* to draw attention to the *artifice* and *textual surface* of the dialogue.[297]

However, there is another important aspect of the *particular* statue that is the subject of Eucrates' story, which is activated by the Platonic atmosphere that pervades the dialogue. Couched in this Platonic background, the description of the bald and pot-bellied Pellichus takes on new significance as an icon of Socrates, who is described in just the same terms when he appeared to Eucrates in the Underworld (*Philops.* 24).[298] A further clue to the Socratean association lies also in the statue's association with Demetrius, the sculptor from *Alopece*, which was also Socrates' deme.

The Socratic associations do not end there. This is a *moving* statue, and the sceptical Tychiades makes a rather scornful allusion to the statues of Daedalus, the legendary sculptor whose skill was such that his statues appeared to come alive.[299]

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[296] For an important new interpretation of the tone of this Lucianic diptych, see Sidwell 2002. A metatextual reading of the *Imag.* and *Pro Imag.*, including an exploration of the Platonic presences that pervade them (modelled on Alcibiades' iconistic encomium of Socrates, *Symp.* 215 a), is a subject I have in mind for future research.

[297] Tim Whitmarsh (in an article which he very kindly permitted me to read in advance of its publication), argues that statues in Philostratus' *Heroicus* at times serve as 'paradigms for description', and that Philostratus, by emphasizing the *inertness* of statues in comparison with their live subjects, engages in an quasi-metatextual exploration of literary *mimesis* and its relation to reality: 'Philostratus' discourse of statuary is complex and variegated, but what abides throughout is an intense interest in the question of how life-like these representations are. This exploration of iconicity is...self-reflexively metadiscursive on Philostratus' part: he is investigating representation in an extended sense that includes also literary description...' (Whitmarsh *forthcoming*). Richard Hunter (1983: 38ff. and 1996a: 376-7) has made similar observations concerning the iconicity of Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*; see also Zeitlin (1990, esp. p. 430 ff.), and Laird 2001: 20 ff. (on 'meta-ekphrasis' in the story of Gyges' ring in Plato's *Republic*; he alludes to prologue of *D&C*).

From a different perspective, the description of the statues in the *Philops.* may perhaps be seen as a display of culture and erudition, *de rigeur* in the literary *symposium*, from Plato, through Plutarch, to Lucian himself (who wrote a counter-*Symposium*) and to Athenaeus, in whose work this form attains its encyclopaedic *acme* (and in parodic form also, e.g. the bouts of astrological lore in the *Cena Trimalchionis*). Once again, the effect of this is to foreground the *literary artifice*, to remind us that we are reading a work of literary fiction, by bringing the generic background of the literary *symposium* closer to the surface.

[298] A playful reification of Socratic art-theory may be lurking under the surface here: the in-text icon of Socrates is itself an εἴδωλον.

[299] On Daedalus, see Morris 1992: 215-237; on Daedalus' remarkably lifelike statues, see Diodorus Siculus 4. 76; cf. n. 301 below.

On one level, the reference to Daedalus is part of the web of Cretan allusions in this passage, along with references to Minos, to the labyrinth, designed by Daedalus himself to house the Minotaur, and to Talos, the giant bronze guardian of Crete (and another moving statue). The Cretans in antiquity were, of course, notorious as liars, as Lucian was well aware, and that seems to be the point of Tychiades' words here, namely to imply that Eucrates' story is just a fabrication.[300] On another level, however, the reference to Daedalus also evokes Socrates, for Socrates famously claimed descent from Daedalus, and used the image of the moving *Daedalic* statue several times as a metaphor for elusive philosophical arguments.[301]

Socrates is also associated in a curious way with statues. Alcibiades famously alludes to statues in his attempt to describe Socrates' nature in Plato's *Symp.*, a work which, as I have shown, is very much in our mind as we read the *Philops.*.[302] Socrates himself says that he trained initially, but unsuccessfully, as an apprentice sculptor alongside his father - a story which finds striking resonance in Lucian's own claim, in the ostensibly autobiographical *Somnium*, to have commenced an unsuccessful sculptor's apprenticeship with his uncle, prior to following his true vocation to become a *rhetor*.[303]

So what are we to make of this extraordinarily rich web of associations? It seems to me that Lucian is appropriating Plato and the ironic, paradoxical *persona* of the Platonic Socrates for his exploration of lies and fiction in the *Philops.*. Again and again, we find Platonic and specifically Socratean allusions *in places where the veracity of the narrative is open to question*. I have already examined this effect of the intertextuality with the *Phaedrus* in the opening section,[304] but there are other examples too, e.g. *Philops.* 16, where Tychiades casts doubt on the Platonist Ion's claims to have seen an exorcised spirit depart from a person's body, with the quip that a Platonist's claims to autopsy are hardly

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[300] Lucian incorporates Eubulides' liar paradox in the preface to the *VH* (1.4); cf. p. 123. Odysseus, of course, adopts the *persona* of a Cretan in his fabricated tales about himself in *Od.* 13, 14 and 19.

[301] Plato, *Euthyphro* 11 b6 - c1 and 15 b7-10; *Alcibiades I* 121 a3-4; *Meno* 97 d3 - e4. On Daedalic statues, see Mossman 1991, Kassel 1983.

[302] For Alcibiades' reference to statues and Socrates, see Plato *Symp.* 215 b and 216 d - 217 a; cf. n. 285.

[303] *Somnium* 1-4. For different interpretations of the Socratic allusion in the *Somnium*, see Gera 1995 (Socrates' ambivalence as a model ironizes Lucian's portrayal of his own youthful enthusiasm, reflecting his underlying sense of disillusionment with his career choice), and now Sidwell & Humble *forthcoming* (Lucian may have wanted to project a self-image as an exposer of fraud and pretension, in the Socratic mode).

[304] Cf. p. 17 ff..

reliable, given that they also claim they can see the incorporeal forms.[305] In macrocosmic terms too, it is significant that Lucian adopts, here and elsewhere, a *Platonic* structure - the dramatic framing dialogue - as the vehicle for his fictions. With its philosophical associations (of which Lucian was well aware),[306] the dialogue lends itself naturally to the critical exploration which is integral to the *Philops.*, but the Platonic structure also subordinates the fiction to a speculative frame, with an effect of literary incongruity that is very much in the spirit of playful erudition or *paideia*. Plato seems to be 'good to think with' about fiction, not only because he was a philosopher, but because in some ways, he too used fiction - *mythoi* - in the service of philosophy;[307] perhaps we may say that Lucian, in appropriating Plato and Socrates, turns this equation on its head, harnessing philosophy playfully in the service of fiction.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the *Philops.* can now be seen as a highly complex *enactment* of the theory and paradoxical nature of fiction, and also of the dynamics of reading and writing fiction, which involves not just fictional authors and readers, but 'real' ones too - Lucian himself, and his readers, both ancient and modern. The theory implicit in works such as the *Philops.* could therefore be exploited most usefully by modern scholars of ancient fiction, especially in the absence of explicit ancient handbooks on the subject. In saying this, it is important to emphasise that none of this denies the essentially *ludic* nature of the text. Lucian is clearly having fun, and the *Philops.* is rich in burlesque (e.g. burlesque of medical expertise), sarcasm (Tychiades' sardonic responses to the fanciful tales), philosophical jokes (e.g. Ion's eyes at *Philops.* 16), word-play,[308] comical caricature (the childlike philosophers on the edge of their seats in anticipation of the next tale; Arignotus as *magus gloriosus*), comic exaggeration and fantasy (Arignotus' encounter with the ghost; the animated pestle), travesty (e.g. Herodotus' story of Melissa and Periander) and all sorts of literary cleverness.[309] In addition to this, Lucian offers readers a sumptuous feast of literary fare, a full menu of magicians, miracles and the supernatural. In fact, he has succeeded so well in this, that he actually does himself a disservice. I have already mentioned the tendency has been to read the

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[305] Plato and Socrates appear in other works too in the context of make-believe: see *Nav.* (see Appendix II) and *VH* (see p. 122 ff.).

[306] *Bis Acc.* 33ff..

[307] On the problems of attaching the label 'fiction' to Plato's myths, see Gill 1993.

[308] See n. 149 and n. 167 above.

[309] See the discussion of *effets de creation* on p. 52 ff..

*Philops.* largely for the entertainment of its *novelle* - as a 'pot-pourri of 'classical' ghost stories',[310] or to ransack it for evidence about ancient concepts of the supernatural or magical practice; in this chapter, I hope to have made a convincing case for considering this dialogue, with all its mirror-like layers, as a meaningful *whole*, and to have drawn attention to its enormous value as a document of practical theory on fiction, as well as its unquestionable status as literary entertainment. It is a mark of Lucian's particular brilliance, I think, that he manages to interweave so seamlessly two qualities that are not often found combined with such a light touch, in antiquity or today - and furthermore, that he achieves this not only once, but in the three other works to which I will now turn, in a manner that is in each case unique.[311]

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[310] Anderson 1976b: 116.

[311] In *Bacchus* 4-5, Lucian himself hints his work may contain a more serious subtext underneath its ludic façade, which will only become apparent upon closer inspection; see also Branham (1985: 242, n. 8) and Nesselrath (1990: 137ff.). Lucian therefore represents his work as the antithesis to sham philosophers like Eucrates and Arignotus in the *Philops.*, whose venerable outer appearance conceals a far less worthy inner nature (cf. n. 285 above).

## INTRODUCTION: *TOXARIS* AND THE GAME OF MAKE-BELIEVE

καὶ μήν, εὖ ἴσθι, οὐκ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμι καὶ ἔτι πορρωτέρω ἐλθεῖν, εἰ μέλλω τοιούτοις φίλοις ἐντεύξεσθαι οἶος σύ, ὦ Τόξαρι, διεφάνης ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων.[1]

And furthermore, know this well, I would not shrink from going even farther, if I were to meet with the sort of friends which you, Toxaris, have proved yourself to me to be, from what you have said.

So ends the dialogue known as *Toxaris or Friendship* (Τόξαρις ἡ Φιλία); the Greek speaker, Mnesippus, declares that his Scythian interlocutor, Toxaris, has proved his worth as a friend by his *words* - which, in the context of this dialogue, must mean his *stories*.[2] My thesis in this chapter is that the *Toxaris*, like the *Philopseudes* and the *Navigium*, is, on one level at least, 'about' storytelling and fiction, and it embodies some of Lucian's most important 'practical theory' on these matters. Furthermore, there is clearly an affinity between the subject-matter of the short stories embedded in the *Tox.*, and many motifs that are characteristic of the surviving Greek novels. By weaving these motifs into the fabric of his stories, Lucian evokes the world of the so-called 'ideal' romances, and in so doing, practically extends us an invitation to apply his practical theory to the novel, the genre of fictional story-telling *par excellence*: in this respect, the *Tox.* is a unique treasure among the works that are ascribed with certitude to Lucian's authorship.

For a long time, the *Tox.* seemed fated to be consigned to the οἰκία εὐρώεντα of the ill-defined. The tone of the dialogue in particular seemed difficult to assess. For Bompaire, the work was a comic fantasy.[3] While Anderson read the *Tox.* as comic fiction, its absurd tales designed to entertain readers,[4] Swain viewed the dialogue's entertainment value as of secondary importance only; the moral message was uppermost in it, and he classified the *Tox.* alongside other moralistic literary works exemplifying virtue (e.g. works on friendship by Aristotle, Cicero,

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[1] *Tox.* 63.
[2] For the possible significance of the speakers' names, see n. 42.
[3] Bompaire 1958: 662-7.
[4] Anderson 1976b: 83-89.

Seneca and Plutarch, among others).[5] Other analyses emphasize how the dialogue sheds light on matters of historical import, such as cultural relativism,[6] and shifts in the importance and meaning of friendship in imperial society.[7]

Others adopted a more literary approach to the work. Perry and Jones both emphasized links between the stories in *Tox.* and 'popular' Greek fiction, by which they meant the novels, principally.[8] Pervo interprets the dialogue as a 'subtle parody of the kinds of sentimental views of Greek male friendship depicted in the romantic novels, as well as popular myth, legend, and saga.'[9]

A certain amount, therefore, has been done to highlight the relation between the *novelle* in the *Tox.*, and the Greek romances, but this has not advanced much beyond an identification of novelistic motifs or *topoi* in the tales told by Mnesippus and Toxaris respectively; I will show how the presence of these novelistic motifs represents merely the most obvious outward manifestation of this dialogue's richly nuanced relationship with the great works of Greek fiction. Scholarship on the *Toxaris* has tended naturally to concentrate on the stories that are the central focus of the work; it is crucial, however, to take cognizance of Lucian's artistic choice to embed these stories within a dialogue frame, and to explore the effects of the resulting dialectic between frame and narratives. By ascribing the stories to different *personae*, and subordinating the *novelle* to the dialogue form, Lucian at once distances us (and himself) from the fiction, and projects it into a speculative framework, which serves his practical exploration of fiction and fictionality; it is just as important, therefore, to consider the significance of the dialogue's framing structure, as the nature of the stories themselves. [10]

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[5] Swain 1994: 174 ff.. Pervo also explores Swain's idea about the link between the stories in the *Tox.*, and the *exempla* from moralistic literature, but suggests that Lucian is parodying this literature; he likens it to the *De Syria Dea*, a similar work of 'subtle parody', whose tone has proven to be just as difficult to assess; on the issue of parody in the *De Syria Dea*, see Avery 1997: 106 ff., esp. 155-6; Lightfoot 2003: 196-9.

[6] See Bowersock (1994: 44 ff.), e.g.: 'It is Lucian to whom we must turn for a reflection of the great change in attitude toward the Hellenic standard.' (44). Bowersock views the *Tox* .as 'a good representation of the toleration of diverse cultures and international diversity that characterize virtually all the extant fiction of the second century and later' (46), and links this to Lucian's own cultural identity. Whitmarsh (2001: 125-6) offers a refinement on Bowersock's arguments: cf. n. 21 below.

[7] Rejano 2000; cf. n. 86 below.

[8] Perry (1967: 234); Jones (1986: 56-58); also Bowersock (1994: 44); Rejano (2000: 240): see discussion at p. 91 ff. below.

[9] Pervo 1997: 165, with n. 9.

[10] In a forthcoming paper, ' *"Plato alone was not there..."*: Platonic Presences in the Second Sophistic', I explore the significance of Lucian's appropriation of the specifically *Platonic* model for his dialogues (as opposed to the Aristotelian or Heraclidean paradigms, which were the more usual alternatives, as Cicero makes explicit (*Letters to Atticus* 13.19; *Letters to Quintus* 3.5), and Plutarch's dialogues demonstrate implicitly). The Platonic model was undoubtedly more subtle and

One vital aspect of Lucian's choice of the dialogue form is that the interaction between the speakers in the dialogue dramatizes the dialectic of fictionality, i.e. the idea that fictionality is based on a *contract* of understanding between author and reader. Mnesippus and Toxaris are both 'authors' and 'readers' in the text; 'authors' of their own fictions, and 'readers' of each other's. Their twin roles necessarily underpin *our* role, and Lucian's, as readers and author of the *Toxaris* respectively. It is significant, therefore, that the inscribed commentary in the dialogue (i.e. Mnesippus' and Toxaris' responses) focuses the reader's attention particularly on the *way* in which the stories are told, and problematizes their credibility as stories, or their questionable status as fiction. On the other hand, Mnesippus' and Toxaris' role as authors in the text, *whose claims to veracity are questionable*, also ironically underpins Lucian's own authorial role. The interaction between these inscribed readers and authors, therefore, dramatizes the knowing composition and consumption of fiction; the dialogue is a complex *enactment* of various aspects of fiction-reading, ranging from critical appraisal of style, to vigilant policing of the narrative's fictionality, to the absorption of ethical content and lessons.

It is also significant that the stories are embedded within the framework of a *competition*. According to Pervo, this competitive context reflects the work's formal nature as a rhetorical ἀγών σύγκρισις,[11] but Lucian did not intend the dialogue to be interpreted as a serious piece or moralistic literature.[12] I propose here a rather different interpretation The boundary between truth and lies was rather rigorously policed in antiquity; consequently fiction, which sought to straddle this boundary, could arouse deep-seated anxiety - unless its insidious powers were somehow 'neutralized' by being explicitly acknowledged and 'allowed'. This happened as standard practice in the enclosed civic space of the theatre - which, as I suggest elsewhere in this thesis, may be one of the reasons for

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difficult to emulate, as it required the author to veil his presence, but 'speak through' different *personae* with varying degrees of irony. In Lucian, these sorts of games are even clearer in dialogues where one of the interlocutors is homonymous with Lucian himself, such as the *Nav.* (see Appendix II). Just as Plato's use of the dialogue form represents an *enactment* of Socratic dialectic, so too Lucian's dialogue is an *enactment* the lessons about friendship on one level, and the composition and reading of fiction on another: cf. n. 60 below, and see also Branham's excellent essay (1989: 65-123) on the Lucian's use of the Platonic model in the *Anacharsis*.

[11] See also Bompaire 1958: 289f.. Plutarch uses *syncriseis* also; a good example is his essay *De Gloria Atheniensium*, which considers whether the Athenians have a better aptitude for war or literature (*Mor.* 345 c ff.); see Bompaire 1958: 273f., and see also following note.

[12] Pervo 1997: 164. Also of interest for the reader of the *Tox.* is Plutarch's rather puzzling essay, *Parallela Graeca et Romana*, also known as the *Parallela Minora* (*Mor.* 305 a ff.). This is a *syncrisis* of tales from Greek and Roman history, which some scholars believe to be parodic, in a similar manner to Lucian's *VH* (cf. n. 65 below).

the rather pointed use of theatrical imagery in Lucianic fiction, specifically in contexts where the truth-status of the fiction is being problematized.[13] In the *Tox.*, Lucian presents another way of rendering explicit (and thereby neutralizing) the deceptive powers of fiction - by framing it within the context of a story-telling competition, which is dictated by certain rules, boundaries and stipulations to control the potential for mendacity, at least nominally.[14]

There is good reason for interpreting the competitive framework in the *Tox.* in this way. The competition, *prima facie*, fails. At the end of the series of stories (*Tox.* 62), Mnesippus suddenly realises that he forgot to appoint an umpire to decide the outcome; this diminishes the importance of the primary competitive element, and leaves the reader to wonder about the point of this apparently inconclusive competition after all.[15] The answer is implicit in Mnesippus' final words, which I quoted at the start of this chapter: it was not designed to decide who the better friends were, but who told the better stories: the *stories* are the important element here; the competitive framework in which they are installed reflects an anxiety about, but also an interest in, their nature as fiction.

The story-telling competition is governed by rules about the themes of the stories themselves, the sorts of characters allowed, their 'dramatic date' and so on.[16] There are also stipulations regarding the number of stories to be told by each narrator, and the forfeits to be endured in the event of defeat. Each speaker, furthermore, must swear an oath beforehand to abide by the rules of the competition, and to tell only the truth:

> ...πρότερος δὲ λέγε, ἀλλ' ἐπομοσάμενος ἦ μὴν ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖν· ἄλλως γὰρ ἀναπλάττειν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν καὶ ὁ ἔλεγχος ἀφανής. εἰ δὲ ὁμόσειας, οὐχ ὅσιον ἀπιστεῖν.[17]

> ...You speak first - but only after swearing that you will indeed tell the truth, for otherwise it is not very difficult to make this sort of thing up, and the

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[13] Cf. p. 192 ff..

[14] The competitive framework, therefore, is a textual analogue for Morgan's paradigm of fiction as a *game*, also governed by conventions and rules, on which see Morgan 1993: 193-4. Cf. p. 111.

[15] One might compare the similarly inconclusive ending of Plato's dialogue on friendship, the *Lysis*; when Socrates' conversation with the youths Menexenus and Lysis is ended by the arrival of their stern *paidagogoi*, Socrates concedes that they have failed to define friendship, although – importantly – they are thought to *be* friends (223b). Lucian clearly had this dialogue in mind in the *Tox.*; cf. n. 21 and n. 42 below.

[16] One is reminded here perhaps of the sorts of conventions governing other literary 'games', such as the pastoral *carmen amoebaeum* (e.g. Theocritus, *Idyll* 5, which also influenced Catullus 45, and was absorbed into the literature of the Second Sophistic, e.g. *Daphnis & Chloe* 1.15-16), or even the sympotic rules governing the speech-making in Plato's *Symp.* (176 a – 177e), or indeed the comic *agon*: see Bompaire 1958: 251 ff. For the connection between competitive elements, like this one, in Lucian's works, and the agonistic culture of *paideia*, see Chapter 3, n. 145.

[17] *Tox.* 11.

proof is not apparent. But if you were to take an oath, it would not be right to doubt you.

As Toxaris' words show, the necessity for these oaths reflects a degree of anxiety about the difficulty in policing the truth-status of fiction; the act of swearing to tell the truth is predicated upon an explicit acknowledgement of how easy it is to fabricate, which then becomes a *Fiktionalitätssignal*. As will become clear later in the dialogue, however, even these oaths do not by any means provide a guarantee that the speaker will tell the truth.[18] As the narratives unfold, one feels increasingly that claims to be telling the truth are directly related to the entertainment value of the stories - in other words, the nominal acceptance of these stories *as truth* is integral to their entertainment value, as is the case with fiction. The speakers' concern with truthfulness in the frame polarizes the fictional aspects of the stories, as well as rendering them 'safe' for the extra-dialogic reader.

The dialogue falls roughly into three sections: 1-12 (preamble, including *ekphrasis*); 12-61 (story competition); 62-63 (conclusion). The introductory section not only raises the issue for discussion, but it is subtly connected with the stories that follow; here especially, the author 'speaks across' the interlocutors to the extra-literary reader, investing his dialogue with an extra, metaliterary dimension and significance, as I will now show. [19]

## *EKPHRASIS* AND TEXTUALITY: PAINTING IN WORDS

There is no denying that the focus of the *Toxaris* is the ten stories embedded in the dialogue; however, like Plato, Lucian invests a great deal of care in constructing a preamble and setting in his dialogue, which will set the appropriate tone for the stories, and evoke the appropriate readerly response.[20] Toxaris' rather elaborate *ekphrasis* plays a vital role here, for a variety of reasons. In terms of the dialogue's cultural politics, it is pivotal in the deconstruction of the Scythian stereotype, and the Scythian/Greek polarity that is linked to this. In terms of the dialogue's poetics – a crucial issue, given that the dialogue is 'about' stories - the *ekphrasis* engages the reader's response at the *cognitive* as well as the emotional

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[18] *Tox.* 56; cf. p. 99 and p. 109 ff..

[19] One should compare here the preamble to the *Philops.* (see Chapter 1. p. 9 ff.) and the proem to the *VH* (see Chapter 3, p. 122 ff.).

[20] On the importance of Plato's introductions, see for example Halperin 1992 (where he is largely concerned with the *structure* of these openings). Ancient Neoplatonic exegetes of Plato's texts regarded the settings of the dialogues as allegorical, and combed them for hidden philosophical meaning: see Dillon 1999. On the fictionality of Plato's dialogue frames, see McCabe 2000, esp. 8 ff.; see also Gill 1993 and Laird 2001. For discussion of the preambles to Lucian's dialogues, with their 'préoccupations pittoresques et romanesques', see Bompaire 1958: 307ff..

level, anticipating an ideal reader who will respond critically to the narrative technique of the stories (not just their content), just as the inscribed readers, Mnesippus and Toxaris, will do. The manner in which Toxaris invests his description with the atmosphere of tragedy (a literary genre with a *spectacular* aspect) reflects inversely what he himself is doing - narrativizing pictorial art; this, as well as the manner in which Mnesippus responds to his description (highlighting the interrelation of narrative and pictorial artistry), suggests that Lucian wants *us*, the extra-dialogic readers, to think about genre and artistic form as we read *his* text. The multiple layers of text and reading in the *ekphrasis* involve the reader of the *Tox.* in a self-conscious play with textuality, and Toxaris' knowing concern with his own reading and narrative craft figures Lucian's own authorial concerns metaleptically as well.

At *Tox.* 6, Toxaris explains to why the Scythians are so impressed by the Greek heroes, Orestes and Pylades, that they attribute divine status to them. According to Toxaris, they won the Scythians' respect on meritocratic principles, despite the fact that they were Greeks and enemies, because of their exemplary friendship for one another, which they demonstrated in their feats against the Scythian king, Thoas.[21] Toxaris then informs Mnesippus that these 'exploits of friendship' are in fact commemorated in an inscription set up by the ancient Scythians in a shrine devoted to the heroes. In some detail, Toxaris describes the

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[21] The deconstruction of ethnic stereotypes and the polarities engendered by these is an important theme in the dialogue, reflected on a number of levels: for example, the contest between the Greek and the Scythian resolves itself in their becoming friends (note that the organic hybrid, Geryon, is used as a symbol to emphasize the complete coalescence of this process: see n. 55 and n. 56 below). Toxaris, despite being a Scythian, appears to be just as eloquent and immersed in Greek literature as Mnesippus; so too the Scythian friends in Toxaris' stories appear – paradoxically – to be rather truer to the Classical Greek ideal of reciprocity in friendship. The *ekphrasis* has a role to play here too, as it involves a *Scythian* telling a *Greek* (significantly *in Greek*; Toxaris' use of the Scythian word *korakoi* at one point (*Tox.* 7), like the word *zirin* in his first narrative (*Tox.* 40), reminds us that Greek is not his only language; this incorporation of foreign words is reminiscent of Herodotus (e.g. 4.59), but Anacharsis was also bilingual, since his mother was Greek (Diogenes Laertius 1.101)) - about a *Scythian* representation of a *Greek* myth involving *Greek* heroes in *Scythia*, who embody the *Scythian* ideal in friendship, despite being *Greek*... (On bilingualism here, cf. p. 116 f., esp. n. 162.) It would be interesting to explore further the duality that is inherent in the *Tox.* (e.g. two speakers in dialogue; two friends Orestes and Pylades; two sets of stories in close responsion to one another etc.). The duality is obviously connected with this polarity; according to Whitmarsh, this dialogue 'dramatizes the cultural bifocality of Lucian's persona.' The duality also reflects the (usually) binary nature of friendship, which is the theme of the dialogue: '[The] harmonious resolution makes the narrative structure a parable of the thematic content: Greek and barbarian are united.' (Whitmarsh 2001: 126); on the duality of friendship, see Plutarch, *Mor.* 93e. Interestingly, Plato's dialogue on friendship, the *Lysis*, is also marked by recurrent pairs, e.g. Socrates converses with the two boys, Menexenus and Lysis, and makes pointed use of the dual number from 207c onwards; Socrates' argument is much concerned with the issue of *reciprocity*, esp. 212 a ff., and the dialogue closes with the arrival of the two *paidagogoi*. In my view, the duality of the *Tox.* may also reflect the dual dynamic of fictionality (the contract between the author and reader).

ancient paintings on the temple walls facing the inscription, which are a pictorial representation corresponding to the narrative text:

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ περιβόλῳ τοῦ νεὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁπόσα ἡ στήλη δηλοῖ γραφαῖς ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰκασμένα δείκνυται, πλέων Ὀρέστης ἅμα τῷ φίλῳ, εἶτα ἐν τοῖς κρημνοῖς διαφθαρείσης αὐτῷ τῆς νεὼς συνειλημμένος καὶ πρὸς τὴν θυσίαν παρεσκευασμένος, καὶ ἡ Ἰφιγένεια ἤδη κατάρχεται αὐτῶν. καταντικρὺ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου τοίχου ἤδη ἐκδεδυκὼς τὰ δεσμὰ γέγραπται καὶ φονεύων τὸν Θόαντα καὶ πολλοὺς ἄλλους τῶν Σκυθῶν, καὶ τέλος ἀποπλέοντες, ἔχοντες τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν καὶ τὴν θεόν. οἱ Σκύθαι δὲ ἄλλως ἐπιλαμβάνονται τοῦ σκάφους ἤδη πλέοντος, ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι τῶν πηδαλίων καὶ ἐπαναβαίνειν πειρώμενοι· εἶτ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀνύσαντες οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τραυματίαι, οἱ δὲ καὶ δέει τούτου, ἀπονήχονται πρὸς τὴν γῆν. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἴδοι τις ἂν ὁπόσην ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων εὔνοιαν ἐπεδείκνυντο, ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς Σκύθας συμπλοκῇ. πεποίηκεν γὰρ ὁ γραφεὺς ἑκάτερον ἀμελοῦντα μὲν τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν πολεμίων, ἀμυνόμενον δὲ τοὺς ἐπιφερομέμους θατέρῳ καὶ πρὸ ἐκείνου ἀπαντᾶν πειρώμενον τοῖς τοξεύμασιν καὶ παρ᾽ οὐδὲν τιθέμενον εἰ ἀποθανεῖται σώσας τὸν φίλον καὶ τὴν ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνον φερομένην πληγὴν προαρπάσας τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι.[22]

But in the temple precinct as well, the same scenes which the column explains are represented in pictures by the ancients: Orestes sailing with his friend - then, when his ship has been wrecked on the cliffs, his arrest and preparation for the sacrifice, and Iphigenia is already consecrating them. Opposite this on the other wall, he is depicted as having already cast off his chains, and in the act of murdering Thoas and many other Scythians - and finally their sailing away, with Iphigenia and the goddess in their possession. But the Scythians are grabbing hold of the ship in vain even as it sets sail, hanging from the sails and trying to get on board; then, having failed their attempt, they swim away towards land, some of them wounded, and others for fear of being wounded. It's then especially - in the engagement with the Scythians - that one would see what enormous good will they showed on behalf of each other. The artist has depicted each man ignoring the enemies at his own side in an effort to ward off those who are bearing down on the other man, trying to face the arrows in his stead, and counting the prospect of his own death as nothing if he can save his friend and take the blow that is destined for him on his own body first.

This passage constitutes an *ekphrasis* of the paintings in the Oresteion. The rhetorical schools which enjoyed unprecedented status during the Second Sophistic emphasized the importance of such descriptive exercises, as can be seen in the several *Progymnasmata*, or handbooks of rhetorical composition, that have survived since antiquity.[23] This new emphasis on the descriptive manifests itself

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[22] *Tox.* 6.
[23] For a discussion on the rhetorical background of the Second Sophistic for descriptive passages in these novels, see Bartsch 1989: 3-39. Four of these extant *Progymnasmata* contain prescriptions for

increasingly in the literature of the era, especially in the sophistic novels of Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus, as Shadi Bartsch has shown;[24] it is also evident in iconistic works of the era, such as Philostratus' *Imagines*, and in Lucian's own work too, especially his *prolaliae*.[25]

Bartsch identifies two broad categories of descriptions of works of art. Lucian is generally associated with the second of these, which may be called the 'enigmatist' technique. The aim of this sort of description is not simply to elaborate on a meaning that is already present in the painting, but to elucidate a *hidden* meaning; the interpreter in this case describes and explains not just what is painted, but what is *symbolized*.[26] Most of the works of art that are the object of such descriptions are allegorical, and they are also usually obviously imaginary, existing only to illustrate an idea.[27] Such descriptions tend to be focalized through a 'viewer in the text', whose initial confusion about the meaning of what he sees mirrors that of the reader's, and is resolved by the timely arrival of an interpreter or exegete.[28] Lucian's description of the painting of Heracles Ogmios in *Heracles*, including the Celt's exegesis, is a good example of this 'enigmatist' technique, as is his *ekphrasis* of the allegorical painting of Slander in *Calumnia*.[29]

Although Lucian tends to be associated generally with the 'enigmatist' category, his *ekphrasis* in *Tox.* 6 (and in some other works also, such as *De Domo* and *Herodotus*) belongs, rather, to the other category discussed by Bartsch, that of the 'analogists,'[30] represented largely by Philostratus in the *Imagines*. With this technique, the writer seeks to *emulate* or *surpass* the skill of the original artist in

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the composition and deployment of *ekphrasis*; these are the works of Theon and Hermogenes (early and late second century A.D. respectively), and Aphthonius and Nicolaus (fourth and fifth centuries A.D. respectively): see Bartsch 1989: 7ff.. As Bartsch (1989: 8) points out, these handbooks formed an important part of elementary education, 'thus establishing a normative basis for the use of the rhetorical devices they define.'

[24] Bartsch 1989: *passim*.

[25] On *ekphrasis* in Second Sophistic literature in general, see Anderson 1993: 144-155 and more recently Zeitlin 2001. On Lucian's use of *ekphrasis*, see Bompaire 1958: 707-735; Laplace 1996. Bartsch (1989: 14 ff.) discusses *ekphrasis* in Philostratus and Lucian. For the theoretical problems of the relationship between description and narrative, see Fowler 1991.

[26] Bartsch 1989: 22.

[27] Bartsch 1989: 23.

[28] See Bartsch 1989: 25-26 (interpretative difficulties are identified by a viewer in the text). 'Viewer and puzzle must go hand in hand, since the former articulates the status of the latter. Where both are absent, the allegorical meaning of the painting is previously made obvious by the way the painting is described for the reader and by its position in the text.' (*ibid.*: 24).

[29] Cebes' *Pinax* could also be included here; for discussion, see Bartsch 1989: 22ff.. It is generally thought that use of the term *ekphrasis* when denoting descriptions of works of art is anachronistic, but Bartsch has shown that the evidence from ancient sources on this matter is not conclusive (1989: 31, n. 32).

[30] Pollitt (1974: 10) coined the term 'literary analogists' for the descriptive technique of the two Philostrati and the sophist Callistratus: cf. Bartsch 1989: 23, n. 24; as Bartsch notes, Lucian was clearly adept at both styles.

his interpretation of a painting (or statue), both in terms of craftsmanship and emotive appeal. He will supplement his description of the actual picture with additional 'background' information from mythology and literature, and 'narrativize' it. 'Interpretation' in this case means 'seeing - and describing - more than what could be immediately visible.'[31]

The *ekphrasis* in *Tox.* 6 contains several references to the role of the artist and the spectator - a distancing technique that serves to remind us that the narrative is mediated through a work of visual art. For example, Toxaris uses a mixture of active and passive verbs that remind readers of the artist's agency in the production of the painting (e.g. πεποίηκεν...ὸ γραφεὺς; τὰ αὐτὰ...εἰκασμένα δείκνυται; γέγραπται). His use of spatial terms of reference (e.g. καταντικρὺ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου τοίχου) also reminds us of the two-dimensionality of the events depicted in the painting, and therefore sustains the illusion that we are visualizing in words a work of art.[32] However, this illusion is complicated by the fact that Toxaris uses *temporal* terms of reference in his description as well, and even attributes finite action to the subjects of the painting (e.g. καὶ ἡ Ἰφιγένεια *ἤδη κατάρχεται* αὐτῶν; *ἤδη* ἐκδεδυκὼς τὰ δεσμὰ; *τέλος* ἀποπλέοντες). By doing this, he superimposes a narrative frame onto his description, transforming static art into dynamic, diegetic action. [33] Blurring the boundaries even further, Toxaris invests the painted figures with the emotional impetus proper to their original, real-life counterparts, e.g.:

πεποίηκεν γὰρ ὁ γραφεὺς ἑκάτερον *ἀμελοῦντα*...τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν πολεμίων...καὶ *παρ᾽ οὐδὲν τιθέμενον* εἰ ἀποθανεῖται σώσας τὸν φίλον.

It is significant that Toxaris scrupulously bases his interpretation here on the manner in which the artist has portrayed the figures; clearly, this is not a case of a viewer arbitratily importing his own views and emotions into his 'reading' of the picture, but nevertheless, Toxaris is still 'seeing' more than could have been depicted in an actual painting. This suggests a degree of latitude in the reader's use of his imagination and interpretive skills in response to a text, but that there is also a link between author intentionality and reader interpretation.

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[31] Bartsch 1989: 17. Longus' novel is an extreme example of this; on the relation between Longus' narrative technique and contemporary trends in wall-painting, see Mittelstadt 1967.
[32] *Tox.* 6.
[33] Bartsch (1989) also points out that the superimposition of a progressive temporality, along with the communication of what was thought or felt by the characters in the painting, are aspects of *narrative* rather than of *description*; she discusses Philostratus' *ekphrastic* technique in these terms at pp. 15-22, where she also refers to, but does not discuss, this *ekphrasis* in the *Tox.*.

Analysis of details in the story depicted in the paintings also reveals interesting aspects of Toxaris' narrative technque. In general, the murals seem to represent the Euripidean version of the myth from the *Iphigeneia in Tauris* (*IT*),[34] although Lucian may have had other literary versions in mind too.[35] Toxaris lays great emphasis on the depiction of Orestes and Pylades' selfless courage during the engagement with the Scythians, as each man risks his own life to save the other.[36] Of course it is only natural that he should emphasize just such a scene in the context, but it is hardly a coincidence that this also appears to have been one of the most famous and popular scenes in dramatic performances of the myth as

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[34] The principal point on which he deviates from the Euripidean version is where Toxaris says that Orestes kills King Thoas: (γέγραπται καὶ φονεύων τὸν Θόαντα). In the *IT*, Orestes does indeed suggest they should murder the king – which may perhaps indicate an alternative sequence of events which Euripides suppresses – but Iphigeneia declines to do so, out of respect for the laws of hospitality (*IT* 1020-1021):

Or.:    ἆρ' οὖν τύραννον διολέσαι δυναίμεθ' ἄν;

Iph.:   δεινὸν τόδ' εἶπας, ξενοφονεῖν ἐπήλυδας.

(Observe that both Iphigeneia and Mnesippus (*Tox.* 2) use the same word – ἐπήλυδες – to refer to Orestes and Pylades.) There were, of course, other versions of the myth in antiquity apart from the Euripidean one. In a much later account of the origins of the cult of Artemis Orthia in Sparta, the mythographer Hyginus reports that Thoas was murdered prior to Orestes' theft of the statue and escape; Hyginus' syntax is at least susceptible of the interpretation that Orestes was the murderer (*Fabulae* 261): Orestes...occiso Thoante simulacrum sustulit...et Ariciam detulit. For other references to the murder of Thoas by Orestes, see Servius on *Aeneid* II, 116 and VI, 136; *Tox.* 6 appears to be our earliest literary account of this particular detail in the Orestes myth.

[35] Trenkner (1958: 52, n. 10) believes that Toxaris' story represents a version of the story in the *IT* which omitted the element of intrigue; she suggests that Lucian is working from a version of the story in a tragedy. In one of his exile poems (*Epistulae ex Ponto* 3, 2. 33-102), Ovid relates how an old Taurian told him the tale of Orestes and Pylades in Tomi. Ovid's account is framed in a similar manner to Lucian's, including a deconstruction of ethnic prejudices. Ovid explains that he had been praising the integrity of his friend Cotta, when an old man, one of the Tauri, said to him (ll. 43-44):

nos quoque amicitiae nomen, bone, nouimus, hospes,

quos procul a uobis Pontus et Hister habet.

Just as in *Toxaris*, the Scythian gently corrects the prejudice that friendship is an alien concept to such remote people, who are 'uncivilised' from a Roman point of view. To prove his point, he tells Ovid the story of Orestes and Pylades. In his version, when Iphigeneia is required to sacrifice one of the pair, both friends vie for the privilege of dying to save the other – this, says the Scythian, was the only occasion in their friendship on which they were *not* unanimous (ll. 85-88):

ire iubet Pylades carum periturus Oresten;

hic negat, inque uices pugnat uterque mori.

extitit hoc unum, quo non conuenerit illis:

cetera pars concors et sine lite fuit.

Bompaire points out other affinities between the work of Lucian and Ovid (e.g. Bompaire 1958: 259 and 658), which he thinks is attributable to the fact that both may have been familiar with the same Alexandrian sources.

[36] For self-sacrifice for a friend as a *topos* in stories about friendship, see Trenkner (1958: 71-2), who notes that either Sophocles (in the *Chryses*), or Euripides (in the *IT*) was the first to introduce the story of the noble rivalry of Orestes and Pylades in the matter of friendship; the motif appears also in Euripides' *Orestes* and *Peirithous*, and in prose form in Valerius Maximus, *De Amicitia* 4.7.4; it may also be folkloric. For the idea of sacrificing one's life for one's friends, see Plato, *Symp.* 179b, 208d (in the context of *eros*); Seneca *Ep.* 9.10; Aristotle, *EN* 9.8. 1169 a 18 - b 2. It is also as a novelistic motif (e.g. Ach. Tat. 3.22.1: ὑπὲρ φίλου, κἂν ἀποθανεῖν δεήσει, καλὸς ὁ κίνδυνος, γλυκὺς ὁ θάνατος); for further discussion, see Hock 1997.

well. We know, for example, that Orestes and Pylades' altruistic competition featured in a Greek tragedy by Sophocles, and a Latin tragedy by Pacuvius,[37] where it was much admired by Cicero.[38] Indeed, it is worth reflecting on Cicero's comments on Pacuvius' dramatic representation of Orestes and Pylades' friendship in some detail. At *De Finibus* 5, 63, Laelius describes the audience's reaction to such demonstrations of loyalty on the stage:

> ...clamores uulgi atque imperitorum excitantur in theatris, cum illa dicuntur: *Ego sum Orestes*, contraque ab altero: *Immo enimuero ego sum, inquam, Orestes!* Cum autem etiam exitus ab utroque datur conturbato errantique regi: *Ambo ergo una necarier precamur*, quotiens hoc agitur, ecquandone nisi admirationibus maximis?

> ...the shouting of the crowd and those who are inexperienced is roused, when those words are spoken: 'I'm Orestes!' - and then from the other: 'No, *I'm* Orestes, I tell you!'. But even when their final words are delivered by both of them to the confused and misguided king - 'Therefore we both beg to be killed together' - no matter how many times this is acted, is there any occasion when it does not meet the greatest applause?

Toxaris makes a similar point about the typical response of Greek audiences to displays of friendship on the stage (*Tox.* 9). According to Cicero's character, Laelius, there is no-one who would not commend this affection of spirit; above all, these two friends are commendable for their lack of concern for personal interest, and their loyalty, which is unswerving, even to the detriment of their own welfare:

> Nemo est igitur quin *hanc affectionem animi* probet atque laudet qua non modo utilitas nulla quaeritur sed contra utilitatem etiam conseruatur *fides*.[39]

> For there is nobody who would not approve of and praise this affection in spirit, in which not only no profit is sought, but loyalty is maintained, even at the risk of profit.

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[37] Pacuvius' *Dulorestes*; the fragmentary text of this play can be found in *Remains of Old Latin* Vol. II, (ed. & trans. by E.H. Warmington (Harvard, 1936)), pp. 208-224. The plot of Pacuvius' play (which was composed in the second century B.C.) involved a famous scene where Thoas wished to kill whichever of the two captives happened to be Orestes; each man therefore claims that *he* is Orestes in order to save the other from death, and the scene culminates in their request to be killed together (see following note). It is curious how enduring such *topoi* can be; one is reminded of the memorable scene from the battlefield in Kubrick's film *Spartacus* (1960), where Spartacus' fellow-slaves stand up defiantly in their chains to identify themselves as the man himself, frustrating Crassus' attempts to single out their leader for punishment, and demonstrating their solidarity by their willingness to die in his place; the hilarious crucifixion scene in Monty Python's *Life of Brian* (1979) is a parody of this. Interestingly, Pervo (1997) suggests that the 'ludicrous' nature of many of the tales in the *Tox.* indicate that the stories were meant to parody these *topoi*. Cf. p. 94 ff..

[38] Cicero *De Finibus* 2, 79:
...aut Pylades cum sis, dices te esse Oresten ut moriare pro amico, aut si esses Orestes, Pyladem refelleres, te indicares, et si id non probares, quo minus ambo una necaremini non precarere?

[39] Cicero *De Finibus* V, 63. Cf. n. 86 below.

Toxaris also remarks on the friendship of Orestes and Pylades, with its exemplary εὔνοια and πιστόν. The resemblance is even more striking in view of what Laelius goes on to say, namely that not only legend, but history itself is replete with such examples of friendship - especially Roman history:

> Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae uerum etiam historiae refertae sunt, et quidem maxime nostrae.[40]

This too resonates with the *Toxaris*, where both speakers claim supremacy in friendship for their respective nations, as Cicero does for the Romans. Where Cicero stipulates a crisp distinction between *historiae*, with their implied veracity, and mere *fictae fabulae*, however, the speakers in Lucian's *Toxaris* make a gentlemanly agreement to tell the truth, but tease each other (and the reader) with the possibility that, for all their earnest assertions to the contrary, their stories are entertaining fictions.

The purpose of this brief detour through literary accounts of Orestes and Pylades' feats is not to argue for specific or pointed intertextuality between the *Toxaris* and any other particular text which treats the myth, but to show that the images Toxaris evokes in his 'word-picture' would have had a distinctly *literary*, and especially *theatrical*, flavour for Graeco-Roman readers.[41] Considering the Greeks' general opinion of the Scythians, Toxaris' rhetorical expertise, appreciation of art, and familiarity with tragedy is most unexpected, and rendered all the more ironic in light of Toxaris' own explicit (and, one must infer, tongue-in-

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[40] *De Finibus* V, 64; see also *De Finibus* I, 65, where it is claimed that the mythical stories of antiquity demonstrate the rarity and importance of true friendship: Quod quam magnum sit [amicitia] fictae ueterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tam multis tamque uariis, ab ultima antiquitate repetitis, tria uix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem peruenias profectus a Theseo.

[41] Aristotle's remark (*Poetics* 1453 b15-22), that the best tragic plots take place amongst φίλοι, is interesting in this regard, even if by φίλοι he principally means people who are bound together by ties of kinship. On Aristotle's concept of φιλία in the *Poetics*, see Else (1963: 349-351 and 414 f.) and Belfiore (1998: 141-7). Belfiore concludes that, although Aristotle does not explicitly define the concept, it must include more than ties of blood or kinship; it is also significant that he frequently mentions φιλία in connection with suffering (πάθος) and recognition (ἀναγνώρισις), motifs that are characteristic of the genre of tragedy (*ibid.*: 141). Traditional morality clearly had a rich tragic potential, as Blundell points out (1989: 272). For an overview of the treatment of the problematics of φιλία in Greek epic and tragedy, see Belfiore 1998: 147-151 and 151-154 respectively. She finds that, of our thirty-two extant Greek tragedies, twenty-six feature a central *pathos* among φίλοι, and violation of *philia* is an important theme in some of the remaining six, leading her to conlcude that tragedy, in contrast to epic, is characterised by its focus on *harm* amongst φίλοι: 'violation of *philia*...can be said to be a defining characteristic of tragedy as a whole.' (158).

cheek) eschewal of the Greek talent for eloquence and their love of the theatre
(*Tox.* 9). [42]

This irony is not lost on Mnesippus, who comments wryly, and in a pointed manner, on Toxaris' unexpected skill with words, and the vividness of his description.

ὦ Τόξαρι, οὐ μόνον ἄρα τοξεύειν ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν Σκύθαι καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμείνους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥῆσιν εἰπεῖν ἀπάντων πιθανώτατοι...ἐλελήθεις δέ με, ὦ γενναῖε, καὶ γραφεὺς ἀγαθὸς ὤν. πάνυ γοῦν ἐναργῶς ἐπέδειξας ἡμῖν τὰς ἐν τῷ Ὀρεστείῳ εἰκόνας καὶ τὴν μάχην τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων τραύματα.[43]

> Toxaris, the Scythians, it seems, are not only skilled at archery, and better than everyone else in matters of war, but also the most convincing of all people at making speeches... But I did not realize, my dear fellow, that you were a skilled painter as well; at any rate, you showed me the pictures in the Oresteion, the men's battle, and the wounds they received on each other's behalf, in a most vivid manner.

By calling Toxaris a skilful *painter* (γραφεύς) on the basis of his vivid verbal description - praise he reserves elsewhere for Homer himself [44] - Mnesippus elides the distinction between verbal and pictorial text. This idea of the analogy between visual and narrative art had a Classical pedigree, having been first expressed by the poet Simonides in the fifth century B.C., but it seems to have exercised a peculiar fascination on writers of the Second Sophistic as well.[45] As we shall see, it

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[42] At *Tox.* 8, Lucian exploits the homonymy between Toxaris' name and archery (τοξεύειν), the skill for which the Scythians were famous, and which typified them in the Greek imagination (in their capacity as the police force in Classical Athens, they were commonly known as τοξόται). This word-play highlights, paradoxically, Toxaris' *a*typicality as a Scythian: cf. n. 21 above.
The Greeks had a rather schizophrenic attitude toward the Scythians; they could represent the noble savage of primitivist thought, and one philhellenic Scythian, Anacharsis, was in fact numbered among the Seven Sages of antiquity; in general, though, they were regarded as uncouth barbarians, famous for their rude speech or thuggish silence (on which, see Herodotus 4.127; Diogenes Laertius 1.101). Aristophanes does not miss the chance to exploit the comic potential of this (for example, the Scythian archer at *Thesm.* 1001 ff.): 'Their uncouth behaviour, their broken Greek and their general stupidity were open to derision, and so provided the poet with a useful and easy target for fun.' (Ehrenberg 1951: 175). For further references to the Scythians, and discussion, see Lovejoy & Boas 1935: 315 ff. and Hartog 1988: 2-206. Mnesippus' name may be significant, for a different reason; it may recall Ctesippus, one of the speakers in Plato's dialogue on friendship, the *Lysis*.
[43] *Tox.* 8.
[44] In *Imag.* 8, Homer is identified as ἄριστος τῶν γραφέων; see Zeitlin (2001: 224). Another effect of identifying Toxaris as the *grapheus* of the word-picture is to elide the agency of the original artist, who (putatively, at least) painted the mural in the first place. By attributing the role of painter to Toxaris in this way, Mnesippus could perhaps be suggesting that he really is their creator, i.e. that he actually 'made up' the paintings, to illustrate his point. On *ekphraseis* of imaginary paintings, see Bartsch 1989: 23.
[45] See Plutarch, *Mor.* 346 f: πλὴν ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν; see Zeitlin 2001, esp. 219: '...the authors of the Second Sophistic, so concerned with their own verbal artistry and performative style,

is significant that this nexus of ideas is evoked in preparation for the embedded stories of the dialogue.

The term Mnesippus uses to denote the vividness of Toxaris' description (πάνυ...ἐναργῶς) is also suggestive. *Enargeia* - vividness - was used as a rhetorical term to denote a quality much sought-after in *ekphrasis*.[46] As Zanker has shown, this quality was especially associated with poetry and historiography, and laid strong emphasis on *visual* and *emotive* appeal;[47] *enargeia* was achieved when one's description made the listener feel that he was actually an eye-witness of the events or objects described, experiencing the feelings he would naturally feel if this really were the case: ἐνάργεια τοῦ σχεδὸν ὁρᾶσθαι τὰ ἀπαγγελλόμενα.[48] This is confirmed when Mnesippus speaks about how Toxaris in effect *showed* him the paintings by his description (ἐπέδειξας ἡμῖν τὰς...εἰκόνας), meaning that the *ekphrasis* was so vivid, it was *as if he were actually seeing the paintings themselves*.[49] In the context of this rhetorical terminology, other possible meanings suggest themselves as well; the verb also connotes ἐπίδειξις, the display speech, where the sophist showcased his talents - which is essentially what Toxaris is doing, as Mnesippus astutely perceives.[50]

It is also significant that Mnesippus comments on Toxaris' *convincing* manner of speaking (ῥῆσιν εἰπεῖν ἁπάντων πιθανώτατοι). In the context of the story-telling, and the concern for *true* stories, that takes up most of the dialogue, this alerts readers to Toxaris' ability to convince his audience (it is implied) of what is *not* true; coupled with the reference to Toxaris' concealed talents

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continually draw upon the resources of visual representation, in both theoretical and practical ways.' For the general argument that such *visual* emphasis in Lucian's work (including theatrical imagery) reflects self-consciously the belated mimeticism of Second Sophistic literature – 'the mimetic identity-crisis of his age' - see Whitmarsh 2001: 264-5.

[46] Theon, *Progymnasmata* 11: ἔκφρασις ἐστὶ λόγος περιηγηματικὸς ἐναργῶς ὑπ' ὄψιν ἄγων τὸ δηλούμενον. Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata* 10: ἀρεταὶ δὲ ἐκφράσεως μάλιστα σαφήνεια καὶ ἐνάργεια· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς σχεδὸν τὴν ὄψιν μηχανᾶσθαι. (See Zanker 1981: 300 and 298 respectively).

[47] Zanker 1981: *passim*.

[48] Theon, *Progymnasmata* 11 (see Zanker 1981: 298). Zanker also shows (*ibid.*: 303) that the concept of ἐνάργεια is related to the Greek φαντασία (Latin *visio*), on which see Quintilian, *Inst.Or.* 6.2.29: Quas φαντασίας Graeci uocant (nos sane uisiones appellemus), per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesentantur animo ut eas cernere oculis ac praesentes habere uideamur, has quisquis bene ceperit is erit in adfectibus potentissimus.

[49] Of course, Toxaris' *enargeia* enables Mnesippus to 'see' only the mimetic representation of the events (αἱ εἰκόνες), not the events themselves; a small point, maybe, but it does reflect the characters' overall concern with *stories* of friendship, rather than the actual *deeds*, which in turn mirrors Lucian's concern with *textuality* in the dialogue.

(ἐλελήϑεις δὲ με), this constitutes the first of a series of *Fiktionalitätssignale* in the dialogue.[51] Mnesippus' comments about Toxaris' speech are a significant indicator for how we are meant to 'read' the text. As the inscribed 'reader' for Toxaris' *ekphrasis*, his response guides our own, as by a process of narcissistic identification, we are inclined to align our readerly response to his.[52] It is significant, therefore, that Lucian uses him to engage the reader's response at a cognitive level at the very start of the dialogue in this way, evoking a critical appreciation of Toxaris' rhetorical style, rather than a purely emotional response to the story told.[53] Mnesippus signifies an ideal reader who will maintain a degree of critical distance from the narratives, and apply criteria of plausibility and rhetorical style to what he reads.

There are obvious thematic parallels between the *ekphrasis* and the dialogue, which invite the reader to consider their interrelation and its implications more deeply. The theme of the painting - a story of friendship - becomes the theme of the dialogue, on two levels: at the most obvious level, of course, the stories recounted by both speakers are about friendship; more cunningly, however, the story-telling contest between Mnesippus and Toxaris, which is itself an attempt to outdo each other in *stories* of friendship, is analogous to Orestes' and Pylades' struggle to outdo each other in *deeds*, as represented in the paintings. The paintings, therefore, constitute a *mise en abyme* representation of the dialogue itself.[54] The emphasis in the *ekphrasis* on the κοινωνία of Orestes and Pylades, their unanimity, and their absolutely equal commitment to the ideals of friendship can therefore be read as a proleptic suggestion of Mnesippus' and Toxaris' eventual unanimity, and the fact that they ultimately cannot decide who is the superior in matters of friendship. With the Greek heroes, their vying to surpass one another becomes, paradoxically, the seal of their friendship. The connection between the paintings and the speakers is hinted at again towards the end of the dialogue, when Mnesippus illustrates the perfect union of their friendship by

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[50] For discussion of the *ekphrasis* as a tool for advertising rhetorical and writerly skills, see (for example) Bartsch 1989: 14

[51] The Scythian Toxaris, therefore, *dissembles*; his taciturn air is an ironic pose. It is interesting to read this in light of his fellow-Scythian Anacharsis' disavowal of irony, which he identifies as a culturally specific Greek trait (*Ana.* 18).

[52] Bartsch (1989: 38-9) discusses the 'lure of narcissistic identification' which entices the interpreter (i.e. reader) to align his response to that of the in-text interpreter.

[53] Cf. Bartsch (1989: 1-39), who discusses description as a 'device requiring hermeneutic activity' (35). See Hamon (1981: 11): 'It <i.e. description> is what stops, blocks and suspends the momentum of reading. But it also requests a "translation" as to its meaning, its function in the work; it calls upon and interrogates the reader whom it transforms into an interpreter...'.

[54] For a definition of this figure, see Chapter 1, p. 58.

referring to artistic depictions of the three-headed monster, Geryon, which he interprets as symbolic representations of unanimous friends, who are so close that they are practically the same body.[55] Mnesippus' reference to these paintings towards the close of the dialogue forms a neat chiasmus with Toxaris' *ekphrasis* towards the beginning; where Toxaris' *ekphrasis* foreshadows the contest between the two narrators (i.e. the dialogue itself), as well as the competitive element in many of the stories of friendship that follow, Mnesippus' interpretation of Geryon paintings reflects their own newly wrought solidarity, and looks back to similar metaphors in the stories, where friends are said to form the one body.[56]

The implications of this *mise en abyme* go deeper still, however. According to Toxaris, Scythian law prescribes that all children should commit the text of the epigraphical record of the exploits of Orestes and Pylades to memory, so that they might internalize from an early age the lessons of friendship it contains:[57]

καὶ ἅ γε μετ' ἀλλήλων ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων ἔπαθον ἀναγράψαντες οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν ἐπὶ στήλης χαλκῆς ἀνέθεσαν εἰς τὸ ᾽Ορέστειον, καὶ νόμον ἐποιήσαντο πρῶτον τοῦτο μάθημα καὶ παίδευμα τοῖς παισὶ τοῖς σφετέροις εἶναι τὴν στήλην ταύτην καὶ τὰ ἐπ' αὐτῆς γεγραμμένα διαμνημονεῦσαι.[58]

In a similar way, Mnesippus' and Toxaris' reflection on the painting of the Greek heroes, and on their own tales of similar noble feats in the name of friendship,

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[55] *Tox.* 62. Mnesippus' interpretation of paintings of Geryon recalls the poignant state of the primeval humans in Aristophanes' myth of Eros in Plato, *Symp.* 189d6 ff.; the context is also similar in each case (φιλία/ ἔρως). Interestingly, Aristophanes also refers to art in his *mythos*, to illustrate the result of Zeus' threat to chop the humans in half again, if they persist in their hybristic behaviour; in that event, he says, they would resemble the profile figures in relief-sculpture. The resonance with the Platonic Aristophanes might serve as a hint that the stories are fictitious, and also that the 'contest' in the *Tox.*, along with the dire penalties proposed by each speaker in the event of failure, are not to be taken *au pied de la lettre*; we are dealing with a contest of speech (λόγοι) similar to the one in Plato's *Symposium*. For the idea that a friend is a second self, see Aristotle, *EN* 1166 a31f., 1170 b6f., *MM* 1213 a10-26; Plutarch, *Mor.* 93e (cf. Blundell 1989: 40, with n. 65). This resonates with Socrates' exploration of the idea that one is a friend to one who *belongs by nature* to you (Plato, *Lysis* 221e-222a: τὸ μὲν δὴ φύσει οἰκεῖον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν πέφανται φιλεῖν), which recalls the Platonic Aristophanes' myth explaining love as the desire to be reunited with one's original organic other half. Goldhill (1995: 56 ff.) explores the appropriation of Aristophanes' *mythos* in depictions of love in the novels.

[56] The same idea is expressed by two of the friends in the star trio of Toxaris' third story, Arsacomas (46) and Macentes (53); Toxaris seems to be showing off the Scythians' knowledge of Greek literature and philosophy again. It is inviting to read Mnesippus' 'symbolic' interpretation of the Geryon paintings metatextually, as a hint to the reader of the *Tox.* to look beyond the surface meaning of the dialogue itself. As a hybrid monster, we might expect Geryon to carry some metapoetical signficance in a Lucianic dialogue: see Chapter 1, p. 66 ff.. The comparative brevity of the passage, however, as well as its belated position in the dialogue means that it does not carry the same programmatic importance as Toxaris' *ekphrasis*.

[57] Clearly, the text of the Orestes/Pylades inscription was felt by the Scythians to have a didactic function, to inculcate certain ethical principles in the youth – an idea which has Platonic resonance; see Janaway 1995: 80-105. Cf. n. 123.

leads them ultimately to internalize and enact their message, and become friends themselves.⁵⁹ Mnesippus' concluding statement, that their friendship is founded on λόγοι, emphasizes the parallel with the lesson in friendship which the Scythian children learn from ἡ στήλη αὕτη καὶ τὰ ἐπ' αὐτῆς γεγραμμένα. There is an analogy, therefore, between the function of the inscription, and that the λόγοι in the *Tox.*, and the explicitly *textual* nature of the former draws the reader's eye close to the textuality of the latter, and the dialogue itself.⁶⁰

Actually, the presence of the inscription in Toxaris' *ekphrasis* is curious; after all, what Toxaris is really interested in, and what he spends most time describing, are the paintings. Lucian could easily have omitted the reference to the inscription altogether, and the *ekphrasis* of the paintings would not be rendered any less effective. The fact that, despite its apparent dispensability, he devotes considerable attention to describing the textual nature of the inscription, and the paintings' relationship to it, suggests that we should consider its importance more carefully.

Toxaris places considerable emphasis, in his brief reference, on the *textuality* of the inscription: he refers to the original act of inscribing (ἀναγράψαντες), specifies the medium on which the text is written (ἐπὶ στήλης χαλκῆς), and then reiterates these ideas emphatically when referring to the law which requires the study of τὴν στήλην ταύτην καὶ τὰ ἐπ' αὐτῆς γεγραμμένα. He then refers to the paintings opposite the inscription, which represent the text visually in pictorial form (ὁπόσα ἡ στήλη δηλοῖ γραφαῖς ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰκασμένα δείκνυται).⁶¹ The situation that arises from this is quite complex; Toxaris 'narrativizes' the paintings, which themselves constitute a visual representation of a narrative text (the inscription). At the same time, Toxaris'

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⁵⁸ *Tox.* 6.
⁵⁹ This perhaps suggests that reading of fiction in antiquity *could* be seen as ethically edifying. For an exploration of ancient analogues for the *Bildungsroman*, see Morgan 1996.
⁶⁰ This raises the issue of how we are meant to read *Tox.*; at at least two readings seem to be implied here – an ethical reading, and a literary (or metaliterary) one; both readings are enacted by the speakers themselves, who ultimately internalise the stories' ethical lessons, but are also preoccupied throughout with the quality of the *logoi* themselves, and the style in which they are told. In her examination of the contrasting ways in which dialogue and drama deal with ethical questions, such as the issue of friendship, Blundell (1989: 7f.), argues that drama enacts the ethical issue, where dialogue merely enacts the discussion of the issues: '...the philosophical dialogue typically dramatises not the problem itself but its discussion in theoretical terms...a dialogue does not enact the problems it aims to solve.' Clearly, however, this is not true of Lucianic dialogues such as the *Philops.* and *Tox.*, which both 'dramatise' the ethical question under discussion (cf. Tychiades and Philocles' dialogue in *Philops.* is itself a demonstration of the seductive powers of fiction).
⁶¹ *Tox.* 6.

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narrativization of the painting constitutes *our* text, the text of Lucian's dialogue. Just as the visual text of the paintings is framed by Mnesippus' 'reading' of Toxaris' *ekphrasis*, so too the text of the *ekphrasis* is framed by *our* reading of the dialogue; from our point of view, Toxaris' description is a textual representation (i.e. an *ekphrasis* in the *Toxaris*) of a visual representation (i.e. the paintings) of a text (i.e. the inscription recording the heroes' exploits). By adding all these layers and emphasizing the textuality of each layer, and how each one corresponds to the other, Lucian seems to be playing a game with the textuality of his own characters and dialogue, drawing it tantalizingly close to the surface. But this is not just a game of gratuitous writerly sophistication. By drawing attention to the textual nature of the dialogue, Lucian prepares us for the fact that the paintings described by Toxaris, which correspond to the text of the inscription, correspond also to *our* text, in what we now call *mise en abyme*, as the painting described by Toxaris reflects or symbolizes the dialogue which contains it. [62]

The theme of the paintings is therefore reflected both in the themes and patterns of the stories, and in the story-telling act itself, which constitutes most of the dialogue. The fact that Toxaris and Mnesippus pay such attention to the description of the painting perhaps foreshadows the fact that their own friendship will be founded not on proven acts of friendship, but on powerful verbal descriptions of it. This is especially ironic in the character of Toxaris, and suggests that his 'Scythian-ness' is a sophisticated pose, wherein he plays up to the Greek (literary) idea of what Scythians are like. One is left with an impression of a world pervaded by a literary atmosphere, a world in which *stories* are the principle thing. In the following section, I will demonstrate how the authors in the text - Mnesippus and Toxaris - who show themselves to be aware of the limits of narrative credibility, consciously make fiction and 'real life' overlap in their stories.[63] Their self-conscious playing with the fictionality of their narratives reflects Lucian's game with the ontological status of his own text, which he problematizes somewhat in the *mise en abyme*: on more than one level, what the *Toxaris* is really 'about' is story-telling, and the nature of fiction.

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[62] The fact that the paintings refer to another text is perhaps also a clue that the *Tox.* (which the paintings symbolize) is referential to other texts itself: see the section on 'novelistic motifs' below.

[63] It is interesting also, from a metaliterary perspective, that Toxaris emerges as the more fanciful or novelistic narrator; his more distinctly novelistic narrative technique may reflect the fact that Scythia, the land he represents in the dialogue, was a setting for the action in some of the Greek novels - possibly reflecting the idea that remote Scythia is εὐκαταψευστέρα than Greece; cf. Sidwell's interpretation of Mnesippus' final remark about going to Scythia (Sidwell *forthcoming, ad loc.*); cf. p. 145 and p. 152 f. below, esp. n. 137. On Scythia as a novelistic location, see Stephens & Winkler 1995: 267-276 (on the *Calligone* fragment), and more generally Dumézil 1978.

## EMBEDDED FICTION: THE STORIES OF THE *TOXARIS*

When he proposes the contest of friendship with Mnesippus, Toxaris stipulates that their respective stories should *not* rehearse the well-known tales of the παλαιοὶ φίλοι of the Greek poetical tradition, such as Achilles and Patroclus or Theseus and Pirithous; instead they should produce narratives that pertain to contemporary characters and their exploits:

εἰ δ᾽ οὖν δοκεῖ, οὕτω νῦν ποιῶμεν. τοὺς μὲν παλαιοὺς φίλους ἀτρεμεῖν ἐάσωμεν, εἴ τινας ἢ ἡμεῖς ἢ ὑμεῖς τῶν πάλαι καταριθμεῖν ἔχομεν, ἐπεὶ κατά γε τοῦτο πλεονεκτοῖτε ἄν, πολλοὺς καὶ ἀξιοπίστους μάρτυρας τοὺς ποιητὰς παρεχόμενοι τὴν Ἀχιλλέως καὶ Πατρόκλου φιλίαν καὶ τὴν Θησέως καὶ Πειρίθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑταιρείαν ἐν καλλίστοις ἔπεσι καὶ μέτροις ῥαψῳδοῦντας· ὀλίγους δέ τινας προχειρισάμενοι τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν διηγησάμενοι, ἐγὼ μὲν τὰ Σκυθικά, σὺ δὲ τὰ Ἑλληνικά, [καὶ] ὁπότερος ἂν ἐν τούτοις κρατῇ καὶ ἀμείνους παράσχηται τοὺς φίλους, αὐτός τε νενικηκὼς ἔσται καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀνακηρύξει, κάλλιστον ἀγῶνα καὶ σεμνότατον ἀγωνισάμενος.[64]

If, then, it seems like a good idea, let's do it this way now. Let's leave undisturbed the friends of old - if either we or you have any that we can list from ancient times - since in this respect, you would have the greater advantage, producing many trustworthy witnesses, the poets, who sing of the friendship of Achilles and Patroclus, Theseus and Pirithous, and the camaraderie of others too in the finest verses and rhythms. Instead, let us handpick a few of those who belong to our own times, and when we have told the story of their deeds - I the Scythian ones, you the Greek - then whichever of us is superior in these and produces the better friends, he will be the victor and he will proclaim his own country victor too, having taken part in a most noble and solemn contest.[65]

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[64] *Tox.* 10. For Orestes and Pylades as one of the 'canonical' pairs of friends, see Plutarch, *Mor.* 93e; Cicero, *De Finibus* 1.65 (cf. n. 38 and n. 40 above). Achilles and Patroclus serve as the mythical paradigm for the friendship of Chaireas and Polycharmus in Chariton's novel also (1.5).

[65] On the poets' license with the truth, see *Philops.* 2 ff. (cf. Chapter 1, p. 20 ff.) and cf. Morgan 1993: 178. This thinking is also evident in the passage cited from Cicero on p. 85 above. The speakers' insistence on stories pertaining to *recent* events reflects the ancient suspicion about the veracity of narratives about the distant past, because it is impossible to be accurate about the details of such narratives; clearly, therefore, this was an important consideration for ancient historiographers: see Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 9, with discussion in Wiseman 1993: 141 ff.; Hartog (1988: 265 f.) shows that this is related to the privileged authority of autopsy. It is interesting that Plutarch (if indeed he is the author) prefaced his *syncrisis* of stories from Greek and Roman history in a similar manner (*Mor.* 305 a-b): τὰς ἀρχαίας ἱστορίας διὰ τὰ παράδοξα τῆς πράξεως οἱ πλεῖστοι νομίζουσι πλάσματα καὶ μύθους τυγχάνειν· εὑρὼν δ᾽ἐγὼ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νῦν χρόνοις γεγονότα ὅμοια, τὰ ἐν τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς καιροῖς συμβεβηκότα ἐξελεξάμην, καὶ ἑκάστῳ πράγματι ἀρχαίῳ νεωτέραν ὁμοίαν διήγησιν ὑπέταξα, ἀναγράψας καὶ τοὺς ἱστορήσαντας ἄνδρας.

Toxaris has just been speaking about the Greeks' flair for representing friendship on the stage in their tragic plays, but their failure to live up to this artistic ideal in real life, in contrast to the Scythians, whose comparatively poor powers of speech leave them far behind the Greeks when *talking* about the topic of friendship, but who nonetheless surpass them in putting these ideals into practice.[66] It is surprising, then, in the wake of such a speech, that this Scythian should propose settling the dispute over the superiority of Greek or Scythian friends by a contest of λόγοι; the implication is, of course, that Toxaris' claims about Scythian lack of eloquence are to be understood as ironic. Toxaris may well have his tongue in his cheek here also when he describes the Greek poets as 'trustworthy' witnesses,[67] but his stipulations about the terms of the competition reflect his (at least ostensible) concern that his Greek rival will be able to trump him with examples of friendship drawn from a rich literary tradition; the story of Achilles' and Patroclus' friendship belongs, of course, to the epic tradition, and Theseus and Pirithous' companionable exploits were a favourite topic for tragedy as well.[68]

However, on a close reading of this passage, it is also possible to discern Lucian's sly tones cutting across the words of Toxaris, one of the inscribed authors, to provide the external reader with a clue about the generic proprieties of the stories that follow. When Toxaris asks that they leave the ancient friendships of the Greek literary tradition aside, he suggests that their stories be about the exploits and adventures of ordinary, contemporary people. Clearly also, their stories are to be narrative accounts (διηγησάμενοι), not poetry. Subtle clues maybe, but could they cumulatively point to the characteristics of *novelistic* narrative, which deals in narrative prose, not with the mythical heroes of old, but with non-legendary (albeit extraordinary) individuals in a society which, if not exactly contemporary, is at least non-heroic in its presentation?[69] Furthermore,

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[66] *Tox.* 9: ὅσῳ γὰρ δὴ λειπόμεθα ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλίας λόγοις, τοσοῦτοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς πλεονεκτοῦμεν. The *locus classicus* for this 'rhetorical disavowal of rhetoric' is Plato, *Apol.* 17 a-b (Whitmarsh 2001: 263-4); cf. p. 122 ff..

[67] See also Sidwell *forthcoming*, note *ad loc.*.

[68] Theseus features in Euripides' *Hercules Furens, Theseus, Aegeus*, and perhaps also the *Alope*; he also features in the Euripidean satyr play, *Skiron*. Achilles features as a character in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis, Skyrioi, Telephus*, and also in Sophocles' *Lovers of Achilles* and *Those who dine together* (probably both satyr-plays: see Michelakis 2002: 172 ff.). Aeschylus' *Myrmidons* concerns the friendship of Achilles and Patroclus. On Achilles in Greek tragedy in general, see Michelakis 2002; the author treats the *Myrmidons* on pp. 22-57. On violations of *philia* in Greek tragedy, see Belfiore 2000; cf. n. 41. For the fragments of Euripides' plays, see vol. VIII of the Budé edition.

[69] In general, the novelists consciously strive to imbue the societies they depict with an air of historical realism: see Morgan 1982 (on Heliodorus' novel) and 1993: 182 (novels as profoundly *un*Aristotelian texts) and 202 ff.; Hunter 1994 and Hägg 1999 (on Chariton's novel, primarily).

the titles which Toxaris uses to designate their respective tales ('Scythian tales' - τὰ Σκυθικά; and 'Greek tales' - τὰ Ἑλληνικά) resonate with the conventional titles given to some of the Greek novels, such as Xenophon's *Ephesiaka* (*Ephesian Tales*), Iamblichus' *Babyloniaka* (*Babylonian Tales*), Iolaus' *Phoinikika* (*Phoenician Tales*), and Heliodorus' *Aethiopika* (*Ethiopian Tales*).[70] In this passage, therefore, the inscribed author, by means of ironic self-effacement, advertises his own knowledge of the Greek literary tradition, and at the same time the concealed author, Lucian, subtly advertises the novelistic affinities of the narratives embedded in his dialogue.

Perry was the first to recognise the general relationship between the subject-matter of the stories in the *Tox.* and the Greek romance novels.[71] More recently, Pervo surveys and explores Lucian's deployment of novelistic motifs in these *novelle*. His article is a useful *entrée* to the subject, but his approach is not without its problems. Most seriously, the conclusion which Pervo draws from his survey - that Lucian transposes these novelistic motifs into a ludicrous context in the *Tox.*, and therefore means to parody the novels - is questionable. First of all, the interpretation of the contexts in the *novelle* as 'ludicrous' needs qualification. Certainly, some of the circumstances in these stories might be viewed as extreme - but they are hardly more 'ludicrous' than analogous situations in the novels. In fact, when one considers novels like Iamblichus' *Babyloniaka*, with its lurid adventures involving killer-bees (armed with diarrhoea-inducing honey), cannibalism, ghosts and a heroine who is alarmingly disposed towards violence and murder,[72] *Leucippe and Clitophon* with its mock-disembowelment and mock-decapitation of the heroine,[73] the multiple improbabilities in the plot of

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There is little concern for historical realism in Longus' pastoral fantasy, but the author does occasionally allow the more realistic aspects of rural existence to intrude into his pastoral fantasy, tingeing it here and there with realism of a different kind, e.g. 1.23 (flies); 3.25 ff. (mercenary peasants).

[70] All of these works, with the exception of Heliodorus' novel, either pre-date, or are contemporary with Lucian's *floruit*. As Holzberg notes (1995: 10), further titles following this pattern are documented for non-extant novels; Holzberg links this sort of title to the genre of historiography.

[71] Cf. n. 8.

[72] Killer bees and laxative honey: *Bab.* 3-4; appearance of ghosts of victims who were cannibalized by a robber: *Bab.* 5-6; King Garmus dancing in drunken glee around the cross that is destined for the hero's crucifixion: *Bab.* 21; for Sinonis' vindictive and murderous temper, compare the violent tendencies of the heroine in the *Calligone* fragment (see Stephens & Winkler 1995: 267).

[73] *L&C* 3.15 and 5.7. These scenes have been interpreted in varying ways, for example as 'kitsch' (Reardon 1994, esp. 264ff.); as a reflection of the heroine's lack of autonomy from the male protagonist, and possibly pornographic (Elsom 1992: 216 ff.); appealing to the reader as *voyeur* (Anderson 1982: 24-5 and Konstan 1994: 60-64); or as a game with the reader's expectations, reminding him of 'the continual play of deception and discovery' (Bartsch 1989: 129).

Xenophon's *Ephesiaka*,[74] the necromancy in Heliodorus' *Aethiopika*,[75] or even the serial swooning at the end of *Chaereas and Callirhoe*[76] - the stories of the *Toxaris* are, on the whole, comparatively restrained, or at least no *more* sensational than the novels. Although in some cases it is hard to resist the idea that Lucian's is being somewhat facetious, I believe it is the *extremeness* of these stories that is emphasized. The point of these extreme, sometimes highly improbable, circumstances is not to render the stories ridiculous, but to highlight the quality of the friendship, which stands up even under conditions of extraordinary duress.

To claim that an author engages in *parody* is to say something about authorial intention; it is important, therefore, to justify such claims, ideally with explicit evidence from what the author himself writes, but otherwise with implicit evidence, judging from the overall tone and self-consciousness of the text as a whole.[77] In the context of the *Tox.*, evidence might be sought, for example, in an exploration of how such parody might be related to the broader context and

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[74] For example, in *Eph.* 4. 2 a freak wind, sent by the sun-god in answer to the hero's prayer, blows Habrocomes off his cross and into a river. Habrocomes is quickly recaptured and a second execution is arranged, but he prays again, and once again he is rescued miraculously, this time by the intervention of the Nile, which floods and extinguishes the flames that threaten to consume him. This sort of miraculous divine intervention in Xenophon contrasts with the more carefully constructed causation in analogous scenes in other authors' works, such as Charicleia's execution (*Eth.* 8. 9, where the properties of a special gemstone on her person render her invulnerable to fire. (The causation in the latter case is perhaps not inherently any more plausible, but it *is* better integrated with the plot.) Other improbabilities in Xenophon's plot include *Eph.* 4. 3, where Hippothous captures Anthia for a second time - the first capture was reported at 2. 11- but neither one recognises the other. At *Eph.* 5. 10, an apparently random confluence of events - both Hippothous and Habrocomes decide, independently of each other, to break their voyage to Ephesus at Rhodes - brings about the hero's reunion with Anthia. One theory that used to be evoked to account for such apparent carelessness is the so-called 'epitome theory', based on the discrepancy between the information in the *Suda*, which says that the *Ephesiaca* comprised ten books, and the mere five books represented in the manuscript tradition. As Kytzler notes, there is no definite proof to support this theory (nor indeed to refute it unequivocally), but the idea has now, on the whole, been abandoned. On the epitome theory for Xenophon's text, see Anderson's introduction to his translation of the novel in Reardon 1989: 125-8 and Kytzler 1996: 348-350. For a sensitive re-evaluation of the artistic merit of Xenophon's work, see Konstan 1994 and also Kytzler 1996, esp. pp. 350-1.

[75] *Aeth.* 6. 14-15.

[76] *C&C* 8.1.

[77] See Genette 1982: 26. Avery (1997: 8) defines parody as 'the imitation of a literary work in a manner of ridicule. The element of ridicule in parody often implies criticism of the target of parody.' Genette (1982: 30 ff.) distinguishes between parody and pastiche on the basis of their relationship to the hypotext; where pastiche merely *imitates* the hypotext, parody seeks to *transform* it; cf. Goldhill 1991: 208. In his discussion of the *Tox.*, Jones (1986: 56-8) declares himself unable to detect a parodic tone in the work: 'The *Toxaris* remains an oddity among Lucian's works. It might be regarded as parody or pastiche in the manner of the *True Histories*, but the tone does not favor this easy solution. It is better to accept the oddity, and to admit that Lucian is sometimes untypical and experimental.' (57-8); compare Whitmarsh (2001: 249): '...Lucian's writing, just like his literary persona, is avowedly anti-generic and parasitical.' Rejano also denies the presence of an ironic tone in the dialogue (2000: 231): 'Luciano parece haber dejado por un momento la crítica irónica para dedicarse a una alabanza sincera de la amistad como sentimiento noble...todo el diálogo adquiere una cierta aureola de hagiografía multiple y pagana.'

concerns of the dialogue, or what the overall effect of this novel-parody might be. Pervo, however, offers no satisfactory justification for his claim that Lucian parodies novelistic *topoi* in this work, nor can I see that such evidence exists; this is a serious obstacle to his thesis.

Many of Toxaris' and Mnesippus' stories evoke the atmosphere of the novels, not only by incorporating motifs and plots that are familiar from the novels, but sometimes by adopting novelistic narrative techniques as well. Dealing with Mnesippus' stories first, Pervo notes that there is an affinity between Charicleia, the conniving minx of the first story, and the 'typical' scarlet women of the novels, who were rivals of the heroine, for example the type represented by characters like Melite in Achilles Tatius, or perhaps Lycaenion in *Daphnis and Chloe* etc..[78] We get into difficulties immediately here, because of course, the question arises of just how 'typical' these particular anti-heroines are; certainly, Melite and Lycaenion are far from being the unsympathetic, one-dimensional character that Lucian's Charicleia represents. [79] Charicleia herself can hardly be said to represent a character at all; she is little more than a type, a ruinous trap for the main character, Deinias. Of course, this difference is attributable at least in part to the vast difference in scale between Lucian's *novella* and the novels, but if we are going to compare Charicleia to female characters in the novels, it is more appropriate to choose female antagonists who *are* more 'typical', or more minor representatives of the type, e.g. Demainete, Knemon's evil step-mother in Heliodorus' *Aethiopika*, who is herself presented as a version of the Euripidean Phaedra, or the lustful Persian queen, Arsake, who has designs on the hero Theagenes later in the same novel.[80]

Pervo alludes to Demainete when he compares the seduction techniques which Charicleia brings to bear on the hapless Deinias (*Tox.* 15), and similar ploys by Demainete in *Aethiopika* 1.9. There is more to compare here than just similar content; like Mnesippus' tale, the narrative in Heliodorus is an embedded story too; Knemon tells Theagenes and Charicleia how his evil step-mother, Demainete, first seduced his father, Aristippus. Like Deinias, Aristippus is also described as a fairly wealthy man, and Demainete, like Charicleia, is described as 'pretty enough.' Pervo rightly observes that many of her seduction tricks are identical to those used

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[78] For parallelism between the roles of Melite and Lycaenion, see Morgan 1996b: 181. Charicleia is introduced in *Tox.* 13; her name, meaning something like 'gracious reputation' is clearly meant to be ironic, given her meretricious conduct in the *Tox.*.

[79] For Melite as an unconventional female rival to the heroine, see Reardon 1994: 87. Reardon contrasts Melite favourably with 'the black-and-white caricatures' Manto and Cyno, of Xenophon's novel.

[80] *Aeth.* Books 7 and 8. For further discussion of Knemon's narrative, see n. 85 below.

by Lucian's Charicleia, e.g. sighing when Aristippus leaves, running joyfully to meet him on his return, complaining that she would die when his return was delayed, clever use of kisses and tears. Both narrators also use a hunting-metaphor to describe the seduction; these women 'ensnare' their unsuspecting victims with their charms. However, it is clearly problematic to say that Lucian's description of Charicleia's seduction is novelistic, on the basis of this comparison with Heliodorus. For one thing, Heliodorus post-dates Lucian, probably by at least a century.[81] For another, such descriptions of female seduction techniques are not inherently novelistic; they are borrowed from the genre of New Comedy especially.[82]

Pervo also refers to a parallel between *Tox.* 15 and *Leucippe & Clitophon* (*L&C*) 5.23, where Melite's husband, Thersandros, presumed by everyone to be dead, suddenly returns home to find his wife dining with another man, the protagonist, Clitophon. I confess I do not see any parallel between this passage and *Tox.* 15; however, it is interesting as a comparand for an episode later in Mnesippus' story (*Tox.* 17), where Deinias is caught *in flagrante delicto* by Charicleia's husband, Demonax. It should be noted, however, that the tone and gravity of these passages is very different.[83] The scene in *L&C* is comical, in a way that is characteristic of Achilles' detached and ironic style, and it has a happy ending; in *Tox.* 17, in contrast, the cuckolded man's threat of violence has disastrous consequences, spurring Deinias into a murderous frenzy, in which he kills both husband and wife, unleashing almost psychopathic rage in his repeated blows to Charicleia's body. One is reminded of the scene in Chariton's novel, where Chaireas suspects his wife, Callirhoe, of unfaithful conduct, and kicks her - apparently killing her - only to discover, to his mortification, that his suspicions were unjustified.[84] In Mnesippus' story, however, there is no happy ending for any of the parties involved; Deinias and Agathocles go into lifelong exile, where Deinias soon dies after an illness, and Agathocles, bereft of his one source of (questionable) joy, lives out the rest of his lonely existence as a manual labourer in self-imposed exile.

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[81] On Heliodorus' date, see Morgan 1996c: 417-421.

[82] Sidwell, *forthcoming ad.loc.*; cf. Maehler 1990.

[83] It is tempting to read *L&C* 5.23 as a tongue-in-cheek *reprise* of the quasi-miraculous return of loved ones who were presumed dead in the Greek novels, e.g. the courtroom scene in *C&C* 5.8.

[84] *C&C* 1. 3-4; Hunter (1994: 1081, n. 128) also makes this comparison. In his chapter on 'Other Peoples, Other Places', Bowersock (1994: 29-53), explores the very different treatment of the Hellenic standard in these two works, but concedes nevertheless that 'the stories told by the two speakers [in the *Tox.*] reflect the literary tastes of which Chariton is a prime example.' (1994: 45).

Pervo, justifiably, questions the reciprocity of Deinias' friendship, and finds that Agathocles' loyalty is excessive; however, I do not agree with him that Lucian therefore means Agathocles' self-sacrifice is to be a parody of the *topos* that friends should share one another's suffering - χρὴ τοῖς φίλοις ἁπάσης τύχης κοινωνεῖν.[85] Even if Agathocles' altruism in the story is felt to be extreme - as I think it is, and I suspect ancient readers would have thought so too - this is not grounds for interpreting Lucian's treatment here as parodic. Surely the point is that his sacrifice *should* be regarded as extreme. After all, Mnesippus wants to present examples of Greek friends who make the ultimate sacrifice, even if (especially if) that is detrimental to their own interests.[86]

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[85] *Tox.* 5 and cf. *Tox.* 36. On the issue of reciprocity, see the following note. For a similar expression in Greek tragedy (which Toxaris points to as the showcase for Greek ideals of friendship), see Euripides, *Phoenissai* 243 (in a choral ode): κοινὰ γὰρ φίλων ἄχη. The idea also occurs in epic, e.g. *Iliad* 9.615 (Achilles to Phoenix): καλόν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὸν κήδειν ὅς κ᾽ ἐμὲ κήδῃ; cf. Socrates' words in Plato, *Lysis* 207c: κοινὰ τά γε φίλων λέγεται. Pervo raises the possibility that Agathocles' 'excessive' devotion to his friend might be indicative of 'unrequited homosexual passion,' and describes Mnesippus' story as 'a sad little melodrama, with sentimental colouring, suitable for a sub-plot in a novel' (167). Several of our extant novels feature what may, for convenience sake, be called 'sub-plots' about tragic same-sex love stories in the novels: see *L&C* 1.12ff. (Kleinias & Charikles); *L&C* 2.34; Xenophon, *Eph.* 3.2 (Hippothous tells Hab. story of his love for Hyperanthes); Iamblichus, *Bab.* 17 (according to Photius' summary, Iamblichus includes a digressive account detailing the 'unlawful' love affairs of the Egyptian princess Berenice, including her affair with a woman called Mesopotamia).

Although this is not the place for full exposition of the matter, I have qualms about the loose manner in which the term 'sub-plot' is sometimes used to denote any narrative element in the novel that is tangential or incidental to the main plot. It is surely desirable to distinguish between a 'sub-plot' on the one hand, and an embedded narrative on the other, as the two narrative forms engage the reader in quite different ways. The term *sub-plot* suggests a continuous and unfolding narrative, the progress of which is either partially or wholly co-extensive with the progress of the main plot: in formal terns, it is a *dynamic* narrative, from the point of view of the external reader. An *embedded narrative*, on the other hand, is formally static, denoting a story told by one of the characters in the main plot, which is usually *analeptic* (i.e. pertaining to a time that is anterior to the temporal reach of the main plot) or *paraleptic* (i.e. providing information that is surplus to the requirements of the main plot). The best example of a sub-plot in this sense is the story of Calligone and Callisthenes in *Leucippe and Clitophon*, which is only resolved at the end of the novel, and provides a thematic counterpoint to the main plot, as Morgan has shown (1996b: 186); see also Hägg 1971: 75, n. 2. Heliodorus presents us with arguably the most richly complex plot of all; however, a story such as Knemon's tale (*Aeth.* 1. 9ff.) is perhaps better viewed as an analeptic embedded narrative, although a case may be made for designating it a sub-plot, given that the resolution of Knemon's story is part of the fabric of the main plot: *Aeth.*2.5 (Knemon discovers Thisbe's corpse in the cave). On Knemon's tale, see Morgan 1989.

[86] On the topic of Greek friendship in general, see Konstan 1996, esp. 118-120 (where he discusses the *Tox.*) and 1996a. On the ancient idea that friendship should be based on reciprocity, see Plato, *Lys.* 212 a ff.; Aristotle, *EN* 1155 b 27 - 1156 a5, and *Rhet.* 1381 a1f.: φίλος δ᾽ἐστὶν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ φιλούμενος; for modern discussion, see Gill 1998. Konstan (1998: 289-290) notes that friendship in classical texts tends to be represented as a relationship between equals, whereas later discussions tend to focus on friendship between people of different social status; this does seem to ring true for the depiction of friendship in Mnesippus' stories at least, which leads Rejano (2000) to argue that Lucian's treatment of friendship in the *Tox* should be read as a wistful idealization, reflecting the fact that imperial culture was favourable to more institutionalized relations based on inequality, such as patronage, than true reciprocal friendship of this sort.

Paying attention to Toxaris' response to the story, as the inscribed 'reader', is a good way of gauging the effect Lucian intends. When Mnesippus completes his narrative, Toxaris says:

καὶ εἴθε γε, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ἀνώμοτος ὢν ταῦτα ἔλεγες, ἵνα καὶ ἀπιστεῖν ἂν ἐδυνάμην αὐτοῖς· οὕτω Σκυθικόν τινα φίλον τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα τοῦτον διηγήσω. πλὴν οὐ δέδια μή τινα καὶ ἄλλον ὅμοιον εἴπῃς αὐτῷ.[87]

I wish, Mnesippus, that you had not been under oath when you were telling me these things, so that I could disbelieve them - for this Agathocles whose story you told is such a Scythian type of friend. Apart from him, I'm not afraid that you'll talk about another one like him.

By wishing he could legitimately disbelieve his story, Toxaris accomplishes two things at once; first, he acknowledges Agathocles' outstanding display of friendship (but cleverly, in such a way as to appropriate this excellence in support of his own cause - Agathocles is a very 'Scythian' type of friend). Second, he manages, tactfully, to inject a note of doubt in our minds about the veracity of Mnesippus' tale. Identification with the inscribed reader, Toxaris, here means that the external reader is made to suspect the truth-status of the story, while at the same time he agrees to accept the sincerity of the inscribed author, Mnesippus', oath to tell the truth. The implication is not only that the stories are made up, but delivered as if they are true, but also that the reader is aware of this, and prepared to go along with the game of make-believe; what we have here essentially, in the dialogue between Mnesippus and Toxaris, is an enactment of the contractual basis of fiction.

About Mnesippus' relatively short second and third narratives, Pervo has surprisingly little to say. The selfless courage displayed by Euthydicus, by leaping overboard into storm-tossed waters to rescue his ailing friend Damis, is yet another variation (and again, an extreme example) on the theme of κοινωνία

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It is commonly assumed that the attribution of high moral value to altruism was a sign of Christian influence, but as Blundell shows, the idea existed in Greek moral thinking, independent of the Christian context (see Blundell 1989: 35f., with references). See also Democritus' remark, that the true giver of *charis* does not think of the return (DK 68 B 96), a sentiment which is echoed by Pericles at Thuc. 2.40.4f. (on altruism as part of the political ideology of Periclean Athens, see Herman 1998), and in Demosthenes 18.269. Blundell speculates that this 'may be one of the points on which a moralising ideal diverges furthest from ordinary practice', and points out that such selfless concern for a friend may be thought to benefit oneself in the long term. Nevertheless, there are examples of altruistic behaviour towards φίλοι in literature, e.g. Achilles (*Iliad* 18.98-106) and Adrastus (Herodotus 1.41f.). For the idea that a true friend, like a parent, consults the long-term interests of his friend, whereas the flatterer merely seeks to gratify in the short term, see Plato, *Phaedrus* 233 b-c and *Lysis* 207 eff.; Aristotle, *EN* 1173 b31- 1174 a1; see also Plutarch, *Mor.* 48e (with Russell 1973: 94-96); additional references in Blundell 1989: 36.

[87] *Tox.* 18.

among friends, which will be mirrored later in the more grisly self-sacrifice of Belitta in Toxaris' second story.[88] This story, however, is also redolent of the world of the Greek romance. With regard to the sea-storm that dominates Mnesippus' story, it is worth noting that the perils of marine travel, including pirates, storms and shipwrecks, are regular *topoi* in the novels.[89] In fact, a close parallel for Mnesippus' story may be found in an embedded narrative in Xenophon's *Ephesiaka*, where Hippothous relates the tragic tale of his love for Hyperanthes.[90] This story also involves a sea-storm, and a shipwreck, and like Euthydicus, Hippothous tries desperately to keep Hyperanthes afloat in the water; however, unlike Mnesippus' tale, Hippothous' story ends tragically, as Hyperanthes drowns. Although he does not note these links with the novel, Pervo still detects parody of the typical novelistic hero in this short tale: 'Lucian may be sneering here at the "new kind of hero" found in romantic novels, the individual who prefers death to separation from one's friend.'[91] I confess that I find the reasoning behind this conclusion opaque; presumably, Pervo is once again interpreting the extremeness of the circumstances in the story as ludicrous, a connection which, as I have already explained, is unwarranted.

Mnesippus' third story concerns a trio of friends; again, Toxaris will mirror this structure in his third narrative.[92] This time, Eudamidas' rather unusual will, and the financial burdens he bequeaths on his two friends, Aretaeus and Charixenus, is the central feature of the story. While the legal and financial intricacies of wills and legacies are not an obvious novelistic *topos*, they do crop up

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[88] *Tox.* 43; see p. 106 ff. below.

[89] See, for example, Achilles Tatius, *L&C* 3.1-4, and also the elaborate description of a sea-storm which separates the couple in Column II of the Herpyllis fragment of Antonius Diogenes (Stephens & Winkler 1995: 164 ff.). Lucian himself is conscious of the stereotype nature of such stories: see *Merc.co.* 1; he includes his own description of a sea-storm at *Nav.* 7 ff. and *VH* 1. 5-6. Pervo (1997: 13) cites sea-voyages as a *topos* of the 'popular' tradition.

[90] *Eph.* 3.2. Morgan (1996b: 175) interprets the tableau of Hippothous' desperate and ill-fated efforts to keep the helpless Hyperanthes afloat as 'an icon of the disparity of their roles.' This asymmetry is integral to their homosexual relationship, with its polarised roles of active and submissive partners, representing a different erotic paradigm to the relationship between the main pair of lovers, Habrocomes and Anthia, which is characterised by a comparatively higher degree of equality or parity between the partners (e.g. Anthia is able to defend herself against potential rapists (*Eph.* 4.5), unlike the more helpless Hyperanthes, who must rely on Hippothous' intervention when confronted with similar circumstances). Read against this background, it is possible to interpret Mnesippus' happy ending (both friends survive and subsequently live happily together in Athens) as a reflection of the parity of roles between φίλοι. On the subject of the new paradigm of equality represented by the lovers in the Greek romances, see Konstan 1994 (with a review by J.R. Morgan, *C.R.* 45 (1995): 270-272). Goldhill (1995, esp. 132-161) explores this new symmetry against the philosophical background which was dominated by the homosexual and asymmetrical erotic paradigm; his study is particularly interesting here, given Mnesippus' assertion that the two friends end up *studying philosophy together*.

[91] Pervo 1997: 168-9.

[92] *Tox.* 44-55; see p. 108 ff..

in the novels occasionally.[93] Pervo, however, reads Lucian's story as a 'romanticization of social convention,' and continues: 'It witnesses to a new romantic view of life, the kind of view Lucian seems elsewhere to scorn.'[94] However, it is hardly sound methodology to make claims about shifts in social attitudes like this, on the basis of the subjective interpretation of one short narrative. Pervo does not cite evidence for his claim that Lucian elsewhere 'scorns' such a romantic view, unless by this he means the 'sneering' tone which he detects in the stories of the *Tox.*, in which case, we must ascribe a degree of inconsistency to the author in the dialogue. My own view is that the legalistic and financial demonstration of friendship in this story is integral to the ethnic identity of the *Greek* narrator, as distinct from his Scythian counterpart. Mnesippus has undertaken to narrate τὰ Ἑλληνικά,[95] and courtrooms, money, and legal documents are all integral to life in the Greek *polis*. As a corollary to this, it is noteworthy that these institutions are almost entirely absent from Toxaris' Scythian tales.[96]

Pervo makes an interesting point when he identifies the mocking crowd with their scornful attitude to the friends' action (*Tox.* 22), as a 'foil' to the 'proper' reaction. In other words, what Mnesippus has done here is to inscribe an audience into his narrative, whose reaction to the central characters as 'readers in the text' governs our own *by antithesis*: these mocking individuals are therefore 'anti-readers'.[97] This is a feature of subtle novelistic narrative technique, as Morgan has demonstrated with regard to Heliodorus;[98] in terms of subject-matter, however, this appears to be Mnesippus' least conspicuously 'novelistic' tale.[99]

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[93] Although the context is very different, wills and legacy-hunters are an important feature of Petronius' *Satyrica*. Chariton includes a considerable amount of realistic legal detail about the sale-transaction between Theron and Leonas in *C&C* 1.14, where Leonas purchases Callirhoe for Dionysius. This is perhaps to be expected from an author who informs us in the opening sentence of his work that he was a secretary working for the attorney Athenagoras. (On the importance of Chariton's *sphragis* as a *Beglaubigungstrategie* - and also, paradoxically, an *Fiktionalitätsignal* - see Rosenmeyer 2001: 137-8. (Incidentally, Iamblichus also inscribed himself into his novel (*Bab.* 10; Photius, *Bib.* 75b); it would be most interesting to study the nature of this ostensibly autobiographical information, and how it affects the fictionality of his work – especially given the possible associations between *magic* and *fiction*: see Chapter 1, p. 59 ff.). Pervo (169) points to an interesting analogy for Mnesippus' story in the Gospel of John (19: 25-27).

[94] Pervo 1997: 169.

[95] *Tox.* 10.

[96] The one exception to this is Toxaris' fourth narrative, where a specific monetary denomination is mentioned, and reference is also made to the theatre and the possibility of recourse to legal action against thieves; it is significant, however, that this is the only one of Toxaris' stories to be set in a Greek city: see ní Mheallaigh, *forthcoming*.

[97] I owe the terminology here to Morgan: see following note.

[98] Morgan 1991: 102.

[99] This is in sharp contrast with Toxaris' highly novelistic third narrative; see p. 108 ff..

More can be said about Mnesippus' fourth and fifth stories. Pervo reads the fourth narrative, the tale of Zenothemis and Menecrates (*Tox.* 24-26), as a 'nearly perfect foil' to the Greek idealistic romances. The woman in the story, Cydimache, is hideously ugly; one half of her body is palsied, and she is missing one eye; she is, in short, an unapproachable monster (ἀπρόσιτον μορμολυκεῖον). This unfortunate woman suffers from epilepsy as well;[100] in short, she could hardly differ more from the dazzlingly beautiful heroines of the novels, like Callirhoe, Anthia and Charicleia.[101] The 'romance' between Zenothemis and Cydimache is also presented in a manner that seems to be antithetical to the novelistic romances. As Pervo observes, the are no *coups de foudre* here; Zenothemis marries this repulsively ugly girl essentially as a favour to his friend, her father, and even then, we are far removed from the splendour of the novelistic weddings.[102] For a start, contrary to the usual practice, the wedding feast takes place at the groom's house. Zenothemis announces his nuptial intentions *inter pocula*, and Menecrates' fatherly response, in his daughter's presence, is to beg him *not* to bind himself - a young, handsome man - to such an ugly, misshapen girl. Undeterred, Zenothemis carries the girl off to his bedroom, consummates the marriage there and then with businesslike efficiency, and then rejoins the party once again.[103] Quite unlike the lovers of the novels, Cydimache and Zenothemis are never separated; Zenothemis, we are told, brings his wife everywhere with him.[104] Pervo's parody-theory would appear initially to find more fertile ground here – but the point of this parody is surely not to comment on the depiction of male friendship in the novels, but to show that Greek friends are even more altruistic than their novelistic counterparts. After all, the story about Zenothemis' ugly wife contains a pointed message for Toxaris, given the Scythians' predilection

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[100] *Tox.* 24: ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ καταπίπτειν πρὸς τὴν σελήνην αὐξανομένην. Pervo compares this detail about Cydimache's epilepsy, to Xenophon *Eph* 5.7, where the heroine, Anthia, feigns epilepsy in order to escape working in a brothel.

[101] For descriptions of these heroines' awesome beauty, see *C&C* 1.1; 2.2; 3.2; 3.8; 5.3 etc.; *Eph.* 1.2; 2.11; 3.3; 5.5; *L&C* 1.4; 6.6-7; 7.15; *D&C* 1.17; 1.24-5; 4.32-3; *Eth.* 1.2; 2.31,33; 3.4; 4.1; 8.9; 10.9. An Oxyrhynchus papyrus containing a fragment of the novel known as *Calligone* (P. Oxy. ined. 112/130) also refers to the heroine's beauty and stature; see Stephens & Winkler 1995: 268, with n. 3.

[102] Contrast Chaereas' and Callirhoe's splendid wedding, which is attended by the entire population of Syracuse, it seems, and is compared to the wedding of Peleus and Thetis (*C&C* 1.1); the lavish wedding of Habrocomes and Anthia, celebrated throughout the city of Ephesus, with the lengthy description of their first lovemaking on their wedding night (*Eph.* 1.7-9); the royal wedding of Charicleia and Theagenes, in the presence of the nation of Ethiopia (*Eth.* 10. 40-41); Daphnis' and Chloe's wedding, with its pastoral theme (*D&C* 4. 37-40); cf. also Iamblichus, *Bab.* fr. 84 (Stephens & Winkler 1995: 218), which contains references to some rather lavish nuptial arrangements.

[103] *Tox.* 25.

[104] *Tox.* 26.

for beautiful women.[105] It is significant that this story, which coincides most strikingly with the novels, is, like the second tale (about Euthydicus and Damon), remarkable also for Mnesippus' self-conscious narrative technique.[106]

In Mnesippus' fifth story, too, there appear to be many echoes of the Greek romance, especially Chariton.[107] Pervo refers to Demetrius' tourist-activity in Egypt as a 'common' novelistic motif, citing *L&C* 3.9 - 4.5 as an example.[108] Other novelistic *topoi* in this story include threatened suicide, with a friend's intervention to prevent it;[109] swooning,[110] the motif of self-accusation in order to share a friend's fate - which was a feature of Mnesippus' first story as well;[111] incarceration;[112] meritorious conduct even in the context of injustice;[113] financial compensation for undeserved misfortune;[114] the role of *tyche*.[115] One could augment this list, by including Mnesippus' self-conscious reference in *praeteritio* to a climactic courtroom scene; situations like this, which afforded the author with

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[105] *Tox.* 26.

[106] In both of these narratives, Mnesippus is explains, in a self-conscious manner, how he and his sources acquired their information, e.g.: his fourth narrative is delivered dramatically, in direct speech, but Mnesippus explains how he heard it from an (anonymous) native of Massilia when he was visiting as an ambassador (*Tox.* 24); he says that he heard the tale of Euthydicus and Damon from Simylus, the captain of the ship on which the adventure happened (*Tox.* 19), but that the aftermath of the adventure was related to him by Euthydicus himself, as Simylus' knowledge was restricted to what he witnessed from the ship (*Tox.* 21). One might compare the self-justification of Lucius, the ass-narrator, explicitly in deference to the *lector scrupulosus* (Apuleius, *Met.* 9.30), when he introduces the miller's tale: sed forsitan lector scrupulosus reprehendens narratum meum sic argumentaberis: 'Unde autem tu, astutule asine, intra terminos pistrini contentus, quid secreto, ut adfirmas, mulieres gesserint scire potuisti?' accipe igitur quem ad modum homo curiosus iumenti faciem sustinens cuncta quae in perniciem pistoris mei gesta sunt cognovi.

[107] See Pervo 1997: 170-3.

[108] Pervo does not mention to the same motif in *Philops.* 33 (Eucrates visits the statue of Memnon; cf. Chapter 1, p. 50 ff.). Ogden (forthcoming) connects the motif of the two friends journeying to Egypt to study philosophy and medicine, with the series of Greek narratives describing the acquisition of arcane knowledge in Egypt and the East, such as Ps.-Thessalus of Tralles, *De virtutibus herbarum* 1-28 (for further discussion, see Appendix I).

[109] Chariton, *C&C* 1.5; 5.10; 7. 1 (here Polycharmus claims merely to wish to *postpone* Chaereas' suicide); Achilles Tatius, *L&C* 7.6; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 2.1-2 and 3-5. On the motif of suicide in the Greek novels, see MacAlister 1996.

[110] Pervo (1997: 171, n. 44), comparing *C&C* 8.1 with *Tox.* 30.

[111] Pervo (1997: 172, n. 50) adduces the example of *C&C* 1.5, where Chaereas impugns himself before the people of Syracuse, and asks for the death penalty, so that he might share Callirhoe's fate; as Pervo observes, 'Romantic heroes...seem to revel in assuming full share of the blame.' This motif recurs elsewhere too, e.g. *L&C* 2.35 (Menelaos relates how he begged for the death penalty, for having accidentally killed his boyfriend); 7.6 (Clitophon admits to the false charge of murder, in order to receive the death penalty); *Aeth.* 8.8-9 (thinking Theagenes is already dead, Charicleia willingly admits to the false charge of murder).

[112] *Aeth.* 8.6 ff..

[113] *Aeth.* 8.8-9 (see previous note) is a good example of this also. Pervo (1997: 171, n. 48) cites parallels from the new testament.

[114] Cf. Xenophon, *Eph.* 4.4.

[115] For the prominence assigned to the deified Tyche in the Greek novels as a reflection of the 'defeatist resignation' and helplessness felt by people as a result of important socio-political and cultural changes, see (for example) Morgan 1996: 189.

the opportunity for rhetorical display, were a common feature of the novels.[116] These parallels lead Pervo to conclude that Mnesippus' story 'belongs to the realm of the Greek romance.'[117] However, he also points out some odd features of the story, e.g. Demetrius' ultimate desertion of Antiphilus, and its implication that money is a substitute for friends, which he interprets as evidence that Lucian is 'poking fun' at the kind of sentimental friendships in the novels: 'The holes in the story suggest that Antiphilos, however passionate in his devotion, was something less than the best kind of friend.'[118] However, it seems clear that the friend who is being singled out for praise here is Demetrius, just like Agathocles in the first story; the antipathy or passivity of Deinias and Antiphilus respectively serves as a foil to highlight their friends' altruism and loyalty.[119]

In Toxaris' confident response to Mnesippus' challenge to surpass his stories of Greek friends, Lucian presents us with a sophisticated and self-conscious narrator who manipulates the Greek stereotype of Scythians, both by knowingly playing up to it, and ironically undermining it.

...ἄρξομαί γε ἤδη, μηδὲν ὥσπερ σὺ καλλιλογησάμενος· οὐ γὰρ Σκυθικὸν τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπειδὰν τὰ ἔργα ὑπερφθέγγηται τοὺς λόγους.[120]

I will begin now anyway, without any fancy speech, like you - for that it not the Scythian way, especially when the deeds speak louder than the words.

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[116] *C&C* 5.4 ff.; *D&C* 2. 15 ff. (a rustic trial); *L&C* 7.7 ff. and 8.8 ff.; *Aeth.* 8.8 ff.. It is interesting that Mnesippus merely evokes this *topos* in *praeteritio*, out of concern for the credibility of his narrative; this suggests that the inclusion of any *topos* which is too overtly literary will cast doubt over the veracity of this tale. Pervo (1997: 13) puts trial scenes into the vague category of 'subjects of the popular tradition', in which he also includes sea voyages, domestic intrigue, murder charges and wills. It is not clear what Pervo means by the 'popular tradition' - whether he means the novelistic tradition, or something else - but certainly most of these *topoi* are featured in the novels too.

[117] Pervo 1997: 172-3.

[118] Pervo 1997: 173.

[119] Moreover, as an adherent of Cynic philosophy (*Tox.* 27), we should expect Demetrius to value self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια): see ní Mheallaigh *forthcoming*. This idea was not specific to the Cynic philosophy, however; see Konstan (1997: 119), and Aristotle *EN* 1169 b6f.: αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

For the argument that even a self-sufficient man needs friendship as a means for self-knowledge, see Aristotle, *MM* 1213 a24ff.. By making Demetrius travel to India, however, Lucian may be suggesting that there is something unusual about his attitude: see Konstan (1997: 119): 'Perhaps, by projecting the extreme of self-sufficiency onto distant India with its tradition of contemplative self-realization, Lucian also renders it foreign: in leaving personal intimacy behind, Demetrius leaves the Greek world too.' Cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1253 a25 (the self-sufficient man has no part in the *polis*).

[120] *Tox.* 35.

Once again, Toxaris' response, as the inscribed reader, influences our own. His polemical introduction to his narratives invites us, as external readers, to contrast the Scythian tales to the Greek, and to contrast Toxaris' narrative technique, as a Scythian, to that of Mnesippus. Yet what Toxaris goes on to say immediately and ironically undermines his rejection of cleverness and 'fancy speech'. First of all, for all his claims never to waste words, it takes him some four chapters of prelude before he actually begins his first narrative! This is especially ironic, given his complaint against Mnesippus for obstructing him with his pedantic prevarication.[121] Secondly, not only does he comment - virtually metatextually - on the thematic patterns of Mnesippus' stories, but in his explanation for these patterns, he employs a highly rhetorical simile (life as a figurative ship-voyage, wherein the true friend's merit is tested), which, as Pervo has shown, resonates cleverly with (and undermines) Mnesippus' story involving a test of friendship on an *actual* sea-voyage.[122] Add to this his depiction of the Scythians as warlike, nomadic people, and his detailed description of the ritual of blood-friendship, all of which represents an evocation of, but also a reworking of Herodotus,[123] and one is left with the impression of a highly self-conscious and confident speaker, who is steeped in knowledge of the Greek literary and rhetorical tradition - including what the Greeks tended to think about the Scythians.

Toxaris' stories are also, like those of Mnesippus, studded with novelistic motifs, and in many cases his narrative technique is strongly redolent of the novelists'. He begins his first story, strikingly, with a false start *in medias res*, which he then alters in favour of a more conventional temporality when he begins the narrative properly. Given Toxaris' sophisticated self-consciousness, it is

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[121] *Tox.* 38: ὁρᾷς τοῦτο ὡς ἐριστικὸν ποιεῖς καὶ δικανικόν, ὑποκρούων μεταξὺ καὶ διαφθείρων μου τὸν λόγον; This is ironic on a number of levels, as Toxaris evokes the *Greek* world of the lawcourts, to object to a Greek's conduct - in many ways, Toxaris' speech is more 'Greek' than Mnesippus'. There may also be an implicit contrast here between the Athenian courts, and those of the Scythians, where virtually no dialogue is permitted: see Herodotus 4.68, and Hartog 1988: 125 ff..

[122] Pervo 1997: 174, n. 58.

[123] The description of the ritual of Scythian blood-friendship is a fascinating pastiche of Herodotean colouring and rhetorical *topoi*. The ceremony involving the mutual letting and drinking of blood to seal the pact of friendship is a reworking of Herodotus' account of the oath-making ritual in Scythia (4.70; see Hartog 1988: 113 ff.). Said (1994: 151) notes that Lucian does not simply borrow from Herodotus; he enriches him. On Lucian's characteristic refashioning of Herodotean motifs, see Avery 1997: *passim*; Lightfoot 2003: 91-5 (on pseudo-Ionism) and 196-9; cf. also n. 126 and n. 143 below. The idea of a *courtship* ritual for friends is redolent of Pausanias' justification of the Athenian custom of courting homosexual lovers (see Plato, *Symp.* 182 a7 ff.); for another 'Platonic' aspect of the Scythian society as described by Toxaris, see n. 57 above. For discussion of the concept of πολυφιλία in the *Tox.*, see Rejano 2000: 240 f., and cf. Russell (1973: 93 ff.) on Plutarch's discussion of the theme.

tempting to interpret this double start as a calculated demonstration of his ability as a narrator to manipulate narrative temporality.[124]

Dandamis[125] and Amizoces of the first story show the same willingness to share each other's fate as the loyal friends in the novels, such as Polycharmus in Chariton, only this tale is a characteristically savage Scythian variation on the theme. Interestingly, sacrificing one's eyes for one's friend was – in the figurative sense - a *topos* of friendship literature, as Pervo demonstrates.[126] It is ironic, once again, to see the Scythian narrator appropriate commonplaces of the Greek literary and rhetorical tradition in this way. Pervo describes Amizoces' voluntary and reciprocal act of self-mutilation (*Tox.* 41) as an 'excess of devotion', comparable to that of Agathocles in Mnesippus' first tale;[127] it seems to me, however, that the Scythians' reciprocity is a self-conscious improvement on the story of Deinias and Agathocles.

Belitta in Toxaris' second story shows a degree of selfless courage - readiness to risk one's life to save a friend - similar to that of Euthydicus in Mnesippus' second narrative, only in a more grisly context, and with a less fortunate outcome. In prising his friend, Basthes, from the jaws of the lion, Belitta is himself killed; all three are then buried in close proximity to one another, in two tombs - one for the two friends, united in death, and one for their leonine nemesis. The historicity of this story has been considered suspect for a long time; Harmon focuses primarily on the unlikely presence of a lion in South Russia in the second century A.D., and on the 'poetic justice of the animal's entombment,' which he suggests is indicative of a literary source for the story, perhaps an epigram.[128] Pervo describes this story as 'clearly fictitious', and cites parallels from the fable tradition (Babrius and Phaedrus 479, which features a man strangling a lion), and also from the novelistic tradition (Iamblichus, *Babyloniaka* 3, with its 'leonine stele,' which seems to

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[124] Although beginning *in medias res* is a sign of creative narrative ability, and therefore marks the story as potentially fictitious, it can also be construed as an attempt to render the story realistic (the sense of 'intruding' into a pre-existing diegesis is a 'world-creating' effect). Heliodorus, the master of narrative technique, begins his novel *in medias res*: for a precise analysis of this famous opening, see Morgan 1994b and Winkler 2000-2001.

[125] It would be interesting if Lucian was inspired with the idea for the name 'Dandamis' by the coda to Mnesippus' last story, which described Demetrius heading off to join the Brahmans in India: Dandamis was a name associated with the Brahmans in both the historical and novelistic tradition of Alexander the Great: see Stoneman 1995. Both the Brahmans and the Scythians were associated with Cynic ideals of primitivism: see ní Mheallaigh *forthcoming*.

[126] Pervo 1997: 175, with n. 63; e.g. Catullus 14.1; Petronius, *Sat.* 1.1. Lucian may also have got the inspiration for the motif of the blinding of captives from Herodotus' description of this Scythian custom in 4.2: cf. n. 123 and n. 143 above.

[127] Pervo 1997: 175. It is an extreme enactment of the principle of κοινωνία between φίλοι; cf. n. 85.

[128] See Harmon's note *ad loc.* (Loeb vol. V).

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denote an inscribed pillar - probably a funeral monument - decorated with some sort of sculptural motif depicting a lion).[129] This latter claim is rather tenuous, however, since the putative 'parallelism' in this case lies only in the fact that both passages involve lions in a funerary context; the role attributed to the lion in each case is clearly very different, and in Iamblichus' case, the funereal association is subliminal only. A better parallel (although again, not direct) may be found later in Iamblichus' novel (Photius 74a29), where the hero, Rhodanes, is presented with a scene that is similar to that in Toxaris' tale: three apparent deaths - two humans, and a dog.[130]

Interestingly, Toxaris shows that he is sensitive to the likelihood that this story may be difficult to believe, by framing the story with *Beglaubigungstrategien*. As he introduces the tale, he tells Mnesippus that Belitta was in fact a cousin of Amizoces, from the previous story. We have already encountered this technique of *evidential realism* (whereby an author 'verifies' his fiction by reference to details that are in fact equally fictitious) in the stories of the *Philops*..[131] The detail about the tombs at the end of the story is also pointed; not only does Toxaris let us know that he himself took part in constructing them (ἡμεῖς ἐθάψαμεν αὐτοὺς), but their alleged presence also serves as implicit physical evidence to corroborate his tale. Given the remoteness and vagueness of the geographical location, however, this information is, in practical terms, unverifiable, and therefore potentially as specious as Belitta's alleged relation to Amizoces. This is not the only occasion on which Toxaris exploits the remoteness of the Scythians' world to produce stories whose veracity may be suspected, but not conclusively disproved.[132] In the relatively short compass of his second

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[129] Photius *Bib.* codex 94, 74a17ff. Wilson (1994: 104, with n. 2) translates as a 'pillar with a lion on top of it', and notes that the pillar was probably a funeral monument. Stephens and Winkler (1995: 191) translate: 'pillar of a lion'.

[130] In this passage, Rhodanes' Hyrcanian dog kills a slave and a girl, consumes the body of the slave, and manages to eat half of the girl, when Sinonis' father arrives on the scene. Seeing the mangled remains of a girl in the jaws of the dog, whom he recognises as belonging to Rhodanes, the old man immediately assumes it is his daughter's body. He kills the dog, buries the girl, lays the dog's corpse on her grave, scrawls her epitaph in the animal's blood - then hangs himself. In common with Toxaris' story are the motifs of an attack by a predatory animal, twin deaths which are directly linked to one another (Belitta/ Basthes; the girl/ Sinonis' father), and a burial which involves the offending beast. There are differences too, however; where Belitta loses his life in his attempt to rescue Basthes, Sinonis' father opts to kill himself, out of grief. The dog is a more integrated part of Iamblichus' story, since it belongs to Sinonis' beloved Rhodanes, whereas the lion in Toxaris' story is a random predator. Iamblichus' story has a happy twist that is absent from Toxaris'; it turns out that the girl is not Sinonis after all, and Soraichos, her father, is cut down from his noose just before he expires.

[131] See Chapter 1, p. 35 ff..

[132] Cf. n. 63 above. His statement at the end of his first narrative, that Dandamis and Amizoces now sit, maintained by public expense, and honoured by all the Scythians (*Tox.* 41) implies that, if one

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narrative, therefore, Toxaris shows that he is a capable manipulator of the principles of fictionality - which should serve as advance warning (*Fiktionalitätssignal*) to alert readers to the potential for fiction in the next narrative, his most ambitious story.

It is widely acknowledged that Toxaris' third narrative is rooted in the novelistic tradition; this is clear even from the text itself as it stands, for all the ingredients are there - love at first sight, amatory rivals, separation of lovers, emphasis on chastity of the heroine even when separated, travel, exotic locations, intrigue, war, marriage and, of course, friendship. Even the narrative technique is at times distinctly novelistic, especially Toxaris' narratorial interruptions to explain local customs,[133] and the dramatic and highly rhetorical speeches.[134]

With Toxaris' third narrative, we are in the unusually privileged position of actually possessing a novelistic text, which may be directly related to it. The papyrus fragment, *PSI* 981, which is dated to the second century A.D. (and therefore roughly contemporary with Lucian), carries part of the text of what appears to be a novel, which was written in Greek, and is now usually called the *Calligone*, after its heroine.[135] The scene appears to be set in a camp, suggesting a military context, somewhere in the vicinity of Scythia. Apart from this apparent similarity in setting, the same name - 'Eubiotus' - also appears in both Toxaris' tale

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were to follow the Scythians (who are nomads!), one could still see them in this state. There is a similar implication at the end of his fourth narrative, when he says that his friend Sisinnes still lives in Scythia, where he is married to Toxaris' sister, and is still lame from the wound he sustained in the gladiatorial fight (*Tox.* 60). Interestingly, Toxaris' third story - the most conspicuously novelistic narrative - is, like many of the novels themselves (notably *C&C* and the fragmentary novels, *Ninus* and *Metiochus and Parthenope*: see Hunter 1994 and Hägg 1999), imbued with an air of *historical* realism.

[133] This happens frequently, for the relatively brief scale of the narrative, e.g. *Tox.* 44 (Toxaris explains the Bosporan custom of suing for marriage); *Tox.* 45 (explanation why Scythians do not pour libations); *Tox.* 48 (lengthier digression to explain Scythian custom of raising forces 'on the hide'); *Tox.* 51 (details of the customary clothing and hairstyles of the Scythians and Alans). The effect of these digressions is simultaneously to invest the narrator with an air of authority, and to imbue the narrative with an air of realism, by emulating the ethnographic digressions in the Herodotean tradition of historiography. There are abundant examples of this technique in the novels too, especially (although not exclusively) in the so-called 'sophistic' novels, e.g. *C&C* 7.2 (explanation of nature of Tyre and its people); *D&C* 1.30 (bizarre information about cows' swimming abilities, which seems to be an 'ironic pastiche' of similar displays of erudition in the novels: see n. 22 of Christopher Gill's translation in Reardon 1989); *D&C* 2.1 (the Lesbian manner of growing vines); *L&C* 1. 17-18 (power of *eros* manifested in animal, vegetable & mineral forms); *L&C* 2. 15 (description of Egyptian ox); *L&C* 4. 18-19 (drinking-habits of the Egyptians; description of crocodile); *Bab.* 8-9 (Photius *Bib.* 75a: information about the temple of Aphrodite, and the paradoxographical account of the temple-priestess' ugly daughter, Mesopotamia, who was subsequently beautified by the goddess); *Bab.* 10 (Photius, *Bib.* 75b: Iamblichus displays his erudition in arcane magical lore); *Aeth.* 3.14 (Kalasiris explains Homer's true Egyptian identity to Knemon); *Aeth.* 10.27 (description of a giraffe; for further discussion, see Morgan 1994b: 97-100).

[134] There are many examples of this in the novels; Sopatros' speech (*L&C* 8.10) is a good example of a speech in high-flown and ornate style.

[135] See Stephens & Winkler 1995: 267-276.

and the *Calligone* fragment; in both cases, too, the name seems to belong to a foreign male of some authority.[136]

Based on the evidence of the Cairo fragment, Rostovtzeff speculated on the existence of an entire Scythian / Bosporan novelistic tradition, and proposed that Lucian was using a lost Scythian novel as a basis for this tale.[137] Harmon even detects signs of abridgement in Lucian's narrative.[138] Zimmermann, however, argues against any profound connection between the two texts, despite the occurrence of the name 'Eubiotos' in both.[139] More recently, scholars have observed the novelistic atmosphere of Toxaris' narrative, but moved away from the idea of specific resonance with any particular representatives of the novel tradition.[140] Pervo, observing that there is enough travel and incident in this story to fill an entire novel, believes that Lucian *is* using a specific novel as his source here, but not our *Calligone* fragment.[141]

Pervo believes that Lucian is questioning the ethic of friendship in this story by presenting it as a socially destructive force, similar to the friendship of Abauchas and Gyndanes, which is subversive of family life in Toxaris' fifth tale. I do not endorse this view, however; this is surely a case of friends whose loyalty is so remarkable that it *even* takes precedence over ties of blood or kinship; we are meant to read these stories as laudations of such friendship, not critical commentary on its negative social implications.[142]

It is a good idea to take our cue from the reaction of the inscribed reader, Mnesippus, to see how Lucian means us, as external readers, to interpret this story:

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[136] For speculation on the role of Eubiotus in the *Calligone* fragment, see Stephens & Winkler 1995: 267-9. In Toxaris' story, Eubiotus is the illegitimate brother of King Leucanor of Bosporus (*Tox.* 51), living among the Sauromatians (*Tox.* 54). He leads a mixed army of Sauromatians, Alans and Greeks against the Scythians.

[137] For discussion, see Zimmermann 1935. These theories do not generally find favour now.

[138] Harmon's note *ad loc.*, Loeb vol. V.

[139] Zimmermann (1935).

[140] Anderson merely suggests that in *Toxaris*, as in the *Vera Historia*, Lucian is exploiting every opportunity for *pseudos* (1976b: 12). Rostovtzeff (1931: 33) observed a structural similarity between the scene in the Temple of Ares in Toxaris' story, and the scene in the *Calligone* (both scenes feature the dismissal of attendants, the fabrication of a story in order to deflect attention from real event, and the pulling of sword or dagger). This similarity, however, is deemed to be 'of doubtful significance' by Stephens & Winkler (1995: 269), who reject the notion of any significant overlap between the *Tox.* and the *Calligone* fragment, although they do concede that the general nature of Toxaris' tale is novelistic: 'the rest of Lucian's tale is exciting enough and might well fit into romance' (269). Stephens & Winkler promote instead the hypothesis of an original famous local story or legend, which would have served as the source for *both* the *Calligone* and this story in the *Tox.* (270).

[141] Pervo 1997: 176, n. 66.

[142] Cf. n. 157.

ΤΟΞ. τοιαῦτα, ὦ Μνήσιππε, τολμῶσιν ποιεῖν Σκύθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων.

ΜΝΗ. πάνυ τραγικά, ὦ Τόξαρι, καὶ μύθοις ὅμοια· καὶ ἵλεως μὲν ὁ Ἀκινάκης καὶ ὁ Ἄνεμος εἶεν, οὓς ὤμοσας· εἰ δ' οὖν τις ἀπιστοίη αὐτοῖς, οὐ πάνυ μεμπτὸς εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν.

ΤΟΧ. These, Mnesippus, are the sort of daring deeds that Scythians do on behalf of their friends.

ΜΝΕ. How very theatrical, Toxaris, and how story-like! May Scimitar and Wind, by whom you swore, be gracious - but if one were to disbelieve these tales, one would not be thought *very* blameworthy![143]

Clearly, Mnesippus finds Toxaris' tale a little hard to swallow. Jones interprets these lines as a signal from the author that he does not mean the reader to take the stories seriously.[144] As Pervo points out, it is hardly surprising that he doubts Toxaris' truthfulness, given that the Scythians depicted in his story readily tell lies.[145] This in fact contrasts noticeably with the Greek characters in Mnesippus' tales, who are generally scrupulous with regard to the truth. In the context of the dialogue, it is clearly ironic that the Scythian, Toxaris, should deliver the most elaborate and most obviously novelistic narrative of all; the more stories Toxaris tells, the more he proves himself an exception to the Scythian stereotype to which he himself ostensibly subscribes.[146] Scythians, it seems, are not what they

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[143] These gods are not included in the list of Scythian deities in Herodotus 4.59 (see Hartog 1988: 173 ff.); at 4.62, however, Herodotus mentions a form of sword-worship among the Scythians, where the ἀκινάκης represents the war-god. Toxaris' sworn forfeit - to cut off his right hand – shows that Lucian probably had this very passage in mind, as it reflects Herodotus' description of how the Scythians amputated the right arms and hands of the human victims sacrificed to these totemic swords. The deity ἀκινάκης of Toxaris' oath (*Tox.* 38; cf. *Iup.Trag.* 42; *Scytha* 4) could also be derived from the memory of Herodotus' description of the Scythian oath-making ceremony (4.70), which involved mutual blood-letting, and then dipping the ἀκινάκης (as well as other assorted weapons) into the mingled blood and wine. For Lucian's use of Herodotus in the dialogue, see n. 123 and n. 126 above. In fact, according to Herodotus, the Scythians' mightiest oath was to swear upon the king's hearth (4.68). It is perhaps possible to construe Toxaris' evocation of *wind* as a divine power as a *Fiktionalitätssignal*, as Lucian refers to wind elsewhere as a force of literary inspiration, e.g. *Hist.co.* 45 (see von Möllendorff 2000: 97f.).

[144] Jones 1986: 58: 'The mildly humorous tone with which Mnesippus listens to Toxaris shows that Lucian does not expect to be read in the spirit of an Iamblichos.'

[145] Pervo 1997: 178. There are several instances of apparent misinformation by Scythians in Toxaris' tale, although it is sometimes difficult to decide whether this should be ascribed to a character's mendacity, or ellipses in our information. Lonchates' message to Leucanor concerning the Scythians' complaint about Bosporan cattle-raiders (*Tox.* 49) appears merely to be a pretext, presumably fabricated, in order to gain access to the king; his claim that Arsacomas is not a friend at *Tox.* 50, however, is certainly a lie. Similarly, at *Tox.* 51, Macentes' announcement to the Machlyan despot, Adyrmachus, that the people of Bosporus are calling on him to take over the newly vacant throne, appears to be a fabrication; certainly, his subsequent claim to be an Alan is a pretence. Sisinnes, in Toxaris' fourth story, also behaves in a less than honest manner when he takes Toxaris to the theatre, under the pretext of going to see an entertaining show (*Tox.* 59: ὡς ἐπὶ τερπνόν τι καὶ παράδοξον θέαμα...ἄγει εἰς τὸ θέατρον).

[146] *Tox.* 9-10.

claim to be. Mnesippus' rather pointed reference here to the reliability of Blade and Wind, the Scythian deities by whom Toxaris swore to tell the truth, whose authenticity Mnesippus has already questioned,[147] seems to emphasize the connection particularly between Toxaris' identity as a *Scythian*, and the questionable veracity of his tales. Against this background, the Scythian characters in this tale, with their comparative lack of scruples about the truth, surely compound Mnesippus' already lively suspicions about the reliability of this Scythian narrator.

Mnesippus' choice of language here is also significant, leaving little doubt that we are meant to be aware of the literary texture of the tale. The adjective τραγικός is commonly used at this time to denote stories or descriptions that had been embellished in a literary manner.[148] It is also significant that theatrical language and imagery is frequently used in the novels themselves, to the extent that there may even be a case for considering such language a feature of novelistic narrative as well. The further qualification μύθοις ὅμοια indicates quite clearly that Mnesippus is using the term to express his doubts about the historicity of Toxaris' tale, and that these doubts are directly linked to the story's distinctly literary air. His language here is in fact quasi-technical, engaging subliminally with the type of criticism which divided narrative prose into modes such as *historia*, *plasma* and *muthos*, depending on the relationship intended by the author between the content and objective fact.[149] In his response to his story, Mnesippus lets Toxaris know that he *suspects* the status of his story as fact, but that he nevertheless lends it credence, *in compliance with the rules of their competition*. This is tantamount to an expression of the conventions of reading fiction, that the reader knows, on one level, that the story is not *factually* true, but allows it to be true on another level, i.e. *fictional truth*.[150]

When Toxaris expresses his determination to continue, regardless of Mnesippus' scepticism about the truth of his stories, Mnesippus asks him to keep things shorter from now on:

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[147] *Tox.* 38.
[148] See Sidwell *forthcoming*, note *ad loc.*. Morgan (1993: 216 ff.), where he connects the theatrical imagery in the novels with their self-conscious fictionality.
[149] Cf. p. 155 ff..
[150] Compare *Tox.* 18 for a similar response on the other side; cf. p. 99. It is interesting that the verb ἀπιστέω is associated repeatedly with the reader's reaction to fiction; Mnesippus and Toxaris use the verb (or its cognate noun, ἀπιστία) three times here in almost as many lines, and the word also occurs as a *leitmotiv* throughout both the *Tox.* and *Philops.* in general. *Apistia*, it seems, is a key element in the reader's reaction to fiction; this is significant for the intended reception of works

μὴ μακρὰ μόνον, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ οὕτως ἀφέτοις χρώμενος τοῖς λόγοις· ὡς νῦν γε, ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὴν Σκυθίαν καὶ τὴν Μαχλυανὴν διαθέων καὶ εἰς τὸν Βόσπορον ἀπιών, εἶτ᾽ ἐπανιών, πάνυ μου κατεχρήσω τῇ σιωπῇ.[151]

Only, don't let them be too long, my excellent fellow, and don't use such an unrestrained flow of words - for as it is, what with running up and down all over Scythia and Machlyene, and heading off into Bosporus, then coming back again, you have taken great advantage of my silence.

This example of metalepsis reflects Mnesippus', and therefore the reader's, intimate involvement in the story: in hearing/ reading about the friends' travels, the audience/ reader effectively travels with them, and is worn out - by the figurative journey of reading.[152] Metalepsis also shows the power of fiction to absorb the reader into the fictional world, and make him forget the boundaries separating story world from real world. By framing his request in these terms, Mnesippus problematizes the ontological status of Toxaris' story-world - and there is an added irony here for readers of the *Tox.*, who are themselves reading a fictional dialogue about 'reading' fictional stories.

Mnesippus' metaleptic request sets the tone for Toxaris' fourth narrative, in which his 'absorption' into his own fictions is reified; Toxaris himself has a starring role in his own fourth story, and in a further blending of fiction and 'reality', his fictional *persona* behaves - ironically - just like a character from a Greek novel, especially in his quick despair and proclivity towards suicide, once the going gets tough.[153] Despite this, there are explicit indications in the fourth story that Toxaris is actually trying to counteract the damage done to his

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such as Diogenes' Ἄπιστα ὑπὲρ Θούλην; cf. Chapter 1, p. 31 ff. (esp. n. 110 and n. 112), and Chapter 3, p. 190 with n. 298.

[151] *Tox.* 56.

[152] Compare *Nav.* 39 and also *Philops.* 39. For 'reading' as a figurative journey in the *VH*, see Larmour 1997; cf. p. 129 ff. and p. 168 ff. below. The specific terms in which he does this – incorporating a reference to the diverse peregrinations of the protagonists, the length of the narrative, and theatrical language – are all suggestive of the novelistic genre. Compare Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 4.4, where Kalasiris, in the flow of his lengthy tale (which mirrors the novel itself), admires Knemon's stamina as his audience. The remark of the interal narrator to his internal narratee imply an acknowledgment by the author (Heliodorus) of the stamina of the extra-diegetic narratee (the reader of his novel); see Morgan (1996c: 443): 'Heliodorus uses the figure of Kalasiris self-referentially to make clear what sort of work he himself is writing.' On Kalasiris' narrative, see Winkler 1982.

[153] *Tox.* 58; compare Chaereas' reaction to averse circumstances, *C&C* 1.5; 1.6; 3.5; 5.10; Sisinnes' more optimistic attitude, dissuading Toxaris from this drastic action, and buoying up his spirits with good hope, also mirrors the conduct of the loyal friends in the novels, such as Polycharmus in *C&C*. The motif of rewarding a loyal friend by giving him one's sister in matrimony (*Tox.* 60) occurs also in *C&C* 8.8. It is interesting that Toxaris narrates his own experiences, and those of his friend, in terms of literary, novelistic motifs; the fact that Toxaris is a Scythian adds an ironic dimension to this, and establishes a link between the novelistic genre and the cultural politics of the dialogue, as I will show; cf. p. 115 ff..

narratorial credibility by his suspiciously literary third narrative. Before he begins the story, for example, he declares his willingness to comply with Mnesippus' request for a narrative that will be briefer than the previous one - and, by way of a contrast with the previous one, introduces this story as one which directly involves himself:

πειστέον καὶ ταῦτά σοι νομοθετοῦντι καὶ διὰ βραχέων λεκτέον, μὴ καὶ κάμῃς ἡμῖν τῇ ἀκοῇ συμπερινοστῶν. μᾶλλον δὲ ἄκουσον ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ οἷα φίλος, Σισίννης τοὔνομα, ὑπηρέτησεν.[154]

I must obey your dictates in these matters too, and I must speak briefly, so you won't be worn out by following me around with your attention. Listen, instead, to the sort of service a friend - Sisinnes by name - rendered to me myself.

In contrast to the rather complicated cast of the third story, therefore, Toxaris announces that this tale is going to take the form of an ego-narrative, which is unique among the *novelle* in this dialogue - and what greater guarantee of trustworthiness could there be than personal experience?

At *Tox.* 60, Toxaris also makes a point about how the more familiar setting of the story, in contrast with the remote locations of the preceding narrative, should lend support to the credibility of the tale:

τοῦτο, ὦ Μνήσιππε, οὐκ ἐν Μάχλυσιν οὐδὲ ἐν ᾽Αλανίᾳ ἐγένετο, ὡς ἀμάρτυρον εἶναι καὶ ἀπιστεῖσθαι δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ πάρεισιν ᾽Αμαστριανῶν μεμνημένοι τὴν μάχην τοῦ Σισίννου.

This, Mnesippus, did not take place among the Machlyans or the Alans, so as to be without witnesses and susceptible of disbelief; on the contrary, there are many of the Amastrians who still remember Sisinnes' fight.

The greater credibility of the location in Amastris is based on two factors: the fact that Amastris is a *city*, and the fact that it is a *Greek* city. On the one hand, the urban setting (and the public nature of the main events in the story) means the greater availability of witnesses, as Toxaris points out here.[155] On the other hand, the fact that Amastris is - uniquely in Toxaris' stories - a *Greek* city means that the events in the story unfold in a location that is, theoretically at least, familiar to Mnesippus (and to readers of the *Tox.*). This lends credibility to the story, on the principle that the farther from 'home' one goes, the greater latitude there is for fabrication about exotic and remote places and peoples. Both of these points therefore represent a calculated attempt to convince Mnesippus of the truth of this

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[154] *Tox.* 56-7.

tale, but on the other hand, by his knowing manipulation of these devices, Toxaris risks, paradoxically, reversing their desired effect. Add to this the fact that ego-narrative was the standard form in antiquity for the delivery of *untrue* tales,[156] combined with the novelistic elements in the story, which I pointed out above, and this means that Toxaris' carefully wrought *Beglaubigungsstrategien* are converted into *Fiktionalitätssignale* instead; Toxaris, it seems, is a *fabulateur malgré lui même*.

Toxaris' fifth and final story, although comparatively brief, is also - again ironically, for the Scythian narrator - imbued with the distinct flavour of Greek literature. Abauchas' choice to prioritize the life of his friend over that of his wife and children echoes the famous choice of Intaphernes' wife in Herodotus, and similar sentiments voiced by Antigone in Sophocles' play; it also enacts a dilemma faced by some of the protagonists of the novels.[157] At *C&C* 3.5, Chaereas becomes suicidal when, on the point of departure to rescue his wife, his aged parents entreat him to stay behind; his loyal friend, Polycharmus, however, handles this situation much more capably.[158] In contrast with the hapless Chaereas, Leucippe is only too willing to desert her mother for her beloved (*L&C* 2.30).

## CONCLUSION

I began this chapter by pointing out some of the problems of definition that this dialogue has presented to scholars, and to the deficiency in any critical approach which focuses solely on the narratives, without paying sufficient attention to the extraordinarily rich and dense layers in which these narratives are

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[155] Toxaris tends generally to show greater concern for providing *corroborative* evidence for his stories, whereas Mnesippus tends, on the whole, to be more concerned with citing plausible *sources* (e.g. *Tox.* 12, 19 and 21); see Said (1994: 157-8).

[156] On the Greek novelists' use of the technique of ego-narrative (esp. Achilles Tatius), see Hägg 1971: 124-136 and Reardon 1994. On the connection between the ego-narrative and mendacity, see p. 159 f. below, esp. n. 168.

[157] Hdt. 3. 119; Sophocles, *Antigone* 905-912. Lucian employs the motif again in *Dea Syria* 18. The theme has also been traced to Indian literature, in the *Ramayana* and *Jatakas*: see Pischel 1893 and Noeldeke 1894. Pervo (1997: 178, n. 75) cites as an analogy the Gospel tradition that discipleship with Jesus is preferable to family membership. He interprets this story as a demonstration of how Scythian friendship is a socially subversive force, and feels that Greek readers of the *Tox.* would not have approved of such a demonstration: 'Rather than promote domestic and civic life, Scythian friendship appears to subvert it. How would Greeks of the Imperial age have regarded this story? With ambivalence, at least.' (179). It seems to me, however, that Pervo misses the point here. Toxaris' tales pertain to a *non*-Greek culture; it is more likely, therefore, that Greek readers would have felt the satisfaction of recognising conduct which they regularly associated with wild barbarians like the Scythians, rather than feel serious concern about the socially corrosive nature of Scythian friendship. In any case, the literary parallels within the Greek tradition (Intaphernes' wife, Antigone) imbue Abauchas' choice with a *positive* light.

[158] For discussion of this passage, see Konstan 1994: 15 ff..

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packaged. I hope, in the course of this chapter, to have explicated some of these layers, and to have brought to light the significance of the dialectic between narrative and frame, at least as far as Lucian's interest in exploring the nature of fiction in this dialogue is concerned. Lucian's use of *ekphrasis* at the beginning of the work, for example, is related both formally and thematically to the rest of the dialogue, and as *mise an abyme*, it functions as a signal to the external reader about the self-conscious textuality of the *Toxaris*. I have also observed the way in which Lucian inscribes authors and readers in his text, and projects the dynamic process of creating and receiving fiction in a manner that knowingly underpins both *his* authorial activity, and *our* readerly participation. The competitive framework of the dialogue can be interpreted, in this respect, as a metaphor for the contract of understanding – the rules of the game - between any author and reader of fiction. The *Tox.* provides us with implicit, encoded commentary on the novel; the enclosing of novelistic-type narratives within this knowing dialogue frame reflects in microcosm the metatextual and transgeneric dialectic between the *Tox.* itself and the Greek novels. The hiding author of this Platonic-style dialogue speaks across his fictional *personae* to the extra-literary reader, activating an additional layer of significance for the novelistic *topoi* that are studded throughout these stories, so that, for the reader who is alert to these nuances, the *Tox.* is not merely comic fantasy, moralistic rhetoric, or something indefinable in between, but also a practical exposition of the theory of reading and writing fiction.

Can we be more specific? In his article on the ancient readers of the novel, Bowie expressed the necessity to assess the importance of the themes related to those of the novel in the *Tox.* and *Philops.*. 'That Lucian knew only romances in which travel dominated and was unfamiliar with the sentimental "ideal" romance is highly improbable.'[159] My arguments in this chapter suggest that the *Tox.* provides some positive evidence that he *did* know it, even if he doesn't make it explicit that he is referring to the novel texts. As a final thought, therefore, I suggest that the act of 'reading' and 'writing' specifically *novelistic* fiction is inscribed into the *Toxaris*. Mnesippus and Toxaris also show – as we might have guessed from the novels themselves [160] – that readers read these texts with attention to matters of style, vividness and – most interesting of all, from my own point of view – matters of narrative plausibility, which they observed closely.

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[159] Bowie 1994: 444.
[160] For an excellent overview, see Morgan 1993: 220 ff.

As well as telling us something about *how* these texts were read, the *Tox.* can also offer us a glimpse at *who* read them. Of course, Lucian does not provide us with precise demographic profiles for his in-text readers; nevertheless, some basic data can be extrapolated from the text. Both Mnesippus and Toxaris are male – which would, admittedly, be more interesting if Lucian used female *personae* more often, but it seems to confirm the general consensus about a predominantly male readership in antiquity, nevertheless.[161] It is implied also that those who were familiar with the novels were from a diversity of ethnic backgrounds, but were Greek-speaking – which, again, may seem rather a banal point to make, except when we remember that Toxaris, at least, is depicted as bilingual.[162] Whatever resonance this may have had for Lucian personally, as a native of Syrian Samosata, it is interesting that the novels are appropriated in this dialogue in a discussion relating to matters of cultural and ethnic relativism.[163] If readers of non-Greek ethnicity, like Toxaris, were reading the novels in antiquity (as they surely were), we may surmise that they engaged with them in a similar manner; the cultural politics that are inscribed in our surviving novels implies this too.[164] Within the context of the Greek/Scythian dialectic in this dialogue, the way

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[161] On the issue of ancient female readers for the novels, see Bowie 1994: 436-440; Egger 1999.

[162] Cf. n. 21. If indeed there were bilingual consumers of the novels, then this would lend support to arguments for the occasional presence in the novels of translinguistic word-play (cf. Chapter 1, n. 167). On Lucian's bilinguality, see Adams *et al.* 2002: 14f.; the term is broader than 'bilingualism', and denotes 'an individual's disposition to process two languages and two cultural systems' (*op. cit.*: 15).

[163] Cf. n. 21 and n. 165 above.

[164] Whitmarsh (1998: 97): 'There seems to have been an inherent tendency in the novelistic genre to erase dominant or Hellenocentric perspectives, and to review traditional material from an alien angle... The coalescent genre of the novel seems to celebrate the contestation of dominant cultural

in which Mnesippus reacts *against* the novel genre (in his fourth narrative), and Toxaris readily *appropriates* it (in his third), suggests that the novel had a certain cultural *cachet* - that it was bound up with implications of erudition, truthfulness, and Greekness[165] – all of which would have resonated especially strongly with the culture of *paideia* in the Second Sophistic.

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narratives.' This is a particularly burning issue in Heliodorus' *Aethiopika*, which, as Whitmarsh shows (1998: 99), is a centrifugal text; see also Selden 1998.

[165] Greekness, for Toxaris (as for Lucian?), can be acquired from *paideia* (i.e. knowledge of the Greek language, immersion in the Greek literary tradition etc.), and it implies a feigning – in more neutral terms, a disjunction between culturally acquired appearances, and ethnic identity – that resonates with Toxaris' own non-conformity to the ethnic stereotype, and finds expression in his obvious talent for fiction; cf. Whitmarsh (1998: 101): '...self-fashioning is a process both necessary and analogous to literary creation: to write Greek is always to enter a world of fictions, appearances, configurations and performances.'

## INTRODUCTION: JOURNEY INTO FICTION

Any scholar approaching the *Verae Historiae* must experience a feeling like that which Lucian's narrator surely felt, when he first saw Hercules' footstep imprinted on the rock of the mysterious western island (*VH* 1.7): giants have passed this way before. Perhaps more than any other Lucianic text, the *VH* has benefited from a long tradition of scholarly attention, and, especially in recent years, a richly varied diversity of interpretative approaches.

The *VH* has been read as philosophical parody,[1] or as a parody of historiography;[2] as novelistic fiction,[3] and as science-fiction;[4] as an attack on superstition,[5] as a satire on so-called *apista*-literature,[6] and indeed as a satire on the fictionality of all literature;[7] as a fantastic attack on an obsolescent literary canon,[8] an attempt to inject some much-needed vitality and humour into that same canon,[9] or a 'parodic response to the staider forms of contemporary traditionalism;'[10] as an intellectual game,[11] a metapoetical allegory of reading - either reading as a constantly failing search for meaning,[12] or as a successful hermeneutic process;[13] ultimately, one of 'the most radical experiments in prose fiction ever attempted by ancient writers.'[14] In one extreme case - now no longer widely credited - it was regarded as entirely derivative of an earlier work, which is now no longer extant.[15] Early champions of *Quellenforschung* especially tended to treat the text as little more than a mosaic of allusions to earlier sources.[16] Latterly, attempts have been made to reassert the autonomy of Lucian's own creative input,

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[1] Georgiadou & Larmour (1996), (1998b).
[2] Georgiadou & Larmour (1994).
[3] See especially Bompaire (1988).
[4] See Fredericks (1976); cf. Swanson (1976) and Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 45ff..
[5] This interpretation, posited by Rohde, is countered by Hall (1981: 340-341).
[6] Morgan 1993: 196.
[7] Larmour 1997; see p. 167 ff..
[8] Scarcella (1988); *contra* von Möllendorff 2000: 23.
[9] See von Möllendorff's cautious comments (2000: 24).
[10] Branham 1989: 5-6.
[11] Bompaire (1958: 658) 'une énigme littéraire'; cf. Hall (1981: 340) 'a sort of academic game'; Bompaire (1988: 38): 'une sorte de "puzzle" érudit.'
[12] Larmour (1997).
[13] Von Möllendorff (2000: 558, with n. 139).
[14] Romm 1992: 174; Romm discusses the *VH* as a fiction of exploration at pp. 211-214.
[15] Reyhl (1969); for discussion of the relationship between the *VH* and the *Wonders beyond Thule* of Antonius Diogenes, see p. 185 ff..

and to read the text as a landmark document in the history of the concept of fictionality.[17]

In approaching the *Verae Historiae*, therefore, I too am conscious of treading a well-worn path, but (with perhaps a little of the intrepidity of the Lucianic traveller) I hope to provide a fresh perspective on it. In the first two chapters of this thesis, I explored two works where Lucian used the form of the Platonic dialogue as a speculative frame for series of embedded fictions. The *VH* is a work of fiction on a more ambitious scale and, unlike the other two, *not* subordinated to a dialogue frame.[18] In this chapter, I examine the *VH* as a showcase illustration of Lucian's work as a practical theoretician of fiction like the *Philops.* and *Tox.* (and the *Nav.*, on which see Appendix II), and contextualize it within the spectrum of contemporary literary trends. [19] Because of the length and complexity of this chapter, I include here a summary of the argument in each of its three subsections.

## LUCIAN'S APOLOGY FOR FICTION (*VH* 1. 1-4)

In this section, I explore the extraordinarily dense intertextual fabric of Lucian's proem. I show how Lucian, by establishing a subversive dialectic with the literary theories of Plato and Aristotle, stakes out a new theoretical frame to determine his narrative's relation to extra-literary reality - a point which is significant especially for the theory of fantasy-fiction in antiquity. I will show how he also establishes a dialectic with Strabo, who himself identified the intermediary nature of fiction (between the poles of truth and falsehood) in the context of travellers' tales. By constructing this intertextuality with Plato especially, and by inscribing himself within the tradition of the fantastic explorer's log - a tradition which began with Homer's *Odyssey* - Lucian identifies himself as a narrator and author with notoriously ambiguous figures such as Socrates and Odysseus, which has significant implications for his practical experimentation with fictionality in the *VH*.

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[16] That is not, however, to denigrate the value of their pioneering work on this text, e.g. Stengel (1911).

[17] For cautionary remarks on the questionable appeal of free, inventive fiction, in accordance with the literary ideals of the second century A.D., see von Möllendorff (2000: 25). Both Rütten (1997: 30 ff.) and von Möllendorff (2000: 22 ff.) treat the theme of fictionality in the *VH*; the most extensive treatment, however, is that of Fuchs (1993: 221 ff.).

[18] For the 'pseudo-dialogic' nature of the proem to the *VH*, however, see n. 166 below.

[19] For other treatments of the *VH* with the *Philops.* and *Tox.*, see Anderson 1976b and Swain 1994; these do not, however, explore how Lucian deals with the issue of fictionality. Fuchs (1993) does not include the *Tox.* in her analysis of Lucian and fictionality.

## THE *VH* AS SELF-CONSCIOUS FICTION

Lucian's confession in the proem clearly marks the *VH* out as self-conscious fiction. In this section, I examine particular aspects within the narrative that reflect this self-consciousness, e.g. homodiegetic narration as an intrinsically self-conscious, and therefore potentially self-reflexive, narrative mode. I also look at how metatextuality (e.g. literary criticism) is inscribed into the narrative. Lucian is clearly interested in textuality in the *VH*; the creation and reception of texts is inscribed into his text in *mise en abyme* - therefore the *VH* is, in one sense, 'about' reading. Hypertextuality is also inherent to the self-consciousness of the *VH*, and advertised by the author in the proem; I look at how the *VH* 'overwrites' anterior literary texts, especially the Homeric poems. The fantastic mode of the *VH* is particularly well-chosen for a text that is conscious of its own 'literariness'; I examine fantasy elements such as large-scale metalepsis, and I suggest that it is possible to read the hybrid monsters that populate the pages of the *VH* in such proliferation as an *effet de création*, given that such hybrids are used elsewhere in Lucian's works as a metaphor for his own peculiar literary creation (*Lucianea mixis*).

Clearly, my analysis in this section involves the application of modern literary theories to Lucian's text, particularly those of Genette (especially his theory of hypertextuality),[20] Dällenbach (for *mise en abyme*),[21] Todorov and Armitt (on the genre of fantasy),[22] and Alter's excellent study of self-consciousness in the modern novel.[23] In selecting and applying these theories, I follow J.R. Morgan's judicious lead, and declare my approach to be 'eclectic and pragmatic.'[24] My guiding principle is that such self-consciousness should not be postulated for texts that do not clearly advertise their own reflexivity; happily, the *VH* is an excellent candidate for such analysis on this principle.

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[20] Genette 1982a.
[21] Dällenbach 1989.
[22] Todorov 1970; Armitt 1996.
[23] Alter 1975.
[24] Morgan 1991: 85, n.2.

## AUTHORS OF A SELF-CONSCIOUS AGE: THE *VH* IN CONTEXT

It is not enough to identify signs of literary sophistication, and then leave the job at that, as if they were an end in themselves. My purpose in the final section of this chapter is to show how Lucian's games with fiction are extreme, but not isolated phenomena; Lucian's experimental fiction can be related meaningfully to other fictional works of the same era (particularly Longus and Antonius Diogenes), and even possibly to a contemporary literary trend.

## LUCIAN'S APOLOGY FOR FICTION (*VH* 1.1-4)

The proem to the *VH* has an extremely important place in the literary theory of the Second Sophistic. Here Lucian evokes the theoretical arguments of Aristotle and the geographical schools to construct an innovative literary theorem to describe how his text functions, and in doing so he also shows, by implication, what some of the literary priorities and expectations of his era were. The proem is essentially an *apologia*: Lucian explains and justifies the sort of text he has composed, outlining the sort of reader he has in mind, his intentions for the text, and defending his position as its author. By getting this business out of the way in advance of the text itself, he establishes a sort of preliminary contract of understanding with the reader; more specifically, by disclaiming all pretence to truth, the author asserts for himself the right to fabricate freely while remaining exempt from the censure that clearly usually accrued to such composition.[25]

Much attention has been devoted to the proem to the *VH* as a key passage for Lucian's conception of fictionality.[26] My purpose here is to examine how Lucian's programmatic statements in his proem resonate with the discourses of predecessors who themselves theorized, directly or indirectly, on the nature of fictional writing, such as Aristotle, Strabo and the poets of Old Comedy. I hope to break open new ground by exploring more fully the resonance which Lucian's proem strikes with Plato's *Apology* in particular.[27] I will show how this nexus of Aristotelian, Strabonian, Comic and Socratic resonances not only reflects the particular *Lucianea mixis* in the *VH* formally, but also creates a new theoretical space in which the author (narrator) and reader of the *VH* can manoeuvre.

### Plato and Socrates in the Proem

The proem to the *VH* resonates unmistakably with Plato's *Apologia*, especially (given the exordial nature of the proem) in its opening sequence, where Socrates begins his defence speech. Lucian in fact presents his proem in terms of a self-defence (ἀπολογία), as he presents arguments to legitimize his text, and expresses his hopes thereby to *escape* (ἐκφυγεῖν: the verb connotes the status of a legal defendant - φεύγων) the *accusation* (κατηγορία) of others:

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[25] *VH* 1.4; cf. p. 153 f..

[26] See especially Romm 1992: 211-214; Rütten 1997: 30ff.; Georgiadou & Larmour 1998: 51 ff.; von Möllendorff 2000: 30-61and 562ff.. Fuchs (1993: 189-191 and 231 ff. especially) discusses *VH* 1.1-4 in the context of the ancient concept of fictionality.

[27] Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 1; see now also Laird (2003).

οὕτω δ' ἂν μοι δοκῶ καὶ τὴν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορίαν ἐκφυγεῖν αὐτὸς ὁμολογῶν μηδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγειν.[28]

And in this way I hope also to escape the accusation of others, by admitting myself that nothing I say is true.

The sort of argument he uses to defend himself here is the 'hands up, I admit it' approach. Rather than try to prove that his hypothetical accusers are wrong, Lucian admits that yes, he *is* a liar - but an *honest* liar, because unlike other liars, *he* is not trying to convince anyone that what he says is the truth:

διόπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ κενοδοξίας ἀπολιπεῖν τι σπουδάσας τοῖς μεθ' ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ μόνος ἄμοιρος ὦ τῆς ἐν τῷ μυθολογεῖν ἐλευθερίας, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἱστορεῖν εἶχον...ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐτραπόμην πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων εὐγνωμονέστερον· κἂν ἓν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο ἀληθεύσω λέγων ὅτι ψεύδομαι.[29]

For this reason, and because I myself, motivated by vanity, was eager to leave something behind for posterity, so that I wouldn't be the only one without a share in the freedom to tell stories, and since I had nothing true to relate...I turned to lies in a much more honest fashion than the others. And in this one point I shall be truthful, by saying that I am lying.

This resonates with Socrates' apologetic discourse in the opening to Plato's work, where, in agreement with his accusers, he concedes that he *is* a clever speaker - but only if by that, they mean someone who speaks the truth.[30] The passage contains many points of reference for the *VH*, so I quote it here in full:

ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν, ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.[31]

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[28] *VH* 1.4.

[29] *VH* 1.4. This recalls Eubulides' liar paradox (see Diogenes Laertius 2.109).

[30] Cf. *Apol.* 18 a5f., where Socrates identifies truth-telling as the sign of excellence in an orator. For Socrates' 'truthful lie', see also *Rep.* 382 b6-8; cf. Chapter 1, p. 21 ff..

[31] *Apol.* 17a1 - b8 .

What effect my accusers have had on you, Athenians, I do not know; for they almost made *me* forget myself - so persuasive was their speech. And yet they have said virtually nothing that is *true*. But of the numerous lies they told, the one that most surprised me was this, when they said that you must take care not to be deceived by me, because I am a clever speaker. But not to be ashamed that they would instantly be proved wrong by me in practice, when I am revealed *not* to be a clever speaker in any way - that seemed to me the most shameless part of all - unless, that is, these people call a man who speaks the truth a clever speaker. If *that's* what they are saying, then I at least would agree that I am an orator not of their ilk; for these men, as I say, have spoken little or nothing that is true, whereas you will hear nothing *but* the truth from me.

Of signal importance for the *VH* is the manner in which Socrates establishes here, in the *exordium* to his speech, a distinction between *truth* and *plausibility*. In this passage, he shows that lies can be extremely persuasive, irrespective of their 'objective' truth-content. What *really* surprises Socrates, however, is his accusers' audacity in warning the court not to be deceived by his clever speeches; they appear to be unconcerned that their claim will be contradicted the instant he begins to speak - for Socrates, by his own admission, is *not* a clever speaker.

In the proem to the *VH*, similarly, Lucian accuses other writers, such as Ctesias and Iambulus, of writing lies. He makes it clear that he does not find fault with them for telling lies *per se* - seeing as this appears to be the habit even among philosophers; what *does* surprise him, however, like Socrates, is the fact that they expect their lies to remain undetected:

> τούτοις οὖν ἐντυχὼν ἄπασιν, τοῦ ψεύσασθαι μὲν οὐ σφόδρα τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐμεμψάμην, ὁρῶν ἤδη σύνηθες ὂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπισχνουμένοις· ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐνόμιζον λήσειν οὐκ ἀληθῆ συγγράφοντες.[32]

From the beginning of the *Apology*, Socrates establishes a discourse which opposes artless truth and clever lying (e.g. 17 b8 - 18 a6, where he associates rhetorical sophistication with falsity, and opposes it to plain, truthful speaking).[33] By presenting himself subsequently as a guileless, plain-speaking man who knows nothing, Socrates, by this logic, implies that he is truthful: the discourse of truth and lies in the *Apology* is therefore closely connected with Socrates' ironic self-presentation as an ignorant sage, which we can see, for example, in his famous reflection after he has interviewed the reputedly wise politician:

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[32] *VH* 1.4.
[33] This connection has a very old pedigree in Greek thought; compare Achilles' suspicions of Odysseus' eloquence in Book 9 of the *Iliad*.

πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ᾽ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν
κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ,
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι
αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι.[34]

And so I thought to myself as I went away that I was wiser than this man; for
perhaps neither of us knew anything worthwhile, but this man thought he
knew something when he didn't know - while I, just as I didn't know, didn't
think I knew. And so I *seemed* at any rate to be wiser than this man in this
small respect at least: that whatever I did not know, I did not think I knew.

This is analogous to the proem to the *VH*, where the discourse of truth and
lies involves Lucian's depiction of himself as an honest liar. In just the same way as
Socrates' professed ignorance in the *Apology* is a form of wisdom and knowledge,
so too Lucian's professed mendacity in the *VH* is a form of honesty and truth.[35]

To sum up, then, the obvious points of comparison between the *Apology*
and the proem to the *VH* are the fact that both texts of self-defence and self-
justification; just as Socrates defends himself against slander, and defends the way
he speaks, Lucian also anticipates likely accusations, and defends the way he
writes.[36] Both Lucian and Socrates are concerned with truth and lies; they both
identify a problematic 'grey area' of lies that are plausible enough to be interpreted
as the truth; and both establish themselves as honest men, in contrast with other
writers or speakers.

The intertextuality with Plato's *Apology* is not confined to the proem of the
*VH*. In *VH* 2.17-20, Lucian describes Socrates' conduct on the Isle of the Blessed,
as he chops logic with Nestor and Palamedes, while surrounded by the beautiful
youths of mythology, such as Hylas, Hyacinth and Narcissus. Not only does this
reflect in a general way the typical behaviour which Plato attributed to Socrates in
life, but there is a direct allusion here to *Apol.* 41 a-c, where Socrates imagines how
he would ideally spend his time in the afterlife - conversing with Palamedes and
Ajax and others who, like him, died on account of an unjust verdict. This whole
scene in the *VH* recalls the famous passage in the *Apology*, where Socrates 'in the
dock' explains why he is not afraid of death:

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[34] Plato *Apol.* 21d. Lucian evokes Socrates' famous ironic statement again at *Herm.* 48.

[35] Cf. Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 57.

[36] The *mise en scène* of the lawcourt is important too; Lucian uses it elsewhere to define his
methods and justify himself as a writer (*Bis Acc.* 33 ff.;). The idea may have its foundation in
literary trials such as the contest between Aeschylus and Euripides in Aristophanes' *Frogs*; Lucian
exploits the idea comically, e.g. *VH* 2.20 where Homer is taken to court by one of his characters,
Thersites; cf. *Consonants at Law*. Cf. n. 46 and n. 191.

εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἅιδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ συγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἀληθῆ. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων - ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη - καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἴεται μέν, ἔστιν δ' οὔ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἄν τις, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς διαλέγεσθαι ἐκεῖ καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας; πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστίν.[37]

But if, on the other hand, death is like travelling away from here to another place, and the things that are said are true - that all the dead are there - then what greater good could there be than this, gentlemen jurors? For if someone arrives in Hades, having been released from these people who claim to be judges, and finds the true judges - those who are said to pass judgement there, Minos, Rhadamanthys, Aeacus, Triptolemus and the rest of the demi-gods who were just in their own lifetime - then would his trip there be a waste? Or what price would any of you pay to meet Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? For I am willing to die many times over, if these things are true, since personally at any rate, I would have a marvellous time there, whenever I met Palamedes and Ajax son of Telamon and anyone else among the ancients who died on account of an unjust judgement, comparing my experiences with theirs - and it would not be unpleasant, I think - best of all, moreover, spending my life cross-examining those who live there and interrogating them, as I do with people here, to see who among them is wise, and who *thinks* he is wise, but isn't really. What price would one pay, gentlemen jurors, to cross-examine the man who led the vast expedition to Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or one might say the myriads of other men and women, with whom it would be an unimaginable pleasure to converse and keep company and cross-examine. In any case, the people there do not, I am sure, kill for this reason, for in all other respects the people there are happier than people here, and of course, they are immortal for the rest of time, if indeed the things that are said are true.

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[37] *Apol.* 40 e4 - 41 c8.

I have quoted this rather long passage fully, because it is germane to many of the details in Lucian's description of his sojourn with the dead on the Isle of the Blessed; in fact it is highly probable that Lucian drew many of his ideas for this section of his work directly from it. Some of these borrowings are obvious enough; Rhadamanthys, for instance, appears in the *VH* as the judge of the afterlife, just as in Socrates' vision (although Socrates also imagines other judges there too).[38] Ajax son of Telamon features in both accounts, with reference to the circumstances of his death in each case.[39] Socrates' reference to meeting Homer and Odysseus probably gave Lucian the idea for making these two conspicuously present on the Isle of the Blessed, and it may more particularly have inspired Lucian with the idea for interrogating Homer - an act that fortifies his identification with Socrates (both of them interview famous dead people).[40] Socrates mentions Homer and Hesiod together, and Lucian pits the pair against each other in a poetry competition.[41] Socrates' idea of meeting the poets Orpheus and Musaeus probably inspired Lucian with the idea of including the lyric poets Eunomus, Arion, Anacreon and Stesichorus among the guests at the banquet on the Isle of the Blessed.[42] Socrates refers separately to demi-gods (ἡμίθεοι), and the leader and members of the expedition to Troy· ὁ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγών τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν; Lucian's account also features demi-gods and the Trojan veterans: πάντες...οἱ ἡμιθέοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Ἴλιον στρατεύσαντες....[43] Socrates' dream of comparing experiences with Palamedes and Ajax, as well as others who suffered from an unfair verdict, is reified by Lucian when he depicts Socrates in discussion with Palamedes and Nestor;[44] the ill-fated Ajax has already been mentioned.[45]

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[38] See *VH* 2.6ff..

[39] Cf. *VH* 2.7.

[40] Homer and Odysseus sit at the banquet together at *VH* 2.15; Lucian interviews Homer at 2.20.

[41] Cf. *VH* 2.22.

[42] *VH* 2.15. It is perhaps worth noting that, in keeping with the different tone in each passage, the poets whom Socrates imagines, Orpheus and Musaeus, are - as oracular poets and founder-figures - rather more awesome than the lyric party-poets Lucian encounters. Anacreon especially has a reputation as something of a libertine in antiquity. Stesichorus is also an appropriate choice in the *VH*, given Helen's capricious behaviour on the Isle of the Blessed. Interestingly, in *Orat.* 11, Dio discusses the lies of Homer and Odysseus, Stesichorus and Helen, and dreams – all of which are featured in the *VH* too. I intend to explore further elsewhere this intertextuality between *VH* 2 and Dio's Trojan oration; for other studies of the relationship between these two authors, see Swain 1994, Georgiadou & Larmour 1997, Leigh 2000.

[43] *VH* 2.17.

[44] Lucian uses this vision of Socrates elsewhere too; cf. *D.Mort.* 6 (20), 4 and 6: Socrates chatting to Nestor and Palamedes; Socrates associated with the beauties Charmides and Phaedrus; *Nek.* 18: Socrates with Palamedes, Odysseus, Nestor and a babbling corpse. At the beginning of Apuleius, *Met.* 10.33, the ass associates Socrates with Ajax and Palamedes, who also suffered unfair trials.

Characteristically, Lucian adds a comic and ironic twist to the Platonic intertext, as the fate that dogged the earthly Socrates, and which he hoped to escape through death, pursues him still on the Isle of the Blessed in the *VH*. The 'true judge' Socrates had hoped to find there turns out to be of remarkably similar mind to the self-proclaimed judges who condemned him in the Athenian court; Rhadamanthys is reported to be so fed up with Socrates' ironic posturing and interrogation, that he has threatened him many times with exile from the Isle of the Blessed, unless he gives up his annoying conduct and joins in the fun:

ἐλέγετο δὲ χαλεπαίνειν αὐτῷ ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ ἠπειληκέναι πολλάκις ἐκβαλεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς νήσου, ἢν φλυαρῇ καὶ μὴ ἐθέλῃ ἀφεὶς τὴν εἰρωνείαν εὐωχεῖσθαι.[46]

Socrates is in fact accused of perjury for claiming to conduct himself chastely with the youths in his company, as the youths themselves, Hyacinth and Narcissus, testify to his lewd behaviour:

μόνος δὲ Σωκράτης διώμνυτο ἦ μὴν καθαρῶς πλησιάζειν τοῖς νέοις· καὶ μέντοι πάντες αὐτοῦ ἐπιορκεῖν κατεγίνωσκον· πολλάκις γοῦν ὁ μὲν Ὑάκινθος ἢ ὁ Νάρκισσος ὡμολόγουν, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἠρνεῖτο.[47]

Socrates alone swore that he was chaste in his relationships with the youths; everyone, however, accused him of perjury - indeed, Hyacinth and Narcissus frequently supported these accusations, but he kept denying them.

This passage illustrates very well the complex intertextuality that often operates in Lucian's text; the notions of accusations of perjury and lewd conduct with young men clearly evoke Plato's *Apology*, while the youths' testimony to Socrates' indecency is in fact a reversal of Alcibiades' famous character-testimonial in Plato's *Symposium*. In a similar way, by comparing Socrates' courageous behaviour in the battle against the souls of the wicked to his bravery in the earthly battle at Delium,[48] Lucian echoes once again Alcibiades' description of Socrates'

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[45] *VH* 2.17 (Locrian Ajax); for Ajax son of Telamon, see *VH* 2.7.
[46] *VH* 2.17. There are several references to courtcases and legal action in this part of the text (e.g. Thersites' libel suit against Homer, which may remind us of the charges which Palamedes lays at the poet's door in Philostratus' *Heroicus* – cf. n. 226; the trial and punishment of Cinyras etc.). In fact, the population of Lucian's Isle of the Blessed appears to be quite litigous - a most un-utopian trait; contrast the absence of lawsuits and the prevalence of natural justice in the utopian society described by the embassy from the King of Ceylon in Pliny *HN* 6. 84-91, for instance. Zeitlin (2001: 244) says that the Isle of the Blessed here represents the world of the Second Sophistic in microcosm.
[47] *VH* 2.19.
[48] *VH* 2.23: ἠρίστευσε δὲ καὶ Σωκράτης ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ ταχθεὶς, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτε ζῶν ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ ἐμάχετο.

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conduct during that harsh campaign, at *Symp.* 220 d-e, and indeed Socrates' own reference to it at *Apol.* 28e.[49]

The intertextuality between *VH* 2.17-20 and *Apol.* 40 e4 - 41 c8 (quoted above on p. 126) is more nuanced still, however. It is not simply a matter of a direct current of echoes flowing between Plato's text and Lucian's; these echoes reverberate further within the *VH* itself, creating a circuit of meaning that ripples just beneath the surface of the text. The passage from the *Apology* is evoked directly in *VH* 2.17, and thereby established as an intertext; but it also finds subtler echoes in the proem and the beginning of the narrative. Socrates begins and ends his vision with a *caveat* about the truthfulness of traditional accounts about life after death; similarly, Lucian's account of life on the Isle of the Blessed is itself couched in a text where the discourses of truth and lies are problematized. Homer's narrator, Odysseus, is distinguished from Homer himself at *VH* 1.3, as in the *Apology* passage. Finally, Socrates describes the experience of death figuratively as a journey to a different place: οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον - a figure which is itself pregnant with meaning for the *VH*, as I will show.

At *Apol.* 41 a5, having outlined the tremendous opportunities death provides, such as the chance to meet the great and true judges of the afterlife, Socrates asks, rhetorically: ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; 'Would the trip away, then, be a waste?' A little later, when describing the possibility of meeting literary figures such as Homer, Hesiod, Palamedes, Ajax and others, Socrates reiterates the sentiment by declaring that meeting these figures would be, as far as he is concerned, a marvellous way to spend his time:

> ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν...καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα...[50]

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[49] As a reward for his outstanding valour, Socrates is given his own personal paradise on the Isle of the Blessed - a beautiful park in the suburbs, where he gathers his friends to engage in discussion and argument; there he founds his *Academy of the Dead*: ἐφ' οἷς καὶ ὕστερον ἐξῃρέθη αὐτῷ ἀριστεῖον, καλός τε καὶ μέγας παράδεισος ἐν τῷ προαστείῳ, ἔνθα καὶ συγκαλῶν τοὺς ἑταίρους διελέγετο, Νεκρακαδημίαν τὸν τόπον προσαγορεύσας. Lucian may have got his idea for the *Academy of the Dead* from Aristophanes' description of Socrates' *phrontisterion*, as a place for the 'wise *souls*', the pale, ghost-like sophists. Socrates himself alludes to this play and how it damaged his reputation in *Apol.* 19 b4 ff.. The notion that Socrates, whom Rhadamanthys in fact wanted to punish with exile, is ultimately rewarded in such a conspicuous and generous manner, may be meant to recall Socrates' provocative contention to the court (*Apol.* 36 d-e) that he deserved not punishment, but an Olympic victor's reward. On the laudatory tradition of Socrates' bravery, see Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 207.

[50] *Apol.* 41 b 1-6.

Personally at any rate, I would have a marvellous time there, whenever I *met* Palamedes and Ajax son of Telamon and anyone else among the ancients who died on account of an unjust judgement...best of all, moreover, spending my life cross-examining those who live there and interrogating them...

The significance of my italics in this passage will become apparent presently. First, however, it is crucial to note how Lucian aligns his text - significantly, a text which incorporates an account of a trip to the land of the dead - with the tradition of writers who describe their own wanderings and *journeys abroad*: πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι...συνέγραψαν ὡς δή τινας ἑαυτῶν πλάνας τε καὶ ἀποδημίας;[51] he also designates his journey as an ἀποδημία.[52] Lucian's text, therefore, is a figurative journey,[53] which he says will provide his readers' minds with recreation that is not inappropriate:

> γένοιτο δ᾽ ἂν ἐμμελὴς ἡ ἀνάπαυσις αὐτοῖς, εἰ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν ἀναγνωσμάτων ὁμιλοῖεν ... οἷόν τι καὶ περὶ τῶνδε τῶν συγγραμμάτων αὐτοὺς φρονήσειν ὑπολαμβάνω.[54]

> *And the rest would not be inappropriate for them*, if they were enjoying the sort of reading material...that I trust they will find in this text.

It seems to me that the phrase that I have italicized here echoes Socrates' rhetorical question in *Apol.* 41 a5: ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία;. Socrates talks about death as a worthwhile journey in the *Apology*; similarly Lucian, in the proem, for which we have already established an intertextual relationship with the *Apology*, speaks of his own text as a figurative journey and respite that is commendable. The intertextuality is secured by the fact that on both of these 'journeys', whether it is Socrates' vision of the afterlife, or reading Lucian's *VH*, one *meets* (ἐντυγχανεῖν) 'ancient' literary figures such as Homer and Odysseus in

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[51] *VH* 1.3.
[52] *VH* 1.5. It is clearly significant, in this connection, that Lucian explicitly identifies the *Odyssey* as a hypotext for the *VH*, given that there was a strong tradition of allegorical exegesis which interpreted Odysseus' wanderings as a metaphor for a journey of knowledge, a journey of the soul: see Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 5ff.; for further discussion of this interpretation of the *Odyssey*, see Rutherford 1986; cf. p. 182 below.
[53] Cf. p. 167 ff..
[54] *VH* 1.2.

person.[55] Where Socrates uses the verb ἐντυγχάνειν literally, in the sense of 'to meet', however, Lucian plays on its metaphorical meaning of 'to read.'[56]

On close analysis, therefore, the intertextuality between Plato's *Apology* and Lucian's proem suggests that the *diegesis* of the *VH* consists of a reification of other authors' texts, just as Lucian's 'journey' is itself a metaphor for reading. Nowhere is this clearer than in the interview with Homer on the Isle of the Blessed (*VH* 2.20), which is itself a reification of a discourse - an enactment of the Alexandrian critical scholarship on Homer's text - which represents the *pepaideumenos*' encounter with his literary heritage through the act of reading.[57]

In Plato's *oeuvre*, the *Apology* forms a natural companion piece to the *Phaedo*, as the two works deal with the trial and execution of Socrates respectively; the intertextuality with the *Apology* in the *VH* therefore also provides a neat complement to Lucian's appropriation of the myth of the *Phaedo*. Von Möllendorff argues for a fairly comprehensive intertextuality between the *VH* and Plato's *Phaedo* as well, especially the myth (*Phaedo* 108 d1 - 115 a6), which he believes Lucian uses as an 'organising subtext' for the *VH*.[58] Lucian clearly evokes the *Phaedo* when, in his description of the guests on the Isle of the Blessed, he states that Plato alone was not there (2.17). One of the reasons why the reference to Plato is particularly apt here is the fact that his famous self-declared absence from the prison cell on Socrates' last day in the *Phaedo* resonates with his apparent absence as an author from his text; he lets Socrates do all the talking, as it were, to such an extent that it is all too easy to forget that Plato is in fact the author of the dialogues.[59] Von Möllendorff also reads allusions to the *Phaedo* myth in details in the *VH* such as the ascent out of the fish (analogous to the ascent out of the hollow places of the inhabited world, *Phaedo* 110 a); the stars and planets resembling islands in the sea of the firmament (*VH* 1.10; cf. Socrates' description of the true surface of the world, which includes features that correspond to a sea with islands, *Phaedo* 111 a-b); the view from above, down on the inhabited world in both works (*VH* 1. 10 and 26; *Phaedo* 110 bff.); the Isle of the Blessed in the *VH* perhaps corresponding to the idea that the true surface is a

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[55] Cf. *VH* 1.2, where Lucian says that his text contains riddling references to some of 'the ancients' - poets, philosophers and historians alike: τῶν ἱστορουμένων ἕκαστον οὐκ ἀκωμῳδήτως ᾔνικται πρός τινας τῶν παλαιῶν ποιητῶν τε καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ φιλοσόφων....

[56] See *VH* 1.4. Georgiadou & Larmour (1998a: 59) also note this possibility, and cite *Dem.Enc.* 27 and Plato, *Symp.* 177b for parallel uses of the verb; see p. 173 f. for the further implications of this.

[57] Cf. p. 160 ff., esp. n. 173.

[58] For a discussion of the intertextuality with the myth of the *Phaedo*, see von Möllendorff 2000: 544-560.

[59] Cf. *Philops.* 24; cf. p. 12, with n. 32.

place of bliss (*Phaedo* 111 b6-c3); the abundance of jewels and precious metals on the Isle of the Blest corresponds to the similar abundance of precious materials in the upper world, as seen by εὐδαίμονες θεαταί (*Phaedo* 111a); the association of Tartarus, the place of punishment, with the Ocean in both works (*VH* 2.29ff. ; *Phaedo* 111 dff.).

By virtue of this intertextuality with the *Phaedo*, consequently, Lucian as the author of the *VH*, is identified with Socrates, as the teller of the myth in the Plato's work.[60] Other details in the narrative seem to confirm this identification, e.g. it is predicted for both Lucian and Socrates that they will attain a state of blissful afterlife in the near future (*VH* 2.27: Rhadamanthys' prophecy that Lucian will come to his reward on the Isle of the Blessed shortly; *Phaedo* 115 d4: Socrates' prediction that he will soon go to the place of bliss himself).[61] Lucian's legacy, in the form of the narrative of the *VH*, is equated with Socrates' legacy, in the form of the myth in the *Phaedo*.[62] As von Möllendorff notes, the myth is a form whose truth-status is ambivalent, but the results of reading it are acknowledged to be worthwhile;[63] this in itself makes Plato's myth a particularly appropriate comparand for the *VH*, a text whose truth-status is explicitly negative, but which the author nonetheless commends as beneficial reading material for scholars (1.1-2).

The scholiast felt that there was an intertextuality between *VH* 1. 4, and Plato, *Rep.* 614af.; in other words, that Lucian's observation that it was customary even for those who claimed to be philosophers to tell lies (ὁρῶν ἤδη σύνηθες ὂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπισχνουμένοις), was an implied criticism of Socrates, who, when he introduces the (clearly fabricated) Myth of Er, claims to be telling the truth:

ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἡρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου...[64]

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[60] Von Möllendorff 2000: 556.
[61] Von Möllendorff 2000: 557. He argues that this identification of Lucian with Socrates is not rendered problematic by the fact that Lucian subsequently reveals his own 'real' name at 2.29, or that Socrates himself features as a character in the narrative (e.g. 2.17, 2.19, 2.23). Lucian relies on his readers' familiarity with the game of 'double identity' in other works (e.g. Lycinus in the *Nav.*), so that they will recognise the same game here. Von Möllendorff also points out that there is an analogous situation in the *VH*, whereby Lucian is also identified with Odysseus, who himself features as well as a character in the narrative, and whom Lucian (2.29) actually meets (von Möllendorff 2000: 556, n. 138).
[62] Von Möllendorff 2000: 555. For the *VH* as Lucian's legacy, see *VH* 1.4, with further discussion below.
[63] Von Möllendorff 2000: 555.
[64] *Rep.* 614b; my translation here does not capture the pun on the words *Alkinou/alkimou* in Greek.

'Mind you, though,' said I, 'it's not the tale told to Alkinous that I shall tell you, but the that of a mighty man, Er of Armenia...'

Socrates exploits the widely recognised ambiguity of the truth-status of Odysseus' Phaeacian tales, as a foil to imbue his own narrative with greater credibility - when ironically, his own tale is just as fabulous; in other words, there is a self-conscious disjunction between Socrates' ostensible claims as narrator, and what he is really doing. However, the reference to the *Odyssey*, by raising the issue of narrative veracity, and aligning Socrates - even momentarily - with that arch-manipulator of the truth, Odysseus, injects a subversive element of doubt into the text. By knowingly constructing a polarity with Odysseus' tales, which is ostensibly calculated to confirm the veracity of his tale, but paradoxically gives the game (it is a *Fiktionalitätssignal*), Socrates advertises the fictionality of the *mythos*.

Lucian does something analogous when he is introducing *his* narrative in the *VH* - although, of course, he apparently eschews all desire to seduce his readers into believing it. However, the resonance of his narratorial air with ambiguous figures like Ctesias and Socrates - who both used polemic against the mendacity of predecessors, in an attempt to boost the credibility of their own (equally fabulous) narratives [65] - makes us wonder if even this apparent honesty is but a pose, a narratorial trick. Socrates and Cteisas in the prologue to the *VH* remind us that we have seen this sort of thing before; how can we be sure that Lucian's attempts to distance himself from their tactics is not a cunning ploy itself, also designed to lure us in, only in a more knowing manner?[66]

In the *Republic*, Socrates demonstrates that the poets do not possess genuine knowledge about everything they write about; if they did, he argues, they would not be content to devote themselves to producing mere reflections of the real thing in their poetry, but they would be eager to exercise their expertise, and to leave behind a legacy of noble deeds - for example by becoming a real doctor, say, rather than merely describing a doctor's activity in poetry.

ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων πέρι, ἅπερ καὶ μιμεῖται, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἂν σπουδάσειεν ἢ ἐπὶ

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[65] See Ctesias' polemic against Herodotus, *FGrH* 688 T 8, and Hartog (1988: 297): 'Ctesias, who was a doctor at the Persian court of king Artaxerxes, wrote *Persika*, in which he began by "taking the opposite view from Herodotus on just about everything", condemning him as a liar on many counts and labeling him a *logopoios*. As a result, Herodotus's credibility was ruined and denounced as a mere attempt to seem such, while high claims were made for Ctesias's own credibility... Needless to say, what follows is generally accepted to be a heap of the most arrant lies.' Cf. p. 179f., with n. 258.

[66] Laird (2003) draws attention to how this intertextuality in the *VH* can provide us with insight into *Plato's* use of fiction as a philosophical discourse.

τοῖς μιμήμασι, καὶ πειρῷτο ἂν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἑαυτοῦ καταλιπεῖν μνημεῖα...[67]

But, I suppose, if he were *truly* an expert in these things which he imitates, then he would be far more eager for action than for imitation, and he would try to leave behind many noble deeds as memorials to himself...

It is interesting to compare this with *VH* 1.4, where Lucian himself admits that just such an eager desire to leave a legacy for posterity incited him to write his text: [68]

διόπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ κενοδοξίας ἀπολιπεῖν τι σπουδάσας τοῖς μεθ' ἡμᾶς...ἐπεὶ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἱστορεῖν εἶχον...ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐτραπόμην...

For this reason, I myself, eager in my vanity to leave something behind for posterity...since I had nothing true to tell...I turned to lies...

Both authors speak of 'truth' - in Plato's case, the man who possesses 'true' knowledge of something; in Lucian's case to the 'true' report he does *not* have. Both authors also speak in similar terms of the 'eager desire' to leave behind a legacy (σπουδάζω: the same verb is used in each case). In the case of Socrates' 'true expert', this legacy consists of deeds, whereas the literary legacy of the poets reflects the fact that they do *not* possess true knowledge. Lucian, therefore, by expressing his desire to leave behind just such a literary legacy, aligns himself with the poets, who are content to devote themselves to mere reflections of reality; but Lucian also goes one step further. As he admits himself, his composition is not *even* a reflection of a reality, as the 'reality' never existed in the first place.[69] It looks like Lucian has carved out a new notch for himself and his work on Plato's scale of *mimesis* - one even lower down than the work of the poets. Their work is at least a reflection of reality, albeit three times removed, but his is not a reflection of reality at all. Consequently, his zeal to leave something behind for posterity is defined as an empty desire for reputation (κενοδοξία). In the context of this intertextuality with Plato, this word surely evokes Socrates' distinction between 'true knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη), and opinion (δόξα) which is merely a reflection of true knowledge - and is therefore, by analogy, more or less the equivalent of artistic or literary *mimesis*, with respect to true reality. (Mimetic art correlates to *doxa* on the cognitive register for Plato.) The addition of the idea of emptiness

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[67] Plato *Rep.* 599b.
[68] Cf. Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 28.
[69] *VH* 1.4.

($\kappa\epsilon\nu o\delta o\xi\acute{\iota}\alpha$) to this already less-than-substantive concept reflects the idea that the *mimesis* in this fantasy text bears no relation to true reality whatsoever.[70]

Lucian's adoption of a Socratic air in the *VH* can be related to his appropriation of the form of the Platonic dialogue in other works, such as the *Tox.*, *Philops.* and *Nav.*, as part of a *speculative framework* within which to explore a concept or dynamic, in this case fiction-writing and fictionality. The ambivalence of the Platonic Socrates, with his famous Socratic irony, is highly appropriate to the ambivalent Lucianic *persona* in the *VH*; in particular, Socrates' ironic *persona* is an apt comparand for Lucian's ironic projection of a more naïve narrator in the *VH*. Lucian arguably evokes the ironic Socrates in order to reflect a fundamental irony (in the Aristotelian sense of pretending to know less than one does) about reading and writing fiction - namely that one consentingly and knowingly ascribes credence to a world one knows is not real.[71] This polarity of consciousness is essentially what Lucian problematizes in the *VH*, when he splits the Lucianic voice into truthful author and mendacious narrator, who are yet one and the same person. There are also other reasons too why the Socratic air is appropriate for the narrator of the *VH*. The famous icon of the serio-comic, hybrid Socrates from Alcibiades' description in the *Symposium* is perhaps a good analogy for Lucian, the *spoudogeloios* of the *VH*,[72] as well as reflecting the serio-comic spirit of the work itself.[73]

## Aristotle

It is significant that the proem to the *VH*, which constitutes something of an *apologia* for the nature of the fantastic text to follow, strikes a resonance with a number of passages from Aristotle's *Poetics*, where he compounds formulae to legitimise the truth-value of literary texts. An analysis of the particular passages to which Lucian alludes, and the changes he rings on them, will illuminate Lucian's own concept of fictionality, and show that he was himself conscious of the newness of his contribution.

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[70] Todorov 1970: 98; cf. p. 161.

[71] Cf. p. 68 ff..

[72] See Camerotto 1998: 129, n. 22.

[73] Branham 1989: 51-2. Lucian declares the serio-comic nature of his work in the *Bacchus*, a *prolalia* which some scholars believe prefaced the *VH*: see Georgiadou & Larmour 1994: 1500 ff.. More generally, Socrates' hybrid nature might reflect the *mixis Lucianea* of philosophical dialogue, old comedy, and Cynic diatribe (*Bis Acc.* 33); see Camerotto 1998: 120-129. Indeed, Socrates' hybridity might be seen as an emblem for Plato's own compositional technique; Halperin (1992: 93-6) notes that much of Plato's work is in fact composed in the 'mixed' narrative mode which he himself identifies at *Rep.* 394 c4-5).

At *VH* 1.2, Lucian writes explicitly about his intended readership; he writes for the educated élite, the *pepaideumenoi*, with the intention of providing recreational reading material and mental stimulation too.

γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἐμμελὴς ἡ ἀνάπαυσις αὐτοῖς, εἰ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν ἀναγνωσμάτων ὁμιλοῖεν, ἃ μὴ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ ἀστείου τε καὶ χαρίεντος ψιλὴν παρέξει τὴν ψυχαγωγίαν, ἀλλά τινα καὶ θεωρίαν οὐκ ἄμουσον ἐπιδείξεται, οἷόν τι καὶ περὶ τῶνδε τῶν συγγραμμάτων φρονήσειν ὑπολαμβάνω·[74]

But their recreation would be all the more fitting for them, if they busy themselves with the sort of reading material that will not only provide pure entertainment with its wit and humour, but will also reveal itself as a not uncultured source of intellectual speculation, the sort of thing which I expect they will find in this text too.

This passage resonates in a curious manner with the section in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1128 a1) where Aristotle deals with the quality of wit, with its excess (buffoonery) and deficiency (boorishness).

οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὡς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν· διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν.[75]

But since there is also time for relaxation in life, and since this includes spending time in playful amusement, it seems proper that in this area too there should be an appropriate form of social conduct, covering both the sort of things one should say and how one should say them, and likewise the proper way to listen. And it will make a difference what sort of people one speaks to, and what sort of people one listens to.

There are some obvious common points of reference for both of these texts. Both authors use the same term to refer to designated relaxation time in our daily lives: ἡ ἀνάπαυσις. Aristotle discusses the social behaviour that is appropriate for such periods of relaxation, whereas Lucian discusses the appropriate sort of reading material, using similar language, e.g.: *VH* 1.2:

γένοιτο δ' ἂν *ἐμμελὴς ἡ ἀνάπαυσις* αὐτοῖς, εἰ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν *ἀναγνωσμάτων ὁμιλοῖεν*

echoes *EN* 1128 a1:

οὔσης δὲ καὶ *ἀναπαύσεως* ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι *ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής*.

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[74] There is an intertextuality here with Plato's *Apology* as well: cf. p. 129 ff..
[75] *EN* 1128 a1.

The terms in which Lucian promotes his serio-comical text here intersect even more strikingly with Aristotle's recommendation that a moderate amount of relaxation (σύμμετρος ἀνάπαυσις) helps us to continue our business with greater zeal (σπουδαιότερον ἔχεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων).[76] There is in fact a double intertextuality here, as this passage also recalls Plato, *Philebus* 30e (Socrates and Protarchus are in conversation):

ΣΩ.    ἔχεις γὰρ δήπου νῦν ἡμῶν ἤδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.
ΠΡΩ.   ἔχω καὶ μάλα ἱκανῶς· καίτοι με ἀποκρινάμενος ἔλαθες.
ΣΩ.    ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιά.

Soc.    Have you got the meaning of my answer now?
Pr.     I have indeed, well enough - but I wasn't aware that you had given your answer.
Soc.    **That's because sometimes a joke is a break from seriousness, Protarchus.**

A little earlier, at 30b, Socrates mentioned physical exercise and treatment of the body when it is ill - which reminds us of the athlete-image in the *VH*. Socrates' crucial comment (printed here in bold) - that a joke provides a rest from seriousness - is clearly reflected in Lucian's recommendation of the lighthearted nature of his work, with clear verbal echoes linking the two passages. Protarchus' observation, that the jocular style of Socrates' answer blinded him temporarily to the seriousness of the importance of his communication, is also relevant to the serio-comical *VH*, whose frivolity serves a valuable purpose for serious scholars.[77]

The image of the athlete (*VH* 1.1), which provides the point of comparison for the scholarly reader of the *VH*, is most interesting, evoking the combination of τέχνη and ἄσκησις, as von Möllendorff observes;[78] the latter idea especially implies that the ideal reader of the *VH* is likely to be a professional *pepaideumenos*, one who has made his intellectual training into a career and way of life.[79] Just as serious athletes require physical relaxation, so too scholars need

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[76] *EN* 10. 6.1176 b30 ff.; *Pol.* 8. 3.1337 b36 ff.; cf. Janko 1984: 148.

[77] This point is made also in the *prolalia Ba.* 5; cf. n. 73 above.

[78] Von Möllendorff 2000: 17; he discusses the ideal reader of the *VH* on p. 22 ff..

[79] For the *VH* as part of the scholar's ἄσκησις, i.e. the practice of *paideia*, see von Möllendorff 2000: 559. The Athenian Stranger in Plato's *Laws* also makes a point about the importance of alternating zeal and relaxation with respect to the body, soul and livelihood, as a crucial aspect of *paideia* which people ought to grasp (*Laws* 724 a-b); see von Möllendorff 2000: 36. cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1371a 20: μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ. For the reader of the *VH* as athlete, see Larmour 1997: 143. The image resonates with the broader interest at this time in the role served by gymnastics in education (e.g. Lucian, *Anacharsis* 20ff.; Philostratus, *Gymnasticus*), but the idea also had a Platonic pedigree; see, for example, *Rep.* 410 bff.. Laird (2003) argues that the language

recreational reading material to refresh and stimulate the brain; the mixture of usefulness and pleasure, which the *VH* will provide, is mirrored by mixture of usefulness and pleasure that is found in gymnastics in *Anacharsis* 6;[80] reading the *VH*, therefore, is tantamount to mental gymnastics.[81] Lucian's emphasis on the *release* (*VH* 1.1: ἄνεσις; ἀνιέναι) provided by the *VH* also recalls the terms in which Hermogenes of Tarsus (second century A.D.) recommends a variety of literary forms - such as diatribe, dialogue, comedy and Socratic *symposia* - which have the virtue of inducing in the reader alternately the double effects of relaxation (ἄνεσις) and tension (τάσις).[82]

Both Aristotle and Lucian seem to agree that the type of conduct or reading material suitable to such occasions should be 'middle-of-the-road', i.e. not totally ridiculous, nor devoid of play either. In terms of social behaviour, Aristotle advocates that we should aspire to wittiness, which is midway between buffoonery and boorishness:

οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔτροποι·[83]

In terms of reading material, Lucian recommends his own text, which is humorous and diverting, but will also provide mental stimulation and food for thought.[84]

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of the prologue (especially words such as *psychagogia* and *theoria*) is evocative of 'a philosophical sort of education.' Cf. n. 145 below also.

[80] See Camerotto 1998: 137, n. 256.

[81] One might compare the figurative *desultoria scientia* of Apuleius' style (*Met.* 1.1). Of course, the *seriousness* of the preface is dubious; Branham certainly seems to think that Lucian is speaking tongue-in-cheek here too: 'The salubrious effects of literary speculation that combines formal experimentation, wit, and novelty in the service of an aesthetic view of literature are ironically advertised in the opening gambit to *A True Story*; the prologue itself initiates the facetious game it describes with its parodic reference to Odysseus as the archetypal liar/author deceiving the simple Phaeacians with his preposterous tales...' (Branham 1989: 211-2). Branham adds in a note (*ibid.*: 268, n. 2): 'It is hard to tell where the honest prologist ends and the lying narrator begins: Does the prologist really believe relaxation is more important (*megiston*: 1) for an athlete than exercise? Or is this the first lie?' Bitel (2001: 144) compares the similar ambiguity in Apuleius' prologue.

[82] Hermogenes II. 455-6 (Spengel); see Bompaire 1958: 557. Hermogenes' ideas in turn intersect strikingly with Lucian's own self-conscious hybridization of literary forms such as Menippean satire, diatribe, comedy and dialogue (*Bis Acc.* 33), as Branham astutely notes (1989: 47): 'Although Lucian's literary debts are manifold, ranging from the fantastic quality of Aristophanic plot structures to the naturalistic dramatization of philosophical conversation in the style of Plato, his most fertile link with tradition is arguably the conception of the seriocomic character and mode of writing. He is not reduplicating a recognizable generic type so much as renovating one that existed in diverse forms...In so doing he is reinventing a way of writing that strove for the precarious complexity of tone and effect produced by superimposing generic repertoires conventionally kept distinct and reformulating their key elements.' On Hermogenes' importance for the literature of the second century A.D. in general, see Rutherford 1998, *passim*.

[83] *EN* 1128 a3.

[84] *VH* 1.2. Significantly, this Aristotelian passage follows directly after Aristotle's discussion of the quality of sincerity, with its excess (boastfulness), and its deficiency (self-depreciation: εἰρωνεία), for which he cites Socrates as the supreme example (*EN* 1127 b14 - 16). Lucian's proem itself

In his discussion of wit, Aristotle recognizes the highly subjective nature of humour, which makes it an elusive quality to pin down; for example, he distinguishes between the type of jesting that is characteristic of a freeborn gentleman and a man of servile status, as well as the humour characteristic of the educated, as opposed to the uneducated:

...ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου.[85]

He elaborates briefly on this issue, illustrating the point further by using as an analogy the difference between the broad wit that is typical of Old Comedy (obscenity: ἡ αἰσχρολογία) and the subtler species in New Comedy (innuendo: ἡ ὑπόνοια). He concludes from this that the difference in type of humour consists in varying degrees of decorum: διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην.[86]

Although Lucian does not discuss the subjective nature of wit in the *VH*, some of the thought processes in the proem to the *VH* are similar to Aristotle's here. Aristotle, as we have seen, distinguishes between the type of humour characteristic of the educated and the uneducated; in a similar vein, Lucian makes a point of singling out his ideal, educated reader, the *pepaideumenos*, and distinguishing him from an inscribed anti-reader, a naïve reader, represented by the gullible Phaeacians, whom he describes as ἰδιῶται ἄνθρωποι.[87] Even the image of the athlete, which Lucian uses to represent his ideal reader, correlates with Aristotle's text. At 1128 a3, Aristotle infers that the witty character must be agile because of the quickness of its impulses; he suggests it is possible to infer mental agility from such movements, just as we infer physical agility from the movements of body: τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη. It is possible that this inspired Lucian with the idea of drawing an analogy between mental and physical training in the athlete image (*VH* 1.1).[88] Finally, Lucian's

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evokes the famous ironic pose of Socrates through intertextuality with Plato's *Apology*, as I have already demonstrated.

[85] *EN* 1128 a5.

[86] *EN* 1128 a7.

[87] *VH* 1.3. The Phaeacians listening to Odysseus (*VH* 1.3) are 'in-text' readers, whose function is to focus the extra-textual reader's response by *antithesis*: cf. Morgan 1991: 102. The ἰδιώτης is contrasted with the σοφός at *Conv.* 35; see Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 56. On Lucian and his readers, see Korus 1986; Georgiadou & Larmour 1994: 1455-6; see especially the discussion at p. 175 ff. below.

[88] Cf. p. 137 f. above.

proem also evokes the discourse of Old Comedy, although not for the same purposes as Aristotle here.[89]

Lucian establishes a subversive dialectic with Aristotle's *Poetics*, in order to define more clearly the nature of his own literary enterprise in the *VH*. At *Poetics* 1460 18-19, Aristotle identifies Homer as having a seminal role as the model which other literary artists follow in learning how to embellish their work with marvellous (and less than truthful) details:[90]

> τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ· σημεῖον δέ, πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι. δεδίδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ.

> But amazement is pleasant; proof of this is the fact that everyone embellishes when they tell stories, in order to give pleasure. And it is above all Homer who has taught others how one should tell lies.

Aristotle's understanding here of the pleasure humans naturally take in imaginative embellishment is echoed in *VH* 1.3, where Lucian concedes an attractive quality to the lies of Iambulus:

> ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ Ἰαμβοῦλος περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ θαλάττῃ πολλὰ παράδοξα, γνώριμον μὲν ἅπασι τὸ ψεῦδος πλασάμενος, οὐκ ἀτερπῆ δὲ ὅμως συνθεὶς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

> And Iambulus too wrote many strange things about those in the great sea, fabricating a lie that was obvious to everybody, but putting together a not unpleasant plot all the same.

And within a few lines, Lucian identifies Homer's Odysseus as the archetypal model for such literary lies, when he told the story of his marvellous adventures to the Phaeacians:

> ἀρχηγὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διδάσκαλος τῆς τοιαύτης βωμολοχίας ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου Ὀδυσσεύς, τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀλκίνουν διηγούμενος ἀνέμων τε δουλείαν...[91]

> But the instigator and instructor in this sort of buffoonery is Homer's Odysseus, telling the court of Alcinous the story of the enslavement of winds...

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[89] For the discourse of Old Comedy in the *VH*, see p. 191 ff..

[90] Compare this passage from Aristotle with Plato, *Rep.* 595 c; see following note.

[91] *VH* 1.3; cf. p. 132. There is also an echo here of Plato, *Rep.* 595 b9-c3: ῥητέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν *πρῶτος διδάσκαλός* τε καὶ *ἡγεμὼν* γενέσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος

While it is clear that Lucian is following the general tenor of Aristotle's argument here, he also refines it; where Aristotle simply identifies the author Homer as the archetypal literary embellisher, Lucian, with greater narratological scrupulousness, distinguishes *author* (Homer) from *narrator* (Odysseus), thereby also distinguishing text from diegesis, and implying that the author may allow his narrator to lie without incurring any such guilt himself. This is highly significant for the narratological structure of the *VH* itself, where the *persona* of Lucian is split between the (truthful) author, and the (lying) narrator; just as Homer is not necessarily to blame for Odysseus' lies, so too the author Lucian hopes to evade censure by warning his readers that, as the narrator, all he will tell is lies:

> οὕτω δ' ἄν μοι δοκῶ καὶ τὴν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορίαν ἐκφυγεῖν αὐτὸς ὁμολογῶν μηδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγειν.[92]

> And in this way I think I will escape the censure of others, by admitting myself that I say nothing truthful.

At *Poetics* 1451 a 36ff., Aristotle discusses the differences between the work of the historian, and that of the 'poet' (the term 'poetry' – ποίησις - may include what we would nowadays generally call 'literature', as prose fiction would have covered the same ground as poetry for Aristotle in terms of content). The historian describes things which *have* happened, whereas the 'poet' describes things which *could* happen.

> φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

> It is also clear from what has been said that it is not the task of the poet to describe things that have happened, but things that could happen, and things that are possible in accordance with probability or necessity.

Aristotle reiterates this sentiment again a few lines later, to emphasise that this is the point of distinction between the two:

> ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο.[93]

> But they differ in this respect, that to one belongs the task of describing things that have happened; to the other, the sorts of things that could happen.

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ἀνήρ... Note how this passage also emphasizes Homer's archetypal status with regard to lack of *truthfulness*, as in the *VH*.
[92] *VH* 1.4.

Aristotle explains that literature is more 'catholic' in this respect, in that it treats universals, whereas history deals in particular events, people etc.; for this same reason, literature is more *philosophical* too, because it facilitates speculation on the general nature of things.[94] For Aristotle, therefore, the universality of literature itself constitutes a sort of truth, and the fact that we can infer important lessons about life from such 'plasmatic' ('made-up') literature serves to legitimise it, even if it does not deal with factual truths, as history does.[95] This idea underlies the longstanding apologetic for *plasmata*, namely that they may be indulged only if some didactic or moral purpose can be extracted from them; make-believe for its own sake is for children only.[96]

In a similar vein, Aristotle later argues that plausibility should always be the guiding principle in plot-construction; probability should even take precedence over fact, if the fact is less believable.

προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα.[97]

It is necessary to choose impossibilities that are plausible, rather than possibilities that are unbelievable possibilities.

As Fuchs notes, Aristotle's concept legitimises fiction by the universality of its contents; the demand for truth is replaced by a demand for plausibility. But this necessarily limits the extent of Aristotle's theory, as it can only ever legitimise plasmatic literature, i.e. material that is compatible with extra-literary reality; it cannot legitimise texts like Lucian's, which are explicitly at odds with reality.[98] Why, therefore, does Lucian use Aristotle's theory as a frame of reference for a text which is going break the rules?

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[93] Aristotle, *Poetics* 1451 b4 ff..

[94] *Poetics* 1451 b5ff.: διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ᾽ ἱστορία τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον λέγει. Lucian exploits the similarity in the discourse of poets and philosophers in a more negative way - see following note.

[95] It is striking in the *VH* that Lucian, unlike Aristotle, does not distinguish in this way between writers of literature, and writers of factual discourse, but rather throws poets, philosophers *and* historians all together into the same category of literary liars: ...τῶν ἱστορουμένων ἕκαστον οὐκ ἀκωμῳδήτως ᾔνικται πρός τινας τῶν παλαιῶν ποιητῶν τε καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ φιλοσόφων πολλὰ τεράστια καὶ μυθώδη συγγεγραφότων... He shows greater discernment in the *Philops.*, where he grants poets a degree of license with the truth: cf. Chapter 1, p. 21 ff..

[96] Hence Lucian's insistence on the *usefulness* of his text, in addition to its entertainment value; see the discussion at p. 179 ff. below.

[97] Aristotle *Poetics* 1460 a 26 f..

[98] Fuchs 1993: 252. Fuchs (1993: 201) notes that the modern idea of the 'pact' of fiction between author and reader is not present in Aristotle's conception; for this reason, the modern concept of fiction can be used of ancient literature in a restricted sense only, to refer to objectively 'made-up'

In his proem, Lucian admits openly that the contents of his narrative are lies, but plausibly presented lies:

> οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ ξένον τῆς ὑποθέσεως οὐδὲ τὸ χαρίεν τῆς προαιρέσεως ἐπαγωγὸν ἔσται αὐτοῖς οὐδ᾽ ὅτι ψεύσματα ποικίλα πιθανῶς τε καὶ ἐναλήθως ἐξενηνόχαμεν...[99]

> For not only will they find the novelty of the plot, or the charm of the subject-matter attractive, nor indeed the fact that *I have brought out a variety of lies in a plausible and specious manner...*

It seems here that he is working with the Aristotelian idea that a plot should above all be *plausible*, irrespective of its factual content, but he is clearly stretching it to its limits.

Lucian seems to characterise his work as history in the proem (referring to it, for example, as τάδε τα συγγράμματα and τα ἱστορούμενα),[100] but in contrast to Aristotle's *dictum* that history describes things that have happened, Lucian asserts that *his* history describes things that have never happened, and could never happen.[101] Lucian's plot is non-plasmatic, in that it explicitly does *not* seek to be compatible with extra-literary reality.

I have tried to show here how Lucian reacts against Aristotle deliberately in order to highlight his new legitimisation of fiction, moving the argument away from the issue of *contents* and their relation to extra-literary reality, and transferring it into the arena of authorial intentionality and reader reception - in other words a contractual basis for fiction. Lucian problematizes Aristotelian ideas of truth and plausibility in a way that provides insight into the paradoxical nature of fictionality. He asserts that his text will lie somewhere in between the two poles of Aristotelian truth; it will neither convey truth as history (i.e. it describes things that never happened), nor truth as literature (i.e. it describes things that could never happen). By denying all claims to historical or plasmatic 'truth' to his (ironically titled) *True Stories* in this way, Lucian appears at first to be drawing the focus away from the objective truth-value of the contents of the narrative, to foreground the *plausibility* of the text, a move which would seem, initially at least, to comply with Aristotelian requirements. Yet he also undercuts this by warning his readers not to be fooled by the plausibility; it is all lies, and nothing is to be believed.

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content, but not to any contractual understanding of fictional truth. She later refines this idea, when she is discussing Lucian (252).
[99] *VH* 1.2.
[100] *VH* 1.2.
[101] *VH* 1.4.

Lucian therefore appropriates and manipulates Aristotelian theory in the proem, in order to whittle down closer to the essential paradox of fiction, namely that the reader knowingly complies in the make-believe, while remaining aware on one level that it is never really true. He identifies the crucial point, that fiction is not really deception, or mendacity, as the author's attempt to convince the reader of the veracity of the text is itself part of the game of make-believe; it is in this sense that the author of a fictional text 'lies honestly'. By denying his text any 'truth' in the Aristotelian sense, and by problematizing the plausibility of its presentation as well, Lucian foregrounds the author/ reader contract programmatically, in a way that will turn subsequent *Beglaubigungsstrategien* in the text from *Lügensignale* into *Fiktionalitätssignale*.[102]

Lucian therefore prepares readers for a paradoxical text, in which he will try to convince readers of the veracity of what he has told them is untrue, while both remain aware that this is in the nature of an intellectual game. By differentiating more carefully than Aristotle did between author and narrator, Lucian also prepares the reader in advance for the problematization of authorial *persona* in the *VH*. Working with, and reacting against Aristotle's theory, Lucian marks out his legitimization of fiction as a *new* departure, founded upon a compact of understanding between author and reader. This new apologetic discourse fits in neatly with Lucian's claims about the novelty and intellectual appeal of his literary enterprise in the proem.

### Strabo

One of the crucial functions of Lucian's proem is to establish the *VH* as a fantastic explorer's log, the archetype for which was indeed, as Lucian himself recognized, Odysseus' Phaeacian tales (*VH* 1.3).[103] Like the ghost stories and urban legends in the *Philops.*, this is no random or careless choice. The explorer's log was the most appropriate vehicle for such audacious and explicit fiction, as a genre in which the boundaries between truth and lies were notoriously unstable, and recognized as such in antiquity, especially by critics of Homer in the Hellenistic era, and scholars of geography. By aligning himself with the tradition

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[102] Fuchs 1993: 224: 'Eine Beglaubigungsstrategie, die vom jeweiligen Verfasser mit der Absicht verwendet wird, daß der Leser mit ihrer Hilfe den Text als erfunden identifiziert, wird somit zum Fiktionalitätssignal.' For reservations, however, that *Beglaubigungsstrategien* were interpreted in antiquity as *Fiktionalitätssignale* only in the second place, if at all, see *ibid.*: 233-234 and 251-252.
[103] Anderson (1982: 72) describes the beginning of the *VH* as the 'conventional beginning of a voyage narrative.' Romm (1992: 213) notes how the proem attunes the reader to the complex ambiguities of the explorer text. Rütten (1997: 109) refers to Lucian's choice of novelistic travel-narrative, but claims that he rouses the reader's expectations about generic conventions, only to dash them, and play with a variety of different topics.

of the fantastic traveller's tales of the *Odyssey* and the explorer's log, Lucian not only selects a form which will reflect the thematization of the mutability of truth and lies in the *VH*, but he also evokes the critical theories of these scholars as a speculative frame of reference for his literary experiment in make-believe.

The field of geography in antiquity, while it may appear initially to be an unlikely quarry for ancient ideas about fiction, actually produced some of the most sophisticated thinkers on the subject. This connection between ancient geography and fiction is less surprising, however, when one considers that the issues of veracity and credibility are first really highlighted in the context of travellers' tales and explorers' logs. Make-believe has for a long time been associated with either temporal or spatial remoteness, or both;[104] and if earnest historians and geographers could express distrust of facts that were associated with distant times and locations, it would not be long before inventive authors would learn to exploit the explorer's log - which dealt especially with remote and exotic locations - as a literary form which could allow them to write fiction.[105]

For Strabo, as a scholar of geography, the issue of veracity in explorers' texts was supremely important; for example, he denigrated the explorer Pytheas unequivocally as 'the very worst of liars' for writing an account of his travels which included a description of the far-remote, legendary island of Thule.[106] But Strabo proved himself to be uncommonly perceptive when he identified an 'intermediate' sort of text, which was neither wholly factual, nor entirely fabulous, where the categories of truth and lies were deliberately blurred. These texts were mendacious, inasmuch as they presented untruths in a plausible way - for example, in the form of an explorer's log, which purported to be genuine - but they were nevertheless exempt from critical reproach, because they presented these specious lies in such a transparent way that they could not be confused with genuine explorer's logs. They could, therefore, be appreciated and enjoyed on their own terms, as literary inventions, *as fiction*.

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[104] One can see in the fairy-tale that spatial and temporal distance in fact function as *Fiktionalitätssignale*; a formula such as 'a long time ago, in a land far away...' emphasises spatio-temporal remoteness (and indefiniteness), and is a clue to the reader that what follows is make-believe: see Fuchs 1993: 218ff..

[105] See Romm 1992: 202: '...there were others in later antiquity who perceived the intermediate nature of these texts not as a problem needing to be resolved but as an opportunity waiting to be exploited. It is no coincidence...that several of the most innovative works of prose fiction in the second century A.D. took the form of explorer's logs.'

[106] Strabo 1.4.3. Romm (1992: 198, n. 58), however, cautions that one shouldn't immediately presume that Strabo's polemic against Pytheas here was based solely on the fact that Thule was a legendary geographical fixture; it was probably fuelled as much by the fact that, by incorporating Thule into the *oikoumene*, Pytheas presented an image of the world that was endorsed by Strabo's rivals, Eratosthenes and Hipparchus. On Pytheas, see now Cunliffe 2001.

Strabo described this sort of text with the label 'Bergaean,' which is a reference to the author Antiphanes of Berge, whose work, now lost, was written in the form of a travel-log, to give an authentic frame to an otherwise absurdly fantastical narrative.[107] A tantalising few details of Antiphanes' work have been fossilised in other authors, offering us a glimpse of what must have been a marvellously imaginative, even surreal fantasy; for example, Antiphanes describes a remote city of the far north, where the air is so cold that one's words freeze in mid-air; conversations spoken in winter are therefore only heard once the thaw of summertime has set in![108] Such obvious absurdity undermined the bid for authenticity that was implicit in the literary form, uncovering the playful mendacity of Antiphanes' text; these were lies, but transparent lies, which could then be enjoyed for their own sake, and the adjective 'Bergaean' came to mean something close to what we would designate 'purely fictional.' Now, Strabo, in his *Geography*, was not interested in pursuing, and maybe was not even aware of, the enormous literary implications of this twilight zone that he had identified, but by establishing a 'Bergaean' class of texts, which characterised 'a domain of narrative in which the inventions otherwise scorned as *mythoi* or *pseudea* could be

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[107] Romm (1992: 196) cites Strabo's use of the term 'Bergaean' as an example of how 'the terminology used in geographical criticism consistently reveals its literary orientation.' On the overlap between geography and fiction in general in antiquity, see Romm 1992: 172-214 and Romm 1994. On Antiphanes of Berge, see Knaack 1906.

[108] Plutarch *De profect. in virtute* 79a; see Weinreich 1942. Such 'concretization' resonates with the almost surreal fantasy that permeates the epigrams of Lucillius, e.g. the 'vertically challenged' Hermogenes, who is so short that when he drops something, he has to pull it back *down* to himself with a pitchfork; Marcus, who was so incredibly thin that his head perforated one of Epicurus' atoms; when the same Marcus tried to blow a trumpet, he slid head-first into the mouthpiece, and right through the instrument! (*Anth. Pal.* 11. 89, 93 and 94 respectively). For an excellent assessment of the importance of Lucillius' work, and its place in contemporary literary culture, see Bowersock 1994: 22ff. and 34f.. Bowersock identifies Lucillius as a turning point in imaginative literature in antiquity, which 'reopened the Aristophanic vein of fantasy and outrageousness.' (34) This sort of technique clearly has its roots in Aristophanic fantasy (one thinks of the weighing of poetry *Frogs*), and seems to have catered for a particular taste at the time; see Bowersock 1994: 33ff., and p. 191 ff. below. Many examples of such playful reification of text can be found throughout Lucian's works: Hermes exploits the (literally) mountain-moving powers of Homer's poetry (*Charon* 4); Charon's proud knowledge of some Homeric poetry is gleaned from the copious lines which the poet vomited up during his rocky crossing in Charon's ferry (*ibid.* 7); even more surreally, the letter Σ indicts the letter T for usurping his place in the spelling of words (*Iud. Voc. passim*). There are also many examples in the *VH*, e.g. 2.42 (the sea-forest, which, as well as recalling a similar phenomenon reported by the notoriously mendacious Megasthenes (715 F 25 Jacoby), is also a reification of a verse of Antimachus). On Lucian's use of this technique, see Matteuzzi 1975 and Fusillo 1999: 373-4, who connects it with Euhemeristic rationalization. On the Antimachus quotation, see Matthews (1996: 224 ff.), who concludes that 'Lucian's story is invented, to some extent, to make fun of Antimachus by interpreting in a ridiculous manner what must have seemed to him a very unusual expression.' (*op. cit.*: 225).

tolerated and even encouraged,'[109] he had opened up definitively the third semantic space which fiction occupies: not truth or lies, but *truthful lying*.[110]

As Romm shows, it is also clear from what Strabo and others say that the boundaries of this literary category were a source of constant dispute; the categories of Bergaean fiction and truthful *periploi* were especially susceptible to becoming confused.[111] Strabo tells us, for example, that Eratosthenes labelled Euhemerus 'Bergaean.'[112] We know something of Euhemerus' work from Diodorus Siculus;[113] it was called the *Sacred Inscription* (Ἱερά ' Ἀναγραφή), and seems to have incorporated some sort of travel narrative, in which Euhemerus, in the service of King Cassander of Macedon (reigned 305-297 B.C.), describes a group of islands off the shore of Arabia Felix, especially the largest island, Panchaea. From what Strabo tells us about Eratosthenes' opinion of this work, we might conclude that it was generally considered to contain little of factual value for geographers, whatever its entertainment value as literature. However, both Polybius and Strabo attributed greater geographical credibility to Euhemerus' work than to that of Pytheas, and Polybius denigrates Eratosthenes himself as 'Bergaean' for esteeming the truth-value of Pytheas' text more highly than Euhemerus'.[114] The point is that nobody seems to be sure whether the *Sacred Inscription* was a Bergaean fiction, or a paideutic geographical text.

Similarly, Strabo is critical of the work of the second century B.C. explorer, Eudoxus of Cyzicus (who recorded an attempt to circumnavigate Africa), describing him as 'Bergaean,' whereas his predecessor and fellow-Stoic Posidonius considered this same text to be a truthful account. According to Strabo, Bergaean authors like Eudoxus could be excused, because, like conjurers with their tricks (θαυματοποιοί) they made no secret of their lying, and consequently, nobody

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[109] Romm 1992: 197.
[110] Strabo and Lucian show us that there was an understanding of how to read fiction in antiquity, as does Gorgias (cf. Chapter 1, p. 59 ff.), but it was by no means ubiquitous; Diodorus, for example, includes utopian accounts, such as the work of Euhemerus, in his history of real island societies. The very fact that Lucian satirizes this sort of reading suggests that it was in fact the prevalent approach. See Fuchs 1993: 202-203: 'Satirische Angriffe auf die angebliche Lügenliteratur wären überflüssig, wenn diese nicht in weiten Kreisen distanzlosen Glauben gefunden hätte. Sie lassen darauf schließen, daß fiktionale Texte häufig nicht in ihrer Fiktionalität erkannt worden sind.' (202).
[111] For the following account, see Romm 1992: 197 ff..
[112] Strabo 1.3.1; 2.4.2.
[113] Fragments of Euhemerus' work are preserved in Diodorus 5.41-46 (as well as a little in Book 6 of the *Library*). On Euhemerus' work, see Holzberg 1996: 621-626. Fusillo (1999: 372) discusses Euhemerus' possible influence on the *VH*. For utopian elements in the *VH*, see Fauth 1979, von Koppenfels 1981, and Nesselrath 1993.
[114] Polybius 34.5.

took them literally.[115] Posidonius, however, deserves greater censure because, as a philosopher, he should have recognised Eudoxus' work for what it was, and not attempted to elevate it to the status of a serious geographical text. Posidonius, then, is guilty of 'misreading' Eudoxus, or as Romm observes, Posidonius' crime is against the literary scale of value: '...the geographer's inability to distinguish truth from fiction results in a conflation of high and low forms of literature, and a collapse of the critical canon.'[116]

The need to be able to 'read' properly, to develop the faculty to discern what is written in the form of *myth* from what is written in the form of *history*, even where an author does not signpost it explicitly, is an issue that concerns Strabo in his *Geography*. Before one passes judgement on an author's information and credibility, one must ascertain first whether he intends what he says to be interpreted as fact, or in terms of a story or myth. I quote the following passage at some length, because it is an important intertext for the *VH* proem, for three reasons. First, Strabo is talking about how the truth content of a text is related to author intentionality and reader reception. Second, he mentions reasons why an author might choose to fabricate. Third, he deals explicitly with Homer, Herodotus and Ctesias in this context.[117]

> Ἡσιόδου δ᾽ οὐκ ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο ἄγνοιαν, Ἡμίκυνας λέγοντος καὶ Μακροκεφάλους καὶ Πυγμαίους· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ Ὁμήρου ταῦτα μυθεύοντος, ὧν εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι οἱ Πυγμαῖοι, οὐδ᾽ Ἀλκμᾶνος Στεγανόποδας ἱστοροῦντος, οὐδ᾽ Αἰσχύλου Κυνοκεφάλους καὶ Στερνοφθάλμους καὶ Μονομμάτους, ὅπου γε οὐδὲ τοῖς πεζῇ συγγράφουσιν ἐν ἱστορίας σχήματι προσέχομεν περὶ πολλῶν, κἂν μὴ ἐξομολογῶνται τὴν μυθογραφίαν. φαίνεται γὰρ εὐθύς, ὅτι μύθους παραπλέκουσιν ἑκόντες, οὐκ ἀγνοίᾳ τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ πλάσει τῶν ἀδυνάτων τερατείας καὶ τέρψεως χάριν· δοκοῦσι δὲ κατ᾽ ἄγνοιαν, ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ πιθανῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα μυθεύουσι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων. Θεόπομπος δὲ ἐξομολογεῖται φήσας ὅτι καὶ

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[115] Strabo 2.3.4-5. Romm (1992: 200): 'Such artists can be "forgiven" by their audiences because all are aware of their intent to deceive; similarly the meaningless marvels of the Bergaeans are permissible so long as they are accepted as such and not allowed to intrude on the serious business of understanding the earth.' On the Platonic implications of the θαυματοποιοί-simile, recalling Plato's image of the shadow-players who entertain the inhabitants of the Cave (*Rep.* 514b and 602d), see Romm 1992: 200. On the connection between fiction and the imagery of magic, see Chapter 1, p. 59 ff..

[116] Romm 1992: 200.

[117] Strabo is perhaps not one of the authors to whom one would expect Lucian to allude (Householder (1941) does not include him in his list of sources, for example). Von Möllendorff (2000: 38, n. 23), however, has shown that it is entirely plausible that Lucian knew Strabo's work. The first ancient reader of the *Geographika* about whom we can identify is Dionysius Periegetes (*ca.* 120 A.D.). By the end of the second century A.D., Strabo's work was known in Alexandria – so that Lucian, whose career took him to Egypt, could also have acquired knowledge of it there.

μύθους ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ἐρεῖ, κρεῖττον ἢ ὡς Ἡρόδοτος καὶ Κτησίας καὶ Ἑλλάνικος καὶ οἱ τὰ Ἰνδικὰ συγγράψαντες.[118]

No-one would charge Hesiod of ignorance, when he speaks of Half-dogmen and Long-headed men and Pygmies; nor would anyone charge Homer himself of ignorance when he tells stories, including the ones about these Pygmies, nor Alcman when he writes accounts of Steganopods, nor Aeschylus writing about men with dog-heads, men with eyes in their chests, and one-eyed men - since we don't even pay attention in many details to those who write prose in the form of history, even if they don't admit to story-telling. For it is instantly clear that they are weaving tales consciously, not out of ignorance of reality, but out of a desire to fabricate the impossible, for the sake of sensationalist delight.[119] They *seem* to be doing so out of ignorance, because that's the best and most convincing way to tell stories of this sort about things that are obscure and unknown. Theopompus, however, owns up to the fact by saying that he will also tell stories in his histories, better than Herodotus and Ctesias and Hellanicus[120] and those who wrote histories of India.[121]

Here Strabo seems to be elaborating the Platonic idea that no-one errs willingly, but only out of ignorance of the right course of action. Strabo endeavours to show that it is too facile to apply this theory straight to literature; an author may tell 'untruths', not because he is in ignorance of the truth, but because he is motivated by a positive desire to fabricate even what he knows to be impossible; it *is* possible, in literature, to 'lie' or 'err' knowingly; it is, however, a less culpable activity when one's readers *know* that you are lying.[122] As long as Bergaean texts remain honest in their lying, then, and are not taken seriously by readers, it seems that Strabo has no fault to find with them, or with those who read them; implicit in this, however, is a degree of anxiety about reader reception and transparency of

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[118] Strabo 1.2.35.

[119] Although my translation does not reflect the actual alliteration in the Greek at this point, I have tried to bring out its effect. By joining these two nouns as an alliterative pair, Strabo practically turns them into a *hendiadys*, which in turn implies an equation of the marvellous (τερατεία) with the pleasure and charm (τέρψις) that was traditionally associated with poetry and fiction. For more on this, see p. 183 f. below.

[120] The fifth-century author, Hellanicus of Lesbos, was known for his histories in two, three or four books (as opposed to the more numerous book divisions of Herodotus and Thucydides, for example); see Bowie 1994a: 452. It is possible (but not provable) that Lucian might have had Hellanicus in mind as a model for the two-book arrangement of the *VH*; this seems especially plausible if what Strabo says here about the historian is true, i.e. that Hellanicus' veracity was impugned in antiquity alongside other historians such as Ctesias, Herodotus and writers of *Indika*. Anderson, at any rate, interprets the book division of the *VH* as an attempt to impose a historiographical form on the work, although he also considers the possibility that it was originally conceived as one book, the second book having been added later (1976b: 10-11).

[121] Cf. Strabo 11.6.3, where he refers once again to the untrustworthiness of Herodotus, Hellanicus and Ctesias – all of whom sought to record things that they had neither seen nor heard in the guise of history (ἐν ἱστορίας σχήματι).

[122] See the discussion of Lucian's appropriation of Old Comedy in the *VH*, at p. 158 f. and p. 192 ff..

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authorial intention when it comes to fictional texts.[123] Clearly, the pact of fiction was not yet sufficiently well and widely understood to allow 'academic' writers like Strabo to rest assured that fictional texts would be interpreted properly as fiction, and not be mistaken for factual discourse.[124]

In the opening chapters of the *VH*, Lucian aligns himself with the tradition of explorer texts and geographical writers, entering into a theoretical space where the boundaries between truth and fiction were known to be fluid. The setting he chooses for his 'true stories' - in the Ocean, beyond the Pillars of Heracles - has a crucial literary significance. The Pillars of Heracles were one of the markers of the known and inabited world, the *oikoumene*; to travel beyond them was to venture into the unknown, or in literary terms, into the realm of fantasy; accounts of such journeys out into Ocean (*exokeanismoi*) came to be synonymous with tales of the fantastic, the archetype for which was, as Lucian himself recognized, the *apologos* of Odysseus.[125] By establishing his narrative as an *exokeanismos* in the tradition of the *Odyssey*, therefore, Lucian not only assimilates himself, as narrator, to Homer's Odysseus, but instantly invests his account with an ambiguous truth-value.[126] Another effect of this, especially in the wake of his animadversion in the proem that the narrative has deeper layers of meaning (ᾔνικται), is that Lucian also evokes the tradition of allegorical interpretation of Homer's poem, one important strand of which read Odysseus' journey as symbolic for the journey of the soul and its quest for knowledge.[127]

Writers of explorer-texts as well as literary critics recognised the significance and the enormous literary potential of passing beyond the Pillars of Heracles, out into the unknown realm of Ocean, where reports could not be verified (nor,

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[123] Strabo is certainly not the only one to express such anxiety. Romm (1992: 200-201) mentions the second century A.D. author Aelius Aristides in this connection; in *Or.* 48, Aristides launches a vehement attack on the fanciful *periplus* of the explorer Euthymenes, who claimed to have circumnavigated Africa and to have discovered the source of the Nile. It is not the fanciful nature of the text *per se* which Aristides censures, but the more sinister fact that Euthymenes *tried to pass it off as a serious, truthful account*: '…when such fictions begin to intrude into the realm of factual narrative, Aristides must intervene to redraw the boundary line.' (Romm 1992: 201).

[124] Fuchs draws attention to the fact that *Beglaubigungsstrategien* in ancient fiction appear to have been interpreted very often *au pied de la lettre*, and warns that we should not be over-ambitious in postulating a universal understanding in antiquity of fictionality, as we understand it today; for references, see n. 102 above.

[125] See *VH* 1.3 for Lucian's reference to the Phaeacian tales. For the association between 'ocean' and fiction in antiquity, especially in connection with Odysseus' adventures in *Odyssey* 6-12, see Romm 1992: 172-214. For the connection between imagery of sailing and storytelling, see n. 213.

[126] The *apologos* of Odysseus was a by-word in antiquity for lying (Plato, *Rep.* 614b; Aristides 354.20); cf. Parry 1994. Cf. p. 132 f. above.

[127] On the use of the verb αἰνίττομαι in ancient literary criticism as a term for *allegoresis*, and the journey in the *VH* as an allegorical journey of the soul, see Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 5 ff.; cf. p. 193 f..

therefore, refuted), thus enabling one to pass off fanciful accounts as truth.[128] Remote islands such as Thule or Cerne were thought to be located either just within, or just beyond the outermost boundaries of the *oikoumene*, but the vagueness of their location suggests they may have represented a fantastical boundary, rather than a clearly defined geographical limit, as recent scholarship has shown.[129] Other writers, such as Euhemerus and Iambulus, chose the remote and exotic location of islands in the Indian Ocean as the setting for their fictions.[130] Lucian himself says that 'everybody' recognized that Iambulus' account was a lie, but enjoyed it nevertheless:

> ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ ᾽Ιαμβοῦλος περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ θαλάττῃ πολλὰ παράδοξα, γνώριμον μὲν ἄπασι τὸ ψεῦδος πλασάμενος, οὐκ ἀτερπῆ δὲ ὅμως συνθεὶς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.[131]

This is very close to a formulation of what we would call 'fiction' in modern terms.[132] True, the fact that others, like Diodorus, seem to have interpreted Iambulus' work as factual, means it is unwise to assume a universal understanding of the link between geographical remoteness and fictionality in antiquity.[133] The crucial point for Lucian, however, *is* this very ambivalence of the truth-value of these sorts of texts; it is this ambivalence that he evokes and problematizes in the*VH*, as I will show.

At *VH* 1.3, Lucian identifies by name two of the writers whose works serve as models for the sort of text he is writing in the *VH*, i.e. Ctesias and Iambulus. There has been some misunderstanding about how these writers relate to the *VH*; the difficulty is rooted in the fact that there is a lacuna in the text just before Ctesias is named, which leaves the relationship of this clause with the previous sentence unclear. Most editors, including Macleod, supplement the text with a word like οἷον or ὧν, which suggests that Ctesias and Iambulus are examples of the sorts of

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[128] Romm (1992: 194) notes a reference in Aelius Aristides (*Orat.* 48) to the figurative peregrinations of the mind (*nous*, punning on *naus*) beyond the Pillars of Herakles. The imaginative freedom provided by great geographical distance was recognised and exploited by Renaissance writers too, such as Rabelais, Tasso and Cervantes; see Romm 1994.

[129] See Clarke 1999: 34; Romm 1994: 103-4.

[130] Islands are a common motif in paradoxographical texts and fantastic narrative (such as the Phaeacian tales in the *Odyssey*), because they are isolated, closed environments. Gabba (1981: 55 ff.) emphasizes the scientific importance of islands as well (cf. the proliferation of islands in ps.-Aristotle, *On marvellous things heard*). One might compare also the prevalence of insular environments such as planets and space-stations in modern science fiction: see Westfahl 1989. Lucian himself refers to the stars as 'islands' floating in the firmament as if in a great ocean (*VH* 1.10). On islands as the dominant spatial form in utopian narratives, as a metaphor for otherness, see Fauth 1979: 39-42.

[131] *VH* 1.3.

[132] See further p. 155 ff..

authors to whom Lucian says the text makes riddling reference (ἤνικται); in other words, that they are the targets against whom the satire of the *VH* is aimed. [134] Romm, however, argues persuasively that this is inconsistent with Lucian's explicit policy of *not* naming any of the sources to whom he alludes in the text, since he expects readers will recognise them themselves anyway (οὓς καὶ ὀνομαστὶ ἂν ἔγραφον, εἰ μὴ καὶ αὐτῷ σοι ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως φανεῖσθαι ἔμελλον).[135] Romm suggests rather that Ctesias and Iambulus are named as examples of the authors whom Lucian seeks to imitate in the *VH*, in other words that they are the *models* for the type of text he writes, rather than the targets of his satire. One can in fact buttress this argument from the way in which Lucian's text corresponds with what he says in *VH* 1.3, right after he has named Ctesias and Iambulus:

> πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις προελόμενοι συνέγραψαν ὡς δή τινας ἑαυτῶν πλάνας τε καὶ ἀποδημίας, θηρίων τε μεγέθη ἱστοροῦντες καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠμότητας καὶ βίων καινότητας· ἀρχηγὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διδάσκαλος τῆς τοιαύτης βωμολοχίας ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου Ὀδυσσεύς...

> And many others too, choosing the same subject-matter as these, wrote as if about their own travels and trips abroad, with accounts of huge beasts and savage men and strange ways of life. And their leader and instructor in this sort of nonsense was Homer's Odysseus...

It is clear from this that the sort of texts which others *as well as* Ctesias and Iambulus wrote are imaginative explorers' logs, for which Odysseus' Phaeacian tales are the archetype. Now, this is clearly the sort of model Lucian follows in the *VH*, as his text, like theirs, also purports to be an explorer's log - Lucian even pretends it is a record of his *own* travels - and in it are descriptions of huge beasts (e.g. giant moon spiders, a giant whale, a giant seabird), savage people (e.g. the Bull-Heads and Ass-Legs), and strange customs (e.g. the ethnography of the Moonfolk). Lucian's text is also closely modelled on the *Odyssey*,[136] and indeed Odysseus, the archetypal explorer himself, features as a character in the story.

By assimilating the travel-tales of the *Odyssey* to texts like those of Ctesias and Iambulus, which were notoriously fabulous, Lucian inscribes himself in a debate which had been raging among philosophers and geographical scholars since Hellenistic times, concerning the truth-value of the geographical details in

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[133] See n. 110 above.
[134] Cf. p. 158 f..
[135] *VH* 1.2; Romm 1992: 212 with n. 86.

the Homeric poem. Lucian aligns himself with scholars like Eratosthenes, who opined that Odysseus' travel tales were fantastic, and that the geographical details were equally fanciful. For Eratosthenes, the remote, unidentifiable location of most of Odysseus' adventures (beyond Ocean, the land of the Phaeacians) provided a sort of 'credibility shield' for the stories; as there was no way to trace the hero's steps and test the veracity of his report, it was a region of earth that was εὐκατάψευστον - easy to tell lies about.[137] Eratosthenes did not press the Homeric poems for factual truth; in fact, believing that the primary function of poetry was to provide entertainment (ψυχαγωγία), not instruction, Eratosthenes, as head of the Library at Alexandria, sought nothing less than 'to exorcise Homer's ghost' from geography.[138] Aristarchus, the grammatical scholar of Homer, and himself also a head of the Library at Alexandria, also interpreted the geographical remoteness of the Phaeacian tales in literary terms as a gauge of their fantasticality, and Aristarchus' pupil, Apollodorus, construed Homer's ἐξωκεανισμός - 'removal into Ocean' - of Odysseus' journey as a narratological move, to allow him greater freedom to fabulize: μυθολογίας χάριν.[139]

The Stoics, on the other hand, reacted strongly to these interpretations of the Homeric poems. Stoic thinkers such as Crates of Mallos, Polybius, and Strabo sought 'to uphold Homer's greatness, restore the historicity and paideutic content of the fabulous wanderings, and refute the idea of the Odyssey as a fictional ἐξωκεανισμός.'[140] They did not deny that there was an element of the fantastic in Homer's tales, but held that this was allowable, given that Homer's intentions were serious and paideutic; for the Stoic Strabo, in contrast to Eratosthenes, the instructive principle was primary in the Homeric poems, and their entertainment value was of subsidiary importance only;[141] Homer intended to educate, and with this aim in mind he embellished his narrative sometimes with 'lies' (ψευδῆ), which served to ornament the poem and sweeten the pill of learning, as it were:

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[136] For the *VH* as (partly) a new *Odyssey*, see Bompaire 1988: 38 ff..

[137] Strabo 1.2.19; see also Strabo 11.6.4: τὸ πόρρω δυσέλεγκτον (specifically with reference to the Alexander historians). For a more detailed account of this ancient debate, and of the crossover between geography and fictional discourse in antiquity, see Romm's superb essay (1992: 172-214); there is also relevant discussion in Clarke 1999, esp. 23-5.

[138] Romm 1992: 185-6; see Strabo 1.1.10 and 1.2.3.

[139] Strabo 7.3.6. On Aristarchus and Apollodorus, see Romm 1992: 186-188. Lucian's interview with Homer (2.20) shows that he was familiar with the Alexandrian school of Homeric criticism: cf. n. 173.

[140] Romm 1992: 188.

[141] Strabo 1.2.3.

'*Pseudos*-filled passages could be understood purely as a vehicle for delivery of the *Odyssey*'s geographic lessons.'[142]

Given that what Lucian explicitly sets out to do in the *VH* is to write a fictional explorer's log – a Bergaean text - it seems likely that his open declaration in the proem about the truth-status of his text is calculated to stave off Strabonian criticism: '...Lucian begins by demoting himself to the stature of Strabo's *thaumatopoioi*, the entertainers who escape censure because they openly admit their use of fictions.'[143] By designating the fantastic, Odyssean travel tales of the *VH* as 'light' reading-material, meant for scholars to enjoy after the study of 'more serious' matter (*VH* 1.1: μετὰ τὴν πολλὴν τῶν σπουδαιοτέρων ἀνάγνωσιν), Lucian is clearly working within the Eratosthenean frame of reference, but his declaration that his work will not *only* provide pure entertainment (ψιλὴν...ψυχαγωγίαν) for readers, but useful mental stimulation as well, is an attempt to justify the *VH* in terms of the long-standing debate about the pleasure/utility principle in literature, which might be construed in accordance with Stoical principles, as I have shown above, and also within the context of the Plato/Aristotle debate.[144]

The proem is a crucially important piece of text, not only because it provides the 'key' for reading the *VH* itself, investing the narrative with a subversive layer of meaning, but because it also provides vital evidence for Lucian's concept of fictionality, and from a broader perspective still, it reflects the literary games that were being played at the time. In this section, I have tried to demonstrate the extraordinarily dense and rich intertextuality in the proem, to extricate some of the threads of its fabric, and to explore some of the implications of its allusions. It is time now to see what conclusions have taken shape.

Lucian uses the proem to speak as the author of the *VH*, to define the type of text he has produced; it is a fantasy explorer's log, a *voyage imaginaire*, full of lies plausibly told. He defines the ideal type of reader he has in mind - a *pepaideumenos*; the image of the athlete surely evokes the agonistic culture of the

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[142] Romm 1992: 192. In other words, Strabo shifts the emphasis from the fantastical *content*, to Homer's *intentions* (Strabo 1.1.7) – a move that Lucian makes explicit in the *VH* (cf. p. 158 f.). There is some overlap between Strabonian and Lucianic justification of fiction, and Socrates' justification for the use of *mythoi* to convey higher 'truths' (e.g. *Phaedo* 114d); the subject warrants further investigation.

[143] Romm 1992: 212. Lucian describes his own work as *thaumatopoeia* at *Zeuxis* 12 (cf. Chapter 1, p. 59 ff.). For an analysis of the *VH* and Antonius Diogenes' novel as Bergaean texts, see Romm 1992: 202-214, esp. p. 203: '...it was as the authors of these two texts were taking advantage of the license Strabo had granted to Bergaean writings...'.

literary élite in the Second Sophistic.[145] He provides guidance about the way in which the text should be read, and by inscribing an 'anti-reader' into the text, in the form of the gullible Phaeacians, who accepted Odysseus' archetypal lies without question, Lucian constructs his ideal reader by antithesis.[146] Lucian also defends his decision to write fantastic fiction. The proem therefore is both prescriptive and apologetic.

But there is more. I hope to have shown that by establishing a subversive dialectic with the literary theories of Plato and Aristotle, and by evoking Strabo's connection between the explorer's log and Bergaean fiction, Lucian also creates a new theoretical framework for his experiment with fictionality in the *VH*.

One of the difficulties facing any ancient author who wanted to deal with the issue of fiction, was the lack of a proper term for the concept. Probably the closest and the most commonly used term in Greek was *pseudos*. *Pseudos*, however, presented a particular set of problems, as the word covered several semantic concepts. [147] On the one hand, *pseudos* could mean a lie (i.e. a deliberate falsehood, involving the intent to deceive, which is usually objectively untrue: *mendacium est enuntatio cum voluntate falsum enuntiandi*).[148] On the other hand, *pseudos* could also denote an error (an incorrect statement, disinguished from the lie by the absence of intentionality).[149] In Plato's works, an attempt is made to differentiate between lies and errors, using the criterion of intentionality to evolve concepts such as the ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον and ψεῦδος ἀκούσιον.[150] Plato, of course, is dealing with *pseudos* from the ethical perspective, but Strabo, as we have seen, employs a similar conceptual framework in dealing with literary 'mendacity:' some authors pretend to know less than they do (εἰρωνεία!) in order to facilitate a more convincing delivery of their fantastic untruths.[151] Lucian himself uses Plato's construct in the *Philopseudes*, only to discard it: there are

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[144] For discussion of pleasure in Plato's art theory, see Janaway (1995: 36-57); cf. p. 183 ff. below.

[145] This topic - Lucian's repeated use of agonistic motifs and metaphors (e.g. courtroom debate), and how they reflect the agonistic culture of *paideia* – in one which I intend to explore more fully elsewhere; cf. n. 36 above.

[146] I have borrowed the phrase from Morgan 1991: 102, where he discusses Heliodorus' use of 'anti-readers' in the *Aithiopika*.

[147] For an introduction to the semantics of lying and deceptive speech, and the difficulties which the undifferentiated concept of ψεῦδος presents for the study of an ancient concept of fiction, see Fuchs 1993: 1-12 and 234 ff.; see also Rütten 1997: 31.

[148] Fuchs 1993: 2ff..

[149] For discussion, see Fuchs 1993: 1-12.

[150] Cf. Fuchs 1993: 10-11. For ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον, see *Rep.* 535e; for ψεῦδος ἀκούσιον, see *Laws* 730c.

[151] See Strabo text quoted on p. 148 f..

cases, Tychiades finds, when even those who are highly erudite consciously *prefer* lies to the truth.

This brings us closer to the literary meaning of *pseudos*. The word could be used to describe what we would probably call fiction; this is the delivery of information which the speaker knows to be untrue, with the intention of persuading the audience of this untruth. On face value, therefore, this looks like a lie - but the vital difference here is that the speaker *expects his audience to recognise that the information he is delivering is untrue*. Fiction is usually thought of in terms of written communication, in which case it is accompanied by subtle indicators (*Fiktionalitätssignale*) to let the readers know that they are not *really* meant to believe that what is being said is 'true'; what is required is that they simply go along with the game of make-believe.[152] It is interesting here to consider some of the highly complex modes of oral communication that are related to the idea of fiction, forms of expression such as euphemism, metaphor, and irony. In each of these modes of expression, proper communication between speaker and audience is founded on a contractual understanding that the information is not to be interpreted literally; in irony, for example, the speaker counts on the comprehension of his interlocutor, to recognise that the true meaning of his words is located in the *opposite* of what he actually says.[153] The most notorious practitioner of irony (εἰρωνεία) in antiquity was, of course, Plato's Socrates; bearing in mind this connection between irony and fiction, Lucian's adoption of a Socratic air in his capacity as a fabulist is highly apt.

There were other terms in antiquity, which were used to denote a literary mode approximating what we would call fiction. Ancient literary theory in fact differentiated between 'realistic' fiction (i.e. fiction that was not 'true' in the literal sense, but which sustained compatibility with extra-literary reality, and was therefore plausible), and fantastic fiction (which was neither literally true, nor plausible).[154] Sextus Empiricus, who was probably a contemporary of Lucian,[155]

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[152] See Morgan (1993: 225): '…the novel has to reassure us constantly that it is only fiction, and it does this by keeping at least one part of the reader consciously in the real world, where he can watch from an aesthetic distance.'

[153] Fuchs 1993: 6-8.

[154] Reitzenstein 1963: 91-92. Fuchs (1993: 218) cautions that the borders between realism and fantasy in the consciousness of an ancient reader can differ from that of modern readers; for example dreams, oracles, and magic could be accepted as 'realistic' in antiquity, in a way that they probably wouldn't today. On the other hand, readers can (and could then too) be persuaded to accept elements that they initially find unbelievable, through a combination of rationalist explanations and carefully constructed *realia* (*Beglaubigungsapparat*). This should be considered against the contention that there was no concept of fiction in antiquity (cf. Chapter 1, n. 98).

envisaged three categories of event-based narrative, which he divided according to the degree to which the narrative adhered to real events or probability. Sextus named these categories ἱστορία, πλάσμα, and μῦθος. Ἱστορία was defined as the exposition of true events that had actually happened, such as how Alexander died in Babylon, having been poisoned by conspirators - in other words, what we would call 'historical narrative'. Πλάσμα meant a narrative of events that had not *actually* happened, but which were *similar* to real events, such as the plots in comedy and mime; we would probably call this 'realistic' or 'plasmatic' fiction. Finally, μῦθος was the exposition of things that were non-existent and false, such as the stories about how the race of venomous spiders and snakes sprang from the Titans' blood, or how Pegasus sprang from the head of the Gorgon when her throat was cut, and the various metamorphoses, such as how the companions of Diomede changed into seabirds, Odysseus into a horse, and Hekabe into a dog:[156]

πρὸς τούτοις ἐπεὶ τῶν ἱστορουμένων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἱστορία τὸ δὲ μῦθος τὸ δὲ πλάσμα, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἱστορία ἀληθῶν τινῶν ἐστι καὶ γεγονότων ἔκθεσις, ὡς ὅτι Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Βαβυλῶνι δι' ἐπιβούλων φαρμακευθεὶς ἐτελεύτα, πλάσμα δὲ πραγμάτων μὴ γενομένων μὲν ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς γενομένοις λεγομένων, ὡς αἱ κωμικαὶ ὑποθέσεις καὶ οἱ μῖμοι, μῦθος δὲ πραγμάτων ἀγενήτων καὶ ψευδῶν ἔκθεσις, ὡς ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν φαλαγγίων καὶ ὄφεων γένος Τιτήνων ἐνέπουσιν ἀφ' αἵματος ἐζωγονῆσασθαι, τὸν δὲ Πήγασον λαιμοτομηθείσης τῆς Γοργόνος ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐκθορεῖν, καὶ οἱ μὲν Διομήδους ἑταῖροι εἰς θαλασσίους μετέβαλον ὄρνις, ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς εἰς ἵππον, ἡ δὲ Ἑκάβη εἰς κύνα...[157]

Cicero also divided event-based narrative into three categories, *historia*, *argumentum*, and *fabula*, which correspond more or less to the three categories of Sextus Empiricus respectively. For Cicero, *historia* was factual narrative, which related events in our past; *argumentum* represented plausible or 'realistic' fiction, such as the plots of comedies, and *fabula* denoted fiction that was 'non-realistic', such as the mythological plots of tragedy:

Id quod in negotiorum expositione positum est tres habet partes: fabulam, historiam, argumentum. Fabula est quae neque veras neque veri similes continet res, ut eae sunt quae tragoediis traditae sunt. Historia est gesta res,

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[155] Sextus' dates are not certain, but according to Blank (1998: xv), most scholars think he belongs to the later second century A.D. (or slightly earlier in the same century); this would make Sextus a contemporary of Lucian.

[156] It is interesting that Sextus Empiricus chooses the same examples from mythology (stories about the Gorgons, Titans, Pegasus, and metamorphoses) to illustrate the category of 'non-plasmatic' fiction, as Lucian does (*Philops.* 2). This may ultimately lead back to Socrates and Phaedrus' discussion of the truth-value of myths, in Plato *Phdr.* 229 c7-e4; cf. Chapter 1, p. 17 ff..

[157] Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* 1.263-264.

sed ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota. Argumentum est ficta res quae tamen fieri potuit, velut argumenta comoediarum.[158]

Sophisticated as such schemes are, however, the distinguishing criterion for different types of fiction is still objective, i.e. the degree of compatibility with extra-literary reality; things have not progressed much beyond Aristotle. The proem to the *VH*, however, breaks the mould of ancient fiction theory.

Lucian was not the first to formulate some sort of concept of fictionality; he was, as we have seen, preceded to a certain extent by Strabo, and by 'creative' historians such as Theopompus, who owned up to fabulizing.[159] But in the proem to the *VH*, Lucian does something strikingly new; he explicitly shifts the legitimization of fiction away from the Aristotelian concept of compatibility with extra-literary reality, and onto a new load-bearing contractual understanding between author and reader.[160] The reader is made to understand that the narrative consists entirely of lies; there is no intent here on the part of the author to 'deceive' his readers, in the malicious sense we usually associate with mendacity, but he invites his readers to participate knowingly in a game of make-believe.

It is worth noting, in light of this attribution to Lucian of a sophisticated understanding of the contractual basis of fiction, that his accusations of mendacity against other authors must then be construed as a series of sleights of hand. For example, in accusing Herodotus as a liar, he wilfully ignores the fact that Herodotus had no *intention* to deceive; his ψευδῆ, such as they are, are the result of faulty information, not malice aforethought (in Platonic terms, they might be described as ψευδῆ ἀκούσια).[161] By another sleight of hand, Lucian's criticism of utopian-philosophical works (such as Iambulus') overlooks their parable-like didactic tendency, and instead postulates for these works a purely factual orientation with regard to 'truth', as Fuchs has shown.[162] Lucian's criticism of these authors is wilfully naïve, but also polemical; it highlights the fact that, without any explicitly worded contract between author and reader, such texts were susceptible to misreading. This is, after all, the axe Lucian is grinding in the *VH*, and it is this problem which he means to address in his own proem.

Here, then, is a new formula for providing an author of fiction with the license to thrill, which exonerates him from any ethical scruples concerning a

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[158] Cicero, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1.8.13; cf. *De Inventione* 1.19.27, and Quintilian, *Inst.Or.* 2.4.2.
[159] See passage quoted from Strabo on p. 148 f..
[160] See Fuchs 1993: 252.
[161] Fuchs 1993: 190.

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departure from truth or reality.[163] This idea was not original; it was germane to the fantasy of Old Comedy, for example. However, whereas Old Comedy was a communal and civic experience, founded on a tacitly acknowledged suspension of the normal rules (the *carnival* experience, which paradoxically served to *reinforce* the norms of Athenian society), Lucian's proem renders this generally tacit understanding explicit; furthermore, the proem of the *VH* represents a *private* contract, between reader and author.[164] For all this, Old Comedy and Lucianic fiction are not unrelated, and we will return to their relationship presently.[165]

## THE *VH* AS SELF-CONSCIOUS FICTION

By speaking metatextually *as the author* in the proem about the text we are about to read, and addressing his remarks to the extra-diegetic reader of this text,[166] Lucian establishes the *VH* as a self-conscious narrative, which invites more than one reading, and draws attention constantly to its own status as a literary text. In this section, I will discuss some of the ways in which Lucian's narrative can be said to be self-conscious, playing with its own ontological status and flaunting its own textuality.

In the proem Lucian establishes the fact that the *VH* will be a homodiegetic narration, i.e. presented by an ego-author, telling a story in which he himself is involved.[167] After Odysseus' Phaeacian and Cretan tales in the *Odyssey*, ego-

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[162] Fuchs 1993: 190-191.

[163] The enjoyment of fiction for fiction's sake (i.e. not for any other purpose, such as moral improvement, or as a medium for apprehending higher truths, as in Plato's myths) was widely disdained in antiquity as a childish pursuit. Cf. Chapter 1, n. 161.

[164] Interestingly, Morgan (1991: 91ff.) interprets the *theatricality* of Heliodorus' novel as the author's attempt to make the private reader feel that he is participating in a communal activity, by identifying with (reading *through*) the mass audiences through whom the events of the novel are frequently focalized. '...Heliodorus has made the solitary reader part of an experiencing community, again metaphorically denoted as a theatrical audience, whose responses are inscribed in the text...the reader is drawn across the narrative frame and permitted the illusion that his experience of events has the same status as the crowd's.' (92).

[165] Cf. p. 191 ff..

[166] Lucian makes a direct reference to the extra-diegetic reader at *VH* 1.2 (οὓς καὶ ὀνομαστὶ ἂν ἔγραφον, εἰ μὴ καὶ αὐτῷ σοι ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως φανεῖσθαι ἔμελλον...) - a direct communication from *author* (ἂν ἔγραφον) to *reader* (ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως), concerning the text which follows. Apuleius also engages the reader directly in the prologue to the *Met.*; see de Jong (2001) for a discussion of the proem as 'pseudo-dialogue' or 'dialogical monologal discourse'. De Jong suggests Plato as a model for Apuleius' prologue (2001: 202-4), as many of Plato's dialogues themselves open with a conversation. Lucian clearly imitates this narrative structure in the *Philops.*, *Nav.* and *Tox.*, but Plato should also be considered as a model for the pseudo-dialogic proem of the *VH*, especially in light of the dense Platonic intertextuality we have discovered there.

[167] Fusillo (1999: 58) describes the narratorial voice of the *VH* as homodiegetic and extradiegetic, with internal focalization - a situation which is typical of the picaresque novel.

narration became almost a sign of mendacity in itself.[168] Homodiegesis in general, and especially autodiegesis (i.e. a narrator telling his *own* story, the story in which he was protagonist) is also, clearly, intrinsically self-conscious. Petronius and Apuleius especially exploit this for ironic effect in their novels.[169]

The author's admission in the proem that his adventures are no more than a textual creation is echoed at 2.47, where the narrator promises to continue his account in 'more books' - a comment that reminds us once again (in ring composition) of the *textual status* of the narrative.[170] The identification of the fictional narrator with the author, made explicit at 2.28, has a similar effect; homonymy, or virtual homonymy, between a diegetic character and the author is acknowledged as one of the signs of reflexivity in a text.[171] Lucian's assertion at 2.31 that 'I never told a lie...' jars - and is meant to jar - with his self-declared mendacity in the proem, reminding us paradoxically that the narrator is merely a fabricated persona.[172]

Most importantly, the proem establishes the hypertextual nature of the *VH*. The crucial phrase is ᾔνικται (1.2), a term which connotes, among other things, the tradition of *allegoresis*;[173] this is a clue to the reader that this text appropriates other texts both to be part of its own fabric (intertextual), and also to superimpose itself on them (hypertextual, e.g. Odysseus' letter (2.35), which 'continues' and also, to a certain degree, 'rewrites' the story of the *Odyssey*).[174] Intertextuality and

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[168] For the mendacity of homodiegesis, see Maeder 1991: 23ff.. Fusillo (1999: 358) connects ego-narration in the ancient novel with 'comic-realist' narrative, such as *Lucius or The Ass*, Petronius' *Sat.*, Apuleius' *Met.*, and (partly) Achilles Tatius' work. Laird (1993: 155), noting that the first-person narratives of Dictys and Dares were believed to be authentic for a long time, says that Apuleius 'by using that form too, and by using it throughout without enclosing its principal first-person narrative inside another, might be seen (from the ancient point of view at least) to be aspiring to the status of discourse which we might term "factual".' On truth and lies in Odysseus' tales, see Emlyn-Jones 1986; Parry 1994; Richardson 1996.

[169] Morgan (1991: 88, n.11) suggests that Encolpius is an 'unreliable, through readable, misinterpreter.' Encolpius is 'readable', because he is ironized (see Conte 1996: 1-36 on this); in a similar way, the reliability of Lucian the narrator is explicitly undermined, rendering him equally perspicacious. On the splitting of the narrative voice in Apuleius' *Met.*, see Smith 1999 and Winkler 1985: 135-179; cf. n. 209.

[170] Compare the similar ring composition in Longus' novel (see Maeder 1991: 21). According to Laird (2003), this abrupt ending 'echoes the closural techniques in Plato's myths and of the dialogues enclosing them.'

[171] Dällenbach 1989: 46-47. For discussion of the homonymy in the *Nav.* between the character Lycinus, and the author Lucian, see Appendix II.

[172] Dällenbach describes an aporistic statement such as 'I am lying' as a 'paradoxical reflexion', associated with *mise en abyme* (1989: 24).

[173] On the *VH* and the allegorical tradition, see Georgiadou & Larmour 1998a: 5ff.. Lucian's own *enactment* of the discourse of the Homeric critics, Zenodotus and Aristarchus, in his interviews with Homer (2.20) is a reflection in microcosm of the hypertextuality of the *VH* itself; in other words, metatextuality (commentary) is inscribed into the text of the *VH* itself. According to Alter (1975: 12), literary criticism is intrinsic to all self-conscious novels.

[174] Formally, it is a 'proleptic continuation'; see Genette 1982: 197 ff..

hypertextuality are characteristic elements in self-conscious discourse,[175] and Lucian's self-conscious fiction in the *VH* also reflects this, as a text *about* literature and reading.[176]

This 'literariness' is reflected in the fantastic mode of the narrative, for while fantasy, as a mode of fiction, appears to enjoy the greatest degree of autonomy from extra-literary reality, it is also paradoxically most obviously the product of the author's pen. Consequently, fantasy as a genre is most self-reflective, as it is, essentially, 'about' text.[177] Lurking beneath the surface of the fantastic text is an anxiety about the ontological status of the worlds it creates; fantasy most obviously uses words to construct worlds (as fantastic worlds have no extra-literary counterpart) - consequently narratives about these fantastic worlds are, ultimately, about text. Of course, this is literally (and disturbingly) true for all fiction, but fantasy, paradoxically *because* of its autonomy from extra-literary reality, is more conscious of, and more anxious about, the confines of its own textuality.[178] It seems that the more a text breaks free from reality, the more it is constrained to end up talking about itself and the dynamics of its own creation; this is one of the reasons why the fantastic mode of the *VH* happens to be particularly well adapted to an experiment in how fiction works.

The narrative's concern with its own textuality and ontological status is evident in the way that it incorporates several documentary texts, such as inscriptions, e.g. the inscription on island of Vine-women recording visit of Dionysus and Heracles (1.7); the terms of the treaty between the inhabitants of the Sun and Moon, inscribed on slab of electrum (1.20); the inscription recording

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[175] See Genette 1982: 449, n.1 on the link between self-consciousness and hypertextuality especially.

[176] Genette defines intertextuality as 'a relation of co-presence between two or more texts, that is to say, eidetically and most often, by the literal presence of one text within another,', e.g. quotation, plagiarism, allusion. Hypertextuality is 'literature in the second degree...the superimposition of a later text on an earlier one that includes all forms of imitation, pastiche, and parody, as well as less obvious superimpositions.' (Richard Macksey in his *Foreword* to Genette 1997: xviii-xix). See Genette 1982: 8-12. Hypertextuality, however, differs from intertextuality, inasmuch as recourse to the hypotext is *never* indispensable to the simple understanding of the hypertext; every hypertext carries autonomous significance, and can be read for itself, although non-recognition of the hypotext strips the hypertextuality of a real dimension - which is why the hypertextuality is so often advertised in the paratext (Genette 1982: 450f.).

[177] Todorov 1970: 98, '...le fantastique a une fonction à première vue tautologique: il permet de décrire un univers fantastique, et cet univers n'a pas pour autant une réalité en dehors du langage; la description et le décrit ne sont pas de nature différente.' Cf. n. 329.

[178] '*Fantasy, as a belated form of romance, promises an absolute freedom from belatedness, from the anxieties of literary influence and origination, yet this promise is shadowed always by a psychic over-determination in the form itself of fantasy, that puts the stance of freedom into severe question.* What promises to be the least anxious of literary modes becomes much the most anxious.' Quoted here from Heckelman (1989: 35); originally from p. 6 of Bloom, H., '*Clinamen*: Toward a Theory

Lucian's visit to Isle of Blest on a slab of beryl (2.28).[179] Of course, by recording such inscriptions, Lucian parodies one of the *Beglaubigungsstragien* of the historiographers; *these* inscriptions are cited to verify claims that we have been told are *untrue*, and anyway, the fantastic location and materiality of these texts (inscribed on semi-precious stone such as beryl; located on a remote, magical island, suspended in outer space, or on the Isle of the Blest) clearly undermines their documentary authority.[180] This latter inscription is of particular narratological interest, because, as von Möllendorff has recently shown, it represents both text and story of the *VH* in *mise en abyme*. The dubious credibility and parodic nature of the epigraphical text, therefore, is a subversive emblem of the *VH* itself.[181]

Lucian also cites other documentary texts too; he refers in the narrative to a poem by Homer, which recorded the battle between the Blessed and the Damned, of which Lucian quotes the first line (2.24), and the narrative also contains a letter, from Odysseus to Calypso (2.35). These last two examples, the poem and the letter, are particularly self-reflexive, the one representing a sort of centripetal dynamic of self-consciousness (inasmuch as it authenticates the diegetic world of the *VH* by referring to an event which is itself internal to the diegesis, or

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of Fantasy,' in Slusser, G.E., Rabkin, E.S. & Scholes, R. (edd.), *Bridges to Fantasy*, Carbondale 1982: 1-20. (The italicization is in the original.)

[179] One might compare the similar appropriation of archaeological and palaeontological discourse to corroborate the truth-value of stories in Philostratus' *Heroicus*. I will explore elsewhere the idea that this is a *literary* technique, related to the elaborate *Bücherfunde* ploy that frames Antonius Diogenes' novel, for example (cf. n. 287), and analogous also to the role of Damis in Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius* (cf. n. 295), and to the novelists' use of letters (cf. n. 187). Of course, that is not to deny any correspondence between the literary technique and historical reality, as clearly, the efficacy as any authenticating device is directly related to the fact that it reflects historical reality. Jones (2001: 143-4) contains interesting arguments in favour of the historicity of some of the archaeological and palaeontological discoveries evoked in the *Heroicus*.

[180] Said (1994: 161) suggests that the inscriptions in the *VH* may be meant as a parody of Herodotus' rather disingenuous use of epigraphical texts (on which, see West 1985, esp. p. 303-4). On the dubiousness of the inscription at 2.28 especially, see Goldhill 2002: 65. For the parodic truth-implications of the choice of a lunar setting in the *VH*, see Morgan 1985: 479. The beryl *stēle* on which Lucian's name is recorded is, of course, also part of a familiar Golden Age motif, where precious materials are said to occur in abundance, and are therefore used as we would use baser substances (cf. Apul., *Met.* 5.1: the description of Cupid's house, with its *rococo* interior design, including floor-mosaics composed of precious stones: *vehementer iterum ac saepius beatos illos qui super gemmas et monilia calcant!*)

[181] See von Möllendorff 2000: 566ff.. Von Möllendorff argues that this inscription, located on the isle of the dead, is associated with *funerary* inscriptions (perhaps reminding us of Lucian's tongue-in-cheek statement in the proem that the *VH*, this mock-*res gestae*, is to be his legacy to posterity). I think this is right, but one might also compare Alexander's construction of an arch and inscription at the ends of the earth (*Alexander Romance* 2.41).

homodiegetic - i.e. the battle); the other a centrifugal one (cross-referencing events from another diegesis, or heterodiegetic).[182]

The allusion to Homer's poem represents another text about a diegetic event in the *VH*. Now on one level, we know that this poem does not exist at all, as we have been warned that everything the narrator says is untrue. However, we are also beguiled by the impression that the text is an independent product of an event reported in the *diegesis* (whereas in fact, the event itself is the product of the *diegesis*), into attributing the event, and consequently the *diegesis* that generates it, with a fictive ontology.[183] Within the speculative framework of the *VH*, this highlights the world-creating power of text.[184] Lucian, however, teases the reader about the ontological status of this text, by telling us that it did not survive the journey (of course!) - although he can quote the first line of it. The poem is, as I have said, about an event which is described in Lucian's *diegesis* - but because this event is diegetic only (i.e. it has no extra-literary point of reference), this means that the poem is ultimately 'about' Lucian's narrative; in other words, the text has generated a text *whose theme is itself*. On the one hand, this self-referentiality is ironic, given that Homer's poem is cited partly to corroborate the veracity of Lucian's narrative - a *Beglaubigungsstrategie* which actually has the opposite effect of highlighting the narrative's fictionality instead. On the other hand, it emblematizes the self-consciousness of the *VH*. Homer's poem, which 'contains' part of the *diegesis* of the *VH* itself, does not exist independently of the text of the *VH* (and it barely exists even there); Lucian plays with the idea of a text which contains part of his *diegesis*, and is at the same time contained by it (paradoxically, almost *not* contained by it, as the narrator lost it!). Homer's poem in the *VH* is an intra-diegetic text (a text created and contained by the narrative) about the *diegesis* itself; it therefore constitutes an example of *mise en abyme*.[185] Odysseus' letter is an intra-diegetic text about an extra-diegetic text, Homer's *Odyssey*, and is therefore hypertextual, in the sense that it 'continues' the story of the *Odyssey* (strictly speaking, it is an *allographic hypertext*, i.e. a text which

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[182] Dällenbach (1989: 59) uses the terms 'particularizing' and 'generalizing' here to describe these alternative dynamics.

[183] Dällenbach (1989: 8) refers to the optical illusion of mirrors in paintings - Velasquez's *Las Meniñas* being the supreme example - which reflect what fictively exists outside the painting, and he compares *The Mouse Trap*, the play-within-the-play of *Hamlet*, which actualizes events that precede the temporal reach of the play.

[184] Cf. Dällenbach (1989: 48) on texts '...that, conscious of their literariness, "narrativize" it and strive, by a permanent or occasional reference back to themselves, to reveal the law underlying every linguistic creation.'

[185] For a definition of this figure, see Chapter 1, p. 58; cf. also Chapter 2, p. 88 ff..

overwrites an anterior text by another author).[186] The technique of embedding a letter in the narrative in this way has a world-creating effect analogous to the reference to Homer's poem, especially given the documentary status of letters: the impression is given that the letter is the product of this world, when in fact the world is a product of the letter - a point which is doubly ironic, given the clearly *literary* nature of its contents. Such use of letters can also be connected to the narrative's self-conscious textuality.[187] The fact that Lucian's *diegesis* contains *a text about a text* in this way is also emblematic of the hypertextual nature of the *VH* itself - all the more so because of the way in which Lucian the narrator is assimilated to Odysseus, the adventurer and narrator of the Phaeacian tales, and the way in which the narrative of the *VH* itself is assimilated to that part of Homer's *Odyssey* (*VH* 1.3). Odysseus' action in writing a letter to Calypso, which is itself a continuation and therefore a hypertext of his own narrative, is a diegetic reflection of Lucian's action in writing an account of his own adventures, which is explicitly a hypertext of the *Odyssey*; in this way, Odysseus' letter also constitutes a sophisticated *mise en abyme*, reflecting the way in which Lucian constructs the narrative which encloses it.[188] *Mise en abyme* is, of course, a sign of, and a product of, the self-conscious or reflexive narrative.[189]

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[186] See Genette 1982: 60-61.

[187] On the ancient novelists' exploitation of the documentary status of embedded letters to authenticate their narrative, see Rosenmeyer 2001: 133-168, esp. 168: '...[the embedded letter] adds a certain weight to the narrative by simulating a "real" epistolary exchange, a document that gives the illusion of being separable from the rest of the novel.' (Cf. Maeder 1991: 31ff. on Antonius Diogenes' use of letters). Lucian's incorporation of a letter in the narrative of the *VH* could, therefore, also be seen as part of his game of verifying a fictive reality, exemplifying the world-creating power of text; in this capacity, it is therefore analogous to the reference to Homer's poem. Rosenmeyer identifies the novelists' use of embedded letters as a associated with the self-consciousness of these texts: 'The novel's enjoyment of the textuality of the letter is connected with its overall fascination with intertextuality and allusiveness, and its dialogue with other genres and time periods, so characteristic of literary products of the Second Sophistic.' (168).

[188] The function of *mise en abyme* is to bring to light the way in which the writer constructs his text (Dällenbach 1989: 15).

[189] Dällenbach 1989: 57: 'As a secondary sign, the *mise en abyme* not only emphasizes the signifying intention of the primary sign (the narrative that contains it), it also makes clear that the primary narrative is also (only) a sign, as any trope must be - but with added power, according to its stature: *I am literature, and so is the narrative that embeds me.*' *Mise en abyme* is therefore a sign of a work's modernity or self-awareness. Dällenbach judiciously warns against anachronistic or retrospective readings that attribute reflexivity to a text that does not warrant it: 'Although not necessarily invalid, this practice becomes so...when the decoding it involves is entirely unconnected with the encoding, for instance when the notion that all fictions are mere allegories of their own production is applied to texts that do not subscribe to this view.' (1989: 49). As hermeneutic principles to help the critic determine when a sequence in a text can be interpreted as an enactment of the narrative, Dällenbach suggests that one only attributes reflexive meaning to a segment of the text if this is justified by the whole text, and that one does not interpret a text in a reflexive-allegorical way unless reflexivity itself appears as a theme in it (1989: 49). The *VH* qualifies under both of these rubrics.

These examples show that Lucian is preoccupied with *writing about literature* in the *VH* - a tendency which is also reflected elsewhere, for example, when he 'corrects' and continues Homer, e.g. Lucian corrects Homer's aetiology for the rain of blood that signalled Sarpedon's death (1.17); Lucian amends Homer's description of the city of dreams (four gates, not two: 2.32-33);[190] Odysseus' letter 'completes' his own (after)life-story, in a sort of post-script to the *Odyssey* (2.35); Lucian corroborates Homer's description of Calypso's cave (2.36). He enacts a dialogue with the literary past, presenting contemporary literary issues in dramatic form, e.g. Lucian interviews Homer (2.20), or he recounts a poetry competition between Hesiod and Homer, which Homer loses (2.22).[191] The motif of meeting authors in person also reflects the narrative's preoccupation with its own textuality, and perhaps a latent anxiety about authorship as well, given the split identity of the author/narrator of the *VH*.[192] One can also interpret in this light the motif of reifying textual worlds - such as Aristophanes' Cloudcuckooland (1.29), Plato's Ideal State (2.17), the Platonic Socrates' ideal afterlife (2.17) - and vivifying diegetic characters - such as Homer's Odysseus and Thersites (2.20).[193]

Another way in which Lucian draws attention to the textual surface of the *VH* is by the use of doubles and symmetry. A few examples of this will suffice to show what I mean: e.g. the upper world of the Moon finds a counterpart in the lower world of the whale;[194] the Vine-women of the first adventure is mirrored by the final adventure with the Ass-Legs;[195] the motif of sexual entrapment in the

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[190] Mal-Maeder (1992: 135-139) treats these as examples of the transstylization of Homer's text in Lucian's pastiche, i.e. elements of the Homeric poems are 'rewritten' in historiographical style and language, with ludic effect. She notes also that Lucian thereby ridicules the tradition of allegorical interpretation on Homer, which was popular among Neoplatonists and Neopythagoreans around Lucian's own time (136). On transstylization as a hypertextual operation, see Genette 1982a: 257-261.

[191] For further discussion, see Nesselrath 2002. Like the lawsuit taken by Thersites against the poet (2.20), these episodes reflect the favourite sophistic theme of *Homeromastigia*, which was a 'well-established sophistic exercise' (Anderson 1976a: 169-170). Anderson also compares this lawsuit to *Iud.Voc.* 9, where Thucydides adjudges the case between the letters Xi and Sigma (cf. n. 36). It is clear from *Pro Imag.* 24 that Lucian was aware of *Homeromastigia*. On the Second Sophistic trend for Homeric revisionism, see p. 175 ff. and n. 226 below.

[192] Cf. p. 167 ff., esp. n. 230.

[193] See now also Laird (2003), who argues that the creation of multiple worlds in the *VH* is a comical reflection of the construction of hypotheses, which is fundamental to philosophical discourse, as Plato realised. What Lucian does here is also analogous to the reification of literary metaphor (cf. n. 108), suggesting perhaps that all worlds are, on some level, textual constructs. Laird (*op.cit.*) very cleverly observes that the reference to Plato's fictive 'state' and 'laws' could also be a reference *to the works themselves*, the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

[194] The spatiality of the *VH* has been interpreted variously, either as an aspect of Menippean Satire (von Koppenfels 1981: 29 ff.; Fusillo 1999: 368-9), or utopian narrative (Fauth 1979: 51-4).

[195] For an interpretation of these two sexual adventures as symbolic for progress in the process of reading, see Larmour 1997, esp. p. 142 ff.. Georgiadou & Larmour (1997) compare Lucian's vine-women and Dio's Libyan snake-women (*Orat.* 5). For the significance of *wine* in the context of *fiction*, cf. Chapter 1, n. 215.

episode of the Vine-women is also reflected in Cinyras' punishment for his sexual misdemeanour in 2.26; the river of wine flowing from grapevines in 1.7 corresponds to the sea of milk in 2.3, and the milk-producing grapevines on the island of cheese etc..[196] Even the discourse of truth and lies in the proem finds a reverse expression in the narrative; in the proem, the author's lies are truthful (1.4), whereas in the narrative, the narrator's truthfulness is a lie (2.31). The result of all of this obvious artifice is to betray the author's hand in the text (*effets de création*). Such symmetry has been shown to be characteristic of the self-conscious narrative.[197]

Analogous to this is the way in which Lucian also plays with narrative temporality, referring to events that, relative to the diegetic *tempus*, are still in the future, either in homodiegetic prolepsis (1.27: reference to losing Endymion's gifts in the whale; 2.24: reference to losing Homer's poem along with everything else), or partly heterodiegetic prolepsis (2.27: Rhadamanthys' prophecy about Lucian's fate). Alternatively, Lucian also refers to events that are in the diegetic past, in heterodiegetic analepsis (2.35: Odysseus' letter).[198] Lucian also plays with narrative mood, for example deliberately omitting information (paralipsis), out of concern for credibility, e.g. when he refuses to describe the Sparrow-corns and the Crane-riders, because he did not see them himself, and the reports about them are incredible (1.13).[199] Obvious bids for credibility such as this (*Beglaubigungsstrategien*) - and there is a rich array of these techniques in the *VH*[200] - in fact act as signals for the fictionality of text (*Fiktionalitätssignale*), in light of author's warning in the proem.[201] This sort of toying with narrative temporality and mood also reminds the reader of the author's directorial presence

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[196] In Fredericks' view (1976: 56), features like these suggest an 'alternate ecology'.

[197] On doubles as part of novelistic self-consciousness, see Alter 1975: 21 ff., esp. 23: '...the self-conscious novelist utilizes the double with a conscious quality of intellectual playfulness...'. On narrative doubling as an *effet de création* in the *Philops.*, see Chapter 1, p. 53 ff..

[198] Laird (1993: 151-2) notes how plausibility may be induced by cross-references to details from *other literary fictions*: 'Not just details from what is perceived as the actual past, but also cross-referencing to other stories that the ideal reader knows, boost the credibility of this story.' (152).

[199] Cf. Chapter 1, p. 37, with n. 134. One might compare his expression of misgivings about describing the Moonfolk's amazing ocular apparatus, because he fears he will be considered a liar (1.25). This does not constitute paralipsis, as Lucian does describe them, despite his reluctance; however, his demonstration of an awareness of the limits of reader-credibility is itself an effective *Beglaubigungsstrategie*; see Fusillo 1999: 360 ff..

[200] For examples, see p. 188 ff..

[201] See Chapter 1, n. 139.

in the narrative, controlling the temporal order in which he narrates events, just as he controls the nature and amount of information to which he makes us privy.[202]

Other features of Lucian's narrative also betray its preoccupation with its own textuality. The very numerous hybrids with which Lucian populates his fantasy worlds, especially the lunar and solar worlds, the internal world of the whale, and the ocean, may also symbolize the author's creative artifice.[203] As we have already seen, Lucian uses the hybrid monster as a recurring metaphor for his own literary creation.[204] A strong case can be made for this interpretation of the hybrids in the *VH*, as the vocabulary used to describe their strange appearance - words such as καίνον and ξένον - resonates with Lucian's description of the *VH* in his proem, especially where he speaks of the novelty of his plot (τὸ ξένον τῆς ὑποθέσεως)[205] and its similarity to the subject-matter of the works of Ctesias and others, who wrote about 'facts stranger than fiction' (e.g. the πολλὰ παράδοξα of Iambulus), and the 'strange' lifestyles (βίων καινότηται) of other peoples.[206]

In the final section of my exploration of the self-consiousness of the *VH*, I will address the manner in which Lucian flaunts the world-creating powers of text, evolving the equation that if text creates all worlds, then all worlds must be textual. A fantasy text such as the *VH* illustrates this equation in an especially pointed way, because the worlds postulated by fantasy need not even correspond to extra-diegetic reality in order to win our credence; they need only be consistent within their own terms to be plausible.[207] At the same time, this very discrepancy from extra-literary reality distances us somewhat as readers, keeping us all the time aware of the *fictive* nature of these worlds: this is what rescued Antiphanes of Berge's work from Strabo's criticism, and it is also the reason why Lucian himself

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[202] Longus also consciously plays with narrative temporality, to flaunt the greater flexibility in this respect of narrative art over visual art (Maeder 1991: 19-20); for similarities between Longus and Lucian as writers of self-conscious fiction, see below, p. 180 ff..

[203] Georgiadou & Larmour 1994: 1500, but with a rather different interpretation: 'The hybrid is a grotesque formulation: each element is familiar, but the combination of the two produces an unfamiliar and distorted entity. So it is with the blending of the real and unreal in the "Ver. Hist." as a whole... The numerous hybrids in the narrative...serve as reminders of the fact that the whole story is a hybrid mixture of incredible inventions and devices designed to make them seem credible.'

[204] Cf. *Philops.* p. 66 ff.. Von Möllendorff (2000: 110 f.) thinks that Lucian's ἱππόγυποι evoke the ἱππαλεκτρύων which features in the literary debate in Aristophanes' *Frogs* 927-944 (where Euripides and Dionysus mock the bombastic nature of such creations); it is, therefore, a metapoetical touch.

[205] *VH* 1.2.

[206] *VH* 1.3; cf. 1.5: πραγμάτων καινῶν ἐπιθυμία.

[207] On internal consistency as a tool for narrative plausibility, see *Herm.* 74.

hopes to escape being impugned as a liar (*VH* 1.4).[208] The fantastic mode of the *VH* is therefore intimately connected to Lucian's intellectual concerns in this text, because fantasy illustrates that texts, as long as they are plausibly constructed, can persuade us to believe anything, while at the same time it reminds us constantly of the fictionality of this process.

Text and narrative are interconnected in the *VH*, the most obvious point of intersection being the identification of the author (at the textual level) with the narrator (at the diegetic level) at 2.28, in the form of an inscription on the Isle of the Blessed:[209]

Λουκιανὸς τάδε πάντα φίλος μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν
εἶδέ τε καὶ πάλιν ἦλθε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.

Although this revelation comes as a surprise, Lucian has in fact prepared the way for it already, right at the beginning of the narrative, through a range of subtle cross-references which link the voice in *VH* 1.5 with the authorial persona in the proem. In a sense, both of *VH* 1.5 and the proem are introductory. The proem constitutes a false start; only in 1.5 does the narrative proper begin. Similar vocabulary is used in both sections. In the proem, the author speaks of the *purpose* (ὑπόθεσις) of his work; this is mirrored in 1.5, where the narrator speaks of the purpose (ὑπόθεσις) of his journey.[210] In 1.3, the author aligns his work with the tradition of Odysseus' (and others') travel-tales, with their emphasis on journeys abroad (ἀποδημίαι) and the discovery of novel lifestyles of men (βίων καινότηται); at 1.5, the narrator also refers to a journey abroad (ἀποδημία), for the sake of novelty (πραγμάτων καινῶν ἐπιθυμία) and finding out about new people. At 1.2, the author advertises the novelty of his plot (τὸ ξένον τῆς ὑποθέσεως), which will appeal to readers and motivate them to read; this is also reflected by the desire for novelty which the narrator claims inspired him to travel (1.5). The opportunity for speculation (θεωρία), which the text will provide for readers (1.1), is reified by the tourist activity of the intrepid narrator.[211] Both the

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[208] See p. 153 ff..

[209] Georgiadou & Larmour (1998a: 3) note that this signifies a 'disintegration of the boundary between the two voices, similar to what happens in books 9-12 of the *Odyssey*', and cite Winkler 1985: 135-179 for Apuleian parallels; cf. n. 296 below.

[210] Cf. p. 190 ff..

[211] Interestingly, the term *theoria* has primary theatrical associations, as von Möllendorff notes (2000: 39). Figuratively, it means contemplation, but it was used also to denote journeys of exploration and pilgrimage, e.g. this is the word used to describe Solon's travels at Herodotus 1.29; see von Möllendorff 2000: 67f.; cf. p. 191 and n. 302.

reader and the narrator are motivated by their διανοία to travel - the one literally; the other figuratively, through reading.[212]

The result of this is what might be called an equation between the narratological and nautical registers of the narrative; the act of reading and writing the text becomes, in figurative terms, the act of voyaging and exploration with the narrator; the author's plan for his text correlates to the narrator's plan for his journey, etc..[213] If, then, the goal of the journey is never realized - is in fact deliberately withheld - then this must have implications for the reading of the text.

The inconclusiveness of the journey-narrative in the *VH* has been interpreted in various ways. Larmour argues that Lucian's text frustrates the search for meaning in reading (is anti-hermeneutic), and thereby denies the viability of reading in general as a hermeneutic process: the *VH*, in Larmour's view, is a satire on the fictionality of all literature.[214] The *VH* is 'anti-hermeneutic', inasmuch as Lucian himself suggests in the proem that there is meaning 'behind' the text (the crucial word is ᾕνικται, a word which connotes *allegoresis*); yet the abrupt and premature ending of the narrative itself - before its original purpose of documenting the inhabitants of far side of Ocean has been realized - suggests that the search for some sort of autonomous or historical reality 'behind' the words is futile.

Von Möllendorff dissents from this opinion, arguing that if the *VH* is anti-hermeneutic, then it cannot be satire, as satire seeks to expose and remedy; it is susceptible of interpretation.[215] According to von Möllendorff, the process of reading as a successful hermeneutic endeavour is inscribed into the text of the *VH*; it is reflected in the reader's progress from simple recognition of allusions, to a full

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[212] At *VH* 1.1 there is a reference to the relaxation and refreshment which the text will provide for the reader's διανοία; at *VH* 1.5, note the reference to the διανοία of the narrator which prompted him to travel.

[213] See also von Möllendorff 2000: 64 ff.. There is a clear connection between *fiction* and the *marine voyage* in antiquity, which probably had its roots in the travel-tales of the *Odyssey*, as Romm has shown (1992: 172 ff.). As we have already seen, the genre of the *voyage imaginaire* was the vehicle for some of the most self-conscious fiction in antiquity (e.g. Antiphanes of Berge, Antonius Diogenes; see Romm 1994). Lucian himself clearly exploits this association in the *VH* and *Nav.*, and parallels may be found in other authors of the Second Sophistic too (e.g. in Philostratus' *Heroicus* 8. 13; 53.2-3 55.6; ; the link between deception and the sea-voyage has its place in the repertory of rhetorical *topoi* as well, e.g. Maximus of Tyre, *Orat.* 25.5 f.). This also has rich implications for the presence of *sailors* in the narrative frames of the charming fictions in the *Heroicus* and Dio's *Euboicus*, and also in the prologue to Achilles Tatius' novel. I would like to speculate that that this represents a subliminal link between fiction and escapism in antiquity; Padel (1974), for example, notes the prevalence of *ship* imagery (as well as bird imagery) in Euripidean escape-odes. For the particular associations of the Lucianic ship in the *VH* – an ἄκατος – see Chapter 1, n. 215.

[214] Larmour 1997.

[215] Von Möllendorff (2000: 558, with n. 139).

metapoetical reading of the text (i.e. the realization that the act of reading is itself inscribed in the work).[216] Von Möllendorff notes that the ship-voyage was used since the earliest works of Greek literature as a metaphor for poetical composition, with its inherent possibilities and risks, and he points to the use of shipwreck as a metaphor for abruptly ended dreams elsewhere in Lucian's works.[217] By using both figures in the *VH*, he argues, Lucian's journey is presented both as a goal-orientated, useful voyage, and also as a project which is doomed to failure.[218] He insists, however, that the shipwreck at *VH* 2.47 does not mark the failure of the *VH*, as Larmour believes, but merely the end of the narrative. For von Möllendorff, the unfinished state of the description of the project of the *VH* (i.e. the narrative falls short of describing the task which Lucian claims he did actually accomplish) reflects the unending work of the *pepaideumenos*, which can certainly be practised, but never fully circumscribed in theory: 'Dies ist nicht so zu verstehen, als setze der Schiffbruch das Scheitern des literarischen Unternehmens 'Wahre Geschichten' ins Motiv. Vielmehr markiert er drastisch das Ende eines Dichtens, das sein Ziel praktisch erreicht hat, theoretisch aber nicht erreichen kann: die Tätigkeit des πεπαιδευμένος kann nur anschaulich gemacht, nicht aber vollständig beschreiben werden, ist sie doch ein überindividueller und daher unendlischer Prozeß.'[219]

Although I do not go all the way with von Möllendorff in reading this as a metaphor for the work of the *pepaideumenos*, his basic point is crucial. The project which the narrator undertook in 1.5 is apparently successful. The shipwreck does not prevent him from reaching the 'other continent'; he and his crew swim ashore, and his final words promise to deliver an account of the experiences they had there: τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐν ταῖς ἑξῆς βίβλοις διηγήσομαι.[220] Furthermore, we have also been informed proleptically, through Rhadamanthys' prophecy, that Lucian will have many adventures on the 'other

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[216] Von Möllendorff 2000: 558.

[217] Von Möllendorff 2000: 565-566. He compares the analogous use of the sea-voyage metaphor at *Herm.* 28, and also cites Lucian's use of shipwreck as a metaphor for abruptly ended dreams at *Bis Acc.* 21; *Sat.* 4; *Merc.co.* 2. One should add the example from *Nav.* 13, where the metaphor is used self-consciously (cf. Appendix II).

[218] 'Dies miteinander verknüpft, stellt sich Lukians Reise in den *Wahren Geschichten* als nützliches, zielorientiertes und erfolgversprechendes Unterfangen und zugleich als eitles und daher zum Scheitern verurteiltes Projekt dar...' (Von Möllendorff 2000: 566)

[219] Von Möllendorff 2000: 566, n. 162.

[220] *VH* 2.47.

side', and will finally return home safely (*VH* 2. 27). It seems, therefore, as if it is the *text* that falls short of the *story*, and not the other way around.[221]

The implications of this are manifold. First of all, by telling the reader that an indeterminate 'amount' of story exists, which, however, is not covered by the narrative, Lucian creates a sort of diegetic vacuum which the reader's mind seeks to fill, and can only do so through his imagination.[222] Therefore the author, in a way, invites the reader to participate in the authorial act of creating worlds, thereby highlighting the reader's role in make-believe, and also drawing him metaleptically into the fiction. [223]

Secondly, the paralipsis enhances the credibility of the diegesis by adding 'depth' to it;[224] it suggests, paradoxically, that the diegetic world exists autonomously, and that the function of the text is subordinate to it, merely to describe *what is already there*. It shows how worlds can even be 'created' negatively, by withholding text. This is paradoxical, because of course, without the text to reify it, the diegetic world of the *VH* does not, in *any* sense, exist (it certainly does not 'exist' in the ontological sense, as the author himself has told us). The effect of this is to highlight the *generative* role of text - which clearly then has implications for texts which claim merely to 'report' rather than to invent, such as historiography and ethnography.[225]

Where historiographical authors wished to present an account, the veracity of which they could not confirm, one option available to them was to attribute the report to a third party, and distance themselves from it; that way, they could have their proverbial cake and eat it too. The liberation of narrators from their authors in the *VH* could perhaps be seen as a parodic reification of this technique, especially given Lucian's parodic use of other historiographical techniques in the text too. So, with scrupulous precision in the proem, the author Lucian identifies Homer's *narrator*, Odysseus, as the liar, without impugning the honesty of the

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[221] See the scholiast's rather disgruntled comment: καὶ τὸ τέλος ψευδέστατον μετὰ τῆς ἀνυποστάτου ἐπαγγελίας (Rabe 1906: 24, l. 47). At *Hist.co.*31, Lucian excoriates historians for making similar promises which they do not fulfil (see Georgiadou & Larmour 1994: 1489). However, Bompaire (1958: 673) interprets this promise literally. Anderson (1976b: 11) considers the possibility that Lucian might have planned to write a third book of the *VH*. Fusillo (1999: 362) reads the ending as a parody of the promises of continuation that are typical of voyage narratives.

[222] See Larmour 1997: 135-6, where he compares the similarly inconclusive ending of *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym*, by Edgar Allan Poe.

[223] Cf. Chapter 1, p. 7f..

[224] See Said 1994: 162, where she compares the similar effects achieved by Herodotus' 'silences.'

[225] See Said 1994: 167-9, esp. p. 167, where she describes the *VH* as a supreme subversion of ethnographic discourse (i.e. the ethnographer's text is usually the result of his travels, whereas Lucian 's voyage is the result of his text).

author, Homer himself.[226] (And there is some comic value in the manner in which one author here cliquishly defends the reputation of another, dumping the blame on his hapless narrator instead!)

However, this process is taken a step further in the second book, where, on the Isle of the Blessed, Homer appears alongside his narrator Odysseus, and other characters too.[227] Socrates appears prominently in the afterlife - significantly, behaving in the manner ascribed to him by Plato - whereas his author Plato (without whom, in one sense, this Socrates would not 'exist') is remarkable only for his absence.[228] It seems that in this fantasy world, the normal laws of narrative logic are suspended.[229] The confusion between the respective roles of authors, characters and readers seems to have a particular resonance for a text like the *VH*, which deliberately and problematically conflates the identity of its author and hero-narrator.[230]

One of the implications that arises as a natural consequence of the idea that the text and *diegesis* of the *VH* are interconnected, is that if the narrative of the *VH* is 'about' the process of travelling towards a goal, so too the *VH* as a text is *about the process of reading*. Now, the *VH* implicitly demands more than one reading. This is not only implicit in Lucian's designation of the text as a riddle (ἤνικται), connoting the multiple possibilities of reading in an allegorical text;[231]

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[226] *VH* 1.3; cf. p. 140 f.. This is the reverse of the situation at Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.* 11. 34, where it is *Homer* who makes *Odysseus* tell lies: see Said 2000: 176-186. A similar dynamic can also be seen in Philostratus' *Heroicus*, where it is revealed that Homer was in cahoots with Odysseus, and whitewashed his story accordingly; cf. n. 191.

[227] *VH* 2.15: Homer and Odysseus seated together at the banqueting table; *VH* 2.20: Odysseus defends Homer against Thersites' charge. Cf. n. 191.

[228] *VH* 2.17. Plato's absence from the company on the Isle of the Blessed recalls his absence from Socrates' prison cell in the *Phaedo* (59 b 10); cf. Chapter 1, p. 12 with n. 32. As McCabe notes (2000: 8), this 'absence' in the *Phaedo* makes us 'notice *that the dialogue is fiction.*' See also Laird (2003), who notes that the references to Socrates and Plato in *VH* 2.17 'foreground the fictive nature not only of Platonic myth, but also of Plato's dialogues themselves.' Laird also notes how Lucian, by placing Socrates' dialectic in a narrative context, mirrors Plato's own compositional technique 'just as in Plato's works dialectic is never a disembodied technique, but one which is embedded in the mimetic drama of characterised exchange.' I am extremely grateful to Andrew Laird for sending me a copy of his excellent article, which allowed me to incorporate referenes to it at a very late stage of this thesis' production.

[229] Mal-Maeder (1992:137) notes this too, but she does not develop the idea beyond this observation.

[230] I see that Laird (2003) also connects this slippage between characters and authors with the problematization of the relation between the 'authorial' voice in the prologue, and the mendacious narrator of the *VH*, suggesting that Lucian (like Apuleius and Plato) is playing with 'philosophical questions about presence and representation'. Laird argues – correctly - that Lucian's text sheds light on Plato's philosophical use of fiction. However, I believe we can advance beyond this - especially given that Lucian's fictionalising takes on its own literary impetus, in the *VH* and elsewhere - and argue that he not only shows an astute understanding of Plato's authorial games and use of fiction, but appropriates these in an exploration of the nature of literary fiction itself.

[231] Cf. n. 127 and p. 193 f..

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it is also one of the effects of withholding the goal of our reading (finding out about the inhabitants of the far side of Ocean). If one is journeying towards a goal, and that goal is ultimately withdrawn, one realises at a late stage that 'the journey was the thing' after all; this invests the journey retrospectively with new significance, which one must then *reconsider*.[232] The inconclusive ending of the *VH* forces the reader to realize at a late stage that the reading of the narrative itself (not what it signifed) was the crucial thing. This encourages a re-reading, which, in the case of a fantastic text especially, as Todorov noted, can only be a *meta-literary reading*: 'la première et la seconde lecture d'un conte fantastique donnent des impressions très différentes (beaucoup plus que pour un autre type de récit); en fait, à la seconde lecture, l'identification n'est plus possible, la lecture devient inévitablement méta-lecture: on relève les procédés du fantastique au lieu d'en subir les charmes.'[233] It is not so much the case, therefore, that the *VH* is an 'anti-hermeneutic' text; rather, the narrative diminishes the relative importance of hermeneutic reading (the search for the reality signified by the text), in favour of the meta-literary reading, reading the process of reading, which is itself inscribed in the text.

In the second book especially, Lucian exploits these two levels of meaning in the *VH* - textual and diegetic - to produce an extended conceit, where readers *actually meet* the authors and characters whom they encounter figuratively in their reading - the basis for which is the dual meaning of the verb ἐντυγχάνειν, as we have already seen.[234]

On the Isle of the Blessed (2. 5-29), all of the narrators and diegetic characters (e.g. Plato's Socrates, Homer's Odysseus, Thersites, Helen and Calypso) seem to have been liberated from their authors, and are enjoying a sort of metaleptic autonomy. In the fantastic chaos resulting from the metaleptic dissolution of the conventional boundaries that separate the diegetic and extra-diegetic worlds (and diegetic from meta-diegetic worlds), authors of one *diegesis* become characters in another, and diegetic characters in turn usurp their authors' role, and take charge of their own narratives.

So, the extra-diegetic reader - you and I - 'meets' (i.e. reads) authors like Homer and Herodotus (and even Lucian himself) as diegetic characters in the *VH*.

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[232] This idea is expressed eloquently in the final lines of Cavafy's poem *Ithaka*:
  Poor though you find it, Ithaka has not cheated you.
  Wise as you have become, with all your experience,
  You will have understood the meaning of an Ithaka.
(from: *Poems by C.P. Cavafy*, trans. J. Mavrogordato (London, 1971)).
[233] Todorov 1970: 95.

The extra-diegetic reader's encounter with the author Homer as a diegetic character in the *VH* is encapsulated in the episode at 2.20, where Lucian, the narrator and the intra-diegetic reader of Homer, meets Homer in person on the Isle of Blessed: *his* questions about Homer and his work represent *our* questions, embodied in the tradition of Homeric criticism. At the same time, Lucian the narrator, reader and character, is also, as author of the *VH*, the author of this Homer as well. Homer in the *VH* in turn interacts with his own diegetic characters on the same ontological plane as himself, e.g. Odysseus and Thersites (2.20). Finally, these metadiegetic characters (i.e. characters who are already diegetic - say, Homer's Odysseus - who also become part of the fabric of Lucian's *diegesis*) themselves take over the role of authors of their own narratives, as when Odysseus pens a letter to Calypso, continuing his own story from Homer's *Odyssey* analeptically.[235]

The extra-diegetic reader (you and I) is identified with the intra-diegetic reader (Lucian the narrator and reader of Homer, and also the reader of Odysseus' letter). This is important, because this identification elicits from us two sorts of reading for the *VH* itself - both the hermeneutic type, and the meta-literary type. The representation of Lucian as a reader questioning Homer about the extra-literary realities 'behind' his text obviously signifies a hermeneutic reading. But when Lucian represents himself in the narrative reading the text of one of Homer's characters, Odysseus, he inscribes a *meta-literary* reading into the text. Two characters in fact read Odysseus' letter; Lucian and Calypso. Calypso, from our point of view at least, belongs to the same ontological register as Odysseus, as a metadiegetic character; her reading of Odysseus' letter therefore does not constitute a breach of narrative logic. Lucian's reading, however, is a metaleptic act, as he is also a reader of the poem which 'contains' Odysseus and Calypso; he reads Odysseus' letter 'knowingly' in a way that Calypso does not. Our assimilation as readers to this meta-literary reader in the text clearly has implications for the manner in which we read the *VH*.

The absurd, and slightly unsettling, result of this metaleptic chaos is a convergence of the roles of author, character and reader. Somehow, every author is also himself part of a *diegesis* (e.g. Homer the author of the *Odyssey* is also Homer the character in the *VH*); conversely, every character within a *diegesis* can become an author (like Homer's Odysseus in Lucian's text). The author himself

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[234] Cf. p. 129 ff..

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can also be a reader (like Lucian), and even the readers of the *VH* almost, or virtually, become authors.

Lucian's large-scale metalepsis is a reification of make-believe worlds and characters, which shows how, by the act of reading itself, we can literally be absorbed into the diegetic world.[236] Metalepsis makes us question the fabric of our own 'reality,' because of its disturbing insistence on the permeability of reality constucts.[237] This can be connected with Lucian's exposure in the *VH* of the text-bound relativity of all 'truths', especially with regard to historiographical and other texts which claim to represent the 'truth'; it also a concern which the *VH* shares with works of self-conscious fiction from the modern era,[238] as well as his own contemporary age.

## AUTHORS OF A SELF-CONSCIOUS AGE: THE *VH* IN CONTEXT

This process begins in the paratext itself. Two titles for this work have been bequeathed to us by the manuscript tradition. The earlier *codices*, dating to the tenth and eleventh centuries, give the title ἀληθεῖς ἱστορίαι ('genuine investigations'/ 'true histories'), while the later group, dating from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, give ἀληθῆ (or ἀληθινά) διηγήματα ('true tales'/ 'true stories').[239]

Arguments can be made in support of both titles. The older title - ἀληθεῖς ἱστορίαι - has perhaps a more 'scientific' ring to it, in the broadest sense. Ἱστορία basically meant 'inquiry' or 'research', and certainly by Lucian's own time, it had also come to mean roughly what we mean by 'history'. By giving his work a title like ἀληθεῖς ἱστορίαι, therefore, Lucian may have wanted to imbue it with an air of 'scientifity', implying that it is the result of serious inquiry or research, which is

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[235] *VH* 2.35. Thersites' protestations against Homer's unfair treatment of him in the *Iliad* may also be read in this light; the diegetic character seeks to 'rewrite' his own author's narrative involving himself. (*VH* 2.20).

[236] So Socrates' wish to meet Palamedes in the afterlife (*Apol.*41 a-c) is actualized in the *VH*; this is analogous to the reification of wishes in the *Nav.*.

[237] Cf. Chapter 1, p. 57 f. and General Conclusion (esp. p. 204 f.).

[238] Alter (1975: 186) identifies this as one of the preoccupations of modern novels such as Cervantes' *Don Quixote* and post-modern works like Nabokov's *Pale Fire*, which ask us 'to ponder how the mind uses words to structure reality, to consider the deep trouble as well as the delights we make for ourselves through the stirring verbal realities we construct.' Romm (1994) explores the relationship between the work of Cervantes, Rabelais and Antonius Diogenes.

[239] Swanson 1976: 230; the translations proposed here are mine. The latter title is the better attested, both by the γ group manuscripts and by the Byzantine patriarch Photius (*Bibl.* 166). This is the title which Macleod prints in the OCT, and it is also endorsed in the two most recent commentaries on the text; Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 1, n.1) and von Möllendorff (2000: 33).

compatible with the pose of learned explorer which his narrator adopts, and with the variety of quasi-scientific *Beglaubigungsstrategien* which he brings to bear on the text.[240]

In doing this, he may also have been following something of a fashion. Photius records a summary of a work by a man known as Ptolemy Chennus ('the Quail'), an Alexandrian, and one of the foremost educators of the time, who was active from the reign of the Emperor Nero, till the early second century A.D.; his work, entitled either παράδοξος ἱστορία ('Paradoxical History') or καινή ἱστορία ('New History'),[241] essentially 'rewrote' many famous traditional stories from the past, in a manner that blatantly flouted the truth, but did so with a pose of scholarly precision and scrupulousness, which included listing the authorities and source for all of his 'facts'. Since almost none of these authorities or sources is known outside Ptolemy's work, it may safely be assumed that they are spurious; Ptolemy simply made them up, as part of his game with the truth.[242] Another near-contemporary of Ptolemy, Philo of Byblos, apparently also produced a παράδοξος ἱστορία, although he is now best known for his *Phoenician History*, a fictional work which invented a pre-Homeric history, once again under the guise of serious historical enterprise, by claiming to be the translation of an authentic historical document authored by the Phoenician Sanchuniathon.[243]

Texts like these, in which the author adopts a serious 'academic' pose to invest his fictional text with authority, as part of the game of make-believe, are characteristic of what appears to have been a literary 'revisionist' movement in the

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[240] In Genette's terms, therefore, this title is both thematic and rhematic, as it reflects the thematization of issues of truth and lies in the work, but the word ἱστορία also possibly contains some information about its generic background (on thematic and rhematic titles, and their functions, see Genette 1997: 77 ff.). Genette (*ibid.*: 97) draws attention to the ambiguity of Proust's title *À la recherche du temps perdu*, which reflects the work's generic ambiguity, 'half-way between the autobiographical and the novelistic'. I wonder if one might argue that Lucian's title also reflects the generic vagueness of his work, especially given the semantic proximity of the French *recherche* and the Greek ἱστορία? Frye (1973: 234-5) classifies the *VH* as the third phase of satire, associated with fantasy - a category it shares with Apuleius' *Met.*, while von Möllendorff (2000: 16) claims that the *VH* is unique, not fitting into any single genre. Swanson (1976: 230, n.3) draws attention to the plural title *True Stories*, to argue that Lucian did not envisage a narrative composed of one overarching unified plot, but a series of episodes; the imaginative nature of the episodes is more important than any link between them. This does seem to be more in line with Lucian's method of composition in other works of fiction, such as the *Philops.* and *Tox.* (collections of stories) - and even (it is reasonable to surmise) in the episodic *Metamorphoses*, if this was Lucian's work. One might compare the episodic nature of modern television science fiction series, such as *Star Trek*.
[241] Photius *Bib.* 146a-153b. For an assessment of the importance of Ptolemy's work in the context of contemporary literary trends, see Bowersock 1994: 23-27.
[242] For a similar game in Antonius Diogenes, see p. 186 f.. Ptolemy and Antonius Diogenes may have been contemporaries: see Bowersock 1994: 35.
[243] *FGH* III.C.790, F1, 28. See Bowersock 1994: 43-44, who again points out that this work may have been contemporary with that of Antonius Diogenes.

first and second centuries A.D. especially.[244] This movement produced revisonist fictions which claimed the status of authentic historical documents, such as the *Ephemeris Belli Troiani* of Dictys of Crete, and the *Acta Diurna Belli Troiani* of Dares the Phrygian. Both of these works present themselves as eye-witness accounts of the Trojan war, a pose that was so convincing that they were prized as authentic historical sources for the Trojan saga in Byzantine and and in Medieval times.[245]

Now Lucian was clearly very much a writer in the spirit of these times. He is supposed, for example, to have forged a treatise in the style, language and thought of Heraclitus; the forgery was so successful that scholars were duped into writing commentaries on it.[246] The *VH* also clearly shows the influence of this literary taste for truth-games, and for revisionism too; it includes some Homeric revisionism of its own in Book 2, where the narrator either confirms or refutes the correctness of Homer's information.[247] The title ἀληθεῖς ἱστορίαι therefore, could arguably have been a signal that the *VH* belonged to this literary tradition. The presence of the adjective ἀληθεῖς in this case seems curiously tautological, because the noun ἱστορία should, of itself, connote truthfulness; the fact that this qualification is needed should immediately arouse suspicions in the reader about the truth-content of *these* ἱστορίαι. This is borne out by the proem, which contains an explicit denial of the truthfulness of the ἱστορία: ἐπεὶ *μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἱστορεῖν εἶχον...ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐτραπόμην.*[248]

In the *VH*, then, rather than try to convince the reader of the authenticity of his material, the authorial persona challenges him instead to remain always aware that it is pure fabrication. In this respect, Lucian is nearer to someone like Antonius Diogenes, who seems also to have designed a deliberately self-contradicting authenticating framework for his work, *The Incredible Things Beyond Thule*, and to let his text oscillate between two poles of credibility.[249] Seen in this light, the (now generally accepted) title ἀληθῆ διηγήματα acquires an extra edge. The noun διηγήμα ('story', 'tale', 'narrative'), of itself, does not

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[244] See Bowersock 1994: 43.
[245] See Merkle (1994) and (1996). On Dictys and Dares' works as products of this 'revisionist' movement, see Bowersock 1994: 23. From a later date, we also have Protesilaus' ghost's revisionist 'corrections' of Homer in Philostratus' *Heroicus*; see Bowersock 1994: 111-112, and now Maclean & Aitken 2001: lx-lxxvi.
[246] See Strohmaier 1976.
[247] See generally p. 159 ff..
[248] *VH* 1.4.

connote truth; in fact it rather suggests a story that *has been made up*.²⁵⁰ This title, therefore, with the accompanying adjective ἀληϑῆ, is antiphrastic; it draws attention immediately to the problematic relationship between truth and fiction, which is thematized in the text itself, and is compatible with the author's self-exposure in the proem.²⁵¹

The inclusion of a proem to advertise the self-conscious nature of the narrative was certainly not without precedent or parallel, both in historiography and contemporary prose fiction, as Lucian was well aware.²⁵² Hecataeus, working in the latter half of the sixth/ early fifth century B.C., may have been the first historian to append his name to his work in this way.²⁵³ Herodotus also introduced his work with a prologue outlining his purpose in writing the *History*. Although it does not, strictly speaking, preface his work, Thucydides' famous programmatic declaration at 1.22, outlining both his purpose and historiographical method, is obviously relevant here too.²⁵⁴

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²⁴⁹ Cf. p. 185 ff.. Lucian is fond of constructing conflicting frames of response for his fiction – see General Conclusion (p. 202 ff.).

²⁵⁰ Von Möllendorff (2000: 33) notes that, since the work of Chariton and Xenophon Ephesius, the noun could also be used to mean 'narrative' or 'novel'.

²⁵¹ Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 1, n.1) note that Polybius defines the word διήγημα as 'history without truth' (1.14.6). Fusillo (1999: 356) describes the title as an 'antiphrase', anticipating a work that is full of 'paradoxical fiction' (see Genette 1997: 82-3 for general discussion of such ironic titles). Swanson (1976: 230) translates ἀληϑῆ διγηγήματα as 'True Fictions', and notes that this fits in with the 'oxymoronic distinction between true falsehood and false truth', and is therefore a title most suitable to Lucian's 'veritable genre of philosophical science fiction.'

²⁵² *Hist.co.* 52-54. For a general narratological study of the preface, see Genette 1997, chapters 8, 9 and 10 (p. 161ff.), which has informed much of what I have to say below. For the Latin historians' use of the prose preface, see Janson 1964: 64ff.. Moles (1993) contains relevant discussion of the issues of truth and falsehood in the prologues of Herodotus and Thucydides. Maeder (1991) is an excellent study of how the Greek novelists flaunt the fictionality of their narratives in their prologues. Much work has also been done on the prologue to Apuleius' *Met.*, a passage of vital importance for Lucian too; the collection of essays edited by Kahane and Laird (2001) is invaluable here; of particular relevance are Trapp (2001), Bitel (2001), Morgan (2001) and de Jong (2001). Note that von Möllendorff (2000: 66) does not count the proem to the *VH* as paratextual, but as integral to the travel-fiction.

²⁵³ *FGrH* 1 F 1 (from the proem to his *Genealogies*): ῾Εκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὧδε μυθεῖται· τάδε γράφω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ ῾Ελλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν. Genette (1997: 161) defines a 'preface' as 'every type of introductory (preludial or postludial) text, authorial or allographic, consisting of a discourse produced on the subject of the text that follows or precedes it.' The *exordium* of rhetorical speech is analogous to the novelistic or historiographical preface (Genette 1997: 164).

²⁵⁴ Hornblower (1991: 59) notes that 'methodological prefaces of any kind, discussing how one has arrived at the truth, are rare in the historians of antiquity'; he cites, however, the often-overlooked preface to Arrian's *Anabasis* as a fine post-Thucydidean example. Macleod (1987) postulates an intertextual relationship between Lucian and Arrian, but his proposals do not include the *VH*. For the almost archetypal status of Thucydides 1.22, see Genette 1997: 14, '...the authorial preface...has changed hardly at all - except in its material presentation - since Thucydides'; Genette discusses the prefaces of Herodotus, Thucydides and Livy at pp. 164-5, and connects this practice to the prefaces of Chariton, Longus, Lucian (*VH*) and Apuleius (*Met.*), contrasting it with the technique of beginning *ex abrupto*, which Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus used. Genette (1997: 292-

Genette identifies several important functions of the original, authorial preface - noting that prefaces may simultaneously have many functions.[255] The primary function is monitory - to ensure the text is read, and read properly. Genette distinguishes here between 'themes of the why' (i.e. authorial arguments to explain *why* one should read the book, such as dwelling on the high quality of the text, demonstrating the importance of the subject-matter, or the *usefulness*, *novelty* and *truthfulness* of the work - all of which are clearly reflected in Lucian's preface),[256] and 'themes of the how' (i.e. details about the text's genesis, the choice of reader, contracts of fiction, statements of intent, and genre definitions). There are also varieties of subversive prefaces, which may be polemic or ludic in spirit; the preface to the *VH* clearly falls within this category - as do the prefaces of several other texts of the same era.

Lucian's pointedly subverts the *topoi* of historiographical prologues like those of Herodotus and Thucydides, when he emphasizes that his work is designed for posterity; unlike his serious forbears, however, Lucian's motivation is not to preserve the glorious deeds of mankind (as in Herodotus 1.1), nor to be an enduring reminder of the warlike tendencies of human nature, so that future generations may learn from history (Thucydides 1.22), but pure personal vanity instead (*VH* 1.4: κενοδοξία).[257]

Lucian uses his proem in the manner of a historian, to set forth his methodological principles for the *VH*. However, whereas Thucydides and Arrian scrupulously explain their methods for arriving at the truth - thereby addressing one of Genette's 'themes of the why' - Lucian explains how he arrived at the opposite - complete falsehood. In the climactic, penultimate sentence of the preface, he makes it clear that he did *not* either see or learn by report about the things which he describes in his narrative: γράφω τοίνυν περὶ ὧν μήτε εἶδον μήτε ἔπαθον μήτε παρ᾽ ἄλλων ἐπυθόμην (*VH* 1.4). This establishes a

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3) shows that the composition of fictional prefaces is an act of self-depiction, which is characteristic of self-conscious, self-reflexive and ludic fiction; the corollary of this argument is that authors who wish to prioritize the mimetic illusion of their texts, rather than draw attention to their *literal* dimension, tend to avoid such exploitation of paratextual elements: cf. Morgan 1991, esp. pp. 86-90 on the famous opening to Heliodorus' novel.

[255] For the following account, see Genette 1997: 196 ff..

[256] In the case of the claim to novelty, Genette (1997: 200) claims that it is a feature of authorial prefaces since Rousseau only, and that authors of the Classical age preferred to insist on the traditional nature of their subject instead, either explicitly (as in tragedy, for example), or indirectly, by indicating their sources or precedents. He notes also that truthfulness is the only aspect of *treatment* (as opposed to *subject-matter*) for which the author gives himself credit (1997: 206f.).

[257] Cf. p. 133 ff.. Genette (1997: 200) shows that the argument of usefulness may also be deployed subversively, when the author points out, paradoxically, the *uselessness* of his text; Lucian, however, asserts a *positive* intellectual value for his self-confessed frivolity.

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subversive dialectic especially with Thucydides 1. 22, where the historian emphasizes the importance of autopsy and rigorous corroboration of other people's testimony:

τὰ δ' ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἠξίωσα γράφειν οὐδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ' οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών.

As for the actual events in the war, I did not think it proper to write an account of what I learned from casual acquaintance, nor of what seemed likely to me, but of the events where I myself was present, following up each detail with the greatest possible accuracy from other people's accounts too.

With this remark, Lucian also associates his work with that of Ctesias, which was, he says, based neither on autopsy nor on reliable report (Κτησίας...ὃς συνέγραψεν περὶ τῆς Ἰνδῶν χώρας...ἃ μήτε αὐτὸς εἶδεν μήτε ἄλλου ἀληθεύοντος ἤκουσεν).[258] The purpose of this subversive intertextuality with serious historiographical prologues is to define more clearly the fantastical nature of the VH, and highlight its acknowledged non-seriousness by contrast.

Other literary artists in antiquity were also aware of this historiographical technique, and one group in particular clearly emulated the practice: the Greek novelists. Chariton's introductory autobiographical note (Chaereas and Callirhoe 1.1) is clearly written as a nod to this historiographical tradition.[259] Longus, author of the pastoral romance Daphnis and Chloe (D&C), provides a more richly nuanced and more subversive example.[260] Longus was probably a contemporary of Lucian.[261] I believe that there is a stronger affinity between these two than is widely acknowledged, inasmuch as both were working within the same ludic and allusive literary tradition; it is worthwhile comparing Longus' prologue with Lucian's.

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[258] VH 1.3. Interestingly, Photius makes a similar claim about Antonius Diogenes' narrator Deinias, who, he says, reports things that no-one had ever seen, or heard of, or even imagined before (Photius, Bib. 111 a4-11). This is the opposite of what Ctesias claims, in his anti-Herodotean polemic (FGrH 688 T 8; cf. p. 133 with n. 65).

[259] For interesting discussion of Chariton's introductory statement, see Hägg (1999: 148-9), and Reardon (1999: 177, n.26), both with additional bibliography; see also Rosenmeyer (2001: 137-138).

[260] For the intertextual dialectic between Longus' prologue and Thucydides' manifesto, see Morgan 1994a, esp. 73 ff..

[261] The question of Longus' date is rather fraught; for a learned discussion of the relevant evidence, see Hunter 1983: 1-15, who concludes that there is no reason to doubt the communis opinio that Longus belongs to the late second or early third century A.D. (in which case, he is roughly contemporary with Lucian). Bernsdorff (1993) provides a positive argument for contemporaneity between the two authors, on the basis of intertextuality between Lucian VH 2.5 and D&C.

First of all, the function of the prologue in each case is analogous. As Morgan points out, Longus uses his prologue 'to stake out the relationship between his creation and reality.'[262] By presenting his work metatextually as a narrative representation of a picture, Longus alerts readers to the self-conscious artifice of his novel - the fact that it is constantly aware of its own status as a work of art. By introducing his novel as an εἰκών, he more particularly evokes the doctrine of μίμησις, especially the connection between the mimetic arts of poetry and painting, as developed in Book 10 of Plato's *Republic*.[263] This foreshadows the fact that his narrative thematizes the process of *mimesis* that is integral both to Daphnis and Chloe's educational experience, and also to the novelist's (and the

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[262] Morgan 1994a: 65. On the prologue in *D&C*, see Hunter 1983: 38-52. Hunter suggests that by setting his novel up to 'compete' with the appeal of visual works of art, Longus 'employs a mild form of...self-advertisement', for which he compares Lucian, *De Domo* 21 (1983: 43). Longus' programmatic exploration of the interrelationship of art and nature (or 'reality') is also connected to the self-conscious fictionality of his novel; see Hunter (1996: 382): ' "Fiction" itself is an idea bound up with "art" and "nature", for in fiction art claims to create (or imitate) nature.' Cf. Zeitlin 1990: 430 ff.. Longus is not the only surviving Greek novelist to do this sort of thing; his device of introducing his narrative *via* a description of a painting is often compared to the opening of Achilles Tatius' novel, *Leucippe and Clitophon*, where the contemplation of a marvellous painting of the rape of Europa leads to Clitophon's narrative of his own story. Like Longus, Achilles Tatius also problematizes the relationship between pictorial art, narrative fiction and 'real life'. The ego-narrator Clitophon introduces himself as if his personal experiences (which are, of course, the subject of the novel) were the subject of the painting (1.2: ἐγὼ ταῦτ' ἂν ἐδείκνυν...τοσαύτας ὕβρεις ἐξ ἔρωτος παθών), and when invited to tell his story, he warns his narratee that he is stirring a wasps' nest of stories, *which resemble fiction* (1.2: σμῆνος ἀνεγείρεις...λόγων· τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ μύθοις ἔοικε: on the Platonic resonance of this phrase, see Maeder 1991: 15). Finally, the *mise en scène* of Clitophon's narration - a grove of plane trees with a cool stream running through - distinctly recalls the *locus amoenus* of Plato's *Phaedrus*, which both prepares the reader for a λόγος ἐρωτικός, and also draws our attention closer to the textual surface of the narrative (for Lucian's similar use of this *locus amoenus*, see Chapter 1, p. 17 ff., and Appendix II). It is also worth noting the programmatic importance of Heliodorus' exquisite *ekphrasis* of the engraved amethyst on the ring, which Kalasiris bestows on his benefactor, Nausikles (*Aithiopika* 5.14). This passage is clearly not a prologue, but it is striking for the way in which he plays with the relationship of art and nature or reality, in a manner that surely recalls the introductory *ekphraseis* of Longus and Achilles Tatius. Even Morgan, who admits that he is generally reluctant to read post-modernist concerns with hermeneutic theory into Heliodorus' text, concedes ('in a spirit of only half-serious speculation') the possibility of such a reading here (Morgan 1991:100). Bowie is right, I think, to postulate an implicit reference to Longus' novel in the pastoral scene engraved on Heliodorus' jewel (Bowie 1995). Novels usually reflect themselves in *mise en abyme* through *non-novelistic* works, such as the gem-art in this example, reflecting perhaps the *visual* emphasis that Heliodorus gives his narrative. The near centrality of this *mise en abyme* is also interesting; Dällenbach observes that 'many texts fight shy of revealing their artificiality by too rigorous a symmetry and tend to shift their *mise en abyme* slightly to the left or the right' (on these issues, see Dällenbach 1989: 70-72). On *ekphrasis* in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus in particular, see Bartsch (1989: *passim*). On the peculiar blend of *effets de réel* and *effets de création* in Achilles Tatius' opening scene, see Maeder (1991: 2-16). Schwartz (1976) explores similarities between Lucian and Achilles Tatius, but his analysis is in a different vein from mine, and he does not discuss the *VH* in this connection at all. Cf. Fusillo (1999: 356), who identifies a similar 'rationalism' as one of the 'possible points of contact' between Lucian and Achilles Tatius.
[263] See Hunter 1983: 44ff..

putative painter's) artistic endeavour.[264] We remember how Lucian's prologue, by virtue of a subversive intertextual dialectic with Platonic and Aristotelian literary theory, establishes from the outset both his narrative's self-conscious fictionality, and its liberation from extra-literary reality.

The authorial persona in Longus' prologue explains his novel's genesis: he wrote it in order to narrativize a painting he saw on Lesbos, which (as he learned from an exegete) depicted the story of the life and love of Daphnis and Chloe:[265]

πολλὰ ἄλλα καὶ πάντα ἐρωτικὰ ἰδόντα με καὶ θαυμάσαντα πόθος ἔσχεν ἀντιγράψαι τῇ γραφῇ.[266]

Many other details all about love I saw and wondered at, and a desire seized me to depict the picture in words.

Similarly, in his prologue, Lucian explains why he wrote the *VH*. It is interesting to note that a sense of amazement (θαῦμα) seems to have given both authors the incentive to write their works; in Longus' case, it is amazed astonishment at the subject-matter of the painting, and in Lucian's, it is astonishment at the audacity of writers who tell lies and expect to get away with it (*VH* 1.4).[267]

In both cases, the authors claim that their current literary endeavour is the result of contemplating other works of art, whether pictorial (as in Longus), or narrative (as in Lucian); both prologues therefore - in each case, slightly differently - advertise the hypertextual nature of their respective narratives. In this context, it is significant that Longus is explicit about the role of an exegete in

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[264] For discussion, see Zeitlin 1990, esp. p. 436 ff.. The human characters in *D&C*, for example, are frequently depicted trying to imitate the animals (e.g. 1.3 and 1.6: where the peasants, Lamon and Dryas respectively, imitate (ironically) the animals' 'humane' behaviour to the abandoned babies; 3.13-14: the children try to learn how to satisfy their desires by imitating the animals' mating habits - and fail miserably (for the irony of this, see Hunter 1983: 20). Maeder (1991: 20) notes that Longus' emphasis on the propaideutic value of his novel foreshadows the theme of *paideusis* in the story. The link between *mimesis* and *paideusis* in the story is reflected also in the *paideutic* value of Longus' *mimetic* narrative.

[265] The picture therefore constitutes an example of *mise en abyme*. Maeder (1991: 8) notes that the elaborate *ekphrasis* of the picture of the rape of Europa at the beginning of Achilles Tatius' novel is an example of *mise en abyme* with a proleptic function: cf. Chapter 2, p. 78 ff.; see also the excellent analysis in Martin 2002.

[266] *D&C* Prologue 2.

[267] This motivational force ascribed to θαῦμα in both passages may be less than fortuitous, given that both authors, as I argue here, evoke Aristotle intertextually in their prologues. Aristotle defined θαῦμα as the sense of wonder that inspires humans with a desire to learn (*Rhet.* 1371 a 21). It is also hardly fortuitous that the noun and its cognates appear in the preface to Herodotus (ἔργα...θωμαστά), in Thucydides 1.22 (τὰ ἀρχαῖα...θαυμαζόντων), and in Arrian's prologue (ὅστις δὲ θαυμάσεται...ἐπὶ τοσοῖσδε συγγραφεῦσι...τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἐντυχὼν οὕτω θαυμαζέτω) as well. The context in which Lucian uses the verb θαυμάζω is closest to Arrian, as both authors use the verb to speak of a *reader's* surprised reaction. Significantly, Latin

mediating to him the information contained in the painting; like Lucian's reference to his text as an *aenigma* (ἤνικται), this may be construed as a hint to the reader to watch out for hidden meanings, such as symbolism and allegory.²⁶⁸ Lucian's prologue on the whole is of a more transgressive nature, given that he warns readers that he simply made up everything in his narrative. In Longus, on the other hand, one feels that the authorial persona speaking in the proem is, potentially at least, as much a part of the diegetic world as Daphnis and Chloe are; this is because, as a self-begetting novel, the textuality of *Daphnis and Chloe* is itself part of the fabric of the *diegesis*.²⁶⁹ The motif of autogenesis in Longus' novel is related to, but less transgressive than, Lucian's admission of creating a diegetic world which has no extra-literary point of reference.

Another similarity between both prologues is the way in which they evoke the dichotomy that was well-established in ancient literary criticism, between what is *pleasant* or *charming* (τὸ τερπνόν) and what is *useful*. Generally speaking, stories that were charming were associated with falsehood, whereas utility tended to be associated with truth-bearing literature like historiography. Hunter, in discussing the dichotomy between these values in Longus' prologue,²⁷⁰ in fact quotes a passage from Lucian's *Zeus Tragoedus* as proof of the common currency of this view:

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equivalents, such as *miror*, also form a *leitmotiv* in the prologue to Apuleius' *Met.*: see, for example, Smith 2001: 90-91.

²⁶⁸ See Bartsch 1989: 41-42 (on the allegorical use of pictorial descriptions in texts): '...in almost every case, a characteristic of this allegorizing use of descriptive passages is the insertion into the text of an interpreter (ἑρμηνεύς or ἐξηγητής) to uncover and explain the deep meaning of the painting.' As examples of such allegorical paintings, Bartsch cites the *ekphrasis* in Longus' proem, in the opening to Achilles Tatius' novel, and in Lucian's *prolaliae*, *Heracles* and *Slander* (on which, see *ibid.*: 23ff.). With regard to the Longus passage, however, Hunter warns that the word ἐξηγητής (as well as associated words like περιηγητής, and the verbs μηνύειν, ἑρμηνύειν) are used for both allegorical *and* non-allegorical paintings. The word ἐξεγητής may in fact mean no more than 'museum guide', and given the context of the fiction that Longus has set up here, the presence of such a person is also entirely to be expected (1983: 46, with n. 93). For a different opinion, see Morgan (1993: 218): '[Longus' prologue]...contrives to communicate the ground rules of the novel's hermeneutic dynamics. The need for an exegete to interpret the painting suggests that the novel also has layers of meaning and connection beneath its obvious surface...' The connection of stories to *objets d'art* is a feature also of Herodotean narrative.

²⁶⁹ Morgan (1994a: 73) notes that it is our first self-begetting novel from antiquity; he sees this as a reflection of the author's concern with the opposition between truth or reality and fiction, and connects it with the novel's self-consciousness: 'In fact the painting which supposedly gave rise to his narrative turns out to be an autobiographical document of the novel's protagonists, dedicated by them at the end of their story. *Daphnis and Chloe* is thus our first self-begetting novel and it is hardly surprising that it is preoccupied with its own status and function as a fiction, and the relation between fiction and experience in general.'

²⁷⁰ Hunter 1983: 47ff..

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οὐ γὰρ ἀληθείας μέλει [sc. τοῖς ποιηταῖς]...ἀλλὰ τοῦ κλυεῖν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μέτροις τε κατάιδουσι καὶ μύθοις κατηχοῦσι καὶ ὅλως ἅπαντα ὑπὲρ τοῦ τερπνοῦ μηχανῶνται.[271]

For [the poets] are not concerned with truth, but with the attention of the audience, and on account of this, they sing in metres and resound with stories and devise everything totally for the sake of charm.

Therefore, as Hunter observes, the element of τὸ τερπνόν that is emphatically associated with the painting in Longus' prologue, as well as his description of his novel as a κτῆμα τερπνὸν (a suggestive phrase that echoes, and subverts, Thucydides' κτῆμα ἐς ἀιεὶ) links the work with the poetic tradition, especially with poetic licence, and consequently falsehood.[272] Lucian seems to be exploiting the same semantics in his prologue, where he concedes that Iambulus' obviously mendacious work was οὐκ ἀτερπνῆ (VH 1.3); significantly, this is the tradition he follows in his own explicitly false text too.

However, both Longus and Lucian also claim that their fictions will be useful.[273] Although he does not explicitly use a term to denote utility (such as χρησιμόν or ὠφέλιμον) with regard to his text, Lucian implicitly ascribes these qualities to the VH, by stating that the allusive texture of the narrative, as well as its very playfulness, will provide both the mental stimulation and recreation that is necessary and appropriate for mental gymnasts, or scholars (VH 1. 1-2). When viewed within the frame of the traditional dichotomy between what is pleasant (false, and frivolous), and useful (true, and serious), it is clear that Lucian's implication that the explicitly playful nature of his text will make it useful for serious scholars of literature (as well as his claim that writing this playful text was a serious endeavour - 1.4) constitutes something of a paradox, which is consistent with his reputation for being spoudogeloios.[274]

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[271] Iup.Trag. 39. Hunter cross-refers to Philops. 4; also to Isocrates ad Nicoclem 48, Dio Chrys. 11.42, and Plutarch Mor. 16 a-f. He also cites Horace Ars Poetica 333-346, where ficta are associated with voluptas.

[272] Hunter 1983: 47; it also means that Longus aligns his work with Herodotus (ibid.: 49, and 96-97). On the subversive intertextuality between Longus' proem and Thucydides 1.22, see Hunter 1983: 48-50, and Morgan 1994a: 73 ff.. Morgan argues that Longus in this way asserts a truth-bearing role for fiction as well: 'Fiction in its turn is the vehicle of truth, about ourselves and the world. Through fiction we can pool our experiences and learn imaginatively what we cannot or choose not to learn experientially.' (76) Daphnis and Chloe, he concludes, is a 'self-referential defence of fiction.' (77).

[273] For the Aristotelian overtones of this justification, see the discussion on p. 135 ff. above.

[274] Eunapius, Lives of the Sophists and Philosophers 454: ἀνὴρ σπουδαῖος ἐς τὸ γελασθῆναι. On Lucian's serio-comic style, see Branham 1989, chapter 1, 'The Rhetoric of

Longus also asserts that his novel will be useful; it will cure the person who is sick, provide consolation for the one who is grief-stricken, stir the memory of one who has experienced love, and instruct the one who has not:

καὶ νοσοῦντα ἰάσεται καὶ λυπούμενον παραμυθήσεται, τὸν ἐρασθέντα ἀναμνήσει, τὸν οὐκ ἐρασθέντα παιδεύσει.[275]

Moreover, Longus emphasizes the *universal* usefulness of his novel, for no-body has escaped, nor will ever escape, the experience or Eros, as long as beauty exists, and eyes can see:

πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς Ἔρωτα ἔφυγεν ἢ φεύξεται, μέχρι ἂν κάλλος ᾖ καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ βλέπωσιν.[276]

Given that Longus is essentially justifying his fiction in his prologue, and that his method for doing so entails relating it to historiography, this idea resonates with Aristotle's legitimization of plasmatic fiction. Aristotle also contrasted *poiesis* (poetry, or more generally, creative literature) with history. According to Aristotle, even if fiction does not, like history, relate the truth in its particulars, it nonetheless conveys *universal* truths, which we can all apply to our own lives (*Poetics* 1451 b5 ff.).[277] If I am right, then this is another point in common between Longus and Lucian, as Lucian, as I have already shown, also evoked this Aristotelian formula in his prologue, to justify his fiction.[278] It is interesting that two near-contemporary authors of such self-conscious fictions should evoke the same branch of literary theory in order to justify their work. Moreover, it is also, I think, significant that their respective fictions, *Daphnis and Chloe* and the *Verae Historiae*, are arguably among the least concerned of all our extant Greek novels (or novel-like works of extended prose fiction) to give the impression of compatibility with extra-literary reality; in Longus' case, the general atmosphere of rural fantasy is integral to the pastoral mode of his novel;[279] in Lucian's case, the text breaks even more audaciously with Aristotelian rules that dictate that plasmatic fiction should conform with plausible reality.[280]

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Laughter' esp. pp. 26-28 and 47-51; Branham's discussion here, however, focuses on works such as the Menippean pieces, *Pisc.*, *Bis Acc.*, various *prolaliae* and the *Demonax*, not on the *VH*.

[275] *D&C* Proem 2.

[276] *D&C* Proem 2.

[277] Cf. p. 141 f..

[278] Cf. p. 142-144.

[279] On the relation between Longus' novel and the bucolic tradition, see Rohde 1937; Mittelstadt 1970; Cresci 1999; Hunter 1983: 66f.. On the issue of how 'realistic' Longus' depiction of Lesbos was, see Mason 1979; Green 1982; Kloft 1989. Morgan (1994a: 77, n.1) speaks of 'the deliberate artificiality of his setting'.

[280] In a stimulating article, van Mal-Maeder (1992) argues that by mixing historiographical prose with the substance of Homer's poetry in the *VH*, Lucian asserts for his prose the license for fantastic

For someone who is exploring how the *VH* fits into the (roughly) contemporary literary scene, Longus probably does not suggest himself as the obvious starting point. There are, after all, other works that apparently lend themselves to comparison with the *VH* much more readily; the work on which most ink has been spilled in this context is surely Antonius Diogenes' *Incredible Things Beyond Thule*. However, I deliberately chose Longus to start with here, because I did not wish to become side-tracked by the rather fraught issue of similarities in content, which has tended to dominate comparative studies of Lucian's and Diogenes' work. The dissimilarity of content between *Daphnis and Chloe* and the *VH* itself serves to clarify that the points of comparison I am looking for do not pertain to similarity in plot or subject between Lucian's work and others'. Although Longus' pastoral romance is not an instantly obvious comparand for the *VH* in terms of subject-matter and plot, they are close relatives in terms of their self-conscious fictionality. When self-reflexive texts such as these diverge from extra-literary reality, it has the effect of drawing the reader's (and the critic's) attention away from what we might call the referential dimension of the fiction, and onto its literal dimension, highlighting the artifice and fictionality itself. This spirit of ludic self-consciousness - authors playing with the ontological status and the compositional techniques of fictional narrative, and playing with the rules of make-believe - is the common denominator I am looking for in seeking links between Lucian's literary enterprise and others from the same era. The relationship between the *VH* and Diogenes' *Apista* emerges not as one of direct causality; rather, both works should be seen as products of their time,[281] written in

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fiction that was usually associated with poetry in antiquity: '...loin de prétendre au vrai ou seulement au vraisemblable, Lucien revendique en effet le droit de se livrer dans sa prose à la pure fantaisie poétique, et il le fait sous la tutelle d'Homère.' (1992: 146). While I agree with her that the *VH* has a more serious 'message', besides its pure entertainment value, however, I do not endorse her view that Lucian intended the *VH* as a denunciation of the contemporary taste for 'escapist' literature (van Mal-Maeder 1992: 144). Firstly, it is not clear what is meant by the term 'escapist literature.' Mal-Maeder seems to mean the novels - but I am not sure how appropriate such a description is for this genre: are they to be viewed as escapist in terms of content (i.e. because their stories deviate, or are separate from 'reality'; Livy's preface, for example, shows that events in the distant past provided a welcome escape from the grim present), or genre (i.e. because they provide the option of 'lighter' reading, as opposed to the more serious prose genre of history)? There are difficulties with both views: most of our extant examples fit the category of 'plasmatic' fiction, which means that their stories are realistic, rather than escapist in that sense; and Aristotle, as we have seen, actually ascribed higher philosophical value to reading 'plasmatic' fiction, than history. Furthermore, as we have seen, there is every reason to suppose that the readership of this so-called 'escapist' literature in fact overlapped with the ideal readers of the *VH* - and anyway, the reasons for which Lucian recommends the *VH* (and Iambulus' work) sound very much like a *promotion* of readerly escapism; cf. p. 151.
[281] Bowersock sees no need to connect the two works at all: 'Lucian's work is simply and independently a development from the same Neronian beginnings as Diogenes' own.' (Bowersock 1994: 37).

a similar spirit, with a similar readership in mind, even if they have somewhat different literary aims. The central issue connecting them is the interplay of fact and fiction, which is generated in both works by a conflicting *Beglaubigungsapparat*. Both Diogenes and Lucian employ mechanisms that are intended to induce reader-credulity, yet this is also undermined by authorial devices which remind the reader that the text is entirely fabricated, and not true.

According to Photius 111a, Diogenes began each of the twenty-four books of his work with a list of the sources he used for his composition. This would have given readers the impression that each of the books had been scrupulously researched; the illusion, however, was seriously undermined by two things. First of all, Photius tells us the name of only one of the 'sources' whom Diogenes invokes; it is none other than Antiphanes of Berge. Given that Antiphanes' name was literally synonymous with transparent fiction in antiquity, it looks like this device of source-identification was merely spoof.[282] 'Of all the sources that Antonius could have chosen to cite, Antiphanes was the one least calculated to confirm the veracity of his work...some sort of humorous, probably parodistic, motive seems the likeliest explanation'[283]

Secondly, Diogenes openly admitted to having simply made the whole thing up, in a letter addressed to a certain Faustinus, which accompanied the narrative, probably as a 'postface'.[284] Included within this letter to Faustinus was another letter, this time addressed to the dedicatee of the novel, a woman called Isidora, who was perhaps Faustinus' wife.[285] In the letter to Isidora, in direct contravention of the information supplied to Faustinus, Diogenes strives to authenticate the novel, by explaining the extraordinarily complicated circumstances which (supposedly) led to the original recording of the events, and the subsequent discovery of the text.[286] As evidence for the truth of his claims, he

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[282] One is reminded of the invented 'sources' cited by the contemporary writer Ptolemy Chennus in his παράδοξος ιστορία: see p. 175 f.; see Gabba 1981.

[283] Morgan 1985: 483.

[284] Opinions differ about the location of this letter. Morgan (1985: 482-484) is inclined to believe that the letter was published originally as part of the work, probably as a prefatory letter, as Photius' summary suggests that the exposure of the work's fictionality was 'by design'. Romm, however, argues convincingly that it was an addendum, given its position in the sequence of Photius' summary: '...Photius's description of the letter to Faustinus (111a30-40), which occurs at the conclusion of his plot summary, probably reflects its placement at the end of the novel.' (Romm 1994: 114, n. 30). Bowersock (1994: 37-38) suggests that this Faustinus may be identified with a man of the same name, who was one of Martial's patrons; this would then secure a Domitianic date for Diogenes.

[285] Bowie 1994: 437.

[286] In Genette's terms, the letter to Faustinus is an *authentic authorial* preface, with *assumptive* function, i.e. 'the real author, in his preface, claims (or more simply, assumes) responsibility for the text' (Genette 1997: 184). The letter to Isidora is also an *authentic authorial* preface, but with

cites a 'historical' document, yet *another* letter, addressed by a man called Balagrus, a contemporary of Alexander the Great, to his wife Phila, in which he reports the discovery in a tomb of an exciting new text - which turns out to be the text of the novel.[287]

It is not immediately clear what we are to make of such painstaking and contradictory elaboration. Bowie suggests that we may be able to infer something about female consumption of novels in antiquity, from the fact that availability of the novel to the female dedicatee, Isidora, appears to be mediated *via* Faustinus. He also focuses on the pattern of male/ female pairs, both in the narrative proper (Derkyllis/ Deinias; Derkyllis/ Mantineas), and in the framing apparatus (Faustinus/ Isidora; Balagrus/ Phila), with the attractive suggestion that Isidora may stand for the credulous reader of the novel.[288] Others interpret this exaggerated intricacy as a parody of authenticating devices in itself, just as the convoluted narrative structure could itself be construed as an amplification almost *ad absurdum* of increasingly complicated novel plots.[289] What seems undeniable here is the fact that Diogenes goes to enormous trouble to authenticate a text which, elsewhere, he readily admits to be the product of his own invention; in

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*disavowing* funtion, i.e. 'another kind of authorial preface, just as authentic in its status of attribution in that its declared author is indeed the real author of the text, but much more fictional in its discourse because in this preface the real author claims…without really inviting us to believe him - not to be the author *of the text*'; this is also known as a *crypto-authorial* preface, 'for the author uses it to conceal (or deny) his authorship' (*ibid.*: 185; for further discussion, see *ibid.*: 280 ff.). The letter from Balagrus to Phila is a *fictive allographic* preface, i.e. 'the preface-writer is fictive, as is the alleged author of the text, but these are two distinct persons' (*ibid.*: 189; for further discussion, see *ibid.*: 288 ff.). For general discussion of these different types of senders of prefaces, see Genette 1997: 178 ff.. The complex and self-contradictory nature of Diogenes' layered paratext itself functions as a *Fiktionalitätssignal*; Genette's observation about the similarly self-conflicting paratext of modern novels such as Nabokov's *Lolita* is relevant here: 'What one paratextual element gives, another paratextual element, later or simultaneous, may always take away; and here or elsewhere, the reader must put it all together and try…to figure out what the whole adds up to. And the very way in which a paratextual element gives what it gives may always imply that none of it is to be believed.' (Genette 1997: 183).

[287] For the motif of *Bücherfunde* as an authenticating device in ancient narrative in general, see Speyer 1970. Morgan (1985: 481-2) and Bowersock (1994: 31) compare the similar use of the device in the apocryphal works of Dictys Cretensis and Dares the Phrygian; one could also add the 'original' text of Sanchuniathon, written in Phoenician, which was the pseudo-hypotext for the *Phoenician History* of Philo of Byblos (*FGrH* III.C.790, F1, 28). Diogenes' novel may in fact be the only extant novelistic text to present one of its diegetic characters as the author and writer of the text (not just the narrator) in this way. The technique is close to that used in *Daphnis & Chloe* (the author is 'in the book', as it were, but not 'in the story'; cf. p. 180 ff.), and also in the apocryphal texts of putative 'eye-witnesses', such as Dictys of Crete, Dares the Phrygian, and the *Phoenician History* of 'Sanchuniathon'; these apocryphal authors are, however, not the authors of novels containing their *own* stories, as Deinias is.

[288] Bowie 1994: 437-8.

[289] Morgan (1985: 484) interprets this 'Chinese box' narrative structure as a device to secure verism - but so extreme in its complexity that it might be parodic.

other words, Diogenes problematizes the fictionality of his own narrative in a way that is similar to Lucian, and typical of the self-conscious novel.[290]

Lucian also frames the narrative of the *VH* with a self-contradictory *Beglaubigungsapparat*. His insistence in his preface on the *untruthfulness* of his text is subsequently problematized in the narrative by authorial devices whose purpose it is to elicit credence (*Beglaubigungsstrategien*), such as his ostensible accuracy with large numbers.[291] Both Lucian and Diogenes, therefore, subvert the usual purpose of introductory frameworks, which are designed to give the impression of 'real life', to authenticate the fiction.[292]

Both authors also do homage in their text to sources or models which had negative truth-value for readers (in both cases, probably tongue-in-cheek): whereas Diogenes cites the notoriously mendacious Antiphanes of Berge as a source, Lucian praises the comic poet Aristophanes, inventor of Cloudcuckooland, for his supreme truthfulness.[293]

The textual surface of the narrative is dangerously close to the surface in both works, a trait which they also share with the authors of the 'sophistic' ideal novels. In Diogenes' novel, there is a remarkable emphasis on *writing*, and an elaborate apparatus to explain the transmission of not just the story, but the *text* itself. No doubt for the sake of that extra *'frisson* of satisfaction',[294] he creates the illusion of an apocryphal text, where Deinias, the autodiegetic narrator, is also presented as the author - literally the writer of the novel. The real or 'authentic' author (Diogenes himself) is absent from the *diegesis*, but surfaces in the paratext, as we have already seen; clearly, then Diogenes did not intend that the illusion of the apocryphal author should be taken *au pied de la lettre*; instead, he created the

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[290] Alter 1975: 193: '...the self-conscious novel tends to polarize the inherent tension between fiction and reality.'

[291] On Lucian's use of numbers in the *VH*, see Scarcella 1985. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry expresses the idea beautifully in a poignant passage from *Le Petit Prince*, which I cannot resist quoting: 'Si je vous ai raconté ces details sur l'astéroïde B 612 et si je vous ai confié son numéro, c'est à cause des grandes personnes. Les grandes personnes aiment les chiffres...Ainsi, si vous leurs dites: "La preuve que le petit prince a existé c'est qu'il était ravissant, qu'il riait, et qu'il voulait un mouton. Quand on veut un mouton, c'est la preuve qu'on existe", elles hausseront les épaules et vous traiteront d'enfant! Mais si vous leur dites: "La planète d'où il venait est l'astéroïde B 612", alors elles seront convaincues, et elles vous laisseront tranquille avec leurs questions... Les enfants doivent être très indulgents envers les grandes personnes.'

[292] See Fusillo (1999: 357-8); he contrasts the introductory framework of Achilles Tatius' and Longus' novels, and also the settings of Plato's dialogues. On the Platonic nature of Lucian's proem, see p. 180 ff..

[293] *VH* 1.29; for more on the importance of Old Comedy in these two texts, see p. 192 ff..

[294] The phrase is from Bowie 1994: 184-5.

pseudo-author as part of his game with the ontological status of the narrative, presenting the novel *as if it were a historical document*.[295]

A similar dynamic can be discerned in the *VH* too, but this time with an extra, self-conscious twist. Lucian presents himself in the proem as the author of a text in which he is the autodiegetic narrator (telling his own story); but he also abnegates his narrator (himself!) and his story. The result is a 'splitting' of the Lucianic *persona* into truthful author and lying narrator - even though they are (belatedly) revealed to be one and the same person (*VH* 2.28).[296]

Another point in common between Lucian's and Diogenes' work is what appears to be a curious but deliberate discrepancy between the subject of the narrative that is suggested by the title or in the proem, and the amount of textual and narrative space actually devoted to it. To a greater or lesser extent, the reader is misled in his expectations, and it is worth asking why.

The title of Diogenes' monumental work suggests that the novel deals with the 'incredible things' witnessed or experienced by the narrator beyond Thule; however, it seems that Deinias only relates what he saw beyond Thule rather briefly, and very belatedly, in the final twenty-fourth book. Photius himself comments rather grumpily on the discrepancy between title and contents.[297] There are various ways of explaining Diogenes' titular choice. One might, with James Romm, read the title as *rhematic* in principle, signalling the work's

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[295] See Bowie 1994: 195, where he discusses the rather elaborate *Beglaubigungsapparat* of Philostratus' *Heroicus* and *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* in similar terms; in particular Damis, the privileged source of information in the *Life*, is a 'novelistic card', and part of Philostratus' game of make-believe, created for 'the pleasure of playing with the ontological status of a narrative.' As analogies for this, Bowie cites the (non-novelistic) work of Dictys of Crete, and Diogenes' novel; cf. Francis 1998. For the interpretation of Damis as a historical figure, see Anderson 1986: 155-173.

[296] In his discussion of onymity, Genette (1997: 37 ff.) discusses instances where the author's name is incorporated into the preface (e.g. Hesiod, *Theogony* 22; Herodotus and Thucydides; Plautus (prologue of *Pseudolus*), Chariton; Virgil (closing lines of *Georgics*); one might include here also Heliodorus' *sphragis* at the end of his novel. According to Genette (1997: 41): 'The author's name fulfills a contractual function whose importance varies greatly depending on genre: slight or nonexistent in fiction, it is much greater in all kinds of referential writing, where the credibility of the testimony, or of its transmission, rests largely on the identity of the witness or the person reporting it. Thus we see very few pseudonyms or anonyms among the authors of historical or documentary works, and this is all the more true when the witness himself plays a part in his narrative.' Lucian's delayed self-revelation, then, is part of his obfuscation of the border between fiction and factual discourse in the *VH*, which is rendered all the more complicated by its incorporation into a (highly specious) *epigraphical* text (suggesting truthful, documentary evidence), and the fact that this technique of belated self-revelation itself has a Homeric pedigree (Odysseus' belated self-disclosure to the Phaeacians in *Odyssey* 9; cf. n. 209). The parallel with Odysseus is particularly ironic, given what Lucian says about the truth-value of the *Odyssey* in his preface, and also the distinction he makes there between the gullible Phaeacians, and the knowing reader of the *VH*. Lucian's self-disclosure to the *reader* will be received quite differently, it is implied, from Odysseus' self-revelation to his Phaeacian audience.

[297] *Bib.* 110 b.

freedom from generic constraints.[298] On the other hand, it may be argued that the revelations of the final book represent the climax of the narrative, and that Diogenes' title reflects this, but given the truly monumental proportions and the incredible elaboration of the rest of the story, the inequality is rather striking, the title foregrounding what seems to have been a relatively small, and (in terms of the plot) extraneous, portion of the story. While this is a familiar enough phenomenon in titles of modern novels,[299] however, it seems to be without precedent or parallel among the ancient novelists.[300]

Without more of Diogenes' original text, it is difficult to say what the effect of this might have been - but Lucian may offer us a clue. Not only is the title of Lucian's *VH* deliberately misleading, inasmuch as the story told is anything *but* true,[301] but even the professed goal of the narrative is never quite realized. At *VH* 1.5, the narrator declares that the purpose of his plan (ὑπόθεσις ἡ τῆς διανοίας) is to discover what the end of the Ocean is, and what sort of people inhabit the other side:

> αἰτία δέ μοι τῆς ἀποδημίας καὶ ὑπόθεσις ἡ τῆς διανοίας περιεργία καὶ πραγμάτων καινῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι μαθεῖν τί τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ καὶ τίνες οἱ πέραν κατοικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι.

> The reason for my journey and the purpose of my plan was my curiosity and desire for novelty, and wanting to find out what the end of the ocean was, and who are the people inhabiting the other side.

This curiosity, which motivates the narrator to 'travel' (i.e. to compose his fictional travelogue), mirrors the curiosity which will motivate the reader to follow him through the *aenigma* of his text; it resonates also with the *curiositas* that motivates Lucius' adventures in Apuleius' 'picaresque' fiction, and with the quest for knowledge that fuels travel-narratives whose discourse shades from factual into fictional, such as Pytheas' *Peri Okeanou*, the account of Alexander's travels to the ends of the earth, reported in his letter to Aristotle and Olympias in the

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[298] 'Surely this willful *exôkeanismos* was intended by Diogenes as a demonstration of his freedom from generic constraints - just as his choice of title was meant as a response to the critical ethic that had ruled *apista* out-of-bounds.' (Romm 1994: 105). On the possible metapoetical significance of the term *apista*, see Chapter 1, p. 31 ff., esp. n. 110 and n. 112; cf. also Chapter 2, n. 150. On rhematic, or 'objectal' titles, see Genette 1997: 77 ff..

[299] This is the case of the thematic title that is 'attached, by synecdoche or metonymy, to an object that is less questionably central...or sometimes...resolutely marginal' (Genette 1997: 82).

[300] Curiously, Plautus sometimes attaches this sort of title to his plays; see Genette 1997: 82.

[301] The title of the *VH* would correspond to Genette's fourth type of thematic title, which 'functions by antiphrasis, or irony, either because the title forms an antithesis fo the work (*La joie de vivre*, for the gloomiest of the novels by Zola...) or because the title displays a provocative absence of thematic relevance...' Genette points out that the latter is the case of most surrealist titles. (Genette 1997: 82-3).

*Alexander Romance*, and Deinias' wanderings in the *Wonders Beyond Thule*.[302] But in the *VH*, we never really find out about the 'other side'. At 2.47, the narrator and his crew approach a landmass which they infer to be the 'opposite continent'. While they debate amongst themselves whether to turn back, or disembark and explore further (remember, this was their original goal after all), a storm wrecks the ship, and some of the crew manage to reach the land in safety. Just when we expect to find out, finally, about the inhabitants of the 'other world', Lucian ends the narrative, with a brief recap of the adventures so far, and a promise to reveal all about the 'other world' in subsequent books - which of course never materialize. It looks rather like Lucian followed Diogenes' model here, but took it one step further, cheating the reader entirely of his expectations. It will be possible, presently, to speculate further about the further implications of this, given that the narrative and text of the *VH* are interconnected.[303]

The vital link between Antonius Diogenes and Lucian, we are beginning to see, is less a deliberate evocation of one author by the other, than a common point of reference that anchors them both in the same literary tradition, the contemporary trend for more ludic (and more fantastic) fictions; integral to this is the manner in which both authors evoke Old Comedy, and its most famous representative, Aristophanes.

Bowersock cites various sources that indicate that Old Comedy seems to have undergone something of a revival during the Second Sophistic, at least in the literary circles of the *pepaideumenoi*, and that Aristophanes in particular was highly esteemed,[304] e.g. Pliny *Ep.* 6.21.2-5 (Pliny recommends the contemporary poet Vergilius Romanus, who has composed a very good comedy modelled on Old Comedy, and has recited it to a select audience); Achilles Tatius, *Leucippe & Clitophon* 8.9 (a speaker at court is successful because he imitates the 'urbane

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[302] As Romm (1994: 104) notes, Photius' comment (*Bib.* 109 a13f.), that Deinias travelled 'in pursuit of scientific knowledge' (κατὰ ζήτησιν ἱστορίας), 'recalls Pytheas of Massilia, since he was one of few, in contrast to the normal ancient pattern of mercantile and military exploration, to undertake a true voyage of research.' For Alexander's letter, see *Alexander Romance* 2.23 ff. (translation in Reardon 1989); some of the marvels reported there are intriguingly similar to details in the *VH*. On the motif of *curiositas* in Apuleius' novel, see, for example, Schlam 1968; Sandy 1972; DeFilippo 1999. Space does not permit me here to compare the prologues of the *VH* and the *Met.* in detail, so I reserve it for future research; Morgan (2001, esp. p. 154) touches on the subject briefly.

[303] See p. 167 ff..

[304] See Bowersock 1994: 19-21. Anderson (1976c: 67) argues that, in comparison with Herodotus, Thucydides and Plato, Aristophanes was 'much less extensively cultivated in the Second Sophistic as a literary author' (although he admits that it would be dangerous to insist on this point, given that so much of Aristophanes' work is non-extant). This certainly seems to be true, but it may actually have enhanced his esoteric appeal; for example, we hear of the pioneering attempts of the Atticist

style' of Aristophanic comedy); Horace, *Sat.* 1.4.1 (contemporary satire's debt to poets of Old Comedy).[305] Bowersock also cites the evidence from our two authors: Lucian, *VH* 1.29 (the reference to Cloudcuckooland and praise for Aristophanes), and a reference in Diogenes' letter to Faustinus, where the author claims to be a 'poet of Old Comedy.'[306] One could augment this list further by adding Plutarch's syncrisis of Old and New Comedy (*Mor.* 853a – 854d), which is evidence at least for contemporary intellectual interest in these genre. Lucian himself proudly declares that he has appropriated the discourse of Old Comedy, as well as philosophy, to create a new, hybrid literary form.[307] It would, I think, prove insightful to view the apparent trend in contemporary literature for elements of fantasy (e.g. in the epigrams of Lucillius, works such as Lucian's *Consonants at Law*, elements in the work of Antiphanes of Berge) in this context of the renascence of Old Comedy.[308]

So what special relevance or meaning did the newly revived Aristophanes have for readers in the first and second centuries A.D.? Atticists like Phrynichus could admire the purity of his Greek; public speakers like the priest in Achilles Tatius' novel could emulate his witty style and invective. Most importantly, references to Aristophanes among the *pepaideumenoi* show that they were familiar with the ancient secondary scholarship on Old Comedy.[309] Ancient scholars of this literature recognized the fact that the poets of Old Comedy did not prioritize reality in their plots; we may therefore assume that *pepaideumenoi* like Lucian were aware of this aspect of Old Comedy also, a point which is highly significant for texts like the *VH* which openly break with adherence to reality and even plausibility.

Fortunately, we can also get a better idea of what Aristophanes and Old Comedy in general meant for Lucian himself, in the dialogue where he talks about

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Phrynichus in the second century to assert a status of prestige for Aristophanes to equal that of Menander (see Winkler's note on *L&C* 8.9 in Reardon 1989).

[305] Marcus Aurelius (*Ad Se Ipsum* 11.6) praises the moral value of comedy in general, specifically its 'educational outspokenness' (παιδαγωγικὴ παρρησία).

[306] I discuss this further at p. 193 ff..

[307] *Bis Acc.* 33. For a brief survey of the ways in which Lucian appropriates and imitates Aristophanes, see Sidwell 2000: 138; cf. Ledergerber 1905.

[308] For the epigrams of Lucillius, which are of Neronian date, see n. 108.

[309] Citations of comedy in Athenaeus' work also reflect contemporary intellectual interest in all periods of the genre's development, and significantly, show the author's familiarity with the secondary scholarship on this literature, especially that of the Alexandrian and Pergamene schools, as Sidwell (2000: 139) has recently demonstrated. The tendencies in citation which Sidwell suspects are derived from Alexandrian and Pergamene scholarship on comedy include: interest in the biography of the poets; interest in the history of the genre; interest in the persons who are the subjects of comic treatment; awareness of issues of disputed authorship and revision; implicit aesthetic judgements; and descriptions of plots and characters.

his new literary creation, a hybrid mixture of serious philosophical dialogue, with genres that scoff at all that is solemn, such as Old Comedy, and the Cynic diatribe (*Bis Acc.* 33). Dialogue's complaint at being mixed with this low company is illuminating; he claims that he has been made 'to act the buffoon, and to act out silly, outlandish plots.' Clearly, Old Comedy, in Lucian's eyes, gave him the license both to attack established people and ideas, and also to fabricate fantastical plots; we should bear this in mind as we analyse the significance of the evocation of the discourse of Old Comedy in Diogenes' work, and the *VH*.

In the letter to Faustinus, Diogenes apparently described himself as *a poet of old comedy*: λέγει δὲ ἑαυτὸν ὅτι ποιητής ἐστι κωμῳδίας παλαιᾶς.[310] If we possessed Diogenes' original text, it might provide us with clearer insight into his precise meaning here; however, I would like to speculate on the possible significance of his words below. Before this, however, I wish to note some of the ways in which Lucian himself appropriates the discourse of Old Comedy in the *VH*.

Diogenes' letter to Faustinus and Lucian's proem fulfil an analogous function; both of these paratextual elements seem to have exposed the fictionality of the narrative, and in both of them, the author aligns himself with the tradition of Old Comedy, to a greater or lesser extent. In Lucian's proem, this is achieved almost subliminally. At *VH* 1.2, Lucian alerts readers to the 'sources' (the old poets, historians etc.) to which his text makes riddling reference 'in a manner that is *not uncomical*': τῶν ἱστορουμένων ἕκαστον οὐκ ἀκωμῳδήτως ἤνικται πρός τινας τῶν παλαιῶν ποιητῶν τε καὶ συγγραφέων... The phrase οὐκ ἀκωμῳδήτως by itself evokes comedy in general; the association with *Old Comedy* in particular is arguably elicited by the proximity of this phrase to the words '*old* poets' in the same line. Further on, at *VH* 1.3, the word βωμολοχία occurs in the context of narrative embellishment and mendacity: ἀρχηγὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διδάσκαλος τῆς τοιαύτης βωμολοχίας ὁ τοῦ ᾽Ομήρου ᾽Οδυσσεύς... The word is used here in the sense of 'foolery', 'charlatanry', 'buffoonery', but it was a word especially associated with the world of Old

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[310] Photius, *Bib.* 111a [166], p. 147, ll. 34-5. Bowersock (1994: 20, n. 40) points out that modern translations reflect an uneasiness about this specifically *theatrical* allusion; Henry translates 'Il se dit le narrateur *d'une intrigue ancienne.*' Sandy (in Reardon 1989: 781) translates 'He says of himself that he is the author of *an ancient story.*' (Italics are mine.)

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Comedy.[311] This subliminal association in the proem, between Old Comedy and freedom with the truth, is exploded later on in the narrative, when Lucian alludes to Cloudcuckooland, the fantastic creation of Aristophanes, and praises the poet explicitly in the context of truth and lying:

ἔνθα δὴ καὶ τὴν Νεφελοκοκκυγίαν πόλιν ἰδόντες ἐθαυμάσαμεν...καὶ ἐγὼ ἐμνήσθην Ἀριστοφάνους τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ καὶ ἀληθοῦς καὶ μάτην ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἔγραψεν ἀπιστουμένου.[312]

And then we saw the city of Cloudcuckooland too, and we were amazed...and I remembered Aristophanes the poet, a wise and truthful man, who was mistakenly distrusted for the things he wrote.

With Lucian, therefore, we can demonstrate that Aristophanes is an integral part of the discourse of literary truth and lies. With Diogenes, claims must be more tentative, given that we now only possess an epitome of his work, but I believe nevertheless that it is possible to draw similar conclusions from Diogenes' self-alignment with the tradition of Old Comedy.

Diogenes' reasons for describing himself as 'a poet of Old Comedy' in the context of the *Apista* are somewhat opaque. He was not writing poetry, nor can an explanation be found in the fact that some of the (late antique) terms for the novel texts evoke the theatrical context - terms such as δρᾶμα, δραματικόν and even κωμῳδία.[313] These terms evoke the *New* Comedy of Menander, which flourished in the Hellenistic era (the same era, it is now generally thought, as the novel's own gestation), whose domestic and romantic plots, and realism were all reflected in the plots of the 'ideal' romances.[314] But the plot of Diogenes' novel, with its emphasis on marvels and fantastic travel, and its relative diminishment of the love element, is quite *unlike* the plots of New Comedy, and is not easily classed with the 'ideal' novels - and anyway, the fact that he specifically refers to *Old* Comedy rules out this explanation. In fact, Diogenes' novel seems to have resembled much more closely the plots of Old Comedy, especially with its element of fantasy.[315] Diogenes and Lucian, then, probably appropriated Old Comedy because of the strong fantastic component in their own work; we can be more confident here with Lucian, who specifically evokes Aristophanes in his capacity as a comic utopian

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[311] LSJ records the meanings 'coarse jesting, buffoonery, ribaldry.' Plato uses the word in his discussion of the ethical dangers of comedy (*Rep.* 606c). Interestingly, Aristotle discusses the quality of βωμολοχία right after the quality of truthfulness at *EN* 1108a 20 ff.; see p. 136 f..

[312] *VH* 1.29.

[313] Holzberg 1995: 8-9.

[314] For a balanced view of the similarities, and differences, between the ideal novels and New Comedy, see Reardon 1969: 292 ff..

fantasist, the author of *Birds* - in an ironic reference which then undercuts the enterprise of more 'serious' utopianists such as Iambulus.[316]

However, their appropriation of Old Comedy may also have had much to do with their ludic exposure of the fictionality of their work. Lucian's praise of Aristophanes at *VH* 1.29 is clearly ironic, given that he has already alluded to poets' license with the truth in the proem, and he is praising Aristophanes for the truth of something which is obviously *not* true, but purely the figment of his creative imagination (and anyway, he has already warned us not to believe anything he says).[317] A unique phenomenon in the *VH*, Lucian's praise for the poet is striking; after all, the narrator excoriates other authors (such as Herodotus and Ctesias, *VH* 2.31) who are in fact far less liberal with the truth than Aristophanes (although, the point here is surely that Aristophanes was not trying to pass off his fantasy as fact...but more on this anon). By singling out Aristophanes for praise in his capacity as a creator of fantasy worlds - in a work whose genesis is rooted in the polemical *criticism* of many authors for their freedom with the truth, Lucian must be pointing to the poet of Old Comedy as a key figure and authorial accomplice in the game of literary lying.[318]

There are two levels of play here. At the primary level there is the joke centred on the absurd idea that the comic poet Aristophanes could be cited as a trustworthy witness or authority for *any*thing. Lucian was not the only author to extract comic or paradoxical value from the notion that Aristophanes - and especially Aristophanes as author of *Birds* - was a reliable and trustworthy source. In Athenaeus *Deipn.* 9. 398e-399a, the discussion at the dinner table turns to the identity of the mysterious *tetrax* bird. Larensis, who is clearly the expert on the subject, quotes in particular a reference to the *tetrax* bird in Aristophanes *Birds*,[319] and challenges the company to come up with any other references - which they are unable to do. Larensis then produces a live specimen for the party, which he says he acquired during his procuratorship in Moesia. Triumphantly, he notes that there is no description of the bird available in Aristotle's *Historia Animalium*, despite that author's erudition and the encyclopaedic (and costly)

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[315] See also di Gregorio 1968: 200, n.1; Romm 1994: 108; Stephens & Winkler 1995: 107.

[316] Cf. n. 113.

[317] Fuchs (1993: 231) observes that it is significant that Aristophanes is named in the *narrative*, where we have been warned to *reverse* the truth-value of all statements.

[318] Bowersock (1994: 21) reads Lucian's praise of Aristophanes as 'an entirely plausible index of the tastes and controversies of his time and, in particular, of the important relationship between Aristophanes' theatre and the practitioners of fiction.'

[319] *Birds* 884.

nature of the enterprise;[320] he was glad to have had the authority of the poet Aristophanes instead - that 'most solid of witnesses': ἔχαιρον ἔχων ἐχεγγυώτατον μάρτυρα τὸν χαρίεντα ᾿Αριστοφάνη.[321]

As Braund notes, Larensis is 'playing with the notion of Aristophanes' reliability, a notion readily defensible on lexical grounds, but at once also absurd in the case of a comic poet.'[322] The similarity with Lucian's joke at *VH* 1.29 is striking; it may be inferred from both these allusions that the *pepaideumenoi* enjoyed such games with Aristophanes' text. This sort of ludicity probably had its roots in ancient secondary scholarship on Old Comedy, especially the hypotheses, which declared that these plays did not have a 'true subject' (ἀληθὴς ὑπόθεσις), but had a purely playful basis instead, e.g.:

> οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας ποιηταὶ οὐχ ὑποθέσεως ἀληθοῦς, ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς εὐτραπέλου γενόμενοι ζηλωταὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐποίουν.[323]

> The poets of Old Comedy entered the competitions aspiring not to truthful plots, but witty play.

This brings us to the secondary dynamic of the playful reference to Aristophanes at *VH* 1.29, which has to do with this recognition of the fact that Old Comedy did *not* prioritize truthfulness (in the sense of plots that were compatible with reality), but in fact happily sacrificed it for the sake of comic wit and play. This clearly strikes a chord with Lucian's admission in the proem that he is going to abandon reality and even plausibility in the *VH*, a text which he says is designed for pleasure and relaxation, rather than serious reading.[324] By declaring himself to

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[320] According to Larensis, Alexander paid Aristotle eight hundred talents for his research on animals (*Deipn.* 398 e).

[321] *Deipn.* 398 e-f.

[322] Braund 2000: 9.

[323] Koster 1975: 7 ll. 9-10, example quoted by Sidwell (2000: 139, n. 12), who translates: 'The poets of Old Comedy entered the contests as zealots not of truth, but of wit.' Sidwell cites this as evidence for the sort of comic scholarship to which the joke at *VH* 1.29 (the pretence that Aristophanes belongs to the tradition of those who tell the truth) is related. Although he does not discuss the particular episode involving the *tetrax* bird specifically (he does of course include it in his list of references in Athenaeus to Aristophanic comedy, p. 144), Sidwell concludes that Lucian's works show a 'similar set of connections with the remains of comic scholarship' as Athenaeus.

[324] Sidwell (2000: 139-140) suggests that the language in *VH* 1.2, with its animadversion about 'riddling references' (ἥνικται) to various lying writers and its declaration about the ὑπόθεσις of the text, 'connects with remarks in the comic scholarship about the way in which the comedy of invective was forced to abandon openness for enigma at a certain stage.' There is evidence to suggest that poets of Old Comedy were constrained by civic rulers to 'encode' their satirical personal attacks (see Sidwell 2000: 139-140 with n. 13, where he cites two edicts from Athens which forbade open ridicule in this manner); in general, see Halliwell 1991. Lucian therefore offers a hermeneutic key to reading his text by evoking the discourse of Old Comedy, and scholarship on Old Comedy: 'Lucian is telling us here that he expects us to know who is being referred to although

be an 'honest' man in the narrative, Lucian identifies himself with the 'honest' Aristophanes (1.29); this implies that his authorial activity in the *VH* is analogous to that of Aristophanes when he wrote plays such as *Birds*. So what was Aristophanes' particular contribution to fiction, and how does it fit in with what Lucian, and indeed Diogenes, were doing?

Fuchs argues that the fantastic elements in Old Comedy were legitimized by the atmosphere of comic chaos, with the accepted suspension of the normal rules, which demanded compatibility with reality. 'Durch den satirisch-gesellschaftskritischen Charakter der Komödie wird also ein Konsens mit dem Publikum hergestellt, der es ihm ermöglicht, auch die surrealen Bestandteile zu akzeptieren. Trugspiel und Metarealität in der Komödie des Aristophanes können nur mit Hilfe eines solchen Konsenses funktionieren.'[325] Modern literary theorists tend to see this as an aspect of Bakhtin's 'carnival,' which '...celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order.'[326] However, it is a two-way dynamic; the very fantasy in itself acts as a sort of pressure-release, unburdening the audience of its commitment to the make-believe, and allowing all to revel in the absurdity of the situations depicted on stage, regardless of how 'unrealistic' or implausible they are.[327] Strabo's reaction to Antiphanes of Berge's outrageous fantasy is instructive; his explorer's log was *so* fantastic, that he clearly did not expect to deceive anyone, and so the fiction could be enjoyed on its own terms. By exposing the fictionality of his own work, Antiphanes won the right to fictionalize to his heart's content:[328] fantasy is closely associated with self-conscious fictionality.[329]

Old Comedy had an in-built tendency to expose its own fictionality. Poets of Old and Middle Comedy show they are aware of the *fictivity* of their plots; witness the querulous fragment of another Antiphanes, this time a poet of Middle Comedy, which contains a complaint about the greater creative effort required to write

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he has eschewed ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν ('satirizing by name').' (Sidwell 2000: 140). Cf. n. 127 on αἰνίττομαι.

[325] Fuchs 1993: 231-232. On fantasy in Old Comedy, see Handley 1985: 379-384; for fantasy in Aristophanic comedy in particular, see Dover 1972: 30-48; Moulton 1996: esp. 223 ff..

[326] Silk 2000: 76.

[327] Fuchs 1993: 232: 'Nach modernem Verständnis wird ein Text in seiner Fiktionalität akzeptiert, wenn er als solcher von dem Rezipienten erkannt werden kann. Eine Legitimation auf diesem Weg muß aber auch phantastische Inhalte miteinbeziehen, denn diese sind aufgrund ihrer Diskrepanz zur Realität eher leichter als erfunden zu erkennen als realistischere Texte.'

[328] Cf. p. 145 ff..

[329] Armitt (1996: 18): 'It is not simply that fantasy fictions are 'presented' as language: they *are* language. The world of the literary fantastic...only exists as a literary construct. Literature more than any other aesthetic medium, reminds us that we understand, create and experience not only the

comedy, in contrast to the tragedians who simply inherit their plots from the mythological tradition.[330] Of course, the tragedians are highly self-conscious too, but in the case of the comic poets, this self-awareness is accompanied by a ludic and bathetic attitude, which manifests itself in a constant desire to expose the fictionality of their work, to break the dramatic illusion, to let the audience 'in', and involve them in the business of drama and theatre, which is not typical of tragedy. The comic audience, in a sense, becomes the accomplice of the fictional characters - becomes part of the drama - and conversely the drama becomes part of extra-theatrical reality; one way or another, the boundaries demarcating both worlds are rendered permeable.[331] This rupturing of the dramatic illusion is analogous to narrative metalepsis.

Old Comedy, therefore, was liberated from demands for 'reality' by virtue of its comic nature; this is arguably the reason why writers like Antonius Diogenes and Lucian, who evidently desired to break free of the constrictions of plasmatic fiction and write fantasy, evoke the discourse of Old Comedy in their work. However, as Fuchs points out,[332] Lucian in the *VH* has constructed a type of legitimization for his fantastic material, which will stand up even without the comic element; by advertising the 'mendacity' of his narrative to the reader in advance, he presents a contract of fiction, which then exculpates him in advance from the charge of mendacity as an author, and removes any sense of righteous indignation from a reader who would seek a 'realistic' text. The reader who undertakes to read these lies must do so knowingly and consentingly.

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world around us but also the world of our dreams, desires and fears, in terms of the very language we learn to articulate. Fantasy fiction simply brings this to the fore.' Cf. esp. p. 161, with n. 177.

[330] Antiphanes fr. 191; see discussion by Handley (1985: 411-413), who connects the sentiment of this fragment with Aristotle and Menander: 'his conception here of organically constructed comedy about fictional people is closely akin to some of Aristotle's principles of dramatic composition, and may have been influenced by them; it anticipates…what we find in Menander.' (413) Moulton 1996 connects the fragment with Aristophanes' aesthetic of novelty (καινότης).

[331] This happens especially in the *parabasis*. For a discussion of the *parabasis*, and of the 'rupture of dramatic illusion' in Aristophanes' comedy general see Dover 1972: 49-65. Recent studies on metatheatre in Greek comedy include Bain 1977: 208 ff.; Chapman 1983. Taplin (1996) conducts a *synkrisis* of fifth-century comedy and tragedy using theatrical self-reference, or metatheatre, as a touchstone; one of his conclusions (1996: 26-27) is that they differ markedly in the sort of behaviour they elicit respectively from the audience: 'The inactivity of the audience is…a vital prerequisite of the tragic experience…The audience of comedy is, on the other hand, allowed, and encouraged, to express its response by laughter, and to interrupt the play when it is moved to do so.' He suggests that the more passive conduct that is (generally) typical of the tragic chorus, and the more active role played by its comic counterpart (especially in the first half of the play), may reflect the behaviour expected of the audience. We should also remember that the audience of Old Comedy was responsible for a certain amount of interpretation and recognition (e.g. of comical and topical allusions, disguised satirical attacks etc.; cf. n. 324); therefore it is perhaps also to be inferred that the *VH* demands from its readers an interaction and interpretative process that is analogous to what Old Comedy required of its audience.

[332] Fuchs 1993: 252.

# CONCLUSION

I have examined in detail the complex theoretical nexus evoked by Lucian intertextually in his proem, and its programmatic importance for the narrative of the *VH*. I have explored the ways in which the *VH* reveals its own self-consciousness as fiction, reflecting Lucian's interest in the dynamics of fictionality itself, and appealing to an implied readership of *pepaideumenoi*, who were expecting playful theoretical and cerebral stimulation from Lucian's fiction.[333] Finally, I have explored the common ground the *VH* shares with other sophisticated works of prose fiction of roughly the same era.

The question of the genre of the *VH* is not straightforward – something that should hardly surprise us, given Lucian's proudly professed talent for literary innovation and hybridization. Attempts have been made to fit the *VH* into the category of the novel; Reardon, for example, proposes that we ought to expand our sense of what a novel is, in order to accommodate works, such as the *VH*, that don't quite seem to 'fit in'.[334] Well-meaning as such attempts are, they are, I feel, misguided; we do not need any explicit ancient handbook, theory or definition, to tell us what is clear from the texts themselves - that the authors of our five fully extant Greek novels perceived themselves to be working within a distinctive generic framework, with varying degrees of liberty and knowingness. Presumably, Lucian could have played this game, had he wanted to; he is no *exclusus amator* of the romance genre, however, and Bowie is right to exclude the *VH* from this category.[335] I see no reason why we should feel uncomfortable about this; as

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[333] Morgan (1991: 90) makes the important observation that the implied reader of Heliodorus' *Aithiopika*, 'while highly literate and alive to nuance, is clearly expecting emotional rather than cerebral or theoretical stimulation.' This is a judicious corrective to the sometimes over-ambitious tendency to attribute post-modernist concerns to ancient authors. Lucian, however, makes it quite clear that the implied reader of the *VH* can expect intellectual stimulation and amusement from this text (*VH* 1. 1-2).

[334] Reardon's justification of the inclusion of the *VH* in his *Collected Ancient Greek Novels* is telling (1989: 620): 'The claim of this piece to inclusion in the present volume may be thought tenuous, but the novel, or romance – prose fiction – cannot be confined too fine, in antiquity or any other age.' Laird (1993: 154) prefers the label 'prose fiction' to more traditional labels, such as 'novel' and 'romance', as it does not carry the implication that these texts are quite so homogeneous.

[335] Bowie (1994: 189ff.) discusses novelistic elements in the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*; among the reasons for *not* classifying it as a novel, he includes the parodic treatment of some novelistic motifs (e.g. pirates); no sub-plots - the work gets its coherence not from narrative structure, as in the novels, but from its central character; absence of theme of *eros* (except in a negative form). All of these factors are relevant to the *VH* also. See also Swain (1999a: 8): 'As a work of sustained narrative, *True Histories* could well be described as a novel. Yet there is no characterization, no developed focus on named persons, and it is perhaps better not so called, however convenient the label may be.'

Morgan astutely notes, all novels are fiction, but not all fictions are novels.[336] There is enough evidence to show that there was a distinct category of ancient fiction, whose interests were different from those of the love romances. This category shows close affinities with the interrelated genres of historiography, the explorer's log, and paradoxography. Fictional texts such as the *Wonders beyond Thule*, the mendacious narrative of Antiphanes of Berge, and the *VH* represent ludic experiments with the conventions of these genres, exploiting and elaborating long-implicit metaphors for fiction, such as the sea-voyage, Thule, even possibly the moon. The revisionist fictions of Ptolemy Chennus, 'Dictys' and 'Dares', which share a similar playful and experimental attitude in their mixing of the discourses of fact and fiction, can also be included here.

There is, however, still a difference between these works, and the *VH*. Lucian announces his work metatextually, as jocular, experimental and intellectually challenging – something that will divert and amuse, but also stimulate his learned readers. We must not forget that the readers of the *VH* were readers of other types of contemporary fiction too. The cerebral and imaginative delights of the *VH* are a joy in themselves, but the thoroughly intertextual and hypertextual nature of this text also invites us to apply its implicit games and 'practical theory' to our reading of other fictions. Lucian's striking formulation of a contract of fictionality, and his enigmatic adumbration of a theory of fiction, provide us with insight on the rules within which other contemporary authors of fiction were playing too.[337] The *VH* is liminal; it *belongs* and plays on the margins of ancient fiction. Where else but on the margins can you play on both sides of the fence?

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[336] Morgan 1993: 176.
[337] Swain 1999a: 32: '...anyone interested in the novel must pay attention also to other types of prose fiction in the same period. *True Histories* is the best of the rest...'.

## FICTION ON THE EDGE: ANCIENT METAFICTION?

*'I would argue that metafictional practice has become particularly prominent in the fiction of the last twenty years. However, to draw exclusively on contemporary fiction would be misleading, for, although the term 'metafiction' might be new, the practice is as old (if not older) than the novel itself.' (Waugh 1984: 5)*

I do not like the word 'conclusion'. A word which has its roots in the notions of synthesis and shutting down no doubt has its place in scholarship - we need places where we can stop, rest, and survey - but it seems objectionable nonetheless - as if one were sealing the delightful pot of ideas with a sepulchral, scholarly lid. Beginnings and ends are liminal spaces, and now that I have reached the end of this thesis, I prefer to use this space, not so much to conclude the thoughts that have evolved over the preceding chapters, but rather as a threshhold to launch out onto new horizons - liminal and ever-shifting goals in themselves.

I would hazard a guess that Lucian himself regarded boundaries with some antipathy; he consciously flouts them, plays along their edges, and refuses to be hemmed in. In dealing with works like the *Philopseudes*, *Toxaris* and *Verae Historiae*, I have emphasized repeatedly the need to advance beyond the notion that the marginality of Lucian's fiction is a drawback, a critical problem. We are dealing here with an author who proclaims proudly that he has evolved a new hybrid literary genre. Clearly, this is not an author who is preoccupied with fitting into neatly squared categories; to find fault with him over this is to miss a crucial point, namely that Lucian's work embraces, revels in liminality, in terms of discourse (truth, lies, fiction...) as well as genre. This liminality is itself reified in the structure of the works I have examined, for example, in the professed hypertextuality of the *VH*, and the paradoxical identity of its narrator with an author who denies him; in the dialogue form of the *Philops.* and *Tox.*, in the nesting of stories within this dialogue frame, and in the multiple dissonances between authorial, narratorial, and narrated narratorial voices. The intense self-consciousness and self-reflexivity of these works is itself

liminal. All this liminality is by design, not accident, and we surely owe it to this supremely self-conscious artist to explore his designs, not disdain them.

One of the points which I have suggested that we can extract from the liminality of the *Philops.*, *Tox.* and *VH* is that it implies, or reflects, the fact that fiction, fiction-writing and fiction-reading is itself a liminal discourse, inasmuch as it is always dialogic, relying on a two-way contract of understanding between the author and reader, and involving a constant interplay between belief and non-belief. Another idea, which I would like to float now, is that this almost pathological liminality points to these works' status, not only as self-conscious fiction, but actually as *metafiction*.

The terms 'self-conscious fiction' and 'metafiction' are related, but distinct; plainly put, whereas self-consciousness is a prerequisite for all metafiction, not all self-conscious fiction evolves into metafiction.[1] The term 'metafiction' belongs to modern literary theory, and seems to have been coined by the post-modernist novelist and critic, William H. Gass, in 1970.[2] Metafiction is liminal fiction *par excellence*, as it both constructs and exposes its own fictionality, embodies both creation and criticism, and is therefore concerned with itself, with other fictions, and even extra-literary matters. Robert Scholes' definition of metafiction as 'a border-line territory between fiction and criticism' demonstrates the liminality that is inherent in this meta-genre quite clearly.[3]

So, do Lucian's self-conscious fictions qualify as metafiction? Patricia Waugh elucidates the term more fully: '*Metafiction* is a term given to fictional writing which self-consciously and systematically draws attention to its status as an artefact in order to pose questions about the relationship between fiction and reality. In providing a critique of their own methods of construction, such writings not only examine the fundamental structures of narrative fiction, they also explore the possible fictionality of the world outside the literary fictional

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[1] According to Waugh (1984: 5), '…metafiction is a tendency or function inherent in *all* novels'; even though only some novels qualify as full-scale 'metafictions', very many novels contain metafictional elements, such as reflections on their own ontology and construction - a point scholars such as Morgan (1993) and Laird (1993) have demonstrated admirably with regard to the ancient novel.

[2] Gass (1970: 24-5): 'There are metatheorems in mathematics and logic, ethics has its linguistic oversoul, everywhere lingos to converse about lingos are being contrived, and the case is no different in the novel. I don't mean merely those drearily predictable pieces about writers who are writing about what they are writing, but those, like some of the work of Borges, Barth, and Flann O'Brien, for example, in which the forms of fiction serve as the material upon which further forms can be imposed. Indeed, many of the so-called antinovels are really metafictions.'

[3] Scholes 1995: 21.

text... they all explore a *theory* of fiction through the *practice* of writing fiction.'[4]

The distinction is subtle, but crucial. While contemporary writers such as Achilles Tatius and Longus especially were certainly writing self-conscious fiction, the dynamic of Lucian's work is clearly different from theirs. Lucianic narrative fiction advances beyond the ludic and self-conscious construction of fictional worlds, into a more distanced, critical, and speculative exploration of the dynamics of fictionality itself; it is *more* than self-conscious, it is quasi-theoretical, and is therefore more precisely described by the term *metafiction*. Lucian's fiction, as well as displaying the familiar traits of literary self-consciousness, is also philosophical and epistemological - concerned with how we know things.[5] We might recall how the fictions in the *Nav.* and *Philops.* evoke reflections on extra-literary concerns, such as the fictionality of philosophical thinking, and the nature of truth and lies. In the *VH*, by revealing, parodically, the textual and fictional nature of historiography, which was traditionally regarded as a truthful discourse, Lucian implies that 'truth' is always, potentially, a fictional construct; Andrew Laird has recently argued that Lucian problematizes the fictionality inherent in philosophy in the *VH* as well.[6] In many ways - this is merely a summary - Lucian's metafiction, like the modern counterparts which Waugh discusses, embodies commentary, not just on the nature of fiction itself, but on the fictionality inherent in extra-literary discourses and modes of thought as well.

I have demonstrated the many ways in which Lucian's fictions draw attention to their own status as artefacts in the preceding chapters, with an array of self-conscious and self-reflexive techniques, including intertextuality, authorial intrusion, *mise en abyme*, and metalepsis. Metalepsis is especially interesting, and particularly important to metafiction, as it involves the breaking of 'frames', making us aware that we, as extra-literary readers, might also be characters within some broader frame, being read even as we read, and positing the disturbing hypothesis that extra-literary 'reality' - Life - might itself be a fiction, a great narrative, escape from which is remote, unless we too can manage some extraordinary mental and metafictional leap which might provide

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[4] Waugh 1984: 2.
[5] On the philosophical aspects of fiction, see Prado 1984.
[6] Laird 2003.

us - the diegetic characters - with a glimpse 'outside the box' at the fiction of our own lives.[7]

What is going on here? As Waugh points out, this concept of the inescapability of the text may reflect the artist's grasping after new means to transcend his or her own medium, and the restrictions of language. Waugh is, of course, discussing the modern phenomenon of metafiction only, but her remarks are suggestive for ancient fiction too, and I quote her in full. 'The present increased awareness of "meta" levels of discourse and experience is partly a consequence of an increased social and cultural self-consciousness. Beyond this, however, it also reflects a greater awareness within contemporary culture of the function of language in constructing and maintaining our sense of everyday "reality". The simple notion that language passively reflects a coherent, meaningful and "objective" world is no longer tenable. Language is an independent, self-contained system which generates its own "meanings". Its relationship to the phenomenal world is highly complex, problematic and regulated by convention. "Meta" terms, therefore, are required in order to explore the relationship between this arbitrary linguistic system and the world to which it apparently refers. In fiction they are required in order to explore the relationship between the world *of* the fiction and the world *outside* the fiction...In literary fiction it is...possible only to "represent" the *discourses* of that world. Yet, if one attempts to analyse a set of linguistic relationships using those same relationships as the instruments of analysis, language soon becomes a "prisonhouse" from which the possibility of escape is remote. Metafiction sets out to explore this dilemma.'[8]

Before we are too hasty to dismiss the possibility that these post-modernist concerns might be a contingency in the minds of authors in the

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[7] The disturbing framing of 'realities', featuring especially the collapse of artificial realities, has been popular as a major premiss of recent science fiction films. In *Robocop* (directed by Paul Verhoeven, 1987) and *Total Recall* (also directed by Paul Verhoeven, 1990; based on the short story, 'We can remember it for you wholesale', by Philip K. Dick), the central character discovers that his personal life is an artificial construct – a programme implanted in his brain - which he must 'unlearn', while simultaneously 'relearning' his former 'true' life, thereby reclaiming his true identity. No such comfort exists for the human characters of *The Matrix* (directed by Andy and Larry Wachowski, 1999), who discover that human life and reality as we know it is an artificial computer-generated programme, to which all humans are connected. Disconnection from the matrix in this case means, not *anamnēsis* of an older reality, but disjunction from everything one has ever known, and being launched into the true, horrible reality against which one has been anaesthetized all along. Peter Weir's film, *The Truman Show* (1998), albeit of a different genre, explores similar ideas as well, which have particular relevance for the generation of 'reality television'. On 'frame-breaking' as an integral part of metafiction, see Waugh 1984: 28-34.

[8] Waugh 1984: 3-4.

second century A.D., we might recall the increasing synthesis of pictorial and textual representation in authors like Longus, Achilles Tatius, and Lucian himself - in what appears to be an attempt to forge some sort of transcendent language of artistic expression.[9] There is a sense here that these sophistic masters of language, trained to capture the pictorial in the textual, trained to filter and interpret the world around them in terms of the literary, the rhetorical, the textual, were beginning to feel haunted by the paranoia that everything is fictional, everything is text. [10] Even in the literature of the ancient imperial era, then, there does indeed seem to have been some direct connection between the literary self-consciousness of such writers, and their metaleptic problematization of the restrictions of their own artistic medium, now traditionally regarded as post-modernist.

We should not be excessively surprised by this, either. Of any time period in antiquity, the Second Sophistic was the era most likely to engender such self-conscious and self-exploratory metafiction. Characterised by self-conscious retrospectivity and hypertextuality, this was, in some ways, itself an era of meta-culture, at least in literary and artistic spheres, and it seems to be a natural progression that literature that is to a large extent predicated upon, and therefore intimately concerned with, other literature, should generate and contain self-reflexive speculation on its own creation processes. One of the reasons why Lucian is such a crucial figure for the modern scholar of ancient fiction, is that, as a self-conscious author and a practical theoretician – a metafictionist, composing his fictions from the edge – he renders these processes explicit.

What, then, are the new directions into which some of the theories I have propounded in this thesis might take us? Clearly, the claim that a concept of fiction did not exist in antiquity is no longer tenable. It is time to consider seriously the existence of metafiction in antiquity, perhaps best viewed as sprung from a dynamic within the genre of narrative prose fiction and the novel itself.[11] If the richness of ideas yielded by Lucian's 'un-canonical' fiction shows us anything, it is that we must now look increasingly towards the 'edges' of

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[9] See Chapter 3, n. 262; cf. Zeitlin 1990, esp. p. 430 ff..

[10] We might remember here Petonius' ironization of Encolpius, the *scholasticus* and mythomaniac narrator of the *Satyrica*, who filters his low-life experiences through the prism of high literature and myth; see Conte 1996: 1-36.

[11] See Waugh (1984: 14): '...metafiction is not so much a sub-genre of the novel as a tendency *within* the novel which operates through exaggeration of the tensions and oppositions inherent in all novels: of frame and frame-break, of technique and counter-technique, of construction and deconstruction of illusion.'

ancient fiction, where we will discover an intellectualization of fiction, with speculation, not only on the nature of fiction itself, but how it relates to issues such as truth, philosophy, and even cultural identity; the fiction of sophistic writers like Dio and Philostratus, especially, require this sort of critical attention in their own right. Furthermore, works such as the *Philopseudes* and *Toxaris* suggest that a connection between metafiction and the sub-genre of the short story may have been crystallizing at this time – perhaps an interesting example of form mirroring content?[12]

I spoke of the ill-favoured connotations of the word 'conclusion'; terms such as 'metafiction', as well as terms like 'Second Sophistic', and 'post-modernism', are also somewhat objectionable, because they imply a phenomenon that is epigonic, belated, derivative, self-involved and therefore exhausted.[13] (Sometimes, the scholar too - a meta-specialist in his or her own right - might wish to transcend language!) We should guard against these connotations. Metafiction need not imply the exhaustion or 'death' of fiction (anymore than a conclusion need imply the end). With the value of hindsight, we can now see that reports of the death of the modern novel were greatly exaggerated; in antiquity too, the genre continued to flourish, even as Lucian composed his metafiction; Heliodorus, for example, was yet to come. It might

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[12] Clearly, the large scale narrative suits the aims of the novelist, who wishes to 'capture' and encapsulate a fictional world, populated by fictional characters with the all the details of their fictional lives – each one a potential 'novel' in microcosm; the aims of the short story are different, and this is reflected in the comparative brevity of form. The smaller scale seems to be particularly well suited to metafiction especially, for reasons which Scholes explains: 'When extended, metafiction must either lapse into a more fundamental mode of fiction or risk losing all fictional interest in order to maintain its intellectual perspectives. The ideas that govern fiction assert themselves more powerfully in direct proportion to the length of a fictional work. Metafiction, then, tends toward brevity because it attempts, among other things, to assault or transcend the laws of fiction – an undertaking which can only be achieved from within fictional form.' (Scholes 1979: 114)

[13] See Waugh's essay, 'What is metafiction and why are they saying such awful things about it?' (Waugh 1984: 1-19), esp. p. 7 ff..

be timely here to recall my analogy between self-consciousness in fiction, and the attainment of self-conscious cognition in adolescence; what has traditionally been viewed as an end may in fact represent the beginning of maturity, and an awakening to new possibilities within oneself.

There has been a great deal of speculation over whether Lucian could have *invented* the sort of stories we find in the *Philops.*, and in this context, the tale of 'The Sorcerer's Apprentice' presents some particular problems. Although parallels of a general nature may be found for individual motifs within the story, as an organic tale in ancient Graeco-Roman literature, it is apparently unique: 'L'histoire de l'apprenti-sorcier...est isolée dans la littérature antique malgré quelques rapprochements téméraires...'.[1] Even Bompaire, who believed that Lucian was, in general, using handbooks of marvels (περὶ θαυμασίων) as a source for his material in the *Philops.*, tentatively suggested that this particular tale might have been Lucian's own invention.[2]

Schwartz, noting the apparently unique nature of the motif of the animated pestle in Lucian's story, thought that it might be a parody of animated statues, like the little clay πάρεδρος in *Philops.* 14.[3] He observes the reference to an animated pestle in *Philopatris* 4 (which clearly recalls the passage from the *Philops.*) but discounts it on the grounds that the authorship of this work is suspect (even though it is included in the Lucianic *corpus* in six of the manuscripts, it probably dates to the Byzantine era, tenth century, or later).[4] Unable to cite an exact precedent for the motif, therefore, Schwartz refers instead to its *Nachleben*, when

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* I wish to record here my gratitude to Dr. Daniel Ogden, for his generosity in sharing his thoughts with me about this story, and in permitting me to see his unpublished work on the subject, which I read after this Appendix had been written. Happily, we have both, independently of one another, arrived at similar conclusions about several details (especially the connection with the *Setne* tale). In revising this Appendix, I am very pleased to acknowledge my debt to Daniel, where his research has enriched my own.

[1] Caster 1937: 333.

[2] Bompaire 1958: 457 ff. (esp. 459); see also 695; Jones 1986: 49. More recently, Ogden (forthcoming) suggests that the tale is linked to the 'tradition of Greek narratives of magic and initiation', such as ps.-Thessalus of Tralles' *De virtutibus herbarum* (either first or fourth century A.D.) 1-28, where the author explains how he acquired his knowledge of medicine, and ps.-Democritus' (possibly first century A.D.) account of his training in the art of medicine.

[3] Schwartz 1951: 57 'La littérature magique ancienne ne connaît rien de tel et l'on peut se demander s'il n'y a pas ici une parodie des statuettes animées par un πάρεδρος comme au par. 14.' I do not, however, agree with Schwartz that the clay cupid is a 'parody'; it is based on a real element in the practice of magic in antiquity, the magician's 'demon helper,' or πάρεδρος. See p. 213 and n. 45 below.

[4] On the manuscript tradition for the *Philopatris*, see Macleod 1987: xvii. On the date and authorship of this work, see Reinach 1902, Helm 1927: 1755, and more recently Baldwin 1982. For an allusion to *Philops.* 13 in the *Philopatris*, see Reinach 1902: 101 'l'allusion à la rencontre avec saint Paul est faite en termes qui sont une imitation évidente du *Philopseudès* (chap. XIII).'

it is manifested as the *golem* in medieval Jewish literature, for example, and in later fairy stories, which feature analogous transformations.[5]

He did not develop his theory any further, however, and it was left to Anderson to argue that Lucian did indeed have the means to invent the tale from his own resources.[6] Following Schwartz's lead, Anderson insisted that Lucian could have developed his animated pestle as a variation on the animated clay cupid at *Philops.* 14 ('Lucian has only to twist the basic motif in the tale of Chrysis and Glaucias'),[7] or the walking statue at *Philops.* 21.[8] These are the most obvious models; he also cites at considerable length various others, some of which are less than convincing. For example, he compares Eucrates' animation of the pestle to the motif of sculpting lifelike figures out of inanimate rock at *Somnium* 3, noting that both Lucian's apprenticeship as a sculptor, and Eucrates' as a sorcerer, end in disaster, as they each split the object they are plying in two.[9] Then again, there is the sword that is left to slay the tyrant on its own, just as Pancrates leaves the pestle to do its housework (*Tyrann.* 2); monkeys in human clothing (*Pisc.* 36); and a variety of autonomous utensils, such as the runaway household appliances at *Sat.* 23, or the self-replenishing cups at *VH* 2.14.[10] On the strength of these internal parallel motifs, he asserts confidently that 'There is not even the slightest element in this story...that Lucian could not have supplied for himself.'[11]

However, Anderson's approach, which involved dissecting the story in order to isolate and extract recognisable themes and motifs, does violence to the organic unity, not only of the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' tale itself, but also to the stories in the 'parallel' passages he used. Some of these 'parallels' are also intrinsically problematic. Despite the arguable presence of the Hesiodic proverb in both stories,[12] the connection between the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice', and Lucian's tale of his own misfortunes as a sculptor's apprentice, is tenuous. The connection with the performing monkeys in *Pisc.* 36 is also negligible, since the only common

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[5] Schwartz 1951: 57. He does not elucidate which fairy stories he has in mind. On the *golem* (meloG), the android of Jewish tradition, which was brought to life by the use of holy names (an idea connected with the creative power of words in the *Sefer Yezirah*), see *Encyclopaedia Judaica* 7.753-756 and Collins 1993.

[6] Anderson 1976b: 28-30.

[7] Anderson 1976b: 29.

[8] Anderson does not, however, attribute any parodic intention to Lucian here, as Schwartz did (see n. 3 above).

[9] Anderson's case for making a parallel here rests largely on his argument that the Hesiodic proverb ἀρχὴ...ἥμισυ παντός (*WD* 40) is perceptible in both passages (*Somn.* 3 ἀρχὴ δέ τοι ἥμισυ παντός; *Philops.* 36: ἐξ ἡμισείας γε); see Anderson 1976b: 30.

[10] This last comparsion is also made by Stengel 1911: 61.

[11] Anderson 1976b: 30, where he adduces the story's climactic position as further justification to the claim that it is Lucian's own synthesis.

feature is that both the monkeys and the pestle are dressed up in human clothing, and bidden to behave in a manner that is unnatural to them, but the all-important elements of magic and reversal are absent from the *Pisc.* passage. Finally, the motif of the self-replenishing cups at *VH* 2.14 is rooted not in magic, but in the *topos* of Golden Age imagery.[13]

Despite these difficulties, Anderson's study represented an important new departure in Lucianic scholarship, by reclaiming for Lucian a degree of creative autonomy, in the wake of Bompaire's rather reductive approach. However, more recent studies (including Anderson's subsequent work) have speculated mainly on the possibility that Lucian was influenced by folklore here. Among the modern folklore parallels that have been canvassed for this story are AT Type 325: 'Apprentice and Ghost/ The Magician and his Pupil', Christiansen 3020: 'Inexperienced Use of the Black Book',[14] and AT Type 1174: 'Making a Rope of Sand'.[15] Intriguing ancient parallels have been posited, too. I have already mentioned the idea that particular motifs from the *VH* and *Tox.* have resonances with near-eastern folklore, especially the ancient folklore of India, the stories of Sindbad the sailor, and the 'Birth Stories of Buddha', or the Jātakas.[16] This tradition may well be significant for the *Philops.* too. Jennifer Hall, for example, has pointed out the similarity between the motif of the animated pestle in Lucian's 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' story, and the motif in tale no.186 from the Jātakas, where a magical axe performs services for its owner at his command,[17] drawing attention to Lucian's Syrian backround for the possibility that he may have had 'childhood

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[12] See n. 9 above.

[13] Hall (1981: 352) interprets this detail as a parody of a 'Comic Utopia', such as we find in Athenaeus *Deipn.* 6. 267e-270a (a passage quoted from Crates' comedy *The Wild Animals*, which features self-washing cups, self-filling ladles, and other automatic household items, which wait on humans in a manner similar to Pancrates' pestle.) Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 193) follow Stengel and Anderson in comparing these cups to the pestle in the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice'; they cite also the miraculous dinner which the Indian sages arrange at Philostratus *VA* 3.27. Pancrates' pestle, however, is an android, not an automaton as in these examples: see Davis 1957: 1 ff.. On parodic utopian elements in the *VH*, see Nesselrath 1993.

[14] Christiansen 1958: 28 ff.. See Felton 1999: 122 n. 6. For Lucian's use of folklore themes in the *Philops.*, see Bompaire 1958: 457-460, and Anderson 1976b: 24-30.

[15] Anderson 2000: 103ff.

[16] Motifs in the *VH* such as the sea of milk (*VH* 2.3), the giant seabird and the giant whale are reminiscent of elements in the adventures of Sindbad the sailor, a tale which goes back to an Indian story of some antiquity; see Coulter 1926: esp. 39ff.; Schenda 1965, and Hall 1981: 571 ff. (n. 49), who also carefully cites parallels from Greek literature. Toxaris' final narrative (*Tox.* 61) contains the motif of 'Intaphernes' wife's choice' (similar motif at *Dea Syria* 18), which is attested in Greek literature at Hdt. 3.119, and Sophocles *Ant.* 905-912, but there are also parallels from India in the Ramayana and the Jātakas, and from Persia (cf. Chapter 2, p. 114 with n. 157).

[17] Hall 1981: 347, n. 49. For translations of these texts, see Beswick 1995.

reminiscences' of such folktales.[18] The particularly Egyptian setting of Lucian's tale has led others to seek a model in the literature of that land, and Anderson, in a more recent study, cites as a 'genuine native Egyptian predecessor' the tale of Naneferkaptah.[19] This is indeed a striking parallel, but a much stronger case needs to be made in support of the connection.

The tale which involves the prince Naneferkaptah is part of a cycle known as the *Stories of Setne Khamwas*.[20] There are two stories in the cycle, *Setne I* and *Setne II*, which were both written in Demotic. The handwriting on the papyrus which records *Setne I* is datable to the Ptolemaic period, and the *Setne II* papyrus can be dated to the Roman era. [21] *Setne I* involves the eponymous Prince Setne's desire to retrieve a book of magic that had been written by Thoth. This book had been stolen from Thoth by a prince called Naneferkaptah, who lived long before Setne's time, but took the book to the grave with him. Setne, in turn, tries to steal the book from Naneferkaptah's tomb, a transgression which brings the dead man back to life, and the two princes, both powerful magicians, engage in a contest of skills, until finally Setne is defeated.[22]

There are several points of comparison here with Lucian's story. The contest between the two magicians perhaps finds resonance in the competitive vying between the apprentice and his master in Eucrates' account.[23] The locations specified for both stories are the same, ie. Memphis and Coptos.[24] Most intriguing, however, is the account of how Naneferkaptah actually retrieved Thoth's book in the first place. He had been informed by a priest that the book was buried underwater at Coptos in several chests of precious material, guarded by six miles

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[18] Hall 1981: 573. She points out that these tales were popular among Buddhists in western India, where Greeks settled after Alexander's conquests, and were apparently well-known by the end of the third century B.C..

[19] Anderson 2000: 104-5.

[20] The text is translated, with notes, by Lichtheim 1980: 125-151.

[21] *Setne I* is preserved in the Cairo Museum Papyrus No. 30646 (with some pages lost); *Setne II* is preserved on the *verso* of the British Museum Papyrus No. 604 (large portions of this are also missing). See Lichtheim 1980: 125f..

[22] *Setne I* is translated in Lichtheim 1980: 127-138.

[23] *Philops.* 35: τοῦτο ἐγὼ πάνυ ἐσπουδακὼς οὐκ εἶχον ὅπως ἐκμάθοιμι παρ' αὐτοῦ· ἐβάσκαινε γάρ, καίτοι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα προχειρότατος ὤν.

[24] Eucrates sails to Coptos to hear the famous sunrise salutation of Memnon's statue (*Philops.* 33), and Pancrates is from Memphis (*Philops.* 34); in the Egyptian story, Naneferkeptah himself is reported to have acquired the magical book originally from Coptos, and his tomb (containing the book) is located at Memphis. Of course, Memphis and Coptos were two of the main tourist attractions in Egypt in Roman times (the trend for Egyptian tourism burgeoned under Hadrian's reign: Bernand & Bernand 1960: 165). Anderson, however, warns that we should not dismiss Eucrates' account of his visit to the Colossus of Memnon 'as a purely decorative detail thrown in to emphasize Eucrates' credulous outlook', speculating that it might represent a vestigial allusion to another version of the folktale, where the magician, having reversed the spell, is himself turned to stone (Anderson 2000: 104, with n. 7).

of scorpions, snakes and other reptiles, and also an 'eternal serpent'. After a four day sojourn with the priests at the Temple of Isis at Coptus, Naneferkaptah orders some pure wax to be brought to him, moulds a boat and crew out of it, utters a spell, and brings them to life. Sailing out into the waters in this vessel, after three days, he reaches the location where the book is buried. He throws some sand out onto the water before him, and a gap forms in the river. Casting a restraining spell over the six miles of reptiles and other nasties, he turns to fight the eternal serpent and kills it - but it comes to life again. Naneferkeptah kills it a second time, with the same result. On his third attempt, however, having killed the serpent, he cuts it in two, and separates the pieces with sand. This does the trick, and the serpent finally expires.

Anderson makes a rather weak case for a resemblance between the two, on the strength merely of the presence of the water element in both stories, and the reference to magical books;[25] the resonance is clearly more profound. Isis is mentioned in connection with magical exploits in both stories, and the adventure in both cases is preceded by a trip over water.[26] Both stories contain an account of how a magician animates inanimate material; in Naneferkaptah's case, it is the ship and crew from wax, whereas in Lucian's tale, Pancrates animates the famous pestle or broom to do the work of a servant.[27] Naneferkaptah's struggle with the eternal serpent bears resemblance to Eucrates' panicked efforts to control the animated pestle, and the same motif of cutting the object in two appears in both.

Is this coincidence, then, or are we justified in supposing that Lucian could have been familiar with this Egyptian tale? *Setne II*, the second tale in the cycle, continues the story of Setne's adventures after his death.[28] His son, Si-Osire, guides him to the underworld, where he witnesses the blissful rewards for those who were just in life, and the everlasting punishment of sinners. Obviously, this tale had absorbed elements of Greek origin, such as the central theme of a living

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[25] Anderson 2000: 104f.; but his claim that Naneferkaptah starts a flood with one of the spells from Thoth's book is incorrect. Anderson notes that 'Egyptian magic in the narrative tradition does a good deal of water engineering', citing as examples the Old Testament story where Moses parts the waters of the the Red Sea (*Exodus* 14. 21-29; one might also include here the miracle of the spring of water struck from the rock by Moses' rod at *Exodus* 17. 5ff.), and also the aquatic feats of the Old Kingdom magicians Djadja-em-ankh and Djedi in the Westcar Papyrus (Anderson 2000: 105). Djadja-em-ankh parts the waters of a lake to retrieve the turquoise pendant of one of the rowing girls in King Snefru's party (see Lichtheim 1973: 216-7 'The Boating Party'). Djedi floods a dry channel in order to make it navigable for King Khufu (see Lichtheim 1973: 217-220 'The Magician Djedi', esp. p. 219).
[26] Anderson (2000: 104) notes that in several of the versions of this tale (including modern folkore parallels), the adventure is preceded by a trip on water, or it arises out of one.
[27] Isis and magic: *Philops.* 34; Animation of broom or pestle: *Philops.* 35. For the symbolism of the broom in antiquity, see Davis 1957.
[28] Lichtheim 1980: 138-151.

person's visit to the underworld (like the *katabaseis* of Orpheus or Odysseus), and the description of particular types of punishment (the 'Sisyphean' task of plaiting ropes which are always being consumed at the other end by donkeys; or people who are, in the mode of Tantalus, prevented from reaching the food and drink that is suspended above them, by the pits that are being dug by others at their feet).[29] Lichtheim unequivocally endorses the possibility of interchange between the two literary cultures. 'The presence of Greek motifs in *Setne II* is one of the many testimonies to the intermingling of Egyptian and Greek cultures in Greco-Roman Egypt. As the known materials bearing on this phenomenon are more intensively studied, and as new sources come to light, the symbiosis of the two peoples and their cultural syncretism will become ever more tangible.'[30]

In fact, one can cite more Egyptian parallels for the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice.' Reitzenstein called attention to *Papyrus Berolinensis* I, 101ff., where a δαίμων πάρεδρος receives orders from its master that recall the tasks assigned by Pancrates to the animated pestle: πῦρ φέρει, ὕδωρ φέρει.[31] More recently still, in his masterful study of magic and magicians in the Graeco-Roman world, Matthew Dickie cites the story about a well-known Egyptian magician called Pases. Pases possessed a demi-obel, which he could magically retrieve again every time he spent it.[32] By means of magical incantations, he could also conjure out of thin air expensive dinners along with waiters to serve them, and make them vanish again, as necessary. The resonances with the Lucianic tale are tantalizing.

Finally, there is an important parallel in the basic motif of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, where Lucius, in his curiosity and desire to emulate the magical expertise of Pamphile, steals from her room a magical salve, and anoints himself with it. The metamorphosis is itself successful, but Lucius then finds himself unable to change back into human form, with disastrous - and hilarious - consequences.[33] Apuleius was not only a contemporary of Lucian, but a native himself of Madaura, in north Africa.[34]

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[29] People plaiting ropes: *Setne II* 1.30 (Lichtheim 1980: 139); people reaching for food: *Setne II* 2.1 (Lichtheim 1980: 139f.). Both motifs are repeated at *Setne II* 2. 24ff..

[30] Lichtheim 1980: 126.

[31] Reitzenstein 1963: 5, n. 3. Ogden (forthcoming) cites also Simon Magus' animation of a sickle as another parallel (ps.-Clementine, *Recognitions* 2.9).

[32] Apion's story is cited in the *Suda*, s.v. *Pases*, as an explanation of the proverbial phrase 'the demi-obel of Pases'; this must, therefore, be the story that features in Apion's work (Dickie 2001: 215).

[33] *Met.* 3. 21ff.

[34] His birthplace is inferred from *Met.* 11.27.9. This same motif appears also in the (pseudo-Lucianic) *Asinus* (13ff.). Anderson (1976b: 37) cites this as a parallel for the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice'. On the question of the authorship of the *Asinus*, see Jones 1986: 46, n. 2 and 170f. Appendix C, who opines that it is unlikely that Lucian was the author. Helm 1927: 1749 disputes its

In light of this cumulative evidence, I would like to speculate that Lucian's 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' tale is in fact a product of the interface between Greek and Egyptian cultures. Lucian, after all, spent some time living and working in Egypt himself. At a late age, he assumed an official position in the service of Rome in the retinue of the prefect of Egypt,[35] where he seems to have entertained hopes of a higher position, possibly the post of imperial procurator.[36] Lucian's works contain many references to Egypt; for example, Egypt is the setting for one of the *novelle* of the *Tox.*,[37] and at *Luct.* 21, he claims to have personally witnessed the Egyptian process of mummification.[38] Recent attempts to establish a chronological sequence for Lucian's works tend to place the *Philops.* in this later phase of his career.[39]

The *Setne* cycle, as we have it, is datable to Egypt of the Graeco-Roman period, and the tale about the magician Pases was included in a work about magicians by Apion, a Greek writer living in Egypt (and probably of Egyptian descent) during the first century A.D., whose work, as I shall argue more fully elsewhere, Lucian knew.[40] Now, while I do not wish to propose a direct line of

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authenticity on linguistic grounds, and Hall (1981: 354-367) also considers it spurious. Amongst the defenders of Lucianic authorship are Anderson (1976b: 34-49) and Macleod (1979 (Loeb trans.): 47-51). The erotic adventure of the ass-man certainly existed in literary form before Lucian, and may have been one of the *Milesiaka*: see Cataudella 1957: 152ff. and Juvenal *Sat.*: 6.334. For the view that Lucian was the author, not of the *Asinus* attributed to him, but of the original Greek *Metamorphoses*, of which the *Asinus* is an abridgement, see Debidour 1994.

[35] He refers to his age at *Apol.* 1 (he is already near Aeacus, and has one foot in Charon's ferryboat). At *Apol.* 12, he outlines his official duties in Egypt; various attempts have been made to identify his position. Jones 1986: 20-21 suggests that he may have held the position of 'introducer' (εἰσαγωγεύς), the official who brought cases to the prefect's court; see Jones 1986: 21, n. 80 for relevant bibliography.

[36] *Apol.* 12. esp. 15ff.: καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐ φαῦλαι ἐλπίδες, εἰ τὰ εἰκότα γίγνοιτο, ἀλλὰ ἔθνος ἐπιτραπῆναι ἤ τινας ἄλλας πράξεις βασιλικάς.

[37] *Tox.* 27-34; see Chapter 2, p. 103 f., esp. n. 108.

[38] λέγω δὲ ἰδών. Hall, however, warns that his references to Egypt may be no more than literary artifice (Hall 1981: 43). For Lucian's claims of autopsy as a parody of the ethnographic technique, see Said 1994: 154ff.. It is clear that Lucian was familiar with Herodotus' ethnography in Book 2; this passage from *Luct.* recalls Hdt. 2. 78, 85f. and 136; see also *De Syria Dea* 23 (cf. Hdt. 2.28), and *ibid.* 45 (cf. Hdt. 2. 149), with Lightfoot 2003.

[39] Jones 1986: Appendix B, 167 includes the *Philops.* among the works which he thinks are likely to be from a later period. Of course, any attempt to ascertain a chronology on the basis of the internal evidence of the texts themselves is fraught with difficulties, and we cannot in fact make assertions of any certitude about the precise date of Lucian's appointment in Egypt: it may be around 175 A.D. or later (Hall 1981: 41ff.). Even given this probability, however, Hall advises caution against ascribing a late date to works on the strength of any references they contain pertaining to Egypt, as these references may often be explained as literary artifice, and it is also not impossible that Lucian visited Egypt as a tourist earlier in his life as well (Hall 1981: 43). For attempts to establish a chronology for Lucian's career and works, see Baldwin 1973: 7-20; Hall 1981: 1-63; Jones 1986: 6-23 and 167ff..

[40] See Dickie (2001: 213ff.), who describes Apion as 'something of an international star' (213), having taught at Alexandria and Rome, and performed in Greece. He was nicknamed 'the Cymbal of the World' by the Emperor Tiberius, because he liked to blow his own trumpet! The *testimonia*

descent between Lucian's tale and these particular Egyptian texts, it is plausible that he knew versions of these stories, and had them in mind when he was composing the *Philops.*; we have, after all, ample evidence for a strong tradition of oral transmission of this sort of tale.[41] As Jennifer Hall rightly points out, 'such pieces of folk lore are...'the stray waifs of literature' which have 'floated around the world for ages...liable everywhere to be appropriated by any casual claimant.'[42]

If Lucian did appropriate some of the basic motifs in the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' from folktale, then he has certainly also remodelled this raw material into a more contemporary, and characteristically Lucianic, tale.[43] The character of Pancrates is especially illustrative here. Arguments have been made in support of the historical status of this character,[44] but whether he is to be identified with any

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for his life may be found at *FGrH* 616. The title of the work in question here is uncertain, but the *Suda* offers three variants (*On the Magus / On the Magi/ On Homer as Magus*). The link between Apion's works and Lucian's is a subject I mean to investigate further elsewhere, as the case for a connection between the two is compelling. Apion's works included the paradoxographical *Aegyptiaca*, in which he related many of the wonders of Egypt, adding to these the claim of autopsy, just like many of the narrators in the *Philops.*. He in fact visited the Colossi of Memnon, like Eucrates, and he may have initiated the tourist practice of recording the experience in a *graffito* on the monument (his inscription appears to be one of the oldest there: Bernand & Bernand 1960: 165). Like Eucrates, who claimed to have heard an oracle, seven lines long, from the statue (*Philops.* 33), Apion also claimed to have had an extraordinary experience there; he heard Memnon sigh three times (Bernand & Bernand 1960: no. 71). The Elder Pliny claims to have met Apion, who told him that he had called up the ghosts of the dead in order to inquire of Homer where his native land was, and who his parents were - just like in Lucian's interviews with the poet on the Isle of the Blessed at *VH* 2.20 - but Apion claims he cannot reveal what Homer told him!(Pliny *HN* 30.18: seque euocasse umbras ad percunctandum Homerum, quanam patria quibusque parentibus genitus esset, non tamen ausus profiteri, quid sibi respondisse diceret.) One might compare Eucrates' 'disinclination' to divulge the oracle Memnon delivered to him at *Philops.* 33, and similar ironic examples from the *VH*: cf. Chapter 1, p. 37 with n. 134.

[41] Reitzenstein 1963: 8-12. See Jones 1986: 50: 'Though some of Lucian's inventions are inspired by literature, allowance must be made for oral sources - the tales told for small change in the streets and squares by professional storytellers and religious devotees, or related on occasions similar to the one described by Lucian.' Jones cites as evidence for this practice the testimony of Pliny *Ep.*2.20.1 (the cry of the wandering story-teller: 'assem para et accipe auream fabulam') and Juvenal 15.16 (in this satire on Egyptian culture, he compares Ulysses to a 'mendax aretalogus').

[42] Hall 1981: 574, quoting E.B. Cowell, *The Jātaka, trans. from the Pali by various hands under the editorship of E.B. Cowell* (Cambridge, 1895): vol. 1, p. vii.

[43] Hall (1981: 219f.) agrees with Bompaire that Lucian adapted his 'anecdotes' from handbook sources, but she also emphasizes how he 'makes them peculiarly his own', especially in the way Tychiades ridicules each tale (comparable to Lycinus' scathing comments in the *Navigium*), and Lucian's method of 'hitting off the air of earnest veracity assumed by the narrators.'

[44] 'The actual story has no exact parallel and may be [Lucian's] invention, but the sorcerer is a real person.' (Jones 1986: 49). It has been speculated that Lucian's Pancrates should be identified with the Egyptian magician of the Hadrianic era (a generation before Lucian), called Παχράτης, whose name appears on Paris Magical Papyrus 2441ff. (see Schwartz 1951: 55f.). The emperor Marcus Aurelius retained the services of an Egyptian magician on the Marcomannic campaign (Hall 1981: 216). For the opposite view, however, that Lucian did not have a specific historical figure in mind, see Caster (1937: 333f.): 'Le portrait de Pancratès me semble au contraire très artistique; c'est un croquis de caractère.'; also Reitzenstein 1963: 39 (εἰκονισμός). Ogden (forthcoming) identifies Apion as the historical prototype 'behind' the character of Pancrates; he does not, however, consider the possibility of Apion's wider influence on Lucian himself: cf. n. 40 above.

particular historical individual or not, Lucian certainly depicts him as a typical θεῖος ἄνθρωπος of the era.[45] Reitzenstein assumed that Lucian had Apollonius of Tyana in mind when describing the figure of Pancrates; others have argued that he is modelled on Pythagoras.[46] There is certainly a strong connection between Pancrates and Pythagoras in the *Philops.*; Pancrates was, after all, a tutor to the Pythagorean Arignotus, and the fact that both characters are described in the dialogue as holy men (Arignotus at *Philops.* 29; Pancrates at 34) underlines the parallel between the two. Pythagoras' association with Egypt is traditional.[47] He was reputed to have studied in Egypt for twenty-two years; Pancrates' twenty-three years may be deliberately calculated to surpass this figure.[48]

Lucian, however, has delicately adapted his holy-man-type to the Egyptian setting. Arignotus' description of his physical appearance at *Philops.* 34 corresponds to the classic Herodotean image of the Egyptian priest, with his shaven head and white linen clothing.[49] Significantly, Herodotus asserts that these

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[45] Arignotus identifies him as an ἀνὴρ ἱερός at *Philops.* 34. For the phenomenon of holy men during this period, see Anderson 1994. Pancrates' supernatural servant is reminiscent of the magician's πάρεδρος. Graf (1997: 107ff.) notes that it was the essential goal of the potential magician in antiquity to obtain a demon helper, or πάρεδρος, but that the search for such a helper was not the prerogative of the magicians alone: philosophers also had 'companions' (117). The tasks that were typically assigned to a πάρεδρος inlcuded fetching water, oil, wine, vinegar and bread (Graf 1997: 108); at *Philops.* 35, Eucrates describes how the animated pestle would draw water and do the shopping!

[46] Reitzenstein 1963: 5. For Pythagoras as the model for Pancrates, see Herzig 1940: 27-29. Jones, in keeping with his thesis that much of the detail in the *Philops.* is a satire on contemporary philosophy, interprets the importance given by Lucian to Pythagoreans (and Platonists) in the dialogue as a reflection of the growing influence of the Neo-Pythagoreans and Neo-Platonists in this era, and the influx of demonology and oriental lore into Greek thought, which they precipitated (Jones 1986: 51). On descriptions of Pythagoreans in Lucian, see Caster 1937: 51, and Hall 1981: 185-6. One might compare Pancrates to Kalasiris, the Egyptian high-priest of Heliodorus' novel, who is also imbued with a Pythagorean air: see Jones (2004: 3): 'Kalasiris' ascetic and itinerant lifestyle, together with his physical appearance, aligh him rather more with Pythagoreanism, than with the Isis cult of which he is was high priest.'

[47] The tradition is reflected elsewhere in Lucian's works; at *Vit.Auct.* 3, the Pythagorean philosophy claims to have studied with the wise men in Egypt, and at *Gallus* 18, the cock claims that in his previous incarnation as Pythagoras, he studied the books of Horus and Isis in subterranean chambers with the Egyptian 'prophets'.

[48] Iamblichus, *Vit. Pythag.* 4.19; *Philops.* 34. See Schwartz 1951: 55 *ad loc.*: 'Il y a là un désir évident de surenchérir.' Graf (1997: 89 ff.) notes that a similar lengthy training period (twenty years) was allotted to the Druids in Caesar's time (*De Bello Gallico*, 6.14); the apocryphal biography of the bishop Cyprian (died 258 A.D.) refers to his 10-year apprenticeship as a magician with the priests of Memphis, before converting to Christianity (ps.-Cyprian *Confessions* 12). He concludes from this that Lucian's tale, although clearly an invention, 'is grounded in precise information about contemporary beliefs' (Graf 1997: 91f.). Caster and Reitzenstein believed that Lucian deliberately attributed quasi-historical features to Pancrates to build an impression of veracity (for references, see n. 46).

[49] Schwartz 1951: 56; Reitzenstein 1963: 39; see Herodotus 2.36-7. The reference to Pancrates' poor Greek (οὐ καθαρῶς ἑλληνίζων) is interesting. Intellectual snobbery was endemic among the *pepaideumenoi* (e.g. Philagrus' hotheaded slip in Philostratus *VS* 578f.; Lucian's own *Pro Lapsu*), but at *Merc.co.* 24, the poor Latin accent (perhaps feigned?) of Greek scholars working at Rome is a

priests are free from the burden of all housework and expenditure, but that food is cooked and prepared for them, and wine is brought to them (2. 37); the agents of these services are unspecified (ἐστὶ πεσσόμενα, γίνεται, δίδοται), and the vague air of mystery might also have suggested to Lucian the idea of ascribing a supernatural assistant to his wandering Egyptian holy-man. Some of the magical feats ascribed to Pancrates conform to the *topos* of the 'holy man and the beasts,' exerting charismatic influence over creatures that are ordinarily dangerous;[50] in the case of the Egyptian holy-man, however, this power manifests itself, appropriately, in his ability to ride *crocodiles*.[51] The image of the crocodiles wagging their tails with joy as they swim with him is a suitably ludicrous touch.[52] Details like this, as well as Eucrates' suspicious reluctance to disclose either the oracle which he claims Memnon delivered to him (because it would too much of a digression!), or the words of Pancrates' transformative spell (because he never learned the counter-spell!) render his claims to veracity humorously specious, in a manner that is characteristic of Lucian.

In his most recent consideration of the *Philops.*, Anderson declares that the tale of the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' is a *Kunstmärchen*.[53] This term, however, is inappropriate, as Lucian's story is clearly *not* a literary fairy-tale, such as the tale of Cupid and Psyche in Apuleius' *Met.*,[54] but a narrative which, ostensibly at least, relates the speaker's own experiences in the conventionally realised 'here and now'. My claim that Lucian did not *ex nihilo* invent the raw material of the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' need not, and is not meant to, diminish his creative input in composing the *novella* as we have it; if Lucian already knew a version of this story, in appropriating it, he has made it distinctively his own; this is, after all, his

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sign of their erudition. For literary feuds as an integral feature of intellectual life in the Second Sophistic, see Bowersock 1969, chapter 7; Baldwin 1973: 41 ff., and Jones 1986: 101ff..

[50] Apollonius of Tyana apparently understood bird-language (Philostratus, *VA* 1.20), and Orpheus, ancient predecessor to these charismatic figures, famously charmed the wild animals with his music. One might also consider the snake-charming powers of the Babylonian sorcerer at *Philops.* 12 in this connection: see following note.

[51] *Philops.* 34. We do in fact have references to crocodile-riding and crocodile-charming in the papyri (see Herzig 1940: 11f., with n. 34), and there are allusions to Egyptian priests charming crocodiles in the Greek literary tradition also (see Schwartz 1951: 56, where he notes that the Egyptian deity Harpocrates was frequently depicted riding a pair of crocodiles) We know of Egyptian magicians who earned their living by exhibiting such 'miraculous' feats as riding crocodiles (Graf 1997: 109), or who conjured up visions of extravagant meals in the town squares (see Dickie 2001: 215 and 229 ff.). The snake-charming feat of the Babylonian magician in *Philops.* 12 may also be connected to the 'holy man and the beast' motif (a motif which finds resonance in the traditional Irish legend of how St. Patrick got rid of the snakes from Ireland.)

[52] *Philops.* 34: the crocodiles and other beasts are depicted as ὑποπτήσσοντα καὶ σαίνοντα. The verb σαίνω usually characterises the behaviour of pet dogs.

[53] Anderson 2000: 104f..

[54] *Met.* 4.28 - 6.24.

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characteristic technique, as he suggests elsewhere.[55] Legendary Egyptian lore, paraded as anecdotal experience - the story of the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice' encapsulates the ludicrous nature of Eucrates' sensationalism, and Lucian's love of a good tale.

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[55] See *Pisc.* 6.

# APPENDIX II: THE *NAVIGIUM* AND MAKE-BELIEVE

A place for the *Navigium* is warranted in any study on Lucian's fiction. True, it does not contain the sort of *novelle* which are found in the *Philops.* and *Tox.* as, strictly speaking, it is constituted of a series of wishes, rather than narratives;[1] nevertheless, it is close to these two dialogues in structure, as Husson and others have observed, sharing much common ground with the *Philops.* in particular.[2] The set of characters in the *Nav.*, for example, and the dynamic between them, is similar to that in the *Philops.*; the *Nav.* is a dialogue among a group of fantasizing philosophers, whose daydreaming is punctuated (and effectively punctured) by the wry comments of the sceptical Lycinus. This sceptical commentator thematizes the issue of fantasy and believability in the dialogue, in a manner that is reminiscent of Tychiades in the *Philops.*.[3] Furthermore, as in the *Philops.*, there are numerous Platonic echoes in the *Nav.*, some of which I will discuss more fully below.[4]

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[1] See Bompaire 1958: 465-6: 'Le cas du *Navire* est un peu à part; on ne peut exactement l'appeler une collection de contes, puisqu'il n'en contient que trois... Sans aller avec Schissel jusqu'à considérer le groupe *Philopseudès-Toxaris-Navire* comme reprenant l'*Urform* du roman - à savoir une série de récits encadrés dans un dialogue - , on admettra que Lucien s'autorisait d'une tradition narrative bien établie pour nous livrer ces mosaïques où brillent d'ailleurs de savoureux détails.'

[2] Bompaire 1958: 465: 'Le groupe *Philopseudès-Toxaris-Navire* est caractérisé par la forme dialoguée.' Cf. Husson 1970: 9-10; Hall 1981: 219. For the idea that the *Nav.* belongs to Lucian's *juvenilia*, see Hall 1981: 49; some scholars date the work to *ca.* 165 A.D. on the basis of internal references (Hall 1981: 462, n. 66).

[3] On the relation between the *personae* Tychiades and Lycinus, see p. 230 ff..

[4] Cf. p. 224 ff.. The most obvious resonance is in the opening scenario of the *Nav.*, where four companions - one of whom is called Adeimantus - have just been down to the Piraeus to see for themselves the enormous ship the *Isis*, and they are now making their way back to the city. One of their number - Adeimantus himself - is missing, and the other three speculate on his whereabouts until at last they catch sight of him, walking alone, so preoccupied with his thoughts that he barely notices his friends, who holler after him. Clearly, this dialogue-promenade is meant to recall the opening of Plato's *Republic*, where a group of companions - one of whom is also called Adeimantus - talk as they travel. They too have just been on a sort of tourist trip, both to take part in the rites of 'the goddess', and to witness the inauguration of the new festival, which Socrates refers to in terms befitting a theatrical spectacle. The motif of someone catching up with the rest of the party or *vice versa* is present in both cases too; in *Rep.* 327 b-c, Polemarchus spies Socrates and Glaucon, and sends his slave ahead to get them to wait for him; similarly, in *Nav.* 10-11, the trio (Samippus, Timolaus, Lycinus) spy Adeimantus in the distance, and hasten to catch up with him. The correspondence between the two passages is confirmed by the same motif of 'catching hold of someone's cloak' in both, with clear verbal echoes between both passages; at *Rep.* 327b, Polemarchus' slave comes up behind Socrates and catches hold of his cloak: καί μου ὄπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι; cf. *Nav.* 11: ἢν μὴ τοῦ ἱματίου λαβόμενοι σε ἐπιστρέψωμεν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε... Of course, by evoking the *Rep.* in this way, Lucian may wish to imply that there is an analogy between Socrates' philosophical fantasy (i.e. the ideal state), and the rather more wordly aspirations of his wishful philosophers (one might compare the bathetic relation between the *Philops.* and the *Phaedo*; the

Early scholarship on the *Nav.* treated it primarily as a satire on philosophy, attributing specific philosophical affiliations to each of the main characters; Timolaus was therefore said to be a caricature of Socrates, Adeimantus was an adherent of Platonic doctrine, Samippus was a Stoic or a Cynic, and Lycinus was a Sceptic.[5] Rudolf Helm saw the influence of Menippus in the motif of 'laughing at folly' in the *Nav.*.[6] Bompaire's treatment of the *Nav.*, however, is seminal to my own approach, for while he ackowledged the importance of the diatribe as the raw material of the *Nav.*, he discerned also a sometimes overriding concern with fabrication and story-telling: 'l'aspect romanesque l'emporte sur la leçon diatribique.'[7] Bompaire compared the *Nav.* to the *Tox.* for the way in which, in both works, the story-telling element becomes practically an end in itself: '...dans le *Navire* ou dans le *Toxaris* les histoires joissent d'une autonomie qui peut sembler étrangère à un procédé ornemental...elles sont à elles-mêmes leur propre fin, et leur fonction n'est plus proprement stylistique.'[8] Finally - and most importantly - Bompaire discerned traces in the *Nav.* (as well as in the *Tox.* and *Philops.*) of parody and fantasy: 'des nuances inédites de parodie ou de fantaisie.'[9]

The fullest recent treatment of the *Nav.* has been Husson's edition of the text with translation and commentary; however, although Husson's commentary is important for asserting the status of the *Nav.* as one of Lucian's finest works, worthy of scholarly attention in its own right, Husson tends to underestimate the sophistication of Lucian's work, and her analysis is at times superficial. Husson explored the influence of themes from the moral (Cynic) diatribe in the *Nav.* -

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*Philops.* is a περὶ ψυχῆς of a different kind! Cf. Chapter 1, p. 11 with n. 22). However, the intertextuality also draws the reader's attention closer to the artificiality, the textual surface of the *Nav.*, alerting him to the likelihood that there will be a degree of self-conscious literary creation in this dialogue.

[5] Schissel von Fleschenberg 1912: 22, n. 1. Caster (1937: 17) also used this approach; for him, Adeimantus was a Stoic - cf. *Herm.* 18. For Timolaus as Socrates see also Bompaire 1958: 187; See Husson (1970: 1.7-8) for a summary of these views. Anderson includes the *Nav.* in Lucian's 'Platonic suite,' along with the *Symp.* and *Philops.* (see Anderson 1976a: 165). More recently, Hall saw mockery of contemporary philosophers and philosophy as the primary concern of both the *Nav.* and the *Philops.* (Hall 1981: 172).

[6] Helm 1906: 337-9; cf. Hall (1981: 467), who argues that the *Nav.*, although similar to the Menippean group (especially in its treatment of the 'vanity of human wishes' theme), lacks the influence of Old Comedy, leading Hall to conclude that the *Nav.* is 'an offshoot of the genre.' A more helpful approach, in my opinion, is to regard it as a Platonic-style dialogue, transformed by elements of fantasy and parody.

[7] Bompaire 1958: 354, n. 3.

[8] Bompaire 1958: 446. The fact that the 'serious' speculative purpose recedes from view as the dialogue advances, essentially yielding to the importance of telling interesting tales, is a structural reflection of the risk involved in make-believe, that by participating in it, it may consume you; cf. *Tox.*.

[9] Bompaire 1958: 468. Bompaire treats the wishes in the *Nav.* as examples of 'fantaisie pure' at pp. 696-697. For the dream of Samippus as parody of the Alexander tradition, also containing fantastic elements, see pp. 620-621.

especially the theme of the vanity of human wishes - but dismissed the dialogue's central theme as 'banal', focusing instead on the work as a showcase for the excellence of Lucian's character-drawing and 'realistic' psychology; for Husson, this is the main thing, and other concerns in the dialogue are of surplus value only: 'Il est préférable de ne pas attribuer à Lucien des intentions qu'il n'a probablement pas eues et de penser qu'il était superflu d'ajouter de telles précisions dans un dialogue où l'analyse psychologique tient la première place.'[10] There is a lack here of any appreciation for the sophisticated game-playing in the *Navigium*.

More piecemeal studies exploited the *Nav.* merely as a quarry for 'evidence' for the dimensions of putative ancient super-tankers.[11] Anderson's studies on Lucian, however, marked an important shift towards study of the *Nav.* in literary terms, considering it along with the *Tox..*, *Philops.*, *VH* and the *Onos* as an example of Lucian's comic fiction. More recently, Nesselrath conceded that there may be more to the *Nav.* than meets the eye; frustratingly, however, his single-line footnote gloss does not do much to qualify or explain this rather enigmatic statement.[12]

In this brief essay, therefore, I wish to explore what I consider to be one of the underlying *strata* of the *Nav.*, the question of make-believe. I propose that there are important literary dynamics underlying the principal theme in this dialogue, which have been almost entirely ignored until now, but which are significant not only for their intrinsic interest, but as a foundation for any proper understanding of the literary sophistication and game-playing of the *Philops.*, *Tox.* and *VH*. It is not my intention to assert an overriding importance for issues of fictionality in this work; indeed, in a dialogue which focuses explicitly on the whimsical notions of philosophers, it is necessary to keep a balanced view of the relative 'weight' of other themes too, and not to distort the overall picture. But these other themes should not be ignored, either. Although the *Nav.* is on one level 'about' the folly of human wishes (in much the same way as the *Philops.* is, on one level, 'about' the folly of superstition), on another level, this very issue engages the reader/audience with the question of fantasy and make-believe. The *Navigium* is therefore an important complement to the study of other works (such as the *Philops.*, *Tox.* and *VH*), where fictionality is more explicitly treated.

In what ways, therefore, are we justified in saying that the *Nav.* is 'about' fiction? The dialogue can be said to reflect on its own status as make-believe in

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[10] Husson 1970: 7-8.
[11] Cf. p. 227 ff..
[12] Nesselrath 1990: 138 (with n. 49).

certain ways. Issues such as plausibility and suspension of disbelief especially are thematized particularly through the character of Lycinus, who is himself also part of the game of make-believe, and whose homonymy with the author, Lucian, deserves further scrutiny: through Lycinus, Lucian arguably inscribes his own authorial presence into the dialogue. I will show how Lucian uses metalepsis, Lycinus, and narrative style to demonstrate the ethically worrying ability of make-believe to absorb one into itself.

It is interesting that, despite the fact, according to the terms of the wishing-game, the participants are to have *carte blanche* - no limits to their fantasizing, and no need to heed the laws of nature - there is still a concern that their wishes should be in some way *plausible*. When Adeimantus wishes for a ship made of solid gold, Lycinus quickly points out the logistical problem of keeping it afloat; he is afraid the ship will sink, and Adeimantus' pretty boy will drown. Timolaus, tongue firmly in cheek, tells Lycinus not to worry - dolphins will save the boy, just as they did in the case of Arion and Melicertes - [13] but Timolaus suggests that Adeimantus should have made a more plausible wish:

> ἄμεινον γὰρ ἦν πιθανώτερον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καί τινα θησαυρὸν ὑπὸ τῇ κλίνῃ ἀνευρεῖν, ὡς μὴ πράγματα ἔχοις ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου μετατιθεὶς χρυσίον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ.[14]

> It would have been better to make it more believable, and find some treasure under the bed, so that you wouldn't have the trouble of transferring the gold from the ship to the city.

Timolaus' remark here is, of course, tongue-in-cheek again, evoking a situation which equally improbable; it is also mildly metaleptic, as 'real life' concerns (transport) jar with details of Adeimantus' fantasy.

Yet again, a little later, when Lycinus warns Adeimantus about the dangers of wishing for gold, reminding him of the fate of Midas, Adeimantus retorts that when he gets *his* turn, he can articulate his wish *in a more plausible manner*:

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[13] *Nav.* 19. Husson (1970:1.9) mentions the anecdote about Arion as one of elements that contribute to the fantastical atmosphere, and prepare for the element of the marvellous in the dialogue. The story about the dolphin's rescue of Arion is told by Herodotus at 1.24. Tales of amazing rescue by dolphins were popular also among more contemporary authors, e.g. Plut. *Sept.Conv.* (with Mossman 1997); Philostratus *Imagines* 19. Lucian tells the story of Arion, focalized through the dolphin, in *DMar.*5, where he also alludes also to the legend of Melicertes mentioned here. For an excellent discussion of the intertextuality of *D.Mar.* 5 with Herodotus 1.24, see Avery 1996: 63-82. Avery cites the reference to Arion and Melicertes at *Nav.* 19 as 'a reminder that, when Lucian seizes upon a particular quotation, phrase, or image, he often employs it multiple times over the course of several texts.' (Avery 1996: 78). For dolphins in ancient art and literature in general, see Stebbins 1929: 59-96.
[14] *Nav.* 20.1-3.

τὰ σὰ ῥυθμιεῖς *πιθανώτερον,* ὦ Λυκῖνε, μετ᾽ ὀλίγον, ἐπειδὰν αὐτὸς αἰτῆς.[15]

Clearly, plausibility is a decisive factor in estimating the relative value of these wishes - which suggests that the moral content of the wishes is not the only, or even the primary, criterion for judgement of their relative merits. One might compare the stories of the *Tox.*, which are supposed to be judged for their depiction of friendship (moral/ethical value), but are actually judged for their merit as good, plausible fiction (literary value).[16]

Lycinus repeatedly draws attention to the inherent implausibility of the others' wishes, especially by metalepsis, i.e. comments wherein the 'real' world is consciously made to intrude into the fantasy, producing an incongruous effect which highlights the discrepancy between the two. There is a good example of this at *Nav.* 39; Lycinus wants to put an end to Samippus' fantasy about a glorious military campaign in the Near East, and to let the third speaker, Timolaus, have his turn:

> πέπαυσο ἤδη, ὦ Σάμιππε, καιρὸς γὰρ σὲ ἤδη μὲν νενικηκότα τηλικαύτην μάχην ἐν Βαβυλῶνι εὐωχεῖσθαι τὰ ἐπινίκια - ἐκστάδιος γὰρ οἶμαί σοι ἡ ἀρχή - Τιμόλαον δὲ ἐν τῷ μέρει εὔχεσθαι ὅπερ ἂν ἐθέλῃ.

> Stop now, Samippus, for now that you have won such an enormous battle, it's time for you to celebrate your victory feast in Babylon - *for I think your empire is six stades long* - and time for Timolaus in his turn to wish for whatever he wants.

Samippus' 'empire' here is made co-extensive with the length of road he has used up during the narrative of his fantasy; the incongruity brings us sharply out of the fantasy world, back to the 'real' scenario of the conversation between four friends as they travel home, debunking Samippus' exaggerated fantasies at the same time.[17]

But how 'real' is this 'real' world? A more complex instance of metalepsis is found a little earlier, in chapter 35. Samippus is in the middle of waging his fantasy military campaigns, and asks his 'generals' for their advice about what to do next. Adeimantus, supposedly in charge of the cavalry, wants to send the infantry out against the enemy, and Timolaus advises that the whole army march

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[15] *Nav.* 22.

[16] See Chapter 2, esp. pp. 74-78.

[17] See the remark by Genette's history teacher: 'We are going to study the Second Empire now from the coup d'état to the Easter vacation.' (1980: 235, n. 54).

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out *en masse*. When asked for his opinion, however, Lycinus gives a rather unexpected reply:

ἐπειδὴ κεκμήκαμεν συντόνως ὁδεύοντες, ὁπότε κατήειμεν ἕωθεν ἐς τὸν Πειραῖα, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἤδη τριάκοντά που σταδίους προκεχωρήκαμεν καὶ ὁ ἥλιος πολύς, κατὰ μεσημβρίαν γὰρ ἤδη μάλιστα, ἐνταῦθά που ὑπὸ τὰς ἐλαίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνατετραμμένης στήλης καθίσαντας ἀναπαύσασθαι, εἶτα οὕτως ἀναστάντας ἀνύειν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ.[18]

As we are worn out from our continual journeying - since we went down to the Piraeus early this morning, and even now we have advanced some thirty stades - and the sun is intense, for it's right about midday now, I suggest we sit down somewhere here on an overturned headstone beneath an olive-tree, and take a break. Then, after we've recovered in this way, we can complete the rest of the journey to the city.

This example is doubly complex, because the metalepsis jolts us back out of fantasy, reminding us that the four *soi-disant* military heroes are in fact travellers on the road, worn out not from glorious exploits on the field of battle, but from their long walk back from the Piraeus. But in doing so, it presents a situation which itself evokes the famous *locus amoenus* of Plato's *Phaedrus*.[19] This complicates matters, as the literary allusion opens the possibility that the supposedly 'real' world of the framing dialogue, in which the philosophers' fantasies are anchored, is not real at all, but is itself also a literary construct. The result is a vertiginous layering of reality, which forces the reader to realize that all the worlds that are constructed by texts are potentially as fanciful as Samippus' consuming dream.

The confusion is itself thematized by Samippus' response, in which he corrects Lycinus by reminding him that he is 'in fact' still in Babylon.

ΣΑΜΙΠΠΟΣ
ἔτι γὰρ Ἀθήνησιν, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι δοκεῖς, ὃς ἀμφὶ Βαβυλῶνα ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ πρὸ τῶν τειχῶν ἐν τοσούτοις στρατιώταις κάθησαι περὶ τοῦ πολέμου διασκοπούμενος;
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ

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[18] *Nav.* 35.

[19] *Phaedrus* 229a ff.; cf. *Laws* 625a. For the appropriation of Plato's *Phaedrus* by second century authors, in general, Trapp 1990; at p. 47 Trapp cites *Nav.* 35 as a possible evocation of the *Phaedrus*, but has misgivings: 'here the relationship is more distant.' Macleod (*OCT*) sees an allusion to the *Phaedrus* passage also in *Nav.* 13, where Adeimantus dreams of building himself a house by the Ilissus, but while it is true that Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (esp. 230b) comments on the special beauty of the area on the banks of the Ilissus, I do not see any pointed intertext with this passage in *Nav.* 13. For the possibility that Lucian got inspiration for Adeimantus' dream-house from Herodes Atticus' mansion by the Ilissus, see Husson 1970: 2.33.

ὑπέμνησας· ἐγὼ δὲ νήφειν ὤμην καὶ σοὶ ὕπαρ ἀποφανεῖσθαι τὴν γνώμην.[20]

SAMIPPUS
But my dear fellow, do you still think that you are in Athens, when you are located in the plain around Babylon, before the city walls, in the midst of so many soldiers, cogitating on the war?
LYCINUS
You've just reminded me - but I thought I was sober, and that I was going to declare my opinion to you in reality.

'Fact' and fantasy have been inverted here. For the ardent daydreamer Samippus, his dream is momentarily more 'real' than 'reality', and Lycinus (ironically) expresses confusion as to his own state of consciousness.[21] Like Lycinus, we start to feel somewhat lost in this topsy-turvy world where the boundaries between reality and illusion seem no longer to be impermeable.

The ontological status of the framing scenario is again problematized when Lycinus, after he has been appointed by Samippus as leader of part of his 'army', says that he will desert his post if the enemy horsemen charge him:

καί μοι δοκῶ, ἢν βιάζωνται, αὐτομολήσειν προσδραμὼν ἐς τὴν παλαίστραν ἔτι πολεμοῦντας ὑμᾶς καταλιπών.[22]

And I think that, if they press hard, I will desert and run into the wrestling-school, leaving you all still waging war.

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[20] *Nav.* 35.

[21] Lycinus' pose of self-effacing irony is close to that famously attributed to Socrates. In fact, more than one of the principal characters in the *Nav.* is described in terms that recall the Platonic Socrates. The very first image of Adeimantus, the character whose namesake featured also in Plato's *Rep.*, presents him as barefoot - ἀνυπόδητος αὐτὸς ὤν (*Nav.* 1). Husson regards this detail as too banal to contain any specific allusion to Socrates, but her argument ignores the distinctly Platonic atmosphere within which this description is couched (cf. n. 4 above); in a context like this, surely evokes the image of the Platonic Socrates, who famously walked on the ice at Potidaea barefoot (Plato, *Symp.* 220b). Socrates' bare feet were something of a trademark; they are one of the key features in Aristophanes' parody of the philosopher, and some of his adherents and admirers adopted the fashion too: Aristophanes depicts Socrates barefoot at *Clouds* 103 and 363; Socrates' acolyte Aristodemus went about barefoot in imitation of his master (Plato *Symp.* 173b; cf. also *Phdr.* 229a, where Phaedrus acknowledges Socrates' custom: εἰς καιρόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνυπόδητος ὢν ἔτυχον· σὺ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἀεί.). Furthermore, the image of Adeimantus, the barefoot lover of boys, so lost in his thoughts that he is deaf to his companions' cries (*Nav.* 10), may also recall Socrates' periodic trancelike preoccupation with his own thoughts (Plato *Symp.* 175 a-d and 220c). Other characters in the *Nav.* are aligned with the Platonic Socrates in similar ways too. Timolaus is described as being old, bald and snub-nosed (*Nav.* 45) - features which distinguished the Platonic Socrates also, as Lucian was well aware; the point of the comparison is to highlight the absurd and ridiculous nature of Timolaos' wish. For similar descriptions of Socrates elsewhere in Lucian's works, cf. *D.Mort.* 6.4; *Philops.* 24 (cf. Chapter 1, p. 12 – and also the Socratic appearance of the statue of Pellichus, on which see p. 70). It is perhaps no accident that Socrates is associated with the characters who either initiate the fantasies (Adeimantus), or who indulge in them to the most outrageous degree (Timolaus); Socrates is found elsewhere too in Lucian's works in the context of the unbelievable: cf. p. 71 f..

[22] *Nav.* 37.

Once again, the metalepsis serves to jolt us out of the fantasy, reminding us that the speakers are in fact walking along a road, quite possibly adjacent to a *palaestra* - far from the exotic field of battle, at any rate. But the literary texture of Lycinus' remark - alluding obliquely to Plato *Charmides* 153a - calls the ontological status of this 'real' scenario into question. Once again, this results in a layering of 'realities', which itself problematizes the creation of fantasy worlds.

Finally, Timolaus' wish to possess various rings of magical powers, including the power to render its wearer invisible contains an explicit allusion to the famous ring of Gyges, a story which is related by Glaucon in Plato, *Rep.* 359d - 360d:

> ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι τὸν ῾Ερμῆν ἐντυχόντα μοι δοῦναι δακτυλίους τινὰς τοιούτους τὴν δύναμιν, ἕνα μὲν ὥστε ἀεὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἄτρωτον εἶναι καὶ ἀπαθῆ, ἕτερον δὲ ὡς μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι τὸν περιθέμενον, οἷος ἦν ὁ τοῦ Γύγου...[23]

> But I wish for Hermes to meet me and give me some rings, with powers like this; one to be strong and healthy in body, and to be invulnerable and impervious to suffering; another so that the wearer won't be seen, like the one belonging to Gyges...

Husson enumerates several parallels between this passage and the story in the *Rep.*, including the list of the benefits of invisibility, e.g. the freedom to steal/ kill/ have sex with whomever one choses with impunity, and the acquisition of godlike status.[24] While the story about the ring of Gyges was known in antiquity outside the Platonic context, the fact that there is already a considerable amount of intertextuality between the *Nav.* and the *Rep.*, and the fact that there are such close parallels between both the Lucianic and Platonic passages, strongly suggests that Lucian had in mind the literary, Platonic version of the tale.[25] The Platonic pedigree of Timolaus' wish makes it a particularly appropriate fantasy for a philosopher, as well as pointing once again to the literary, story-telling impetus which is always present beneath the surface of this dialogue.[26]

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[23] *Nav.* 42.
[24] Husson 1970: 2.88-89; cf. the reference to the 'riches of Gyges' in *Par.* 58.
[25] Herodotus also tells the story of Gyges, but does not mention any such ring (Hdt. 1. 8-16). For connections between the Platonic and Herodotean stories, however, see Laird 2001: 13-20. For a detailed genealogy of the tale, see Smith 1902. Husson (1970: 2.89) draws attention to the various folkloric elements in the story (e.g. power of invisibility, magical acquisition of wealth, gift to make others fall in love with you).
[26] We might compare Martin's astute observation about the reference to *mythoi* in the prologue to Achilles Tatius' novel: 'the coy reference to fiction within a work of fiction obviously is meant to emphasize the "reality" of the fiction, but of course it simultaneously reminds us that it is a fictional reality into which we are being drawn.' (Martin 2002: 143). Timolaus claims he wants to use his magical powers to gain knowledge about exotic fauna such as the phoenix and griffin, about exotic races such as the Indians, Hyperboreans, and Antipodeans, and about the stars and other natural phenomena such as the source of the Nile (*Nav.* 44). Such curiosity, and the desire for knowledge

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By metalepsis, therefore, Lycinus points again and again to the absurdity of his companions' fantasies, and demonstrates the potential that such daydreaming has to swallow one up in its own world. Metalepsis suggests this, because it deliberately treats fantasy-world and real world in *parataxis*, gliding over the boundaries that normally distinguish them, in a manner that is both absurd and profoundly disturbing, as it has implications for the ontology of the extra-dialogic world too, the world of the reader. The presence of this self-conscious technique in the *Nav.* suggests a degree of meditation on - or at least consciousness of - the boundaries between fantasy and reality, a question which seems to fascinate Lucian in other works, such as *Tox.* and *Philops.*, where he deals more explicitly with fiction in narrative.[27] The reference to the Platonic tale about the ring of Gyges suggests that Lucian had the narrative fiction of philosophers in mind when composing this dialogue, as well as their wishful fancies.

It is not just the character Lycinus who plays tricks on his fellow speakers; on another level, the author Lucian is playing tricks on his reader too. The internal metalepsis among the characters of the dialogue is mirrored by an external metalepsis which challenges the reader to remain aware that the dialogue itself is make-believe, and that as readers of the *Nav.*, we are - potentially at least - as much in a world of make-believe as the wishful characters themselves. This is brought to mind when our attention is drawn dangerously close to the textual surface of the dialogue, which happens in a number of ways, as we have already seen. The conventional form of the dialogue-promenade, and the ubiquitous intertextuality with Plato especially, reminds us that we too are in a world that has been constructed from the author's fancy, and the marvellous sight of the ship, with its fantastic dimensions and its tale of adventure, also helps to create an atmosphere of fantasy from the outset for the dialogue as a whole.

It is worth reflecting upon the nature of the *Isis*, and its relevance to the dialogue, in more detail. Much ink has been spilled on the question of the factuality of the dimensions of the *Isis* and her voyage. On the one hand, there are those who interpret the passage as a factual description of an actual ship, even though it denotes a vessel of unprecedented and unparalleled magnitude for the

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and exploration, was a motivational force for travel narratives whose truth status ranged from documentary (e.g. Pytheas), to more ambiguous (e.g. Ctesias), to outright fantastical (e.g. Deinias in Antonius Diogenes' novel, *The Wonders Beyond Thule*; Menippus in Lucian's *Icaromenippus*; Lucian in the *VH*; Alexander's explorations to the ends of the earth, reported in the letter to Olympias and Aristotle (Recension C); we may also recall the curiosity that spurs on Lucius, the intrepid adventurer of Apuleius' *Met.* (cf. Chapter 3, p. 191 with n. 302). Of course, Timolaus' wish-list of exotic things to see also has a distinctly Herodotean flavour; for references, see Husson 1970, notes *ad loc.*.

ancient world, a hypothesis which is still unverified by the archaeological record.[28] Others try to integrate this idea with the literary texture of the entire section; for Jones, the ship's dimensions represent an interpolation of reality into the atmosphere of Platonic fantasy at the beginning of the dialogue: 'Other works with a modern setting have an antique patina: thus Lycinos and some companions in the *Ship* stroll down to Piraeus, like Socrates in the *Republic*, but the immense size of the ship and its destination in Italy betoken a world far different from Plato's.'[29] Anderson suggests that 'there is little besides the three measurements he [Lucian] gives that could not have been supplied from a conventional nautical simile', and suggests that several 'inconsistencies' in the description may mean that the rest is fictitious too - but he nonetheless concludes that Lucian intended to give a 'realistic' description of a voyage, in contrast to the fantastic version in the *VH*, and in contrast to the fanciful wishes that follow.[30] Houston, however, argues decisively that the *Isis* is a literary construct rather than a historical reality, and should be compared to other *ekphraseis* of ships, such as those found at *VH* 1. 11; *Jup.Trag.* 47, and Philostratus, *VA* 3.35. The fact that the *ekphrasis* is located in the opening section of the dialogue is significant, as this section is 'a literary construct in which Lucian draws together details, themes, and scenes from other works, especially Plato's and his own.'[31]

Indeed, given the Platonic atmosphere of the opening section, in which the *ekphrasis* is contextualized, we may be meant to think also of Plato's famous metaphorical ship of state. Given the fact that the 'Platonic' character, Adeimantus, brings Lycinus on board the ship, and then goes on to exploit the *ship as a metaphor*, just as Socrates does in the *Rep.*, the possibility of a Platonic resonance here is harder to discount. In the *Rep.*, the ship functioned as a metaphor for the hierarchy of the ideal state;[32] in the *Nav.*, the amazing ship *Isis*, with her incredible dimensions, functions as a metaphor for the extravagant

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[27] Cf. Chapter 1, p. 57 f., and Chapter 2, p. 111 f..
[28] See Casson 1950; Isserlin 1955; Casson 1956; cf. Husson (1970: 2.14): 'les indications fournies par Lucien ont toutes les chances d'être exactes et ne relèvent pas de la fantaisie.' One should not discount the possibility that Lucian is showing off his virtuosity in the rather technical description of the ship and her voyage as well; in several of his works, he demonstrates a flair for (pseudo-) erudition; see Anderson 1976a: 113 ff..
[29] Jones 1986: 158.
[30] Anderson 1976a: 39.
[31] Houston 1987: 445-6.
[32] *Rep.* 488b ff.; see also *Polit.* 299 b and 302 aff.; *Euthydem.* 291d; *Laws* 758a. Lucian knew this image and used it elsewhere, e.g. *Jup.Trag.* 46 ff..

fantasies of mankind – which implies a playful criticism of the 'fancies' of philosophers.[33]

The image of the ship and sailing is used as a sustained metaphor for fantasizing in the dialogue. Adeimantus' role in helping Lycinus across the gangway onto the ship, described in *Nav.* 1, is analogous to his figurative role in initiating the fantasizing. The figurative significance of the ship is further hinted at by the speakers' use of the ship and sailing as knowing metaphors for flights of fancy like one in which Adeimantus indulges. Adeimantus himself refers in a wry and self-effacing manner to how he had been sailing away on the ship of his dreams:

> ἔτι δέ μοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν ναῦν εὐθετίζοντι καὶ ἐς λιμένα πόρρωθεν ἀποβλέποντι ἐπιστάς, ὦ Λυκῖνε, κατέδυσας τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ ἀνέτρεψας εὖ φερόμενον τὸ σκάφος οὐρίῳ τῆς εὐχῆς πνεύματι.[34]

> And while I was still setting things right on board and looking out at the harbour from a distance, with your interruption, Lycinus, you sank my wealth and overturned the boat which was being carried along nicely by the favourable wind of my wish.

Lycinus, entering the game, casts himself tongue-in-cheek in the role of pirate and shipwrecker, and seeks to comfort Adeimantus for the shipwreck of his dreams by multiplying the number in his imagined fleet, demonstrating that in fantasy, anything is possible.[35] Bridling at this ridicule, Adeimantus threatens to sail away by himself again - but Lycinus instead offers himself and the other two companions as fellow-sailors to share his voyage, whereupon Adeimantus, still churlish, threatens to run ahead and pull up the gangway, to prevent them joining him. His figurative action here is the inverse of his initial action in helping Lycinus across the actual gangway of the *Isis*; the play here on metaphor and reality calls into question the literal reality of the *Isis*, an important point which eluded the supporters of the ancient super-tanker hypothesis.

Timolaus also exploits the image wittily to record the mirth which Lycinus' wry remarks provoke in Adeimantus, thereby interrupting the progress of his daydream:

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[33] It is significant, in this connection, that Lucian presents Plato's ideal state as something of a figment of his imagination, his own private fantasy-world, in the *VH* 2.17; cf. Chapter 3, p. 165, with n. 193.

[34] *Nav.* 13.

[35] *Nav.* 14. Exaggeration like this is just one of the weapons in Lycinus' arsenal for debunking his companions' fantasies; cf. *Nav.* 15, where Lycinus asks Adeimantus to sail to Egypt and bring back a pyramid, if the ship can carry it. Lycinus also highlights the absurdity of the fantasy by using metalepsis.

ὁρᾶς, ὡς ἐρυθριᾶν Ἀδείμαντον ἐποίησας πολλῷ τῷ γέλωτι ἐπικλύσας τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς ὑπέραντλον εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ἀντέχειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπιρρέον; 36

Do you see how you have made Adeimantus blush, overwhelming his ship in a wave of laughter, with the result that it is now waterlogged and can no longer hold out against the incoming flood?

Samippus, seeing Adeimantus' enthusiasm to participate in the game of fantasy, adapts the proverbial expression about 'having one foot in the grave', to remark that he has 'one foot in the ship already', and so on.37

In my view, therefore, we ought to view the *ekphrasis* of the ship as a *mise en abyme* representation of the dialogue itself. To review the arguments in support of this, the dialogue itself is named after the ship, the fantastic dimensions of which prefigure the fantastic wishes of the characters.38 The interconnection of the ship and the dialogue's theme is itself suggested in the *parataxis* between ship and wishes in the double title.39 The ship functions both as the bridge which leads from the preamble to the main body of the dialogue, and also as the catalyst for the characters' fantasizing.40 The speakers' self-conscious use of the ship as a metaphor for this fantasizing renders this connection explicit, in a playful and metaleptic reworking of the *topos* of the ship as a metaphor for reading.41 Lurking here, perhaps, is a knowing acknowledgement of the vessel's ontological status from the point of view of the extra-dialogic reader, for whom the *Isis* can only be 'textual'; the task of the *ekphrasis*, in making the ship 'visible' to the reader, anticipates the speakers' playful reification of their wishes in the dialogue.42 By incorporating an *ekphrasis* in this self-conscious and writerly way, Lucian constructs an implicit dialectic between the author and reader concerning the

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[36] *Nav.* 16.

[37] *Nav.* 17. In Genette's terms (1982: 43), this constitutes a parodic deformation of the proverb 'one foot in the grave.' The proverb in its usual form is found in *Herm.* 78: τὸν ἕτερον πόδα ἐν τῇ σορῷ ἔχων. (For points in common between the *Nav.* and *Herm.*: see Husson 1970: 2. 29, where she cites Schwartz *Biographie*: 90-91.) The proverb appears again in slightly adapted form in *Apol.* 1. For Lucian's use of proverbial expressions, see Bompaire 1958: 399 and 409.

[38] According to Houston (1987: 448): the ship is 'parallel to, a sort of analogue of, the men's wishes: extravagant but untrustworthy.' Houston believes that the significance of the ship is its *unpredictability*, reflecting or foreshadowing the fickleness and fragility of human wishes: 'Surely it is the unpredictability of the ship, the fact that all our hopes, if we own such a ship, may be dashed, which is the paramount idea here.' (1987: 449).

[39] See also Houston 1987: 449.

[40] See also Houston 1987: 448. At *Nav.* 12-13, Adeimantus explains that the sight of the huge ship caused him to start dreaming.

[41] Cf. p. 167 ff., esp. n. 213 and n. 217.

[42] In many ways, the role of the description of the ship is comparable to that of the *ekphrasis* of the Scythian murals in the opening section of the *Tox.*; cf. p. 78 ff.. Anderson (1976a: 156) notes that both dialogues contain an element of formal *ekphrasis*.

nature of his text, which is reflected by the sophisticated games between the speakers, which problematize the ontology of the ship.

The character Lycinus is extremely important in this connection, because he alone acts as a bridge between the extra-dialogic world of author, reader or audience, and the world of the characters within the dialogue. Houston contends that Lycinus is the only character in the dialogue with a firm grip on reality;[43] while this is true to a certain extent, especially in contrast to his fantasizing interlocutors, the literary texture of this 'reality' and of Lycinus' comments destabilizes this putative 'reality' too, in a game of knowingness, which implies an authorial presence in the character of Lycinus, and implicates the reader too.

It is worthwhile dwelling a little on the character of Lycinus in the *Navigium*.[44] In his essay on how Lucian treats the issue of cultural identity in Empire society, Goldhill argues that it is not sufficient to say that Lucian is *a.k.a.* Lycinus, without asking *why*. For Goldhill, Lucian's adoption of this apparent pseudonym is part of his 'fascinating repertoire of strategies of self-presentation - a self-presentation which sets at stake what you might imagine it means *to be Greek*.'[45] By adopting an array of different 'masks' in his dialogues (e.g. Tychiades, Parrhesiades, the Syrian orator), Lucian's writing, therefore, 'engages with...the projection of a cultural identity.'[46] While I agree with the broad point being made here, however, we should not presume that the significance of the Lycinus-*persona* is unitary across the number of works in which the name occurs. Surely different contexts imbue the name with different significance from dialogue to dialogue. Goldhill does not discuss the 'why' of the Lycinus in the *Navigium* - as opposed to, say, the Lycinus of the *Imagines* diptych - but it would be misrepresentative, I think, to read cultural politics into a work, like the *Navigium*, which does not prioritize such issues. The answer, in this case, seems to lie elsewhere.

In an article on Lucian's 'masks', Dubel examines the three *personae*, which, she maintains, are designed to lead us back to Lucian the author, and are therefore examples of ancient autofiction, i.e. 'Lycinus', the 'Syrian orator', and 'Parrhesiades'.[47] Of the three, she identifies Lycinus as the most transparent

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[43] Houston 1987: 447.
[44] For Lucian's *personae* in general, see Dubel 1994 and Goldhill 2002 especially, which have enriched my comments here. For 'Lycinus' in Lucian's *Symp.*, see Branham 1989: 105-108.
[45] Goldhill 2002: 66 f..
[46] Goldhill 2002: 67. On Lucian's playful treatment of the question of cultural identity, see also Whitmarsh 2001: chapter 2, esp. 122-130.
[47] Dubel (1994: 20 with n. 6) is careful to distinguish between *authorial personae* (e.g. Lycinus) and *satirical personae* (e.g. Tychiades in *Philops.*).

pseudonym of Lucian himself; not only is it almost a homonym of the author's Roman name (Lucianus), but the identity with Lucian is confirmed in *Pro Imaginibus*, where Lycinus is identified as the author of the book *Imagines*.[48] Beyond the obviously intended identity of the *Lycini* in both works in this diptych, however, Dubel points out that '...la récurrence du nom ne signifie pas nécessairement qu'il y a récurrence du personnage.'[49]

Dubel notes that 'Lycinus' is a *persona* found in eight dialogues in all, a density of distribution unparalleled in Lucian. 'Lycinus' tends to appear in the Platonic genre of discussion, which is the 'realistic' setting of the dialogue/ symposium (e.g. *Symp.*, *Lex.*, *Herm.*, and *Eun.*), as well as in the so-called 'dialogues of Antioch' (*Salt.*, *Im.*, *Pr.Im.*), and also in the *Amores* (of doubtful authorship).[50] Lycinus is Lucian's Athenian double (he is generally implicitly Athenian),[51] but otherwise the diversity of *personae* represented by this single name renders this 'most transparent' double of Lucian, paradoxically, the most difficult one to pin down. 'Cette absence d'unité fait de Lykinos le double le plus difficile à cerner.'[52]

Dubel argues that by giving a character a name similar to his own, Lucian invests him with extra *auctoritas*, marking him out as the dominant character. This is especially clear, and important, in Lucian's 'satirical' dialogues, where Lycinus is meant to represent the point of view of the man of reason.[53] Lucian, therefore, uses 'Lycinus' to construct an Athenian identity for himself, but paradoxically, at the same time as the identity is struck, the dissonance between the names Lycinus/ Lucian (the imperfection of the homonymy), as well as the multiplicity of *personae* signified by this one name throughout Lucian's work, serves to distance the *persona* from the author, to highlight the *fictive* nature of

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[48] Dubel 1994: 19f.. For a thoughtful re-assessment of the tone of the *Imagines* and *Pro Imaginibus*, and the alignment between author and *persona* in them, see now Sidwell 2002.

[49] Dubel 1994: 24-5.

[50] Dubel 1994: 19, n.3; she interprets the presence of the name in the *Amores* as evidence that the name was recognised in antiquity as a mark of Lucian.

[51] Dubel 1994: 24 with n. 27, where she cites *Nav.*11 (Lycinus' joke about the fact that he and the others have been 'initiated') as evidence for his Athenianness. This is the only place in the *Nav.* where it might be said that Lycinus refers explicitly to a cultural identity; however, one should beware of over-interpreting what is, after all, a jocular statement, and anyway, non-Athenians could be initiated too (e.g. Neaira). It may be possible to detect a playful Platonic resonance here instead. Diotima uses the language of initiation in her lessons about Love to Socrates (Plato *Symp.* 210a; cf. *Phdr.* 249c ff.); in the Platonic atmosphere of the opening of the *Nav.*, Lycinus employs similar language to try to induce his philosopher friend to tell him the secret - of his own private love affair!

[52] Dubel 1994: 25.

[53] Dubel 1994: 25. Branham, however, notes that Lucian tends not to let an 'authorised' character dominate the conversation in his dialogues, a practice wherein he differs markedly from Plato (Branham 1989: 103-4).

the character. 'Lucien est ainsi un auteur qui se dérobe en se démultipliant...'[54] Dubel, therefore, as well as Whitmarsh and Goldhill, reads a problematization of authorial and cultural identity into Lucian's name-game.

None of them, however, has focused attention on the 'Lycinus' of the *Nav.*, probably for the very sound reason that a reading of cultural identity issues is not obviously warranted in this dialogue. Instead of engaging in the politics of cultural identity, I would argue that the Lycinus- *persona* of the *Nav.* engages the author's identity with the game of fact and fiction - make-believe - instead, a connection which will become more significant in the *Philops.*, and attain its acme of cleverness in the *VH*.[55] The sceptical Lycinus (Λυκῖνος), the master of metalepsis in the *Nav.*, is himself a quasi-metaleptic character, as his name is so close to the author's - only two vowels in the difference, as Goldhill points out[56] - as to suggest

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[54] Dubel 1994: 26, with the argument that the multiplicity of names Lucian uses to inscribe himself into his works represents a play on anonymity. Whitmarsh (2001: 253) follows Dubel in pointing out that this non-synonymity between the author and his satiric *personae* is a conscious distancing technique. Goldhill (2002: 66) interprets Lucian's name-games as 'part of his staking out a position on what it might mean to be a somebody in Empire culture.'

[55] *VH* 2.28 (cf. p. 167 ff., and n. 296), where Lucian himself is inscribed indirectly into the text (in a commemorative epigram composed for him by Homer and erected on a *stele* on the Isle of the Blessed); the extreme dubiousness of this is summed up by Goldhill: 'That Lucian immortalizes his name...in a third-rate epigram by a fictionalized and untrustworthy poet on a monument in an unseeable afterlife, recorded in a work which boasts of its own falsehood, neatly summarizes Lucian's oblique and funny stance towards proclaiming and preserving the glory of his own name. M. AGRIPPA L.P.COS. TERTIUM FECIT this isn't.' (2002: 65). For Lucian's authorial presence in the *Philops.*, see Chapter 1, esp. p. 28 ff.; and in the *Tox.*, see Chapter 2, p. 76 ff. and p. 93 f..

[56] Goldhill 2002: 66. Bowie (1970) reads the name 'Lycinus' as a Hellenization of 'Lucian'. In Genette's terms, the name 'Lycinus' qualifies as a *parodic allusion* to the author's name; the pun (or *parodic deformation*) is a specialised case of this; see Genette 1982: 45-6. Is it possible that, in

the meta-presence in the dialogue of Lucian (Λουκιάνος) himself. As a consequence of this, every time Lycinus points out the fact that his companions' imagined scenarios are merely make-believe, by extension, Lucian points out the make-believe of his own text. Lucian inscribes his authorial presence in the *Nav.*, as well as in the other three works I have examined in this thesis, in a way that ironizes the text, and induces us to think about the artifice of his fiction.

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choosing a name for his *persona* that conflates both Greek and Latin versions of his own authorial name, but is also different from that name, Lucian encapsulates his cultural allegiance to the Greek-speaking world of the Roman empire, while reminding us of his 'difference', as a Syrian? However, the name 'Lycinus' is attested in the epigraphy of the Classical era, as well as in the Classical Greek orators, and once in Aristophanes *Ach.* 47-50 - significantly, in a fantastical genealogy, where the name may carry a humorous reference to the *Lyceum* (see Dubel 1994: 24, with notes).

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