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University of Dublin

Trinity College

Irish School of Ecumenics

Beyond the Walls

A dialogue with Abraham Joshua Heschel and Edith Stein
on the Interreligious Significance of Empathy for Jewish-Christian
Understanding

by

Joseph Redfield Palmisano

This dissertation has been submitted for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy

University of Dublin

February 2010

Director: Prof. John D'Arcy May

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SUMMARY

The following thesis of approximately 94,000 words explores the interreligious significance of empathy for Jewish-Christian understanding. We examine how Edith Stein (1891-1942) responds to the call of empathy through a prophetic witnessing in theory and praxis in the midst of the *Shoah*, and incarnates a dialectical belonging between sameness and otherness. We employ a phenomenological methodology of 'reading' Stein's narrative through Abraham Joshua Heschel's doctrine of divine pathos/prophetic sympathy. We explore how Stein, while incarnating a prophetic pathos, critically extends pathos/sympathy towards an *em-pathos* with the religious other. We argue that empathy may be a more nuanced, interreligiously attuned category for Jewish-Christian understanding and interreligious dialogue; a way of *re-membering* oneself with the religious other that buttresses an interreligious unity-in-diversity as argued for in Vatican II's *Nostra Aetate*.

Chapter 1: we bring D. Tracy into dialogue with Heschel on what is constitutive of a 'prophetic' interreligious witnessing. Considering Heschel through Tracy's hermeneutic on a 'prophetico-mystical' approach provides us with an interreligious lens for considering Heschel's *The Prophets*, and Stein's later theory and praxis of empathy.

Chapter 2: with an interreligious perspective in place, we move to discuss Heschel's own argument on subjectivity vis-à-vis a wider conversation on subjectivity with E. Levinas and J-L. Marion, thereby critically *situating* Heschel's thesis: the prophetic witness is the object of God's concern, while the object -- God -- is, more accurately, the Subject.

Chapter 3: the prophetic witness responds to the call of pathos from the divine Subject with *prophetic sympathy*. We examine this response with a critical question in mind: if God is the Subject, then may the prophetic witness *also* be qualified as a

subject beyond any *object-ification* as an unqualified extension (*vasum Dei*) of the divine? Stein *et al's* articulation of the prophet as a unique, independent center of action pushes Heschel to consider how the prophet enters an authentic -- as he argues *trans-subjective* --situation with the divine, beyond the 'non-mutual' categories of prophet as an 'extension' of the divine.

Chapter 4: our methodology focuses on 'unpacking' Stein's concept of empathy as arising 'con-primordially': 'I' become one *with* the other by turning to the content of the event of the other *as if* I were the subject. Stein's thesis of empathy secures the mutuality of an authentic trans-subjectivity that critically extends Heschel's argument.

Chapter 5: we 'walk' with Stein through her life's narrative of conversion and entrance into Carmel. We examine how a desire for religious transcendence progressively deepens in and through her conversion, manifesting itself in a *wider* concern-for-others through her writings and advocacy during her years in Carmel.

Chapter 6: we argue that Stein's *way* of witnessing to the cross, through her own phenomenological considerations in *The Science of the Cross*, and her own praxis of going to Auschwitz enacts an interreligious solidarity with suffering others that is consistent with her *hermeneutics from empathy*.

Chapter 7: we reflect on how Stein bridges sameness with otherness -conveying an *em-pathos* in word and deed that is less narrow and more interreligious
in kind, precisely because her 'way' of martyrdom is as a *re-memberer* with the
religious other(s)-who-is-same.

Chapters 8 – 9: we consider how the concept of *teshuva* challenges the Catholic Church towards a more profound *hermeneutics from empathy*. We then apply this double hermeneutic of *teshuva*-empathy in order to critically examine how the church, in its documentary history since *Nostra Aetate*, has been re-membering itself with Judaism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

With deep gratitude

to

Prof. John D'Arcy May and Mrs. Margret May

Professor Linda Hogan, Head of School, Faculty, Staff and Student community of The Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin

Dr. Nadine Linendoll, Dr. Kevin Yao, Dr. Jay Zhu and the staff of Tufts University Medical Center

Joseph, Dolores and John Paul Palmisano Theresa and Vincent Rosarbo

Do bhaill Chumann Íosa in Éirinn agus in New England

Is iad mo bhráithre agus mo chairde sa Tiarna iad a dtiomnaím an saothar seo dóibh mar ní bheadh sé ann ina n-éagmais

festina lente

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ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Abraham Joshua Heschel

MNA Man is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion

GSM God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism

Prophets The Prophets

WM Who is Man?

Essays The Insecurity of Freedom: Essays on Human Existence

MgSa Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity

BGM Between God and Man: An Interpretation of Judaism

MQG Man's Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism

Poems The Ineffable Name of God: Man, Poems

PT A Passion for Truth

IEE Israel: An Echo of Eternity

TMH Heavenly Torah: as Refracted Through the Generations

(*Torah min ha-shamayim be-aspaklaria shel ha-dorot*)

Works by Emmanuel Levinas

OB Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence

DF Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism

NT Nine Talmudic Readings

EN Entre Nous: On-Thinking-of-the-Other

AT Alterity and Transcendence

TI Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority

OE On Escape

Works by Jean-Luc Marion

GB God without Being

RG Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and

Phenomenology

ID The Idol and Distance: Five Studies

BG Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness

PC Prolegomena to Charity

Works by Edith Stein

Life Life in a Jewish Family

EW Essays on Woman

OPE On the Problem of Empathy

HL The Hidden Life: Hagiographic Essays, Meditations, Spiritual Texts

Letters Self-Portrait in Letters

KF Knowledge and Faith

PPH Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities

FE Finite and Eternal Being

SC The Science of the Cross

PA Potency and Act

Other Works

Broken "Broken Continuities: 'Night' and 'White Crucifixion'"

DwO Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue

Eclipse "The Eclipse of Difference: Merton's Encounter with Judaism"

FCF Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of

Christianity

HGU Humani Generis Unitas

PB Person and Being

Symbol Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian

Existence

INTRODUCTION

A Composition of Place

On the 12 May 2009, Pope Benedict XVI prayed at one of Judaism's holiest sites, the Western or 'Wailing' Wall of the Temple in Jerusalem. Following the Jewish tradition, the Holy Father placed a handwritten prayer in a crevice of the wall that read:

God of all the ages, on my visit to Jerusalem, the "City of Peace", spiritual home to Jews, Christians and Muslims alike, I bring before you the joys, the hopes and the aspirations, the trials, the suffering and the pain of all your people throughout the world. God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, hear the cry of the afflicted, the fearful, the bereft; send your peace upon this Holy Land, upon the Middle East, upon the entire human family; stir the hearts of all who call upon your name, to walk humbly in the path of justice and compassion. "The Lord is good to those who wait for him, to the soul that seeks him" (Lam 3:25)!

Compose the place in your imagination: Benedict's white-soutaned right arm reaching a hand forward; reaching with a hand displaying, on the third finger, the Ring of the Fisherman, a ring bearing the image of the apostle, the Jewish man, Peter, fishing from a boat; a hand reaching out, from the barque of Peter, reaching out with a crisply folded piece of paper containing a memory, a prayer, a hope: 'stir the hearts of all who call upon your name, to walk humbly in the path of justice and compassion'. The Wall, as Abraham Joshua Heschel remembers, whose "very being is compassion", shares the following:

The Wall...At first I am stunned. Then I see: a Wall of frozen tears, a cloud of sighs. Palimpsests, hiding books, secret names. The stones are seals. The Wall...The old mother crying for all of us. Stubborn, loving, waiting for redemption. The ground on which I stand is Amen. My words become echoes. All of our history is waiting here. No comeliness to be acclaimed, no beauty to be relished. But a heart and an ear. Its very being is compassion. You stand still and hear: stones of sorrow, acquaintance with grief. We all hide our faces from agony, shun the afflicted. The Wall is compassion, its face is open only to those smitten with grief...These stones have a heart, a heart for all men. The Wall has a soul that radiates a presence...What is the Wall? The unceasing marvel. Expectation. The Wall will not perish. The redeemer will come.¹

Benedict reaches, touches the wall; a prayer reaching out, reminding God and humanity: 'The Lord is good to those who wait for him, to the soul that seeks him (Lam 3:25)!' Even in the midst of trials, "[i]t is good to wait in hope for [God's] mercy to show itself' for every believer "achieves hope by recalling the mercy of God."²

The prayer; a *re-membering* of the Christian with the Jew; a memory enacting a "flowing presence" towards the other. The wall is 'a soul that radiates a presence': we are already with the eternal.⁴ Touching the wall is touching a presence.

1

¹ Abraham Joshua Heschel, *Israel: An Echo of Eternity,* (intro.) Susannah Heschel, (illustr.) Abraham Rattner (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2005), 19-20, hereafter *IEE*.

² Delbert R. Hillers, Lamentations: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible Commentary, vol. 7a (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 109-131; 129, 123. Also see 120-122: "In content chapter 3 [of Lamentations] differs from the [other chapters] in that there is very little specific reference to the fall of Jerusalem or the sufferings that followed. The poem begins, 'I am the man who has seen hardship,' and it continues for a long time to seek how this man has suffered. Thus one of the major questions that arises is: How is this chapter connected with the rest of the book? Another is: Who is this man?...The view adopted here is that the sufferer of chapter 3 is indeed an individual, not a collective figure like the Zion of chapters 1 and 2. This individual is, however, not a specific historical figure, but rather anyone who has suffered greatly. He is an 'Everyman,' a figure who represents what any man may feel when it seems that God is against him. Through this representative sufferer the poet points the way to the nation, as he shows the man who has been through trouble moving into, then out of, near despair to patient faith and penitence, thus becoming a model for the nation."

³ Eric Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, (trans./ed.) Gerhart Niemeyer (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, 1990), 133: "neither does eternal being become an object in time nor is temporal being transposed into eternity. We remain 'in between,' in a temporal flow of experience in which eternity is present. This flow cannot be dissected into past, present, and future of the world's time, for at every point of the flow there is the tension toward the transcending, eternal being. This characteristic of the presence of eternal being in temporal flow may be best represented by the term *flowing presence*."

⁴ Stein, *Potency and Act*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 11, (eds.) L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, (trans.) Walter Redmond (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2009), 202, hereafter *PA*: "we should not understand being placed into eternity as if it began absolutely at the end of earthly life...it is clear that the core [of the person] has already been in eternity throughout the entire duration of its earthly life. Time is in eternity and never ceases therein."

A touch breaking open 'the seals', a wall becoming a doorway; an 'expectation', a response to the lamentation of division; a reaching beyond the walls of the isolated self; a border becoming porous through memory; filtering through as an effusive concern for one another; i.e., an *Einfühlung: the hearts of all who call upon your name desire to walk humbly in the path of justice and compassion.'* With Benedict reaffirming Vatican II's desire for empathy with the other through solidarity in all things: 'I bring before you the joys, the hopes and the aspirations, the trials, the suffering and the pain of all your people throughout the world'. A straining together, as Christians and Jews, towards a wider eschatological hope: 'The Wall will not perish. The redeemer will come'.

Context and Concern

Phillip Cunningham, in a recent reflection on the development of *Nostra Aetate*, and in light of the fortieth anniversary of this landmark text, shares the following:

[u]ltimately the council embraces an eschatological ("the church awaits the day, known to God alone[§4]") rather than a missionary understanding of the church's relationship with the Jewish people. *Nostra aetate* was "an expression of the long-term 'eschatological' hope of the church for the eventual unity of all mankind," reported the New York Times [forty-one years ago].⁵

What is the significance of this 'eschatological turn' in the document? It occasioned Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel to comment the following: "this is the first statement of the church in history -- the first Christian discourse dealing with Judaism -- which is devoid of any expression of hope for conversion." But is there not a deeper theological significance because of this very 'eschatological turn' within the document? This development occasions, some forty years on, a further point of contact for the Jewish Catholic dialogue.

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⁵ Phillip Cunningham, "Uncharted Waters: The Future of Catholic-Jewish Relations," *Commonweal*, 83/13 (14 July 2006): obtained from http://www.commonwealmagazine.org on 19 July 2006. ⁶ *Ibid*.

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Assertions (TI, IV 326-346), "the knowledge of future eschata is derived from our knowledge of the present events of the history of salvation;" and "our knowledge of the future is the knowledge of the futurity of the present." So when we eschatologically strain towards God qua 'Absolute Future' "we 'project' from the present forward into the future..., as opposed to 'apocalyptic,' in which we 'inject' the future back into the present." And if what Rahner says is true -- "eschatology is anthropology conjugated in the future tense" -- then arguably memory is the necessary prefix or ground for eschatology's inflection into this future. Christian memory, as Nostra aetate affirms, eschews (in the strict Rahnerian sense) being 'apocalyptic' in so far as it attempts to "inject" back into itself a future that is 'forgetful' of its own past. Such a self-imposed amnesia subtly reintroduces the possibility for future proselytism of Jews by Catholics. Indeed, the context of Jewish remembering (zkr) creates the condition for the possibility of Christian mnemoneuein, for mnemoneuein is rooted and grounded in zkr.

The liturgico-ethical/political reflections of Bruce Morrill, which follow the comprehensive survey of Nils Dahl, tell us the frequent use of *mnemoneuein* in the New Testament is due to the pervasive influence of the Jewish remembering matrix, most notably expressed through the verb "zakar, 'to remember." Z[a]k[a]r connotes "the calling forth 'in the soul' of a thing or event such that what is remembered effects the subject's disposition, decision, and action." The Jews called

⁷ Peter C. Phan, "Eschatology" in *The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner*, eds. Declan Marmion, Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 174-192; 178.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 189.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 178. Also see: Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith*: *An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity* (New York: Crossroad, 1978), 432 - 433, hereafter *FCF*.

Nils Alstrup Dahl, Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church, (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976) 12 - 14;
 13 in Bruce T. Morrill, Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory: Political and Liturgical Theology in Dialogue (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2000), 149.
 11 Ibid.

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 Ibid.

for God in praise and worship by remembering *God as the One who remembers*: God remembers the covenant, and when we remember God's memory for us 'we' have solidarity with the One who chooses 'us,' for God does not forget 'us' (e.g., Psalm 105:8). The God of Israel is never divorced from the present situation of God's people, and a consoling, empathic remembering of how God is "intervening on their behalf" is of "fundamental importance to [Jewish] religious practice." ¹²

Metz tells us, "I would describe the Jewish spirit as the power of memory...Jewish memory resists forgetfulness of the forgotten. In the final analysis, for it, wisdom is a form of sensing absence." Memory lives and grows in its straining, and even becomes a 'subversive' agent in building the Kingdom of God because our 'memoria passionis' is able to speak the truth to unjust structures of sin. Metz's reminder comes with the following challenge:

Yet it is true also for the faith of Christians that it not only has a remembrance, but is a remembrance: the memory of suffering, the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. We Christians have certainly preserved this remembrance-structure of our faith in our cult ("Do this in remembrance of me."). But have we cultivated it enough in the public sphere? Have we formed it and defended it in the intellectual and cultural spheres? Or have we not in those places continued to be latter-day Platonists?...The spirit of remembering that is at work in the biblical stories of hope cannot simply be sublated [aufgehoben] into the Greek spirit. But who then has saved and preserved this spirit of remembering -- for Christianity...?¹⁴

These are challenging questions from Metz: have we cultivated remembrance in the public sphere? Have we formed and defended a 'remembering-structure' in the intellectual and cultural spheres in such a way whereby tiqqun olam -- the healing of the world -- is a mandate that we come to view as being given interreligiously, within us and the other, being given to Christianity by its Jewish inheritance?¹⁵ Indeed, in

¹² Morrill, Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory, 150.

Johann Baptist Metz, A Passion for God: The Mystical-Political Dimension of Christianity, (trans.) J.
 Matthew Ashley (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 1998), 121-132; 130-131.
 Ibid., 131.

¹⁵ Heschel, *The Prophets* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 389-390, hereafter *Prophets*: "Marcion wanted a Christianity free from every vestige of Judaism. He saw his task in showing the complete

an age of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, when "God did not depart of His own volition; He was expelled. *God is in exile,*" the question of humanity's effacement as a contemporary form of idolatry takes on a renewed importance.¹⁶

In the midst of this exile, we are faced with the question: "[h]as the memory of Auschwitz transformed us in our existence as Christians? Are we in fact a church after Auschwitz?" The memory of suffering, suffering *caused to*, and *suffered by*, others may be all too overwhelming for us to hear. So overwhelming that we may be tempted to *regulate* our remembering and, like 'latter day Platonists', allow our memories to become nothing more than shadows on the wall; something that is formless and distant; in the past. Jacques Dupuis argues,

...[P]urification of memories is not easily achieved. Peoples and religious groups cannot be asked simply to forget what they have suffered at the hands of the other religious traditions, including Christianity, if not by way of the extermination of populations, often at least by the destruction of their cultural and religious patrimony. To forget would amount to betrayal. The personal identity of a human group is built on the foundation of a historical past which cannot in any way be cancelled, even if we should desire to cancel it. But memory can be healed and purified by a common determination to initiate new and constructive mutual relations, built on dialogue, collaboration, and a true encounter.¹⁷

A contemporary, interreligiously attuned Christian remembering is radicalized through the *Shoah;* it is "not only a question of recalling the past" but flows into a concern for living from an eschatological sensitivity that is truly interested in mutual

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opposition between the Hebrew Bible and the Gospels. Repudiating the Hebrew Bible *in toto*, he put in its place a new scripture, the nucleus of which was the letters of Paul...The spirit of Marcion, hovering invisibly over many waters, has often been brought to clear expression. In his work on Marcion, Adolf Harnack, a leading authority on Christian history and dogma, maintains that what Marcion demanded was basically right: the Old Testament must be eliminated from the Church. The trouble with the churches is that they are too timorous to admit the truth. 'The rejection of the Old Testament in the second century was a mistake which the Great Church rightly refused to make; the retention of it in the sixteenth century was a fatal legacy which the Reformation could not yet avoid; but for Protestantism since the nineteenth century to treasure it as a canonical document is the result of paralysis which affects religion and the Church. To make a clean sweep and to pay homage to truth in confession and in instruction is the heroic action demanded of Protestantism today -- and it is almost too late [A. Harnack, *Marcion* (2nd ed. Leipzig, 1924), pp. 127, 222].'"

¹⁶ Heschel, *Man is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1951), 153, hereafter *MNA*.

¹⁷ Jacques Dupuis, "Christianity and Religions: From Confrontation to Encounter," *The Tablet, Open Day Lecture 2001* (20, 27 October and 3 November 2001): < http://www.thetablet.co.uk> accessed 26 October 2006.

relations, dialogue, and collaborative encounter. It is a way of living together into the future i.e., "[t]he common future of Jews and Christians demands that we remember, for 'there is no future without memory'. History itself is memoria futuri."18 Christianity's "encounter with Israel," should therefore be an encounter that heightens Christianity's awareness of "the suffering caused by centuries of Christian anti-Jewish hostility [which] forces the community of Jesus' followers to rethink itself at the very root, or better still to rethink the root itself that bears it, according to Paul's expression (Rom. 11:28)." This "reciprocal attention" of Christians with Jews "to the pain that was inflicted and endured during the Shoah, and to the anxiety induced by the gradual realization of the immediate and remote causes of that tragedy, are required to ensure that our attention is authentic and our dialogue sincere."²⁰

The question may therefore be, as Metz suggests, the following: when we hear the cry of the Shema Israel, do we as Christians appreciate how "for the first time and in a unique way in the religious history of humanity, the name God was laid upon human beings[?]" And do we appreciate this call as one issuing from "a pathic monotheism, with a painfully open eschatological flank," rather than from "a monotheism of power politics"?²¹ A calling from an *other* who has something unique and irreducible to give? Rabbi Ricardo Di Segni is helpful to Christianity in reminding us of this important point:

¹⁸ Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, We Remember: a Reflection on the Shoah (Rome:March 16, 1998) §1: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ documents/rc pc chrstuni doc 16031998 shoah en.html>accessed on 9 February 2008.

¹⁹ Massimo Giuliani, "The Shoah as a Shadow Upon and a Stimulus to Jewish-Christian Dialogue," The Catholic Church and the Jewish People: Recent Reflections From Rome, (eds.) Philip A. Cunningham, Norbert J. Hofmann, Joseph Sievers (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 54-70; 54.

²⁰ Ibid., 55.

²¹ Metz, A Passion for God, 127.

For the Christian, the encounter with Judaism entails a rediscovery of the roots of his faith; for the Jew the encounter with Christianity confronts him with something entirely different, grown out of what are effectively his own religious roots. Theologically the Christian cannot do without Israel; the Jew, in his faith, must do without Christ if he does not want to deny his own faith.²²

But if Jew is able to do 'without Christ' then does it necessarily follow that the Jew is able to do without a Christian? Is the world able to do without a renewed Jewish-Christian friendship? Heschel persuasively argues,

The religions of the world are no more self-sufficient, no more independent, no more isolated than individuals or nations. Energies, experiences, and ideas that come to life outside the boundaries of a particular religion or all religions continue to challenge and to affect every religion. Horizons are wider...*No religion is an island.* We are all involved with one another.²³

So is there not a need for the development of a "religious memory", or a way of remembering "that could strengthen the link of affection and esteem uniting the diverse world of Christianity and the equally diverse world of Judaism?" It is arguable that, some forty years on, Vatican II's document *Nostra Aetate* set the conditions for the possibility of a deepening link with Judaism through the deepening of a shared memory of a God who is 'pathic' towards otherness.

If there *is no future without memory* then Christianity's 'adjustment' of theological perspective may mean (re)considering *how* we remember. This will entail a deepening Christian acknowledgment that we indeed share with Judaism a common memory, and this primordial Jewish remembering-structure i.e., a-way-of-remembering-a-God-who-compassionately-remembers, both *contours and tones* our

²⁴ Giuliani, "The Shoah as a Shadow," 68.

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²² Riccardo Di Segni [Chief Rabbi of the Jewish Community in Rome], "Steps Taken and Questions Remaining in Jewish-Christian Relations Today," from lectures given in the series *The Catholic Church and the Jewish People from Vatican II to Today* delivered at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome between 19 October 2004 and 25 January 2005 under the auspices of the Cardinal Bea Centre for Judaic Studies (19 October 2004, 5 Heshwan 5765): http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/

conferences/Bea _Centre _C-J_Relations_04-05/DiSegni.htm>, accessed on 5 December 2007.

²³ Heschel, "No Religion is an Island" [originally given as inaugural lecture as Harry Emerson Fosdick Visiting Professor at Union Theological Seminary, New York, and appearing in *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, 21/1, part 1 (January 1966): 117-134] in (ed.) Susannah Heschel, *Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), 235-56; 237, hereafter *MgSa*.

Christian way of remembering. Indeed, Christianity is challenged to remember in a way that is pathic with the *tremendum* memories of the last century. The twenty-first century, against the horizon of much dialogue and jubilee requests for forgiveness, may be a time for us, as Jews and Christians together, to make an even greater return (teshuva) to one another. We may leave our exile from one another through a remembering solidarity, where the path of empathy may be our way of taking "seriously both ecclesially and theologically" the "catastrophe" that is Auschwitz. 25 Heschel reminds us "[n]one of us can do it alone. Both of us [Christians and Jews] must realize that in our age anti-Semitism is anti-Christianity and that anti-Christianity is anti-Semitism."²⁶ Recent developments in dialogue have shown how "the growing awareness of the moral and religious meaning of the Shoah" is resituating "the tragic event from the supreme obstacle to dialogue into a, so to speak, privileged instrument to understand what had to be changed and what had to be emphasized and appreciated anew."²⁷ The *Shoah* may continue to open up the possibility for a more profound contact between Christians and Jews while concomitantly challenging Christianity into a self-understanding that is more eschatologically generous in embracing otherness; as James Bernauer argues, "Catholicism's desire for a new beginning with Judaism is also the desire for a new relationship with itself."²⁸ I would like to propose, by way of encouraging this movement towards a 'new beginning' with both Catholicism and Jewish otherness, that one way of strengthening the bonds of friendship is through a more detailed consideration of the thought of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907-1972) and Edith Stein (1893-1942). Heschel and Stein have a

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²⁵ Metz, A Passion for God, 121; italics added.

²⁶ Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 236.

²⁷ Giuliani, "The Shoah as a Shadow," 60.

²⁸ James Bernauer, "The Holocaust and the Catholic Church's Search for Forgiveness," given at Boston College (October 30, 2002): http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/metaelements/texts/cjrelations/resources/articles/bernauer.htm accessed on 3 October 2007.

contribution to make precisely on the question of how our relationship to one another may be more 'em-pathic'. Heschel, Jewish philosopher and scholar of Talmud, argues:

God does not reveal himself in an abstract absoluteness, but in a personal and intimate relation to the world...God does not stand outside the range of human suffering and sorrow. He is personally involved in, even stirred by, the conduct of faith and man...pathos denotes, not an idea of goodness, but a living care, not an immutable example but an outgoing challenge, a dynamic relation between God and man.²⁹

Correspondingly, the philosopher Edith Stein argues in her phenomenology on empathy the following:

[n]ow, in the act of love we have a comprehending or an intending of the value of a person. This is not a valuing for any other sake. We do not love a person because he does good...[r]ather, he himself is valuable and we love him 'for his own sake'.³⁰

Their perspectives dialectically complement one another's contributions in the key of prophetic witness. Our methodology is phenomenologico-narrative in approach, and is therefore necessarily contextual in so far as it takes seriously the post-Shoah context. Heschel's call for a prophetic return to living from God's pathos finds a prophetic response vis-à-vis Edith Stein's interreligiously attuned scholarship and witness of empathy against the horizon of the Shoah.

Heschel's 'ecumenically' expansive style, and positive reception of the other(ness), when communicated through the nomenclature of pathos -- 'not an idea of goodness, but a living care...an outgoing challenge, a dynamic relation between God and man' -- may serve as an interreligously attuned hermeneutical lens through which to view the empathic 'portrait of response' created by Edith Stein's theory and praxis of empathy. On 2 August 1942 Stein was forcibly remanded out of Carmel by the Nazis and murdered at Auschwitz for being a Jew seven days later on 9 August 1942. In this 'portrait', Stein incarnates her phenomenological and mystical theory in

²⁹ Heschel, *Prophets*, 3-4.

³⁰ Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 3 (trans.) Waltraut Stein (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications, 1989), 102, hereafter OPE.

the most soberly germane of ways, and stands as a prophetic 'sign for our times' for the interreligious dialogue. The movement out of Carmel -- the kenosis of Edith Stein -- is a movement from the familiar to the foreign that is familiar for she goes to Auschwitz with her Jewish people. One may draw the analogy from Stein's experience to the interreligious dialogue for "dialogues and conversations with people of other faith traditions usually begin with the familiar," and move towards "a progressive encounter with the unfamiliar...a movement -- literal as much as metaphorical -- over the threshold into a world where one's sense of identity is questioned."³¹ Hence, through the hermeneutic of Stein's phenomenological theory and praxis we the observers may enter the ebb and flow of the interreligiously attuned dialectic of giving and receiving that widens memory for us through a narrative of a life that shows itself interreligiously. Stein incarnates a way of loving in both her writings and her praxis that responds to the givenness of another. Norris Clarke argues, that any "particular action, if done consciously and responsibly, is inescapably my action". By these repeated actions "the whole person behind the act" will "gradually construct an abiding moral portrait" of oneself, "like an artist's selfportrait..."³² Stein's narrative portrait is one of *empathy*.

Composition (Methodology and Structure)

We begin our reflections by 'situating' Heschel's *The Prophets*, as a response-cumtheodicy to the discontinuity of the *Shoah*. We bring David Tracy into dialogue with Heschel on what is constitutive of a 'prophetic' interreligious witnessing (1.1). Considering Heschel *with and through* Tracy's hermeneutic on a 'prophetico-

³¹ Michael Barnes, *Theology and the Dialogue of Religions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 203.

W. Norris Clarke, *Person and Being* (Marquette University: Marquette University Press, 1993) 54-55, hereafter *PB*.

mystical' approach provides us with a dialectically sensitive and interreligiouslyattuned lens for considering both *The Prophets*, and Stein's later theory and praxis of empathy (1.2). Against this horizon, we examine how *The Prophets* 'treatment of Second Isaiah and Jeremiah reveals the motif of a God who remembers. This motif is progressively widened through a consideration of how literary antecedents and descendants to *The Prophets*, most notably in the poem *Help!* (1930ca) and Heschel's speech to the Quakers, Versuch einer Deutung/'A Search for a Meaning' (1938)³³, challenge the inter-religious prophetic witness towards an ethical re-membering of oneself with the other (1.2.2).

In chapter two we move deeper into Heschel's oeuvre through a phenomenological 'conversation' on subjectivity with Levinas and Marion. We explore how Marion's phenomenology on caritas and intergivenness, while buttressing the post-Shoah and Jewish perspective of Levinas, is also a nuanced critique of the Levinasian system by emphasizing the primacy of the givenness of a particular face beyond the possibility of 'substituting' one for 'the other' in the ethical moment (2.1-2.2). Their approaches on receptivity of, and givenness to, the other may serve as 'markers' for situating Heschel's own argument on subjectivity while concomitantly moving us towards a critical reflection on Heschel's main thesis: the prophetic witness becomes the object of God's concern, and the object -- God -- who is more than being-qua-being, becomes the Subject (2.3 - 2.4).³⁴

In chapter three we assemble a 'personalist' hermeneutic by way of Emmanuel Mounier's Personalism. Mounier's personalist hermeneutic gives us a lens for examining how pathos calls the *person* of the prophetic witness into relationship with

³³ Also known as "The Meaning of This Hour".

³⁴ See: Edward Kaplan, "Sacred versus Symbolic Religion: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Martin Buber," Modern Judaism 14/3 (October 1994): 213-231, 225: "the great cleaving point of modernity: Who is the ultimate subject, God or the individual person?"

the divine Subject (3.1). In turn, the prophet responds with *prophetic sympathy* (3.2). Through this call and response dialectic, we examine the nature and kind of the prophet's 'sympathetic' response with a critical question for Heschel in mind: if God is the Subject, then may the prophetic witness also be qualified as a subject beyond the reification of being an unqualified extension (vasum Dei) of the divine (3.3)? Stein's articulation of the prophet as a unique, independent center of action (3.4) pushes Heschel to consider how the prophet enters an authentic -- as he argues transsubjective -- situation with the divine, beyond the 'non-mutual' categories of prophet as nonself/vasum Dei. Further-more, this examination sets the stage for critically advancing Heschel towards a contemporary, interreligiously attuned vision of what it means to be a prophetic witness through the 'middle term' of empathy. A reference to Stein's On the Problem of Empathy in The Prophets -- vis-à-vis a footnote in Scheler -- on what distinguishes a prophetic sympathy, is a demonstrable association between Stein's and Heschel's projects -- yet, it is a link that needs confirmation and testing (3.5). It provides us with a necessary critical opening for considering the following question: how might a phenomenology of empathy creatively extend Heschel's thesis beyond a prophetic sympathy that is arguably 'forgetful' of the prophet's personhood? This marks a turning point in our study, for in the following chapters (4-7) we discuss precisely how empathy, through the theory and praxis of Edith Stein, may reveal a prophetic way of witnessing that, beyond any reduction to the same, is responsive to the contemporary needs of Jewish-Christian, and interreligious, understanding and dialogue. Her example proffers an ethics of return (teshuva) accomplished through a hermeneutics from empathy.

Having laid forth a 'call' hermeneutic by way of an appeal to Heschel's category of pathos, we narratively begin to explore in chapter four Stein's 'response'

from empathy by considering her autobiography *Life in a Jewish Family*. Stein's autobiography reveals how a theory of empathy was *already* manifesting itself as an ever widening *lived empathy* (4.1). We then move to a more systematic consideration of the concept of empathy by way of Stein's dissertation *On The Problem of Empathy*. Our methodology focuses on 'unpacking' Stein's concept of empathy as arising 'conprimordially': 'I' become one *with* the other by turning to the content of the event of the other *as if* I were the subject (4.2). A reprise with Heschel on *prayer as empathy* reveals how the concept is not external to his categories (4.3), and from this we may argue that Heschel's concept of 'trans-subjectivity' actually speaks to what Stein wishes to accomplish through the use of 'con-primordiality'. Stein's thesis of empathy secures the mutuality of an authentic trans-subjectivity: it is a dialogical concept (4.3.1); where empathy may mean a prolonged attentiveness and mindfulness that contributes to genuine inter-religious partnership and cooperation (4.3.2).

Against the horizon of her theory on empathy, we continue with a methodology of 'walking' with Stein through her life's narrative of conversion and entrance into Carmel in chapter five. We examine how a desire for religious transcendence progressively deepens in and through her conversion, manifesting itself in a *wider* concern-for-others (5.1): reflections on the contemporary role of women in the Church and society (5.2); and her letter to Pope Pius XI on behalf of the Jews (1933), as comparatively read through Heschel's *Versuch einer Deutung*, bears out this thesis (5.3.1). In light of the interreligious *inclusio* of 'call and response' formed by Heschel's *Versuch einer Deutung* and Stein's 1933 Letter, we consider how Stein's Thomistic metaphysical reflections, *Finite and Eternal Being*, in concert with Heschel's insights on *depth theology*, is a prophetic text-*qua*-hermeneutic for

examining the 'lights' and 'shadows' of the draft encyclical *Humani Generis Unitas*, further revealing how Stein's *oeuvre* evinces itself as fidelity to Judaism (5.4 - 5.6).

In chapter six we explore the question of how Stein enacts empathy in the midst of the *Shoah* by facing up to, rather than eclipsing, the memory at issue: Stein is one who accepts the sign of the cross in her life as *Sr. Teresa Benedict a Cruce*. We argue that Stein's *way* of witnessing to the cross, through her own phenomenological considerations in *The Science of the Cross (Kreuzeswissenschaft)* (6.1 – 6.2), and her own praxis of going to Auschwitz -- and phenomenologically amplified in her departing words to her sister: 'Come, Rosa, we're going for our people' (6.3) -- enacts an interreligious solidarity with suffering others that is consistent with her *hermeneutics from empathy*.

After the 'action' of narratively considering Stein's life, we reflectively take a step back in order to discern the interreligious significance of Stein's response. We do this by reading Stein's praxis 'through' Marion's hermeneutic of *intergivenness* (7.1). The hermeneutic of intergivenness provides us with a way for discussing how Stein rises as a 'mandorla' figure -- as one capable of dialectically bridging sameness with otherness -- conveying an *em-pathos* in word and deed that is less narrow and more interreligious in kind, precisely because her 'way' of martyrdom is as a *re-memberer* ('smar') with the religious other(s)-who-is-same (7.2). Stein's Jewish *and* Christian fidelity, while being an archetype for interreligious relations, concomitantly challenges Catholicism to do the *teshuva* work of remembering (*qua* embracing) its Jewish heritage (7.3).

In light of Stein's example, we widen our hermeneutical lens in chapters eight and nine, and 'open the question' on how the Catholic Church would do well to (re)consider its con-primordiality with Judaism. The theory and praxis of Stein, as

critically read through the thought of Heschel, has given us a tool for such a project: *a hermeneutics from empathy*. We proceed dialectically by considering how the Catholic understanding of atonement in the Hebrew scriptures, as proposed by the International Theological Commission's document *Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past* may be critically extended by Heschel, Stein *et al*'s commentaries and reflections on *teshuva* (chapter 8). With this *teshuva* lens in place, and as way of 'opening the question' for further debate and scholarship, we 'test' our hermeneutics from empathy by critically examining how the church, in its documentary history since *Nostra Aetate*, has been re-membering itself with Judaism (chapter 9).

Contribution

Jacques Dupuis has recently argued that the "pluri-ethnic, pluri-cultural and pluri-religious world" requires a kind of "mutual conversion" of oneself and the other. But what is meant by mutual conversion, Dupuis wonders. He argues,

[f]irst of all it requires a true sym-pathy or "em-pathy", which will help us to understand the "others" as they understand themselves, not as we, often due to tenacious traditional prejudices, think that we know who they are. In a word, what is required is a welcome, without restriction, of the "others" in their difference, in their irreducible identity. 35

An authentic, renewed empathy is part of the church's eschatological project -- "in a word, we must proceed through encounter rather than through the confrontation of the past." 36

We cautiously venture to 'name' our project as an interreligious phenomenology on empathy.³⁷ And yet, our essay also hopes to be a *theological*

³⁵ Dupuis, "Christianity and Religions: From Confrontation to Encounter".

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Michael Purcell, "Levinas And Theology"? The Scope And Limits Of Doing Theology With Levinas," *Heythrop Journal* 44/4 (October 2003): 468-479, 469: "can theology 'appropriate' phenomenology for its own ends, or has the middle ground between theology and phenomenology, like

inquiry in so far as a hermeneutics from empathy encourages a fundamental engagement with the other -- i.e., "[t]heology will only ever be worthy of the name when it is attentive to the holiness of neighbour, that is, when it is ethically redeemed."³⁸ In this way, a rapprochement between theology and phenomenology may occur at the crossroads of ethics; it is an intersection where we may retrieve one another's holiness by returning to one another through teshuva. The call to enact an interreligiously attuned re-membering through a more profound empathy (Einfühlung), as Dupuis suggests, may be one way of cultivating a wider mindfulness for the other that is essential to a more compassionate and righteous embrace of the world.³⁹ In sum, this project hopes to make a humble contribution in discussing how a 'mutual conversion' to greater understanding and appreciation among Christians and Jews may be hastened through the very renewal of a hermeneutics from empathy. While the renewal of empathy is a "language-transforming proposal" -- i.e., when we feel our way into the life of the other our dialogue with the other, and our dialogues about others, will change -- it is also an action transforming proposal. Living from empathy challenges 'me' towards the humble reception of the other.

two opposing rugby teams, collapsed into a phenomenologico-theological scrum in which there is only a confusion of ideas and players?"

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 468.

³⁹ Rick Lowery, "On Silencing Prophets," *Tikkun* 7/14 July-August (2002): 64-66; 66: "The human ability to empathize with the joy and suffering of others is the cornerstone of human rights. It is celebrated by religious traditions from Hinduism to Islam. And it is codified in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the first of its thirty articles: 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and *conscience* and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood' (emphasis mine). As Mary Ann Glendon documents in her excellent history, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* [New York: Random House, 2001], the word that the committee finally (mis)translated as "conscience" was suggested by the Chinese (Taiwanese) delegate P. C. Chang. He proposed the Chinese word 'ren,' which literally means 'two-person mindedness,' the ability to think from the perspective of the other, to empathize, to have compassion. Human beings are endowed with the ability to 'walk a mile in the other guy's shoes.' We don't always make use of this ability. Indeed, the persistent recurrence of racist and xenophobic ideologies have shown us that the prophetic witness of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is necessary. Its call to *ren*, to compassion, is the lifeblood of prophetic, progressive spirituality."

⁴⁰ Stanley Hauerwas, "Peace: A Theological Analysis," lecture given at The Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin (19 September 2007).

This reception of the other, with their various opinions and life experiences, opens up 'my' daily and eschatological horizons to review and renewal; an encouragement to live from a new depth; a "deep down concern",41 for others and the world. A hermeneutics from empathy encourages me to respond to the summons to be God's partner in promoting peace and compassion. This is a project that was dear to Dr. Heschel, to whom we now turn in beginning our considerations.

⁴¹ Stein, PA, 209: "A man is kind and warmhearted 'deep down,' but he cannot show it in his relationship with others because he is reserved and distrustful and shuts himself off from them. If he could get rid of his inner inhibitions, he would start really to become and appear to be what he is down deep."

Chapter 1 Towards Pathos: Preliminary Considerations.

Abraham Joshua Heschel matriculated at the University of Berlin in April 1928 and earned a doctorate in Philosophy in 1935. ⁴² It was this doctoral dissertation on "prophetic consciousness", published in 1936 under the title *Die Prophetie* (On Prophecy) that may be considered a passionate and creative return to addressing the contemporary problems of the inter-war years of the twentieth-century. John Merkle reports that "[t]he main themes of Heschel's dissertation and of his later book on the prophets are divine pathos – God's being affected by human beings even to the point of suffering – and human sympathy for and identification with divine pathos." In *Man is Not Alone*, Heschel argues, "eternity is not perpetual future but perpetual presence...[t]he world to come is not only a hereafter but also a *herenow*."

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⁴² See the well-informed biographical portrait of Heschel's life and thought by Fritz Rothschild in Heschel, Between God and Man: An Interpretation of Judaism, (frwd.) David Hartman, (intro/ed.) Fritz A. Rothschild (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 7-32; 7-8, hereafter BGM: "Born in Warsaw on January 11, 1907, he was the descendant of a long line of outstanding leaders in Hasidism...[g]rowing up in the closed theonomous world of Jewish piety, Heschel gained in the formative years of childhood and youth two things that are manifest on every page of his published work: a knowledge and an understanding. The knowledge of the Jewish religious heritage was acquired through an undeviating attention during most of his waking hours to the study of rabbinical literature. At the age of ten he was at home in the world of the Bible, he had acquired competence in the subtle dialectic of the Talmud, and had also been introduced to the world of Jewish mysticism, the Kabbalah. The understanding for the realness of the spirit and for the holy dimension of all existence was not primarily the result of book learning but the cumulative effect of life lived among people, who 'were sure that everything hinted at something transcendent' [Heschel, The Earth is the Lord's (New York: Henry Schuman, 1950), 56]; that the presence of God was a daily experience and the sanctification of life a daily task...His study on Hebrew prophetic consciousness, *Die Prophetie*, which had earned him a Ph.D. degree at Berlin University, was published by the Polish academy of Science in 1936 and hailed as an outstanding contribution by leading Biblical scholars...A mass deportation action in October, 1938, found Heschel himself expelled by the Nazis together with the rest of the Polish Jews resident in Germany...[a] call to join the faculty of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, received in April 1939, enabled him to leave Poland before the Nazis overran the country...in 1945 Heschel joined the faculty of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York, where he held the title of Professor of Jewish Ethics and Mysticism. There he taught until the time of his death, influencing a significant number of rabbis and educators in the Conservative movement of American Jewry...Heschel played an important part in the delicate negotiations before and during Vatican Council II. He established cordial relations with Cardinal Bea, whose office was responsible for drafting the declaration concerning the Jews. On September 14, 1964 when a watered-down version of the declaration was about to be introduced, Heschel was received in a special audience by Pope Paul VI and pleaded for a strengthened and more

just declaration by the Council."

⁴³ John C. Merkle, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: Witness to God in Word and Deed," *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations*, 2/2 (2007): 3-12; 5 from http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ accessed on 1 October 2008.

⁴⁴ Heschel, MNA, 295.

Heschel scholar and biographer Edward K. Kaplan tells us "Heschel hoped that his alternative theory of prophetic insight" in *The Prophets* "would dislodge the prevailing neo-Kantian rationalism" of the time through an appeal to "the thought of Max Scheler, a moral philosopher and phenomenologist who developed subtle analyses of religious experience and author of *The Nature and Forms of Sympathy* (1913; 1923)." Scheler details the phenomenon of fellow-feeling that Heschel, in turn, phenomenologically amplifies as "an intuitive method" that "allows the reader" of The Prophets "to grasp, through empathy the prophet's experience of God." Let us first consider the here and now Jewish voice vis-à-vis Heschel on divine pathos and prophetic sympathy.

We begin by engaging Abraham Joshua Heschel and David Tracy on what is necessary for a Christian and Jewish 'prophetico-mystical' approach to prophetic witnessing; one attempting to locate itself in the midst of the 'discontinuity' and 'rupture' of the Shoah (chapter 1.1; 1.1.1). After having elaborated this horizon for dialogue as a way of being sensitive to the tension between sameness and otherness, we will need to consider two preliminary concerns: namely, how *The Prophets*, and other texts from Heschel's inter-war years oeuvre, most notably Help! and Versuch einer Deutung, contextually situate themselves as a response-cum-theodicy to the discontinuity of the Shoah (chapter 1.2); and how this response is grounded in a 'personalist metaphysics', where God, in appeals to 'mysterium' categories reminiscent of Nostra Aetate, is nevertheless standing behind mystery as all ineffable and all personal i.e., "what' does not mean 'who.' There is an anticipation of a 'who' in the question of religion',46 (chapter 2). Rather than simply jumping directly into a consideration of the phenomenological relationship of divine pathos to

46 Heschel, Prophets, 339-340.

⁴⁵ Edward K. Kaplan, Samuel H. Dresner, Abraham Joshua Heschel: Prophetic Witness (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 259-260.

sympathy -- what Jürgen Moltmann calls Heschel's "dipolar theology" where "God is free in himself and at the same time interested in his covenant relationship and affected by human history" -- a preliminary exploration of Heschel's metaphysical and theodicean presuppositions within the text will help us to further 'situate' how the prophet's 'sympathetic' response to the call of divine pathos may be critically advanced through Edith Stein's hermeneutics of empathy. 47

(1.1) The Projected Other and the Prophetic Mystical Option.

In his essay, "Dialogue and the Prophetic-Mystical Witness," David Tracy sketches out the demands of an authentic Jewish-Christian prophetic praxis by first examining what may be considered parameters for the postmodern dialogue between Christians and Jews. Tracy argues that dialogue very much presupposes the question of how one interprets reality in relation to the other:

[h]ermeneutics shows how dialogue remains the central hope for recognizing the "possibilities" (and therefore, the live options) which any serious conversation with the "other" and the "different" can yield...to recognize the other as other, the different as different is also to acknowledge that the other world of meaning is, in some manner, a possible option for myself.⁴⁸

The would-be dialogist would therefore do well to be "wary" of any deliberations that are not "grounded" in the "praxis" of a "critical reflection" where one's 'interpretative' methodological approach towards the other is constantly being challenged and revised by this other. To recognize the "other as other," to allow the

⁴⁸ David Tracy, *Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-religious Dialogue*, Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs, 1 (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990), 41,

hereafter DwO.

⁴⁷ Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, (trans.) R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1974), 272. NB: There is a noteworthy ecumenical meeting of minds on the question of divine pathos. Jürgen Moltmann's confessional approach to Heschel's argument against apatheia in God finds a Catholic sympathy in Hans Urs Von Balthasar: "Protestant polemics is directed, not against the natural knowledge of God, but against a picture of God understood as apatheia along the lines of the ancient world, which is then elevated into a norm for Christianity. Moltmann is right to protest against this, pointing to God's 'pathos' in the Old Testament (as interpreted by A. Heschel and even by the Rabbis)," from Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 4: The Action, (trans.) Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 295, 41n.

other to testify to themselves beyond reification allows 'me' and 'the other' to enter "that unnerving place, the dialogue," where the very act of responding, and being responded to, allows for the possibility of living a more meaningful life for and with the other. This meaningful *pas de deux* happens in and through a lived experience with the other. ⁴⁹

Dialoguing with the other -- allowing oneself to be met by the other's otherness -- makes "it possible to revise aspects of [one's] tradition which need revision and to discover often forgotten" memories of the other: "the irretrievably Judaic (and especially prophetic-eschatological) character of Christianity." ⁵⁰

In regards to this specific question of Jewish Christian dialogue, Tracy warns us, "the problem can be that the Christian...may be tempted to believe that the dialogue partner is so similar to us as barely to be other at all." Therefore, this reduction of the other to the same, this reification, is "a serious Christian mistake." He argues, the Jewish other "has too often functioned as the 'projected other' of the Christian."

Tracy responds to this concern of 'projected otherness' by focusing on a 'prophetic-mystical' option for dialogue and praxis. Prophetic agency, according to Tracy, "demands an agent who possesses authentic freedom." He argues, "[s]ince the time of Paul, the issue of the true freedom of the Christian can be interpreted summarily as the gift of freedom in Christ that both empowers and commands the agent to act responsibly before God and for others." The prophetic agent enters into the dialectic between empowerment and call. The agent freely says, here I am *and* I am ready to respond to you. Freedom-empowering-response, concomitant with

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁵⁰ Tracy, *DwO*, 98.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 48-49.

⁵² Ibid., 110.

freedom-opening-one-to-the-call, extends and universalizes prophetic agency beyond any particularized confession. Where does one find the phenomenological evidence of such praxis? One need not look much further than the twentieth century to see how passion and suffering extends and overflows the borders of any particular confession into a world where the other is asking the prophetic agent for a response. Tracy argues that for a Christian "the passion narratives are the first place to look" -- for through the *kenosis* of Christ "Christians discover their principal clues to who God is and who human beings as free agents are empowered to become."⁵³

What is the Christian agent to become for the other? In the person of Jesus the prophetic agent affirms, (1) "sufficient freedom to be responsible to God and others"; (2) "to be able (and commanded) to respond in and through Christ to God and to neighbor"; (3) thereby affirming "the self-as-responsible agent." The prophetic witness may begin by asking herself 'what is "my" response to the-other-made-naked by the apocalyptic dramas of our time? while also asking herself, 'what is inwardly guiding my praxis? Tracy argues for the latter, interior 'strophe' through a phenomenological appeal to a mystical grounding for prophetic praxis vis-à-vis the Gospel of John.

In the Gospel of John one finds a "meditative and mystical rereading of the common passion narrative." The prophetic enters into dialectical tension with the mystical i.e., the "strong sense of agency...of the prophetic reading" enters into a dialogical relationship with the mystical "Johannine model of a loving, meditative self-losing-and-gaining-itself-in-a-new-union-with-the-God-now-construed-as-love-in John." Tracy argues,

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 114.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 115.

(i) Without the prophetic core, the struggle for justice and freedom in the historical-political world can be lost in mere privacy.

while

(ii) Without the mystical insistence on love, the spiritual power of the righteous struggle for justice is always in danger of lapsing into mere self-righteousness and spiritual exhaustion.⁵⁵

In order for one's response to the call from the other to be an expression of true solidarity, the agent must therefore be both part prophet(i) *and* mystic(ii). In this sense, the prophet-mystic balances the dialectic between *the seen and the unseen*. A dynamic and dialectical agency of this caliber successfully holds in tension the demands of the exterior life with those of the interior life. An agency extending beyond a 'mere privacy' and subtending the universal and mystical concern for a love where 'self-losing-and-gaining-itself-in-a-new-union' is actualized. This prophetic-mystical option may be significant to the over-all project of inter-religious dialogue.

If Jews and Christians are going to take the risk of entering into dialogue, then the Christian dialogue partner must be willing to experience Christian theology anew; beyond projection. As Tracy argues, "Christian theology must move past both liberal historical consciousness and neo-orthodox hermeneutical historicity and move again - as Christian theology -- into the concrete histories of suffering and oppression." The suffering of the other, and how one responds, challenges an antipathy from otherness. This reality is the data for a prophetic-mystical response from the interreligious dialogist. Indeed, the face of the other begins to rattle the "ego' of the purely autonomous modern self" from a solipsistic silence towards engagement. ⁵⁷

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 117-118.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 119.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

(1.1.1) Prophetico-Mystical Dialogue: The Disclosure of the Divine.

So how do we, who are of "different religious commitments meet one another" beyond narrowing confessional commitments? Heschel argues that "we meet as human beings who have much in common: a heart, a face, a voice, the presence of a soul, fears, hope, the ability to trust, a capacity for compassion and understanding, the kinship of being human." And the encounter may be "a major challenge to mind and heart" because one must recall "what [one] normally forgets", that this person 'I' am encountering is "not just a specimen of the species *Homo sapiens*. [She] is all of humanity in one…"

The human person "is a disclosure of the divine, and all…are one in God's care"; when we meet one another as persons-to-persons we begin to actualize a transcendence through dialogue. Our desire for height and depth may also be said to be horizontally inclined, for in being-towards-transcendence 'I' am concomitantly, and somewhat mysteriously, committed along the vertical axis of a *pathic* involvement with otherness. This is to say, one's flesh-and-blood response to the other is also a response to a divine concern: "[t]o meet a human being is an opportunity to sense the image of God, the presence of God."

Even in dialogue, where we may "disagree in matters sacred to us" we must appeal to a wider, personal context: "does the image of God I face disappear? Does God cease to stand before me? Does the difference in commitment destroy the kinship of being human?" Jewish-Christian dialogue ought to respect this difference while also being a reverence-filled pilgrimage with one another towards mutual, empathic points of contact and kinship: "to inquire how a Jew out of his commitment

and a Christian out of his commitment can find a religious basis for communication and cooperation."58

Heschel presents four "dimensions" of "religious existence" or "necessary components of man's relationship to God" that may be relevant to further cooperation and communication:

- (a) *the teaching*, the essentials of which are summarized in the form of a creed, which serve as guiding principles in our thinking about matters temporal or eternal, the dimension of the doctrine;
- (b) *faith*, inwardness, the direction of one's heart, the intimacy of religion, the dimension of privacy;
- (c) *the law*, or the sacred act to be carried out in the sanctuary, in society or at home, the dimension of the deed;
- (d) *the context* in which creed, faith, and ritual come to pass, such as the community or the covenant, history, tradition, the dimension of transcendence.⁵⁹

Heschel details each of the following dimensions: in regards to the *law-as-deed* (c), "there are obviously vast areas of cooperation...in terms of intellectual communication, of sharing concern and knowledge"; in regards to the *teaching* (a) "we seek to convey" to one another "the content of what we believe in"; while in regards to *faith* (b), we seek to come to a greater awareness of, and empathy with, the presence of the holy in the other i.e., "we experience in one another the presence of a person radiant with reflections of a greater presence"; while all three dimensions creed (a), faith (b) and ritual (c) are concomitantly sublated, and held together, in and through an appeal to the *dimension of transcendence* (d):

I suggest that the most significant basis for meeting...is the level of fear and trembling, of humility and contrition, where our individual moments of faith are mere waves in the endless ocean of mankind's reaching out for God, where all formulations and articulations appear as understatements...⁶⁰

Notice how Heschel's approach to dialogue is, with Tracy, prophetic and mystical.

Prophetic in the sense of being 'exteriorly' (i) responsive to the dimension of living

⁵⁸ Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 238-239.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 239.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

out the teaching through a deed (a, c); and mystical in the sense of being 'interiorly' (ii) responsive to an element of *inwardness* and *transcendence* (b, d); an approach that 'leaves room' for the mystery of otherness through an appeal to the category of humility; and this humility is made manifest through a humble service, a devotedness to otherness. Such an approach of being grounded in one's own tradition -- while being aware of our growing, eschatologically focused 'interdependence' for and with one another -- has been referred to as Heschel's "concrete universalism". It is an universalism where the dialogist "maintain[s] a creative tension between the universal and the particular so that no abstract universal would vitiate the individuality of the religious experience, and no particular tradition would claim the fullness and comprehensiveness of the universal."61 Such abstract universalizing, as Tracy agrees, is challenged by "a new hermeneutics of mystical retrieval through prophetic suspicion". It is the "retrieval of the sense of history as rupture, break, discontinuity". Yet, it is a hermeneutics where suspicion may also mean prophetic *rapprochement*. The "retrieval of" means nothing less than "the concrete praxis of discipleship in and for the oppressed."62 It is a retrieval of the 'concrete' other -- where I find 'my' very self through empathically responding to the call of the other.

It strikes us that it is precisely in sensing our recent history as a disruptive 'event' that ought to be of primordial concern to both Jews and Christians in dialogue. Rabbi Sir Jonathan Sacks offers us this searching reminder, "Judaism was organised around something other than history. Its key word was memory. History is what

⁶¹ See David Hartman's helpful foreword in BGM, 4: "Heschel realized that you could no longer build a viable isolated faith experience in a world of interdependency...[h]is was a concrete universalism, one that sought to limit -- rather than destroy -- particular religious passions and commitments." 62 Tracy, DwO, 119.

happened to someone else. Memory is what happened to me. Memory is history internalized, the past made present to those who relive it."63

And it is the prophetic-mystical agent who has a special role in this way of remembering:

What is the essence of being a prophet? A prophet is a person who holds God and men in one thought at one time, at all times. Our tragedy begins with the segregation of God, with the bifurcation of the secular and the sacred...[w]e think of God in the past tense and refuse to realize that God is always present and never, never past; that God may be more intimately present in the slums than in the mansions, with those who are smarting under the abuse of the callous.⁶⁴

Prophetic remembering is therefore capable of sensing a rupture where the presenttense holding together of 'God and us' reveals itself as an enduring memory that implicates God with humanity in a mutual concern and desire for divine justice (theodicy) in the midst of discontinuity. The Prophets is an attempt to respond to the contemporary manifestation of discontinuity: The Shoah.

(1.2) Towards a Widening of Concern: The context for Divine Pathos.

In the introduction to *The Prophets*, Heschel explains that what his study is "aimed at" is the very "understanding of what it means to think, feel, respond, and act as a prophet," where the dynamic of pathos may be understood as a "situation" -- an event -- a drama "composed of revelation and response, of receptivity and spontaneity, of event and experience" between God and humanity vis-à-vis the prophet. Heschel's approach employs a "method of phenomenology" whereby one is being drawn to a new depth through a diachronic horizon:

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⁶³ Jonathan Sacks, "Only by bringing the past alive can we be sure to keep our future free," *The Times* (London: 22 April 1995): 9.

⁶⁴ Heschel, *BGM*, 93.

⁶⁵ Heschel, *Prophets*, xxiv.

⁶⁶ Ibid., xxii.

Conventional seeing, operating as it does with patterns and coherences, is a way of seeing the present in the past tense. Insight is an attempt to think in the present. It is in being involved in a phenomenon, being intimately engaged to it, courting it, as it were, that after much perplexity and embarrassment we come upon an *insight* -- upon a way of seeing the phenomenon from within. Insight is accompanied by a sense of surprise. What has been closed is suddenly disclosed. It entails genuine perception, seeing anew.⁶⁷

'Seeing anew' is conveyed as a 'being involved' and 'intimately engaged' with a situation in the *present tense*. For the prophets' "essential task is to declare the word of God to the here and now; to disclose the future in order to illumine what is involved in the present." Heschel is sensitive to this *continuum*, where the future is disclosing itself in light of the past in a present tense way. *The Prophets* is written from the hope of rearticulating the relevance of a divine concern against the *tremendum* horizon of the *Shoah*. Robert Eisen argues,

[*The Prophets*] is dedicated to the victims of the Holocaust, and there is undoubtedly theological significance to this dedication. It is in *The Prophets* that Heschel lays out his notion of divine pathos in greatest detail, and it would seem that, by dedicating this work to the victims of the Holocaust, Heschel is telling us that the best way to combat the evil of the Holocaust is to open ourselves up to the God of pathos who is in search of us.⁶⁹

Heschel's methodology is therefore cognizant of the rupture and discontinuity caused by genocidal collapse. The prophetic witness is drawn into the mutual concern between God and humanity where rupture with the past need not mean *a forgetfulness* of the past but a resituating of the present in light of the past so that a more dialogical and ethical future with Otherness -- both God and others -- may emerge. It is precisely for these reasons that a review of prophetic praxis will have a contemporary relevance to the Jewish-Christian dialogue.

Towards the beginning of *The Prophets*, Heschel reminds us that the substance of the prophetic agency described in Second Isaiah "is of no age". The

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁶⁷ Ibid., xxv.

⁶⁹ Robert Eisen, "A. J. Heschel's Rabbinic Theology As A Response To The Holocaust," *Modern Judaism* 23/3 (Oxford University Press 2003): 211-225, 214.

prophecy has relevance for contemporary hearers of the word because it is "clearing a way for understanding the future in spite of the present." Isaiah's prophecy is "tempered with human tears, mixed with joy that heals all scars". Isaiah calls all of us to engage in the project of *tiqqun olam*; in a healing of the world for one another. No other prophet has "ever gone farther in offering comfort when a sick world cries." Let us briefly turn to examine, as a way to further prepare the ground for a consideration of pathos, the enduring import of Second Isaiah.

(1.2.1) The Prophet's Theodicy: a 'Robust' and Dialogical relationship between God and the Prophet(s).

Heschel reminds us that Second Isaiah is indeed concerned with God's remembering:

The suffering servant 'opened not his mouth, like a lamb that is led to the slaughter' (53:7). Yet, Second Isaiah does not passively accept Zion's lot. Far from being silent, he challenges the Lord, putting the Lord in remembrance... For Zion's sake I will not keep silent, And For Jerusalem's sake I will not rest, Until her triumph goes forth as brightness... You who put the Lord in remembrance, Take no rest... Awake, awake, put on strength... [Isa 62:1, 6-7; 51:9].

In the midst of collapse and rupture the prophet rouses the memory of the Lord for the people. For calling out to God, even with a voice of protest, is legitimate: it is a way of reengaging God with a concern that reignites meaningfulness in the midst of death and destruction i.e., "[m]ore excruciating than the experience of suffering is the agony of sensing no meaning in suffering, the inability to say, 'Thy rod and Thy staff, they comfort me.' Can He Who 'has destroyed without mercy all the habitations of Jacob,' Who has 'become like an enemy' (Lam. 2: 2,5), still be trusted as the God Who is our Father?"⁷² Notice here how *The Prophets* 'reads' the prophetic discourse of Second

⁷¹ Heschel, *Prophets*, 185.

⁷⁰ Heschel, *Prophets*, 185.

⁷² Marvin Sweeney, *Reading the Hebrew Bible After the Shoah: Engaging Holocaust Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2008), 167-187; 184: The first "subunit" in Lamentations 2, vv. 1-10 "begins with a third-person description of YHWH's actions against Jerusalem, again portrayed as the

Isaiah through the lens of the Book of Lamentations. In *Reading the Hebrew Bible After the Shoah*, scripture scholar Marvin Sweeney argues that Second Isaiah appears to "presuppose" the Book of Lamentations.⁷³ The "five dirges" of lament take one "through the expression of mourning and suffering" both from "the standpoint of the personified city of Jerusalem, through the expression of the city's representative" and ultimately "through the people who constitute the community of the Temple…to culminate in appeals for restoration."

Heschel's methodology here of reminding us of Lamentations' *embedded-ness* within Second Isaiah heightens the significance of prophetic agency. Ricoeur argues, in *Figuring the Sacred*, that while narratives may "provide the eschatological anticipation of the 'new' era", prophetic discourse "within the narratives themselves" may further aid us in recognizing and appreciating "the potential of unfulfilled promises that reorient the story of the past toward the future". And the "reenactment" and "recounting" of "narratives" through "nonnarrative modes of discourse" e.g., "psalms" and dirges of "lamentation", is a way, Ricoeur concludes, of "complet[ing] the complex intertwining between" the two.⁷⁴ The tessellation of non-narrative with narrative modes of discourse makes possible the "transfer from mere storytelling to the grasping of the enduring signification of the story".⁷⁵ Heschel's method of punctuating a treatment of Second Isaiah with multiple and direct references to Lamentations, sharpens and heightens the 'transfer' or 'enduring signification' of a

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⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 246.

young woman, Bat [Daughter] Zion. Such a portrayal highlights Jerusalem's suffering as a victim of war, particularly since women in the ancient world were the survivors of war -- the men having been killed by the attacking forces -- leaving the women defenseless at the mercy of invader. Here YHWH becomes the enemy, rejecting the altar and the sanctuary and handing over the city to the attackers as Bat Zion and the women of Jerusalem sit in silence on the ground in dejection and mourning."

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 183: "Lamentations itself would have originated in mourning rituals for the loss of Solomon's temple in 587/6 B.C.E. insofar as it appears to be based in part on the experience of those who were in the city of Jerusalem at the time of the Babylonian siege and destruction."

⁷⁴ Paul Ricoeur, *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, (trans.) David Pellauer, (ed.) Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 243-248; 245.

community's need: a need for a divine concern, the desire for a response from God, for many 'promises' are yet to be 'fulfilled'. In taking the following example of Jeremiah's complex relationship with the divine, Heschel brings us further into the theme of how we may *re-member* God with humanity *via* pathos.

At times, Jeremiah rejoices in God's nearness and solidarity with him -- "The Lord is with me a dread warrior, therefore my persecutors will stumble; they will not overcome me' (Jer. 20:11)" -- while, at other times, Jeremiah is "exasperated by the mysterious remoteness of the Lord", even questioning God's ability to save: "[w]ilt Thou be to me like a deceitful brook? Like waters that fail?' (Jer. 15:18)". Heschel concludes "it is one of the essential paradoxes of prophetic thinking" where the prophet may speak "continually of the people's guilt and of dreadful punishment in store for them" while likewise, almost at the same time -- e.g., after a "disaster" befalls a people -- [the prophet] is capable of being "stunned, puzzled, unable to justify completely the full measure of suffering."

Evidently, prophetic agency also means that the prophet will "not hesitate to complain" to God about God's own ways. ⁷⁶ A prophetic dialogue therefore necessarily "points to a robust relationship" where God and prophet may "express themselves, forcefully and deliberately, when either perceives wrongdoing on the part of the other."

In 'reorienting the story of the past toward the future' through sharpening a concern for 'unfulfilled promises', prophetic praxis, whether it be Second Isaiah, Jeremiah, or contemporary manifestations of the same, deepens the eschatological significance of pathos vis-à-vis a complaining to God. Heschel's sensitivity to a prophetically-minded continuum, where the future is disclosing itself in light of the

⁷⁶ Heschel, *Prophets*, 225-226.

⁷⁷ Sweeney, *Reading the Hebrew Bible*, 187.

past in a present tense way through prophetic living, is driven by a sense of urgency for the universal problematic of forgetfulness for the other. This methodology, as Ricoeur argues, is 'continuing the transfer' of the narrative's importance into contemporary situations.

Heschel's proposal in *The Prophets* of a present tense way of belonging to one another through a greater empathy with God and others becomes a way of responding to a callous way of living; a way of living without a memory for the other, a way of living that set the conditions for the possibility of the Shoah: "...the incapacity to sense the depth of misery caused by our own failures, is a fact which no subterfuge can allude. Our eyes are witnesses to the callousness and cruelty of man, but our heart tries to obliterate the memories, to calm the nerves, and to silence our conscience."78

While Heschel's theodicy is arguably implicit, it would be perfunctory to read The Prophets without recourse to a post-Shoah hermeneutic. This 'rereading', or reconceptualizing, of prophetic praxis reveals an approach that is less concerned with the craft of the historical reporter: a past-tense detailing of prophetic praxis. Rather, through phenomenologically elucidating the sym-pathetic relationship between God and prophet, Heschel wants to show us how the intentionality of prophetic agency has a contemporary relevance: a dialogically expansive reception of otherness incites an ethical witnessing for others in the present in light of the past. Publications prior to, and immediately following, the publication of *The Prophets*, in 1930 and 1938, respectively, alert us to Heschel's growing theodicean preoccupation for divine justice

⁷⁸ Heschel, *Prophets*, 5; *NB*: Eisen, "A. J. Heschel's Rabbinic Theology," 221: "*The Prophets* is Heschel's attempt to deal with the Holocaust as a universal problem for all humanity. Given the revered status of the biblical prophets among Jews and Christians alike, these figures were the perfect focus for this purpose."

and ethical righteousness, further inciting a desire for the humble 're-membering' of oneself with the victims of the Shoah.

(1.2.2) Antecedents and Descendants of The Prophets: Help! and Versuch einer Deutung.

In 1930*ca*. Heschel's collection of poems, originally written in Yiddish, and entitled *The Ineffable Name of God: Man* conveys this sensitivity. For example, in the poem 'Help', we have a prophetic theodicy of protest and lamentation, where Heschel, in making reference to the prophet Jeremiah, is calling on God to remember:

Set me at the head of all the dying/With a greeting, a message from You./The desolate call to You, and You don't come./So send me, and any others You might choose./I cannot curse as justly as did Jeremiah./People are poor, weak; and it seems to me/That their guilt is Yours;/their sins, Your crimes./You are meant to help here, Oh God!/But You are silent, while needs shriek./So help me to help! I'll fulfill Your duty,/Pay Your debts./Let me always feel, suffer,/When human hands in peril/Reach for the emergency brakes of Your world/Which you have forgotten to set up!/And come like a slave at their call/And quench all suffering with my help;/To help each stone, each flower,/To serve each man, each worm./Help me to help!

A facile reading of Heschel's *oeuvre* denies a contemporary eschatological and prophetic sensitivity to a widening concern that situates itself at the nexus between God and humanity where both are implicated to respond: *'You are meant to help here, Oh God! But You are silent...So help me to help!'* The drama of the encounter between God and prophet is "a form of living, a crossing point of God and man"⁸⁰.

We see this dialectic most eloquently balanced in a speech given in February 1938 to a group of "pacifists recently returned from the Second World Conference of Quakers held in Swarthmore, Pennsylvania" entitled *Versuch einer Deutung*/ A

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⁷⁹ Heschel, "Help", in *The Ineffable Name of God: Man, Poems,* (trans.) Morton M. Leifman, (intro.) Edward K. Kaplan (New York: Continuum 2004), 33, hereafter *Poems.* "Help" was dedicated by Heschel to the memory of "Yitzhak Levin, may his soul be in paradise."

<sup>Heschel, Prophets, 6.
Kaplan, Abraham Joshua Heschel, 259-260.</sup>

Search for a Meaning' or 'The Meaning of This Hour' (see: *Appendix 1* for complete speech). 82

In the speech, Heschel decries, with powerful rhetoric, a "monstrous" sense of mistrust for one another that seems to be gripping humanity (§1: "[f]ellowmen turned out to be evil ghosts, monstrous and weird"). Humanity, however, may begin to repair the breach by acknowledging what is 'evil' in ourselves; for in acknowledging the necrotic, objectifying tendencies within 'myself' I inaugurate a process of turning from them (§3: "If a man has beheld evil, he may know that it was shown to him in order that he learn his own guilt and repent; for what is shown to him is also within him."). Proceeding in teshuva through a discerning self-examination is constitutive of prophetic agency for "[p]eople of conscience can recognize radical evil within everyone (including themselves)" and from this new depth of self knowledge may "oppose the torturers more vigorously."83

Heschel goes on to argue that organized religion is not without its own faults in settling for a forgetfulness for the other. When the prophetic substance of the message becomes "trapped" through a stultifying institutionalization (§4: "The name of God was trapped and imprisoned in the temples! How often it was drowned or distorted! Now we behold how it gradually withdraws...") there is all the more need

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⁸² Heschel, "The Meaning of This Hour," in Man's Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism (Santa Fe, NM: Aurora Press, 1998), 147-151, hereafter MOG. Regarding the context of the lecture see: Kaplan, "Sacred versus Symbolic Religion: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Martin Buber," 220: "Heschel truly succeeded [Martin] Buber as religious philosopher one evening in February 1938. Buber had been invited to speak before a meeting of Quaker leaders in Frankfurt by his friend, Rudolf Schlosser, a German Quaker and pacifist. But Buber was sick with a severe influenza and he designated Heschel to address the group, among whom were the Schlossers and the widow of Franz Rosenzweig. A participant describes 'Buber's assistant' as 'a very serious young man, with strong inner concentration, [who] attempted to fathom the meaning of this new persecution of the Jewish people.'...Heschel's idiom, recalling Buber's sometimes abstruse and portentous terminology, defines his bold, relentless theological judgment. The Nazi terror-whose full extent the world could only begin to recognize four or five years later-condemns contemporary civilization as a whole. Trivialization of religion had atrophied our moral sense..." Also see: Kaplan, "God in Exile: Abraham Joshua Heschel, Translator of the Spirit," in Amy Colin and Elizabeth Strenger (eds.), Bridging the Abyss: Essays in Honor of Harry Zohn, Brücken über den Abgrund: Festschrift für Harry Zohn (Munich, 1994). 83 Ibid.

for a response to the situation through a prophetic praxis. A theodicy of protest against injustice -- what Kaplan calls a "theology of distress" -- rises in the text; again, it is a questioning of God's seeming absence in the midst of genocide (§5: "The day of the Lord is a day without the Lord. Where is God? Why didst Thou not halt the trains loaded with Jews being led to slaughter? It is so hard to rear a child, to nourish and to educate. Why dost Thou make it so easy to kill?"). And this questioning of God flows into the indictment of "modern dictatorship" (§6) where the 'worship of force' and the 'despising of compassion' have become our daily way of 'sacrificing others on the altar of war' (cf. §7).

This forgetfulness seems to be rooted for Heschel in the negative outcomes of the Enlightenment's epistemological commitments. Pessimistic, individualizing and, consequently, totalizing tremors (§10: "[where] the killing of civilians could become a carnival of fun, for a civilization which gave us mastery over the forces of nature but lost control over the forces of our self.") reverberate like a new "gospel" being expounded where "truth is mere advantage and reverence weakness"; and "suspicion became a dogma and contempt the only solace" (§8). Humanity's desire for transcendence was believed to be a primitively imposed, imaginative category of escape, and nothing more than "a pretext for a bad conscience" (§8). The face of the Other-and-others became 'overshadowed' and lost (cf. §1) such that "people succumbed to the bigger advantage of a lie – 'the Jew is our misfortune' – and to the power of arrogance – 'tomorrow the whole world shall be ours,'...The roar of bombers over Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, was but the echo of thoughts bred for years by individual brains, and later applauded by entire nations" (§8). What is rightly needed to counter a necrotic epistemology of objectifying religious belief,

⁸⁴ Ibid.

Heschel argues, is a response to this apocalypse of forgetfulness through a new solidarity: a *re-membering* of the 'sense of the sacred' through perceiving God's involvement (§11: "The world has experienced that God is involved. Let us forever remember that the sense for the sacred is as vital to us as the light of the sun."). A sense of involvement where humanity begins again to cooperate with God in the pathic project of redemption by living beyond the "satisfactions" of an individualistic self-concern (§14: "God is waiting for us to redeem the world. We should not spend our life hunting for trivial satisfactions while God is waiting constantly and keenly for our effort and devotion."). Humanity may begin living again from this concern for others by 'involving' oneself in the collaborative project of 'redeeming' the world. By doing so, humanity will necessarily be living (again) from a prophetic consciousness.

Most poignantly and eloquently, in reflecting on the horror of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Heschel concludes in an interview with Carl Stern, "we should not rely on God alone; we have to respond. It is so important that all of us, regardless of our religious affiliation, remember that we all stand under the hand of God and must act with this in mind. As important as it is to discuss theological subtleties, it is much more important to know how to save men from being liquidated."

Heschel's poetry and rhetoric suggest that humanity's pathic involvement with God's project of redemption is the 'answer' to the prophet's calling on God for justice (theo-dicy). The answer is already contained within the prophet herself through her

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⁸⁵ Heschel, "Carl Stern's Interview with Dr. Heschel," originally broadcast on NBC-TV on Sunday, February 4, 1973, under the auspices of *The Eternal Light* (produced by the Jewish Theological Seminary) in *MgSa*, 390; See: Merkle, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: Witness to God in Word and Deed," 6: "Heschel was convinced that biblical and post-biblical Jewish references to God being affected by creatures, even to the point of suffering with them, make more theological or metaphysical sense than the standard claim of classical Greek-inspired metaphysical theology that God is unmoved by the plight of creatures. Heschel's philosophical theology, unlike classical metaphysical theology, was born not of abstraction from human experience but of an analysis of it, particularly an analysis of the experience of the biblical prophets and pious Jews down through the ages."

prophetic response to the call. If 'we' involve God in every aspect of 'our' everyday, then God gets involved:

God will return to us when we shall be willing to let Him in into our banks and factories, into our Congress and clubs, into our courts and investigating committees, into our homes and theaters. For God is everywhere or nowhere...(§12).

God makes *teshuva*. God makes a pilgrimage of *return* to the people, and this return is often announced through the voice of the prophetic witness.

This speech may be considered to be one of Heschel's most eloquent theological statements of protest against the *Shoah*. By "interpret[ing] the crisis" of the *Shoah* and impending war in "theological terms" Heschel formulated a relevant "call to action" in 'The Meaning of this Hour' for a "predominantly non-Jewish audience" (§15: "*The martyrdom of millions demands that we consecrate ourselves to the fulfillment of God's dream of salvation.*"). ⁸⁶ We hear in the speech Heschel's own "certainty in the existence of a God of pathos" and his "empathy with prophetic consciousness". Furthermore, Heschel's "distinctive blend of faith and ethical courage" in the speech allows him to construct a *prophetic call* for a non-Jewish audience that has an "immediate" resonance. Heschel "believed that God accompanied humankind in suffering" for a "people with faith is a strong people, dedicated to the world's redemption." The Christian listener may therefore begin to bear the weight of responsibility for the *Shoah* through Heschel's searching words.

87 *Ibid.*, 261.

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⁸⁶ Kaplan, Abraham Joshua Heschel, 260.

Concluding Remarks.

Heschel's 'method of phenomenology', his 'new way of seeing', as evidenced in our treatment of Second Isaiah in *The Prophets*, along with 'The Meaning of this Hour' and 'Help', allows him to "deconceptualize" and "reconceptualize" prophecy as being both the communicating of a call to a people while, at times, a protesting to the One who calls, especially when the people of God are left to suffer. ⁸⁸ This response, as both protest to the Other, and as the necessary condemnation of the injustices by some against others, radicalizes the message of peace and justice through the *personal* response of the prophet. Such prophetic respondents move beyond "impartiality" and indifference, and into the world through the sharing of an enlivened word of justice: "the prophet's existence is either irrelevant or relevant. If irrelevant, I cannot truly be involved in it; if relevant, then my impartiality is but a pretense." ⁸⁹ Indeed, it is a word capable of subverting injustice through the proclamation of God's reign.

The prophetic witness's response to the call means being in harmony with the divine pathos for ultimately God has an enduring concern, and because of this concern God may never be unsympathetic to humanity. God's silence never means God is forgetful: "God himself is described as reflecting over the plight of man rather than as contemplating eternal ideas...[i]n the prophet's message nothing that has bearing upon good and evil is small or trite in the eyes of God." If, then 'nothing that has

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⁸⁸ Edward K. Kaplan, "Heschel As Philosopher: Phenomenology and the Rhetoric of Revelation," *Modern Judaism* 21 (2001): 1–14; 1: Heschel's methodology is a "creative process manifested in a plurivocal expository style that combines critical analysis and literary methods -- appealing to both rational and intuitive faculties. This discourse fulfills contradictory tasks: it 'deconceptualizes' theology in order to foster insights beyond language. Critical dialectics expose gaps between received ideas and the ineffable; at the same time, Heschel reconceptualizes such insights in order to participate in sacred tradition. Heschel thus maneuvers the reading process itself to effect the transition from concepts to an encounter with the divine presence."

⁸⁹ Heschel, Prophets, xxv.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

bearing upon good and evil is small or trite in the eyes of God' neither is it inconsequential to the prophet.

The Hebrew prophet (and the contemporary prophetic witness) stands at the nexus between God and humanity, breaking the silence of God on behalf of humanity and vice versa, where dialogue is more tria-logue: God -- prophet -- people. The prophet must therefore dialectically balance a hermeneutic of suspicion with a hermeneutic of trust; or empathy: a hermeneutics of empathy where we may begin again to see the mystical and the prophetic strophes in a larger, dialectically-related Hebrew, and also Christian, context.⁹¹ Tracy's perspective may therefore withstand further extension towards the Jewish other through a dialectically sensitive hermeneutics of empathy where an interpretation of rupture-as-forgetfulness is 'mystically retrieved' through a re-membering of one community together with another community. A shared memory, that "slow and silent stream" lapping against the shores of both Jews and Christians, is orienting us, even mysteriously so, towards an eschatological future i.e., "[t]he prospect of all men embracing one form of religion remains an eschatological hope. What about here and now? Is it not blasphemous to say: I alone have all the truth and grace, and all those who differ live in darkness and are abandoned by the grace of God?" This eschatological hope, and our participation as Jews and Christians in this hope-filled project of building the Kingdom, requires an empathic concern and appreciation for one another's uniqueness: "does not the task of preparing the Kingdom of God require a diversity of talents, a variety of rituals, soul-searching as well as opposition?" Heschel does

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⁹¹ *NB*: "There is a current peril facing hermeneutics, to become this kind of discourse about discourse. This danger is balanced by an opposite one, that of breaking into 'hermeneutics of...': hermeneutics of this or that, where finally the fields of application will become absolutely fragmented in the manner of the divisions among disciplines or of the division of labor," from Ricoeur, *Figuring the Sacred*, 304. ⁹² Heschel, "Jewish Theology," 154-163; 161.

⁹³ Heschel "No Religion is an Island," 243-244.

want to maintain a Jewish difference but his approach is also dialectically nuanced in bringing theological reflection to a new interreligiously attuned depth. He tells us in 1966:

The supreme issue today is not the *halacha* for the Jew or the Church for the Christian -- but the premise underlying both religions, namely whether there is a *pathos*, a divine reality concerned with the destiny of man which mysteriously impinges upon history; the supreme issue is whether we are alive or dead to the challenge and the expectation of a living God. The crisis engulfs all of us. The misery and fear of alienation from God make Jew and Christian cry together. 94

We are being pushed towards a deeper consideration of the 'locus' of pathos -- a nexus of mystery and memory, where God's concern 'mysteriously impinges' on us. This exploration may challenge Christians, as if for the first time, to listen for love from the place of otherness: "Jewish difference challenges Christians not first to speak but to hear speech not their own, not simply to love but to consent to the prospect of being loved by an other." The "intergivenness" of loving and being loved pushes us towards a new depth. Heschel concludes that the

...first and most important prerequisite of interfaith is faith. It is only out of the depth of involvement in the unending drama that began with Abraham that we can help one another toward an understanding of our situation. Interfaith must come out of a depth, not out of a void of absence of faith. It is not the enterprise for those who are half learned or spiritually immature.⁹⁷

If prophetic agency is going to be responsive to a contemporary interreligious *milieu*, then it must also be *freed* for being an agency that is responsive to the *interfaith* situation.

This hermeneutics from empathy will largely be drawn from the example of Edith Stein. Stein's modus vivendi in theory and praxis, and most significantly during

⁹⁵ Karl Plank, "The Eclipse of Difference: Merton's Encounter with Judaism," in *Merton and Judaism: Holiness in Words: Recognition, Repentance and Renewal,* (ed.) Beatrice Bruteau (Louisville, KY: *Fons Vitae,* 2003), 67-82; 82, hereafter *Eclipse*.

Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 241.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 263. *NB: Halakhah*: "Literally, 'the path' or 'the walking.' The system of Jewish religious praxis as codified in sacred law." From Arthur Green, *Seek My Face: A Jewish Mystical Theology* (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2003), 267.

⁹⁶ Jean-Luc Marion, *Being Given, Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness*, (trans.) Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 324, hereafter *BG*.

the moments leading to her deportation and subsequent internment(s) in Westerbork and Auschwitz, witnesses to an '(em)pathos finding an ethos' that dialectically bridges 'sameness' and 'otherness' for she exemplifies "both the Christian 'model of a loving, meditative self-losing-and-gaining-itself-in-a-new-union-with-the-God-nowconstrued-as-love,' and the Jewish prophetic witness of 'the-one-for-the-other' who 'goes to the extent of the-one-being-hostage-for-the-other.'"98 Stein gives herself to the other -- Gentile or Jew -- out of a belief, her belief, in the universal call to caritas. It is a response of a woman who is able to hold in dialectical tension her dual affirmations of being a daughter of Israel and Carmel.⁹⁹ We will come to consider in subsequent chapters how Edith Stein responds in a dialectically sensitive way to the demands of a divine pathos from the place of both her Jewish and Christian commitments. From the outset, however, we may conclude, pace Tracy, that the 'mystico-prophetic construal of Christian freedom' already has an antecedent(s) in the face of the Jewish other. This is to say, if one is going to 'honor' the 'other as other' then the 'issue of true freedom' -- a freedom that both 'empowers and commands the agent to act responsibly before God and for others' -- is a real concern prior to 'the time of Paul'. Heschel's considerations on prophetic agency, and his own prophetic voice in condemning the Nazi terror, reveals how the Jewish other, without having to become Paul, is an agent who acts responsibly before God and for others.

In this sense, Christians inherit a freedom that is being continually guaranteed and widened by the *eternal flowing presence* of the promise to Judaism: "[w]ith the passing of time the Covenant assumes an ever more universal value, as the promise made to Abraham takes form: 'I will bless you and make your name great, so that you

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⁹⁸ Joseph Redfield Palmisano, "Same—Edith Stein—Other: *A Living Dialectic*," 19. See: Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, 141, and Tracy, *DwO*, 118.

⁹⁹ See: Palmisano, "To Give of Ourselves: A Way of Proceeding in Interfaith Religious Dialogue," *Groundings*, Papers Presented at the Seminar on Caribbean Spirituality, no. 11 (Kingston, Jamaica: St. Michael's Theological Institute (July 2005): 8-25.

will be a blessing... All the communities of the earth shall find blessing in you (Genesis 12: 2-3)." Indeed, according to the prophet Isaiah, the hope of redemption extends to the whole of humanity: "Many peoples will come and say: 'Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; that he may teach us his ways and that we may walk in his paths' (Isaiah 2: 3). Within this eschatological horizon is offered a real prospect of universal brotherhood on the path of justice and peace, preparing the way of the Lord (cf. Isaiah 62: 10)." ¹⁰⁰

The Prophets, with both its antecedents and descendant texts, situates itself as a contextualized response to the Shoah, and from this horizon we are beginning to appreciate how the prophet's response to God bespeaks a personal relationship; 'out of the depth of an involvement in the unending drama' between God and humanity. This involvement sets the stage for a consideration of Heschel's 'personalist metaphysics'. While we are moving more towards our contemplation of divine pathos and prophetic sympathy as such, and with an eye towards considering a subsequent phenomenological portrait of how Edith Stein's prophetic witness in theory and praxis critically extends the Heschelian project (chapters 4-7), it is nevertheless necessary, especially in light of our above interfaith hermeneutical approach to prophetic witnessing, to consider Heschel's metaphysical commitments in The Prophets; a structure upon which rests Heschel's doctrine of pathos.

In order to 'open up' this question I would like to draw Heschel into a wider phenomenological (and inter-religiously charged) 'conversation' on subjectivity by reflecting with Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) and Jean-Luc Marion (b.1946).

Levinas, a Jew, and like Edith Stein, studied briefly under Husserl before losing his

¹⁰⁰ Benedict XVI, "Meeting with Representatives of the Jewish Community," Rotunda Hall of John Paul II Cultural Center, Washington D.C. (17 April 2008): <www.vatican.va> accessed on 23 September 2008.

family to the Holocaust. 101 Marion, a twenty-first century phenomenologist, reflects widely on Levinas. 102

The twenty-first century Christian perspective of Marion's phenomenology on *caritas* and 'intergivenness', while buttressing the post-*Shoah* and Jewish perspective of Levinas, also serves as a subtle critique to the Levinasian system. Marion does this by emphasizing the primacy of the *givenness* of a particular face beyond the possibility of 'substituting' one for 'the other' in the ethical moment.

Correspondingly, Heschel subverts the *idea* of God as being-*qua*-being, and argues for a God who is more than mystery and truly a Subject.

God is reaching out to the prophet while the prophet is simultaneously reaching out for God, thus arousing a 'transubjective' alliance (*cf.* Heschel, chapter 2). But does Heschel maintain an 'intergivenness' that respects the communicative dialectic of giving and receiving happening between empathic subjects? While we will come to consider this question in more detail in subsequent chapters, especially when we consider Edith Stein's theory and praxis of empathy, let us first 'situate' ourselves around Heschel's claims on divine and human S/subjectivity vis-à-vis Levinas and Marion.

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¹⁰¹ Peter Steinfels, "Emmanuel Levinas, 90, French Ethical Philosopher," *The New York Times* (27 December 1995): <www.nytimes.com> accessed on 18 May 2009: "In 1928-29, [Levinas] studied under Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger at the University of Freiburg. Over the next few years, he introduced the ideas of both German thinkers to France -- first in a doctoral dissertation, published in 1930, on the theory of intuition in Husserl's phenomenology, then in a French translation of Husserl's "Cartesian Meditations" and finally in a 1932 essay on Heidegger. Dr. Levinas's own philosophy began to emerge after World War II. His family in Lithuania died in the Holocaust, while he, by then a French citizen and soldier, did forced labor as a prisoner of war in Germany and his wife and daughter hid in a French monastery."

Marion, a Catholic, is a member of the French Academy who currently holds the seat once held by Cardinal Aaron Jean-Marie Lustiger, Archbishop of Paris and a convert to Catholicism. Lustiger, whose mother was killed at Auschwitz, tells us: "I was born Jewish and so I remain, even if that's unacceptable for many. For me, the vocation of Israel is bringing light to the goyim." From Joanna Sugden "Cardinal Lustiger in his own words", *The Times Online* (7 August 2007): www.timesonline.co.uk accessed on 18 May 2009.

Chapter 2 Towards a Hermeneutics of Empathy: Mystery, Being, Subjectivity.

Heschel's thesis *Die Prophetie* was awarded a doctorate in 1935. The same year, Emmanuel Levinas, in an article for *Paix et Droit*, argued the following:

Paganism is a radical powerlessness to get out of the world. It consists not in denying spirits and gods but in situating them in the world. The Prime Mover, which Aristotle nevertheless isolated from the universe, was able to carry to the heights only the poor perfection of created things. Pagan morality is only the consequence of this basic incapacity to transgress the limits of the world. The pagan is shut up in this world, sufficient unto himself and closed upon himself. Israel's sentiment in regard to the world is entirely different...The Jew does not have, in the world, the definitive foundations of the pagan. In the midst of the most complete confidence accorded to things, the Jew is tormented by a silent worry. As unshakeable as the world might appear to those one calls healthy minds, it contains for the Jew the trace of the provisional and the created. This is the madness of the faith of Israel. 103

In 1961, Levinas published his *Habilitation*, entitled *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (published in English in 1969). Soon after, Heschel translated into English an extended *Die Prophetie*, to be published as *The Prophets* in 1965.

Heschel, like Levinas, is attempting to redress this 'incapacity for transgressing the *limits*' through an appeal to the Other who is beyond being; the one who is more *primordial* and *personal* than any *idea* of transcendence — i.e., "without the sense of the ineffable there are no metaphysical problems, no awareness of being as being, of value as value". ¹⁰⁴ Let us first turn to Levinas.

(2.1) The Givenness of the Visage: Getting beyond Being.

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas argues a radical line, beyond metaphysics, for a "philosophy of the immediate" where the "existent" is "disclosed" as openness beyond Being i.e., "the immediate is the face to face." The ethical relationship between one and the other breaks with the totality of a synchronic worldview where

 ¹⁰³ Emmanuel Levinas, "The Living Relevance of Maïmonides," [L'actualité de Maïmonide], Paix et Droit, 4 (1935): 6-7 in On Escape [De l'évasion], (intro.) Jacques Rolland, (trans.) Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 90-91, hereafter OE.
 104 Heschel, BGM, 47.

Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, An Essay on Exteriority*, (trans.) Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 52, hereafter *TI*.

history is considered "the plane where Being disengaged from the particularism of points of view...is manifested." The relationship between 'me' and the other is an unfolding-event in time, where the other says to 'me' *through the face*, 'Here I am!' The prophetic call of the other shatters the impersonal world, and impels the *I* into a real-time relationship. Levinas argues, "I do find in the Other a point that is absolute with regard to history — not by amalgamating with the Other, but in speaking with him. History is worked over by the ruptures of history, in which a judgment is borne upon it." This relationship incarnates justice when I regard the other as the *real* other. Therefore, the exteriority of the other "is his truth" positing itself over the mere perception of nature. The self-authentic other posits himself "over being and over its idea". ¹⁰⁸

Against this horizon, discourse between the same and the other is revelation; "[t]he absolute experience is not disclosure but revelation: a coinciding of the expressed with him who expresses, which is the privileged manifestation of the Other, the manifestation of a face." The visage is of the other, laughing and crying; smiling or frowning; these are expressive signs of communication from a presence who is disclosing one's self from beyond all signs. Indeed, there is an even more primordial and universal aspect to the call one receives from the other. Simply, the gaze from the "living presence" -- the face -- of the other "speaks" a need beyond words; "[t]he manifestation of the face is already a discourse." "I' am drawn into a conversation without the exchange of words. Non-vocalized speech, therefore, is the very presence

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¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 52, 55: "Totalization is accomplished only in history -- in the history of the historiographers, that is, among the survivors...[t]he time of universal history remains as the ontological ground in which particular existences are lost, are computed...[i]nteriority as such is a 'nothing,' 'pure thought,' nothing but thought."

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 52: "If it [history] claims to integrate myself and the other within an impersonal spirit this alleged integration is cruelty and injustice, that is, ignores the Other."

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 291. ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 66.

of the other who highlights through presence the difference between 'me' and 'you', and the difference -- the *between* 'you' and 'me' -- bespeaks a kind of ethical irreducibility beyond objectification.

Jean-Luc Marion, in reflecting on Levinas, provides a contemporary reading of this phenomenon. He says, "Distance, which thematizes the thing, to the point of granting it a finally ethical irreducibility, does not only prohibit possession; touched, nor tasted, nor possessed, because in it there opens 'a distance more precious than taction, a non-possession more precious than possession, a hunger that is not nourished by bread but by hunger itself."

What becomes apparent from the point of view of Levinas is that '1' may never possess another in the sense of 'having' them. The flesh is not the means through which one may 'get into' the depths of a need being communicated by the other. And yet, the call is generated from the flesh; the eyes, the countenance of the other, call me into a relationship that is, truly, beyond the face. But this relationship does not dissolve the difference. 'You' and '1' remain apart, and yet one of the protagonists -- 'you I am gazing at' -- asks me for more than a look. The gaze is the inauguration of a request-unfolding into a deeper, more attentive consideration. The request is for a radical givenness-towards-the-other that does not harm. It would appear then that a "relation, other than possession" does homage to the subjectivity of the primordial other who is at a distance from 'me'. 111

In terms of the ethical relationship, for example, the gaze -- issuing from the eyes -- of the destitute other says to me in an originally sincere way, 'I need you'.

Levinas says, "[t]he eyes break through the mask -- the language of the eyes, impossible to dissemble. The eye does not shine; it speaks." Language is

¹¹⁰ Marion, *The Idol and Distance: Five Studies*, (trans.) Thomas A. Carlson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 217-218, hereafter *ID*. Marion is quoting directly from Levinas, *TI*, 154. ¹¹¹ *Ibid*.

primordially "the coinciding of the revealer and the revealed in the face." The other's revelation-from-need marks 'me', but not primarily with vocalized words: 'I need your help!'112

The epistemic marking-event is prophetic and issues forth to 'me' in the real-time 'fix your eyes on me!' command from the other. The call is prophetic, for the gaze commands something radical from 'me': 'my' very self. At this juncture, 'I' am called into a "relation between me and the other beyond rhetoric," and it is at this point that one 'feels' the powerful "all or nothing" undertow of the Levinasian ethical system issuing as a call from the other. Levinas argues,

This gaze that supplicates and demands, that can supplicate only because it demands, deprived of everything because entitled to everything, and which one recognizes in giving (as one "puts the things in question in giving") -- this gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face as a face. The nakedness of the face is destituteness [La nudité du visage est dénuement]. To recognize the Other is to recognize hunger. To recognize the Other is to give.

The suffering other calls "into question...my joyous possession of the world," and puts everything about 'my' everyday I call "life" into question. The presence of the other causes a rupture to 'my' comfortable circle of being, calling 'me' beyond "egoist and solitary enjoyment," and into a hospitable solidarity. I come to know there is an other, this other is in need, 'I am' -- or come to more fully be -- through 'my' response to this need.

The other says, 'Here I am!' so to speak, and "overflows" my own identity in the moral call. Levinas concludes,

The presence of a being not entering into, but overflowing, the sphere of the same determines its "status" as infinite...this overflowing presence is effectuated as a position in face of the same. The facing position, opposition par excellence, can only be as a moral summons. This movement proceeds from the other. 114

¹¹² Levinas, TI, 66-67.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 75-76.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 196.

Vocalized language therefore presupposes the originality of the face. The face of the other 'speaks' to me, and invites 'me' into relation.

The 'overflowing presence' of the *visage* invites one into an experience of life, where the greeting *shalom* is to be spoken against and beyond objectifying totalities as "the infinity" of the other's "transcendence". Levinas argues, "[t]his infinity, stronger than murder...in his face, is the primordial expression, is the first word: 'you shall not commit murder.'" Recourse to words is somehow insufficient and superfluous; the call from one to the other in the language of the 'face-to-face' has *already* taken place. 115

The "total nudity" of the other's otherness as communicated through his or her "defenceless eyes" disarms the "I", and draws one beyond resistance and into an ethical relationship directed towards the needs of the one who has been persecuted and rendered defenseless. 116 Levinas says, "[t]hus I cannot evade by silence the discourse which the epiphany that occurs as a face opens... 'To leave men without food is a fault that no circumstance attenuates; the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary does not apply here,' says Rabbi Yochanan." The other breaks-in as an event, as a real-time phenomenological existent who appeals "to me with [his] destitution and nudity - his hunger - without my being able to be deaf to that appeal."118

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 199. *Cf.*, 206: "[I]t is not the mediation of the sign that forms signification, but signification (whose primordial event is the face to face) that makes the sign function possible."

116 *Ibid*: "Infinity presents itself as a face in the ethical resistance that paralyses my powers and from

the depths of defenceless eyes rises firm and absolute in its nudity and destitution."

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 201. Levinas quotes Rabbi Yochanan's Treatise Synhedrin, 104b. It is of interest to note Marion at this juncture on the underlying foundation of the Levinasian system from ID, 219: "...that which speaks in Totality and Infinity is not being, nor phenomenology, but, through them, the word of the prophets and the revelation of the Law; one would miss everything in not hearing them there, present as a second voice." *Ibid.*, 200.

(2.1.1) Einfühlung: Subjectivity through Substitution?

It is against the above radical claims in *Totality and Infinity* that Levinas subsequently articulates a rather passive perspective on subjectivity. In his perspective, the "over-flow" of 'my' identity is essential for empathy, and reaches completion as long as I substitute myself for the other. But there seems to be a sleight of hand in the theory: the passive moment of receiving the Other as my teacher or "Master" who "subtends" 'my' freedom, is, in turn, subtended through substitution in the moment when 'I' take responsibility for this other. ¹¹⁹ He argues,

The self, the subjection or subjectivity of the subject, is the very over-emphasis of a responsibility for creation. Responsibility for the other, for what has not begun in me is responsibility in the innocence of being a hostage. My substitution for another is the trope of a sense that does not belong to the empirical order of psychological events, an *Einfühlung* or a compassion which signify by virtue of this sense. *My* substitution - it is *my own* that substitution for the neighbor is produced. ¹²⁰

In moving from one extreme to the other, Levinas argues for a contradiction: "the subjection or subjectivity of the subject," while at the same time arguing for the accomplishment of *Einfühlung* through my 'subjective' substitution as hostage. He seems to misread, as we will come to consider with Stein, the dialogical, 'feelingwith' nature of empathy, and thereby re-introduces the primacy of the 'I' through substitution.

In the Levinasian system, therefore, the 'I''s passive harmlessness to the "over-flowing" call of the other seems to be 'forgotten' in the empathic moment when the 'I', rather than 'feeling with' the other, accomplishes the annihilation of the other through substitution. Michael Barnes registers a similar critique, "[i]s it possible for Levinas to avoid replacing the violence which would make the same the centre with

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¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 101.

¹²⁰ Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, (trans.) Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981), 125-126, hereafter *OB*.

the more subtle, but equally constricting, violence which would paralyse the self -what Gillian Rose criticises as a 'passivity beyond passivity'?"¹²¹

A 'replacement theory' ethic misses the dialogical and communicative nature of the ethical relationship, and substitution reinforces the subtle violence of a one-sided 'I think' translated into dialogical terms as 'I know what's best for the other'. Substitution, therefore, does violence to the other for it reintroduces the primacy of the *cogito*, and destroys any possibility for empathic solidarity i.e., an intercommunicative 'being and feeling with' the *real* other. For Levinas, empathy is not a 'feeling with' the other. Rather, the 'I' feels responsibility for the other, and substitutes his *self*: 'I' replace my *self* for the other, and thereby re-introduce the hidden primacy of the 'I'.

The possibility for an ethical dialogue is reduced to a one-sided monologue when Levinas keeps the other as a face. Barnes thus concludes that Levinas may be "implicated in a neo-Kantian transcendentalism which leaves him always deeply suspicious of an account of phenomenality anchored in the visible, but equally uneasy about giving any account of the numinous on the grounds that to do so is to fall back into immanence and ontology."¹²²

Let us recall, Levinas argues, "[t]o recognize the Other is to recognize hunger. To recognize the Other is to give." It is about what 'I give' -- and in the moment of 'me' doing what 'I' have to do for the other, namely *giving*, I recognize the other. Again, 'my' very recognition of the other is constituted through 'me' and what 'I' do. But does not one recognize the other in *the first moment of reception*, in first *seeing*

¹²¹ Barnes, *Theology and the Dialogue of Religions*, 70. Barnes is quoting from Gillian Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13-14. Also see: Rose, "Is there a Jewish Philosophy," in *Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 11-24; 14.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 70-71.

¹²³ Levinas, TI, 76.

the givenness of this unique, irreplaceable other? Indeed, reception makes possible a loving givenness to the other, and *vice versa*. Levinas, however, would rather maintain the vast difference between the phenomenal and the numinous. He says himself, "[d]iscourse is not love. The transcendence of the Other, which is his eminence, his height, his lordship, in its concrete meaning includes his destitution, his exile [*dépaysment*], and his rights as a stranger."¹²⁴

In reflecting on the call of the face as presented by Levinas in *Totality and Infinity*, Jean-Luc Marion argues for empathy *towards* the other: "I am responsible not in front of the law by means of the other, but directly for the other...the death of the other, or his life depend directly on my regards for his open face." In contradistinction to the Levinasian position, however, Marion argues for the other's primacy-to-givenness against the violence done to the other through substitution. 'I' recognize the other *not* in giving my *self* to the other (Levinas) but 'I' recognize the other through first *receiving* the givenness of this particular other.

In arguing against the neutralization the other undergoes through substitution, Marion says, "[t]he injunction of obligation toward the other (*autrui*) leads, in reality, to the neutralization of the other as such...no face can claim to be irreplaceable because, if it in fact became so, at once, by right, the act accomplished would cease to satisfy the universality of the law." Marion concludes that a 'primacy-of-the-other' moral injunction not to do harm "does not lead to loving *this* other, if only the universality of the law pronounces it; rather it leads to the law itself, while neutralizing the other in particular (*comme un tel*)." 126

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 76-77.

126 Ibid., 93.

Marion, *Prolegomena to Charity*, (trans.) Stephen E. Lewis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 93, hereafter *PC*.

Marion therefore advances beyond the violence of neutralization-insubstitution in recognizing the particularity of the other(s). Marion's phenomenology does not hold the other out in exile as a stranger or at a height, but welcomes the givenness of the other through love. Marion claims that phenomenology's "privileged theme" for reflection is in fact love. Marion's concern, in arguing for an "intergivenness" expresses a desire to "restore" love, "the most prostituted of words," to the stateliness "of a concept". 127 Let us now turn to consider his twenty-first century phenomenology of love as a way of critically advancing our previous deliberations on Levinas, and towards Heschel.

(2.2) The Visage Beyond Substitution: The Intentionality of Caritas.

The face, particular and unique, sometimes beautiful and other times tortured and tired, gives itself beyond 'my' control. The receiver has no control over the givenness of the other arising first in the face. 128 The critique follows: "as long as the ego remains, givenness remains inaccessible; it appears only once the ego giver is bracketed."129 Hence, Levinas' statement "to recognize the Other is to give" has to be preceded by the sheer givenness of the other.

This receptive stance, in essence, is more relational and non-violent, for 'I' no longer impose what 'I' want to give to an other solely based on 'my' recognition of another in the glance. Rather, I receive what the other has to give, and respond in kind beyond my self-concerns. Unlike Levinas, Marion phenomenologically describes givenness through the hermeneutic of love. Through love (and loving) the phenomenal world meets the noumenal, and at this intersection 'I' receive the other as she presents herself to 'me' from her own intimate interiority. In this experience of

¹²⁷ Marion, BG, 324.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 121: "[T]he phenomenon shows itself insofar as given and the given gives itself in so far as shown [en tant que montré] -- literally a freak show set loose [un monstré délivré]." ¹²⁹ Ibid., 77.

givenness, 'I' must renounce the insurmountable struggle of trying to control the givenness of the other for the sake of 'my' ego. Marion uses a pericope from the Christian scriptures to illustrate this solipsism:

Whence the judgment of Christ: "If you love those who love you, what reward do you deserve? Do not tax-collectors do as much? And if you hail only your brethren, what have you done that is so special? Do not Gentiles do as much?" (Matthew 5:46-47). If we stick to the definition of love as a fabric woven from lived experiences of my consciousness, we turn all love back on ourselves, with a reciprocity that poses no difficulty, because it lacks exteriority. According to the unique presupposition that love plays itself out in my conscious experience and gives me the perfect idol of myself, it attracts what it loves to my consciousness, like the sun attracts the planets, like hatred attracts hatred -- necessarily. 130

Caritas, therefore, is primarily recognition of the other, and to recognize the other is to receive. Caritas calls 'me' out of my introverted 'I think' or 'I do' for the extroverted and unpredictable world of reception where the call from the other "arrives to me, happens to me, and imposes itself on me...the phenomenon is accomplished by its unpredictable landing." Love, therefore, must give itself beyond what 'I' want to give. In other words, what I receive in the sheer givenness of the other calls me to a more radical loving; caritas, a loving-openness-to-death.

In *Prolegomena to Charity*, Marion makes a radical move by subsequently proposing "invisibility" at the very depths of the other, and thus securing the possibility for *caritas* beyond a reifying intentionality. He initiates the move beyond subjectivity through a phenomenology of what remains beyond grasp in the person: the black depth within the eyes; the pupils. He says,

If I want truly to gaze on the other, I attach myself neither to her silhouette...nor to some voluntary or involuntary sign...but to her face; I face up to her (*je l'envisage*)...fixing exclusively on her eyes, and directly in their center -- this ever black point, for it is in fact a question of a simple hole, the pupil.

¹³¹ Marion, *BG*, 133.

¹³⁰Marion, *PC*, 77.

And this "ever black point" is a *cul-de-sac*, so to speak, to 'my' objectifying gaze. The dark pupils, as markers of *apophasis*, deny a look-that-judges. Marion says, "[e]ven for a gaze aiming objectively, the pupil remains a living refutation of objectivity...in the very midst of the visible, there is nothing to see, except an invisible and untargetable (*invisable*) void." 132

The ego may no longer put the other under the microscope of the *cogito* through the gaze. The mysterious blackness of the pupils announces the futility of the 'I''s attempt to 'think through' or 'figure out' the other for 'my' own sake. This would be idolatry under the nomenclature of love. In the dynamic moment when the visage of the other is encountered by the 'I', "it hides, in its petrified immobility, within its pupils, the visibility of every possible objective." ¹³³

The phenomenological move beyond subjectivity is a means of securing the subject, in the Levinasian sense, as primordially given to me from above; mysterious and not graspable by me as an object. But there is an apparent aporia arising from Marion's one-sided approach. If 'I' am 'turned to stone', as it were, and fossilized by this invisible gaze, then is it possible for 'me' to fulfill the intention of loving?

Marion makes a subtle distinction between the primacy of the *I* and the decentered, naked *me*. While the 'I' bespeaks the priority of '*my*' consciousness, e.g., '*I* know', '*I* think', '*I* decide', the 'naked me' is open to the "weight" of the other's invisible gaze as an "injunction". Marion illustrates this dialectical tension as follows: "The *me* designates the *I* uncovered, stripped bare, decentered. *I* become me

Marion, *PC*, 80-81; 80: "Intentionality renders consciousness intentional of something other than its own lived experiences, namely the object itself...[i]ntentionality open only onto the objectivity of intentional objects, and never directly to another subject: in the field of the aim, only one origin, one intentionality, one *I* can be at play." *NB*: Marion coins the phenomenological neologism, *invisable* translated as "that which cannot be aimed at or taken into view," to describe this aspect of the phenomenon. *Cf.*: Marion, *GB*, 13; fn. §8 on 201.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 85: "the injunction brings me to discover myself as obliged by another: I must devote *myself* to...it is incumbent upon me to...this or that, he or she obligates *me* to...[sic]."

by uncovering myself as the simple me of an other... *I* become me by discovering myself as the faltering shadow of I in the denominating gaze of the other -- who came first." And *I* feel the weight of this 'first' other's call in the self-accusative: 'me?':

He makes his invisible gaze felt and weighs upon me by letting the nonsubjective and nonmasterable feeling of respect be born within me. I know and feel, as if in spite of myself, that I am responsible for the fate and death of my brother. Thus the obligation -- which makes itself felt in the feeling of responsibility... [b]efore being conscious of myself (*Selbstbewusstsein*), I am conscious of my obligation...¹³⁵

In this moment, the 'I' feels the weight of the other as the call lands on 'me' from a place outside of 'my' consciousness, and takes 'me' by surprise. The call therefore, as we say in common parlance, 'throws my entire world upside down,' including 'my' understanding of what pertains to loving another. The flow of consciousness is reversed; the other exerts her primacy on 'me'.

The phenomenon of *caritas*, however, is not one-sided. There is a subtle reciprocity in loving. While 'I' love her for her own sake, beyond category or classification; 'I' love her because the mystery *within* this other -- this sheer givenness -- prompts me, and calls 'me' into a non-totalizing and kenotic way of being given, in return, for the other. The praxis of *caritas*, therefore, may balance a distance-to-the-other while allowing for a possible concomitant unfolding of responsibility-for-the-other that is not a substitution but self-surrender. Marion presents the phenomenology of love as follows:

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¹³⁵ Ibid 84-85

¹³⁶ Marion, *BG*, 132: "...we must therefore speak of the unpredictable landings of phenomena, according to discontinuous rhythms, in fits and starts, unexpectedly, by surprise, detached each from the other, in bursts, aleatory."

¹³⁷ Marion, *PC*, 83: "I do not reach the other by means of the consciousness I have of him; he forces himself upon me by means of the unconsciousness to which he reduces my consciousness."

Love in the end would be defined, still within the field of phenomenology, as the act of a gaze that renders itself back to another gaze in a common unsubstitutability. To render oneself back to a gaze means, for another gaze, to return there, as to a place for a rendezvous, but above all to render oneself there in an unconditional surrender: to render oneself to the unsubstitutable other, as to a summons to my own unsubstitutability -- no other than me will be able to play the other that the other requires, no other gaze than my own must respond to the ecstasy of *this particular* other exposed in his gaze. ¹³⁸

If phenomenology is about love, as Marion says, then it is about giving and receiving, it is a kenotic and reciprocal ebb and flow from one to another -- where the particular, personal call is in solidarity with the universal calling to caritas. He says, "[t]he unconditioned nature of responsibility implies its universality, from face to face, up until the last, whoever that might be...ethical responsibility cannot, and even must not make distinctions between faces, such that, with regard to responsibility, the universality of the injunction implies no return whatsoever of the Neuter." ¹³⁹ Marion's position clearly challenges an impersonal and detached metaphysic, and thus critically advances and extends Levinas's original point on the substitutability of the face. 140 Furthermore, his nuanced approach would seem to reflect the Heschelian approach -- e.g., "responsibility to God cannot be discharged by an excursion into spirituality, by making life an episode of spiritual rhapsody, the very sense of responsibility is the scaffold on which [the prophet] stands as daily he goes on building life." Let us now turn to consider Heschel on subjectivity. We have considered Levinas' and Marion's unique approaches on receptivity of, and/or givenness to, the subject. Both approaches may serve as 'markers', helping us situate

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¹⁴¹ Heschel, MNA, 289.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 100-101.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 94.

¹⁴⁰ With Marion, Levinas argues in §7 of his conclusions ("Against the Philosophy of the Neuter," in *TI*, 298-299) against the violence of the neuter of Being, and yet Levinas still speaks of *the* face, and no particular face. He says, "[w]e have thus the conviction of having broken with the philosophy of the Neuter: with the Heideggerian Being of the existent whose impersonal neutrality the critical work of Blanchot has so much contributed to bring out…[t]he Being of the existent is a *Logos* that is the word of no one. To begin with the face as a source from which all meaning appears, the face in its absolute nudity, in its destitution as a head that does not find a place to lay itself, is to affirm that being is enacted in the relation between men…"

how Heschel's 'method of phenomenology' for metaphysics also espouses a personalist 'ethics' of pathos that is anterior to ontological concerns.

(2.3) Not Being but The Mystery of Being.

Heschel argues that any consideration of *being-qua-being* is ultimately a penultimate concern for "[b]eing points to the question of how being is possible". Behind the 'concept' of being *qua* "*petitio principii*" is a more primordial concept; an ultimate principle: "[t]he act of bringing being into being, creation, stands higher in the ladder of problems than being."

While Heschel concedes that "[c]reation is not a transparent concept" he concomitantly wonders "is the concept of being as being distinguished by lucidity?" Heschel's desire *to get beyond being*, in the sense of getting beyond the idolatry of an ahistorical concept, is essentially a desire rooted in the Hebrew Scriptures: "Biblical ontology does not separate being from doing. What *is*, acts." And the Hebrew Scriptures speak of God's "acts of pathos" where God is not being conceived as a ""true being'....but as the *semper agens*". ¹⁴²

The "Greek" appreciation of *being as being* is tautological and self-enclosed (*cf.* Levinas); an inquiry of penultimate concern. And only an *idea* of being is capable of being 'isolated' in being. This self-enclosed system amounts to "the dehumanization of humanity and the depersonalization of God." What is needed, alternatively, is the cultivation of a *remembering sensitivity* for the *subjective* 'quiddity' of the Ineffable; the cultivation of a kind of *habitus* for mystery: "[t]he

¹⁴² Heschel, Prophets, 338-340.

¹⁴³ Michael A. Chester, *Divine Pathos and Human Being: The Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel* (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2005), 119: "[Heschel] attacked the 'Greek-German way of thinking' for its wide-sweeping emphasis on the power and ability of human reason, and for its analytic approach to the questions of humanity and God, which resulted in the dehumanization of humanity and the depersonalization of God...Heschel was so dissatisfied with philosophical rationalism that he seemed to be reluctant to acknowledge any distinction between philosophy as understood by the Greeks and the attitudes of modern Western scientific empiricism."

sense of the ineffable does not stand between man and mystery; rather than shutting him out of it, it brings him together with it."¹⁴⁴

The "supreme and ultimate issue is not *being* but the *mystery of being*."¹⁴⁵ And this "sense" for "the ineffable" may not be considered "an esoteric faculty but an ability with which all men are endowed" for just as we have "the ability to know certain aspects of reality" so, too, are we "endowed with the ability to know that there is more than" what we could possibly know.

Our minds may be "concerned" with both "the ineffable as well as with the expressible", and this "awareness" for the ineffable comes as a givenness in "radical amazement" —"a sense of perpetual surprise at the fact that there are facts at all"; a kind of being in a "state of maladjustment to words and notions". A sometimes speechless sensitivity to the *plenum*: "to all of reality; not only to what we see, but also to the very act of seeing as well as to our own selves" ¹⁴⁶ — and this sensitivity to a more mysterious givenness is just as "universally valid" and rationally grounded as is "the principle of contradiction or the principle of sufficient reason".

While the ineffable offers "resistance to our categories", one's "sense" for the ineffable allows her to nevertheless "perceive...something *objective*" and although this 'object' may not be "conceived by the mind nor captured by imagination or feeling" it is "something real", and the *realness* one is made aware of "is not our self, our inner mood, but the transubjective situation". It is '*transubjective*' because one's being 'radically amazed' is already a response -- an "awareness" -- to the exhaustive inclusiveness of "mystery" e.g., "the grandeur of the sky"; "the mystery of birth and death" etc., -- in "every valuation of reality" where valuation means a deepening

¹⁴⁴ Heschel, MNA, 38.

¹⁴⁵ Heschel, Prophets, 338.

Heschel, God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism (New York: Noonday Press, 1955), 45; 46, hereafter GSM.

involvement with a world of otherness: "[w]e do not create the ineffable, we encounter it." 147

This "awareness of the presence of the mystery" does not therefore easily fit into a notionalistic category of *conceptus*:

All we have is an awareness of the presence of the mystery, but it is a presence that the mind can never penetrate. Such an attitude may be contrasted with Hegel's characterization of the transition of the Egyptian to the Greek religion. "The enigma is solved; the Egyptian sphinx, according to a deeply significant and admirable myth, was slain by a Greek, and thus the enigma has been solved." 148

An 'awareness' for "the extreme hiddenness of God", while capable of being intellectually recognized as a presence-within-a-veil, nevertheless remains beyond 'my' rational, objectifying, grasping-for-*It*; i.e., *Deus absconditus*. And yet, this awareness is nevertheless subtended, as Heschel argues, by a more expansive divine sensitivity "which is neither the construction nor the object of our controlling reason." It is a sensitivity capable of being experienced by humanity through the awareness of a divine *pathos*: "yet His concern, His guidance, His will, His commandment is capable of being experienced by [human beings]." 150

(2.3.1) Rahner's Vorgriff: 'Experiencing' the Ineffable.

The hiddenness of God as impenetrable, and yet capable of being 'experienced': this echoes themes found in Rahner's treatment on how human beings have an 'awareness' of the mystery vis-à-vis a pre-grasp ("Vorgriff") of mystery.

Rahner tells us the human person is "a transcendent being in so far as his knowledge and all of his conscious activity is grounded in a pre-apprehension

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 46-47. See: Rothschild, *Introduction*, 13: "To the sheer sublimity of experience we respond with *radical amazement*, to the *mystery* of reality with *awe*. Awe is not unintelligent fear or abdication of man's rational powers in the face of the unknowable. Human life is the meeting point of mind and mystery, of reason and transcendence."

Hegel, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. 2, p. 122 in Ibid., 49.

¹⁴⁹ Rothschild, Introduction, 14.

¹⁵⁰ Heschel, BGM, 49.

(*Vorgriff*) of 'being'". And while this 'pre-grasp' is "unthematic", or, as Heschel might put it, not 'capturable' by our imagination, it nevertheless accommodates a "present knowledge of the infinity of reality" where we are "presupposing that this infinite pre-apprehension is not grounded by the fact that it can apprehend nothingness as such." ¹⁵¹ The subject's 'unthematic' yet 'ever present knowledge' of being *qua* 'pre-grasp' is a grasp of *something* and not 'nothing'. Nicholas Adams is helpful on this point:

[t]he conditions or 'grounds' for thinking (the German *Grund* has a wide range of meanings including 'reason,' 'condition,' and 'ground') are a prior grasping, at some level, of reality, which is not yet the explicit focus of thinking...the subject is finite, and yet is capable of grasping the idea of infinity. This idea cannot arise from something finite; nor can it arise from 'nothing'. It must therefore originate *outside* the subject. 152

So while the human person may experience the 'categorial' or contingent realities of "emptiness" and "inner fragility" he is concomitantly 'grounded' in *something more*: the dynamic, unthematic movement of a transcendent hope "draw[ing] and mov[ing] and set[ting] in motion" his *reality* which he experiences "as his real life and not as nothingness." ¹⁵³

The person experiences a "kind of absolute...within himself"¹⁵⁴ whenever "in his transcendence he experiences himself as questioning, as disquieted by the appearance of being, as open to something ineffable." When this occurs it becomes much more difficult for man to posit 'nothingness' as his primordial ground.

Furthermore, it throws into question the human's self understanding of "himself as a subject in the sense of an *absolute* subject..." Rather, the 'questioning' and 'disquiet'

¹⁵¹ Rahner, FCF, 26-35; 33-35; 33.

¹⁵² Nicholas Adams, "Rahner's reception in twentieth century Protestant Theology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner*, (eds.) Declan Marmion, Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 211-224; 217.

¹⁵³ Rahner, *FCF*, 33.

¹⁵⁴ Raymond Moloney, "The Intelligent Faith of Karl Rahner," *Milltown Studies* (Summer 1982): 121-129; 122: "[M]an discovers something of the absolute within himself, for one of the conditions of the possibility of knowing any particular being is the grasp of being-as-such, which is some kind of absolute which man experiences within himself."

places the subject within a wider horizon of relationality. The subject makes the exitus from the narrow confines of self qua absolute subject and she begins to embrace her primordial subjectivity as being a receiver, for one is a subject "only in the sense of one who receives being, ultimately only in the sense of grace." A person's pre-grasp is therefore somehow an unthematic reminder to oneself that she has already been 'grasped' and called into a relationship beyond one's self and into a wider horizon of relationality. The subject is being called into the "silent and uncontrollable infinity of reality" we call "mystery". 155

This mystery opens up the possibility for a dynamic relationality with the world i.e., "the grasp of being is the key to man's transcendence and it is the condition of possibility for knowing particular beings." 156 Rahner may conclude that 'being grasped' by being is the condition for the possibility for a greater openness and freedom to both the transcendent and the categorial, opening up one to a life of grace where grace means "freedom of the ground of being...", a freedom "which gives being to man". And this transparency towards grace, this openness is an "a priori openness" that is "present precisely when a person experiences himself as involved in the multiplicity of cares and concerns and fears and hopes of his everyday world." ¹⁵⁷

The 'silent and uncontrollable infinity' we call mystery opens to us in selfcommunication. God becomes the eternally-being-revealed-answer to our insatiable desires and never-ending questioning. The face of the other, the tremendum and joyfilled realities of our everyday -- all moments of God's 'self-communication' -- are 'offers' being "made to every man," and in accepting the offer one becomes "divinized in the ground of his existence." ¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Rahner, FCF, 34, 35.

Moloney, "The Intelligent Faith", 123.Rahner, FCF, 34-35.

¹⁵⁸ Moloney, "The Intelligent Faith", 126.

One responds to this communication by launching out on the pilgrimage of life as the prophet-mystic. 159 While this journey aims at a reunion with transcendence and bespeaks a reditus back towards the Absolute i.e., "[f]rom the absolute within himself man can set out on his way to the absolute which is God..."; it is also an openness in transparency towards others. 160 Grace finds the 'category' of our flesh and blood, and the prophet 'communicates' with grace through a life of 'involvement' and 'concern' with the cares of the world; a seeking-and-finding the face of God in every face. Our metaphysical inquiries may therefore be essentially pointing us towards a theological inquiry into "being as creation". An exploration of the drama of being where, following Rahner's considerations, the flowing presence of being is a creative act 'precisely when a person experiences herself as involved in the multiplicity of cares and concerns and fears and hopes'. Or, as Heschel argues, "there is no being as being; there is only continuous coming-into-being. Being is both action and event." 161

Norris Clarke argues that there is "an immense innate dynamism in the very nature of actual being." We may cultivate an awareness of this dynamism "[w]herever an act of existing is found, participated or unparticipated – to pour over into self-expression, self-communication of its own inner perfection or goodness." ¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ See: Alan Brill, "Aggadic Man: The Poetry and Rabbinic Thought of Abraham Joshua Heschel," Meorot: A Forum of Modern Orthodox Discourse 6/1 (Shevat 5767/2006): 1-21; 5: "Heschel's theological position is certainly not for everyone, particularly those who are comfortable with rational, authoritarian, and legalistic approaches," while directing us to footnote 10 in his article: "Heschel's work is also similar to the important Catholic systematic theologian Karl Rahner in his work modernizing mysticism...In Heschel's belief that every committed Jew becomes a hearer of revelation, one sees a similarity to Karl Rahner's belief that every Christian is a mystic. Rahner wrote that our personalities have an innate capacity based on human freedom to reach the divine. Hearing the divine word in our freedom is our expression of the self. Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word (New York: Continuum, 1994)."

¹⁶⁰ Moloney, "The Intelligent Faith", 122.

¹⁶¹ Heschel, *Prophets*, 338-340.

¹⁶² Clarke, PB, 8: Clarke quotes (i) Étienne Gilson from Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 184; and (ii) Gerald Phelan, "The Existentialism of St. Thomas," Selected Papers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 77 to buttress his argument for a more dynamic reading of Thomism. (i): "Not: to be, then to act, but: to be is to act. And

This dynamic (neo-Thomistic) retrieval may corroborate Heschel's point on being and acting: the "immobility" of thought-thinking-itself is surpassed by action: "[m]ovement, creation of nature, acts within history" eclipses "absolute transcendence and detachment". An exploration of being as creation will therefore carry with it an ethical weight through the intentionality of acting subjects.

And yet, it must be acknowledged, metaphysics customarily has a different starting point. In speaking of the attributes of God in the Thomistic system, for example, one begins with an understanding of who we are as finite human beings, whereas in Heschel's system something beyond our finitude is already wooing 'us': "[i]t is not 'the finitude of being which drives us to the question of God,' but the grandeur and mystery of all being." 164

Oliva Blanchette argues that any description of the *attributes* of God, "such as God's simplicity, perfection, goodness, infinity, immutability, eternity, or unity" is attributive of God because it may *not* be said of persons. Through sustained and intense inquiries into *our* beingness -- i.e., "what we know about composite, imperfect, finite, mutable, temporal, and multiple being" -- we will come to discover that there is a difference between us and God, and we come to know and appreciate God's difference from us by coming to know ourselves. This anthropologically grounded "negative theology", this difference-in-relation "opens up to us a broader understanding of *what* we are as finite beings, creatures of God" while concomitantly "leav[ing] untouched the essence of God as God or of the uncaused Cause, which is

the very first thing which 'to be' does, is to make its own essence to be, that is, 'to be a being.' That is done at once, completely and definitively...But the next thing which "to be" does, is to begin bringing its own individual essence somewhat nearer its own completion." (ii): "The act of existence (esse) is not a state, it is an act, the act of all acts, and therefore must be understood as act and not as a static definable object of conception. Esse is dynamic impulse, energy, act – the first, the most persistent and enduring of all dynamisms, all energies, all acts. In all things on earth, the act of being (esse) is the consubstantial urge of nature, a restless, striving force, carrying each being (ens) forward, from within the depths of it own reality to its full self-achievement."

¹⁶³ Heschel, *Prophets*, 339-340.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 341.

the ultimate mystery of being". 165 Blanchette assures us that starting with a consideration of finitude and moving up towards God on an ever-widening via negativa need not characterize "a mean theology". Rather, it is a theology "informed by all that we know of finite being and, through it, of the act of being." ¹⁶⁶

The person-as-microcosm, however, as the condition for the possibility for what we may say (or may not say) about God's attributes, could never be Heschel's starting point. 167 Rather, God is always already moving towards humanity; an involvement ad extra, one capable of shattering "our solipsistic pretensions", and drawing us into a concern larger than our limits, inciting a response from us that is to be both pathic and kenotic; i.e., prophetic. 168 There is a reversal of perspective; humanity is drawn into the awe-filled *macrocosm* of God the 'Subject':

Man's experience of the ineffable can provide the change of inner attitude, the reverse of Kant's "Copernican Revolution," which is a prerequisite for understanding God: the thaumatic shock can bring about the awareness in man that reality is not grounded in his individual or generic mind, but that the existence and functioning of his own mind and person are themselves a mystery in need of com-prehension. The reality of God can then be grasped not as the consequent, but rather as the premise of human thought. 169

Heschel's approach begins from the marvel (thauma) that there is a certain mysterious ground in each human person that may be comprehended by the 'Subject' (and, correlatively, but not completely, by others). While "Heschel perceives all created reality as existing within the sphere of God's presence and that God's presence

¹⁶⁵ Oliva Blanchette, *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 2003), 548-549. ¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

Rothschild, *Introduction*, 27: "While a consistent tradition in Greek philosophy thought of man as a microcosm, it is characteristic of Biblical thought to recognize in man the imago Dei and to describe experience of the divine by the traits that constitute his kinship with the Creator: life, freedom, responsibility, will, passability."

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 14: "An awareness of mystery was common to all ancient men, but Biblical thought brought about a revolutionary change by teaching that the mystery is not the ultimate. The ultimate is not a blind power or a law but one who is *concerned* with man. The experience of the ineffable not only leads to an awareness of the mystery and majesty in and behind all things; it also shatters man's solipsistic pretensions and opens his soul to an attitude in which the question of God can be raised." ¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

permeates all things," he is nevertheless careful not to equate mystery with God.¹⁷⁰ Speaking of an 'uncaused Cause' or the 'Mystery' *as* God is, for Heschel, a category mistake. He argues, "[i]n the biblical tradition, God was not immured in a conception of absolute transcendence. The Lord who created the world manifests his presence within the world. He is concerned with man and is present to history."¹⁷¹ The 'grandeur and mystery of all being' is a ground, but nevertheless a penultimate ground: "God is a mystery, but the mystery is not God. He is a revealer of mysteries (Daniel 2:47). 'He reveals deep and mysterious things; He knows what is in the darkness and the light dwells with Him (Daniel 2:22)."¹⁷² A-God-who-has-a-concern is 'standing' behind mystery as the ultimate Subject; 'ontologically presupposed' as being the *marrow* wherefrom *pathos* flows.¹⁷³ Let us now consider this reversal of intentionality.

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¹⁷⁰ John C. Merkle, "Heschel's Monotheism vis-à-vis Pantheism and Panentheism," *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations*, 2/2 (2007): 26-33; 30 from http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/accessed on 1 October 2008.

¹⁷¹ Heschel, Prophets, 465.

Heschel, BGM, 49. See: Merkle, "Heschel's Monotheism", 30: "Heschel does not think of the world as being a part of the reality of God. Rather, he views the world as being embayed and imbued by the presence of God, a presence which remains distinct from the world itself. Heschel's normative statement in this regard is: 'The world is not of the essence of God. . . . The world is neither His continuation nor His emanation but rather His creation and possession [God in Search of Man, 121]." 173 Rothschild, Introduction, 15: "Kant has shown that it is an unwarranted procedure to infer, from an awareness from within our experience, a reality beyond the empirical world. When asserting the reality of God, we do not, however, argue from the idea of God to his existence, possessing first the idea and then postulating its ontal counterpart. Neither do we proceed from the givenness of the world to the God who is needed to explain the world. Such a 'God' is derived from the world; it makes him merely the sufficient cause of the universe, and as such he cannot transcend the world infinitely. As Tillich points out, the so-called arguments for the existence of God are not arguments at all. Their value lies in that they make possible the question of God, which can be raised only because 'an awareness of God is present in the question of God'. This awareness, since it precedes the question, is not the result of an argument but its presupposition. Similarly Heschel describes the method of becoming certain of God's reality as an *ontological presupposition*: it is not in going forward from premises to God as a conclusion, but a withdrawal from the conceptualizations of everyday life to their underlying premise, a 'going behind self-consciousness and questioning the self and all its cognitive pretensions...Just as there is no thinking about the world without the premise of the realness of the world, there can be no thinking about God without the premise of the realness of God.' [See: Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 205-206, 121f]."

(2.4) God the Subject, Man the Object.

In *Man is Not Alone* (1952), Heschel asks, "Who is 'I'?" Heschel argues that in "saying 'I,' my intention is to differentiate myself from other people and other things." But, Heschel contends, the self can never be objectively separated from one's *self*: "the self can be distinctly separated only at its branches; namely from other individuals and other things but not at its roots." There is something primordial, stable about the 'I', "[I]ike the burning bush, the self is aflame but is never consumed". The subject is "in travail with the ineffable", consistently struggling to answer the concern, "[s]omething is meant by the simile of man. But what?" Existence itself is all too contingent, not giving up any answers to the primordial question of Who 'I' am?: "[t]o exist implies to own time. But does a man own time? The fact that time, the moment through which I live, I cannot own..." This brings us up against an incongruity with existence, challenging 'my stability, "if life does not belong exclusively to me, what is my legal title to it? Does my essence possess the right to say 'I'?" 175

Heschel is arguing that the individual "I" is really separated from external reality. The *I* only "becomes aware of itself" through my "relation to existence". Yet in becoming aware of being a self, *I* also discover that "what I call 'self' is a self deception." The 'self' believes that *I* can master and control existence. But this lie has often led to the dominance of others where, as Heschel argued for in "The Meaning of this Hour," the 'killing of civilians could become a carnival of fun' by a 'civilization which gave us mastery over the forces of nature but lost control over the forces of our self' (cf. chapter 1; AH§10). Through "penetrating the self" *I* come up against the "monstrous deceit" that the "self in itself" as individuum is the complete

¹⁷⁴ Heschel, MNA, 45-46.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 46.

story. In reality, "the self is something transcendent in disguise." Ultimately, the self cannot live abundantly as "an isolated entity, confined in itself, a kingdom ruled by our will."

While that which "is higher in us" has in most cases been "suspended" through ego-living, with this realization humanity may begin, as Rahner argues 'from the absolute within' herself, to set out again towards 'the absolute which is God' (*cf.* 2.3.1). This way of being characterizes the *homo viator*; the pilgrim towards the ineffable: "[c]lear-sighted souls, caught in the tension of the lavishly obvious and the clandestine stillness, are neither dazzled nor surprised. Watching the never-ending pantomime that goes on within an ostentatious, turbulent world, they know that the mystery is not there, while we are here."

I steadily come to realize that "life is something that visits my body, a transcendent loan...the essence of what I am is not mine. I am what is not mine. I am that I am not." While I may daily "claim that my acts and states originate in and belong to myself", it is through "penetrating and exposing the self" that I come to realize that "the self did not originate in itself, that the essence of the self is in its being a non-self, that ultimately man is not a subject but an object." The I (in Levinasian terms) is thereby constituted by the Other.

God may never be the 'object' of the *I's* thought. While "[t]o think means to set aside or separate an object from the thinking subject", the "setting [God] apart" through an abstraction will allow us to "gain an idea and *lose Him*". We lose God whenever we put God at a distance. This *abstracting* is a way of controlling God by 'bracketing' God in an idea. In the Heschelian system, God may not, as Rothschild argued, 'be grasped as the consequent, but rather as the premise of human thought'

¹⁷⁶ Heschel, MNA, 46-47.

^{1//} *Ibid.*, 48.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 128, italics added.

(cf. 2.3.1). What is needed then is an overturning of our epistemological intentionality: "[t]hinking of God is made possible by his being the *subject* and by our being His *object*." Rothschild is instructive on this point:

human thought is largely based on spatial categories of externality and the notion of an object 'outside' the subject may be a case in point. In knowledge the subject 'takes' the object and incorporates it into his own self as an 'idea'; in practical action man likewise grasps what is external to him and brings it into the domain of his control and power. Thinking about God, however, is different. [God] is neither a thing nor an idea... ¹⁸⁰

All is contained within God as Subject: "In thinking of Him, we realize that it is through Him that we think of Him. Thus we must think of Him as the subject of all, as the life of our life, as the mind of our mind." ¹⁸¹

Heschel continues to argue for the epistemological reversal of intentionality in *The Prophets* (1962). The drama between God and humanity points toward a "mutual inherence of the 'I'" where "an intention of man toward God produces a counteracting intention of God toward man." Yet it is here "all mutual relations end" for in turning toward God, God is *always already* turning toward humanity: "man's awareness of God is to be understood as God's awareness of man, man's knowledge of God is transcended in God's knowledge of man, the subject -- man -- becomes object, and the object -- God --becomes subject." The divine Subject first proffers for relationship: "[e]very apprehension of God is an act of being apprehended by God, every vision of God is a divine vision of man. A mere human aspiration toward God, apart from God's loving election of man, is wide of the mark." While this relationship may be characterized as one where there is a "dual mutual operation, a twofold mutual initiative" between God and humanity, it is God's primary initiative and appeal -- a "transcendent divine attention to man" -- that is the "ultimate element"

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁸⁰ Rothschild, *Introduction*, 15.

¹⁸¹ Heschel, MNA, 128-129.

in the object of theological reflection" for Heschel. The religious person will therefore come to an "awareness" that she is "known by God", in being "an object, a thought in [God's] mind". *I* am contained within the Other, and this other's consciousness is *my* consciousness. It is the *I's* "knowledge of [God]" -- where knowledge means "comprehend[ing] *only* what God asks of man" -- this alone "is the essential content of prophetic revelation". Eisen concludes of Heschel: "[w]e must think of God as the subject and humans as the object and that it is God who is in search of us. We must recenter subjectivity on God in order to see ourselves as the objects of God's concern. God's inner life is defined by His pathos, in that He is emotionally involved with human beings." ¹⁸⁴

Heschel tells us in *The Prophets* regarding the Subjective *pathos* that "God's role is not spectatorship but involvement. He and man meet mysteriously in the human deed. The prophet cannot say Man without thinking God." And God "discloses" to the prophet "a *divine pathos*". ¹⁸⁵ It is precisely this *pathos* -- "the unity of the eternal and the temporal, of meaning and mystery, of the metaphysical and the historical. It is the real basis of the relation between God and man, of the correlation of Creator and creation"--which is made manifest to a prophet on behalf of a people, for "[t]he God of Israel is never impersonal...God is involved in the life of man...an interweaving of the divine in the affairs" of humanity. ¹⁸⁶ Kasimov argues that Heschel's

¹⁸² Heschel, Prophets, 624.

¹⁸³ Heschel, MNA, 128-129, italics added.

¹⁸⁴ Eisen, "A. J. Heschel's Rabbinic Theology," 213: "Heschel critiques the notion ubiquitous in Western culture that man is the subject and God is the object and that our religious quest consists in our search for Him. It is this ego-centered way of thinking that Heschel feels is the root cause of human evil in the modern period. For Heschel, the truth is precisely the reverse. We must think of God as the subject and humans as the object and that it is God who is in search of us. We must recenter subjectivity on God in order to see ourselves as the objects of God's concern. God's inner life is defined by His pathos, in that He is emotionally involved with human beings."

¹⁸⁶ Heschel, *Prophets*, 298, 29.

entire theological structure rests on the assumption that there is a personal God, a God who commands and makes demands on human beings, who is concerned and involved with human beings. Heschel has great difficulty with any system of thought that does not involve a personal concept of God. ¹⁸⁷

In light of this *personalist* horizon, we may take the next step and consider the phenomenological contours of *the call and response of pathos*. For Heschel, God's pathos is set forth as an invitation, as a call, and the prophet responds to this call. God's 'I am' is met with the prophet's response: 'here I am'. Heschel's *mystagogy through mystery* brought us to resituate God as Subject.

The subverting of intentionality, this 'recentering' of subjectivity in a God who has a concern for human persons, has far-reaching implications for a constructive (and metaphysically-charged) post-modern ethics. Heschel argues,

Man is not an all-inclusive end to himself. The second maxim of Kant, never to use human beings merely as means but to regard them also as ends, only suggests how a person ought to be treated by other people, not how he ought to treat himself. For if a person thinks that he is an end to himself then he will use others as means. Moreover, if the idea of man being an end is to be taken as a true estimate of his worth, he cannot be expected to sacrifice his life or his interests for the good of someone else or even a group. ¹⁸⁸

Again, this perspective overturns subject-object intentionality, overtly challenging the *cogito's* drive to conquer and control. Indeed, "the bondage of a fixed self" is exposed through Heschel's anthropologically frank considerations, for most individuals are an admixture of "polymorphous desires" -- and "[w]e need to be aware of the fascist within us all and within theology, that is the desire to control desire in the other and the understanding of God." Yet the givenness from the Other will never submit to 'my' control. In this sense, *I* may no longer master the other by delimiting as '*this*'

¹⁸⁷ Harold Kasimow, "Heschel's View of Religious Diversity," *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations*, 2/2 (2007): 19-25; 23 from http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ accessed on 1 October 2008. See also: Chester, *The Divine Pathos and the Human Being*, 121: "Heschel's concept of the divine pathos brought him into direct opposition to classical Jewish and Christian metaphysics. The God of the Bible is not the Perfect Being who, being self-sufficient, needs nothing beyond himself..."

¹⁸⁸ Heschel, *MNA*, 194.

¹⁸⁹ Jeremy Carrette, "Beyond Theology and Sexuality: Foucault, the Self and the Que(e)rying of Monotheistic Truth," in *Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious Experience*, (eds.) James Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2004), 217-232; 227.

the very givenness of God. Furthermore, an autonomous, ego-driven way of living is *challenged* into being 'de-centred' by a more communal, empathic, and interreligiously sensitive way of living-with-others: "[i]f man is not more than human, then he is less than human." ¹⁹⁰

Yet, overturning and reimagining the intentionality of the relationship with Heschel's 'conceptus' of $God = 'Subject' \rightarrow Humanity = 'Object'$ is a somewhat paltry 'idea-picture' that obfuscates that which is a strikingly more dynamic relationship.

Let us recall, Levinas argued 'there is a coinciding of the revealer and the revealed in the face'. Whilst 'there is a coinciding of the revealer and the revealed' in Heschel's approach, God the Subject does recognize the 'face' of the other, as Marion would argue, in a receptive moment. The other is constituted or 'apprehended' by God as an object. Heschel assigns to God, 'the subjection or subjectivity of the subject'. In the Divine Subject there is 'the very over-emphasis of a responsibility for creation' (cf. 2.1.1). God is the Overemphasized.

The question needs to be asked, however, at this juncture: does Heschel hold 'hostage' all other forms of subjectivity through substitution in this overemphasis? In nearly answering his own question that we posed earlier with Heschel, '[s]omething is meant by the simile of man. But what?' He argues, "[m]an is more than what he is to himself...he stands in relation to God which he may never sever and which constitutes the essential meaning of his life. He is a knot in which heaven and earth are interlaced." So when he also argues that "To be implies to stand for, because every being is representative of something more than itself; because the seen, the known, stands for the unseen, the unknown", we are left with the concern that one who is seen and known, while being more than what is seen, is nevertheless an

¹⁹⁰ Heschel, MNA, 211.

¹⁹¹ Heschel, MNA, 211.

existent in the world. Existence means to stand for something as someone; to stand as someone for another. 193

I stand for the other on behalf of the Other as at an intersection in space and time. But how may I stand for the other, other than as a subject? But this suggests subjectivity, even with the small 's', for persons. The subtle distinction as envisioned by Marion's dialectic 'I' ←→ 'me' offers a critically constructive advance to Heschel's argument. Marion argued, 'the me designates the I uncovered, stripped bare, decentered. I become me by uncovering myself as the simple me of an other'. I feel the weight of this 'first' other's call precisely as it makes 'itself felt in the feeling of responsibility... [b]efore being conscious of myself (Selbstbewusstsein), I am conscious of my obligation'. ¹⁹⁴ While there is an overturning of the I's supremacy, there is not the dissolution of the subject in this approach. Rather, there is a conversion. The self-accusative I or 'who me?' becomes the 'Here I am!' While man meets the 'travail of the ineffable' in realizing 'that the mystery is not there, while we are here' -- that the 'self' is out of his own depth in this world -- 'my' unique response: 'Here I am!' is also not a simple facsimile of God's 'I AM'.

Concluding Remarks.

While embracing God as Subject amounts to the 'repersonalization of God', one is left to wonder if, pace Heschel, the argument 'man is object' is a subtle 'dehumanization of humanity'? Is there a truly 'mutual inherence of the 'I''? That is to say, does Heschel's approach through pathos maintain the 'intergivenness' of the transubjective situation between God and the prophet or will Heschel's approach need to be creatively extended? These are questions we will now begin to take up.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 31

¹⁹³ Existere "stand forth, appear,"...." exist;" from ex- "forth" + sistere "cause to stand". Cf: http://www.etymonline.com> accessed on 17 May 2009.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. 2.2

The 'resituating' of God in the key of pathos is a positive "translation" of a divine concern into a (post)modern context. Yet it nevertheless strikes us that the concretization of pathos may only happen through the 'existence' of the person of the contemporary prophet. The prophet's embodiment of pathos gives an ear to the divine call through an attentiveness to the exigencies of our contemporary world. Indeed, God's subjective givenness towards the prophet will need to be met by humanity's givenness *back* towards God and the world. Indeed, the prophetic witness may be a kind of 'first responder', as it were; one who courageously replies to what is unjust, negative, and "controlling" in our (post)modern *milieu*. 197

It is in this context where the prophetic witness realizes "the need of being needed", and from this realization one begins to embody a "striving to give rather than to obtain satisfaction". 198

One unique face who realizes the 'need of being needed' is that of Edith Stein.

Her phenomenological portrait breaks upon the scene as one who incarnates a way of loving -- in both her writings and her praxis -- that responds to the givenness of

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¹⁹⁸ Heschel, MNA, 214.

¹⁹⁵ See: Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Theology and the Condition of Postmodernity," *The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology*, (ed.) Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3-25; 15: "postmodern iconoclasts do not abandon reason; they merely remove it from its pedestal and *situate* it;"

pedestal and *situate* it;"

196 *Pace* Heschel, see: Arthur Cohen, "The Rhetoric of Faith" in *The Natural and the Supernatural Jew: An Historical and Theological Introduction* (New York: Behrman House, 1979) 234-258; 237, 251: "There is to our view no faith, no wonder, no amazement, however radical and extreme, which can survive unless founded upon the immediacies of man's everyday existence...For too long philosophy and faith have been separated in Judaism. Philosophy has been surrendered to unbelief and faith has either retreated into dull and repetitious recital of formula or been content to confirm its disenchantment with philosophy by reviving the ancient opposition of scripture and reason. This is lamentable -- not so much because philosophy suffers from absence of faith as faith suffers by the loss of contact with the common world of sensation and experience in which men live and through which they pursue their destinies to God. Faith, cut off from its foundation in the finitude of man, is easily deluded. Its rhetoric parts company from the facts; the disabilities of time and history are underrated; the pathos seems to be all on God's side; there is a deficient sympathy and compassion for those who are trapped in their unknowing and disbelief."

¹⁹⁷ Michael J. Scanlon, "The Postmodern Debate," *The Twentieth Century: A Theological Overview*, (ed.) Gregory Baum (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 229-237; 233: "The modern philosophical project of total comprehension of reality would absorb God into a pseudo-explanatory system that amounts to idolatry. The modern desire to 'control' the world is part of the pathology of anthropocentrism, the fruits of which have been all too obvious in the postmodern twentieth century, the ecological crisis being one clear example."

another. We will come to consider how Edith Stein 'breaks upon the scene' as a point of encounter, and gives a message today to Jews and Christians, theologians and others, on how we may go about the interreligious dialogue with one another. Marion calls this breaking upon the scene of the phenomenon the anamorphosis. He says, "[t]o appear by touching me defines *anamorphosis*. The phenomenon crosses the distance that leads it (*ana*-) to assume form (*-morphōsis*), according to an immanent axis, which in each case summons an I/me...to a precise phenomenological point." We will examine Stein's phenomenological in-breaking through the lens of Marion's hermeneutic of "intergivenness". Intergivenness dialectically relates the two following points:

(i) "To receive the Other -- that is equivalent first and before all to receiving a given and receiving oneself from it; no obstacle stands between the Other and the gifted."

AND

(ii) "There is more: the gifted himself belongs within the phenomenality of givenness and therefore, in this sense, gives itself, too, in a privileged way." 200

Through her writings and praxis, the 'anamorphosis' of Stein's way of doing *caritas* arises as a kenotic donation; i.e., *an emptying that gives*. In phenomenological terms, the givenness of Edith Stein "appears to the degree that it arises, ascends, arrives, comes forward, imposes itself, is accomplished factically and bursts forth -- in short, it presses urgently on the gaze..." This is most dramatically seen in her empathic way of being given through a loving self-surrender in solidarity -- not substitution -- with her Jewish brothers and sisters at Auschwitz.

²⁰¹*Ibid.*, 159.

¹⁹⁹Marion, BG, 131.

²⁰⁰Ibid., 323.

Intergivenness, therefore, promotes a way of 'doing solidarity' that advances beyond a one-sided theory on empathic orientation i.e., the problematic of the *locum tenens* of the 'I' who 'substitutes', 'stands in', or 'takes the place' for the other. Stein witnesses to a dynamically *intergiven* relationship of "constant and unremitting awareness", where God as personal and pathic is closer and more *knowable* ('I'eida')²⁰² to 'me' than *my inner most thoughts* (cf. Psalm 139). Or, as Rabbi Halevi teaches, in what has come to be regarded as a "classic formulation": "Ana emtsa'ekh: U-be-tsateti li-qratekh li-qrati matsatikh ('In going out toward Thee, toward me I found Thee.')."²⁰³ God's subjective givenness towards the prophet is indeed met by the subject-qua-prophet's givenness in giving back a prophetic witness to God and the world. This praxis does not attempt to control with an 'idea of God' that loses God. Rather, it is a confluence; the prophet is incited into action through this 'unremitting awareness of God':

It is as bearers of compassion that we become the partners of Y-H-W-H in Creation. The divine energy flows outward from the Source, through the complex and multipronged evolutionary process, and into us...[w]e, by adding to it the insight and act of compassion, send it streaming *back* to the One, our gift in gratitude for the gift of existence itself.²⁰⁴

Before we come to consider Stein's theory and praxis of empathy, we need to take the next step of considering the following: what is the nature of this 'sym/pathetic' call and response between God and prophet in Heschel? Is it possible to maintain a parity of esteem between God and the prophet *as subjects* if one interlocutor has become the 'object' of all concern? To this consideration we now turn.

²⁰³ Reuven Kimelman, "Rabbis Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Abraham Joshua Heschel on Jewish-Christian Relations," *The Edah Journal* 4:2/*Kislev* 5765 from http://www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/4_2_Kimelman.pdf: 1-21; see endnote 72, accessed on 8 October 2008.

²⁰⁴ Green, Seek My Face, 93.

²⁰² Edith Wyschogrod, "Repentance and Forgiveness: The Undoing of Time," *International Journal of Philosophy of Religion* 60 (2006): 157–168; 163-164: "Is belief to be taken as reflecting a more tentative commitment to a truth claim than 'to know' where the latter is understood as philosophical understanding? As Soloveitchik sees it, Maimonides' dictum 'to know that there is a God,' does not imply that each worshipper become a philosopher but rather that 'to know' (*l'eida*) means constant and unremitting awareness of God's existence, that allows for no inattention."

Chapter 3 Pathos and Sympathy.

Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950), formerly a professor of philosophy, founded the journal Esprit in 1932. Esprit became Mounier's platform for developing personalism as "a philosophy of engagement ... inseparable from a philosophy of the absolute or of the transcendence of the human model (Mounier, Be Not Afraid, Harper and Brothers, p. 135)." Personalism, published posthumously in 1950, is arguably a distillation of Mounier's insightful reflections on being-in-relation.

Mounier proposes that a "series of original actions" is inherent to a transubjective 'beingness' with other persons. Our considerations thus far with Heschel have led us to consider whether or not it is "proper to apply the term 'personal' to God[.]" While the mystery of creation is ineffable the cause is all personal: "God is never an 'it,' but is constantly given as a personal spirit, manifesting Himself as subject..."²⁰⁶ But what could Heschel possibly mean by stating that God is 'all personal'?

In chapter 1 we considered how Heschel's 'concrete universalism' encourages a sensitivity within the prophet-mystic for the interfaith situation. Yet, chapter 2 left us with the concern, how does the divine person as 'Subject' relate to the prophetmystic as this self-actualizing, interfaith agent? We may begin to raise the following questions against the horizon of these earlier considerations: may a reasonable creative tension between transcendence and immanence be maintained when arguing

²⁰⁵ See: Mark and Louise Zwick, "Roots of the Catholic Worker Movement: Emmanuel Mounier,

²⁰⁶ Heschel, *Prophets*, 622.

seminarian named Jean Daniélou who later became a Cardinal."

Personalism, and the Catholic Worker movement," Houston Catholic Worker (July-August, 1999): < http://www.cjd.org/paper/roots/rmounier.html> accessed on 20 October 2008: "Emmanuel Mounier

⁽¹⁹⁰⁵⁻¹⁹⁵⁰⁾ articulated the ideas of personalism, of human persons whose responsibility it is to take an active role in history, even while the ultimate goal is beyond the temporal and beyond human history...Mounier himself said that the personalist movement originated in the crisis which began with the Wall Street crash in 1929. Esprit, the journal of personalism, grew out of a movement, of conferences and discussions in every part of France around spirituality and faith in relation to analyses of the social problems and burning controversies of the time. Among the many Catholic intellectuals involved in the personalist movement were Jacques Maritain, Nicholas Berdyaev, and a young Jesuit

for a 'personal' God in Heschel? Is the call of divine pathos from a Divine 'person' (3.1), and the subsequent response in prophetic sympathy from the prophet (who is presumably also a 'person'), a relationship characterized by a truly creative *trans-subjectivity* beyond non-mutality (3.2 – 3.3)? If this is not the case, then what category -- other than sympathy -- will sharpen and maintain a dialectically more subtle intergivenness? Is there a phenomenologically more viable way of acknowledging both God and humanity's subjectivity in one another's midst (3.4)? Is God and humanity forevermore the 'object' of the other's projected similitude or may we re-imagine the relationship as a true partnership vis-à-vis a hermeneutics from empathy, in so far as the prophet may be considered as an independent center of action who is responding to the call of this Other (3.5)?

The enumeration of Mounier's 'original actions' on what 'being a person' means may give us two important tools for answering these questions: (1) it may provide us with a 'personalist' hermeneutic through which we may phenomenologically consider divine pathos; (2) and a 'reading' of pathos through personalism may give us further parameters for considering how God may be described as a person -- apropos of God's relationship to the person of the prophetic witness. To that end, let us first present our interpretive 'tool' of a personalist hermeneutic for considering pathos vis-à-vis Mounier's *Personalism* so that we may address the above questions.

(3.1) The Personalism of Pathos.

- (i) Going out of oneself -- The person is capable of detachment from oneself, of self-dispossession, of decentralizing itself in order to become available for others.
- (ii) Understanding -- This is ceasing to see oneself from one's own point of view, and looking at oneself from the standpoint of others. Not looking for 'myself' in someone else chosen for his likeness to 'me'...but accepting his singularity with 'my' own, in an action that welcomes him, and in an effort that recenters myself.
- (iii) Taking upon oneself -- sharing -- the destiny, the troubles, the joys or the tasks of another; taking him 'upon one's heart'.
- (iv) Giving...In generosity of self-bestowal -- ultimately, in giving without measure and without hope of reward. The economic of personality is an economic of donation, not of compensation nor of calculation. Generosity dissolves the opacity and annuls the solitude of the subject...
- (v) Faithfulness. Devotion to the person, therefore, love or friendship, cannot be perfect except in continuity. This continuity is not a mere prolongation or repetition of the same thing, like that of a material or logical generalization: it is a perpetual renewal. Personal faithfulness is creative faithfulness.²⁰⁷

In light of the above we may begin to 'read' pathos through personalism.

In regards to 'Going out of oneself' (i) Heschel argues pathos as transitive.

Pathos is "not a self-centred and self-contained state; it is always, in prophetic thinking, directed outward; it always expresses a relation to man...[i]t has a transitive rather than a reflexive character..." This transitive concern, this capability of detachment...of self dispossession (i) bespeaks an effusive "regard for others." And this "elemental fact" in God is pointing towards a divine desire for solidarity with otherness: "[t]he predicament of man is a predicament of God." Theologically, pathos

²⁰⁷Emmanuel Mounier, *Personalism* (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame Press, 2001), 20-21.

²⁰⁸ Heschel, *Prophets*, 291.

²⁰⁹ Rothschild, *Introduction*, 23.

as *transitive* is "signifying God as involved in history", and this "insight" is realized "in the light of the prophet's awareness of the mystery and transcendence of God."

In regards to *Understanding* (ii), the prophets "had no theory or 'idea' of God. What they had was an understanding...[t]o the prophets, God was overwhelmingly real and shatteringly present. They never spoke of Him as from a distance." The prophets "experienced the word as a living manifestation of God," where experiencing the divine 'recenters' (ii) the prophet. The prophetic witness may therefore develop an "increased sensitivity" to the situation or 'standpoint' (ii) of others through coming to know the divine Other.

Knowledge in the divine Person is therefore "not an impersonal knowledge" for God not only possesses "intelligence and will" but is capable of *being possessed* along a pathic curve i.e., the divine Person may be "intimately affected" *with and for* humanity. ²¹¹ Epistemologically, pathos "expresses the conviction that the Deity cannot be understood through a knowledge of timeless qualities of goodness and perfection, but only by sensing the living acts of God's concern and his dynamic attentiveness in relation to man, who is the passionate object of his interest." ²¹² This *sensing* and intuitive 'feel' for the pathos of the living acts of God, and the response this intuition awakens in the one-other-than-God, is *prophetic sympathy*. We will come to consider this 'response' to pathos in the next section of this chapter (*cf.* 3.2).

The *Sharing* (iii) and *Giving* (iv) of divine pathos is *situational* and not attributive to God "as something objective, as a finality with which man is confronted". Rather, both sharing and giving are *diakonia* -- they are "an expression of God's will". Both are a form of service to the other, and are a "functional rather than a substantial reality…not an unchangeable quality, not an absolute content of

²¹⁰ Heschel, *Prophets*, 291-292.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 286-287.

²¹² Rothschild, *Introduction*, 24.

divine Being, but rather a situation or the personal implication in His acts." So God's pathos is *situational*. And because God's pathos is situational it is also "ethical" because it is full of concern for persons: "God is absolutely personal -- devoid of anything impersonal". 213

It is "a reaction to human history"; "a response, not a cause" where God takes upon God's self the "total situation" of humankind: the tasks, the joys, the troubles, the destiny of others (iii). God as person engages with this 'total situation' through the 'economics' -- or production -- of a personality where donation, not compensation or calculation (iv), is the regula vitae communis between the divine Person and persons. God, who is "the source of justice", is therefore capable of "taking human pathos and giving it an ethos for flourishing."²¹⁵ If the divine Person's "inner law" is inherently a "moral law" -- where God's pathos is the ethos of generosity (iv) -- then the translucence of pathos is capable of annulling the opacity (iv) of the self-enclosed subject.²¹⁶

Finally, in regards to Faithfulness (v), pathos may be regarded as God's continuous devotion to the person (v), for "never in history has man been taken as seriously as in prophetic thinking. Man is not only an image of God; he is a perpetual concern of God." We experience the 'echo' and 'recall' of the continuousness of God's memory for us, a *continuity* (v) that 'is open to all'. This dynamic and recurrent initiation (Einführung) of God's pathos is not a mere prolongation or repetition (v) rather it is creative (v) because it "adds a new dimension to human

²¹³ Heschel, *Prophets*, 297.

²¹⁴ Rothschild, *Introduction*, 11: "Religion originates in a living situation...one must go beyond the phenomena of religion to that which necessitates religion in one's life: the total situation of man. Only by turning to the reality in which man encounters the significance of ultimate questions and in which he experiences those aspects of life which point to answers can we hope to gain a true understanding of religion."

See: Don E. Saliers, Worship as Theology: Foretaste of Glory Divine (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 29.

²¹⁶ Heschel, *Prophets*, 290-291.

existence...[t]he import of man raises him beyond the level of mere creature. He is a consort, a partner, a factor in the life of God."²¹⁷ The human person as God's consort "is constantly worked upon by God's spirit, and hence can never be altogether indifferent to the problems of religion (*Gaudium et spes*, §5)" for pathos means:

God is never neutral, never beyond good and evil. He is always partial to justice. [Pathos] is not a name for human experience, but the name for an object of human experience. [Pathos] is something the prophets meet with, something eventful, current, present in history as well as nature.²¹⁸

Heschel commentator Matthew Schimm argues, "divine pathos, though real, is an aspect of God's relationship with humanity rather than of God's essence...[w]hat is known of God in Scripture is knowledge of God's interactions with humanity..."²¹⁹ For Heschel, pathos is the "inspired communication of divine attitudes to the prophetic consciousness" while *also* being the "ground-tone of all these attitudes".²²⁰ So while pathos is not 'essential' to Godself it is a "central category" communicated in a distinctively *personal* pitch i.e., "[i]t is this idea of *personal concern* that forms the key concept in Heschel's philosophy. God's essence is inaccessible to man, but his dynamic modes of action in relation to the world and man are empirical datum..."²²¹

Pathos is a divine effusiveness, the manifestation of the Other to others; a revelation not in "an abstract absoluteness, but in a personal and intimate relation to the world." And in and through this personal relationship God does not "simply command" or "expect obedience". Rather, the relationship is one of compassion: the divine Person is "moved and affected by what happens in the world" and "reacts in an

²¹⁷ Ibid., 292.

²¹⁸ The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gaudium et spes, The Vatican (7 December 1965): <www.vatican.va>, §5; Ibid., 298.

Matthew R. Schimm, "Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos: An Examination of Hermeneutics in Biblical Theology," *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 69 (2007): 673-693; 687.

Heschel, *Prophets*, 288.

²²¹ Rothschild, *Introduction*, 22.

intimate and subjective manner."222 It is a self-effusive givenness in concern; an understanding for the situation of the other manifesting itself as a real, not notional, presence. It is a divine concern impregnating itself in the human situation vis-à-vis the prophet's concern -- where the joys and hopes and fears and anxieties of a people are already God's own. This situational concern 'kenotes' itself from an unchanging source.

The 'slow and silent stream' (cf. chapter 1) of memory is full of the living waters of pathos. An eternal concern touching the shores of both God and humanity as a perpetual promise: "you shall be my people, and I will be your God (Ezekiel 36:28)." It is a universal creative fidelity beckoning for the would-be prophet's 'sympathetic' present-tense response to this mystery from the "past" -- yet a mystery that is full of "meaning" in the present. To the prophetic response as solidarity we now turn.

²²² Heschel, *Prophets*, 286.

²²³ William E. Kaufman, "Abraham J. Heschel, The Meaning Beyond Mystery," in *Contemporary* Jewish Philosophies, (frwd.) Jacob Neusner (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1992), 142-174; 158: "Just as the collective faith of the Jewish people is based on its memory of unique, unrepeatable events, so in our individual lives our faith rests on our memory of those moments when we experienced the Divine...To be open to this possibility in the past, one must be open to the mystery in the present. The meaning beyond mystery can be understood only by those who have experienced the mystery."

²²⁴ Heschel, "Jewish Theology," *The Synagogue School*, 28/1 (Fall 1969): 4-18 in *MgSa*, 154-163; 163: "The supreme issue is not whether in the infinite darkness there is a grandeur of being that is the object of man's ultimate concern, but whether the reality of God confronts us as a pathos -- God's ultimate concern with good and evil -- or whether God is mysteriously present in the event of history. Whether being is contingent upon creation, whether creation is contingent upon care, whether my life is dependent upon His care, whether in the course of my life I come upon his guidance. I, therefore, suggest that God is either of no importance or of supreme importance. God is He whose regard for me is more precious than life. Otherwise He is not God. God is the meaning beyond the mystery."

(3.2) Sympathetic Solidarity.

The "central endeavour" of prophetic praxis is to "set forth" God's "divine life" before the people as a concern -- "not only a covenant, but also a pathos; not the eternal immutability of His Being, but the presence of His pathos in time"; i.e., God's "direct relatedness to man." For ultimately "all expressions of pathos are attempts to set forth God's aliveness." The prophet, having been "ineluctably placed within the field of divine perception," sets forth to the nations God's divine life through a remembering mindfulness: "[d]ivine concern remembered in sympathy is the stuff of which prophecy is made." Remembering and reminding; remembering God's desire to be with the people, and reminding the people of this desire enacts memory through meaning.

The prophetic witness is "living in the perpetual awareness of being perceived, apprehended, noted by God, of being an object of the divine Subject." This being 'noted by God' -- being able to "experience oneself as a divine secret" -- is "the most precious insight" for the prophet. This *being* aware of God as the one called upon to remind both God, and a people, to remember the covenant they share provokes "a powerful active response" in the prophet. It is nothing less than a "voluntary self-alignment with the divine pathos" coming as a flesh-and-blood response to a call: *Henani! 'Here I am'*.

The prophet says, *here I am, send me*, and this prophetic witness is flooded through by an openness, a sincerity towards others, a giving without counting the cost, a radical witness where memory *enacts* solidarity. Solidarity with the other breaks the self-sufficiency of the self-enclosed subject. Levinas says, "[i]t is

²²⁵ Heschel, *Prophets*, 355.

²²⁶ Ibid., 279.

²²⁷ Ibid., 619.

sincerity, effusion of oneself, 'extraditing' of the self to the neighbor. Witness is humility and admission: it is made before all theology; it is kerygma and prayer, glorification and recognition." The 'extradition' of the self for the other is *kenosis* and *perichoresis*. The self-emptying is a kind of intercommunication with otherness. It is intercommunication between the one being sent, and the one asking for the sending. And in this inter-communication, the 'third party' of the Infinite makes itself known in and through the face of the other. Heschel calls this prophetic response sympathy:

Seeing that God has a stake in the human situation and that the human predicament is also a predicament of God, [the prophetic witness] responds with *sympathy* and makes God's concern his own. Against *mystical union* where man attains a state of identity with the divine, and against the *idea of incarnation* where the divine becomes man, stands the *sympathetic union*. Here man's personality is not annihilated or identified with the divine essence, but a feeling of complete solidarity with God's purpose and will engenders a new kind of divine-human partnership in which the attainment of God's aims depends on human co-operation and effort."²³¹

The prophet, by taking upon herself the 'concerns' of God, makes God's concern her own. The "predominant and staggering aspect" the prophet "encounters" is one of being called to a 'divine-human partnership', and this becomes the "central feature" of the prophet's *modus vivendi*. The prophet *undergoes* a being called; God calls with a voice of pathos, and this voice bespeaks a total "involvement" of the prophet's

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²³¹ Rothschild, *Introduction*, 26.

²²⁸ Levinas, *OB*, 149.

Levinas, "Violence du visage," an interview with Angelo Bianchi (Hermeneutica, 1985) in Alterity and Transcendence, (trans.) Michael B. Smith, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 181-182, hereafter AT: "... [T]he Jewish Prayer, the daily prayer, replaces the sacrifices of the Temple, according to Jewish theology...it is in its entirety an offering. There is an exception when one prays for Israel persecuted. In that case one prays for the community, but it is a prayer for people called to reveal the glory of God...In our suffering, God suffers with us. Doesn't the psalmist say (Psalms 91:15): "I am with him in distress'? It is God who suffers most in human suffering. The I who suffers prays for the suffering of God, who suffers by the sin of man and the painful expiation for sin. A kenosis of God!"

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 150: "It is in prophecy that the Infinite escapes the objectification of thematization and dialogue, and signifies as *illeity*, in the third person...[T]he Infinite orders to me the neighbor as a face, without being exposed to me, and does so the more imperiously that proximity narrows...I find the order in my response itself, which, as a sign given to the neighbor, as a "here I am," brings me out of invisibility...[t]his saying belongs to the very glory of which it bears witness."

entire "religious consciousness". The prophet's "attitudes, hopes, prayers" -- his entire being -- is "stirred by an intimate concern for the divine concern".

There is a meeting of concerns: "the demand" is spoken to the prophet, and these "moments of revelation" are responded to in the "essential mode" of sympathy. There is an alignment of responsibility; an immediate and unmediated *sym*-pathos with the divine: "[e]poché in the face of divine involvement would be callousness to the divine."²³² The prophet has a compassion-filled "awareness" for the "unity of the psychical life" wherein "passions" may "form an integral part of the human structure".

The prophet, who is sympathetic-other-to-God *per definitionem*, will necessarily find "an emotional religion of sympathy" to be more agreeable than "a self-detached religion of obedience". The prophetic witness not only "apprehends the divine pathos" but is also "*convulsed*" by the call. The prophet becomes "an *ish haruach*, a man driven and emboldened by the spirit of God," where the word "breaks out in him like a storm in the soul." It is a convulsion inciting *not* a "mental appropriation" of the divine pathos but rather a "harmony of his being with

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²³² NB: The following in section 3.2 is quoted from Heschel, *The Prophets*, 393-398, unless noted otherwise. Kaufman reminds us, "The Meaning Beyond Mystery", 146-147: "[Heschel] attempted to analyze the form and content of the prophetic experience without making any judgment as to whether the event happened in fact as it *appeared* to the prophets." However, as *The Prophets* progresses, Heschel argues that "[c]onceptual thinking, taken by itself, is inadequate. It must be complemented by situational thinking." The above therefore suggests that the pure reflection of a classical phenomenological method gives itself over, in Heschel, to a more 'situational' phenomenology. 'Bracketing' the *realness* of the prophet's experience from prophetic consciousness is therefore deemed to be an unnecessary fissure of one aspect under consideration from the other. For Heschel, consciousness and a religious praxis are inextricably united.

²³³ Moltmann, *The Crucified God*, 272. See: G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren (eds.), *The Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament*, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997) 233: 'ish and 'ishshah are used in connection with → נבריא nabhî', 'prophet,' and nebhi'ah, 'prophetess': 'ish nabhi', lit. 'a man, a prophet,'...It is significant that 'ish also appears in connection with ¬ ידימבh, 'spirit' or ruach 'elohim, 'spirit of God.' This means the divine power which differentiates the 'ish who possesses it from other men, and emphasizes the special charisma which he has...the man on whom the spirit of God falls 'is completely changed' (¬ ¬ haphakh), so that because of it he emerges as 'another man' (le'ish'acher), who is called a 'madman' ('ish meshugga', Jer. 29:26; cf. 2K. 9:11; Hos. 0:7)

<sup>9:7).
&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> Heschel, *Prophets*, 395, *italics* added.

its fundamental intention and emotional content". The "homo sympathetikos" as opposed to Stoicism's "homo apathetikos" is attributed with emotions, and the divine pathos "takes possession of his heart and mind". This being possessed, as it were, by a divine concern, may enable the prophet to respond in the midst of opposition; i.e., "with courage to act against the world".

The prophet, we may conclude, *undergoes* a pathos: it is "an overflow of powerful emotion which comes in response to what he sensed in divinity." The prophet feels a *concern* 'weighing upon *my* shoulders', where the "only way to intuit a feeling is to feel it". And furthermore, in "contradistinction to empathy" -- where empathy implies "living the situation of another person" -- "sympathy" however intends a "living with another person".

But who is this person Heschel keeps telling us the prophet is 'living with'? Prophetic sympathy is "a state in which a person is open to the presence of another person", the prophet becomes available to the "presence and emotion of the transcendent Subject" where God is understood to be the Subject. This person-to-person openness between the prophet and God-qua-subject has a "dialogical structure"; an "interpersonal relationship" phenomenologically evincing itself in two ways: (i) "a relationship between the one who feels and the one who sympathizes with that feeling" of the other; and (ii) "a relationship of having a feeling in common". And yet, both expressive nuances of sympathy are primordially a "feeling which feels the feeling to which it reacts". The prophet reacts, and by doing so feels the immanence of the transcendent Subject's divine pathos. As distinct to a "religion of quietude or adoration," sym-pathos evokes "an attitude of many facets" that "knows no bounds within the horizontally human" situation. It is a response of "action" where knowing no bounds means responding to "the world's misery, society's

injustice [and] the people's alienation." And the "religious legitimization" of the prophet's "feeling and affection" towards others is already underwritten by a transcendent concern: "from the vertical dimension within which pathos moves". The intersection of these horizontal and vertical dimensions "creates a marvel of intense existence" where call and response are being given to one another as a *feeling-with* and a *feeling-for* God's concerns. Within the prophetic consciousness "mystical and rational thinking is combined" in a dynamic, 'intergiven' way such that it "puts to shame all slogans about rational and irrationalism."

There is nothing less than an "emotional harmony and concord" with the Subject, and this sym-pathos "presupposes some sort of knowledge of the nature of the pathos" on behalf of the prophet. It may be a kind of "prophetic sense". And yet, this presupposed sense of pathos is not necessarily an "innate faculty" for sympathy. Rather, it is ultimately a response to a call: "the prophet has to be called in order to respond, he has to receive in order to reciprocate", and this reciprocity *i.e.*, the "prophet's communion" with God is "complete surrender and devotion".

Yet is Heschel's philosophy capable of holding in tension 'complete surrender' with a contemporary prophetic praxis, especially when cast against a dialogically sensitive, post-modern interreligious horizon? Kaufmann reminds us, "[d]espite its literary antecedents, the concept of God in search of man is not congenial to the modern mind. Few people today experience the irresistible compulsion of being seized by God, as did the ancient Hebrew prophets."²³⁶

Let us now turn to consider Heschel on sympathy as a form of *surrender of the nonself*. After having considered his argument(s) we may consider whether or not an

²³⁶ Kaufman, "The Meaning Beyond Mystery", 156.

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²³⁵ R. Kittel, *Gestalten und Gedanken in Israel* (Leipzig, 1925), 505 in Heschel, *Prophets*, 397.

argument from surrender is 'anthropologically' sustainable in so far as the category of personhood, and persons-in-relation, vis-à-vis *trans-subjectivity*, may remain relevant.

(3.3) Towards a Contemporary Prophetic Witness: Sympathy as Surrender?

Heschel argues for a necessary distinction between God and humanity (i) while concomitantly arguing for the 'nonself' of the person-qua-prophet in his being given for God (ii).

In regards to (i): "it is mistaken to consider the duty of oneself and the will of God as opposites as it is to identify them. To serve does not mean to surrender but to share," while

In regards to (ii): "[w]e have suggested that the outstanding feature of a person is his ability to transcend himself, his attentiveness to the nonself. To be a person is to have a concern for the nonself," for "[s]elf-centeredness is the tragic misunderstanding of our destiny" and the person will remain "spiritually immature" until "it grows in the concern for the non-self." ²³⁸

Heschel's 'response-as-surrender' may have the quality of being both kenotic and eschatological where God, understood to be the Subject, empties Godself into the other. The prophetic agent, as the aim of God's concern for justice and righteousness also becomes the prophetic agent's concern. God's desire becomes the prophet's *eschaton*. And her response in striving towards this end bespeaks a radical givenness: she gives all of herself to *the concern* of the Other through a living for and with others. Indeed, through the 'decentralization' (i) of oneself, as Mounier argues, the prophet becomes 'available for others' (i). Such dynamic self-emptying stands in contrast to a formalized interiority as envisaged in the *cogito*. Levinas is helpful on this point:

²³⁷ Heschel, *Prophets*, 622.

...[F]or it is beyond the unity of apperception of the *I think*, which is actuality itself. It is a being torn up from oneself for another in the giving to the other of the bread out of one's mouth. This is not an anodyne formal relation, but all the gravity of the body extirpated from its *conatus essendi* in the possibility of giving.²³⁹

The relevance of prophetic sympathy comes in a response that may be likened to "an undoing of the substantial nucleus of the ego" where the "ego' of the purely autonomous modern self' is undone through a prophetic witnessing to the other. 240 The prophetic witness becomes assigned to a future not of their own making through their response to the other. When confronted by the other(s) nothing less than "a 'here I am' (me voici) can answer, where the pronoun 'I' is in the accusative, declined before any declension, possessed by the other..." With Isaiah one says "here I am" and thus becomes a prophet-with-and-for-the-other through sympathy. 241 Heschel argues, in categories akin to Marion, that

[p]rophetic experience is more than an encounter or a confrontation. It is a moment of being overwhelmed by the tremendous arrival. From a distance, the word surges forth to land in the prophet's soul. It is more than the sense of being addressed, of receiving a communication; it is more accurate to describe it as *the sense of being overpowered* by the word.²⁴²

The Other, in a sense, energizes me and stimulates 'my' response which is a response which tears me from my narrow circle of self. The self-thematization of concern for only *what I need* is laid open to the wider campaign of the Subject's transcendent desire for justice and peace. Levinas concludes that the prophet "exhausts" herself in the saying, "here I am" for you from beyond "my" own needs. Heschel refines the dynamic of being 'exhausted' vis-à-vis the phenomenological category of being *exposed*:

²³⁹ Levinas, *OB*, 142.

²⁴⁰ Tracy, DwO, 119.

²⁴¹ Levinas, *OB*, 142.

²⁴² Heschel, *Prophets*, 570.

²⁴³ Levinas, *OB*, 143: "It is to exhaust oneself in exposing oneself, to make signs by making oneself a sign, without resting in one's every figure as a sign...this very extradition is delivered over to the other...[T]his is the pre-reflexive iteration of the saying of this very saying, a statement of the "here I am" which is identified with nothing but the very voice that states and delivers itself, the voice that signifies."

Upon the level of normal consciousness I find myself wrapt in self-consciousness and claim that my acts and states originate in and belong to myself. But in penetrating and exposing the self, I realize that the self did not originate in itself, that the essence of the self is in its being a non-self, that ultimately man is not a subject but an *object*.²⁴⁴

The "directness" -- this 'being overpowered' -- by "divine acts of expression" habituates the prophet to accept God's 'expressions' with an "immediacy" that does not require analogy"; i.e., prophetic consciousness may affirm "the essential unknowability of God" while concomitantly holding for "the possibility of understanding Him by reflective intuition". Heschel concludes,

Since the time of Descartes it has been asserted that the understanding of the other selves takes place through analogy. While it is true that we do not experience a person independently of his bodily actions or expressions, yet through, and in connection with, these expressions, other selves are experienced with the same immediacy with which we experience our own selves. Our conviction as to their existence is based upon directly experienced fellowship, not upon inference.

The prophet's "knowledge of God" meant "fellowship with Him...by living together." ²⁴⁵

The "neutral observer" may come to a "comprehension" of what it means to be in love, for example, from another person who is in love "by way of analogy". The beloved, however -- "the person for whom these expressions are intended" -- this person has an "immediate understanding" of the intentionality: "the intuitive knowledge which the beloved person possesses is a primary factor in the act of understanding" that she is being loved. And this 'act of understanding' is realized 'da'at elohim': a knowledge of God that is a "sympathetic understanding" (*Verständnis*). This understanding is comprehended at a new depth; it is realized as a solidarity (*Einverständnis*) with God in the present situation. ²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ Heschel, *MNA*, 48.

²⁴⁵ Heschel, *Prophets*, 287-88.

²⁴⁶ Rothschild, *Introduction*, 26: The Biblical term '*da'at elohim*,' which is usually translated as 'knowledge of God,' ought to be rendered as 'understanding' or 'sympathy for God.' The experience of the divine pathos mediated through the Word or the events of history that are interpreted as

(3.4) Ways to Know God: Partnering with God and the World.

Edith Stein questions in Knowledge and Faith: Ways to Know God whether or not "we should speak of knowledge of God at all". For while one may hold for a "natural" and "personal experiential" knowledge of the divine, in prophetic experience this knowledge "will always be taken as coming from God". The prophet who receives the revelation "knows that he is undergoing divine action". For example:

Isaiah looked upon God himself and heard his word; and if our reading of his account is correct, he became certain in his innermost being that God himself was present. And only when this happens may we speak of a personal experiential knowledge of God. 247

In Stein's account the prophet gradually becomes 'certain' of God's presence and pathos as a unique centre of action. She does this as a person endowed with critical abilities; as one going on pilgrimage with God for the sake of the world. There is (i) a looking upon God; (ii) a hearing of the word; and (iii) a reception of the word. The prophet gains a personal and experiential knowledge of God as a subject. Undergoing 'divine action' means for Heschel a being 'convulsed' into surrender. In Stein's view, however, the prophet passes through "various degrees and transitions" wherein "[e]ach higher stage represents a richer, deeper self-revelation and commitment of God to the soul". This will mean "an ever deeper and fuller penetration into God and

expressions of the divine attitude, leads to a sympathetic understanding (Verständnis), which, in turn, results in solidarity (Einverständnis). But owing to the nature of the divine pathos as an ever-changing reaction of the Deity to human behavior, understanding for God -- unlike 'knowledge of God' -cannot, once attained, remain man's permanent and safe possession. The voice speaks to man not in timeless abstraction but in singular moments of life and history. Attentive to the unique demand of the hour, man becomes a partner in the work of creation, not by withdrawing from the temporal, but by sensing and meeting the challenge of the time." See also: Kaplan, Abraham Joshua Heschel, 164: "Verstehen [comprehension] makes possible, as opposed to Erkennen [knowledge], a multiplicity of relationships with the 'comprehended' person. The prophet experiences emotional and intellectual situations...' The footnote to this passage cited recognized authorities to validate his methodology: 'The idea of Verstehen, introduced into the human sciences by Dilthey, Spranger, Jaspers, can be extremely fertile as a category of theological systemization [Die Prophetie, 1936, p. 128-129; 129n2]."

²⁴⁷ Stein, "Ways to Know God: The 'Symbolic Theology' of Dionysius the Areopagite and Its Objective Presuppositions," in Knowledge and Faith, (eds.) L. Gelber and Michael Linseen, (trans.) Walter Redmond (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2000), 105-106, hereafter KF.

acquaintance with him, which demands from the soul an ever more total surrender." In this sense, surrender is neither a once-and-for-all immediate event nor does it mean the forced capitulation of 'my' unique 'I'. It is a gradual deepening of a subject-tosubject relationship with the divine; a kenosis through exstasis; where a partnering with God will also mean a partnering with the world for the sake of God.²⁴⁸ How could it be otherwise? How may one surrender a 'nonself'? Unless, of course, one's subjectivity has been completely reduced to the level of an object. But the prophet needs to be more than a means to God's end. The prophetic witness, rather, also gives meaning to the divine project. The contemporary prophet, knowing herself as an independent center of action, and yet a partner of God, balances this call to responsibility with personal freedom so that her response may be inclusive of the human situation(s).²⁴⁹

Stein concludes, "in faith divine and human freedom meet" and faith "as mediated encounter...awakens a longing for an immediate encounter with God...the very content of faith awakens desire." ²⁵⁰ And yet, this longing for immediacy never trumps freedom. Stein, therefore, while arguing for the distinct and real possibility of a prophetic givenness in sympathy, is also phenomenologically frank in considering the real possibility of non-reception that happens between persons:

²⁴⁸ Green, Seek My Face, 172: "...the cosmos itself is to be saved by human action, that God is in need of a redemption, to be effected through us. Here, the Divine and the human are joined together: both are redeemer and both are redeemed...the center of religious obligation for us lies in the realm of beyn adam le-havero, the realization of divinity through deeds within the human community. These remain mitzot for us, obligations created and acknowledged in the course of creating a Jewish community, and forms of service that respond to the all-embracing divine word. Such deeds, we claim, have the power to reunify the divine name -- or to redeem Y-H-W-H."

²⁴⁹ Cf. Mounier, Personalism, 90: "The prophetic gesture can be formed with conscious will to have an effect upon the situation, although by means that derive more from faith in the transcendent power of the absolute than in any efficient causes it may set in motion. The prophet may even grasp the situation in all its depth so fully that [her] witness turns into a practical action." Stein, KF, 113-114.

But in the case of any knowledge of persons, rather than disclosing [erschliessen] oneself, one may close oneself [verschliessen] -- even withdraw behind one's own work. In this case the work still means something, retains an objective significance, but it no longer opens up to access to the person, it no longer provides the contact of one mind to another.²⁵¹

If Heschel is going to maintain God under the nomenclature of divine Person then the question arises as to whether or not the prophet's knowledge of God, as presented as solidarity-through-sympathy, is illustrative of a person-to-person, *transubjective* relationship or is the prophetic witness a mere extension of God's pathos? Are 'other selves', even God, really 'experienced with the same immediacy with which we experience our own selves'?

Prophetic sympathy, if it is personalist, will respect the Divine Person's distance and belonging to other persons. The inter-givenness of love, this kenotic *trans-subjectivity*, works within the dialectical nexus of relating-in-unity what is distinct such that a *being exposed* does not mean the 'annihilation' of selfhood. Mounier puts it well: "the person, by the movement which is its being, *ex-poses* itself." And this exposure of itself shows itself to be "communicable": "I exist for others, and that to be is, in the final analysis, to love."

(3.4.1) Sympathy 'Shaping' Pathos: Beyond Surrender through Mutuality.

While Heschel argues for an *Einverständnis*, *e.g.*, 'to serve does not mean to surrender but to share' and "[t]he culmination of prophetic fellowship with God is insight and unanimity -- not union," where God is more a mutual "partner", ²⁵³ in other places, 'in contradistinction to empathy' he argues for the "meontology" of surrender: *the self is exposed, overpowered; one is greeted with the 'immediacy' of*

²⁵² Mounier, *Personalism*, 20.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 105-106.

²⁵³ Heschel, *Prophets*, 287.

²⁵⁴ Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence*, (trans.) Patrick Madigan, Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, Mn: The Liturgical Press, 1995), 500, 502, hereafter *Symbol*: "the sub-human condition of *mē on* ('non-being' see 1 Cor 1:28; Isa 52:14; Ps 22:6)."

becoming a 'nonself' through the giving of oneself. If the God of the philosophers may be likened to one who "thinks, but does not speak" -- as one who "is conscious of himself but oblivious to the world" -- while the God of the Hebrew Bible is "the God of Israel...a God Who loves, a God Who is known to, and concerned with, man," the an argument from non-mutuality ('the subject -- man -- becomes object, and the object -- God -- becomes subject' so that 'all mutual relations end', cf. chapter 2), especially in light of Heschel's personalist horizon, subtly vitiates the prophet's freedom to respond as this irreplaceable person who is partnering with God. While the prophet's mission is co-extensive with the missio Dei in building the reign of justice and peace, their 'personalities', the divine and human, are not contiguous. If God's pathos is, as Heschel has been arguing, situational 'as an expression of God's will' in time; a 'functional reality' capable of responding to the thisness of the world, then one must believe that the "critical capacities" of this particular contemporary prophet at this particular moment in time are indeed needed for the world project of tiqqun olam. 256

Lest we overstate the case, Heschel's personalist argument *does* 'protect' God from being "conceived as an abstract principle or process", and (re)situates the divine "as the *living God*". Heschel concludes in *The Prophets*:

²⁵⁷ Rothschild, *Introduction*, 25.

²⁵⁵ Heschel, *Prophets*, 289.

²⁵⁶ Kaufmann, "The Meaning Beyond Mystery", 162: "It is true that our concepts cannot capture the essence of God, but the attempt to frame a concept of God is one of the noblest aspirations of the human mind...[w]hy does Heschel demean man's critical capacities? The reason is that his yardstick is the past [Heschel, *GSM*, 222]: 'In calling upon the prophets to stand before the bar of our critical judgment, we are like dwarfs undertaking to measure the heights of giants.' To be sure we must examine figures of the past with reverence. We cannot dismiss the past as obsolete...The most appropriate attitude is phenomenological -- an attempt to understand the life-world of the prophets. And we must conduct such a study with a respect for the integrity of their minds. But just as we are not giants and they are not dwarfs, we are also not dwarfs and they are not giants. Our critical judgment is our highest faculty. Why should it be demeaned? Why can't a reverential attitude be taken both to our present reality and our past history? They need not be mutually exclusive. This is the fallacy involved in Heschel's treatment of modern man."

Prophetic experience was not a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what has been called 'something there,' but rather a feeling of subjective presence, a perception of what may be called *Someone here*. He is all personal. He is all-Subject, not the object of man's quest, but He Who is in search of man.²⁵⁸

The prophetic witness need not live from the hope of drawing out the Unmoved Mover through an unidirectional 'love': "[t]he final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved (*kinei dê hôs erômenon, kinoumena de talla kinei*)."²⁵⁹ This 'one-way' desire, 'my' subjective hyper-kenotic givenness towards the Unconcerned and Unresponsive Deity, subverts a more inter-kenotic understanding of *pathos;* this, too, is a way of loving *beyond mutuality*. For the personalist view, however, Heschel commentator Fritz Rothschild's pithy turn of phrase recommends itself in describing the God who is *living* as *Someone here*: '[t]he pathetic God as distinguished from the God of Aristotle is not the Unmoved Mover but "the *Most Moved Mover*'. The Most Moved is qualified beyond the self-sufficiency of the "inner *logos*" of *Nous-Nousing-Nous*. In this sense, this Living Other may be "called a *person*."

And yet, is Heschel's attribution of God *as Person*, even Rothschild wonders, "strictly correct"? Personhood "usually denote[s] the essential structure of a human being which determines his modes of behavior. God, whose essence is incomprehensible and who is known only by his acts and expressions, cannot properly be called a person..." Eliezer Berkovits, in a rather trenchant review of *The Prophets*, sharpens this perspective:

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²⁵⁸ Heschel, *Prophets*, 621.

²⁵⁹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.7; 1072b4, The Internet Classics Archive:

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/

metaphysics.12.xii.html> accessed on 1 November 2009.

²⁶⁰ Rothschild, *Introduction*, 25.

Jewish theology begins when one realizes the implications of the presence of both aspects, that of the Absolute and of the Personal, in the biblical concept of God...the fundamental challenge to Jewish theology through the ages has been how to reconcile the awareness of God's transcendence with the awareness of God's livingness and concern, which are one in the Jewish concept of God. It is this challenge that gave no rest to the outstanding Jewish philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages; it is this challenge that is completely ignored by Dr. Heschel.²⁶¹

So this raises the necessary *proviso*: how far may Heschel's analogy of God as person really go? Does the Divine Person's 'subjectivity' trump the very God-given subjectivity of the prophet? Is the prophetic witness an independent center of action that is in an increasingly greater communion and communication with God and others or is she a kind of mere extension or "conduit" for the divine pathos? As if the prophet "were not present" but rather simply "a repository of information", where one behaves toward another as though he were an object, "which means in effect, despairing of him"? ²⁶³

The prophet needs to be more than a 'vasum Dei' of a God who seemed silent in the face of genocide. The prophet, who will also be part mystic in contemporary, dialogical situations, will need to feel the 'freedom' of being given to the interfaith dialogue. The prophetic witness is then rightly challenged by contemporary exigencies to be one who 'theodically' attends to God's concern where faithfulness is creative faithfulness (v). And if personal faithfulness is a creative faithfulness then the prophet's response to the many vicissitudes of everyday living ought to have a concomitant 'shaping' influence on God's pathos. In this sense, God's pathos is in

²⁶¹ Eliezer Berkovits, "Dr. A. J. Heschel's Theology of Pathos," in *Tradition*, 6/2 (Spring-Summer, 1964): 67-104; 79-80.

²⁶³ Mounier, Personalism, 22-23.

²⁶² Cf. Stephen G. Post, "The Inadequacy of Selflessness: God's Suffering and the Theory of Love," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 56/2 (Summer, 1988): 213-228; 214: "Neither mutual nor reciprocal, the source of this saintly love is not human but divine-divine agape flows downward through the believer to the anonymous neighbor. Nygren, for instance, refers to the moral agent as a 'tube' or 'channel' (735). 'All that can be called agape,' writes Nygren, 'derives from God' (736). This divine love is, we are told, 'spontaneous and unmotivated,' 'pure and disinterested.' See: A. Nygren, Agape and Eros [orig.: Den kristna kärlekstanken genom tiderna: Eros och Agape], (trans.) Philip S. Watson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

perpetual renewal (v) in so far as the divine Person's 'getting-together' with humanity is responsive to the plurivocal, multiform, unity-in-diversity structure of interpersonal relations.

So when 'I' regard the other as a subject, or when I regard God's regard for the other as subjective, this is "to treat him *as a subject, as a presence* -- which is to recognize that I am unable to define or classify him, that he is inexhaustible..." While Berkovits' criticism raises our attention to the further necessity of relating how God's immanence may be 'situated' in a sharper dialectical tension with transcendence, we also believe that to view such a 'distance' as insurmountable would be facile at best. Heschel's *oeuvre* shows an increasing desire for a more

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²⁶⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁶⁵ Alan Brill, "Aggadic Man: The Poetry and Rabbinic Thought of Abraham Joshua Heschel," *Meorot:* A Forum of Modern Orthodox Discourse 6/1 (Shevat 5767/2006): 1-21; 5 argues that in Heschel's view "prophecy describes a fundamental phenomenological orientation to the divine as a form of sympathy with God," such that "the prophetic sensibility equals revelation" where revelation "has three options in the modern world: a return to a medieval sensibility, a comparative religion category of paranormal consciousness, or a direct experience of a God-infused mystical and poetic life." Brill concludes that within Heschel's system "the subtleties of the relations between the three options are not fully worked out," and it seems as if "Heschel oscillates between R. Ishmael's rejection of metaphysics and R. Akiva's acceptance of a mystical heavenly Torah before returning to the experiential approach," and these "wavering theological reflections on revelation and prophecy have not been superseded." Rather, any theologizing on who the prophet is or should be for today, or on what prophetic praxis means in a post-Shoah, interreligious context has settled for the "safety of historicism". But it strikes us that Heschel in Heavenly Torah: as Refracted Through the Generations (Torah min ha-shamavim beaspaklaria shel ha-dorot, hereafter TMH), (ed.) and (trans.) with commentary from Gordon Tucker and Leonard Levin (New York: Continuum, 2007) is precisely attempting to move beyond the 'safety of historicism' by dealing with the Ishmaelian/Akivan split by continually asking, and further exploring, questions like "Is the Prophet a Partner or a Vessel (Chapter 26, pp. 478-497)?" TMH commentator Gordon Tucker, tells us in the chapter introduction, the following: "The Israelites, for their part, were considered by the Akivans to have been overwhelmed by the divine word, their minds taken over and penetrated by God's will. The Ishmaelians, however, maintained that the Israelites never lost their powers of reasoning and in fact processed the divine thoughts coming through Moses' words in a natural, human way. The different styles of the prophets, not to mention the times when prophets confronted God, must all be dealt with as this controversy develops, and Heschel sets out the texts and the ideas for us. We thus have two different views of what prophecy actually is. It is a subject that had claimed Heschel's attention ever since he wrote Die Prophetie in Germany." Heschel argues dialectically in attempting to hold the two approaches in balance. For example, on the matter of whether or not the prophet is a vessel or partner, Heschel argues, pp. 479-480: "We have been given two approaches to prophecy: (1) Moses our master was merely a vessel that the Holy and Blessed One used, a trumpet that God played; he neither subtracted from, nor added to, what was spoken to him; and (2) Moses our master was a partner in the matter of prophecy. According to the first approach...The persona of the prophet is like the appearance of the moon. Just as the moon receives its light from the sun, not having any light of her own, so the prophet receives divine orders or divine inspiration; he is passive, devoid of initiative...His own vital forces leave him, and the spirit of God enters into him, plucks his vocal chords, and the words emanate from his mouth. Under Philo's influence this idea

dialectically subtle articulation of how God's immanence is subtending God's transcendence precisely because of what is at stake for a post-*Shoah*, Jewish and Christian understanding of prophetic praxis: "transcendence in reference to God means difference, not distance...the more transcendent God is, the more immanent -- as every mystic knew." 266

(3.4.2) Neither Self-Abnegation nor Self-Infatuation: Mutuality.

Stephen G. Post, in challenging the idea of non-mutuality, appeals to Heschel's own insights on a pathic God, in arguing that a "spontaneous and unmotivated," 'pure and disinterested'" love, divine or otherwise, remains immutable love. Post concludes, a "[m]utual love" is the "only appropriate fundamental norm" not only for "human interrelations" but also "for the divine-human encounter as well." If God's pathos is 'all personal' then the prophet's love will be selfless and also self-regarding:

entered the Christian literature on prophecy. Athenagoras (ca. 177 C.E.) believed that the holy spirit enters into the prophet just as a flutist blows into the hollow of a flute [Athenagoras, A Plea Regarding Christians ch. 9, in Early Christian Fathers, (ed.) C.C. Richardson (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953) 1:308.]...On the other hand, the verse 'You represent the people before God' (Exodus 18:19) was expounded in the school of Rabbi Ishmael as follows 'Be for them as an instrument filled with utterances [MI Amole (Yitro) 2].' Now at first glance it would appear that the masters of the midrash and Philo had the very same intent. But it is not so. The meaning of the phrase 'instrument of song' is not the same as that of 'instrument of utterances'. 'Instrument of song' means just what it says: it emits only what is played on or through it; its denotation is a will-less vessel, a mere mass devoid of initiative. By contrast, it is clear that the phrase 'instrument of utterances' was not intended to express that Moses was a mere will-less vessel, vasum Dei. For as we have seen above, it was taught in the school of Rabbi Ishmael that Moses our Master did things on his own authority..." Pace Berkovits, it would appear from the above example(s) that the types of fundamental challenges 'that gave no rest to the outstanding Jewish philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages' are neither being ignored by Heschel, nor is he eschewing the task of grappling with the hermeneutical interplay between the Akivan-Ishmaelian exegetical projects. While, in this instance, Heschel's commentary would appear to be more deferential towards the Ishmaelian approach, his desire to strike a meaningful, dialectical balance between the two schools consistently exercised him: "Rivka Horwitz, in an early review of the first two volumes [of TMH] put her finger on this: 'Often...we have the sense that we are facing an impassioned poet [in Heschel] who speaks of matters that tug at his own heartstrings," from "Iyyun Hadash Bemakhshevet ha-Tannaim," Molad 23 (1965): 242 in TMH, xxv. ²⁶⁶ Scanlon, "The Postmodern Debate," 233.

While the egocentric love of self that places "I" at the center of the universe is anathema, so also is the abandonment of all self-concern that confuses the valid prohibition against selfishness with selflessness. It is as much a moral violation of the equilibrium that mutuality entails to negate the "I" as it is to ignore the "Thou." Mutuality, not mere giving, is the goal of love. Both self-infatuation and selfabnegation leave the agent unattached in any essential way to community so that a significant loss occurs. 267

The sameness and otherness of both God and the prophet, where one's sameness is related to the other's otherness "along a range of varying distances in the relation between self and others" 268 is verified by Post's more discriminative approach from mutuality. Neither God's self-infatuation nor the prophet's self-abnegation (or vice versa) will do. A dialectically sensitive mutuality tempers any surrender to nonotherness for only subjects-in-relation, where "[t]he thou, which implies the we, is prior to the *I* -- or at least accompanies it,"²⁶⁹ may be "a pattern" for humanity's relationship with the divine.²⁷⁰

It is our contention that Heschel's perspectives may be critically advanced towards a more contemporary, interreligiously attuned vision of what it means to be a prophetic witness through the 'middle term' of empathy. Moreover, the beginning of the response may *already* be found in Heschel's phenomenology on sympathy

²⁶⁷ Post, "The Inadequacy of Selflessness: God's Suffering and the Theory of Love," 214-216. Like Post, Jürgen Moltmann recovers the idea of pathos for Christianity. He argues for an essentially pathic and kenotic agape that is neither self-seeking nor self-regarding where apatheia means positively, yet counter-intuitively, freedom in transcendence towards otherness.: "[W]hat Christianity proclaimed as the agape of God and the believer was rarely translated as pathos. Because true agape derives from the liberation from the inward and outward fetters of the flesh (sarx), and loves without self-seeking and anxiety, without ira et studio, apatheia could be taken up as enabling ground for this love and be filled with it. Love arises from the spirit and from freedom, not from desire or anxiety. The apathetic God could therefore be understood as the free God who freed others for himself," See: Moltmann, The Crucified God, 269.

²⁶⁸ Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, (trans.) Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004), 131.

²⁶⁹ Mounier, Personalism, 20.

Heschel, *Prophets*, 293: "The Holy is otherness as well as non-otherness. This is why it is possible to speak of God's holiness as a pattern for man."

through an indirect appeal to the concept of empathy in Edith Stein's phenomenology vis-à-vis Max Scheler. Let us now turn to this consideration.²⁷¹

(3.5) Empathy: 'Real Love is Creative of Distinction'.

In *The Prophets*, chapter 7: "Religion of Sympathy", Heschel argues, following Max Scheler, sympathy may be articulated as a "fellow feeling, or sympathy for God." This sympathy of fellow-feeling "involves the prophet's intentional reference of the feeling of joy or sorrow to God's experience." God's pathos is presented as 'my' pathos "in an act of understanding", where understanding God's pathos means undergoing God: 'my' "primary commiseration is directed" towards, as we have argued, an 'Einverständnis': an understanding-towards-solidarity with God. This structure is "complex", pathos and sympathy are happening simultaneously in real-time, where there is "an articulation of God's view and identification with it." It is an articulation of compassion: "in taking God's part [the prophet] defends the people's position, since in truth God's pathos is compassion. For compassion is the root of God's relationship to man." Heschel concludes that the ...prophets were as profoundly aware of the reality of the divine pathos as they were of themselves and their own feelings. That is the true meaning of the religion of sympathy -- to feel the divine pathos as one feels one's own state of the soul...there is no fusion of being *unio mystica*, but an intimate harmony in will and feeling, a state that may be called unio sympathetica.* It is an accord of human privacy and divine concern.²⁷²

Please notice the '*' attached to *unio sympathetica* in the above quote. The asterisk refers to a footnote in *The Prophets*. In the footnote Heschel tells us: "I am not "one

²⁷² Heschel, *Prophets*, 402-403; 408-409.

²⁷¹ See: Mayer I. Gruber, "Mordecai M. Kaplan and Abraham Joshua Heschel on Biblical Prophecy," *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* [*ZAW*] 116/4 (2004): 602-609, 609: "Heschel's understanding of prophecy dovetails with what is now widely understood as the empathetic mode ... Empathy is the mode by which one gathers psychological data about other people and, when they say what they think or feel, imagines their inner experience even though it is not open to direct observation. Through empathy we aim at discerning, in one single act of certain recognition, complex psychological configurations which we could either define only through the laborious presentation of a host of details or which it may even be beyond our ability to define."

with" the acrobat; I am only "with" him' (Edith Stein, quoted by M. Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy [New Haven, 1954], p. 18)." The example of the acrobat Scheler refers to, and Heschel references in the footnote, is originally from Edith Stein's doctoral thesis, *On the Problem of Empathy*. Being 'with' the acrobat versus being 'one with' the acrobat is illustrative of the subtle distinction(s) Stein contributes to a more comprehensive consideration on the dynamics of empathy.

This would highlight, even from within Heschel's text, that the prophet's sympathetic response to the call of divine pathos is necessarily sensitive to distinctions. Scheler himself will conclude that any direct parallel between divine and human 'personalities' will ultimately need to be differentiated because anything less renders:

a two-fold error in that it involves a naturalizing of the divine personality, as well as the human, and thus a total or partial privation of the spiritual element. True mysticism of the spirit always retains at least a consciousness of the ontological gulf intervening between man and God as a limit approach, and so never aspires to more than a partial identity of attributes.²⁷³

While not wanting to overstate this 'ontological gulf', an appreciation for this distinction between the subjects -- even between the Subject and subject -- may be pointing us to consider how Heschel's use and appeal to the category of sympathy (as being self-regarding while also being *other* regarding) may be less akin to the prophet's direct 'sym-pathos' vis-à-vis "fusion" with divine 'Person', and more about "participat[ing] in the divine activity" through an empathy with the *missio Dei*. 274

Jodi Halpern concludes that this

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²⁷³ Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, (trans.) Peter Heath (London: Routledge & Paul, 1954), 34. ²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, *NB*: Scheler, the son a Jewish mother and Lutheran father who later became a Catholic, advocates this position through an appeal to Paul: "The strictly naturalistic and pantheistic type of mysticism maintains that its deification of existence (by fusion of the soul with God) is truly adequate, compared with the (inadequate) endeavour to invest conduct and character with deiformity by participation in the divine activity ('In Thee we live and move and have our being' [Acts 17:28] or Saint Paul's 'I live, yet not I, but Christ in me' [Galatians 2:20])…"

...distinction between empathy and sympathy is important. Sympathy is about experiencing shared emotion; empathy involves imagining and seeking to understand the perspective of another person. Both sympathy and empathy involve experiencing emotional resonance or attuned feelings in the presence of another. This is sufficient for sympathy, but not for empathy. Empathy is a process in which one person imagines the particular perspective of another person. presupposes a sense of the other as a distinct individual.²⁷⁵ This imaginative inquiry

In terms of love, empathy is a kind of phenomenological preamble to the full kenotic expression of caritas precisely because it is a category sensitive to the distinctiveness of the other as other. Mounier is helpful on this point:

They are mistaken who speak of love as self-identification. That is only true of sympathy, or of those 'elective affinities' in which one is seeking to assimilate more of some good quality, or to find some resonance of oneself in someone similar. Real love is creative of distinction; it is a gratitude and a will towards another because he is other than oneself.²⁷⁶

We may now turn to consider this example in Stein vis-à-vis Scheler as a way of introducing a more comprehensive consideration on the theory and praxis of Edith Stein as one who complements the Heschelian project.

(3.5.1) 'Con-primordiality': The Non-Dissolution of The 'I'.

When we turn directly to Scheler's text (*The Nature of Sympathy*: chapter 2) on "The Classification of the Phenomena of Fellow-Feeling", with particular reference to the question of "Emotional Identification" (part 4), one is immediately drawn into the question: what is "the true sense of emotional unity"? Scheler employs Stein's argument against Theodore Lipps' example of 'the acrobat' in order to argue against Lipps' understanding of "emotional unity" where the identification of oneself with another really means the *loss* of self to the other. Lipps' acrobat example runs as follows according to Scheler:

²⁷⁵ Jodi Halpern, Harvey M. Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004): 561–583; 568, emphasis added. Mounier, Personalism, 23.

- (1) the absorbed spectator of an acrobat in a circus performance identifies himself with the acrobat such that,
- (2) the spectator reproduces these movements within oneself, in the character of the acrobat such that,
- (3) only the *real* self remains, whilst
- (4) the spectator's 'conscious self has sunken completely' into that of the acrobat.²⁷⁷

This *sinking* of the 'conscious self' leads to the annihilation of mutuality. Scheler argues that this is more of "infection" where one's otherness is simply reduced to the same. It is an "involuntary" and "unconscious" identification of one with the other that amounts to the loss of the conscious self.²⁷⁸ Scheler, in wanting to guard against this reduction of the conscious self, employs Stein's insight on empathy, as presented in her doctoral dissertation '*Neues zum Problem der Einfühlung*' (Freiburg, 1917) as a way to triangulate his criticism of Lipps. He says that Edith Stein

...has interposed a just criticism [of Lipps] on this point. 'I am not', she says "one with" the acrobat; I am only "with" him. The correlated motor-impulses and tendencies are carried out by a fictional "I", which remains recognizably distinct as a phenomenon from my individual self; it is simply that my attention is passively fixed throughout on the fictional "I", and by way of this, on the acrobat.²⁷⁹

We must acknowledge that it is from within this context that Heschel's footnote '*' on the nature of prophetic sympathy is obtained. Stein's horizon is concerned with preserving the distinctive qualities and attributes of 'my individual self', while nevertheless acknowledging, at the same time, that being a self is being one who is 'with' others in relation; i.e., genuine empathy 'annuls the solitude of the subject' (cf. 3.1). This is the essential dynamic that a phenomenology on empathy hopes to explore and clarify.

Stein also addresses the acrobat example. In *On The Problem of Empathy* she argues, "I do not go through [the acrobat's] motions but quasi", and "what 'inwardly' corresponds to the movements of the [acrobat's] body" is *given* to my "primordial"

²⁷⁷ Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, 18, *italics* added.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid*.

experience "that 'I move," in a "non-primordial" way. Stein argues that "in these non-primordial movements I feel led, accompanied, by [the acrobat's] movements." 280

In order to make evident the distinction of being 'one with' the acrobat versus being 'with' the acrobat, here Stein introduces us to the dialectic of primordiality \leftarrow \rightarrow non-primordiality in order to balance a relatedness to the other that remains respectful of self-consciousness. Stein will conclude that "what led Lipps astray in his description was the confusion of self-forgetfulness, through which I can surrender myself to any object, with a dissolution of the 'I' in the object." Stein, along with Scheler, is eager to guard against the 'dissolution' of the subject through an over eager self-forgetfulness. The kenosis of the self presupposes a positive self-regard and mutuality; there is something of 'my' self that 'I' may give to the other. Empathy is therefore not a feeling of complete *oneness* but rises, as we will come to consider with Stein, 'con-primordially'. This relating of one's 'primordial' ground with the 'non-primordial' through the intentionality of *Einfühlung*; a *con-primordiality with and for the other*, may also be, as we will come to consider, a fundamental (*grundsätzlich*) category for interreligious dialogue and practice.

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²⁸⁰ Stein, *OPE*, 16.

²⁸¹ Here we 'greet' the obverse side of the subject-object intentionality problematic. In Heschel's argument, we may again recall, there is a reversal of intentionality: the subject, the human person, becomes the object, and the object, God, becomes the subject. Stein concludes, contra Lipps, that it is not possible to 'surrender' or 'forget' oneself to an object such that there is a 'dissolution of the "I" in the object'. If God is the subject, and the prophet is now considered the object, then -- following Lipps -- does God's 'I' not run the risk of being 'dissolved' into the prophet?

Concluding Remarks.

Empathy may be a dialectical *tertium quid* in so far as it may help instigate a deeper reflection on how sameness and otherness subtend one another. Stein argues through her new 'third term' of con-primordiality that 'my' zero point of orientation is the other. The 'zero point' on a scale is that very middle point from which both positive or negative numerical quantities can be measured. *The middle point on the scale*; this very much characterizes Stein's *modus vivendi* in theory and praxis.

As *Knowledge and Faith* revealed, Stein's approach as a scholar is methodical and sober, carrying with it the intentionality of a phenomenological sincerity for exploring how life is lived, not in brackets, but in the everyday. Concomitantly, Stein's own empathy-in-praxis conveys a contemporary, interreligious significance, revealing how a renewed empathy *in* dialogue, such that an 'ethics of empathy,'²⁸² an *Einfühlungsethik*, may be constitutive to the twenty-first century Jewish-Christian project of engagement. To recall from Tracy, a '[h]ermeneutics' -- or an

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²⁸² John May, "Sympathy and Empathy: The Compassionate Bodhisattva and the Love of Christ," (Manuscript) 1-12; 8-9: "Searching lexika and encyclopaedias for entries on Mitleid (the German term for 'compassion'), the Tübingen moral theologian Dietmar Mieth found almost none. Such a simple and basic ethical attitude as com-passio is apparently not rated as highly as one might assume in Christian theology. Yet, as Mieth goes on to argue, an 'ethic of sympathy' (Sympathieethik) is an indispensable complement to Kant's rationally grounded categorical imperative. A Mitleidsethik certainly needs continual rational reflection as a means of controlling emotional impulses, but reason alone does not suffice as either a source or a motive for ethical action [Dietmar Mieth, "Mitleid", (eds.) J. B. Metz et al. [Lothar Kuld, Adolf Weisbrod], Compassion. Weltprogramm des Christentums. Soziale Verantwortung lernen (Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder, 2000), 21-25]. Buddhism is by no means a stranger to such conceptions. The Dalai Lama, firmly asserting the reality of Bodhisattvas informed by the mind of Enlightenment, shows how their existence is premised on the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth, the coincidence of dependence arising and emptiness; 'Hence, the two truths are one entity (HH Tenzin Gyatso, 14th Dalai Lama, "The Practices of Bodhisattvas", (eds.) Lopez and Rockefeller, The Christ and the Bodhisattva, 217-227, 220).' He explains why, in the Buddhist conception of compassion, the really crucial attainment is not loving-kindness (mettā) or even altruism (muditā) but the equanimity (upekkhā) which makes no distinction between the wellbeing of one's dearest friend, a neutral person or one's worst enemy. Mindful of the kindness of other beings, one must 'recognize all beings as your dearest friend' in the 'exchange of self and other'. The fruit of wisdom as one-pointedness of mind is the simple ethical injunction 'Help, do not harm', in other words, a resolve to act (Dalai Lama, "Practices", 225-226, echoing Schopenhauer: "Schade niemandem, hilf allen", cited by Mieth, "Mitleid", 23). This represents a considerable convergence, not just between Buddhist and Christian ethics, but between the Buddhology and Christology from which they derive." On practical ways of living from compassion, see the following project: Adolf Weisbrod, Compassion: Project for Social Learning in School and Society, Schulstiftung der Erzdiözese Freiburg http://www.schulstiftung-freiburg.de/eip/pages/110 compassion artikel a project for socia.php> accessed on 9 November 2009.

interpretation from empathy -- may help us recognize 'the "possibilities" (and therefore, the live options) which any serious conversation with the "other" and the "different" can yield. Halpern argues,

[E]mpathic curiosity pushes one to differentiate one's own from another's experience. In order to take an interest in the distinct perspective of another, one has to recognize that each person's life experience positions her differently...[a] critical step in rehumanization is to view another person as a complex, nonidealized individual.²⁸³

Heschel also argues: "[b]oth communication and separation are necessary. We must preserve our individuality as well as foster care for one another, reverence, understanding, cooperation." The sharing of narratives bespeaks a genuine "esteem for the otherness of others and a tolerance which does not exclude the search for dialogical discourse which is to establish more coherence for the search for truth". It is a dialogue that fosters a kind of "identity in partnership (*Identitätspartnerschaft*)", as von Brück suggests, whereby "tolerance is not a careless 'letting be' but the openness for the other and the own so as to work out the creativity of possibilities..."

Stein's empathically minded scholarship and praxis points to a dialectical way of belonging *trans-subjectively*: from her new-found place of Christian otherness she remembers and shows a concern for her Jewish sameness that is both a prophetic and kenotic transcendence. We may now turn to consider how her self-emptying towards the other is related to a place of sameness through the narrative of her life.

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²⁸⁴ Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 241.

²⁸³ Halpern, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," 574.

²⁸⁵ Michael von Brück, "A Theology of Multiple Religious Identity," in *Converging Ways? Conversion and Belonging in Buddhism and Christianity*, (ed.) John D'Arcy May (Klosterverlag, EOS: Sankt Ottilien, 2007), 181-206, 202.

Chapter 4 On Empathy.

Edith Stein was born on October 12, 1891 in Breslau. Her birth coincides with one of the most important holidays for the Jewish people: The Day of Atonement, *Yom Kippur*.²⁸⁶ Stein says the "correlation of events was so important to her mother that it was the paramount reason why [she] held her so dear." Stein, the youngest in a family of eleven, was a "willful" and "headstrong child" who often became "infuriated when she could not have her own way." Always at the top of the class in the *Gymnasium*, this willfulness develops into an insatiable curiosity and desire for truth in her adult life.

The courses of both Adolf Reinach and Max Scheler have a seminal effect on Stein during her Göttingen University days (1913-1915). Scheler teaches Stein a "'feeling for values' (*Wertfühlen*)" and a way of feeling one's way into living "which breaks through all systems and concepts and a priori notions to reveal the fullness of being to 'the seeing eye and empathetic heart."²⁸⁹ An empathically attuned philosophical attitude, if it is to be truly personalist (i.e., directed towards 'real others'), will *value* that a subject is always a subject in relation: "[b]eing is either open to, or dependent on, what is more than being, namely, the care for being, or it is a cul-de-sac, to be explained in terms of self-sufficiency."²⁹⁰ Under the guidance of

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²⁸⁶ "The Jewish notions of forgiveness and repentance are rooted in the Hebrew Bible. The word "forgiveness" stems from the cultic terminology of cleansing. The verbs are *tiher* (purify, Jeremiah 33:8); *mahah* (wipe, Isaiah 43:25); *kibbs*, *rahaz* (wash, Isaiah 1:16); *kipper* (purge, Ezekiel 16:63). To forgive then, in the biblical sense, entails a cleansing of the individual to be forgiven. It is done by God, but it involves the person's conscience and rituals of personal penitence such as weeping, fasting and rending clothes (II Samuel 12:16 or Ezra 9:3ff)." Rabbi Leon Klenicki, "Can Jews Forgive After the Holocaust? Historical Experience, Reckoning of the Soul and Reconciliation." *Ecumenical Trends*, New York: Graymoor Ecumenical and Interreligious Institute, 31/11 (2002): 1-5, 2.

²⁸⁷ Freda Mary Oben, "Edith Stein the Woman," *Carmelite Studies*, (ed.) John Sullivan, vol. 4, Washington: ICS Publications (1987): 5.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁸⁹ Eric Przywara, "Edith Stein," *In und Gegen* (Nuremberg: Verlag Glock und Lutz, 1955), 49 in Waltraud Herbstrith, *Edith Stein, A Biography*, (trans.) Bernard Bonowitz, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), 20.

²⁹⁰ Heschel, *Who is Man? The Raymond Fred West Memorial Lectures* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 91, hereafter *WM*.

the 'Master' Edmund Husserl, phenomenology becomes a 'first teaching'; and she discovers a new vehicle for appreciating the 'interconnectedness' of persons.

This methodological inquiry into the existential event-horizon(s) of human living, where "[a]ction is experienced as proceeding meaningfully from the total structure of the person", eventually comes to inform Stein's own way of living in the world. She becomes radically 'given' to a way of living, even from behind the walls of Carmel, that bespeaks a prophetic kenosis towards *real others* who are being persecuted by a genocidal totality.²⁹¹ Stein's predisposition towards the *real* makes her increasingly more suspicious of an idealistic philosophical inquiry. She remarks in 1913 during her student years at Göttingen:

[Husserl's] Logische Untersuchungen had caused a sensation primarily because it appeared to be a radical departure from critical idealism...[i]t was considered a 'new scholasticism' because it turned attention away from the 'subject' and towards 'things' themselves. Perception again appeared as reception...[a]ll the young phenomenologists were confirmed realists. However, the *Ideas* included some expressions which sounded very much as though the Master wished to return to idealism. Nor could his oral interpretation dispel our misgivings. It was the beginning of that development which led Husserl to see, more and more, in what he called "transcendental Idealism"...[t]his was a path on which, to his sorrow as well as their own, his earlier Göttingen students could not follow him.

Stein *qua* phenomenologist is very much interested in exploring and delineating one aspect of the phenomenon of reciprocal subjectivity between persons because "[p]henomenology wants to address the whole question of the experience of and the encounter with 'other subjects' (*Fremdsubjekten*)."²⁹³ She therefore makes the move from 'perception to reception' through a phenomenological inquiry on the reciprocity

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²⁹¹ Basehart, *Person in the World*, 40, 35.

²⁹² Stein, *Life in a Jewish Family: 1891-1916*, (trans.) Josephine Koeppel (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1986), 250, hereafter *Life*.

²⁹³ Dermot Moran, "The Problem of Empathy: Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," in *Amor Amicitiae:* On the Love that is Friendship. Essays in Medieval Thought and Beyond in Honor of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy, ed. Thomas A. Kelly and Phillip W. Rosemann (Leuven/Paris/ Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004), 269-312; 270. Also see, from Moran, footnote 10: E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, hrsg. Stephan Strasser, Husserliana vol. I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950), (trans.) D. Cairns, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), Meditation 5 § 44.

of givenness, under the psycho-spiritual category of empathy.²⁹⁴ She says about her project,

Now the question needed to be settled: what did I want to work on? I had no difficulty on this. In his course on nature and spirit, Husserl had said that an objective outer world could only be experienced intersubjectively, i.e., through a plurality of perceiving individuals who relate in a mutual exchange of information. Accordingly, an experience of other individuals is a prerequisite. To the experience...Husserl gave the name *Einfühlung* [Empathy]. What it consists of, however, he nowhere detailed. Here was a lacuna to be filled.²⁹⁵

Dermot Moran, in an essay on the phenomenology of empathy, entitled "The Problem of Empathy: Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein" frames the question for us: "the problem is: how do I constitute someone else as the *alter ego*, as another ego (*Ich*), with its own 'centre' and 'pole' (*Ichpol*) of psychic experiences, affections and performances?" It raises the question: how do I "grasp" the other's "*cognitive* and what in German is called *Geistigesleben*, 'spiritual life'"?²⁹⁶

Stein completed the dissertation in 1917, entitled *On The Problem of Empathy*. Stein's academic pursuit in phenomenologically describing empathy awakens a deeper appreciation within herself for the world of inwardness: "[a]ll that constant drilling about looking at everything without prejudice and throwing away our blinders hadn't been in vain. The bars of the rationalistic prejudices I had unconsciously grown up with collapsed, and there, standing in front of me, was the world of faith." This 'collapse of prejudice' awakens in Stein a growth of trust in others. It is this trust-in-others that embraces, as we will come to consider, an ever-widening interreligious continuum of Jewish-Christian relationality (*cf.* chapters 8 – 9). And it

²⁹⁴ Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 269: "The German term *Einfühlung* is of more recent provenance. The Munich philosopher and psychologist Theodor Lipps is usually credited with coining it from the Greek *empatheia*, literally: 'feeling into' *Einfühlung* thus refers to the phenomenon of feeling (or thinking) one's way into the experiential life of another. See footnote 4, also on p. 269: "Empathy is formed from the Greek prefix '*em*', a rendering of '*en*' ('em after 'p') meaning 'in', and 'pathos' (feeling). In German *Sich einfühlen* is a reflexive verb which literally means 'to feel one's way into'. A. J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond*."

²⁹⁵ Stein, *Life*, 270.

²⁹⁶ Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 270.

²⁹⁷ Stein, LFJ, 260.

is precisely this renewed sense of faith in otherness that she will come to eloquently describe in her dissertation on empathy.

Empathy as truly being *Einfühlung*-in-action; a kenotic given-for-ness into the heart of the world of otherness -- a response to a need in a 'moment of crisis' -- resounds throughout Stein's life as a profound *conatus essendi*; a 'struggling for life' against the *tremendum* horizon of the *Shoah* (chapter 5).²⁹⁸ What becomes the fertile ground for her theoretical reflections on empathy was *already* being prepared through an ever widening *lived empathy* as a Red Cross nurse during the Great War. Let us first turn to consider this antecedent ground. She eloquently describes this *pilgrimage towards the other* in her autobiography, *Life in a Jewish Family*.

(4.1) Antecedents to Einfühlung: Life in a Jewish Family, The Lazaretto. 299

In *Life in a Jewish Family* Stein immediately conveys to the reader the awareness that the fate of the Jews could soon be her own fate. In the preface of the book, Stein chides a friend for her inability to understand how Hitler came to his blind hatred of the Jews. Stein challenges this friend to open her eyes to the "horrendous caricature" that was looking out at them, and all Jews. The "programmed writings and speeches of the new dictators" were a monstrous indication of the things to come. This new reality encourages Stein to witness to her consanguinity with Judaism by writing *Life in a Jewish Family*. She gives the following reasons for doing so:

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²⁹⁸ *Cf.* Heschel, *Prophets*, 413: "The goal of sympathy is not to become like unto God, but to become effective as a prophet through approximation to the pathos of God. In sympathy, divine pathos is actually experienced in the moment of crisis...an assimilation or creative understanding is necessary..."

The quotes in this section are from *LFJ*, chapter 15, pp. 318-367, unless otherwise noted.

Recent months have catapulted the German Jews out of the peaceful existence they had come to take for granted. They have been forced to reflect upon themselves, upon their being, upon their destiny...[r]epeatedly in these past months, I have had to recall a discussion I had several years ago with a priest belonging to a religious order. In that discussion I was urged to write down what I, child of a Jewish family, had learned about the Jewish people since such knowledge is so rarely found in outsiders...[l]ast March [1933], when our national revolution opened the battle on Judaism in Germany, I was again reminded of it...I would like to give, simply, a straightforward account of my own experience of Jewish life as one testimony to be placed alongside others.³⁰⁰

It is interesting to note the date of this foreword to her autobiography: Breslau, 21 September 1933. On October 14, 1933, less than a month later, and ten years after her conversion to Catholicism, Stein enters the Cologne Carmel. This was her first major project as a Carmelite; "a strange project for a postulant to undertake, at her superiors' urgings... a detailed memoir of a Jewish upbringing." Stein writes her Jewish story from the place of her adopted otherness: Carmel. This text-as-witness, beginning with the very title, *rightly remembers* a life of being Jewish. Stein's flesh and blood *anamnesis*, as conveyed to us in her own words, challenges the lies about the Jewish people that were being programmed into the German nation.

In July of 1914 we find Stein reading at her "small desk, immersed in Schopenauer's *The World as Will and Idea*". Stein plans to attend a lecture when, at five o'clock in the afternoon, she receives the news of war. Stein skips class and journeys back home from University to Breslau where she unreservedly presents herself for Red Cross service ("I placed myself unconditionally at their disposal"). Stein desires to give herself completely to something bigger than herself:

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³⁰⁰ Preface, *Life*, 23-24. *NB*: Edith handles the first half of her life, the years 1891 through 1916 in her autobiography. Most of the manuscript was written in 1933. She intended to complete the manuscript but left it behind at the Cologne Carmel in 1938. At the time, Edith, along with her sister Rosa, hastily departed for what they thought to be the safer haven of the Carmel in Echt, Holland. As we know, the Nazis invaded Holland in 1940, and frustrated any further attempts on Edith's part to complete the manuscript.

Patricia Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," in (ed.) Joyce Avrech Berkman, *Contemplating Edith Stein* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 59-75; 71.

She wished her life to be absorbed into a vast plot. The first such grandeur she encountered was the Great War. She ran to it (though she and her family were fiercely pro-German, then and much later, so assimilated that the anti-Semitism of the prewar National Socialist period struck her mother [Auguste Stein] as implausible, demented, ridiculous). It was clearly Edith Stein's desire to disappear into devotion to a greater good. 302

Her immediate desire is to go to the front ("preferably to a field hospital") but she first needs to train in the art of nursing. She spends several weeks at All Saint's Hospital [Allerheiligenhospital], and immerses herself in the work of caring for others ("everywhere I found plenty to do. One never felt like a fifth wheel."). As in studies, Stein proves herself to be both an efficient and caring nurse:

I got the impression that the sick were not used to getting loving attention and volunteer helpers therefore could find endless opportunities to show their own compassion and love of neighbor in these places of suffering.

In 1915 she receives a call to report to a place of great suffering: a lazaretto (*Seuchenlazarett*) at *Mährisch-Weisskirchen* in Austria. Stein faced heavy opposition from family and friends, including a warning from the chief academic officer for the local humanistic *Gymnasiums*, Privy Councilor [*Geheimrat*] Thalheim: "Do you know what goes on in a lazaretto?". Stein retorted to Councilor Thalheim that although she "did *not* know" what war was like, there was nevertheless someone in *need*: "I found it even more essential that persons with a serious attitude should go to work there...I would permit nothing to divert me from my course." Both the Stein family and Councilor Thalheim meet with Stein's determined willfulness. She reported to the field hospital in April 1915. 303

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³⁰² Ibid., 60.

³⁰³ Stein's determination also meets her mother's 'loving opposition' in the following poignant vignette, *Life*, 319: "I had heavy opposition from my mother. I did not even tell her it was a lazaretto...She was well aware that no suggestion of hers that my life would be endangered could ever induce me to change my plans. So as an ultimate deterrent, she told me all the soldiers arrived from the front with clothes overrun by lice and that I could not possibly escape infestation. Naturally that was a scourge I dreaded...When this tactic failed, my mother declared with all the energy she could muster: 'You will not go with my permission.' My reply was every bit as determined. 'Then I must go without your permission.'"

Stein "got along well" with the other nurses and carries out her duties with uncompromising dedication. She wonders about the devotion of other staff members ("one had the impression that in this they were motivated more by ambition than by a love for humanity"). At the same time, she freely agrees to take on more work ("I cheerfully accepted any kind of duty entrusted to me and was always happy to substitute for others"). One nurse in particular, Susanne Mugdan or "Suse" comes to enjoy a mutual and profound friendship with Edith Stein. 304

Stein is taken up with Suse's *Jewish-Christian* background. Suse's mother "had all her children baptized Protestant after her husband died." While Stein wonders as to why Suse's mother ("Frau Mugdan") had her children baptized ("...out of a peculiar mistaken maternal solicitude to insure for them a more prosperous future") she also concludes that Frau Mugdan, "a kind and benevolent woman", did not baptize her children for "her own advantage". But this situation "was never a source of gratitude" for Suse, and proves frustrating: "[Suse's] genuine straightforward soul rebelled against changing one's religion except from *an inner conviction*." Even in the midst of "anti-Semitic remarks" being occasionally thrown about the lazaretto -- an insensitivity that drove Suse to silence -- we never find Stein denying her roots ("...the ability to come forward with a simple acknowledgement that I was Jewish").

It is easy to gloss over the importance of the context wherefrom Stein writes the above acknowledgement(s): again, it is from her newly adopted post-Catholic, post-Carmel situation where she reaffirms her consanguinity with Judaism vis-à-vis

 $^{^{304}}$ Stein, Life, 343: "We had warm, frank discussions on all these matters. But for as long as we were in Weisskirchen, we never used the familiar Du for one another, keeping instead, to the customary and more formal Sie. The easy familiarity with which the other nurses bandied the Du back and forth, when no inner bond really existed between them, made us keep the Sie as an outward sign of mutual respect. This happened quite spontaneously; we never discussed it at all. 305 *Italics* added.

the portrait of her friendship with Suse in *Life in a Jewish Family*. While Stein's subsequent conversion to Catholicism, as we will come to consider, is one of conviction, it also becomes a way of belonging to otherness with greater conviction. She freely belongs to others, Gentile or Jew, and her real-time kenosis towards others through a widening empathy as a nurse concomitantly 'frees' her for completing her considerations on empathy, a project she began entertaining as early as 1913-1914.

After returning from the war, in late 1915, she takes up her study of empathy from a new 'less-limited' and tranquil point of view; from a space widened by compassion. She tells us:

In *Weisskirchen* I used to get anxious indeed when I leafed through the pack of abstracts and outlines. And the winter, that dreadful winter of 1913-14, was not yet forgotten. Now I resolutely put aside everything...and began, entirely at rock bottom, to make an objective examination of the problem of empathy...Oh, what a difference compared to my former efforts!...I was like a tiny dot in limitless space. Would anything come to me out of this great expanse -- anything which I could grasp? I lay as far back as I could in my chair and strenuously focused my mind...[a]fter a while, it seemed as though light began to dawn...and as soon as one point became clear, new questions arose in various directions (Husserl used to call these "new horizons").

What was the difference? Husserl argues in *Cartesian Meditations*, "the *cogitatum qua cogitatum* is never present to actual consciousness [vorstellig] as a finished datum; it becomes 'clarified' only through explication of the given horizon and the new horizons continuously awakened [der stetig neu geweckten Horizonte]."

Furthermore, the "predelineation" of the what (cogitatum/noema), while "at all times imperfect" or "indeterminate", nevertheless "has a determinate structure". Husserl provides the following helpful example drawn from observing a gaming/casino die for describing a process for how one may 'look' for the 'new horizons' in and through the 'structure' of one's experience:

³⁰⁶ Stein, Life, 377.

For example: the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already "construed" in advance as a die, in particular as coloured, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. This 'leaving open', prior to further determinings (which perhaps never take place), is a moment included in the given consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up the 'horizon'. 307

Prior to her war-time service, Stein comments in 1912-13, "what I had learned about phenomenology, so far, fascinated me tremendously because it consisted precisely of such a labor of clarification...one forged one's own mental tools for the task at hand." And yet, it is Stein's *praxis of service* to others at the lazaretto that helps to instigate the subsequent creative unfolding, or 'clarification', of her theory on empathy. The other or 'others' of the lazaretto breaches that which was like an *impregnable wall*. The 'new horizon' of otherness awakens *noesis*: Stein comes to reflect upon her own experience: '...[a]fter a while, it seemed as though light began to dawn...and as soon as one point became clear, new questions arose in various directions'.

We have been arguing that Stein's theoretical considerations on empathy have an antecedent, experiential ground. Most notably, Stein's service to others at the lazaretto 'shapes' her scholarship on the "phenomenology of human personality". 309 It is precisely the distillation of this 'newer' horizon into a theory on empathy that will concomitantly serve as a kind of *magna carta* for how she will live the rest of her life. We must therefore take some time in appreciating this important text on empathy. This consideration may further assist us in underlining how Stein's

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 ³⁰⁷ Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations [Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, 1929]
 in (ed.) Donn Welton, The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology
 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 109.
 ³⁰⁸ Stein, Life, 222.

Rachel Feldhay Brenner, *Writing as Resistance: Four Women Confronting the Holocaust* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997), 24-25: ""According to Stein, the [primordial] core -- or particular potential of a person -- is an invariable given. Its potential cannot be affected by external factors, such as historical circumstances, but the development of the potential may be either enhanced or curtailed by external circumstances. The potential therefore does not always unfold completely, and adverse circumstances might prevent complete actualization of the potential."

subsequent praxis of living empathy, of standing with others in a dialectically attuned, intersubjective matrix of relating sameness and otherness, is grounded in this 'clarified' theoretical ground. This consideration may further reveal how her prophetic response to the call of pathos runs with and through her Jewish identity and into her Christian belonging.

(4.2) The Givenness of Einfühlung.

Stein opens the question of describing the 'certain character' of the empathic event with the following descriptive example in order to draw us into a consideration of *how* we may describe the phenomenological process of empathy i.e., what goes on in 'me' when 'I' enact empathy?

A friend tells me that he has lost his brother and I become aware of his pain. What kind of an awareness is this? I am not concerned here with going into the basis on which I infer the pain. Perhaps his face is pale and disturbed, his voice toneless and strained. Perhaps he also expresses his pain in words. Naturally, these things can all be investigated, but they are not my concern here. I would like to know, not how I arrive at this awareness, but what it itself is.³¹⁰

We know from experience that the expression of pain on the face of the other, whether it be drawn from the above example or our own experiences, is only a visible pointer into the hidden 'other'. The pain he or she is feeling *here and now* is unique and intimate to them. The fact that 'I' am there to recognize and 'take-in' this pain is a necessary prerequisite for empathy. Moran argues, "this temporal coincidence is an important structural feature of empathy...[t]he empathised experience is experienced as being in the same *now* as my own experience. The other experience is given in a presentified 'now' which is identified with my 'now'". And in this same *now* 'I' undergo the experiencing of 'my friend's' concerns as she is in pain. Her concerns become 'my' concerns. The heave and pitch of giving and receiving is the enacted

³¹⁰ Stein, *OPE*, 6.

language of this concern, drawing 'me' beyond a "solipsistic world", and into the drama of intersubjectivity. ³¹¹

This other, and the concern(s) of the other "is experienced as *actually present*". This present-tense presence, the other's face, heightens *pathos*: a transcendent concern in 'me' for the other(s). 'I' therefore take the first step towards *Einfühlung* in orienting 'my' self around *the look* issuing forth from the other. There is a "natural unity" between the other's countenance and the other's feelings. And 'my' preliminary orientation towards the other's look, as an outwardly perceived event, is a first *real* signpost on the journey into *Einfühlung* with the other. ³¹³

Stein argues that the other's 'being-givenness' already "implies tendencies" for the other "to advance to new givennesses". In this we hear the echo of Husserl. The other is a 'new horizon', and this horizon will leave 'further particulars open' for further observation and incorporation. The successful 'accomplishment' of empathy will necessarily depend upon how open and sensitive -- in a word *given*, 'I' am to the multi-faceted horizon of the other.

Stein, however, does insist that the experience of pain in one's own life is ultimately of a unique and personal nature. She argues, "[y]et, in principle, I can never get an 'orientation' where pain itself is primordially given" in the first person other. So while "empathy is a first-person experience" it "does not have the same

³¹¹ Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 285, argues "Husserl himself will say in his *Intersubjectivity* writings, In constituting myself as a body, I am constituting a 'solipsistic world'; whereas, in order to constitute an intersubjective world, I must employ empathy..." See: *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil. 1921–1928*, Husserliana XIV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 8.

Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 289-90.

Stein advocates the realism of con-primordiality in wanting to hold for the "natural unity" between what is envisaged in the countenance and the actual feeling. She says in regards to the example of sadness, *OPE*, 77: "The sad countenance is actually not a theme that leads over to another one at all, but it is at one with sadness. This occurs in such a way that the countenance itself can step entirely into the background. The countenance is the outside of sadness. Together they form a natural unity."

Stein, *OPE*, 57; 7.

intentional structure as a sense perception." 315 Empathy is 'my' experience, and is drawn from, as a reaction to, the experience of the other. But my experience is not the same as the other's original 'sense' experience. What then is the trajectory of empathy's givenness? It is somehow the same, and yet uniquely distinct from, the primordial experience of the other. Stein proposes a nuanced position -- situating 'my' givenness of empathy as being 'con-primordial'; as arising from myself and the other. 316 Let us now turn to consider Stein's tertium quid: conprimordiality.

(4.2.1) Einfühlung as Conprimordial: Dyadic.

Empathy arises as both primordial -- as 'my' unique "present" experience of the other, and also "non-primordial in content" for the experience first and foremost belongs to the other. The experience "arises before me all at once, it faces me as an object (such as the sadness I 'read in another's face'). But when I inquire into its implied tendencies (try to bring another's mood to clear givenness to myself), the content, having pulled me into it, is no longer really an object." 'I' become one with the other by turning to the content of the event as if I were the subject.³¹⁸ Stein delineates the process of *Einfühlung* as follows:

- The content of an experience, upon reflection, pulls "me into it," and thereby ceases being an object of reflection.
- Rather, the content 'I' examine takes a secondary ii. position i.e., "I am now no longer turned to the content but to the object of it,"
- iii. And the 'I', in turn, becomes "the subject of the content in the original subject's place."
- Stein concludes, "only after successfully executed iv. clarification, does the content again face me as an object."

³¹⁵ Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 274.

³¹⁶ Stein, OPE, 57.

³¹⁸ Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 276: "I know my own 'life-expressions' (Lebensäusserungen) are grounded in my own consciousness, and I conclude a similar situation in the case of the expressions of others."

The unique expression on the other's face, her entire countenance, calls me into a preliminary reflection on what is being revealed before 'my' eyes (i). Then a movement happens that may be described as a *metanoia* towards the other; a new givenness as conversion to the subjective experience of the other happens wherein the 'I' gains a "new image" of the other in so far as the 'I' stands in solidarity with the other through a new, non-primordial way (ii). While I may never be the other, or substitute myself for the other, the experience of the other's content moves to be 'my' experience in a "con-primordial" way. I become the subject of the content in the original subject's place (iii). Stein concludes that the empathized content will 'again face me as an object' (iv). But what is really 'facing' me again? What objective state does that which, through empathy, 'ceases to be an object' return to? We will return to this part of the consideration later in the chapter (cf. 4.3.1). Let us first consider con-primordiality.

Stein argues vis-à-vis this new third term of con-primordiality that when I interpret the other from her point of view, the other's "spatial world" becomes "a new zero point of orientation" for 'me'. By "empathically projecting myself" into the life and world of the other "I shift my zero point to this place" and "empathically, non-primordially" achieve this 'new image' or deeper insight and understanding of the other while nevertheless "retain[ing] my 'primordial' zero point and my 'primordial' orientation". **Single Einfühlung** may therefore mean a dynamic 'intergivenness' in a world of otherness i.e., a kenotic 'feeling one's way' into the life of the other where one and

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³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 57 [my *emphasis*]; 61. See: Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 274: "The empathic object is not given *leibhaftig* [corporeally; in tangible form], although it is given as 'itself there' (*selbst da*), literally present at hand. In this sense, empathy intimates the actual presence of the other's experience even if one does not have first person access to it, e.g. I *recognise* the other's sorrow, but I do not *undergo* the other's unique experience (although I may enact or undergo a similar or even possivly [sic] identical experience of my own). The other is still, as it were, indexed to the empathised experience."

the other enter a 'new horizon' of relationality. Empathy therefore consists in a *double movement* where the friend who is mourning presents herself to a preliminary 'being seen by the I' (i), whereas 'being seen' subsequently unfolds into a more intimate and radical givenness to 'me' from the other (ii). Let us first explore these two movements before considering the intergivenness of empathy.

(4.2.1.1) Empathy's Dyadic Structure.

It strikes us that if empathy is con-primordial then it may be considered as having a dyadic structure for the empathic act is both extraverted and introverted.

The extraverted ground of empathy, as we have seen, may be described as the moment when the 'I' sees, for example, another person in pain (i), followed by the subsequent objective (and preliminary) reflection on her status before 'me' in space and time (ii).

The introverted ground of empathy may be described by the following movements: the 'I' takes the objective data presented 'out there', e.g., 'there is another in pain' (i), and renders oneself given anew to the data in a subjective way (ii). One's subjective givenness to the data of the other thereby brings one to a new 'meeting point': the very place of the primordial subject herself.

Empathy brings the profound lesson from the other to me in an intimate way, as a feeling, as a concern, and 'I' show this teaching as a lesson-learned through my own physical, psycho-spiritual re-orientation: a *being given anew* towards the one with whom I empathize.³²⁰ It is the way "human beings comprehend the psychic life of their fellows. Also as believers they comprehend the love, the anger, and the

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 19: "There is a two-sidedness to the essence of empathic acts: an experience of our own announcing another one. And there are various levels of accomplishment possible."

precepts of their God in this way."³²¹ Hence, what 'I' know will remain "blind, empty and restless" unless it points back to "some kind of experienced, seen act. And the experience back to which knowledge of foreign experience points is called empathy."³²²

Empathy is a deeply intuitive realization about the status of another *as other*. The empathic realization is an experience³²³, and this experience, as mentioned above, is con-primordial because it is "led by a primordial [experience] not experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience."³²⁴

The *I* has experiences in the real world where any notion of a "*pure I*" is an "empty" concept, for 'I' depend on an "experience of an outer world and of an inner world". Stein commentator, Mary Catherine Basehart concludes,

the I is revealed as the subject of actual qualitative experiences, with experiential content, lived in the present and carried over from the past, experiences which form the unity of the stream of consciousness...this consciousness is body-bound consciousness. The body given in consciousness is sensed as 'living body' (Leib) in acts of inner perception and in acts of outer perception. It is outwardly perceived as physical body ($K\ddot{o}rper$) of the outer world; but this double givenness is experienced as the same body. ³²⁵

The moment of 'my' primordial experience of the other -- arising from the real-time extraverted phenomenality of the other -- is the necessary prologue to the more non-primordial and self-reflective experience of the other. In the con-primordial moment, the self, as a physical (*Körper*) and psycho-spiritually transcendent (*Leib*) self, makes

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 11. See: Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 271: "*Einfühlung* was seen to reach even into theology, when both Scheler and Stein saw it as involving the question of the relation of the person to God. Scheler writes that the interactions of persons with persons extends to God: 'But it is precisely the realm of spiritual actuality that is articulated as strictly personal, substantive, and intrinsically individual, right up to God, the Person of persons. (*The Nature of Sympathy*, p. 75)."

³²³ Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 287: "For Husserl, as for Stein, empathy is an *experience*, by which they mean it is a first-person undergone event with a certain character which is different from that of a mode of inference or reasoning."

³²⁴ Stein, *OPE*, 11.

Basehart, Person in the World, 38-39.

a pilgrimage towards the other where 'I' 'greet' the other as she greets 'me', with her own inner and outer modes of being given in the situation.

It may be argued, therefore, that empathy is a kenotic response of living-out from one's interiority with givenness. I give myself freely to the place of the subject as prompted by the former; the original phenomenon, the other's unique call and countenance. The con-primordiality of empathy is nothing less than a double-givenness where extraverted and introverted moments of empathy are dialectically related beyond the authority of 'my own perceptions' i.e., "[i]f I experience a feeling as that of another, I have it given twice: once primordially as my own and once non-primordially in empathy as originally foreign." Stein concludes that "this non-primordiality of empathized experiences causes me to reject the general term 'inner perception' for the comprehension of our own and foreign experience." Empathy reaches beyond inner perception toward transcendence by grounding itself in a world of values. What makes this world of values phenomenologically viable for Stein is a feeling for and with the other, beyond a highly-privatized cogito qua solipsistic inwardness. Stein argues, "this 'self'-experiencing 'I' is not the pure 'I,' for the pure 'I' has no depth. But the 'I' experienced in emotion has levels of various depths." 328

(4.3) Heschel On Empathy.

In a fashion corresponding to Stein's thesis on empathy, Heschel refines his categories in speaking of prayer as "an act of empathy" where "our reading and feeling the words of the prayers" is accomplished through "an imaginative projection of our consciousness into the meaning of the words." In this way we may conprimordially *feel* "the ideas with which the words are pregnant." Heschel argues,

³²⁶ Stein, OPE, 34;

³²⁷ See: *OPE*, 108 and following.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 98.

At first, the words and their meaning seem to lie beyond the horizon of the mind...[w]e must, therefore, remember that the experience of prayer does not come all at once. It grows in the face of the word that comes ever more to light in its richness, buoyancy, and mystery. Gradually, going out to meet its meaning, we rise to greatness of prayer. 329

Notice the correspondence between Heschel's and Stein's perspectives. 'I' imaginatively or 'empathically' project 'myself' towards the Other in prayer. And just as one rises to the 'greatness' of the words in the prayer of empathy, we rise to the greatness of the other when our prayer becomes the deed of a *living* empathy. Edmond La B. Cherbonnier, in commenting on Heschel's thesis of prayer as empathy, argues for the natural 'empathy' between prayer and prophetic-action-in-the-world:

[S]ince prayer is a relation between persons, it cannot dispense with words. Were it simply a matter of feeling, then words would be unnecessary. Feelings can be conveyed by inarticulate sound and gestures, as they are by animals...[p]rayer is primarily about action - God commissioning men to action ("Here am I - send me"), or men asking God's help. This kind of communication cannot get very far without words. 330

Heschel concludes that words "demand an intensity of dedication which is rarely present". But so does our devotion to otherness: "Judaism stands and falls with the idea of the absolute relevance of human deeds...*Imitatio dei* is in deeds. The deed is the source of holiness."³³¹

The deeply subjective, introverted moment, "the private, the intimate dimension of the word, the subjective side of the message," as 'my moment of reflecting on the reality of the other before me', allows for the radical 'breaking in' of another's reality into my psycho-spiritual being. The introverted moment of 'me' being given to the datum of the other is a 'new horizon' that is simultaneously reverberating outward as a call *towards the real other*. The call points me directly

³²⁹ Heschel, MQG, 27-30; 28.

³³⁰ Edmond La Beaume Cherbonnier, "Heschel As a Religious Thinker," *Conservative Judaism*, 33/1 (Fall, 1968): 25-39; 34-35.

³³¹ Heschel, *MQG*, 29, 109.

³³² Heschel, *Prophets*, xxii.

back to the *living word*: the extraverted reality of this other whom *I* am endeavoring 'to feel with'; *her pain as my pain, her joy as my joy, her suffering as my suffering*.³³³

And yet, as Cherbonnier argues, empathy is more than a feeling, for "the best way to express mutual empathy is through deeds (*mitsvoth*)" but "deeds require interpretation." While "in a close relationship between two people the significance" of a mutual empathy "becomes self-evident" a greater 'clarification' of what one shares with the other may be required in other situations. For example, "in case of misunderstanding" or in the complexity of interreligious interactions, "the meaning" of empathy will need to be "put into words" through the deed of the dialogue. Let us now turn to consider how empathy may begin to be understood as a dialogical and dialectical *transubjectivity*, where the physical and spiritual worlds of oneself and another begin to meet across a widening range of socio-political and theological perspectives.

(4.3.1) Empathy's Dialogical Structure: Trans-subjectivity's Reprise.

Alastair MacIntyre, in his recent study *Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue*, 1913-1922 argues, in empathy there is a "closer relationship between first-person and third-person accounts" where 'closer' means devotion, while also meaning an ever more subtle 'differentiation' between oneself and another. Empathy between the

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³³³ See the considerations on the dyadic structure of being in Clarke, *PB*, 57: "[T]he unique inner depth of privacy and interiority of the personal resides, irreducible to any of its outward-facing relations, and without which the latter lose their own grounding in being. For unless one has some distinct self to give or share, and some conscious possession of it as one's own, how could one 'give oneself to another' in friendship and love, as phenomenological analyses describe so eloquently?"

³³⁴ Cherbonnier, "Heschel As a Religious Thinker," 34-35.

³³⁵ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue 1913-1922* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 82.

³³⁶ May, "Sympathy and Empathy," 7: "Scheler's analysis of the relationship between moral values and feelings, in particular the *Nachfühlen* that allows us to reproduce in our own sensibility what the other is experiencing, which provides the basis of *Mitgefühl*, empathy with the objectively grasped suffering of the other, and eventually of *Einsfühlung*, identifying oneself with the psychic reality of the other (see: Stegmüller [*Hauptströmungen der Gegenwärtsphilosophie. Eine kritische Einführung*. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 2nd rev. ed.] 1969: 106-110). The presupposition of this act of empathy which makes sympathy possible is not a primary self-awareness; rather, Scheler anticipates Levinas in

first and third positions, in dialogue, may necessarily point towards further clarification and debate, with renewed dedication to a common cause. This pursuit of a greater understanding through an empathic engagement may point towards a more sustainable dialogical "sym-morphos" between the first and third person(s) perspectives. Let us take the following example of the globe from MacIntyre:

Here I lay myself open to what is presented to me in a perceptual experience and report what I see. What I see is a revolving globe with rapidly changing patterns of color. When I report the successive colors, someone else observing the same globe says, 'Between the yellow and green was a very thin line of purple which you missed. Look again!' I look again and see the purple. My first-person report is corrigible in the light of the third person reports. 338

Here one thinks of Husserl's casino die. In this case, however, 'I' am looking at the data with others. Whether it be a die or a globe, our 'looking together' at the same thing, and our reflection back to one another on what we 'see', opens up the world of dialogue. The dialectic between the first and third person(s) is a creative tension where, in personalist terms, the "understanding of ourselves is open to correction by what we learn about ourselves from others through our empathetic awareness of their view of us". 339

maintaining that the reality of the other is given as immediately evident to an inner perception which precedes self-awareness of one's own ego; one thus perceives one's own self "as if I were another" ("als ob ich ein anderer wäre", Stegmüller 1969: 110). Within the framework of Husserl's phenomenology Edith Stein developed an even more differentiated analysis of empathy (Stein [OPE] 1989). She, like Levinas, begins with the 'look' perceived in the face of the other, which leads the person of empathy from what is outwardly seen to the other's inner disposition, from objective intentionality to a subjective 'con-primordiality', the realisation that the other's primordial experience, while not my own primordiality, is equivalently primordial for him or her."

³³⁷ From a Feminist Christian perspective, Elizabeth Johnson complements Stein's considerations on distance-in-relation by differentiating from a Feminist Christian perspective the prophetic witness, while 'in the form of' God is not the same as God: "through the power of the Spirit 'all of us are being transformed into that same image from one degree of glory to another' (2 Cor 3:18). The inclusive 'all of us' makes clear how the whole community, women as well as men, are gifted with transformation 'into the same image,' in Greek the same eikōn." In fact, the Pauline Greek provides the further insight that "the members of the community are identified as sym-morphos to the eikon, that is, sharing the form of the likeness, or formed according to the image of Christ...the image of Christ does not lie in sexual similarity to the human man Jesus, but in coherence with the narrative shape of his compassionate, liberating life in the world, through the power of the Spirit." from She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 2003), 69-75; 73.

MacIntyre, A Philosophical Prologue, 82-83.

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This "iterated empathy" of how others "view us" is a way of being dialogically given to the other for "what we had hitherto taken for granted about our own motives" submits itself to a 'cross-examination' of sorts through the simultaneity of living together as persons in 'first and third' dialogical situations. Through the ebb and flow from oneself to another -- in "becoming aware of the evaluations of others, including their evaluations of us -- we may begin "to question our own evaluations."³⁴⁰

Stein concluded that the process of empathy may be described along "three levels or modalities." And these modalities are:

- (i) the emergence of the experience,
- (ii) the fulfilling explication, and
- (iii) the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience.³⁴¹

In regards to (iii) Stein argues, as we have been considering, that 'only after successfully executed clarification, does the content again face me as an object' (cf. 3.2.1). Once empathy has been 'fulfilled' or accomplished the other faces me again as an object. In light of MacIntyre's considerations, it strikes us that the dynamic ebb and flow between 'the first and third' perspectives, as being constitutive of a dynamic empathy, would put to question a return to the level of objectification. Pace Stein, a 'comprehensive' objectification may subtly (re)introduce a 'cutting off', or an undoing, of the pathic mutuality conceived by Stein in her third term of conprimordiality.

We have been critically wondering with Heschel throughout this study as to whether or not 'mutual' and 'personal' may be attributive of God in his thought. We concluded that the 'overturning' of a relational 'transubjectivity' in favor of a 'Subject object' intentionality between God and humanity makes the argument for

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³⁴⁰ Ibid., 86.

³⁴¹ Stein, *OPE*, 10.

non-mutuality all the more plausible. Might this mean that there is also a subtle return to the 'non-mutual' in Stein through a return to a comprehensive objectivity?

At variable and unpredictable degrees in Heschel, the 'intergivenness' between God and the prophet seemed to oscillate between the two poles of *either* an undifferentiated and direct *sympathos qua* 'non-mutuality' ('here all mutual relations end'). This raised the following question: may the prophet's 'sympathetic' response to the call ever be completely personal? As a response issuing from a prophet who is an independent center of action -- or, as Stein would argue, as a response from *my* 'zero point of orientation' -- and towards a God who is also mutual because he is personal?

At other times, Heschel raises the possibility of the prophet and God being in a *transubjective* situation. This strikes us as being a phenomenologically more viable category when speaking of the mutuality between personal subjects. Furthermore, transubjectivity is another way of naming what Stein is accomplishing by way of the *via media* of con-primordiality. As she herself says, 'Husserl had said that an objective outer world could only be experienced intersubjectively...he gave it the name Einfühlung'.

MacIntyre concludes that Stein's thesis of empathy, to be sure, argues for a dynamic interpersonal mutuality capable of recognizing the following: "[t]he 'I', whether as perceiver or as agent, is partially constituted in and through relationships with others." And this being constituted relationally "involves situating myself bodily in relation to others and to those objects which are shared objects of perception by myself and by those others" in such a way that these "different types of social relationship into which we enter make a significant difference to the kind of human

being that we become."³⁴² That which was once solely the other's is now something that is being shared between subjects. The other's primordial experience is 'still there, manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience'. And there it will remain as being primordial in the other whilst being con-primordially given to 'me'. Any return to the objective level must therefore be a return through the subject, so what faces 'me' again as an object may no longer carry with it a sense of the 'objective' that connotes indifference or 'detachment'.

Take, for example, the act of loving and being loved. Norris Clarke, in *Person and Being*, a creative *rapprochement* towards a more dynamic Thomism, argues that "once one crosses the threshold into personal being the picture begins to change significantly. Once one begins to analyze love, in particular the highest mode of love, the love of pure friendship, it is clear that mutuality is of the essence of this love."³⁴³ A return to an 'empty' spatial-temporal perspective of 'before-being-loved' would seem to be impossible to accomplish *after* the experience. It would be an attempt to deny the memory of the other in oneself. One's relationship with the other does *make a significant difference to the kind of human being that I become*. In this sense, the 'other I love' may *never* completely return to the status of being 'comprehensively' objectified by 'me'. 'I' may never place the other on the shelf marked 'before I loved you'.

While we do not believe that there is a subtle return to non-mutuality in Stein, we would nevertheless want to strenuously preserve the 'doctrine' of conprimordiality for *Einfühlung*. Con-primordiality begins to balance a necessary distance-in-relation constitutive of an empathic response while also challenging a forgetfulness-for-the-other that is accomplished in non-mutuality. Stein's doctrine of

³⁴³ Clarke, *PB*, 85.

³⁴² MacIntyre, A Philosophical Prologue, 136-137, italics added.

con-primordiality pushes us to acknowledge that within the perichoretic drama between the 'first and third' 'my' perspectives and assumptions are capable of being challenged by the other. Ultimately, I must acknowledge that 'I' am involved in the process of *Einfühlung*, and this experience of *my* empathy with the other changes 'me'.³⁴⁴ The 'I' is in fact being converted towards a greater receptivity of otherness in its variegated forms. This 'being awakened' by the other does not vitiate self-possession but heightens it for it encourages one to be more completely human.³⁴⁵ Let us consider empathy's 'humanizing' effect through love.

(4.3.2) Empathy's Intention: The Rehumanization of the Other.

Jodi Halpern argues that "empathy serves as a normative ideal for a rehumanized view of the other" where empathy shows itself forth in "the ability to individualize rather than stereotype". Empathy encourages the cultivation of a *habitus* for "tolerance of ambivalence" and challenges an "organization of experience

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³⁴⁴ It is precisely the 'idealism' implicit in Husserl's approach, where a return to a comprehensive objectivity regarding this other becomes untenable when considered in light of Stein's 'conprimordiality'. MacIntyre is instructive on naming this objection to Husserl's approach, in A Philosophical Prologue, 60: "The 'I' of the phenomenological standpoint is always and necessarily subject and not object. How can this 'I' have the same reference as the 'I' and the 'me' of individuals who are always subjects and objects? It is of course true that the end purpose of the phenomenologist is to give an impersonal account of the nature of the experience of joy as such, of what it is for anyone to be joyful. But a condition of the phenomenologist's report being true is that what he has inspected is his joy, for otherwise it would not be 'subjective' in the required sense. Yet Husserl's account of the radical difference between the phenomenologist's standpoint and that of any individual who is in fact joyful makes it unclear how this condition could be satisfied, how the 'I' who reports as a phenomenologist could be the same as the 'I' whose mental act is the object of the phenomenologist's attention. Or rather, insofar as they are the same, and clearly they must be, it is unclear how the degree and kind of phenomenological detachment from everything that is peculiar to me as experiencing subject is to be achieved. This is not anything like an insuperable objection to Husserl's thesis...The problem for Husserl is this. It appears that from my subjective standpoint other human beings and physical objects can be no more than objects of my experience. Yet it also appears that my experiences of objects can only be what they are, if others too are subjects against whose experiences I must match my own, if I am to have a true view of things. How can both of these be true? That they are true Husserl certainly allows, but he provided no answer to this question..."

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 45: "Like the Sleeping Beauty, we must first be touched by another before we can wake up to ourselves. This process of awakening from latent to explicit self-consciousness is one that unfolds slowly, spread out over several years of time. And it seems that the explicit awakening to self-awareness as an 'I,' as a self, can only be done by another human person, reaching out to us with love and treating us as a person, calling us into an I-Thou relation. So we must first go out to the external world, in particular to other persons, and then return to our center, newly awakened to recognize ourselves explicitly as persons."

through feelings of resentment, anger, or fear." Above all, empathy is realized, *not* "in an intense moment of sympathy, but in living together and genuinely attending to another's perspective over time. Such an understanding seems to be the basis of genuine social cooperation." The give and take between oneself and the other 'rehumanizes' the 'We' within the 'I and Thou' relationship. 347

We considered with Stein that when one encounters the friend grieving the 'I' first objectively *sees* the other grieving. But the 'I' must move beyond an intentional objectivity by allowing the *givenness of the other* to 'do' kenosis towards 'me'. That is to say, in being open to her givenness 'I' may begin to 'feel with' the pain of this friend in mourning. Thus, the lover-loving-the-beloved, and being loved in return, is a 'complete portrait' of giftedness, and bespeaks reciprocity of giving and receiving beyond substitution and towards a trans-subjective solidarity. Empathy results in more than a mutual exchange of '*objective* information'.

Stein's phenomenology evinces a way of being in the world where the possibility for solidarity, the communicative and reciprocal praxis of empathy, is no longer foreign: "But 'I,' 'you,' and 'he' are retained in 'we.' A 'we,' not an 'I', is the subject of the empathizing." In other words, 'the *thou*, which implies the we' -- that which is 'prior to the I' -- is empathy's desired interpersonal horizon (cf. Mounier, chapter 2).

Correspondingly, Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenological concept of 'intergivenness' may be one of the more helpful hermeneutical keys for appreciating how *Einfühlung* bespeaks a *metanoia* towards the 'we': those who *give* empathy,

³⁴⁶ Jodi Halpern, Harvey M. Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," *Human Rights Quarterly* 26 (2004): 561–583; 583. Regarding the process of how empathy may be 'rehumanizing' in the context of Northern Ireland see: Brian Lennon, "Empathy in Christian Forgiving," in *So You Can't Forgive: Moving Towards Freedom* (Dublin: Columba, 2009), 54-56. ³⁴⁷ Clarke, *PB*, 65:

³⁴⁸ Stein, *OPE*, 18.

"receive the Other -- that is equivalent first and before all to receiving a given," and, reciprocally, the one receiving empathy, "the gifted", "belongs within the phenomenality of givenness". The gifted, in turn, "gives itself" to another and/or back to the original empathizer.³⁴⁹

Empathy may be related along the following personalist contours:

- 'I' become aware of the concerns to the O/other subject. (i)
- 'I' take 'the original subject's place' in being given to the concerns of this (ii) O/other.
- (iii)Where taking 'the original subject's place' means being given transubjectively (Heschel) and con-primordially (Stein) to the other; it is an inter-givenness between one's self and the other.
- (iv) This intergivenness is a self-regarding and self-effusive givenness towards a world of otherness; a freely given response to the call of the other who, while in relation to 'me', always remains free and other.

This exchange, beyond economy, and kenotic in nature is the very exchange of the gift of love from one to another. 350 Mounier likewise argues, the "communion of love" between persons "liberat[es] him who responds to it" while it concomitantly "liberates and reassures him who offers it." And through this intercommunication "love is not only reassur[ing] me simply of a state of being in which I find myself, for it gives me to someone else. Love is the surest certainty that man knows; the one irrefutable, existential *cogito*: I love, therefore I am."³⁵¹ 'Being gifted' therefore opens up the possibility for a transformative "being as communion" with otherness. 352

³⁴⁹ Marion, *BG*, 323.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 97: "It is precisely a question of a gift, in no wise of a loan or future repayment, because the gift has burnt up its giver (as one burns bridges) and abandoned itself without reserve or withdrawal. In fact, by disappearing and being missing, the giver, far from failing, fulfills his function all the better in absentia. He truly gives a gift, whose given character can never be contested, since no return can (through lack of a destination) reduce givenness to the rank of a commercial transaction." Mounier, 23, *italics* added.

³⁵² Clarke, PB, 85, nn57-58: "...[I]f person A timelessly gives perfection X to person B, then B does not first lack perfection and then later receive it, but always possesses it in act. And if we add that B receives X in equal fullness to A's possession of it, then no potency is involved at all. There is only the possession of perfection X plus the purely positive relationship of active, grateful welcoming of it as a gift from A. In a word, the love relationship, if properly understood, opens up the capital metaphysical and psychological insight that to be gifted and to be grateful are in themselves not a sign of inferiority or deficiency at all, but part of the splendor and wonder of being itself at its highest actualization, that is, being as communion." Cf. Gerard O'Hanlon, "Does God Change? Hans Urs von Balthasar on the

Concluding Remarks.

We have been arguing that there is a dynamic 'intergivenness' presupposed in *Einfühlung*. No return to a 'comprehensive' objectivity, where comprehensive could be interpreted as meaning a quasi-denial or 'forgetfulness' of the prior experience of the other is possible. The erasure of the memory left by 'you' on 'me' and *vice versa* would (re)introduce a 'barren' concept of a solely self-sufficient 'I', who, on the level of the 'we', risks mutating into totalitarianism.³⁵³

Stein's phenomenology of empathy "begins with the awareness of one's own being that is concomitant with the acts of consciousness". Yet it is her devotion to *real* persons that challenges an epoché of forgetfulness for the other. Stein, in following Husserl's lead, "focuses on the 'things' of experience, the *cogitationes* and their *cogitata*, and probes them by way of descriptive analysis". But it is precisely these "things' of experience" that "presuppose" a real world. Just as there is a "correspondence" in knowing, where givenness arrives in relation, between what is *being given* (*noema*), and what is meant and intended by the *being-given* through an "act of reflective apprehension" (*noesis*) so, too, is there a necessary dynamic 'intergivenness' among persons in the world. This 'correspondence', this partnership-in-giving among persons, may serve as a kind of '*Grund*' which makes the

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Immutability of God," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 53 (1987), 161-83, 171; *The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

³⁵³ May, "Sympathy and Empathy", 7: "The fundamental importance of this convergence is perhaps best illustrated when we contemplate a world utterly devoid of the empathy that makes sympathy possible and prepares the ground for both love and compassion. The fascist and communist regimes of the twentieth century were examples of the attempt to purge society of such 'soft-hearted' virtues. It is hard to decide whether the fanatical anti-Semitism of Hitler's Third Reich, the utterly arbitrary suppression of all opposition, whether imagined or real, in Stalin's Russia, the unquestioning commitment of an entire people to the emperor cult in wartime Japan, or the ruthless sacrifice of tens of millions of lives in pursuit of military and economic power in Mao's China is the most shocking example of the attempted elimination of compassion as a principle of political ethics."
354 Basehart, *Person in the World*, 37-38.

"fulfillment, corroboration, confirmation" and interpretation of knowledge possible across an ever widening continuum.³⁵⁵

Stein recognizes the human person as uniquely capable of fulfilling a vocation for transcendence through being 'pathic' towards others, for "only the person as spirit can go beyond the self and relate cognitively and affectively to others in the full sense of these relations." She argues for the "unified givenness" of the 'I'; i.e., the 'I' is an undivided "center of orientation" and action. Yet, it is "the awareness" of the self as an "*T*"-in-relation-to-others -- as one who is "brought into relief" by "the otherness of the other" --that becomes the data for Stein's exploration of empathy. 357

Edith Stein's more theoretical vision of empathy finds a flesh and blood givenness through her own praxis from the time of her conversion, entrance into Carmel and subsequent death at Auschwitz. Her work, not only significant for phenomenology, has a contemporary importance for Jewish-Christian dialogue. In particular, Stein's middle-way of con-primordiality not only allows the subject to

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³⁵⁵ Edmund Husserl, *Lecture 5 from The Idea of Phenomenology* [Die Idee der Phänomenologie], Husserliana II, (trans. and intro) Lee Hardy (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 49-55; 54-55: "This evident act of seeing is itself knowing in the most precise sense; and objectivity is not something that is in knowing like something is in a sack as if knowing were a completely empty form – one and the same empty sack – into which one thing is put, and then another. Rather, in givenness we see that the object constitutes itself in knowing, that one can distinguish as many basic forms of objectivity. Moreover, the acts of knowing, more broadly apprehended as acts of thought in general, are not free-floating particularities, coming and going in the stream of consciousness. Rather, essentially related to each other, they display the teleological forms of interconnection and corresponding connections of fulfillment, corroboration, confirmation and their counterparts. And everything depends upon the interconnections that present intelligible unity." NB, translator's note: "The correspondence relation is not between stripped-down acts occurring within a self-enclosed mind and objects external to it, as we have in Descartes. Consciousness is not like an empty container into which ready-made objects of knowledge, or its representatives, are simply inserted. Rather, it is a highly complex temporal system of mental processes by which the givenness of the known object is 'constituted'. This means that in every case of knowledge there is a strict correlation between the real (later 'noetic') and the intentional (later 'noematic') components of the act of knowing, which itself can be wholly given in the act of reflective apprehension." 356 Basehart, Person in the World, 40.

Stein, *OPE*, 42. See: Clarke, *PB*, 64: "All being...is caught up in this unending dialectic of the within and the without, the in-itself and the toward-others, the inward-facing act of existential presence in itself, and the outward-facing act of self-expression and self-manifestation to others, by which it enters into a web of relationships with them...A person, like every other real being, is a living synthesis of substantiality and relationality, and the relational side is equally important as the substantial side, because it is only through the former that the self as substance can actualize its potentiality and fulfill its destiny."

move beyond the level of self-containment, but opens the 'I' to the possibility of experiencing 'me' being contained in the other, and the other being contained in 'me'. In a word, it inaugurates a being open to conversion. At the outset, we may conclude that a living Einfühlung in inter-personal encounters may be a 'school of the heart' wherefrom one may emerge as more dialogical, compassionate, and remembering i.e., a more-completely-given 'rehumanized' other in a world of others. From this perspective, it would seem that Heschel's concept of 'trans-subjectivity' actually speaks to what Stein wishes to accomplish through the use of 'con-primordiality'. Heschel's poem "I and You", considered "emblematic" of the "shared pathos" between God and humanity, gives us a powerful poetic insight into how an empathic desire longs for solidarity among persons:

Transmissions flow from your heart to Mine,/trading, twining my pain with yours./Am I not—you? Are you not—I?

My nerves are clustered with Yours./Your dreams have met with mine./Are we not one in the bodies of millions?

Often I glimpse Myself in everyone's form,/hear My own speech—a distant, quiet voice—in people's weeping,/as if under millions of masks My face would lie hidden.

I live in Me and in you./Through your lips goes a word from Me to Me,/from your eyes drips a tear—its source in Me.

When a need pains You, alarm me!/When You miss a human being/tear open my door!/You live in Yourself, You live in me. 358

This desire for living in solidarity -- When a need pains You, alarm me! When You miss a human being tear open my door! -- signals a new way of prophetic witnessing. Stein's way of witnessing will mean cultivating a praxis that is constitutive of being more than religion's 'stereotypical' vasum Dei while also being nothing less than a genuine collaborator; an epi-center of freedom and creative faithfulness. Where 'my' encounter with the other will incarnate a genuine inter-kenosis that is sensitive to the interreligious situation. Indeed, Stein's prophetic witnessing resonates well with

³⁵⁸ Heschel, "I and You", *Poems*, 14, 31.

Heschel's vision: one's response to a divine concern is transitive in so far as it may be localized as a kenotic concern; a radical concern-for-others-as-openness-to-death. But before we come to consider Stein's givenness as prophetic witness to the *tremendum* of Auschwitz, let us explore further her theory and praxis that lead up to her conversion and entrance into Carmel.

Chapter 5 A Finite and Eternal Being: Conversion and Carmel.

In the Spring of 1917, Edith's dissertation was published in Halle, Germany entitled *Zum Problem der Einfühlung*. Later in the same year, Adolf Reinach was killed on 17 November 1917 in the Ardennes Forest. While Stein was greatly disturbed by the death of her professor and friend, she recalls how deeply impressed she was by the faith-filled and tranquil response of Anna Reinach: "rather than appearing crushed by her suffering, the young widow was filled with a hope that offered the other mourners consolation and peace." After his death she "came to stay with his wife and sister for a while since they had asked her to classify the professor's manuscripts." The death of this friend, mentor and one-time chief assistant to Husserl "affected an opening for her" because it was during this time when Stein discovered, "in the course of classifying [Reinach's] papers, some 'Notes on the philosophy of religion' which astonished her." Reinach writes "*Man muss keine Angst vor den letzten Gegebenheiten haben*, 'One must not be afraid of the ultimate realities." 362

(5.1) Reinach's Personalism: a New Horizon.

John M. Osterreicher, theologian and drafter of *Nostra Aetate*, writing some ten years before the Second Vatican Council (1952), argues that there is an abiding Jewish and Christian significance in Reinach's notes on the philosophy of God.

Reinach, a Jewish convert himself to Christianity, articulates a *meta*-physical vision in

³⁵⁹ Herbstrith, Edith Stein, 24.

³⁶⁰ Henry Bordeaux, *Edith Stein: Thoughts on Her Life and Times*, (trans.) Donald and Idella Gallagher (Milwaukee, WI: Bruce, 1959), 22.

³⁶¹ Florent Gaboriau, *The Conversion of Edith Stein*, (trans.) Ralph McInerny (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2002), 52.

³⁶² Adolf Reinach, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1921), xxvii from "Adolf Reinach: Seeker of the Absolute," in John M. Osterreicher, (intro.) Jacques Maritain, *These Walls Are Crumbling: Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ* (New York, NY: Devin-Adair, 1952)100-133; 103.

personalist themes. One comes into contact with the absolute of transcendence through the giving and receiving of a pathic personalism.

On 16 May 1916 Reinach writes from war: "[d]escription of piety, (a) the opening of oneself, receptiveness, (b) the *absolute* direction upward, upward to an absolute above, symbolized in the look of the sky." Reinach "returned again and again to the concept of the absolute". The absolute, limitless in and of itself, provides a "frame" wherein "love, goodness, gratitude, trust, dependence, weakness" become "thinkable" as givennesses varying in "strength and height" to this immeasurably 'absolute' given.

While "no one who has ever plunged into the idea of God's love can say that it can grow in breadth or length or height or depth" human love does, however, strive for 'new heights and depths', towards fulfillment, in being given to the other: "one stretches toward infinity, the other holds infinity within itself." When one reaches in love towards the other, one is reaching towards the absolute.

Reinach writes on 23 June 1916: "In regard to the transcendent world, the human person is pure receiving; in regard to this world, both receiving and giving." The 'intergivenness' presupposed in human loving reawakens a sense of empathy one has with the absolute. The self-sufficiency of the subject, "the desire to be lost in a gelatinous world...to be drowned in a state of endless stupor, to be sustained *not* by the living God -- Person caring for person -- but by the dreary, unconscious and

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³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 126-127; 127: "None of his notes written in the din and mud of war speaks explicitly of Reinach's inner life, nor does his paper on the absolute -- still, they show that its core was the experience, the knowledge and feeling of sealed shelter, of a home in God, *restloser Geborgenheit in Gott*. This made Reinach, a Jew by blood, a Jew according to the spirit, tying him to the Old and New Testaments, with their glad news for the house of Israel and for all those who are raised to its dignity [Romans 3:28-29], that God himself is their keeper."

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 130.

loveless expanse..." is a pessimism that is not capable of dissuading Reinach -- even whilst in the trenches -- from a more expansive view.³⁶⁶

Reinach's philosophy of God anticipates later Christian theologizing on the absolute (and here one thinks of Rahner) while also echoing similar 'pathic' and 'personal' themes we have considered in Heschel and in Stein's own work on empathy. We may only conclude that Stein's exposure to Reinach's notes inflamed a desire within herself to seek and find the unconditional horizon of understanding and compassion.

Stein decided to resign her position as Husserl's assistant at the beginning of 1918. She hoped to stay on at Göttingen, and applied for a professorship. However, her application and thesis, which had garnered a summa cum laude in 1917, were left "unexamined". Despite this troubling setback, Stein dedicated herself over the next ten years (1918-28) to scholarship, and in the process earned "an international reputation" in the academies of Europe. 367

As early as 1919, when humanity seemed to be turning away from one another and towards the idols proposed by World War I and the Russian Revolution, Stein begins to develop and articulate themes at various forums and meetings on her current research that was originally inspired by her Göttingen thesis on Einfühlung. Stein communicates these themes "by asserting the 'inextinguishable uniqueness' of the human person who lives at the same time in a state of spiritual 'interconnectedness' with the rest of reality."³⁶⁸

³⁶⁶ Ibid., 103.

³⁶⁷ Stein, *Life*, 418-419; 418: "The Master [Husserl] gave her a sincere letter of recommendation as she now sought for a professorship, beginning her search in Göttingen where she was so well known...her application was ignored by the faculty. Her thesis went unexamined, and the record makes it clear that there was more than a rejection of a woman behind the move."

³⁶⁸ See: Stein, "Psychische Kausalität, Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften," in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Bd. V (Halle: Niemeyer, 1922; reprint Tübingen, 1970), 43 in Herbstrith, 29.

By the summer of 1921, and while visiting a friend and mentor from her Göttingen days, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, in Bergzabern, she happened upon, "at random, *The Book of Her Life* by St. Teresa of Jesus [Avila]." The book made Stein's discernment complete. She decided to be baptized as a Catholic and to enter the Carmelite order. Stein saw the two -- baptism and Carmel -- as "inseparable" to her commitment to loving others.

She was baptized on January 1, 1922 in the church of St. Martin, Bergzabern by Fr. Eugen Breitling. Not long after her baptism, in 1925, Stein shares correspondence again with a friend and Göttingen colleague, Fritz Kaufmann.

Kaufmann felt somewhat estranged from Stein because of her conversion, and had not been in communication with Stein since 1919. Stein nevertheless reassures him how much she looked forward to meeting him again in person in order to tell him about the last five years of her life. She comments in one of the letters that she had finally "...found the place where there is rest and peace for all restless hearts." *How* she found this 'place of rest' demanded more elaboration but she begs Kaufmann's indulgence for the immediate moment: "[h]ow that happened is something you will allow me to be silent about today." One may only surmise, from the context of the letter, that Stein was speaking of a new found psycho-spiritual 'space' of freedom for in the letter she references the year 1919, and herself being in a "pitiable state" during those days. 369

We know that 1918-1919 was a personally frustrating time as her thesis went unexamined for a professorship at Göttingen, and she was also experiencing a "growing dissatisfaction" with Husserl's working methods for he "found no time to

³⁶⁹ Stein, Letter #38a, "Letter to Frtiz Kaufmann," 13 September 1925, in *Edith Stein: Self-Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942*, (trans.) Josephine Koeppel, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1993), hereafter *Letters*.

stein's assent to a more peace-filled existence "involved both a new direction and a new ordering of goods...everything that had been of importance in her adult life up to this point was to find some place in her new life..." Stein's baptism -- this new found 'place' of peace -- incited her subsequent desire for Carmel. Carmel provided a way for embracing the world on a deeper level; it was an avenue for contact with the absolute horizon -- 'symbolized in the look of the sky'. Stein tells us, "[i]t is just the people who at first passionately embrace the world that penetrate farthest into the depths of the soul...they are taken into their innermost selves."

At the heart of the Teresian system that Stein falls in love with is a powerful empathic givenness for the world. Teresa of Avila tells us in El Castillo Interior,

I think, that we should really be loving our neighbour; for we cannot be sure if we are loving God, although we may have good reasons for believing that we are, but we can know quite well if we are loving our neighbor. And be certain that, the farther advanced you find you are in this, the greater the love you will have for God... Teresa insists that love of God issues forth in a lived empathy with others. She counsels her discalced sisters, in prophetic-like Heschelian terms: "[i]f you see a sick

woman to whom you can give some help, never be affected by the fear that your devotion will suffer, but take pity on her: if she is in pain, you should feel pain too; if necessary, fast so that she may have your food." Teresa concludes that such praxis is "true union" with God in love. 374

It is during this time immediately after Stein's conversion, when the thought of Teresa was still fresh in her heart and mind, where we may enjoy the following

³⁷¹ MacIntyre, A Philosophical Prologue, 170.

³⁷⁰ Stein, *Life*, 417-418.

³⁷² Stein, *Life*, 420; Edith Stein, "Die Seelenberg," in *Welt und Person: Beitrag zum christlichen Wahrheitsstreben*, Edith Steins Werke, Bd. VI (Louvain: Nauwelaerts/Freiburg: Herder, 1962), 66-67, in Waltraud Herbstrith, *Edith Stein: A Biography*, (trans.) Bernard Bonowitz (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), 31.

³⁷³ Teresa of Jesus [Avila], *Interior Castle*, *The Complete Works of St. Teresa of Jesus*, (trans.) E. Allison Peers, vol. 2 (London: Sheed and Ward, 1978), 261. Also *cf.* Chapter 2; Levinas, *OB*. ³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 263.

account of Professor Gertrud Koebner's experience of Edith Stein. Koebner, a young Jewish philosopher, met Stein on a regular basis for private lessons in phenomenology. Koebner tells us that when they "read Teresa together,

Edith revealed a little of her own interior life to me. You could see that it absorbed her utterly...[y]et she never distanced herself from her family or lost any of her immense affection for them. Even after she had fully decided on her future course...she never let anything interfere with her love for her sisters and brothers and their children...Even [Edith's] mother, who found it horrible to see her adored Edith become a Catholic, couldn't condemn it as a selfish act.³⁷⁵

Stein's continued relationship with Koebner gives us an insight into her ability to relate to her Jewish sameness from her new found place of otherness, and reveals her widening regard for all of humanity: "Nothing was allowed to stand in the way of this intention, neither social distinction nor any other obstacle. Only eternal values counted for her ... Edith knew that I would never abandon my Jewish faith and scrupulously avoided any attempt to draw me away from it. She knew that this was the basis on which our friendship could endure." ³⁷⁶

After Stein's baptism and confirmation she took up a teaching position at St. Magdalena's Teacher's College for women in Speyer from 1922 until 1930. Her time in Speyer may well be considered a preoratio for her entrance into Carmel. Her feeling for the intergivenness of love of God/love of neighbor finds further deepening in Speyer in her daily interaction with both her students and the poor of the city.

During these days, in echoing Teresa, Stein writes, "[o]n the question of relating to our fellowmen -- our neighbor's spiritual need transcends every commandment. Everything else we do is a means to an end. But love is an end already, since God is love."³⁷⁷ Even as she followed her journey towards the cloister of Carmel, she saw it as a journey 'out of oneself' and towards otherness. Indeed,

³⁷⁵ Edith-Stein-Archiv, Karmel Köln in Herbstrith, Edith Stein, 35.

³⁷⁷ Teresia Renata Posselt, *Edith Stein. Eine Grosse Frau unseres Jahrhunderts*, ninth edition. (Freiburg-Basel-Vienna: Herder, 1963), 59, in Herbstrith, 39.

Stein *qua* contemporary philosopher of human relationality *and feminist*, was already provoking *aggiornamento*. The For example, Stein's "careful attention to contemporary topics" during these days before Carmel, to topics such as "women's roles" as "professionals" and "responsible co-workers in the Church", may now be considered "forerunners" and "vital issues" that Catholicism came to regard with a deepening theological and pastoral seriousness at Vatican II.

(5.2) Stein on Woman: A Comprehensive Sympathy.

At the fifteenth convention of the Bavarian Catholic Women Teachers Association in April 1928 at Ludwigshafen, Stein gives a talk entitled "The Significance of Women's Intrinsic Value in National Life." The themes of the talk are personal and feminist, echoing her own life experience on the 'frontlines' of war and academe. This progressive address contextualizes and advances the 'prophetic' role being "strongly demanded" of women during the inter-war years.

In the lecture she argues that while man "appears more objective" -- in the sense of being more inclined "to dedicate his faculties to a discipline" like "mathematics or technology" -- the woman's "attitude is personal". Being personal

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³⁷⁸ Stein, *Life*, 419.

Stein, "The Significance of Women's Intrinsic Value in National Life" in *Essays on Woman*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 2, (trans.) Freda Mary Oben (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1996), 253-265, hereafter *EW*.

In a related essay entitled, "The Separate Vocations of Man and Woman According to Nature and Grace," in *EW*, 59-86; 83. Stein proposes a phenomenologically cogent consideration regarding women's ordination in the Catholic Church: "In common usage we say priests and religious must be especially *called*, which means that a particular call must be sent to them by God. Is there any difference between the call sent to man and that to woman? Women just as men have been called to the religious state at all times. And when we consider the manifold ramifications of contemporary religious life, when we acknowledge that the extremely diverse works of charity in our times are practiced by the feminine orders and congregations, we can see only one essential difference which still exists in reality: the actual priestly work is reserved for men...In the early church, women played an active part in the various congregational charities, and their intense apostolate as confessors and martyrs had a profound effect... We are witnessing a decided change here in recent times: feminine energies are now strongly demanded as help in church charities and pastoral work. In recent militant movements, the women are demanding that their activities be recognized once more as an ordained church ministry, and it may well be that one day attention will be given to their demands...It seems to me that such an implementation by the church, until now unheard of, cannot be forbidden by *dogma*."

suggests a comprehensive concern for oneself and others. Women have a "particular interest for the living, concrete person...for her own personal life and personal affairs as for those of other persons." It is, as we've considered with Heschel, a *transitive* concern; a concern directed towards others. Here again we hear the echo of Stein's work on empathy. A desire for personal fulfillment is actualized dyadically: it is constituted by a "two-fold direction" where the woman "would like to become herself a complete human being, one who is fully developed in every way; and she would like to help others to become so." This introverted *and* extraverted praxis is, above all, about "doing justice to the complete human being whenever she has to deal with persons."

Whereas with men, Stein argues, there is a "one-sided development" through an over-emphasized devotion to one discipline, in women there a *distinctiveness* that tends towards living and viewing life with a more complete, all-embracing hermeneutic: "there lives a natural desire toward *totality* and *self-containment*," and this "*personal attitude*" and "*tendency to completeness*" is an attitude that may be "objectively justified and valuable because actually the human person is more precious than all objective values". ³⁸²

Yet just as men may be challenged to cultivate a more complete *personal* attitude so, too, Stein argues, are women called to occupations of "thoroughly objective work". Through a radical givenness the "whole person" may, in "all moods and dispositions", become "subordinate" to something bigger than oneself. Stein

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³⁸¹ Stein, EW, 253-265; 255.

³⁸² *Ibid.*, 255-256. See: Feldhay Brenner, *Writing as Resistance*, 164: "Stein claims that women's greatest contribution to society lies in cultivation of their distinctiveness from men. While she is in favor of the emancipatory gains of the suffrage movement, she strongly objects to undifferentiating equality of men and women. Absolute indiscriminateness between men and women signifies obliteration of distinctions between the genders and therefore amount to complete disregard of the needs, roles and capabilities of women...[Stein's] notion of woman's defeat when feminine particularity is erased recurs in the argumentation of today's thinkers, such as Ivan Illich [*Gender* (New York, N.Y.: Pantheon, 1982), 178], who claims that 'in the games where you play for genderless stakes...both genders are stripped and, neutered, the man ends on top.'"

claims that in giving oneself over to a vocation, one loses "something of the *hyper-individuality* and has attained a definite freedom of self; while at the same time she has attained an inner depth..."

She informs her audience, with an example drawn from her Great War nursing days, that the vocation of the "medical woman", one of the professions "considered earlier as masculine monopolies" is being "mastered" by women. Women working in the medical field have a unique ability for attending to the entire person: "the sick who visit or send for a doctor do not seek merely to have a particular organ healed…one feels himself 'out of line' in his entire system; one seeks healing of body and soul, and one also desires a friendly, comprehensive sympathy." This comprehensive sympathy in showing attention to the entire person "can attain much more than healing the actual illness" because the medical woman "receives insight into diverse human situations; she necessarily gets to see material and moral need."³⁸⁴

To be sure, Stein is neither arguing for only women medical professionals nor is she saying no men are empathic. While a "drive" of *comprehensive sympathy* is "particularly strong in woman" it is, lest we overstate the case, constitutive of all: "each human being is called naturally to this total humanity, and the desire for it lives in each one of us." So while it does signify, "a wide area for authentic feminine activity," it also "signifies Christian charity at the same time."³⁸⁵ And if this is the case, *it signifies charity*, then what does a comprehensive sympathy say about God's givenness? Stein concludes, in categories reminiscent of Heschel's personalism, the following:

³⁸³ Stein, EW, 257.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 262.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., 256, 263.

All truth is discerned by persons; all beauty is beheld and measured by persons...[a]nd behind all things of value to be found in the world stands *the person* of the Creator who, as prefigurement, encloses all earthly values in himself and transmits them. In the area of our common experience, the human being is the highest among creation since his personality is created in the image of God. It is the *whole* person about whom we are speaking: that human being in whom God's image is developed...³⁸⁶

This universal Person-to-person regard for the other was also influencing how she viewed her own givenness to the world. In a letter dated 28 February 1928 she writes,

I have gradually come to the realization that more is asked of us in this world, and that even in the contemplative life, one may not sever the link with this world...the deeper one is drawn to God, the more [one] needs to go out of [herself] -- out into the world, to carry the divine life into it.³⁸⁷

For Stein, 'love is an end'; it is this ultimate end that is 'drawing' us into a world of others who we regard *as* living icons of love i.e., as ends in themselves. As Heschel argues, "[t]o a person who regards himself as an absolute end a thousand lives will not be worth more than his own life," while the one who lives life with "the *certainty of being needed*" is able to live life for others gratuitously. For the person "who thinks that he is an end in himself" will ultimately unleash the silence of totality on others for they will, as an individual or as part of a group, "use others as a means" to an end. 388 Stein's own certainty of being needed, her way of 'carrying the divine life into the world' is through a radical and empathic givenness -- for love "is more than co-operation, more than feeling and acting together. Love *is* being together, a mode of existence, not only a state of the soul." We are beginning to 'feel our way into' Stein's expansive, universalizing regard for the other by way of her scholarship, teaching and subsequent entrance into Carmel. It is precisely her remembering

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³⁸⁶ Ibid., 256.

³⁸⁷ Stein, Letter #45, "Letter to Sr. Callista Kopf, OP," 28 February 1928.

³⁸⁸ Heschel, MNA, 194.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., 206.

Einfühlung that will place Stein in direct confrontation with the totality of Nazism's 'depersonalization'. 390

(5.3) Behind the Walls of Carmel: Kenotic Fragments of a Wider, Pathic Concern.

In 1929 she authored "Husserl's Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas," and in 1931, at the recommendation of Jesuit philosopher Erich Pzywara, SJ, she undertook the translation of Aquinas' *Disputed Questions on Truth* (*Questiones Disputatae de Veritate*). Stein had left Speyer in 1931 with the hope of finally being received at a University. Yet the year was "spent in unsuccessfully applying to the universities of Freiburg and Breslau." Again, similar to her Göttingen experience in 1918, anti-Semitism was "at work behind the scenes" in blocking any appointment to a professorship. ³⁹¹ Fortuitously, she was offered a position at the Educational Institute of Münster. During this time Stein offered "her colleagues a preliminary series of lectures on philosophical anthropology in an attempt to situate the mystery of the human person...in the context of the European tradition." Just as Stein was engaging in this reflection — by 1933, she would "look on horrified as university students began violently attacking Jews." ³⁹²

We hear Stein prophesying her own future to a friend, Sr. Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, OSB, in a letter dated 16 February 1930. Stein writes, "After every encounter in which I am made aware how powerless we are to exercise direct influence, I have a deeper sense of the urgency of my own *holocaustum*. And this

³⁹⁰ Feldhay Brenner, *Writing as Resistance*, 166: "Stein's self-identification as a Jew, a woman, and a daughter implies a degree of self-acceptance...Stein's cultural and emotional affiliation with Jewishness and with Jewish women placed emphasis on ethnic and gender identity, an attitude that countervailed the intent of the perpetrators to depersonalize the victim."

³⁹¹ Herbstrith. 56.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 59; 62.

awareness culminates increasingly in a: *Hic Rhodus, hic saltus*."³⁹³ In commenting on this letter, Josephine Koeppel, the translator of Stein's autobiography and Carmelite contemporary writes, "The remembrance of Nazi infamy will always be associated with the name 'Holocaust;' but for Edith, twelve years before she died during that reign of terror, the word was a challenge to be generous in her everyday life, not only at some moment of extraordinary heroism. That does not lessen the awe we feel at her use of the word, as though she had some chilling premonition of her destiny."³⁹⁴

It is against this horizon wherefrom we may now begin to appreciate how an empathic '*Identitätspartnerschaft*' (*cf.* chapter 3) with Judaism characterized Edith Stein's life and death in Auschwitz.³⁹⁵ It is a partnership forged through a comparative reading of Heschel's Frankfurt address with a letter from Edith Stein to Pope Pius XI.

(5.3.1) 'If The Silence Continues': Edith Stein's 1933 Letter to Pope Pius XI.

In 1933, just prior to her entrance into the Carmelite monastery of Cologne,

Stein wrote to Pius XI asking him to condemn Nazism by way of an encyclical. The

papacy eventually issued an encyclical condemning racism four years *after* Stein's

letter. 396 By this time the programmatic genocide was becoming a horrifying *fait*accompli. In this passionate letter, and in themes that presuppose Heschel's *Frankfurt*Meditation, she calls on the Pope to speak out against the Nazi persecution already

³⁹³ Letter #52, "Sr. Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, OSB, Freiburg-Günterstal". Trans. note: *Hic Rhodus, hic saltus: "Rhodes is right here, perform your phenomenal leap here!"* [from *Aesop's fable*]. ³⁹⁴ Stein, *Life*, 422.

³⁹⁵ von Brück, "A Theology of Multiple Religious Identity," 202.

³⁹⁶ John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII* (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 140: "An atheist from her teens, Stein was initially drawn to Christianity emotionally, but felt a different kind of attraction after reading the autobiography of St. Teresa of Ávila, the sixteenth-century Carmelite mystic. She wrote that her 'return to God made me feel Jewish again,' and she thought of her conversion to Christianity as existing 'not only in a spiritual sense, but in blood terms.'...[f]rom the cloister she wrote a passionate letter to Pius XI, begging him to 'deplore the hatred, persecution, and displays of anti-Semitism directed against the Jews, at any time and from any source.' Her letter drew no response. Four years were to pass before he came to issue the tardy encyclical on anti-racism, *Mit brennender Sorge*."

happening all around Germany. It was only during this century, on 15 February 2003, when the Vatican Archives released Dr. Stein's letter to the public. In reading Stein's letter alongside Heschel's 1938-39 inspirational 'call to arms', *Versuch einer Deutung* 'The Meaning of This Hour', we may begin to appreciate how the Jewish (*and* Christian) call for a more prophetic witnessing is receiving a response in Stein's letter:

Holy Father!

§1: As a child of the Jewish people who, by the grace of God, for the past eleven years has also been a child of the Catholic Church, I dare to speak to the Father of Christianity about that which oppresses millions of Germans. For weeks we have seen deeds perpetrated in Germany which mock any sense of justice and humanity, not to mention love of neighbor. For years the leaders of National Socialism have been preaching hatred of the Jews. Now that they have seized the power of government and armed their followers, among them proven criminal elements, this seed of hatred has germinated. The government has only recently admitted that excesses have occurred. To what extent, we cannot tell, because public opinion is being gagged. However, judging by what I have learned from personal relations, it is in no way a matter of singular exceptional cases. Under pressure from reactions abroad, the government has turned to "milder" methods. It has issued the watchword "no Jew shall have even one hair on his head harmed." But through boycott measures-by robbing people of their livelihood, civic honor and fatherland--it drives many to desperation; within the last week, through private reports I was informed of five cases of suicide as a consequence of these hostilities. I am convinced that this is a general condition which will claim many more victims. One may regret that these unhappy people do not have greater inner strength to bear their misfortune. But the responsibility must fall, after all, on those who brought them to this point and it also falls on those who keep silent in the face of such happenings.

§2: Everything that happened and continues to happen on a daily basis originates with a government that calls itself "Christian." For weeks not only Jews but also thousands of faithful Catholics in Germany, and, I believe, all over the world, have been waiting and hoping for the Church of Christ to raise its voice to put a stop to this abuse of Christ's name. Is not this idolization of race and

governmental power which is being pounded into the public consciousness by the radio open heresy? Isn't the effort to destroy Jewish blood an abuse of the holiest humanity of our Savior, of the most blessed Virgin and the apostles? Is not all this diametrically opposed to the conduct of our Lord and Savior, who, even on the cross, still prayed for his persecutors? And isn't this a black mark on the record of this Holy Year which was intended to be a year of peace and reconciliation?

§3: We all, who are faithful children of the Church and who see the conditions in Germany with open eyes, fear the worst for the prestige of the Church, if the silence continues any longer. We are convinced that this silence will not be able in the long run to purchase peace with the present German government. For the time being, the fight against Catholicism will be conducted quietly and less brutally than against Jewry, but no less systematically. It won't take long before no Catholic will be able to hold office in Germany unless he dedicates himself unconditionally to the new course of action.

At the feet of your Holiness, requesting your apostolic blessing,

(Signed) Dr. Edith Stein, Instructor at the German Institute for Scientific Pedagogy, Münster in Westphalia, Collegium Maria We phenomenologically 'hear' in Stein's letter the beginning of a prophetic response to the call of the other. Prophetic witnessing is, as we considered with Heschel, 'a form of living, a crossing point of God and man'. Stein's response exhibits an increased sensitivity for 'the meaning of this hour'; an hour when the world seemed silent in the face of evil.

Let us call to mind the following vivid example in Heschel's *Versuch einer Deutung*:

A tale is told of a band of inexperienced mountain climbers. Without guides, they struck recklessly into the wilderness. Suddenly a rocky ledge gave way beneath their feet and they tumbled headlong into a dismal pit. In the darkness of the pit they recovered from their shock only to find themselves set upon by a swarm of angry snakes. Every crevice became alive with fanged, hissing things. For each snake the desperate men slew, ten more seemed to lash out in its place. Strangely enough, one man seemed to stand aside from the fight. When indignant voices of his struggling companions reproached him for not fighting, he called back: If we remain here, we shall be dead before the snakes. I am searching for a way of escape from the pit for all of us. Our world seems not unlike a pit of snakes. We did not sink into the pit in 1939, or even in 1933. We had descended into it generations ago, and the snakes have sent their venom into the bloodstream of humanity, gradually paralyzing us, numbing nerve after nerve, dulling our minds, darkening our vision. Good and evil, that were once as real as day and night, have become a blurred mist. In our every-day life we worshiped force, despised compassion, and obeyed no law but our unappeasable appetite...($\S AH6-7$).

Notice Heschel's words: '[w]e did not sink into the pit in 1939, or even in 1933. We had descended into it generations ago'. Correspondingly, Stein argues: 'For weeks we have seen deeds perpetrated in Germany which mock any sense of justice and humanity, not to mention love of neighbor. For years the leaders of National Socialism have been preaching hatred of the Jews.' Observe Stein's temporally charged language. It is as if she's remembering for the Christian church, and thereby reminding the Pope: the present crisis is not a new crisis; the 'seed of hatred' was 'germinated' long ago (§ESI). Her remembering is an anamnesis that does justice: she both names the source of evil ('National Socialism') while concomitantly

implicating this totality of making a 'mockery' of *Jewish-Christian values* -- e.g., 'justice and humanity, not to mention love of neighbor (§*ES1*)'.

Yet it is both the persecutors, and those who remain silent in the face of persecutions, that are to be held accountable (§ES1: '[b]ut the responsibility must fall, after all, on those who brought them to this point and it also falls on those who keep silent in the face of such happenings'). This responsibility most heavily weighs on Christians: '[e]verything that happened and continues to happen on a daily basis originates with a government that calls itself "Christian" (§ES2). The church therefore needs to respond: '[f]or weeks not only Jews but also thousands of faithful Catholics...all over the world, have been waiting and hoping for the Church of Christ to raise its voice' (§ES2). Stein calls on the church to be a prophetic witness in naming as 'open heresy' the 'idolization of race and governmental power' being advocated by National Socialism (§ES2). The church's continued silence vitiates an empathic Judeo-Christian consanguinity: '[i]sn't the effort to destroy Jewish blood an abuse of the holiest humanity of our Savior...[?]' (§ES2).

It is against the above horizon where Heschel and Stein encourage us to embrace the prophetico-mystical option in becoming 'witnesses with open eyes'. Heschel provokes us into considering our fall into blindness: the deriders of compassion 'sent their venom' into humanity 'darkening our vision' such that the difference between good and evil has become like 'a blurred mist'. And this blindness breeds silence: 'silence hovers mercilessly over many dreadful lands...[w]here is God? Why didst Thou not halt the trains loaded with Jews being led to slaughter?...Why dost Thou make it so easy to kill? Like Moses, we hide our face; for we are afraid to look upon *Elohim'* (§*AH5*). Stein warns the church that those 'who see the conditions in Germany *with open eyes, fear the worst*' for all

people. The destruction of the Jews will eventually mean the 'no less systematic' destruction of Christians, and all people of good will, for *silence never purchases* peace from evil (§ES3).

Heschel also wisely draws our attention to the fact that destruction of the Jew will also mean the eventual destruction of the Christian:

Nazism at its very roots was a rebellion against the Bible, against the God of Abraham. Realizing that it was Christianity that implanted attachment to the God of Abraham and involvement with the Hebrew Bible in the hearts of Western man. Nazism resolved that it must both exterminate the Jews and eliminate Christianity, and bring about instead a revival of Teutonic paganism. ³⁹⁷

Indeed, an attack on Judaism is an attack on Christianity. And yet, there is a way 'out of the pit' (§*AH11*) -- if we would only open our eyes so that we might again see *Elohim* in and through the face of the other.

'Someone has Survived', a poem by Dr. Renata Katz recently read at the Holocaust Memorial Day Commemoration in Ballymena, Northern Ireland, expresses this desire for remembering their faces:

I cannot see their faces/I never had a chance/I never met them but have seen them on the old photograph/There was no time to know what they were really like./ I cannot see their faces/And what way it was for them not knowing what happened to their children./ I cannot see their faces/Their blue eyes and unusual accents/But I have seen it in their child./I cannot see their faces/I cannot imagine their horror in knowing that that was it and they were going to disappear/ In dust over Poland!/ The only reminder is one old photograph,/It and the memorial plaque but/No headstone and no grave because they disappeared in dust./It is so painful to imagine that there was no humanity/During that time!/I cannot see their faces/ But I wish to feel their spirits around me to let them know that someone has survived/And the legacy of that time is passed and will survive/In generations to come! 398

In 'seeing again their faces' we begin to prophetically challenge the totality of silence.

This is not an either/or option 'for evil is indivisible. It is the same in thought and in

³⁹⁷ Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 236.

Renata Katz, 'Someone has Survived', a poem read by Shoshanna Appleton, from the *Proceedings* of The 2009 Holocaust Memorial Day Commemoration, The Braid, Ballymena Town Hall, Museum and Arts Centre (27 January 2009): 1-10; 3-4. NB: The author is originally from Czechoslovakia, and has lived in Dublin for over twenty years. When she looks at the faded photograph, she thinks of members of her family who perished in the Holocaust. The poem is dedicated "in memory of my Rosenthal grandparents and the six million others who perished."

speech, in private and in social life', and the 'task of our time' is breaking the silence for 'God is everywhere or nowhere' (\$AH12).

The prophetic witness's empathic 'engagement for service' (§AH13) is actualized in partnering God (§AH14: 'God is waiting for us to redeem the world'). Through this partnership, the prophetic witness works at 'establishing' (§AH14) the reign of God in an interreligious world: 'the glory of man is not in his will to power, but in his power of compassion' (§AH12). Stein claims herself in the letter as 'a child of the Jewish people' who is 'also' a 'child of the Catholic Church' (§ES1). By responding to the call of her Jewish people she reminds Christians of the necessity for a dialogical way of being.

This portrait of call and response reverberating through Stein's *Letter* and Heschel's '*The Meaning of this Hour*', opens up a wider space for a Christian identification with the suffering of the Jewish other, and this solidarity empowers a new kind of prophetic living, even in the midst of discontinuity. The prophet's voice, even in the midst of collapse, is *already* a voice with an eschatological resonance; one reverberating into a *not yet* realized future where hope tells humanity that there will be a 'renewal of the covenant with God' (§*AH27*) through a renewal of trust and solidarity among people. God needs humanity's collaboration in the work of redemption. Even the prophet's protest to God, when *justice is being denied,* speaks to the prophet's sensitivity to the *not yet* situation. Stein's empathic intentionality of 'dialectically belonging' to both Judaism and Christianity is also revealed through her Thomistic study, *Finite and Eternal Being*.

(5.4) Humani Generis Unitas/Finite and Eternal Being: A Hermeneutic of Contrast.

Not long after Stein's 1933 entreaty to Pius XI, having gone unanswered, she enters the Carmelite convent in Cologne. She was 42 years old. On the eve of her entrance into Carmel we find Stein reassuring her family and others, through the person of her young niece, that this decision is not to be regarded by them as a kind of escapism from the world:

What I am doing does not mean that I want to leave my people and my family. I will always be close to you, to the family, to the Jewish people. And don't think that my being in a convent is going to keep me immune from what is happening in the world. 399

The cadence of life in Carmel allows Stein to prophetically challenge, both in word and deed, the depravity of forgetfulness for the other that was about to sweep the world during World War II.

Stein was a prodigious writer from behind the walls of Carmel. She was granted permission to continue her work in the intellectual apostolate during the hours of manual labor. Along with a very healthy correspondence, Stein continued with philosophical and theological reflections in relative peace. In 1935, two years after entering Carmel, Stein comments on her life, "You cannot imagine how embarrassed I am when someone speaks of our life of 'sacrifice.' I led a life of sacrifice as long as I had to stay outside...[o]f course, there are Sisters among us who are called upon to make great sacrifices daily. And I do await the day when I shall be allowed to feel more of my vocation to the cross than I do now, since the Lord treats me once more as if I were a little child." It was during this time when she makes a return to Aquinas and completes a reflection on Thomism entitled *Finite and Eternal Being (Endliches*

⁴⁰⁰ Letter #192, "Letter to Gertrud von le Fort, Baierbrunn im Isartal," 31 January 1935.

³⁹⁹ Suzanne Batzdorff, "Watching Tante Edith Become Teresa, Blessed Martyr of the Church," *Moment* (September, 1987): 46-53; 50.

und Ewiges Sein) in 1937. This study, however, remained unpublished until 1950 because "the German anti-Aryan laws prevented its release."

In a review of *The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI* by G. Passelecq and B. Suchecky, Roland Hill of the London based weekly *The Tablet*, suggests an interesting possibility: "[a]s late as 6 September 1938 [Pius XI] had addressed his famous statement on anti-Semitism to a group of Belgian pilgrims: 'Anti-Semitism cannot be supported. Spiritually, we are all Semites.' The words may have been suggested to him by Edith Stein...[s]he had already urged the Pope, in 1934, to write an encyclical against racism and anti-Semitism.' "402"

The death of Pius XI on 10 February 1939 hastened the departure of the draft encyclical *Humani Generis Unitas* to the Vatican archives. Edith Stein's phenomenologically attuned Thomism may not have had a significant influence on the draft encyclical. Nevertheless, the constructive, empathetic sections of the document exhibit a language that is both personalist and pathic; a language also attributable to Stein's *oeuvre*. Johannes Nota, a Dutch Jesuit priest and philosopher who knew Edith Stein personally in Echt, Holland, and spent his academic career reflecting on her thought, "found the part [of *Humani Generis Unitas*] concerning the unity of the human race 'very good'...[b]ut the sections on the Jews and anti-Semitism seemed to him so mediocre -- the all-too-traditional theology used in them led to positions he described as 'deplorable.'" Stein's increasing interreligious givenness invites us to draw *Humani Generis Unitas* back out into the light, and

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⁴⁰¹ Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent To the Meaning of Being*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 9. (eds.) L. Gelber and R. Lueven, (trans.) K. F. Reinhardt (Washington: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2002), xviii, hereafter *FE*.

⁴⁰² Roland Hill, "The Lost Encyclical," *The Tablet* (8 November 1997):

http://www.thetablet.co.uk/cgi-bin/register.cgi/tablet-00129 accessed on 18 October 2005.

Johannes H. Nota, "Edith Stein und der Entwurf für eine Enzyklika gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus," *Freiburger Rundbrief*, 1975, 35-41, quoted from G. Passelecq, B. Suchecky, *The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI*, (trans.) S. Rendall, (intro.) Gary Wills (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1997), 12.

consider how the tenor of the document might have been different if Stein's Jewish-Catholic and female 'voice' had been more available to Pius XI, and the 'shadow' writers LaFarge and Gundlach. Stein's *Finite and Eternal Being* may aid us in this venture.

The author's preface to *Finite and Eternal Being* already encourages us to consider how the project of searching for truth is a 'common' project, presupposing a wider *empathos* among persons:

Beyond the limitations of historical epochs and peoples there is something in which all those share who honestly search for truth. If this attempt contributes in some degree to encouraging vital thinking in philosophy and theology, it may not be entirely futile. 404

I propose, therefore, as a way of continuing a shared search for truth that we apply a "hermeneutic of contrast", 405 by 'reading' the lights and shadows of the encyclical *Humani Generis Unitas* through the Thomistic lens of Edith Stein's *Finite and Eternal Being*.

The metaphysical matrix of Stein's *Finite and Eternal Being* may be considered phenomenological, personalistic and interreligious. While Stein's Thomism explicitly appeals to Jewish concepts and themes similar to those we find in Heschel, it also critically complements an ecclesial documentary tradition that may be considered historically androcentric in authorship and apathetic, or at least 'distancing', in language and perspective. *Finite and Eternal Being*, however, is

⁴⁰⁴ *FE*, xxviii.

⁴⁰⁵ Ronald Mercier, Unpublished Class Notes, *Social Ethics and Christian Responsibility* (Dublin: Milltown Park Institute, 16 November 2005).

⁴⁰⁶ Stein's reading of Thomas seems to suggest *a common ground* between Christians and Jews for doing philosophy and theology. *FE*, 13: "[Thomas'] own relationship to Aristotelian and Arabian philosophy presents sufficient evidence that he believed in the possibility of a philosophy founded on pure natural reason...in [*Summa contra gentiles*] he points out that in discussions with pagans and Moslems, the Christian thinker cannot refer to a common faith based on the Scriptures (a common ground which in the case of the Jews is provided by the Old Testament...").

written by a *Jewish woman* who is well able for holding in dialectical tension her dual affirmations: daughter of Israel *and* Carmel.⁴⁰⁷

Most importantly, our reflections with *Finite and Eternal Being* may further widen our sensitivity for the interreligious significance of Stein's life. This progressive 'opening of the question' on Stein's way-of-remembering-in-empathy may challenge Catholicism towards a more profound *teshuva* while concomitantly prompting us to consider how her theory and praxis may challenge Christians and Jews towards a deeper 'anamnesis', or a re-membering of one with and for the other in the present, as constitutive of the enduring legacy of Vatican II. But before we may come to 'open the question' on the relevance of Stein's givenness for Vatican II and the contemporary dialogue, let us continue with our reflections on how Stein's givenness from behind the walls of Carmel is progressively leading to a givenness *ex claustro*.

To this end, let us proceed in the following dialectical fashion: let us first consider the positive anthropology within the encyclical in conversation with the contemporary considerations of ethicist and dialogist David Hollenbach (5.4.1), and from this contemporary perspective let us present Stein's anthropology from *Finite* and Eternal Being (5.5). Lastly, we will turn to consider the more negative anthropology through our double hermeneutic of *Humani Generis Unitas*' positive anthropology, and Stein's contemporary and interreligiously minded reflections. This double hermeneutic may serve as a kind of 'leveling force' to some errors in the latter

⁴⁰⁷ Tracy, *DwO*, 49: "...[F]or too many unreflective Christians, the Jew has too often functioned as the "projected other" of the Christian... The Jew and the Christian, along with the Muslim, are profoundly similar, even at times identical in their basic beliefs in God. Nevertheless, they remain profoundly other. Yet this other-ness cannot be a projected otherness but only one where the other as other is honored," quoted from Joseph Redfield Palmisano, "To Give of Ourselves: A Way of Proceeding in Interreligious Dialogue, *Same*-Edith Stein-*Other: A Living Dialectic,*" cited from a lecture (Kingston, Jamaica: St. Michael's Theological Institute: 5 March 2005), 8.

half of the encyclical that the first half of the encyclical warns against (5.6). Let us first turn our attention to the positive anthropology in the document.

(5.4.1) The Unity and Plurality of Social Life: The Positive Anthropology of Humani Generis Unitas.

The draft presents a broad and progressive vision on the unity and plurality of human persons. Reminiscent of what would come years later in *Gaudium et Spes*, the document says that the Church "finds herself here in accord with all other types of society, since by her very nature all are rooted in history, in tradition, in the temporality of our social life; and the same can be said of the Church's accord, both internally and positively, with nations." The church sees itself in solidarity-frombelow with the temporal concerns of humanity. This *embedded and observing*Church is conscious of the other, regardless of faith or creed. Whenever there is a loss of human dignity, when the 'good' of the collective(s) supersedes the good of the person, all of humanity experiences a loss. Humans become robbed of "their lofty status as persons" and become reduced to "nothing more than simple parts of a whole, numbers in endless files of other similar numbers."

The document is reminding us that unchecked modernity has the potential of becoming a diabolical force, wanting to control and decide even the most transcendent aspects of humanity; namely, human personality and free will. In commenting on the totalitarian underside of modernity, Hollenbach says, "[t]he impact of this pursuit of mastery went far beyond the domains of the sciences,

⁴⁰⁸ *Humani Generis Unitas*, §79, quoted from *The Hidden Encyclical*, hereafter *HGU*. Also see: *HGU*, Section 5, "The Unity of the Human Race" at: http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/cjrelations/resources/education/humani_generis_unitas.htm accessed on 1 November 2009. ⁴⁰⁹ *HGU*, §27.

engineering, and technology, where it has been most evident. The overarching discourse of modernity has been a discourse of prediction and, above all, control."⁴¹⁰

Modernity's juntas-of-self-interest normalize atomistic thinking under the banner of 'technological advance' or 'the good of the nation.' In such totalities man becomes the idol of man, and the underlying desire to build up the collective 'We Are!' comes at the expense of the human person. Hence, the phenomenon of selfhatred is constitutive to the ideology of an impersonal collective. The destruction of a community of persons is necessary for the progress of a totalitarian system. The draft encyclical, however, wants to condemn any monolithic 'We Are!' that attempts to deny, rob or control 'my' unique conatus essendi. 411

In countering this totality, the draft appeals to "the spirit of unity," calling humankind into a progressive unity with diversity: "the unity of a large number of members, each one distinct and personally responsible, with his own destiny, but all of them internally organized toward common goals...[t]his unity in plurality is what humanity is." The draft argues that scripture affirms unity in diversity by affirming the "single, unifying stream of bodily life -- the blood stream as it is called -- that God set into movement in the world, and in which all men are plunged, is such a powerful agent of unity." The blood, therefore, "links all men by that which is deepest in them, namely their relationship to God." Ideologies "seek to erect insurmountable barriers between the different communities of blood and race" such that humanity's consanguinity is rendered forgettable. 412 For example, the cohesive phenomenon of

⁴¹⁰ David Hollenbach, The Global Face of Public Faith: Politics, Human Rights and Christian Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003) 55-71; 55.

⁴¹¹ HGU, §32: "ingenious teaching methods could not give man what the development of our times constantly seeks to take away from him: namely, the solidity and richness of a strong personality, personal judgment, a sense of running his own life." *HGU*, §72, §75.

childhood solidarity, expressed so poignantly in the words, 'now we're blood brothers for life!' becomes the fear-filled denial: "I do not know the man (Matthew 26:74)!"

On the issue of consanguinity -- this 'unifying stream of bodily life' -- the document has a prophetic and contemporary relevance. This metaphor has, as Heschel argues, "pretheological" implications. All people are 'plunged' into the world by this 'powerful agent of unity' linking them with something bigger than themselves. Religion's primordial locus -- its "true sanctuary", prior to any confession, is therefore deeper and more expansive than any one "place". Religion, at its best, when it hasn't been "reduced" to a stultifying institutional expression, will be relevant to all people at a "presymbolic depth of existence". Our consanguinity -- this blood we share, so basic to our existence, and yet the very ground from which we begin as children "to sense the truth" and "authenticity of religious concern" -- mysteriously unites humanity on the same corporeal plane. In this sense, Jews and Christians share the memory of the blood where "the antecedents of religious commitment, the presuppositions of faith" are unitive categories that draw us into a shared "depth theology" with one another.

A *depth* connotes a vigor and strength, a beginning again *ex radice*. It bespeaks a concern for "the total situation of man and his attitudes towards life and the world." While blood secures a biological empathy, depth carries the promises of a transcendent solidarity. While "[t]heologies" have the capacity to "divide us" when they become reduced to ideology it is "depth theology" that "unites us": "depth theology seeks to meet the person in moments which the whole person is involved, in

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⁴¹³ Heschel, "Depth Theology," first of a series of lectures delivered during a visiting professorship (Spring 1960) at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, originally printed in *Cross Currents* (Fall 1960), in *The Insecurity of Freedom: Essays on Human Existence* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1967), 115-126, 115-116, hereafter *Essays*.

moments which are affected by all a person thinks, feels, and acts. It draws upon that which happens to man in moments of confrontation with ultimate reality."⁴¹⁴

The texture of living with one another acquires a depth when we give ourselves over to the art of living for one another. Collapsing the distance between oneself and the other -- this, too, is the work of empathy. Stein argues, let us recall, in On the Problem of Empathy that the 'I' know will remain 'blind, empty and restless' unless it points back to 'some kind of experienced, seen act', and 'my' apperceptive understanding for, and givenness to, this 'foreign' experience is empathy. 'I' am given to this new depth of the other while concomitantly being given anew to myself. This foreigner draws 'me' away from myself and into an inward distance. One's desire for 'transcending' the 'immaturity' of 'self-centeredness' intends an emptying of all that is 'non' within the self; an emptying of all those objectifying tendencies which makes 'me' capable of 'fixing' myself and others as a 'non', as being less than a person; a mē on ('non-being'). Kenosis, in this now qualified Heschelian sense, is a way of being 'attentive to a nonself' (cf. chapter 3). No longer frightened by the complexity of the other, we move together as persons beyond a shallow way of relating and into the deep brilliance of a more universal concern(s): "[w]hen the people of Israel crossed the Red Sea, two things happened: the waters split, and between man and God all distance was gone. There was no veil, no vagueness. There was only his presence: This is my God, the Israelite exclaimed."

Heschel concludes that while "[m]ost miracles that happen in space are lost in the heart," depth theology "evokes" the "spontaneity of the person". Without this "responding and appreciation" -- this "inner identification" or "sympathy of identification" with the ineffable -- without this deep memory, all ritual and

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 119.

observance "crumbles between the fingers". This transcendent psycho-spiritual consanguinity therefore 'links' all people by that which is 'deepest in them', 'their relationship to God' and one another.

In terms of *Humani Generis Unitas*, the 'insurmountable barriers' that totalitarianism 'erects' are ultimately a subtle *amnesia for the other* that slowly chisels away at the solidarity of being(s)-in-relation. When forgetfulness sets in, the activity of any group will ultimately devolve into "a matter of me controlling you on my terms...as domination of the weak by the strong". We lose the face of the other through our desire to control: "the dignity of the person as *imago Dei* is warped by an effort to be 'like God." Here, too, a Jewish prescience challenges the idolic desire to control: God created people in God's image (*Tselem*) and likeness (*Demuth*); the symbol of God *par excellence* is the *human person*, *every person*. Heschel argues,

For there is something in the world that the Bible does regard as a symbol of God. It is not a temple nor a tree, it is not a statue nor a star. The symbol of God is *man*, *every man*. God created him in his image (*Tselem*) in His likeness (*Demuth*). How significant is the fact that the term *tselem* which is frequently used in damnatory sense for a man-made image of God, as well as the term *demuth*, of which Isaiah claims (40:18), no demuth, or likeness can be applied to God -- are employed in denoting man as an image and likeness of God. 418

There can be no greater *imago Dei* than the human person herself -- and her 'tselem' may not be 'controlled', for it is a likeness flowing from the transcendent depth of the Other's face. Edith Stein, in her treatment of Thomistic metaphysics of being, turns to this 'image' of the *imago Dei*. In doing so, she extends the positive anthropology, and establishes our reflections on the draft in more contemporary, interreligious terms.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁴¹⁶ Hollenbach, The Global Face, 58.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁴¹⁸ Heschel, *MQG*, 124.

(5.5) Stein's Hermeneutic: "I Am Who I Am" -- God's Being-in-Persons. 419

Finite and Eternal Being is Edith Stein's "inquiry into the meaning of being", and her approach is attentive to both the Thomistic tradition and to the contemporary milieu of interreligious dialogue. 420 In section 4.3 of Chapter VI, "The Meaning of Being," Stein takes up the "ontological question" of God from the perspective of the Hebrew Scriptures. She takes as her "frame of reference that name by which God has designated himself: 'I am who I am.'" Stein wants to posit, "he whose name is 'I am' is being in person." It is obvious to Stein how the "first existent" must be a reasonable and free person for only a person "can create, i.e., call into being by virtue of his will...only a knowing and willing being can posit ends and ordain certain means to these ends."421 To bolster her argument, she turns to the phenomenon of naming oneself "I." She says "I" [Ich] is the name "by which every person designates himself or herself qua person," and only a being who is awakened to "its differentiation from every other existent can call itself an 'I."

The incommunicability of the self-accusative "is a peculiar characteristic of being... which we call life." The introverted strophe of the 'I' allows for 'my' unique unfolding as an individual: "every I subsists for itself..." The 'I', however, is in need of being drawn into community with others. The introverted strophe of the 'I' is "deficient" in so far as the 'I' remains empty of content from "the 'external world.",422

The 'I' must therefore navigate the world as spirit and flesh, and embed oneself in the complexities of the day -- "life comes out of one darkness and moves

⁴¹⁹ The following is quoted from Stein, *FE*, 342-346.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, xxviii: "the search for the meaning of being and the attempt to arrive at a synthesis of medieval thinking and vital present-day philosophy are not only the personal interest of the author but dominate the philosophic scene."

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, 342-343. ⁴²² *Ibid.*, 344.

into another darkness." Stein's insistence on the inherent dialectical tension between the extraverted and introverted moments of living becomes an essential rejoinder to a negative, one-sided anthropology. One strophe set over and against the other may produce the following existential condition (i, ii):

- (i): An unyielding introversion selfishly locks the subject into oneself, i.e., 'I am loving,' 'I am vulnerable' becomes 'I am impenetrable.' The self-accusative 'I' may never be charged by an external need: 'help me!' The givenness of empathy is never realized, and a shared striving for the good life is an enigmatic project.
- (ii): Conversely, a mindless extraversion denies the unique complexities of *every* 'I''s personal, psycho-spiritual *conatus essendi*. *No individual* may be considered unique in and of themselves. The innate human dignity of every person receives a subtle decategorization through naming 'them' as 'collective'.

If humanity forgets the necessary dialectical tension between *both* strophes then an impersonal ideology has the potential of effacing the 'I''s dignified status of being a flesh and blood icon of the Transcendent: the human person "bear[s] a closer resemblance to divine being than anything else that lies within the reach of our experience."

It is against this horizon Stein posits the human person as *imago Dei*.

Stein makes the radical claim that "no finite communion or community is a strictly defined and circumscribed triunity." She prefers to hold that a more "perfect" image of God-in-relation may be "the image that is found -- by virtue of the indwelling of the Divine Persons -- in the individual soul in the life of grace and glory." The actualization of the Imago Dei *qua* person is through "genuine and natural" communion with others -- and this givenness *presupposes* the empathy of a "personal self-giving." The person reaches toward the fullness of being by living well with other human beings i.e., "[t]he 'I am' means: I live, I know, I will, I love."

⁴²³ *Ibid*.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, 466.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, 344-345.

Stein's argument is a further echo of Heschel's conceptual disposition towards the human person. Heschel argued that the person 'is all of humanity in one' and 'a disclosure of the divine'. And 'I' begin to get a 'sense' for 'the image of God, the presence of God' through 'my' engagement with the other. Grace and glory come from the givenness of being open to *the other*: the Jew, the Catholic, the other (*cf.* chapter 1). This communion with otherness through a mutual self-giving brings me closer still to the realization that "truth [is] something to be found through every human encounter (*ezehu hokham ha-lomed me'kol adam*)". This living from a prophetic perspective, with 'open eyes', allows for "seeing truth in multiple and even contradictory manifestations (*shiv'im panim la'torah, elu ve'elu*)." As Stein says, Even the "lacunae" of life "which cannot be filled" create a space wherefrom the human person may reach toward the fullness of being *imago Dei*. This 'spacious' way of living from truth, of living from a sense of givenness-as-communion to the world, threatens the closed system of an extensive totality.

Against the above horizon of the positive anthropology in *Humani Generis Unitas*; the Heschelian insight into depth; and the personalistic reflections from the

Jewish-Catholic perspective of Edith Stein, we must now turn our attention to the

negative anthropology within the document.

(5.6) Doing Teshuva: Moving Beyond a Negative Horizon.

Humani Generis Unitas says the following on racism: "[r]acism does not accord the human person its rights and its importance in the formation of society. It claims that the fact that individuals have the same blood irresistibly involves them in

⁴²⁶ See: *Mishna Avot 4:1*; *Talmud Bavli Yevamot 14a*, on the relationship of the house of Hillel and the house of Shamai; *Num. Rabbah 13*; *Talmud Bavli Eruvin 13b*, in Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 178.

⁴²⁷ Stein, FE, 344-345.

a single current of physical and psychological characteristics."⁴²⁸ One may almost hear the voice of Stein reverberating through the document: every 'I' "emanates its own being," where solidarity is a lived unity in diversity. ⁴²⁹ And one also hears the voice of Heschel on our shared consanguinity: "[t]o act in the spirit of religion is to unite what lies apart, to remember that humanity as a whole is God's beloved child. To act in the spirit of rac[ism] is to sunder, to slash, to dismember the flesh of living humanity."⁴³⁰ The evidence of the document's positive anthropology leaves one all the more perplexed and confused when reading the following negative statements from the same document, in a section of the draft entitled, "Position of the Church with Regard to Judaism [(iii), (iv)]:"

(iii) §142: [The Church's] ardent hopes for their eventual salvation in the future, do not blind her to the spiritual dangers to which contact with Jews can expose souls, or make her unaware of the need to safeguard her children against spiritual contagion...

(iv) §142: The Church has warned likewise against an over-familiarity with the Jewish community that might lead to customs and ways of thinking contrary to the standards of Christian life.

The above leaves Nota, scholar of Edith Stein, commenting, "[i]f one puts these sentences back into the context of the racist legislation adopted in Germany at that period, one can say today: God be praised that this draft remained only a draft!" **431 **Humani Generis Unitas' loss of vision becomes even more jarring when held up against one last vignette: Gustav Gundlach's noteworthy condemnation of Austrian Cardinal Theodor Innitzer's *imprimatur* of National Socialism. Not long before September 1938, when Pius had addressed the Belgian pilgrims with the searching words: 'Spiritually, we are all Semites,' Fr. Gundlach, on 6 April 1938, gave a fiery

429 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 343.

⁴²⁸ HGU, §113.

⁴³⁰ Heschel, "Religion and Race," The Opening Address at the National Conference on Religion and Race (Chicago: 14 January 1963) in *Essays*, 85-100; 85-86.

⁴³¹ Johannes H. Nota, from *The Hidden Encyclical*, 12.

response to Innitzer on Vatican Radio entitled, "What is political Catholicism?"

Gundlach -- introduced on the program as an "anonymous Jesuit" -- exhorted the Austrian branch of *Catholic Action* to not "give up the attempt to put the principles of moral life to work in all domains of terrestrial life...." Any action on the contrary by pastors and other church officials, Gundlach argues, ought to be judged by "all righteous and well-intentioned people, of whom there are many outside the Church... as lacking in dignity and fidelity." ⁴³²

An approach from fidelity was not necessarily new to the church as it had its roots in Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum (18 May 1891): "[i]t is the soul which is made after the image and likeness of God; it is in the soul that the sovereignty resides...[i]n this respect all men are equal; there is here no difference between rich and poor, master and servant, ruler and ruled, for the same is Lord over all." Indeed, Gundlach's address on Catholic Action provides us with the best of snapshots into a positive anthropology. In contemporary terms, William Byron gives a contemporary articulation of the Leonine tradition in "Ten Building Blocks for Catholic Social Teaching." Byron presents the first principle on human dignity: "[e]very person-regardless of race, sex, age, national origin, religion, sexual orientation...or any other differentiating characteristic--is worthy of respect...[t]he principle of human dignity gives the human person a claim on membership in a community, the human family." This positive anthropology was being echoed, at roughly the same time, through the considerations of Edith Stein and Abraham Joshua Heschel. It is this anthropology from pathos that draws us all deeper into the memory that spiritually,

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⁴³² Gundlach, reported by *L'Osservatore Romano* 2 April 1938, quoted from *La Documentation catholique*, vol. 39, no. 87, 456-68, in Passelecq, Suchecky, *The Hidden Encyclical*, 52-57; 52, 53, 55. ⁴³³ Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum* §40: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html accessed on 25 October 2007, *italics* added to original.

⁴³⁴ William J. Byron, "Ten Building Blocks of Catholic Social Teaching," *America* (New York, 31 October 2005): < http://www.americamagazine.org/articles/Byron.htm> on 25 October 2007.

we are all semites. And living with and for others from a hermeneutics of empathy is a way of being faithful to our consanguinity.

Gabriel Marcel, some fifty years ago, proposed the following challenge to an increasingly solipsistic (post)modernity, "[f]idelity truly exists only when it defies absence, when it triumphs over absence, and in particular, over that absence which we hold to be -- mistakenly no doubt -- absolute, and which we call death." In 'defying absence' the 'we' may enter the ebb and flow of giving and *receiving*. Within the matrix of giving and receiving we come in touch with the wider field of God's *esse* as being the kenotic gift of solidarity. Again, we would want to maintain with Stein that the primordially introverted strophe of existence is receptive: "man cannot live by oblative, descending love alone. He cannot always give, he must also receive. Anyone who wishes to give love must also receive love as a gift." But this receptivity is balanced by a kenotic prodigality, a desire for the creative *re-membering* of oneself with the other.

In light of our above reflection(s) with Stein *et al*, we are obliged to conclude that the "deplorable" language nullifies an *imago Dei* theological anthropology. The draft exhibits the bias of an ecclesial reclusivity (see above [i]). That is to say, the givenness of empathy becomes an untenable project. The language of "spiritual danger," "spiritual contagion," and "over familiarity" locks the draft into an unyielding introversion. Furthermore, the use of such language reveals a 'depersonalized' anthropology, indicting the church for being yet another totalitarian voice. Does not the draft of the encyclical itself argue, "we rather frequently find a

⁴³⁵ Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, (trans.) Robert Rosthal (New York: Noonday Press, 1964), 171.

⁴³⁶ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est* (Vatican: December 25, 2005): §7 obtained from

<www.vatican.va> accessed on 9 January 2006.

certain systematic depreciation of man's personality, a mistrust toward it expressed in both speech and writing"?⁴³⁷

Scholars will continue to wonder how the draft could make such an unfortunate turn to racist language in light of its earlier affirmations on consanguinity. It is not implausible, as Passelecq and Suchecky suspect, that the conflation of Bolshevism with the entirely diverse race of the Jewish people may account for the negative anthropology. 438 This short-sighted coalescing of Judaism with a political ideology hastened an ecclesial protectionism "against error". It reduced the complexities of a system of belief to the one dimensional social ideation of this feared 'collective'.

This 'mindless' extraversion of fearing a projected other nevertheless buries the following fundamental memory: in speaking of 'them' Christianity is also speaking about itself. This negligence in remembering our consanguinity is nothing more than the continuance of the "age-old process of dejudization of Christianity" where

obsolescence and abrogation of Jewish faith became conviction and doctrine; the new covenant was conceived not as a new phase or disclosure but as abolition and replacement of the ancient one; theological thinking fashioned its terms in a spirit of antithesis to Judaism. Contrast and contradiction rather than acknowledgement of roots, relatedness and indebtedness, became the perspective. 439

This profanity allows for the narrowing, and ultimate loss of fidelity to a wider memory. The integrity and continuity of *Humani Generis Unitas*' unmistakably humanizing language is compromised by the text's subsequently antithetical negative language. 440 To all appearances, the echo of a Marcionite desire for 'obsolescence

⁴³⁸ See: Passelecq, Suchecky, *The Hidden Encyclical*, 47-52.

⁴³⁷*HGU*, §46.

⁴³⁹ Heschel, "Protestant Renewal: A Jewish View," from *The Christian Century*, vol. 80, no. 49 (December 4, 1963) in *Essays*, 168-178; 169. 440 *HGU*, §148.

and abrogation', combined with the Church's own contemporary disquietude around how it remembers, allows for the document's anxious vacillations; the language of continuity is usurped by discontinuity.

Concluding Remarks.

Our reflections on Stein's dynamic and interreligiously-minded Thomism, coined with the positive anthropology of *Humani Generis Unitas*, and read through Heschel's hermeneutic from depth theology, encourages us today, as Christians in dialogue with our Jewish brothers and sisters, to live more completely from a *hermeneutics of empathy*. A *logic for feeling with the other*, this interpretive 'key' for unlocking memories, may help us remember again our consanguinity with Judaism.

Heschel's poem, "The Forgotten" is an elegiac rallying cry to become a rememberer with the other:

Man, forgotten by everyone -- /like a gas lamp burning in daylight,/(they had forgotten to extinguish it).../today he smoldered at my door./Softly beat his heart:/Open, open your friendship to me!/There is still, in my love,/so much room and so many words for you./Your entire world can fit/into my open, spread-out arms./Come, plant your gaze in me,/Make a home for yourself in my memory. 441

A life that is "compatible" with transcendence, Heschel suggests, is one that "moves always under the unseen canopy of remembrance, and the wonderful weight of the name of God rests steadily" on this person's entire being. Stein herself defies absence by 'opening her heart' to others in solidarity. She makes a 'home for others' through incarnating a remembering empathy *qua* solidarity.

Stein's theory and praxis thus far in our considerations demonstrates a way of being in the world where the possibility for a peace-filled solidarity with the other becomes a live option through the communicative and reciprocal praxis of empathy:

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⁴⁴¹ Heschel, "The Forgotten," Poems, 41.

⁴⁴² Heschel, MNA, 284.

"[b]ut 'I,' 'you,' and 'he' are retained in 'we.' A 'we,' not an 'I', is the subject of the empathizing."443 So while "mineness could be designated as the primary distinctive feature of personal memory," our-ness may be designated as the empathic feature of shared memory.444

Angela Ales-Bello, the dean of the school of philosophy of the Lateran University, and specialist in Husserl and Stein, says the following: "Edith Stein is not removed from the world. Her complex personality did not allow her to forget any element, either human or religious. She knew how to combine human, worldly and political interests with spirituality. Herein lies her great current importance."445 Edith Stein opens herself up to a wider Jewish-Christian pathos. Stein's 'nonremoval' from the world is ultimately revealed for us as a pathos in passio; she undergoes the tremendum of being given in death at Auschwitz as a Jew with other Jews.

Marion presents a reading of givenness in death that is applicable to Stein's praxis, and may be described as a phenomenology of martyrdom. Marion says,

What is given -- time, energy, life -- will never be returned to the giver, since he gives himself, and since this self that he loses cannot be given back to him by anyone. The gift really offered and accepted is, however, addressed to givees who are bracketed -absent. Absent first because no individual can be set up as universal givee when the gift is addressed to a community; no one can say thank you for the sacrifice of a soldier...But there is more: the givees are absent because they can accept the gift only for the sake of transmitting it not back toward the giver, but towards givees still to come.446

Marion argues against the contention that givenness is suspended in death. Rather, death is an event the person receives, and it has an importance and relevance reaching

446 Marion, BG, 93.

⁴⁴³ Stein, OPE, 18.

⁴⁴⁴ Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 126.

⁴⁴⁵ Angela Ales-Bello, "Edith Stein, a saintly thinker waiting to be discovered," *The Pilot* (Boston, Massachusetts: 13 December 2002): 20. NB: BBC Radio 3 aired (26 January 2003): "Sunday Feature: Edith Stein -- the Philosopher Saint." An Adaptation of Stein's by Hatti Naylor, produced by Kate McCall. With Fiona Shaw as the voice of Edith Stein.

beyond the grave. Givenness in death reverberates into the future, and the event -especially martyrdom -- weighs on the living in the question: 'why?' Hence, Marion may raise the objection, "[t]he Epicurean paradox does not hold here which claims that "Death is nothing to us, since when we are death is not [Hotan men hēmeis ōmen, ho thanatos parei ou parestin], and we are no longer when it is [hotan de ho thanatos parēi, toth' hēmeis ouk esmen]."447 Stein's mode of being given par excellence is through an emptying that gives through death. Stein leaves the security of the walls of Carmel, and gives herself to the event, "[f]or death, as radical possibility accomplishes nothing less than intentional exposure, thereby opening the world, and therefore finally givenness itself. Death is given and gives me to myself as the possibility par excellence."448

I suppose she could have left behind the Jewish question for someone else to take up once she had entered behind the walls of Carmel. But this would have been a betrayal of her intersubjective instincts with the Jewish people. Indeed, she chooses to acknowledge her Jewishness, the 'sameness' she shares with a people. Stein's givenness is nothing less than a kenotically communicative praxis i.e., an emptying that gives. An emptying that gives Christians an example of how we may live within the ebbing and flowing of God's pathos; the undertow of an empathy drawing us into a deeper memory for our consanguinity with Judaism. It is to this consideration --Stein's real-time 'cruciform' givenness in death, but in a 'death that defies absence' through her interreligious witness -- to which we will now turn our considerations.

448 Marion, BG, 57.

⁴⁴⁷ Epicurus, Lettre à Ménécée, §125 in Marion, BG, 56.

Chapter 6 Beyond the Walls of Carmel.

In 1938 Teresa Benedicta a Cruce or Teresa Blessed by the Cross, known in the world as Edith Stein, remarked on this religious name she chose in 1933 upon entering the cloister of Carmel. She said, "[b]y the cross I understood the destiny of God's people which, even at that time [1933], began to announce itself. I thought that those who recognized it as the cross of Christ had to take it upon themselves in the name of all. Certainly, today I know more of what it means to be wedded to the Lord in the sign of the Cross. Of course, one can never comprehend it, for it is a mystery."449 The cross she is speaking of is that of the Nazi persecutions being carried out against the Jewish people -- her people. It is a 'heavy' icon, weighing upon us, calling us to re-imagine God as a God of pathos; a God who is empathy-in-action, a living kenosis into the woundedness of the world.

In May of 1987, William Keeler, Archbishop of Baltimore, the chair of the U.S. Catholic Bishops Committee for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs issued an "advisory' to the nation's Catholics indicating appropriate understandings for Catholic veneration" of this Jewish woman, convert and Carmelite who considered herself as blessed by the Cross. 450 The advisory reminds Catholics,

...[T]he killers of Edith Stein, that is to say the perpetrators of the Holocaust, were, by and large, baptized Christians whose consciences, in the Holy Father's phrase, had been "lulled" by centuries of negative theological polemics against Jews and Judaism emanating from all levels of the Christian community. While it cannot be said in any sense that the murderers were practicing Christianity in perpetrating mass murder (indeed, Nazi ideology bitterly opposed and sought to destroy the Church), meditation upon the martyrdom of Edith Stein must stress the guilt of Christians and call all today to repentance, even as they rightly point to the saintliness of her life and death.451

⁴⁴⁹ Letter #287, "Letter to Mother Petra Brüning, OSU, Dorsten," 9 December 1938.

⁴⁵⁰ William Keeler, "Advisory on the Implications for Catholic-Jewish Relations of the Canonization of Edith Stein," Bishops Committee for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, (Washington, D.C.: September, 1998): http://www.usccb.org/comm/archives/1998/98-205a.shtml accessed on 1 October 2008.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*

In the advisory, the Cardinal invites Catholic and Jewish theologians to reflect on the significance of her life for the interreligious dialogue. Firstly, he reminds us that, "[a]s a Church, we cannot pretend that she died as anything other than one of the millions of Jews murdered in the Shoah." The theologian therefore needs to keep proper perspective when examining the relevance of Edith Stein's life. Keeler states:

Edith Stein, it is important for the Church to say, died both as a "daughter of Israel" and as a Christian martyr. We need the reminder of Christian sinfulness that the first affirmation brings with it, as well as the spiritual challenge of the second affirmation. But we need also to remember, sensitively and compassionately, that the Jewish people do not see it that way. Nor, of course, do they need the reminder of the Shoah in the same way we do.

Yet, Jewish and Catholic theologians are being further challenged to examine carefully how Edith Stein stands between two worlds as both dialectically "same" and "other." Against the horizon of her martyrdom, Jews and Christians may engage in a meaningful dialogue where stakeholders may raise "theological issues which go to the heart of the dialogue. What do we mean by redemptive suffering? By redemption itself?" Keeler leaves theologians with this final proposal, "I would suggest just as deferentially that the dialogue over Edith Stein engaged in by Jews and Catholics does not and must not end with the recognition of difference." Indeed, it is the work of theologians to unmask the "deeper commonalities of revealed insight for Judaism and Christianity alike. This is the unending hope of dialogue between us, and the unending goal of reconciliation." 452

We have been attempting to take up Keeler's request throughout this study by "unmasking these deeper commonalities" through our reflection on the meaning and significance of the theory and praxis of Edith Stein's life as read with and through Heschel's perspective on pathos. But what of her death at Auschwitz? It is the following memory, coming from the lips of Stein's own niece and 'hagiographer',

⁴⁵² *Ibid*.

Suzanne Batzdorff, that sharpens Keeler's perspective, and helps us focus our attention on what Christians need to *remember* as we carry on the project of (re)creating an interreligious empathy: "[m]y remarks to the media were repeated in newspapers all over West Germany and in many countries [on the occasion of Stein's beatification on May 1, 1987]. One short, but widely reported article concluded with these words 'The Christian religion to which Edith Stein converted was in our eyes the religion of our persecutors." "453

What do Christians interested in dialogue *do* with this memory being uttered from the lips of Stein's niece? Pass over it in silence or honor it? The horror of the memory may subtly move us towards a forgetfulness so as to make it more manageable for ourselves. Batzdorff's memory -- *the Christian religion was the religion of Stein's persecutors* -- is a memory that Christianity needs to pass through and embrace. It is a memory "reckoning the soul", inaugurating *a perpetual anamnesis* for the Christian church. It is a memory calling Christianity to *re-turn* and '*re-member* itself' with its Jewish brothers and sisters.

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⁴⁵³ Batzdorff, "Watching Tante Edith," 53.

⁴⁵⁴ NB: Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, "We remember: a Reflection on the Shoah," (Vatican City State: March 16, 1998), §IV, italics added: "It was this extreme ideology which became the basis of the measures taken, first to drive the Jews from their homes and then to exterminate them. The Shoah was the work of a thoroughly modern neo-pagan regime. Its anti-Semitism had its roots outside of Christianity and, in pursuing its aims, it did not hesitate to oppose the Church and persecute her members also."

⁴⁵⁵ See: Dennis Hevesi, "Leon Klenicki, Rabbi Who Bridged Gaps Between Faiths, Dies at 78," *The New York Times* (January 31, 2009): "Klenicki joined the Anti-Defamation League as director of Jewish-Catholic relations in 1973. In 1984, he became director of interfaith affairs, a position he held until 2001. In 1998, when the Vatican issued a long-awaited statement on the Holocaust, Rabbi Klenicki was among many Jewish leaders who welcomed its blunt condemnation of the Nazi genocide and its call for repentance by those Catholics who had done nothing to stop it. But the document, titled 'We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah,' also distinguished between centuries of 'anti-Judaism' as a religious teaching and the Nazis' murderous anti-Semitism, which it said had its 'roots outside Christianity.' Rabbi Klenicki called the document 'a salad.' On the one hand, he said, the church had missed an opportunity for 'a reckoning of the soul.' On the other, he said, the statement was important for its wrenching description of the Holocaust and its demands that the horror never be forgotten. 'The deniers of the Holocaust in Europe now have to deal with the Vatican,' he said." From www.nytimes.com accessed on 31 January 2009.

Our recovery of the Jewish-Christian significance of Edith Stein will mean facing up to, rather than eclipsing, the memory that Stein converts and accepts the sign of the cross in her life. We need to embrace and honor this part of her story for, as Metz argues, "there are things that we try to forget and to erase from our minds. And when these things are such that they cannot be wholly erased or forgotten...then our urge to forget them becomes a malady and a wound in the human psyche." Our "deliberate effort to forget" this *part* of the memory only encourages an epoch of death rather than a new relationship grounded in teshuva, for the "unnoticed sway" of forgetfulness "over the human race embodies the profound depths of man's depravity and depravation."⁴⁵⁶ Rather, the past needs to be *resituated* in a way that makes us more vulnerable to the liberative 'wound' (vulnus) of truth.

Edith Stein's canonization, it must be acknowledged at this juncture, leaves the impression of a church interested in 'drawing a line' around Stein, as if we could claim her as 'our' own. 457 This "troubling insensitivity" in forgetfulness for her Jewish roots makes it less likely for our Jewish brothers and sisters to see the "real benefit of contemplating her death". And yet, while Stein "has been folded into the canon of the church" she is "needed exactly where she placed herself: in between." 458

⁴⁵⁶ Johannes B. Metz, *The Advent of God*, (trans.) John Drury (New York: Newman Press, 1970), 2-3. ⁴⁵⁷ NB: It is important for the 'Catholic' heart to hear the following Jewish critique on this matter from Di Segni, "Steps Taken and Questions Remaining in Jewish-Christian Relations Today": "[T]he massive ecclesiastical efforts that took place around the beatification, and later the canonization process of Edith Stein show us a Church that still proposes as a "model of heroic virtues" the converted Jew (or Jewess), and sanctifies the image of the latter even to the point of using the expression (which for us is profoundly disturbing) of a "new Esther." To refer to another, even more recent example, a prestigious Catholic publishing house has published the autobiography of a controversial Chief Rabbi of Rome, who converted to Catholicism in 1945, and was prepared for baptism by a small group of important prelates connected to this University [Pontificia Università Gregoriana], among whom was also Augustine Bea. The publication of this work has been accompanied by a lively marketing campaign on the part of the Catholic media, as well as by highly appreciative reviews in both the specialized and the general press. On the part of an important journalist there has even been a proposal to put forth the former rabbi as a candidate for beatification. What I wish to stress is that, 39 years after Nostra Aetate...I believe I have not come across (and I would be glad if anyone were to correct me on this point) a single article by a Catholic author, where it was said that the times have changed, and that a rabbi who converts to Christianity is no longer an aim of and an ideal for the Catholic Church." 458 Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 62.

One is reminded of Gertrud Koebner's words about Stein: 'Only eternal values counted for her...Edith knew that I would never abandon my Jewish faith and scrupulously avoided any attempt to draw me away from it. She knew that this was the basis on which our friendship could endure' (cf. chapter 5). It is this narrative, devoid of any "whiff of evangelism", of a woman who has "no desire to convince anyone of anything -- nor to persuade, and absolutely not to convert" that we have been considering. Stein is, above all, a woman of faith, and "what continued to happen to her thanks to the daily grace of liturgical and contemplative prayer, was a mystery. It was simply to be lived."

This mystery-filled narrative -- *her* story -- calls Christianity deeper into the memory of how we have been called as pilgrims to return to a primordially Jewish terrain through a *con-primordial* intentionality: "[i]f you do boast, remember that it is not you that support the root, but the root that supports you (Romans 11:18)." Stein's narrative is all about empathy and honoring her origins: "[f]or Edith Stein, Judaism and, more to the point, Jews are not subject to judgment. They *are* -- and are human. Therefore, to be honored in their persons and in their beliefs." ⁴⁶⁰

Even Stein's entrance to Carmel, a charism rooted and grounded in the original inspiration of Elijah, reveals how Judaism *ex radice* is "treasured" in Stein's "own personal life and memory". Furthermore, Stein's intentionality in going to Auschwitz re-creates the pathos of God through an interreligiously sensitive kenosis in her givenness to *'another suffering population'*. Yet they are *her people*, and Stein goes to Auschwitz with them. And it is precisely for this reason: the Jews are not *another population* -- whereby Stein's givenness-in-death may challenge Christianity 'from the inside' to do the *teshuva* work of revising and extending our self-

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid

understanding of what it means to be a martyr, of what it means to be a witness in empathy with the other; a witness to truth. Hampl concludes that, "the propriety of the church's claiming Edith Stein as a martyr of the church rests fundamentally on 'the problem of empathy,' Edith Stein's defining subject. For if the church cannot see itself as it is reflected by another suffering population, and if it refuses to acknowledge the judgment of that gaze, then it fails in this essential spiritual relation of empathy."

Batzdorff, Stein's niece, is optimistic that "by the manner of [Stein's] death, she may have inspired a sincere search for peaceful coexistence and improved relations between Christians and Jews, for cooperation instead of crusades, understanding in place of inquisition and *autos-da-fe*, brotherhood instead of holocaust. Indeed, Christianity's ability to acknowledge -- without preconditions and biases -- empathy's dialectically-interreligiously-attuned *denouement* in the life and death of Stein; vis-à-vis her receptivity for the suffering of her people, is a lesson in kenotic witnessing for the entire Christian church.

While it has *not* been our specific purpose in this study to comprehend the interreligious significance of the symbol of the cross -- if one may even speak of its interreligious 'significance' for a Jewish-Christian dialogue -- it nevertheless strikes us that Stein's *way* of witnessing to the cross, of witnessing to suffering, is consistent with her *hermeneutics from empathy*. In death, Stein subverts and widens -- i.e., *re-imagines* the intentionality of Christianity's cross through her own empathic cruciform givenness. She may become through this praxis "the focal point of an act

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⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 71, 61.

⁴⁶² Batzdorff, "Watching Tante Edith," 53.

of contrition still desperately needed by the Western world in response to the midcentury horrors committed against Jews and Jewish life in Christian Europe." 463

The phenomenological weight of Stein's example is most exquisitely revealed, or 'felt', when one looks at how Stein listens and responds in an interreligious way to the Jewish and Christian call at the time of the Shoah. As phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion argues, while "it is important to maintain the difference between these two calls (one Christian, the other Jewish), it is even more important to hear in them the unique word from which they both issue: 'Listen, Israel, Jahweh our God, Jahweh alone (Deuteronomy 6:4)." Stein's givenness in death therefore draws us into a respectful reflection on how sameness and otherness reaches through the chiaroscuro of death and discontinuity, and finds a dialectically subtle way of being related to one another. Karl Planck argues in a rather provocative essay, "Broken Continuities:

'Night' and 'White Crucifixion'" that the

crucifixion, be it the cross of Jesus or the nocturnal Golgotha of Auschwitz, breaks the moral continuities by which we have considered ourselves secure and whole. To mend these fragments of human experience lies outside our power. We cannot repair the broken world. Yet, as we yield these broken continuities to narrative -- to memoir, to literature, to liturgy -- we begin to forge a new link that binds storyteller and hearer, victim and witness. But here we must be most careful. We rush to tell the story, confident that it is ours to tell when, in fact, it is ours to hear. 465

The "dangerous memory" 466 of Stein's narrative opens us up to the possibility of a harm-less hope; hers is an anamnesis subverting a Christian forgetfulness, a memory dis-arming us, and pushing us towards a new future, even in the midst of discontinuity.

⁴⁶³ Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 62.

⁴⁶⁴ Marion, Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger and Phenomenology, (trans.) Thomas A. Carlson, (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1998), 197, hereafter RG.

⁴⁶⁵ Karl A. Plank, "Broken Continuities: 'Night' and 'White Crucifixion'," *Christian Century* (November 4, 1998, [p. 963]): http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=1069> accessed on 9 February 2008, hereafter Broken.

⁴⁶⁶ See: Metz, Faith in History and Society (New York: Seabury, 1980); "The Future in the Memory of Suffering," in J.B. Metz and J. Moltmann, Faith and the Future (Maryknoll, N.Y., Orbis, 1995), 3-16.

Contemporary Christian theologizing on crucifixion as *anti-sacrifice* explores how the cross is *con-primordially given* with the *tremendum* violence of the twentieth century. For example, Louis-Marie Chauvet and James Alison both follow a Girardian hermeneutic for exploring how the cross both *disassembles* violence and *exposes* the necrotic nature of sacrifice *qua* scapegoatism. Their introductory considerations may help us situate Stein's hermeneutics from empathy as advocating a theory and praxis of kenosis, where kenosis means a movement through anti-sacrifice and into a more complete (interreligious) solidarity.

Stein's final work, *The Science of the Cross (Kreuzeswissenschaft)*, argues for a prophetic agency through the intentionality of kenosis towards the other. It is an intentionality enriched and inspired by John of the Cross's apophatic considerations on mystical love and union with God. *The Science of the Cross* espouses the practical activity of empathy. The widening of empathy in kenosis is testified to by Stein's own givenness at Auschwitz. Before coming to consider both Stein's theory on the cross (6.2) and her subsequent prophetico-mystical givenness (6.3), let us first present Alison and Chauvet's anti-sacrifice hermeneutic of the cross (6.1) vis-à-vis Chagall's all-embracing icon of empathy-in-suffering, *White Crucifixion* (see: Appendix 2).

(6.1) A Christology of Anti-Sacrifice: Empathy's Kenosis towards a Renewed Jewish-Catholic Solidarity.

In 1938, the same year Stein completed *Finite and Eternal Being*, Marc Chagall's "White Crucifixion" exhibited in Brussels. The exhibition is meant to recollect the sufferings of the Jewish people. The painting is a figure of a serene Christ on the cross, bathed in white light, and covered in a *tallit* (Jewish prayer shawl). The painting is an event; around the cross there is happening, a melee of persecution against the Jews:

Like the *arma Christi*, or the tools and implements shown in traditional crucifixion scenes, images of confusion are grouped about the cross. Revolutionary hordes with red flags rampage one village, looting and burning houses. Refugees in a boat shout for help and gesticulate wildly. A man in a Nazi uniform is desecrating a synagogue...Ahasverus, the Wandering Jew, is passing by in silence, stepping over a burning Torah scroll. Old Testament figures are seen hovering, lamenting against the background of desolate darkness. Still, a bright beam of light breaks from on high, illuminating the white and unblemished figure of the cross.

In this painting we have a sincere sign of the times, for in "its very use of scenes of the times, the picture becomes an integrated whole and achieves the timeless depth of an icon." The painting gives itself over to the viewer on any number of levels through a depiction of the *tremendum* givenness of the Jewish people. Critics conclude "the devotional painting 'White Crucifixion'...feels its way into that suffering." Chagall himself says, "[i]f a work of art has total authenticity, symbolic meaning will be contained in it of its own accord." But why does Chagall -- born into a Jewish family in Vitebsk, Russia in 1887 -- employ the imagery of a *crucifix*? One exegesis of the painting argues Chagall uses the imagery of the crucified with a universal goal in mind: "[i]n the figure of Christ on the cross, symbolizing the passion of the prophet of the Jews and the death of the Christian God who took on the form of man, Chagall located a universal emblem for the sufferings of this time."

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gaze."

469 NB: In 1940 Chagall fled Germany for France, and ultimately left France in 1941 for the safe haven of New York City.

⁴⁶⁷ Ingo Walther, Rainer Metzger, *Marc Chagall 1887-1985, Painting as Poetry*, (Koln: Benedikt Taschen, 2000), 62, 65.

Jean-Luc Marion, *God without Being*, (trans.) Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 17-18, hereafter *GB*: "The icon summons the gaze to surpass itself by never freezing on a visible, since the visible only presents itself here in view of the invisible. The gaze can never rest and settle if it looks at an icon; it always must rebound upon the visible, in order to go back in it up the infinite stream of the invisible. In this sense, the icon makes visible only by giving rise to an infinite gaze."

⁴⁷⁰ Walther, *Marc Chagall 1887-1985, Painting as Poetry,* 62. Also see: Cornelia and Irving Süssman, "Marc Chagall, Painter of the Crucified," *The Bridge: A Yearbook of Judaeo- Christian Studies*, (ed.) John M. Oesterreicher, vol. 1 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955): 96-117; 106: "[Chagall] has painted the entire universe, and left out nothing," writes Raïssa Maritain in a poem on Marc Chagall, and she continues with a poignant description of the great *White Crucifixion* [see: Raïssa Maritain, *Chagall ou l'orage enchante* (Paris: Editions des Trois Collines, 1948), 32-33]. Down its center

In *Symbol and Sacrament*, Louis-Marie Chauvet attempts to resituate our understanding of the cross beyond sacrifice: "Christ revealed a non-violent God in the sense that God is not motivated by the desire for punishment or revenge." Jesus' passion and death "is non-sacrificial, in unmasking the violence of humankind with the aim of pushing the violence to its end…[e]ven to its paroxysm…" God therefore enters sacrificial rejection *qua* crucifixion as a way of ending the never ending cycle of recrimination and vengeance.

Similarly, James Alison argues that in the cross there is a moment of "anthropological revelation" -- whereby a movement beyond sacrificing one another and contemporary victimhood becomes a possibility; i.e., "what Jesus was doing was actually *revealing* the mendacious principle of the world. The way human structure is kept going is by us killing each other, convincing ourselves of our right to do it, and therefore building ourselves up over and against our victims."

The intentionality of the cross, when read through an 'anti-sacrificial' hermeneutic, intends the 'dis-assembling' of a world of genocide, racism, sexism and all forms of scapegoatism: "what [Jesus] was beginning to make possible was for us to begin to live as if death were not, and therefore for us not to have to protect

descends a great shaft of light -- Raïssa Maritain calls it 'a great space of ivory in a wasted world' -- and in it rises the cross with Christ nailed to it; at His feet stands a lighted candelabrum with flames so firm, radiance so bright, for here is the Light that all the world's horror cannot put out. Around his loins is the Jewish prayer shawl, and about his Head the glory, and over it, in Latin and in Hebrew, 'Jesus of Nazareth King of the Jews.' Below the cross, beneath His arms of compassion, there are victims of persecution: a Jew clasping the Torah, looking around desperately, not knowing where to flee; another running to save the little that is in the sack on his shoulder; a third paralyzed with fear, bearing a sign on his chest, 'Ich bin Jude'; an old rabbi, his hands to his eyes; and a woman, clutching her child to her heart. On all sides ruin and havoc: the synagogue on fire, the burning houses upside down, people and chairs and books tumbling out of them, and a threatening band of assassins flourishing like banners and weapons over the village. In the sky hover figures of Jews, old and grief stricken. Are they the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and is the woman with them Rachel the mother, 'weeping for her children' (Jer 31:15)? On the water drifts an overloaded boat, with no place to go. Where can Jews go? There is no place for them on earth, no place on earth where Jews are wanted."

⁴⁷¹ Chauvet, *Symbol*, 305-308; 306. Chauvet is reflecting with, in particular, "Discussion avec René Girard," *Esprit* 429 (Nov. 1973): 528-563; 553-556.

James Alison, "Some Thoughts on the Atonement," (Talk given in Brisbane, Australia: August 2004): http://www.jamesalison.co.uk/eng11.html accessed on 30 December 2005.

ourselves over against it by making sure we tread on other people." The cross ultimately reveals that "God was entirely without vengeance...he was giving himself entirely without ambivalence and ambiguity for *us*, towards us, in order to set us 'free from our sins' -- 'our sins' a way of being bound up with each other in death, vengeance, violence and what is commonly called 'wrath." Irish theologian, Enda McDonagh eloquently concludes that

[t]he victim of Calvary pronounces the death of victimization by the power of loving which death not only does not destroy but opens up to new life in resurrection. Practical loving reaches this far. It demands vulnerability even in God... *Vulnerabilis et vulneratus* remain the critical Christian criteria of the genuinely loving being, divine or human. 474

But what kind of 'vulnerability' could the cross possibly 'demand' from the Jew? If the Jewish-Catholic dialogue is truly going to be a *dialogue towards anti-sacrifice* then it occasions us to ask the following unsettling question: what is the symbolic efficacy of an image like *White Crucifixion* for our Jewish dialogue partners in a post-*Shoah* context? While some, even the artist himself, would want to consider *White Crucifixion* as a universal 'icon' -- one has to raise the question, as demanded by our hermeneutic: *how universal*?

Planck argues that there is "also a need to avoid those Christological excesses for which the suffering of the Jew is considered meaningful in light of the passion of Christ, as if Auschwitz were nothing but a stage in the Christian economy of salvation." To reduce or qualify the uniqueness of the Jewish cry of abandonment in the *Shoah* to the 'sameness' of Christianity's 'Eloi, Eloi' may only increase our distance from the memory of suffering. It may do little by way of encouraging a renewed appreciation of a shared Jewish-Christian consanguinity.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid*.

⁴⁷⁴ Enda McDonagh, "Is Love Still Central?" from *The Gracing of Society,* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1989), 28-47; 38.

⁴⁷⁵ Plank, Broken.

The critique that "symbols not only reveal what they symbolize but also -and, at the same time -- conceal that reality" is not unwarranted in terms of White Crucifixion. 476 Yet when faced with the contemporary tremendum(s) of Darfur, Rwanda; with increasing hostilities in the Middle East among Christians, Muslims and Jews, we need, as Christian theologians and dialogists, to be able to work within the between places of revealing and concealing, for "language does not take us into the essence of things, but into the materiality and messiness of history, in which relations, though not 'hidden', are not visible either." So, too, a dialecticallyminded hermeneutic from empathy would also be pushing us to consider how White Crucifixion may be speaking in a new language to us dialogists.

Is the painting trying to vocalize through symbol a way of belonging to one another that dialectically relates sameness in otherness 'on the same canvas', as it were? Is it not advocating the (inter)givenness of a broader interreligious solidarity? The symbolic intentionality of the painting renounces the self-sufficiency of the allknowing subject, and 'makes no guarantees in the present about the future' -- and yet all the protagonists in White Crucifixion share a solidarity under the banner of suffering that the cross somehow typifies. Let us recall from the painting: we see Ahasverus wandering and passing by in silence while other plaintive figures from the Hebrew Scriptures are floating against a dark horizon -- all of whom seem being-lostin-the-world. Even the Torah, Crucifix and Menorah lack a fixity to the ground -- and yet all seem to be 'caught up' with one another, sharing in a wider Jewish and

⁴⁷⁶ James B. Nickoloff, "Commentary on Goizueta: The Paradoxical Character of Symbols, Popular Religion, and Church: Questions for U.S. Latino/a Theology," in Practicing Catholic: Ritual, Body and Contestation in Catholic Faith, (ed.) Bruce Morrill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 179-182; 180-181.

⁴⁷⁷ Henrique Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us: Foucault, Roman Catholicism and Inter-faith Dialogue," in Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious Experience, 191-213; 196.

Christian dialogical matrix with the historical contingency of each other's temporal pain and suffering.

Let there be no mistake, Christianity will need to continually *undergo* a recovery of its Jewishness through *teshuva*. It is the work of asking for forgiveness while humbly pointing towards the possibility of a shared eschatological future. A future that eschews any hope of forcing conversion; i.e., "[o]urs is a season for listening and silence. Not when we speak to victims but when we listen to their testimony do we truly perceive the cross, the cross that breaks our moral certainties and shatters our continuities of power." Now is the time for listening to the voices of those who stand between sameness and otherness, those whose lives are painted on a broader canvas, giving testament to the iconic intentionality of 'the unifying stream of bodily life...the blood stream...which all men are plunged...this powerful agent of unity'.

Edith Stein's final work, *The Science of the Cross* proposes the 'reimaginization' of the cross's intentionality in kenosis as having a natural *Einfühlung* with a more universally relevant, and interreligiously significant, way of witnessing. Furthermore, this treatise gives us a theoretical basis for our considerations on her own mode of kenotic givenness at Auschwitz. Let us first consider her theory.

(6.2) The 'Science' of Kenosis: Stein's Phenomenological Christology.

By 1938, the same year as White Crucifixion's *début* exhibition, Stein begins to feel her vocation more to the cross. While National Socialism was seizing the hearts and minds of German people at *Kristallnacht*, Edith Stein and her younger sister Rosa

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⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid*.

were making preparations to leave their beloved Carmel in Cologne for the safer haven of Echt, Holland. 479

On December 31, 1938, Edith and Rosa Stein left Cologne for Echt, arriving in time for the New Year. Like the wandering Jew Ahasverus, Stein finds a momentary safe haven in this Dutch Carmel. Yet it was during this time in Echt when she wrote her final work, *Kreuzeswissenschaft, The Science of the Cross, A Study of St. John of the Cross.* ⁴⁸⁰ In this work, as in other works, Stein's personalism encourages a movement of the human beyond a closed and autonomous 'what's-in-it-for-me' praxis into something more interpersonal and responsible to the other. The *kenotic* intentionality of *Science* is also a 'practical phenomenology' for it presupposes, and helps us appreciate more deeply, Stein's own way of witnessing in the midst of the *Shoah*.

In a section of the study entitled "The Soul, the 'I,' and Freedom" (chapter 13, section d.) Stein reflects on the theme of the ego. In the language of a phenomenologist and metaphysician, Stein stresses the necessity of free choice in ethical praxis. She says that the "egocentric" individual's

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⁴⁷⁹ Rosa, herself a convert to Catholicism, took refuge with her sister Edith in the Cologne Carmel, and subsequently in the Echt Carmel. Rosa was also gassed and cremated at Auschwitz on August 9, 1942. Rosa and Edith's niece, shares the following: "November 10, 1938, brought *Kristallnacht*, the night of the broken glass, incinerated synagogues and mass arrests. The frantic hunt for visas began," from Batzdorff, "Watching Tante Edith," 50.

⁴⁸⁰ Stein (Teresa Benedicta of the Cross), *The Science of the Cross, a Study of St. John of the Cross (Kreuzeswissenschaft, Studie über Joannes a Cruce)*, (trans.) Hilda Graef, (eds.) L. Gelber and R. Leuven (London: Burn and Oates, 1960). The translator (hereafter Graef trans.) remarks in the preface, ix: "The reader feels that what she [Edith Stein] says about suffering and the Cross are not mere words, no detached analysis of St. John's doctrine, but part of her own life; for while she was writing this book she had frequently to present herself before the Nazi authorities in occupied Holland and suffered all the humiliations that were inflicted by them on the members of her race. Nevertheless, she preserved her calm even in this time of fear and anguish…"

own self is all that matters to him. To the superficial observer it may seem as if such a man were especially near to his interior, yet for him the way there is perhaps strewn with more obstacles than any other type...He may, e.g., be asked to give up a pleasure in order to help someone else. Here the solution will hardly be effected without a free decision. In any case, the sensual man will not decide to make a sacrifice as if it were a matter of course but will have to make an effort.⁴⁸¹

When the "sensual" or egoistic person is "approached by something that belongs to a completely different area of values", say, a request from another in need, he may begin to feel the challenge to respond. He will only venture a response to this other when he "has gone over to an ethical attitude, that is, the attitude of one who wants to recognize and do what is morally right." But in order to make this leap into action the self-enclosed 'I' will have to "take up a position deep within himself". Stein's position here seems counterintuitive. Getting beyond 'myself', and into the world of otherness by going deeper into oneself?⁴⁸² This going deeper, or becoming more completely oneself, is a matter of turning i.e., it is a "turning" toward God in such a way where "one does not look at [God] in the light of any single article of faith, rather one is surrendered to [God], the incomprehensible one". One surrenders herself to a God who is "the embodiment of all articles of faith and yet surpasses them all in his incomprehensibility". 483 This turning is a comprehensive reorientation of one's life to a different value-set where the "believer" comes to know that "there is One whose vision is not limited...who embraces and penetrates everything." Stein concludes that God grants the believer

a personal encounter through a *touch* in his inmost region. He opens to him his own inner being through particular enlightenment about his nature and his secret decrees. He gives him his heart - at first in a moment of personal meeting...then as a permanent possession... 484

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid*, 123; *cf*. Stein (Teresa Benedicta of the Cross), *The Science of the Cross: A Study of St. John of the Cross*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 6, (trans.) Josephine Koeppel, (ed.) L. Gelber and R. Leuven (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2002), 163-164, hereafter *SC*.

⁴⁸² Stein, *SC*, 163. ⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, 135.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 177.

Going deeper will therefore mean a coming 'into touch' with one's own capabilities for living a more meaningful life: "[i]f a man lives in this certainty of faith his own conscience will not rest content with his own best ability." 485 It is a 'turning' in empathy towards one's own transcendence. That is to say, one 'surrenders' to the possibility of living a larger life; of living from the memory of the Other, not just of oneself. Kosuke Koyama's reflections on the "crucified mind" in his study Water Buffalo Theology complements Stein on surrender with a further Christo-kenotic insight on the touch. 486

(6.2.1) Towards a 'Crucified' Mindfulness.

Crucified mindfulness is an eschatologically attuned givenness to the other in the midst of pain and suffering. Koyama, in turning to the Pauline canon, suggests, "[The crucified mind] is expressed in the life-style of the apostolic discipleship; 'when reviled, we bless, when persecuted, we endure, when slandered, we speak kindly...[h]ave this mind among yourselves, which you have in Christ Jesus...(Phil 2:5-11)." It is a mindfulness that expresses itself through the kenotically charged 'intergivenness' of agape: a loving not limited by race, religion, creed, status etc.

Koyama argues that, "[t]he crucified mind is not a pathological or neurotic mind. It is *love* seeking the benefit of others. This mind sees a person 'as he is seen' (1 Jn. 4:20)..." The crucified mind means radical givenness for the other, even towards death: "[w]e are to live according to the painful pathos of God's saving will expressed in the striking images at the crucial moments of salvation history."

If crucified mindfulness is to be a meaningful response to the world's *pathos*, and not some lofty platitude, then it necessarily incarnates love through the touch.

⁴⁸⁵ Graef trans., 123/SC, 165.

⁴⁸⁶ Kosuke Koyama, Water Buffalo Theology: Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition, Revised and Expanded (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1999), 150-170; 150. 487 Koyama, *Water Buffalo Theology*, 150, 159.

Koyama concludes, "[w]hen Christ touches *one*, and *one* is led to touch him in faith...that person is restored to wholeness, to the abundant life in the covenant relationship with God." The dynamic of giving and receiving i.e., *the touch* relaxes the classicist and 'missionary' posture of regarding religious otherness as *threat* or 'to be converted'. God incarnate may be found in the distressing proximity and tactility of '*this* touch', physical or otherwise, from the other. They are "genuine signs," and prophetic embodiments of the *missio Dei*. Koyama's insights help create space for a more profound reflection on the dialectical relationship between the kenotic *and* prophetic moments that should 'mark' Christian praxis and interreligious engagement. Indeed, crucified mindfulness ought to be constitutive of Christianity's twenty-first century 'rendezvous-with-otherness'.

Through the touch, in *the giving of the heart*, a "crossover" or "formal transformation" happens in the human being: "this may not even be possible in a natural way, but only on the basis of an extraordinary *awakening*." One is surrendering to a being 'awakened' to a new solidarity through the touch. It is an awakening that is "a breakthrough to something new". It is a *breakthrough*, in themes reminiscent of Heschel, into the sometimes '*painful pathos* of God's saving will'. Stein argues,

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⁴⁹⁰ Stein, SC, 164.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 166, 168.

⁴⁸⁹ Joseph Palmisano, "Young, Jamaican and Muslim: Receiving Others with Tenderness and Mercy," *National Jesuit News* (April/May 2005): 4 <www.jesuit.org>, accessed on 15 December 2005: "At the turn of the century, John Paul II highlighted the importance of having a generous hospitality towards the religious other. He wrote about this way of proceeding in dialogue in his Jubilee document, *Novo Millennio Ineunte*. Delivered in January 2001 and quoting from *The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et spes*, [§]11 and [§]44, respectively, the Holy Father states: 'Even as she engages in an active and watchful discernment aimed at understanding the 'genuine signs of the presence or the purpose of God,' the Church acknowledges that she has not only given, but has also 'received from the history and from the development of the human race.' This attitude of openness, combined with careful discernment, was adopted by the Council also in relation to other religions. It is our task to follow with great fidelity the Council's teaching and the path which it has traced.'"

[God] is himself a person, his being is personal being; the inmost region of the soul is the heart and fountainhead of her personal life. It is only possible for one person to touch another person in their inmost region; through such a touch one person gives the other person notice of his presence. When one feels one has been touched interiorly in this manner, one is in lively *sentience* with another person. ⁴⁹¹

It is a breakthrough into a pathic relationship with a personal God, a personal encounter.

We recall with Heschel (see: chapters 1-2), 'God does not reveal himself in an abstract absoluteness, but in a personal and intimate relation to the world...[God] is personally involved'. It is this personalist anthropology, found in Heschel and now Stein, whereby God is creatively reimagined as being pathically involved. God's *pathos* is 'not an idea of goodness, but a living care, not an immutable example but an outgoing challenge, a dynamic relation between God and man.' While Stein's position, with many Heschelian echoes, speaks from a Jewish ethos, her 'sensitivity' for *mutuality* in surrender -- e.g., "[i]t is a union of persons that does not end their independence, but rather has it as a prerequisite, an *interpenetration*..." -- continues to creatively extend Heschelian pathos towards empathy. 492

This kenotic journey towards empathy with another, through a subjective mutuality, also helps us appreciate that within the dialogical encounter of 'getting a handle' on the other we are concomitantly 'not getting a handle on one another'.

Koyama argues that

commitment belongs to the world of 'I-Thou-relationship' (I and the Buddha, I and Allah) and not 'I-It-relationship' (I and desk, I and car), to put it in the language of Martin Buber. 'It' can be comparatively treated. 'Thou' cannot be. I can compare this 'it' with that 'it'. But I am confronted with a completely different situation when I wish to compare this 'thou' with that 'thou'. I can 'handle' the former situation, while the latter I cannot, since it points to the relationship of encounter, meaning and commitment…[r]eligious faith cannot be 'it-ized.'

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⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁴⁹² Ibid., 179, italics added.

⁴⁹³ Koyama, "The Spat-upon Jesus Christ," *No Handle on the Cross: An Asian Meditation on the Crucified Mind* (London: SCM Press, 1976) 87-97; 89. It is of interest to note Benedict XVI's address in Turkey on this point of religion existing beyond the snare of commoditization or being 'it-ized'

This 'interpenetration' between the I and Thou, or, to use familiar terms, this 'mutuality' in 'intergivenness', points us towards a *shared* surrender: "in surrendering one's own person, one takes possession of God."

As we considered with Stephen Post, the mutuality of love is the 'only appropriate fundamental norm' for appreciating how a subject relates to another subject (*cf.* chapters 2 and 3). The sharing between subjects may therefore be qualified as an 'I-Thou' relationship because there is something of the other that I can not 'get a handle on' or 'figure my way into' -- and this introverted ground, this space inhabited by mystery, is something not exclusive to the other. It is a 'space' that 'I' inhabit within myself, and yet it is also a communal space, where part of the mystery of my being becomes 'inter-penetrated' with the mystery of the other. Such is the dynamic of an inter-kenotic way of being.

Correspondingly, this pathic intentionality of kenosis may never be envisioned as static and unidirectional, for one's givenness towards another will, hopefully, coax and incite a return givenness from the other. The kenosis of the 'I' may therefore mean a decentering of the 'I' where *Einfühlung* with God will also mean a reciprocally-grounded *Einverständnis* in the world. This movement of both towards the center, or as Hampl argued; into the 'in-between' place of 'you' and 'me' (*cf.* chapter 5), is a 'lively' and transformative 'feeling'-with (or, as Stein says, 'sentience'; *sentiens*) one another on the way towards transcendence.

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through engaging in a dialogue on fundamental values. He says, "We are called to work together, so as to help society to open itself to the transcendent, giving Almighty God his rightful place. The best way forward is via authentic dialogue...based on truth and inspired by a sincere wish to know one another better, respecting differences and recognizing what we have in common. This will lead to an authentic respect for the responsible choices that each person makes, especially those pertaining to fundamental values and to personal religious convictions." *Address, Meeting with the President of the Religious Affairs*, Ankara, Turkey (28 November 2006): <www.vatican.va> accessed on 15 December 2006.

494 *Ibid.*, 179.

(6.2.2) 'Like a Fire Burning': A Habitus-for-Loving.

The development of this habitus for transcendence ultimately shows itself as a dispositio for both spiritual and actual self-surrender; an emptying that gives oneself over to God as prompted by the very givenness of God through kenosis. The goal that any moral agent is rightly striving towards is fully realized in and through the moral agent's surrendering to a mystical love-union with the Infinite. But not surprisingly, the calculus for this way of loving is derived by Stein from the equanimity of personalist categories, "[f]or the property of love is to make the lover equal to what he loves....[i]t is equality in friendship in which the possessions of both are held in common." The surrendering of oneself in the union of love may be characterized then as an 'exstasis' of the self (1) towards the face of the other, and (2) towards the One who originally prompted the 'extradition'. 496 Stein says, "There is indeed a natural seeking and longing for what is right and good...[f]or a man whom God himself has drawn into his own most intimate sphere and who has surrendered himself in the union of love, this question is solved once and for all."⁴⁹⁷ For Stein, the desire for loving union with the divine strengthens one's capacity for ethical agency.

Stein argues, in themes rising from the Hebrew scriptures, one's "transformation in love is the *habitus*" or the "lasting condition" into which the 'I' is placed, and this transformation is like a "fire that burns in her constantly". While "[t]he simple union of love alone is like the 'fire of God in Zion' (Is 31:9)" those who cultivate the *habitus* for loving are to burn with "this fire of charity" for others; that is to say, they will be lovers in the world. This love of service to others, and the desire to live from this love, is also a desire reaching out towards an eschatological reality.

⁴⁹⁷ Graef trans., 123.

⁴⁹⁵ Stein, SC, 189.

⁴⁹⁶ Cf. Chapter 3, where we quoted Levinas, OB, 149: "[i]t is sincerity, effusion of oneself, "extraditing" of the self to the neighbor. Witness is humility and admission: it is made before all theology; it is kerygma and prayer, glorification and recognition."

It is a "vision of peace" where the "furnace of God in Jerusalem" is "blazing in the perfection of love", the fulfillment and coalescence of all things in justice and peace. 498 Loving union with God will also mean union with the other, and over time may develop into a universally applicable habitus-for-loving.

(6.2.3) Remembering The Woundedness of the World.

Stein ultimately concludes *Science* in arguing that "the *new self*" of the one who has surrendered to love "carries the wounds of Christ on the body: the remembrance of the misery of sin out of which the soul was awakened to a blessed life..." Is Stein's sense of 'remembering the misery' setting up a subtle challenge to anti-sacrifice? In one sense, 'remembering the misery' is a way of heaping onto one's self guilt upon guilt. But this is nothing more than a perverted form of vanity, to make it *all* about oneself.

Yet, Stein's sense of remembrance does not mean that one continues the sacrifice of the self to the necrotic torture of beating oneself up for past faults.

Rather, a *remembrance for the misery* is also about remembering the suffering caused to, and endured by, others. The important message here is that the new self is a remembering self. Stein concludes that "whoever, in deep recollection, enters into the attitude" of Christ's kenosis is at the threshold of feeling one's way into "the love that surrenders itself to the limit..." Yet this "self-surrendering love" is not only interested in "self-fulfillment" as "union with God", but *surrendering* also means engagement; a working "and laboring for the union of others with God and for their self-fulfillment". A concern for the self, united with a concern for the fulfillment of the other, "belong inseparably together". 500 The way of remembering God's wounds

⁴⁹⁸ Stein, SC, 187, 189.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 273.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 284.

is through remembering the woundedness of the world. In this sense the 'surrendering' of oneself is nothing less than a being made vulnerable to the memory of the other.

In *Kreuzeswissenschaft*, the large and wide thoroughfare of the *via negativa* of kenosis intersects with the *via positiva* desire for an ethically grounded prophetic witnessing. One cannot be accomplished without the other. Kenosis from the self designates a possibility for an ethical witnessing, while an ethical witnessing, a *laboring* with and for others, makes kenosis meaningful, increasing and widening its depth in the world. Kenosis is an emptying that gives a visible 'manifestation' of the invisibility of love. Stein's own praxis during the Holocaust is a prophetic expression of how kenosis may also be solidarity with a world of (inter)religious otherness. Her theory and praxis therefore gives "the long tradition of apophatic or negative theology" a necessary *aggiornamento*. ⁵⁰¹ She gives herself to this 'furnace' as one who is remanded with *her people* to the conflagration of Auschwitz -- to this consideration we now turn.

(6.3) Beyond the Walls of Carmel.

By 1939 the question had been settled once and for all for Stein. She writes to her new prioress at the Carmel at Echt from a desire for spiritual surrender. Like a contemporary incarnation of the Hebrew Scripture's 'Esther', she becomes increasingly open to the possibility that her way of subverting the epoch of Nazism in loving union with God may come in the form of *ex-stasis* from Carmel.⁵⁰² On

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501 Scanlon, "The Postmodern Debate," 233.

⁵⁰² In a striking analogy to Queen Esther, the Jewish Queen of a Persian court, who liberates the Jewish people from Haman's plot before King Ahasuerus, Edith writes in letter #281, "Letter to Mother Petra Brüning, OSU, Dorsten," 31 October 1938: "I keep having to think of Queen Esther who was taken from among her people precisely that she might represent them before the king. I am a very poor and powerless little Esther, but the King who chose me is infinitely great and merciful. That is such a comfort." In the biblical story, Esther's supplications before God are heard, and Haman's evil plot to

Passion Sunday 26 March 1939 Stein requests the following: "allow me to offer myself to the heart of Jesus as a sacrifice of propitiation for true peace, that the dominion of the Antichrist may collapse, if possible, without a new world war, and that a new order may be established? I would like [my request] granted this very day because it is the twelfth hour." Indeed, it was the 'twelfth hour'. Between 10-19 May 1940, the Nazi forces invaded Holland, and by 1941 the Nazi authorities decreed that "all non-Aryan Germans resident in Holland were stateless; they were to report by December 15 for deportation from the country."

Against the horizon of this apocalyptic drama Stein counsels love. She advises a member of another religious order in 1940, "[s]hould we strive for perfect love, you ask? Absolutely. For this we were created...What can we do? Try with all our might to be empty: the senses mortified; the memory as free as possible from all images of this world and, through hope, directed toward heaven; the understanding stripped of natural seeking and ruminating, directed to God in the straightforward gaze of faith; the will (as I have already said) surrendered to God in love." 505

Stein writes further on a cruciform kenosis against the in-breaking reality of the *Shoah*. She writes on the feast of the Holy Cross, September 14, 1939,

destroy the Jews is uncovered before the King: "I have been taught from infancy, in the bosom of my family that you, Lord, have chosen Israel out of all the nations and our ancestors out of all before them, to be your heritage for ever; and that you have treated them as you promised...as for ourselves, save us by your hand, and come to my help, for I am alone and have no one but you, Lord" (Esther 4:17). *NB*: Biblical scholars today agree the Book of Esther "as it now exists is a fictional story, told for more or less religious purposes and expressing well-known themes of Old Testament wisdom literature," from *The New Jerusalem Bible*, (ed.) Henry Wansbrough, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985), 665-666 and Brown *et al* present in the *New Jerome Bible Handbook* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992), 190.

⁵⁰³ Letter #296, "Letter to Mother Ottilia Thannisch, OCD, Echt," 26 March 1939.

⁵⁰⁴ Stein, *Life*, 430.

⁵⁰⁵ Letter #311, "Letter to Sr. Agnella Stadtmüller, OP, Speyer," 30 March 1940.

The world is in flames. The conflagration can also reach our house...The world is in flames. Are you impelled to put them out? Look at the cross...Make your heart free by the faithful fulfillment of your vows; then the flood of divine love will be poured into your heart until it overflows and becomes fruitful to all the ends of the earth. Do you hear the groans of the wounded on the battlefields in the west and the east? You are not a physician and not a nurse and cannot bind up the wounds. You are enclosed in a cell and cannot get to them...You would like to be an angel of mercy and help them. Look at the Crucified...Bound to him, you are omnipresent as he is. You cannot help here or there like the physician, the nurse...You can be at all fronts, wherever there is grief, in the power of the cross. Your compassionate love takes you everywhere... 506

Your compassionate love takes you everywhere... on July 26, 1942 the Catholic Church of Holland issued a formal protest from the pulpit against the genocide being perpetrated against the Jews. 507 The following day, the *Reichskommissar* ordered all Catholic Jews, approximately numbered at 722, to be deported because of the Bishops' "interference" in the governing of the country. This deportation would be in addition to the 6,000 Jews already deported from Holland. Edith Stein is taken from beyond the walls of Carmel, and goes to Auschwitz *in* solidarity with her people. Yet this desire to be 'present at all fronts', is a way of living that Stein began to cultivate in her service at the lazaretto during the First World War. For example, in 1939, she writes as one who was *already* 'feeling' what the prophetic radicality of witnessing in kenosis would mean for the rest of her life: "At the same time I always have a lively awareness that we do not have a lasting city here. I have no other desire than that God's will be done in me and through me. It is up to him how long he leaves me here and what is to come then. *In manibus tuis sortes meae* <My days are in your

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< http://www.karmel.at/ics/edith/stein.html > accessed on 6 June 2003.

Only Hope]," The Collected Works of Bl. Edith Stein: The Hidden life: Hagiographic Essays, Meditations, Spiritual Texts, vol. 4, (eds.) L. Gelber and M. Linssen,

⁵⁰⁷ Stein, *Life*, 430: "The Bishops informed the Dutch citizens that together with nine other denominational churches in Holland, they had sent a telegram to Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Commander of the Nazi Occupation in Holland, demanding a cessation of measures being taken against the Jews." ⁵⁰⁸ Letter #330, "Letter to Mother Ambrosia Antonia Engelmann, OCD, Echt," presumably in December 1941 she writes to her prioress in Echt, shortly before the Nazis come for her (on 2 August 1942), "A *scientia crucis* <knowledge of the Cross> can be gained only when one comes to feel the Cross radically. I have been convinced of that from the first moment and have said, from the heart: *Ave Crux, spes unica*! <Hail, Cross, our only hope!>"

hands. (Ps 31:15)> There everything is well cared for. I need not worry about anything." ⁵⁰⁹

Stein's givenness during these final days may be described as coming in the form of an empathy that exhibits the kenosis of an effusive compassion for others.

Heschel is instructive on this point:

When the soul of man is asked: What is God to you? there [sic] is only one answer that survives all theories which we carry to the grave: He is full of compassion. The Tetragrammaton, the great Name, we do not know how to pronounce, but we are taught to know what it stands for: 'compassion'...[o]nly one attribute is reserved for God: he alone is called in the Bible *rahum* the Merciful One. ⁵¹⁰

Stein undergoes the call to pathos, and so does God. God's *rahum* con-primordially belongs *within* the relationship between prophetic agent and God. The interior apophatic experience of surrendering to her God in prayer finds an exterior kenotic agency.

On August 2, 1942, the Nazis came for Edith and Rosa Stein. Edith Stein is called beyond the walls of her beloved 'lasting city' of Carmel. Koeppel relates, "the evening hour of mental prayer began, as usual, at 5 P.M. Sister Teresa Benedicta [Edith Stein] read the point of meditation...A few minutes of silence followed. Then, heavy pounding at the door resounded...The S.S. men had come; almost before the nuns realized what was going on, Sr. Benedicta and Rosa had been taken away." Thus, the conflagration reached the home of Edith and Rosa Stein, and a prophecy she once spoke to her friend, Baroness Uta Von Bodman in 1930 on the night the Nazi forces marched in Speyer came to fruition. Nota relates the story as told to him by Baroness von Bodman in 1982. Bodman relates, "Everybody was excited about the

⁵⁰⁹ Letter #300, "Letter to Mother Petra Brüning, OSU, Dorsten," 16 April 1939.

⁵¹⁰ Heschel, *MNA*, 148; *cf.* footnote "**" also on 148: "...The term [compassion] is probably related to the word rehem, womb, and may have the connotation of motherly love. In the Babylonian Talmud, Rahmana, the Merciful One, is frequently used to denote both God and Scripture, Law, or the word of God. The Law *is* Mercy."

⁵¹¹ Stein, *Life*, 430-431.

regained freedom, symbolized in the parade of the German soldiers to the light of torches' flames. Edith Stein, however, was very quiet." When von Bodman asked her why she was not as enthusiastic as the rest of the crowd, Stein responded, "they are going to persecute first the Jews, then afterwards the Catholic Church.' Her friend could not believe it. 'Wait and you will remember my words,' Edith said." 512

Waltraud Herbstrith, in her biographical study of Stein turns to first-hand accounts of her final day. Herbstrith relates,

It was five in the afternoon when the prioress was summoned to the parlor where two S.S. officers waited to question her about Edith Stein. Assuming they had come to discuss the emigration [to Switzerland], Sister Antonia sent Edith Stein to speak to them. The officers immediately ordered her away from the grille, giving her five minutes to pack her things...[b]y the time she reached the convent gate, Rosa [Edith's sibling] was already waiting...[s]urrounded by the crowd and unable to fully absorb the situation, Rosa began to grow disoriented. Seeing this, a neighbor recalled, Edith Stein took her by the hand and said reassuringly, "Come, Rosa. We're going for our people." 513

These words break upon us: "Come, Rosa. We're going for our people." We may recall from Stein's phenomenology: 'words "ought" to point out something to me. Now they are no longer merely the expression of something objective, but at the same time are the externalization or the announcement of the person's meaningful act as well as of the experiences behind it...' Stein makes her words meaningful through her reception to the call issuing from the Jewish people. But her praxis of empathy is oriented towards *a future visage*. The community to whom she finds herself given is not readily available to her as a phenomenological 'we' or 'them'. The only countenance grasping Edith Stein in the moment is that of her sister Rosa. Rosa's

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⁵¹² Nota, "Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger," *Carmelite Studies*, vol. 4, (ed.) John Sullivan, Washington: ICS Publications (1987): 51.

⁵¹³ Kölner Selig-und Heiligsprechungsprozess der Dienerin Gottes Sr. Teresia Benedicta a Cruce -- Edith Stein, (eds.) Teresia Renata Posselt, Teresia Margareta Drügemöller (Cologne, 1962) in Herbstrith, 103. See: Hampl, 72: "Reichskomissar Seyss-Inquart ordered all Catholic Jews to be deported before the week's end. The official Nazi memorandum listed 722 Jews registered as Catholics throughout the country. A further memorandum, dated July 31, claimed that 4,000 Jews registered as Christians had been gathered in one camp. This information was seen as a threat to induce the bishops to stop their protest of the general deportations."

state of affairs in the moment, we may recall, is one of confusion: "surrounded by the crowd and unable to fully absorb the situation, Rosa began to grow disoriented."514 Edith Stein becomes the 'zero-point' of orientation for her sister. Edith allays Rosa's fears through her self-confident appeal, 'come, we are going for our people.' She grasps her hand and re-orients Rosa towards an unknown future of solidarity with others. Stein's givenness to her sister rises as a particular example of her subsequent givenness to the suffering of others on the train, and at Auschwitz.

When Stein writes to the Echt Carmel from Drente-Westerbork, "now we have a chance to experience a little how to live purely from within," and when the once disoriented Rosa says, "they were so upset; we not at all" we find both women at home within the difference between a sameness and otherness.⁵¹⁵ The experience of 'otherness' in the event is dialectically related, at a deeper level, to the 'sameness' being shared among those crowded on the train. For example, the reality of life outside the walls of Carmel on a crowded train en route to death illustrates well 'the otherness' in which Stein finds herself, and yet before and after the experience of being arrested we have found Stein identifying through her writing and praxis with the Jewish people; with the place of 'sameness' -- my people: "[t]he Jew does not stand alone before God; it is as a member of the community that he stands before God. Our relationship to Him is not as an I to a Thou, but as a We to a Thou."516

By August 7, 1942, Edith and Rosa Stein were well on their journey to the East. The train line would have passed near or through Edith's home of Breslau. On

⁵¹⁴ Herbstrith, Edith Stein, 103.

⁵¹⁵ Letter #340, "Letter to Mother Ambrosia Antonia Engelmann, OCD, Echt," 4 August 1942. ⁵¹⁶ Heschel, MQG, 45. NB: "There are many I's but there is no I-Thou relationship. Kant, who introduces the concept of the ethically responsible person in his concept of the kingdom of God

⁽Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason III, 1.4), or sees it, rather, as constituted by such persons, does not grasp the idea of concrete community, since his concept of person is apersonal," in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: A Dogmatic Inquiry into the Sociology of the Church (London: Collins, 1963), 232-33.

this day, a local postman named Johannes Wiener was "standing in the switching area of the railroad depot in Breslau" next to a train with Dutch markings that was waiting servicing by the engineers. The Nazi guards came and opened the sliding doors on the cars. Wiener relates,

Then a woman in nun's clothing stepped into the opening. Wieners looked at her with such commiseration that she spoke to him: "It's awful. We have nothing by way of containers for sanitation needs." Looking into the distance and then across the town, she said, "This is my beloved hometown. I will never see it again." When he looked at her, questioningly, she added, very hesitantly: "We are riding to our death."⁵¹⁷

Once at Auschwitz, we see an Edith Stein who continues to respond to the other. Posselt tell us that one witness, Julius Marcan, noticed the "complete calm and selfpossession that marked her out from the rest of the prisoners," and that Edith ministered to others, especially to women and children. The witness went on to say, "many of the mothers were on the brink of insanity and had sat moaning for days." Edith assumed the care of their children, and she "immediately set about taking care of these little ones. She washed them, combed their hair and tried to make sure they were fed and cared for."518 Thus, even in the midst of human deprivation, Edith Stein manages to reach beyond the totality of genocide, and into the life of another.⁵¹⁹

In one last vignette from the camps we see one of the best examples of her universal concern for intergivenness. Again, it is an example of Edith Stein encouraging us to be like her by 'balancing the opposites' by moving dialectically beyond and between traditions towards infinity through prophetic agency. The eyewitness relates,

⁵¹⁷ Stein, Life, 434.

⁵¹⁸ Posselt, *Edith Stein*, 178 in Herbstrith, 105.

⁵¹⁹ Levinas, "Violence du visage," an interview with Angelo Bianchi, 180: "Somebody wrote that the ethical responsibility you speak of is abstract and devoid of concrete content. Does that seem a valid critique to you?" Levinas responded, "I never claimed to describe human reality in its immediate appearance, but what human depravation itself cannot obliterate: the human vocation to saintliness."

From the moment I met her in the camp at Westerbork...I knew: here is someone truly great. For a couple of days she lived in that hellhole, walking, talking and praying...like a saint...During one conversation she told me, "For now, the world consists in opposites...But in the end, none of those contrasts will remain. There will only be the fullness of love. How could it be otherwise?" 520

Rosa and Edith Stein were murdered and cremated at Auschwitz-Birkenau on August 9, 1942.⁵²¹ We may only conclude with the eloquent words of Nota, who was attempting, as late as July 1942, to secure emigration for Stein and Rosa to Switzerland from Echt,

Edith Stein's obedience to her conscience led her to travel on unaccustomed paths. If the Jewish people seem to stand alone again today, her life and martyrdom are clear testimony that God's election of her people is an enduring one. She was a woman who gave herself fully to this world, yet always remembered that she and her fellow human beings were on their way to God. She was a scholar of considerable philosophical output and a superb translator, who always remained a person of such great reserve and humility that, despite her accomplishments, most people never suspected the measure of her greatness. And yet, when it comes to philosophy and religion, what else but humility is the basic condition for the discovery of truth? 522

Concluding Remarks.

Stein's way of proceeding, receiving and loving those who have been made 'not others' by totality -- her everyday praxis in the midst of the *Shoah* -- reveals a way of doing *mitzvoth* through an *empathic belonging*. Stein's phenomenological portrait 'breaks upon the scene' as one who incarnates a way of loving -- in both her writings and her praxis -- that responds to the givenness of another. Edith Stein as a point of

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⁵²⁰ Report of Mr. Wielek in the Dutch Newspaper, De Tijd, 1952, in Herbstrith, 107.

⁵²¹ NB: Just as Edith's birthday, on Yom Kippur -- the Day of Atonement -- has a certain significance, it is important to note August 9, 1942, the approximated day of Edith and Rosa's death at Auschwitz, was the Jewish feast of Tish'a B'Ab. Koeppel remarks in the translator's afterword to Life in a Jewish Family, 443: "The month of Ab approximates the height of summer in the Jewish calendar; in the Gregorian one, its counterpart would be the weeks ending July and beginning of August. Tish'a B'Ab, the Ninth day of the Month of Ab, is an annual day of black fast in mourning memory of the destruction of the first and second Temples in Jerusalem. The ninth day of August in the year of 1942 saw the destruction of Edith and Rosa Stein, with countless other temples of the Spirit in the infamy of Auschwitz."

⁵²² Nota, "Introduction" in Herbstrith, xii.

⁵²³ See: Levinas, "Dying For," originally published in *Heidegger: Questions ouvertes*, (ed.) E. Escoubas (Paris: Editions Osiris, 1988), in *EN*, 207-217; 216: "The humanness of dying for the other would be the very meaning of love in its responsibility for one's fellowman and, perhaps, the primordial inflections of the affective as such. The call to holiness preceding the concern for existing,

encounter, as a woman of intergivenness, is a dialogist who gives Jews and Christians, theologians and others, a message on how we may go about the interreligious dialogue with one another. She shows us, in recourse to a Jewish sensibility, how "[e]mpathy, rather than expression is the way to piety," and this way to piety is accomplished through doing a mitzvah, a good deed "a mitzvah is a task...an act that ought to be done." To do a good mitzvah is to enact an empathy with God; to "affect God" for while "[s]ymbols evade, mitzvoth transcend reality." The essence of Judaism is the mitzvoth -- "it is a demand rather than a creed. It emphasizes the centrality of the act...God asks for the heart, not for the symbol;...for deeds, not for ceremonies." 525

Stein's way of responding is all about empathy. One reaches out in service to the world from one's own primordial ground. By so doing, one is striving to touch the primordial ground of the other. In reaching out from her depth, the prophetic witness is hoping to collapse the distance between 'I' and Thou in order to incarnate the new solidarity of the con-primordially realized 'We'. Stein responds from this empathic depth in responding to the other. Indeed, we may continue to hear the echo of empathy in the following from Stein:

Human beings are called upon to live in their inmost region and to have themselves as much in hand as is possible only from that center-point; only from there can they rightly come to terms with the world. 526

for being-there and being-in-the-world -- utopian, a dis-interestedness more profound than the *with-the-others* or *for-the-others* of the *Fürsorge* involved in the being-in-the world, in which the being of the other equals his occupation and is understood only in terms of 'one's things' and vested interest. Care as holiness, which is what Pascal called love without concupiscence. A no-place prior to the *there* of *being-there*, prior to the *Da* of Dasein, prior to that place in the sun that Pascal feared was "the prototype and beginning of the usurpation of the whole world."

524 Heschel, *MQG*, 134: "Jewish observance comprises both *mitzvoth* (commandments) and *minhagim*

Heschel, MQG, 134: "Jewish observance comprises both mitzvoth (commandments) and minhagin (customs). The Rabbis were careful to distinguish between law and custom. Customs are symbols born of the mind of man; mitzvoth are expressions and interpretations of the will of God."

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, 138-39. ⁵²⁶ Stein, *SC*, 160.

One, who 'knows oneself', who is in touch with her own depth, who has taken 'into hand' herself at the 'center-point', may more completely and radically reach out from her 'center-point of orientation' (cf. chapter 4, On the Problem of Empathy) in order to accomplish a compassion-filled solidarity.

The person who is in 'command' of oneself, who is reaching out towards the world from one's indivisible 'center-point', will "address herself to another spirit with whatever has become an *interior word*" for her life. One ultimately addresses the other, Stein concludes, with "the intention of sharing with another what one has in oneself." Stein's words: *We're Going For Our People* therefore speaks the *interior word* of a remembering love for the suffering other. Furthermore, these words carry with them the inner promise to share in the suffering of these others.

Through a *kenotic intentionality: an emptying that gives*, God 'turns' towards us, and aims to *give God-self as kenosis*. ⁵²⁸ We, in turn, attempt to recreate this givenness in solidarity. Stein is an exemplar of this praxis, for

everything suggests that Edith Stein was an unusually integrated person, capable of a high state of contemplative prayer. It seems clear that she adapted naturally to the core of prayer: she understood her vocation as an act of solidarity (or, her old word, empathy) with the suffering of the world. 529

Stein's 'science' of kenosis not only 'speaks' the word of solidarity -- this alone would be a superficial *scientia*; but also accomplishes what the word intends; namely, an evermore radical *Einfühlung* through the practical activity of a *flowing presence* -- i.e., a reaching out; also a protest to God and man: murder is this dispersal of "six million" holy witnesses. ⁵³⁰ Yet, our hope rests upon the kenotic presence of Stein,

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⁵²⁷ *Ibid*.

⁵²⁸ Cf. Chapter 2; Clarke, PB, 56-57.

⁵²⁹ Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 70.

Heschel, *A Passion for Truth* (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2004), 300-301, hereafter *PT*: "God himself is the quintessential Job. 'In all their affliction He was afflicted' (Isaiah 63:9). When man is in distress, there is a cry of anguish in Heaven. God needs not only sympathy and comfort but partners, silent warriors. The perplexity must endure. Saints turn from acquiescence to defiance when adversity

and those like her: *beyond all "diaspora" there is communion.*⁵³¹ *Teshuva* through solidarity; a return to the other that overturns totality through an empathic interkenosis.

We applied in this chapter, as inspired by the request of Stein's niece, Suzanne Batzdorff *et al*, a *hermeneutics from empathy* to Stein's own praxis. Such an emptying that gives, challenges and widens our understanding of what it means to be a prophetic witness. Furthermore, we are beginning to appreciate how the 'manner' of Stein's life and death as *witness* is challenging us to see how empathy is a way of re-membering one with the interreligious other and may, in turn, be a helpful category for the contemporary interreligious dialogue. Let us now turn to these considerations.

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seems to contradict the certainty of God's justice. Perhaps it is God's will that man give Him no rest...that he cooperate in seeking a way out of the tragic entanglements. Life in our time has been a nightmare for many of us, tranquility an interlude, happiness a fake. Who could breathe at a time when man was engaged in murdering the holy witness to God six million times?...This is the task: in the darkest night to be certain of the dawn, certain of the power to turn a curse into a blessing, agony into a song...Faith is the beginning of compassion, of compassion for God. It is when bursting with God's sighs that we are touched by the awareness that beyond all absurdity there is meaning, Truth, and love."

⁵³¹ Süssman, "Marc Chagall, Painter of the Crucified," 105, 112: "This is how Christ is in the world today: in the white vesture as the Giver of peace, but on His cross as our Victim, on his cross where we continually put Him. The Jew Chagall can speak to the lapsed Christian about this because this 'Christian' is in a state of 'diaspora' -- perhaps the Jew can speak to the modern Gentile about this better than any Gentile can speak to himself, because the Jew understands the state of 'diaspora'; the exile is familiar territory...the Jewish exile and suffering is nearly lost in the great exiles and sufferings of our time: when whole people are uprooted, whole communities set upon by their fellow-men; when weapons whose destructiveness seems almost to match God's creativeness are brandished over the face of the earth; and when many Christians, fallen into inertia and the sole quest for material well-being, are in flight from God. This is indeed the century of the 'diaspora' -- and it is to this century that Chagall speaks, pointing to the Crucified who hangs over the burning cities, above the atom bomb, whose smoky mushroom cloud cannot obscure Him, above the suffering world."

Chapter 7 Stein's Kenosis: Reimaging Witnessing.

What would it have been like if Stein's response on August 2, 1942 was, 'I am not a Jew, these are no longer my people'? Edith's response: 'we're going for our people' - 'my people', highlights anamnesis, a remembering that engenders a kenosis of witness in the going. It is a givenness based on an affirmation, not a denial, of who she is and continues to be. A witnessing to the one universal and 'seductively' personal call of love that is consistent from Abraham to Jesus: 'Henani!' 'Here I am'! 532

Abraham Joshua Heschel was once asked in an interview, "[w]hat can Christianity learn from Judaism?" He responded that a Christian may learn how "[t]o be a witness to the God of Abraham, of Sinai". One may learn an "openness to God's stake in the ongoing history of the Jewish people...the idea of witness, that is, sensitivity to God's presence, is, above all, the primary existential aspect of Judaism."⁵³³

If Stein had engaged in a deliberate effort to erase the memory of her consanguinity with Judaism then she would have become like many others who were swept up, and trapped by, the genocidal idol of Nazism's 'depravity and depravation' of forgetfulness for the other (*cf. chapter 6*). Stein does not shirk from being

See: Marion's phenomenology on "the call" of the prophet Samuel in reminding the reader of how Jesus' prophetic calling is rooted and grounded in the Jewish matrix: "Three times, 'The Lord called Samuel, and Samuel responded, 'Here I am [*Me voici*]!'...[a]nd Samuel responds to the fourth call of the Lord: 'Speak, Lord, because your servant is listening to you'...[t]hese words 'because your servant is listening to you,' words that make the call (and every prophetic message to come) possible, in fact state the (first) response. Samuel's response (called seduced, who 'takes it upon himself') brings it about that the call sounds for the first time -- without the response, the Lord would not have been able to call. Thus, in the loving intersubjective situation, as well as the election, the word that takes the initiative (the word that elects, that seduces) begins to be understood only when and if the response accords to one having been heard...," in *BG*, 286.

Heschel, "Interview at Notre Dame," from *Theologians at Work*, (ed.) Patrick Granfield (New York: Macmillan, 1967) in *MgSa*, 381-393; 386.

identified as a 'Jew'. She embraces her identity. The "unpredictable landing" of the *Shoah* breaks upon her and the Jewish people as a dis-orienting "fait accompli"; a ghastly certainty, " -- the danger, whose fact is accomplished [dont le fait s'accomplit] -- ". Edith Stein receives the givenness of the phenomenon as it appears in freely saying *Hic Saltus*, *hic Rhodus* in the first person: 'Come, Rosa. We're going for *our* people!' "...[o]r, as we say without thinking when we feel the blow arrive and understand instinctually that I am no longer that spectator but the target: 'This time, my time has come, it's my turn, my number has been called.'" Neither does she run from the scene of the crime nor does she want to substitute Catholicism for her Jewishness. She intentionally exposes herself beyond confessional boundaries, and she finds herself thrown into a reality that is not of her own making; she says, "...the destiny of this people was also mine." Sa6

We have been 'reading' Stein's givenness through her own perspective on kenosis. She argues in *Kreuzeswissenschaft* that "[w]hat approaches from the outside has a certain right to claim [my] attention, and, depending on its *weight*, the value, and meaning it has in itself and for the soul, it deserves to be admitted to an

Marion, BG, 146. It is was a happy coincidence for me to discover how both Jean-Luc Marion and Edith Stein use the same phenomenologically rich and expressive idea from Aesop's Fable to convey a

therefore see her rather as a Jewish martyr, due to Christia malice, then a future Catholic saint."

⁵³⁴ Marion, *BG*, 138: argues in his postmodern study on the phenomenon of givenness: "[u]npredictable landing -- not the uniform arrival, but the unforeseen, spastic, and discontinuous arising and appearing -- in the end emphasizes that the given gives itself."

sense of immediacy. While Stein employs the expression some fifty years earlier in a letter to Sr. Adelgundis (*cf. chapter 5*), Marion uses the expression in his phenomenology of givenness. For example, Marion says in a footnote in regards to the above use of *This time, my time has come, etc.*, "please excuse me for preferring this declaration to the venerable: *Hic saltus, hic Rhodus.*" ⁵³⁶ From: Nota, "Edith Stein und der Entwurf für eine Enzyklika gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus," *Communio*, 5 (1976): 154ff, in Nota, "Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger," *Carmelite Studies*, 52. Also see: Menahem Benhayim, "Of Saints and Martyrs," in Waltraud Herbstrith, *Never Forget: Christian and Jewish Perspectives on Edith Stein*, (trans.) Susanne Batzdorff (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1998), 133-134; 134. Originally from *The Hebrew Catholic* (September/November 1987): 90ff: "Upon the arrival of the Gestapo at the monastery [Carmel] in which Edith and Rosa Stein had sought refuge, it is reported that Edith said to her sister, as they were being led away for deportation to Auschwitz, 'Come, we are going for our people.' This shows the strong sense of solidarity with the Jewish people that she maintained all her life. Some Jewish authors

appropriate depth of the soul." The weight of the other claims Stein at her "deepest point", at the "place of her freedom". It is from this depth, this place of conscience -where the 'I' may "collect her entire being and make decisions" about itself and what actions the 'I' is going to take: "...only at the deepest point can one possibly measure everything against one's ultimate standards...anyone who does not have herself completely in hand can not decide in true freedom but rather, allows herself to be determined by outside factors."537 Indeed, Stein's own confidence in givenness, as we have gathered from her writings and praxis, and exceptionally heard in the words, "Come, Rosa. We're going for our people," highlights an interior center of orientation in Stein wherefrom she may respond to the dis-orienting tremendum with a remembering Jewish-Christian mindfulness for her people: "Edith Stein clearly understood -- as mystics of all faiths and 'ways' do -- that the end point of contemplative life is the oneness that unites the individual with the fullest reality. With God, yes. But with the suffering world as well."538

⁵³⁷ Stein, SC, 159, 160.

Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 69.

(7.1) The Kenosis of Caritas.

In terms of reading Stein's praxis through a hermeneutic of intergivenness, Marion argues, (1) 'To receive the Other -- that is equivalent first and before all to receiving a given and receiving oneself from it; no obstacle stands between the Other and the gifted,' and (2) 'There is more: the gifted himself belongs within the phenomenality of givenness and therefore, in this sense, gives itself, too, in a privileged way' (*cf.* chapter 2). Marion, in order to clarify how "the gifted", namely, the one who receives the given phenomenon, gives herself back to the original giver lists three phenomenological points of description:

- (i) It gives itself first in as much as, like every phenomenon, it arises from the given.
- (ii) It gives itself next par excellence, since it alone can and should respond in turn to the givens that appear as such only by showing themselves to it.
- (iii) Above all, the gifted can glimpse the possibility of giving itself to an exceptional given -- the given that would show itself in the mode of the gifted, it too is accustomed to receiving itself from what gives itself to it. 540

Against the horizon of our hermeneutic, it is obvious that Stein as gifted fulfills the requirements of (i), she gives herself as a respondent to the excessive phenomenological given of the *Shoah*, Stein 'can and should' (ii) respond, and she does -- she reaches across the borders of religion in her kenotic and empathic praxis of solidarity, an example of intergivenness *par excellence*. In regards to (iii), Stein does give herself over to an 'exceptional given': the suffering Jewish other, as envisaged by Edith Stein in Rosa's face; the face of the other who is also family, the face of consanguinity. Stein is 'gifted' through this 'exceptional' Jewish call, a call issuing forth from a people in the voice of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

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⁵³⁹ Marion, BG, 323.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

Marion's phenomenology of the gifted, however, may be critically challenged in light of the 'real-time' example of Edith Stein. For example, Marion argues that the gifted is "accustomed to receiving itself from what gives itself". But is Stein's identity as "the "gifted" solely dependent upon the given; as if she were to receive her very self from the "given"? By overstressing the sheer givenness of each face beyond reification, Marion runs the risk of dissolving the selfhood of the receiver. He thereby reintroduces the Heschelian problematic of passivity from the point of view of givenness (or, in Levinasian terms, substitution). While he argues, "[t]o have done with the 'subject,' it is therefore necessary not to destroy it, but to reverse it -- to overturn it", he also holds that "at the center stands no 'subject,' but a gifted, he whose function consists in receiving what is immeasurably given to him, and whose privilege is confined to the fact that he is himself received from what he receives."⁵⁴¹ This ambiguity on subjectivity would lead us to conclude that the subject is 'overturned' by becoming "the gifted". But why does Marion want to deny to "the gifted" what he seems to retain for "the subject"; that is, a subjectivity?

Our reflections with Stein on empathy have been strongly suggesting that we need to preserve the subjectivity of the subject as *not only* being a receptive pole of sheer givenness but also as being an independent center of action. Marion, however, says, "I will oppose to it the claim that it does not hold this center but is instead held there as a recipient...as a pole of givenness, where all givens come forward incessantly."542 From this perspective, everything therefore depends on the 'surprise' of what is given to the subject. Marion says,

⁵⁴¹*Ibid.*, 322.

[I]f I knew in advance that it is Being or other or God or life that was summoning me, then I would escape the full status of the gifted since I would be free of all surprise. Knowing in advance (or at least immediately) with what and with whom I am dealing when dealing with the word heard, I would know (what) or I would respond (who) according to the surplus of constitution or the equality of dialogue, but without the interlocuted passivity of surprise. In short, I would then become an I who delivers itself from the status of a me. ⁵⁴³

But does not this perspective 'frame' the subject as a *subject always waiting*, waiting for her *self* from another. While I would agree with Marion that in certain phenomenological instances, "...the glory of the visible weighs down with all it has...to the point of making one suffer," -- i.e., at times, the only proper posture and intentionality is one of reception. It would be difficult, however, to agree with Marion that the subject receives her *self* from the call. From such a perspective, the weight of the call crushes the identity of the receiver, and reintroduces the violence of substitution from the "pole of givenness." Through the overwhelming givenness of the given we lose the receiver ("the gifted"), or, at the very least, we lose her ability to give the gift of a *free response* in the 'yes, I will go'. At the extreme, solidarity is rendered empty under the totality of reducing the subject who receives the content (or 'givenness') of the call to the sameness of that content. Stein's hermeneutics of empathy, however, is a more sober and relevant interpretation of how the phenomenon of givenness aims for a dialectically balanced reciprocity of (i) giving and (ii) receiving:

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*, 299.

⁵⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 204.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., 322.

- (i) The manner and measure of receptive appropriation depends, of course, not only on the recipients but also on the givers. The latter may give themselves wholly or without more or less reserve. They may withhold some of their knowledge, their personal convictions, their individuality. Their self-communication may be in the nature of an imperious conquest or of humble service.
- (ii) We are not defenseless prey to that which, by means of the phenomenon of expression, tries to force itself upon us from the outside. Nor are we compelled to surrender or communicate unreservedly all that which is alive within us. 546

For Stein, the givenness of the other will never overwhelm 'me' to the point where 'my' self-identity becomes a clone of (or crushed under) the given.

Against the horizon of the *Shoah*, these exigencies call us to a 'phenomenological frankness', so to speak. There exists the possibility of saying 'no' to the other. Marion's *passivity to the surprise* here hides the phenomenological reality that some say 'no' to the given, the call from the other. Some individuals never leave the narrow circle of the 'I'. Their passivity to the surprise of the destitute other is not a passivity through which they 'receive themselves' from the excessive givenness of the given. Rather, their passivity is characterized as a disregard for the call. In the 'no', the 'I' denies *the showing* of the other that gives itself in a call. Indeed, this too is a violence perpetrated against the given for it illustrates a lack of openness and generosity to the call.

As we have seen from our above considerations (*cf.* chapter 6), Edith Stein stands in direct contrast to the 'no', and incarnates a 'solidarity' and 'empathy' that presupposes a diversity existing among individuals who give themselves -- beyond substitution -- to one another in an empathic way. If the Jewish call -- the given -- shows itself in "the mode of the gifted", then Stein's response in the particular words, *Come, Rosa. We're we going for our people,* and through the general orientation of

⁵⁴⁶ Stein, FE, 414 - 415.

her life (as we have been made privy to through her writings), is a real 'mode' or way of being given in response to the original call. But her generous orientation in solidarity towards the call is not constituted by the sheer givenness of the Jewish call. Her inter-givenness places her between sameness and otherness: the Jewish woman now Carmelite nun receives the call, and gives herself anew to the Jew and the Christian as a Jew and a Christian. Stein is at home in the moment for she is able to 'feel her way into' the reality, not as a substitute, but as an interreligious kenotic empathizer. Stein says, "[a]ll mutual relations and all intercourse among human beings are founded upon bodily-physical expressions and manifestations of the inner life, making intimate contact possible and (within certain limits) even a union of minds.",547

Nothing less than the kenosis of *caritas* makes "intimate contact possible" among people through a union of hearts and minds. Even Marion argues in Being Given that "the loving intersubjective situation" is a phenomenologically reciprocal situation where the lover and the beloved enter a mutual solidarity of giving, receiving and giving again, i.e., "the word that takes the initiative (the word that elects, that seduces) begins to be understood only when and if the response accords it having been heard -- the a priori call awaits the a posteriori of the response in order to begin to have been said and to phenomenalize itself." 548 Givenness, therefore, under the title of intersubjective or transubjective caritas is not one-sided, and allows for an intergivenness, where one and other share the perichoretic simultaneity of being 'the gifted', mutually relating and responding to each other in a con-primordial fashion. I do not always have to wait for the phenomenological expression from the other, but I too may initiate the action or the word in the presence of the other. In terms of

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 414.

⁵⁴⁸ Marion, BG, 287.

Jewish-Christian dialogue, and in the language of Stein's study, we could say that Christianity's non-primordial experience of God's pathos is 'announced by' Judaism's own primordial experience(s), and this 'continuum memory', is emancipatory. The "continuation" of the "biblical narrative" over this empathically charged 'give-and-take' field of meaning becomes, for Christians and Jews, "a memorial (zikkarôn) of freedom and redemption."550 Thus, Stein provides a 'middle way' based on the phenomenological reality found in the exigencies of the everyday where one may either respond to the other with a free 'yes' or with a free 'no'.

When someone says 'I' he or she is "designating" himself or herself as unique from every other, and it is only when a being differentiates itself from every other existent that it may properly call itself I. 551 Catherine Cornille argues, in her recent study, The Im-possibility of Interreligious Dialogue, that "the notion of empathy quickly fades from hermeneutical discourse" when the *inter* of inter-subjectivity is not held in proper dialectical tension. Cornille concludes that "[i]f the self and other are always already interconnected, there is no radical 'other' to be understood and all understanding must be conditioned by one's own subjectivity."552 And yet, every particular expression of love and action on behalf of another, on behalf of justice, 'enlaces' a particular individual and/or community with the suffering of the entire

⁵⁴⁹ By the use of the term 'continuum memory' I am drawing analogy here from the helpful point made by Jewish-Christian dialogue scholar Irving Greenberg on "continuum truths" who argues "...I believe that all theological concepts (even those that we may unequivocally assert are the product of revelation -- if such truths exist) are continuum truths. Their message extends over a field of meaning. At one extreme of the spectrum, we can imagine a divine communication almost unaffected by the human medium and -- extending over to the other pole where human energy overwhelmingly supplies the information. The place where a particular religion, ritual, spiritual concept, or text falls along the continuum may vary from faith to faith, from culture and civilization to culture and civilization...[w]herever you locate on that continuum, I intended to speak to you and affirm that it was God's will/human energy that Judaism and Christianity work side-by-side as covenantal, parallel partners whose task is to redeem the world," in "On the Divine Plan and the Human Role in Development of Religion: A Response to Tom Indinopulos," Explorations and Responses, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 42/3 (Summer 2007): 458-462; 460.

⁵⁵⁰ Benedict XVI, "Meeting with Representatives of the Jewish Community".

⁵⁵¹ Stein, FE, 343.

⁵⁵² Catherine Cornille, The Im-possibility of Interreligious Dialogue (New York: Crossroad, 2008), 137-176; 150.

world, i.e., "truths may be revealed in one culture and preached in another. They may be revealed in the styles and fashion of one differentiation of consciousness, defined by the church in the style and fashion of another differentiation."553 This differentiation challenges the heterology of distance, discretion and isolation, and yet encourages (and respects) a necessary transcendence towards the other. A diversityin-unity desperately needed today i.e., "A more profound empathy, which is not however a fusion (a pure pathos), brings into being a co-singularity via a process of co-singularization."554

In sum, our critical dialogue with Heschel and Stein has been revealing the appropriateness of Einfühlung, in contradistinction to sympathy, as a Grundkonzept for interreligious dialogue. Stein's unique embodiment of Jewish-Christian fidelity is providing our reflections with a necessary hermeneutical key for unlocking how empathy may be paradigmatic to a Jewish-Christian way of witnessing in an interreligiously complex world. Let us continue to reflect on how Stein's embodiment of empathy may itself be a metaphor for how Catholicism may proceed in dialogue with otherness.

(7.2) Embodying Empathy: A Wider Relationality.

Susan Ross argues in Extravagant Affections: A Feminist Sacramental Theology⁵⁵⁵ that the involvement of women in the church since Vatican II has been both "practical and symbolic". Participative women are "symboliz[ing] the sacred". This re-presentation of the sacred may subtly challenge the sensus fidelium to imagine beyond a fixed androcentric imago Dei. Ross argues that "women have

⁵⁵³ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971), 325. 554 Natalie Depraz, "The Phenomenological Reduction as Praxis," in The View from Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 1999), 95-110; 107. 555 Susan A. Ross, Extravagant Affections: A Feminist Sacramental Theology (NY: Continuum, 2001), 164-165.

tended to function, in language as well as in symbols, as objects of men's thoughts and desires," and have not had the opportunity to experience or actualize their "relational subjectivity" through active modes until recent years. Ross provokes us to reflect on how "gendered structures and dynamics" within theology have worked to "prevent women as women from emerging as subjects at all".

Stein's pre-*aggiornamento* perspective and subsequent givenness (*cf.* chapter 5 - 6), as now argued for by Ross, concurs that "women *do* speak and act as subjects", and may be exemplars of a dynamic, relational way of being. Ross argues,

[w]omen's persistence in speaking and acting symbolically constitutes a resistance to such structures as well as the construction of a language that dares to speak of a God whose affection for humanity is so extravagant that this God takes up a home in the body of a woman... 556

The symbolic order of a living ritual, through the body of the feminine, "puts together" (*sym-ballein*)⁵⁵⁷ the word of God while concomitantly affecting a creative distance from ritual's traditional embodiment(s) of God. Moreover, the generative extravagance of this voice not only 'over-turns' (*sub-vertere*) relationality but opens it up for a 'feminist' liturgy in word and deed, conveying a "sense of self" that is "more communal than individualistic." ⁵⁵⁸

The *sensus femininus* creatively deepens and buttresses a liturgico-ethical anamnesis in so far as women are embodying i.e., 'making present', an essential mark of the wider, *male and female* ecclesia. Stein's theory and praxis indeed argues for a vigorous and dynamic "interdependence" of all upon all within the body of the One who gives the *ecclesia* a body. The feminine insistence for a wider relationality conveys then the ethos of a God who is imagined *beyond* the xenophobia of "self-

⁵⁵⁷ See: Chauvet, *The Sacraments: The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body* (Collegeville, Mn: The Liturgical Press, 2001), 13-17.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 165-166.

⁵⁵⁸ Ross, Extravagant Affections, 165-166.

subsistence, impassibility and immutability," and is being made known from *within* the human embodiments of compassion and empathy. 559

(7.2.1) A Metaphor for Stein: The 'Mandorla' Witness.

Many of our 'older brothers and sisters' within Judaism would hold that what Stein accomplished in her conversion to Christianity was precisely a self-imposed exile-in'forgetfulness' from the religion of her ancestors. The *Shoah* certainly demands from Christianity an emptying of any misconceptions and subtle *apologias* around her death. Furthermore, one would not want to uncritically *melt* Stein's selfacknowledged Christian difference into her Jewish ancestry, as if to eschew her conversion. Yet, Stein's 'speaking and acting' symbolically 'constitutes' a form of 'resistance' to a language that wants to make God's pathos less extravagant and more narrow. *Apropos* of Ross, we have been examining in this study how Stein does convey a 'sense of self' that is indeed 'more communal than individualistic'. Stein's theory and praxis is precisely a living from a wider interreligious empathy because it 'dares to speak of a God whose affection for humanity is so extravagant that this God takes up a home in the body' *of both oneself and the other*: Gentile and Jew, Palestinian and Israeli, Belfast Catholic and Ballymena Protestant.

Throughout this study, Edith Stein has been rising for us as a kind of 'mandorla figure' revealing how Christianity may *already* have something of the other within themselves. The mandorla is "the almond shaped figure created by the overlap of two circles and represents the experience of unity between two apparent opposites." It is the mandorla that symbolically "teaches us...not to eradicate tensions, but to hold tensions in such a way that we live in the experience of their

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 166-167.

unity."⁵⁶⁰ We know from geometry that a mandorla is formed by two circles; two circles that intersect such that the center-point of each circle lies on the circumference of the other circle. What is primordial to one circle, its center-point, is given conprimordially to the other circle. One circle's center becomes the other circle's boundary — one encompasses part of the other and creates something new. What was a "non-place"⁵⁶¹ before the intergivenness of the two now becomes the nexus; a new center-point of orientation.

Stein, as a mandorla figure, "stands at the midpoint of the evils of the midcentury...a figure forever calling Christians towards contrition -- the proper Christian response to the Holocaust." She has been pushing us towards a new place; a more limit-less memory for the other. Georges Cottier argues, "[t]he subject who remembers is involved in remembrance by his or her choices, fears, dreams, honesty or cowardice. Remembrance is not neutral, and it is not always innocent. In summary, one can say that it is legitimate to speak of the ethics of memory." While *I* may have sympathy with 'my' own memories, the memory of the other calls for an empathy -- a givenness beyond myself to a kenotically new place.

The *a priori* of the other, her unsubstitutable reality calls *me* beyond impassibility through giving *a* response. The kenosis of loving, the emptying that gives, may never be considered an utter loss. Marion says, "[i]n losing presence, the gift does not lose *itself*; it loses what is not suited to it: returning *to itself*." The gift of loving, while reciprocal, is not meant to return to 'me'. There is a kenosis, starting

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⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁵⁶⁰ David Ranson, "The Invitational Light of Easter" *The Furrow* 60/2 (February 2009): 90-97; 96-97.

⁵⁶¹ See: Barnes, Theology and the Dialogue of Religions, 252.

⁵⁶² Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 62.

⁵⁶³ Georges Cottier, "The Great Jubilee: A Time of Remembrance," in (eds.) Joseph H. Ehrenkranz and David L. Coppola, *Religion and Violence, Religion and Peace: Essays from the Center for Christian-Jewish Understanding Conference in Auschwitz, Poland, May 1998* (Fairfield, CT: Sacred Heart University Press, 2000), 129-137; 134.

from 'me' and going towards 'you' that is reciprocal, assuming nothing and beyond substitution. An *inter-kenosis* is made visible between the lover and the beloved. Indeed, loving may lead to a loss of temporal presence, as in the case of martyrdom, but it is not a loss of identity. Stein's emptying allows her to enter a place beyond privilege, beyond the power of a Christian substitutionism through a *flowing* presence. Stein enters the space as a re-memberer. Her life is a lesson in 'mandorlaliving', revealing how Christians may enter the conversation with Judaism and other religions.

Michael Barnes ratifies this position. What is needed is a new way of being kenotic for the Jewish, Buddhist, Muslim or Hindu other. He says,

Christian eschatology overturns any notion of a privileged place or a privileged moment of time. Now every place and every moment speaks equally of God to those who learn how to discern and witness to the 'seeds of the Word', the signs of the inbreaking of the Kingdom...In a sense, the purpose of Christian places is that they become 'non-places', to be places of *kenosis* and negation which impel disciples away from an attachment to the concrete and a desire to go 'elsewhere' in obedience to Christ's call to follow. 565

The Christian subject enters the dialogue motivated by the kenosis of love and commences as an interreligious dialectician with "a project of engagement with areas of passivity and otherness which continually arise and return." This re-membering, bringing 'you into me', and vice versa, awakens a wider eschatological horizon. Thomas Josef Götz tells us, echoing the thought of Aloysius Pieris, that "genuine conversation" may happen only when "the existential achievement of his or her selflessness and self-emptying begins to speak, and with it the selflessness and selfemptying of Christ. The chance for both lies in letting go of self'...[s]piritual exchange makes possible the encounter in and with the very heart of the religions." 567

⁵⁶⁵ Barnes, *Theology and the Dialogue of Religions*, 252.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 203. ⁵⁶⁷ Thomas Josef Götz, "Catholic Monk, Buddhist Monk: The Monastic Interreligious Dialogue with Japanese Zen," in Converging Ways, 11-23; 23.

Edith Stein's way of being a witness (martyr) compels her beyond a static attachment. She domiciles in the other. The other is a fluid locus, a dynamic subject, one pushing and compelling her towards those 'non-places' of kenosis.

(7.2.2) The 'smar' in Martyr: Witnessing as Remembering.

Above all, however, Stein is a *rememberer*. Stein's *hermeneutics from empathy*, her emptying that gives, has been challenging us to deepen and widen our understanding of what it means to be a prophetic witness. Stein's response calls the Christian church towards a *teshuva ex radice*; a returning to our roots through repentance for the past: to hear anew the inner voice of our ancestors. Cottier argues, "the judgment of the past cannot be disassociated from self-evaluation in the present. They are combined to the extent that the past, for better or worse, weighs on the present. Remembrance, seen from this perspective, is a dimension of conscience." This, truly, is the significance of Stein's martyrdom, a call to remember our consanguinity, *our empathy*, with Judaism. Hampl insightfully offers us the following:

[t]he Greek root of the word *martyr* is often invoked: it means to witness. But in a deeper recess of the word's etymology there is also a related Sanskrit derivation -- from *smar*, to remember. A fierce act of memory then -- the will to remember -- is the hidden kernel of the martyr's calling. ⁵⁶⁹

Stein, in following Husserl, stresses in *On Empathy* that "one experience cannot be in the 'environment' (*Umgebung*) of another, although (and this is important) they do belong to the same temporal frame." ⁵⁷⁰ Stein argues "the present non-primordiality" or 'non-originary' nature of a memory, is necessarily related with the 'originary' or

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⁵⁶⁹ Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 74.

⁵⁶⁸ Cottier, "The Great Jubilee: A Time of Remembrance," 133.

⁵⁷⁰ Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 270; 290. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, hrsg. Stephan Strasser, *Husserliana*, vol. I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950), (trans.) D. Cairns, *Cartesian Meditations* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), Meditation 5 §44.

'primordial' moment of the memory-as-event. 571 A memory, and 'my' empathy with the memory, is necessarily "point[ing] back to the past primordiality" of the event -or, as she concludes, "this past has the character of a former 'now.' Accordingly, memory posits and what is remembered has being."572 Memory lives, it breathes, and is being given to 'me' through an Einfühlung with the event as memory.

The givenness of *Einfühlung* is nothing less than the incarnation of a remembering love. Stein says on empathy as loving, "I do not 'forget' my friends when I am not thinking of them. They then belong to the unnoticed present horizon of my world. My love for them is living even when I am not living in it. It influences my actual being and conduct." Stein goes on to formulate this praxis negatively, "out of love for someone, I can abstain from activities which would cause displeasure without 'being conscious' of this." ⁵⁷³ For Stein, there is no economy of love. One may never measure-out love. The one for the other gains and loses herself through the givenness of a pathic caritas i.e., "when I experience empathy with another, the empathised experience is *located in the other* and not in myself..."574

Stein argues in *On Empathy*, "[n]ow, in the act of love we have a comprehending or an intending of the value of a person. This is not a valuing for any other sake. We do not love a person because he does good...[r]ather, he himself is valuable and we love him 'for his own sake." Thus, the person is given through the dynamic of love, where the originary concern of love opens a depth -- a givenness to dialogue, a givenness bespeaking a generosity in listening, and a givenness unto death. One becomes open to the demands of what loving demands. Stein concludes,

⁵⁷¹ Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 298: "following Husserl, [Stein] characterises this difference as between 'originary' or 'primordial' and 'non-primordial' or 'non-originary' experiences." ⁵⁷² Stein, *OPE*, 8.

⁵⁷³ Stein, *OPE*, 74.

⁵⁷⁴ Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 298.

He who never meets a person worthy of love or hate can never experience the depths in which love and hate are rooted. To him who has never seen a work of art nor gone beyond the walls of the city may perhaps forever be closed to the enjoyment of nature and art together with his susceptibility for this enjoyment. Such an "incomplete" person is similar to an unfinished sketch. ⁵⁷⁵

Caritas therefore advances "onto the scene of the world, advancing in person without a stuntman, double, or any other representative standing in for it." And this way of being given through selfless loving is an emptying that gives; it is both kenotic and prophetic; "it breaks through the frame, is abandoned to the world of which it now makes up a part. It comes forward insofar as it gives itself." ⁵⁷⁶

Stein's martyrdom is a witnessing from one who testifies to a wider memory through a studied and loved empathy. Correspondingly, Heschel argues that the ...most important decision a thinker makes is reflected in what he comes to consider the most important problem. According to Albert Camus, "There is only one really serious philosophical problem: and that is suicide." May I differ and suggest that there is only one really serious problem: and that is martyrdom. Is there anything worth dying for? 577

Truth, at times in our lives, may call us to the radical witness of a kenotic surrender but "[w]e can only live for the truth if we have the power to die for it." In death, Stein is revealing for us what she has been consistently living for: a wider, interreligiously attuned empathy. Stein reaffirms life in her prophetic 'here I am' through death. Her praxis at the time of her martyrdom, and her martyrdom itself is a "Kiddush haHayim," a "sanctification of life," of all life, Gentle and Jew. 579 Heschel concludes that Judaism would want to hold that "the greatness of man is his capacity for kiddush hashem, readiness to die for the sake of God, for the sake of the Name." 580

⁵⁷⁵ Stein, OPE, 102, 111.

⁵⁷⁶ Marion, *BG*, 69.

⁵⁷⁷ Heschel, WM, 92.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁹ Peter Scherle, Unpublished Classnotes, *Post-Holocaust Jewish Philosophy and Theology* (Dublin, Trinity College, The Irish School of Ecumenics: 18 November 2002).

⁵⁸⁰ Heschel, WM, 92.

If a memory is therefore capable of reverberating over a wider "field of meaning," then it may be capable of drawing *others* into a wider (but dialectically sensitive) relationship, so that both sameness and otherness may critically relate to each other across an ever-widening *temporal field of meaning*; where the '*nowness*' of a new relationship may mean the realization of a shared eschatological future. Stein's 'manner' of being given, her own 'readiness', and our memory of her witnessing, is challenging us to consider how this type of witnessing may be significant for how Christians remember and witness to their consanguinity with Judaism.

One may only respectfully submit, in light of our study, that it would be an unexpectedly un-nuanced position to simply conclude that Stein is irrevocably cut off in conversion from her Jewish sameness because of the acceptance of a Christian otherness. For example, Gideon Goosen wonders, "would those who converted from one world religion to another be able to reject their religious past in a definitive way? Was Edith Stein able to reject her Jewish past so that it did not colour her post-conversion religiosity?" While she is one who accepts the religion of her persecutors she may also be likened to a kind of subversive agent who is reimaging for us what an end of scapegoatism would look like, for her praxis is grounded in a way of witnessing-as-remembering (smar) that is challenging contemporary Christianity beyond a present-day Marcionism. Her example is encouraging us to do the teshuva work of re-membering ourselves with our Jewish heritage.

⁵⁸¹ See: Greenberg, "On the Divine Plan and the Human Role in Development of Religion: A Response to Tom Indinopulos," 460.

⁵⁸² Heschel, WM, 92.

⁵⁸³ See: Zev Garber, "The Problem of Edith Stein: Jewess and Catholic Saint," in *Women and the Holocaust: Narrative and Representation*, (ed.) Esther Fuchs, *Studies in the Shoah*, vol. 22 (Oxford, UK and Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999), 1-7.

⁵⁸⁴ Gideon Goosen, "Towards a Theory of Dual Religious Belonging," *Ecumenics from the Rim*: *Explorations in Honour of John D'Arcy May*, (eds.) John O'Grady and Peter Scherle (Berlin: LIT, 2007), 238-245; 243.

(7.3) Witnessing to One Another: Telling Our Stories.

At a recent conference held at Maynooth College, County Kildare, Ireland Sahr Yambasu argued that "when we meet others" we will ultimately

tell them our stories of life, reflecting something of our history – our individual stories and the histories of the people and communities that we belong to and that have shaped our lives. The stories we share with each other are also, by implication, stories about what and who we believe others are. 585

Empathy will be incarnated through the sharing of our stories with one another. This anthropological given may be obvious in the sense that to be a human being is to have a narrative. And yet, this basic affirmation has the power today of being subversive in the sense that our sharing of narratives with one another creates a richness in diversity that subtly challenges the post-modern isolationism of a life fragmented by fear of the other. Jewish and Christian 'stakeholders' have been engaging with one another, especially since Vatican II, through a narrative exchange. The personal narratives and faith narratives, stories about self and community, have built up the bonds over the years.

There will always be a complexity to the relationship for "[t]he work of empathy is precisely trying to imagine a view of the world that one does not share, and in fact may find it quite difficult to share. Notably, while empathy involves perceiving the other's complex point of view, it does not require accepting the other's views." Yet, it strikes us that the empathy we enact with one another through the sharing of stories may move us towards a new *depth* when we consider how this relationship is being 'narratively' or dialogically accomplished within the dialectical matrix of 'belonging and distance'.

⁵⁸⁵ Sahr Yambasu, "Embracing the Different Other," *No Longer Strangers: Cultural Integration in Church and Society in Ireland, Doctrine and Life Special Issue*, (ed.) Bernard Treacy *et al*, 55/8-9 (October-November 2006): 78-84; 82.

⁵⁸⁶ Halpern, "Rehumanizing the Other," 581.

Croatian born theologian Miroslav Volf, in a striking first person narrative example, and reminiscent of Stein's dialectic of giving and receiving (*cf.* 7.1), shares with us the following helpful insight:

Both distance and belonging are essential. Belonging without distance destroys: I affirm my exclusive identity as Croatian and want either to shape everyone in my own image or eliminate them from my world. But distance without belonging isolates; I deny my identity as a Croatian and draw back from my own culture. But more often than not, I become trapped in the snares of counter-dependence. I deny my Croatian identity only to affirm even more forcefully my identity as a member of this or that anti-Croatian sect. And so an isolationist 'distance without belonging' slips into a destructive 'belonging without distance.' Distance from a culture must never degenerate into flight from that culture but must be a way of living in a culture. ⁵⁸⁷

Jewish and Catholic partners in dialogue have to struggle, together, to move beyond the 'snares of counter-dependence' and an isolating "self-sufficiency", ⁵⁸⁸ and towards a dialectically-minded interdependence where empathetic dialogue could then "include conditions for regaining trust, for voicing disagreement, and for securely developing relationships over time." ⁵⁸⁹ Jacques Dupuis concludes that

[t]he grace of interreligious dialogue consists in this welcome for the others in their difference. Interpersonal encounter takes place necessarily between persons who are different, and a richness of communion is built on the mutual complementarity between persons...Unity does not mean uniformity, nor does communion mean conformism. The grace of dialogue between religions consists in the possibility of a mutual enrichment. ⁵⁹⁰

This level and kind of praxis moves us beyond fear, and towards *metanoia*. One is drawn into the intersubjectively attuned, yet arguably complex, way of being given towards otherness in empathy. Yambasu, in picking up the Volfian line, argues that

⁵⁸⁷ Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and Reconciliation (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1996) 50.

⁵⁸⁸ Heschel, *WM*, 91: "The Idea of dependence is an explanation, whereas self-sufficiency is an unprecedented, nonanalogous concept in terms of what we know about life within nature. Is not self-sufficiency itself insufficient to explain self-sufficiency."

⁵⁸⁹ Halpern, "Rehumanizing the Other," 582.

⁵⁹⁰ Jacques Dupuis, "Christianity and Religions: From Confrontation to Encounter," *The Tablet, Open Day Lecture 2001* (20, 27 October and 3 November 2001): < http://www.thetablet.co.uk> accessed on 26 October 2006.

[w]hen we open our arms towards someone, our open arms become a symbol of desire to reach out towards others, a sign that we have created space in ourselves for others to come in and inhabit. In so far as our open arms are a statement that we cannot do without others, they also become an invitation to others to create space in themselves for us to inhabit.

Metanoia through embrace enables persons-in-community to go "on a journey beyond themselves – a journey beyond their incomplete understanding of God's intention for them." My' reception of the other's otherness, through the drama of embrace, reveals to 'me' how this otherness is somehow mysteriously grounded in the sameness of our shared humanity. While some aim "at making others in their own image rather than helping them be themselves," an empathetic "embrace" may be a subversive encounter with the other, capable of "leav[ing] those who engage in it no longer the same people they were before the embrace."

Interreligious dialogue, and the Jewish-Catholic dialogue in particular, is a personalist project. It is very much about how we accept one another as human beings. If a person is an end in him/herself then the goal of every stakeholder regarding an interdependently-minded way of proceeding will only be realized in so far as the different dialogue partners become vulnerable for one another through the drama of embrace. But creating a larger space for the other will take time, and it is a process that may all too easily be romanticized. The cultivation of a sense of empathy may hasten this process.

Marc Gopin concludes that the "critical importance of empathy in Western religious and secular traditions cannot be overestimated." Whether it is in "advocacy", "long-term education" or in "the conflict workshop setting", the "experience" of embrace one offers another through a "relational empathy" may serve as a foundational, orienting-concept (*Grundkonzept*) that "informs" the

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, 84.

⁵⁹¹ Yambasu, "Embracing the Different Other," 79-80.

"methodologies at work" for the given circumstances. In terms of conflict resolution, for example,

...Empathy is evoked by the painful story of the other party, and, in [a] religious setting, both parties refer to God's role in their lives. This, in turn, generates a common bond between enemies that has often led, with subtle, careful guidance, to more honest discussion and relationship building. ⁵⁹³

Gopin contends that "one could explore a means to view" an empathy that leads to 'rehumanizing' (*cf.* Hampl in chapter 4) and reestablishing relationships between oneself and the other "in positive spiritual terms". This mutual process, Gopin concludes, may be "an easy leap for many religious value systems." ⁵⁹⁴

At other times, however, our desire for empathy with the other will also mean simply waiting for, not forcing, one another to dialogue. And *waiting*, as Yambasu reminds us, "is an act of discipline, self-control, and education in patience. It is a statement about our own powerlessness to make people accept us...[w]aiting is not an idle posture. It is a time within which we are afforded the opportunity to woo the other, a time to work towards making the other desire to embrace us." It is also an approach rooted and grounded in the silent and humble solidarity with "[t]he powerless". It is a *teshuva* of listening where a return to a shared future only becomes possible "[w]hen we become the victims' ally". Through the intentionality if listening

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⁵⁹³ Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon, 20-21

Initiatives of Change is an officially recognized independent foundation. Its principal task is the management and maintenance of the conference centre in the former Caux-Palace hotel above Montreux. The Aims of the Foundation: To work for a more just society by strengthening the ethical foundations of democracy; to help heal the wounds of history; to encourage care and responsibility in family life and personal relationships; to strengthen ethical commitment in economic life; to forge networks among people from different faiths and cultures. The Foundation seeks to attain these aims by promoting ethical standards of honesty, purity, love and selflessness as guiding lines for personal behaviour and for our commitments to society. To work in this direction, it depends on many forms of voluntary work and giving. In 1938, as nations re-armed for war, its originator, Frank Buchman called for a 'moral and spiritual rearmament' to work towards a 'hate-free, fear-free, greed-free world'. At the end of the war, under the name *Moral Re-Armament* (MRA), a program of moral and spiritual reconstruction helped to reconcile former enemies. Today Initiatives of Change is a network of people of different faiths engaged in the ever-needed process of 'remaking the world'", from http://www.caux.ch/en/foundation accessed on 6 April 2008.

to the victims we may "receive the reconciling gift that only they can offer: the possibility of waiting together for the inbreaking of the Messiah's reign. Waiting together, we effect not redemption, but the community that is its annunciator and first fruits." So while oneself already has something of the other *already* within one's self, the real-time work of reestablishing relationships between oneself and the other 'in positive spiritual', social and ethical terms is our future, hope-filled work.

(7.3.1) Einfühlung and Interreligious Dialogue.

Foucaultian scholar Henrique Pinto argues in a timely essay, "Roman Catholicism and Inter-faith Dialogue," "the *self* cannot exist without the *other*, neither can *otherness* ever be excluded from the dialogical processes through which we exist." Indeed, dialogue is "*not* the imposition of one voice upon another (found in all religions to some degree)" for the imposing totality of 'us versus them' "is at the heart of the hatred, injustice and violence operating in the world[.]" This may therefore mean, from the Catholic perspective, the movement away from an individualistic self-sufficiency that encourages the maneuvers of distance and discretion and towards a more radical, kenotic givenness: "[w]e have to enter again the paschal journey of self-emptying...[t]his self emptying reaches out to our concepts, theologies, institutions, theoretical or devotional worlds." The *Shoah* reminds us, with all the despondency of Yeats that "... *Turning and turning in the widening gyre/The falcon cannot hear the falconer;/Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; ... "599 And yet, out of this collapse, new forms of faithfulness and respect*

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⁵⁹⁶ Plank, Broken.

⁵⁹⁷ Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 194.

⁵⁹⁸ Adolfo Nicolás, "Christianity in Crisis: Asia. Which Asia? Which Christianity? Which Crisis?" *Concilium* (2005/3): 64-70; 70.

William Butler Yeats, "The Second Coming," from http://www.cs.rice.edu/~ssiyer/minstrels/ poems/289.html> accessed on 31 October 2007. For an interesting and germane biographical note on Yeats and 'The Second Coming' see: Adam Cohen, "What W. B. Yeats's 'Second Coming' Really

for the religious other emerge. In terms of interreligious dialogue, a reverence is born out of "a faithfulness given by means of a permanent critique of one's theological positions in 'agnostic respect' for the *other* of one's religion, and the *other* of other faiths." New centers of dialogue and interaction, real-time epicenters of empathy, are created out of the ashes of such *non*-places.

The *chiaroscuro* of the contemporary *tremendum(s)* spurn Jewish-Christian dialogists to move *deeper* and concomitantly *wider* in our shared search for truth because a dialogical and interreligious theology is "not a discourse on truth, on the 'adaequatio rei et intellectus'" in the sense of it being a *direct correspondence-tending-towards* the "subordination to a perennial *verbum externum.*" Rather, as von Brück argues, "truth is conditioned by language, and language is metaphorical, i.e., notions such as space, time, causality, matter, being, consciousness, truth etc. are metaphors related to each other and conditionally interdependent." And these concepts are "not merely descriptive but they imply a contextual reflection," and therefore "[t]he result is that when we talk about truth…we are not talking only about the possible congruence of thinking and facts (*adaequatio intellectus et rei*), but about

Says About the Iraq War," *The New York Times* (12 February 2007): "Yeats wrote 'The Second Coming' in 1919, an especially dismal moment in history. Europeans were shell-shocked from World War I, and deeply cynical. Yeats's homeland, Ireland, was lurching toward civil war. The old order in Russia had just been toppled by a revolution that Yeats -- who had a fondness for aristocracy -- feared would spread across the continent and the globe. Yeats's perspective on the world's troubles was not what many people who quote him today might suspect. For one thing, he was not a Christian. He dabbled in theosophy and the occult, and considered Christianity an idea whose time had passed. 'The Second Coming' is not, as its title and the Bethlehem reference might suggest, an account of the return of the Messiah. What is being born is nothing resembling Christ. As for his politics, Yeats was hardly a democrat, and he did not care much for 'progress' -- which makes him an odd choice for people who hope to turn Iraq into a vibrant democracy. Yeats was attracted to fascism, and he rebelled as a youth against the adults' talk of progress by embracing its opposite. 'I took satisfaction in certain public disasters, felt sort of ecstasy at the contemplation of ruin,' he once wrote." From: http://www.ny times.com/2007/02/12/opinion/12mon4.html accessed on 31 October 2007.

600 William Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault', in *The*

⁶⁰⁰ William Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault", in *The Later Foucault*, (ed.) Jeremy Moss (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998) 108-128, 122 in Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 199.

⁶⁰¹ Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 199, 202.

a communication of experiences."602 An interreligious theology will therefore value experience -- the 'intergivenness' of the one to the other in dialogue, and not be forgetful of the other's experience of pain and suffering. And yet, our theologizing around experience will need to be a "critical and subversive language" in so far as it embraces the "post-ontological conditions" in which it finds itself, and adopts "a critical epistemology, a hermeneutics of suspicion" in the midst of a "plurality of truth claims."604 Holocaust scholar Zev Garber argues "[f]or the Church, it is the Easter faith, spirit over matter, that enables victory to be proclaimed over Golgotha and Auschwitz. For the Synagogue, it is the covenantal oath at Sinai, uniting spirit and matter and resulting in everyday acts of holiness, that permits Zion to triumph over Auschwitz."605 Catholics nevertheless have to ask themselves: are we more concerned with an "escape" -- a getting out of temporality and the world of otherness?⁶⁰⁶ One has to respectfully wonder, in light of the above horizon, why it seems that the position of Catholic dialogists, at times, has been to hold up the atemporal over and against the provisional as if to suggest the messiness of history could be 'fixed' through naming broad, universal principles for everyone while

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602 von Brück, "A Theology of Multiple Religious Identity," 201.

⁶⁰³ Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault", in Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 199.

⁶⁰⁴ Brück, "A Theology of Multiple Religious Identity," 191.

⁶⁰⁵ Garber, "The Problem of Edith Stein: Jewess and Catholic Saint," 5.

for a harmony between us and the world...[i]ts ideal of peace and equilibrium presupposed the sufficiency of being. The insufficiency of the human condition has never been understood otherwise than a limitation of being, without ever having envisaged the meaning of 'finite being'. The transcendence of these limits, communion with the infinite being, remained philosophy's sole occupation..." Could we envision the possibility of our seemingly infinite biases and smallmindedness with which we may regard the other(s)? Levinas, *OE*, 50-51.

dialoguing with no one. The constant default to a fixed position ensures the future of a more or less narrow, ahistorical and therefore irrelevant dialogue(s) that may amount to nothing more than a thinly veiled proselytism. Being open to transformation, and undergoing the process of being re-centered, challenges idealism's fixity of a self-sufficient ideology -- an ideology willing to tread on other people in order to maintain a fixity of opinion, place and even time -- as if all is mine. Such an ideology assembles a 'sound barrier' blocking and silencing the new voice of dialogue. But a barrier-building ideology secretly hopes for an attempt at a breach. For just at the moment when it seems as if the barrier will begin to crumble, creating a space for something new, the walls become higher and wider. The voices from the inside cry 'threat' and these cries stir up a 'righteous anger' against other voices. But let's name this for what it is: this necrotically driven, self-constituting system is essentially the violence of 'me' against 'you' -- it is really nothing more than another permutation of the 'vengeance' and 'wrath' that is characteristic of racism, religious intolerance and scapegoatism. Indeed, such a system builds wider and stronger walls precisely with the bodies of those it has silenced -- the now forgotten, faceless others.

The ingathering of empathy for one another, as we have now examined through the theory and praxis of Edith Stein, both critically extends a hermeneutic of suspicion while it concomitantly encourages Jews and Christians towards the *plenum* of a more embracing eschatological horizon vis-à-vis our real-time ethical practice i.e., "[in] addressing the problems of the *here and now*, life is summoned to become that which is *not yet*." For "[w]e are not moving back, unlike in Pseudo-Dionysius, 'to the Unity of the One'...[i]nstead, we are losing ourselves' "607" -- and we are losing ourselves in the sense of being *given-for* anew to the process of 'dis-assembling' the

⁶⁰⁷ Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 198.

barriers that prevent us from experiencing the converging ways we are *already* sharing with one another but do *not yet* fully realize. The appropriation of a radicalizing *given-for-ness* in challenging the structures that keep us from one another may begin to accomplish the empathically charged work of *teshuva*. This is a mission that Catholics were given to embrace vis-à-vis Vatican II's *Nostra Aetate*.

Prof. Edward Kessler reports in *The Tablet*, on the fortieth anniversary of *Nostra Aetate*, "...*Nostra Aetate's* present-tense citation of Romans 9:4 – 'to them belong the glory, the covenants, the giving of the law" is the basis "for a revised teaching that Jews are beloved of God and have received an irrevocable calling." As church we are constantly being challenged to move into the present tense by undergoing *aggiornamento*. In recent years, part of the *aggiornamento* has been *teshuva*. Thomas Casey argues,

The fact that the Messiah came 2,000 years ago does not make any difference to me personally if he does not come to me today: and here is where we can learn from Jews. We can be more humble, for although the Messiah is already here, at the same time he is not yet in our hearts half as much as he should be. We often use the fact that Jesus came two millennia ago as a crutch to lean on, as a form of reassurance that we do not need to search for truth any more. We feel secure and so are intellectually and morally lazy, whereas it seems to me that the absence of the Messiah challenges Jews to wrestle with life and history in a way we can easily avoid. Paradoxically, Jews at times are more energized by a Messiah who has not yet appeared than we are by a Messiah who long ago arrived in our midst. 609

God's pathos heard in the present tense should indeed challenge us to *keep searching* as Christians. Stein's voice -- *heard in the present* -- serves as a prophetic call against the totality of fear that keeps us from embracing otherness. This 'embracing' is humanism *par excellence* for it is "...a humanism that stakes its hope for humanity on

⁶⁰⁸ Edward Kessler, "Common Ground with the Chosen People," *The Tablet* (London 22 October 2005): 10-11: 11.

⁶⁰⁹ Thomas Casey, "The Jewish Way to Listen," *The Tablet* (22 March 2008): 14.

a conviction that compassion, not malevolence, is the ultimate attribute of the One Presence within the shards of our fractured world."610

The dynamism of compassion-for-others, of a given-for-ness par excellence, sets the condition(s) for the possibility for a locus of "pure gratuity" wherein we may begin to find ourselves given anew to a "plurality of interactive voices, from where not only us (the same) but they too (the other) -- indeed, all reality -- come to life."611 And it is from within this place of gratuity, this dis-assembling matrix, whereby we may come to revisit our narratives with one another in the real-time 'messiness' of dialogue. So a "return" to the "narratives" of "Jesus, Buddha, Muhammad, Confucius and others," and the prophetic voices of our forerunners in the contemporary Jewish-Catholic dialogue, like Edith Stein, and Abraham Joshua Heschel, may provide us with a model. Indeed, the "best' embodied expressions" for how it is "we ought to be-with-in-dialogue" may teach us anew how to dialogue with one another. And yet, a return to the narratives need not entail a "return to the interpretation of their dogmatic and fixed meanings, but to the telling and retelling of the practices in which they first came to life, and of styles of living through which, in conflict with them, peoples have managed...not to solve the ambiguity, pain and uncertainty of existence, but to live meaningful lives." But precisely in the sharing of the narratives we need to keep in mind how, as Pinto argues, 'life is being summoned to become that which is not yet' through a more profound 'identity-inpartnership' (cf. von Brück in chapter 3).

While we do live life in dialogue with a great amount of 'ambiguity' and 'uncertainty' around 'existence', is not dialogue something more than the 'telling and retelling' of 'practices' and stories for one another? Pinto himself argues:

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⁶¹⁰ Hollenbach, *The Global Face*, 63.

⁶¹¹ Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 198.

⁶¹² Ibid., 199.

[i]t is only through participation, metaphoricity, and the practice of embodied openness towards the other, that we can be faithful and honour the finite infinity of the divine in history. If this has to be said in relation to the church's dialogue with the *other of itself*, how much so in relation to the encounter between religions.⁶¹³

So while being in dialogue incorporates the 'telling and retelling' of 'practices' and stories for one another, Edith Stein's life tells us that dialogue may also take the form of *searching* for identity-in-partnership; a pilgrimage towards a shared futurity that is mindful of the past and present, and yet still open to something new.

God's "searching memory", *qua* (*em*)*pathos*, is calling us towards a renewed awareness of how God's *Einfühlung* finds an ethos through dialogue. We have to be open to the *not yet* -- a future in unity with no prescribed outcomes. A future that may already be charged, as Christians and Jews profess, with the presence of a God who enters as love *qua* gratuity through dialogue. von Brück concludes,

[k]nowledge of the truth is a matter of the eschatological future i.e. in the present we have truth in the mode of searching for it. But now we do have the criterion of love which becomes conscious and knowable in relational patterns of cognition, feeling and action, but it can lead only to relative decisions. This is precisely the place for a productive argument in interreligious controversy.⁶¹⁵

But what does this mean for the future of Jewish-Christian dialogue? If knowledge of the truth is also a matter of the *not yet*, that is to say an eschatological future -- then I would like to suggest that it is precisely through exploring what I would like to call our shared Jewish and Catholic 'eschatological metaphoricity' whereby we may come to appreciate how we share truth 'in the mode of searching for it'.

Jewish metaphoricity gives rise to an image of God whose temporally charged remembering *qua* empathy conveys an eternal givenness and solidarity with a people -- e.g., "God means: No one is ever alone; the essence of the temporal is the eternal; the moment is an image of eternity in an infinite mosaic. God means: *Togetherness of*

614 Karl Rahner, FCF, 318-319.

⁶¹³ *Ibid.*, 201.

⁶¹⁵ Brück, "A Theology of Multiple Religious Identity," 202.

all beings in holy otherness."⁶¹⁶ A Catholic ecclesio-theological rapprochement towards a concept of God who is *always*, *already* in dialogue with otherness respectfully recognizes, and engages with (and is not threatened by), Catholicism's own Jewish otherness. This frank and mature affirmation concomitantly allows for Jews to be our partners in dialogue *as Jews*, without any expectation, as Vatican II argues, for conversion.

Concluding Remarks.

By 'painting' a portrait of Edith Stein's real-time givenness we have charged our reflections with Heschel *et al* with an eschatological metaphoricity that echoes to us from the *tremendum* of the *Shoah*. This echo, I would like to suggest, may orient and direct how we may become, Jews and Catholics alike, more hospitable towards one another as theologians and dialogue partners in our quest for truth 'in the mode of searching for it'. At the boundary of truth we rub up against mystery, the fullness of truth. Our considerations on Edith Stein's theory and praxis have given us a glimpse into a prophetic portrait of givenness. Through her life we experience the *mysterium caritatis*. We are beginning to appreciate what the language of phenomenology gropes for in words; namely, the perichoretic 'intergivenness' we find working through lover relating with beloved, and *vice versa*.⁶¹⁷

Indeed, Stein's "inscape" reveals a certain interreligious coherency in responding to the prophetic call as witness. Are we willing to exhibit the kind of

⁶¹⁶ Heschel, MNA, 109.

⁶¹⁷ *Cf.* Marion, *BG*, 320-324; 323.

⁶¹⁸ Elaine Murphy, "Gerard Manley Hopkins: a legacy to the twentieth century," delivered at the Annual General Meeting of The Hopkins International Summer School, *Studies*, vol. 86, no. 344 (1997): <www.gerardmanleyhopkins.org> accessed on 12 December 2007: "Hopkins' youthful interest in Architecture and Art; his earlier training in sketching and the influence of Ruskin had taught him a way of observing and seeing. Central to his poetry was *Inscape*, a word which he himself coined to refer to the significant elements which unified and gave its subject its character and form. He made detailed notes in his journal of the essential characteristics of a subject on which he fastened his attention. In addition to determining his subject's *Inscape*, he aimed at grasping the essence or stress of its being, its energy, for which he coined the word *Instress*."

'readiness' we see in Stein? Are we willing to engage in the *kiddush hashem* of *remembering* our Christian selves with our Jewish roots? The *tremendum* memory of the *Shoah* is weighing on our present and future. Is the *weight* of the other, as Stein argued in *Kreuzeswissenschaft*, capable of claiming us at 'our deepest point'? The twenty-first century interreligious dialogue is just beginning to unpack the theological significance of living from the depth of a dialectical belonging, and its relevance for a Jewish-Christian future. Stein responds to *the* call *qua* phenomenologist, mystic and, ultimately, martyr, and her response to *the* call advocates a kenotic inter-givenness between lover and beloved. It is nothing less than an intergivenness that respects the communicative dialectic of giving and receiving happening between persons.

Furthermore, her intergivenness, may reveal the 'immediacy' of a common interreligious concern, the concern of atonement.

It is my belief that the Catholic Church would do well to phenomenologically (re)consider, with twenty-first century *teshuva* eyes, our shared Jewish and Catholic 'eschatological metaphoricity'. Clearly, such a recommendation is the beginning of another study. It is not our place here to conduct an exhaustive reflection on how Christianity has honored the memory of this methaphoricity through history. This is a project for future interreligious theologians and dialogists. By way of conclusion, however, I would simply like to 'open the question' on how we may proceed in this task. The focus of this study, the theory and praxis of Edith Stein, as critically read through the thought of Abraham Joshua Heschel, has given us a tool for such a project: *a hermeneutics from empathy*. As the reader may recall, we applied this hermeneutic to the phenomenological example of Edith Stein, and we were enriched by how her phenomenological portrait dynamically broke upon the scene, and emptied over the frames, as a kenotic love. Furthermore, we have been witnessing to

how her theory and praxis enriches this very hermeneutic from empathy because she advocates in her phenomenological and theological considerations a realistic reciprocity between giving and receiving. This larger application of empathy may therefore be accomplished in light of our considerations on Edith Stein. It is as if we were looking to find the places of empathy between Catholicism and Judaism through the transparent frame that once contained her portrait. A frame made empty by her own excessive givenness.

I will therefore continue to follow the cadence of this study in following a hermeneutic from empathy, and now widen our hermeneutical lens so that we may begin to appreciate how this hermeneutic is challenging the Catholic Church beyond any shadow of Marcionism, and into a new empathy with Judaism. The question arises: how do we make a 'return' (*teshuva*) to those we called strangers, our Jewish brothers and sisters?

I will limit the opening of this question to a review of two areas: (1) Edith

Stein was a woman of *teshuva*: does post-*Shoah* Catholicism have a healthy empathy
with a Jewish understanding of *teshuva*?; (2) In light of the fortieth anniversary of

Nostra Aetate, are we living from the prophetic intention (kavanah) of this teshuva
with our Jewish brothers and sisters in our post-Jubliee theory and praxis? In sum, is
our empathy directed towards renewing a relationship with a living faith tradition, one
embodied in the Torah and made manifest through a vigorous documentary tradition?

If we are going to move forward in a consideration of making an interreligious *return* to one another through memory, set in the key of empathy, then we may profit by first considering how Jews themselves do *teshuva* for and with others. Let us first present a reading of *teshuva* combined with a phenomenological consideration of what it means to welcome the stranger (chapter 8). From this perspective, we may

move to consider how well the church has been intentionally, that is to say, empathically living from *teshuva* in its documentary tradition over the last forty years (chapter 9).

Chapter 8 Widening Empathy through Teshuva.

The September 2000 statement of the National Jewish Scholars Project in the United States, entitled *Dabru Emet: A Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity*, makes the following observation in the hope of finding common ground for Jewish-Christian study and reflection:

Jews and Christians accept the moral principles of Torah. Central to the moral principles of Torah is the inalienable sanctity and dignity of every human being. All of us were created in the image of God. This shared moral emphasis can be the basis of an improved relationship between our two communities. It can also be the basis of a powerful witness to all humanity for improving the lives of our fellow human beings and for standing against the immoralities and idolatries that harm and degrade us. Such witness is especially needed after the unprecedented horrors of the past century. 619

Memory, in terms of our study, has had its basis for us, as *Nostra aetate* affirms, in the Jewish, now shared Jewish and Christian remembering matrix of z[a]k[a]r; a 'calling forth in the soul' the memory of the other. The Jews called on God in praise and worship by remembering *God as the One who remembers*: God remembers the covenant, and when we remember God's memory for us 'we' have solidarity with the One who chooses 'us' for God does not forget Israel (e.g., Psalm 105:8). The Divine One is never envisioned as being divorced from the 'here and now' of Israel.

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⁶¹⁹ National Jewish Scholars Project, Dabru Emet [Heb. דברו אמת "Speak [the] Truth"]: A Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity (September 2000): http://www.icjs.org/what/njsp/ dabruemet.html> accessed on 17 March 2008. Some criticism has been leveled against Dabru Emet from Orthodox as well as from Conservative and Reform groups within Judaism for relativizing the difference between Judaism and Christianity. Michael A. Signer, one of the authors of Dabru Emet, in making a general response to criticisms, highlights the importance of an analogical argument/ imagination when considering the nexus between sameness and difference: "[a]n analogical argument offers the possibilities of 'similarities in difference.' The analytical proposition argues from a particular premise and moves through a series of logical analyses. That is why some readers miss the point of the assertion, 'Jews and Christians seek authority from the same book -- the Bible (what Jews call "Tanakh" and Christians call the "Old Testament.") The use of the word 'same' is designed to provoke the reader into further inquiry and actually learn about the difference between the sacred books that are carried by each community. It is indeed possible to punctuate every one of the rubric statements of Dabru Emet (as opposed to the explanatory paragraphs) with a period or a question mark. The aim of Dabru Emet is to urge readers to seek out differences between the two communities and then discern the similarities." See: Signer, "Dabru Emet: Sic et Non", given at the first annual meeting of the Council of Centers on Jewish-Christian Relations (Baltimore: 28 October 2002): http://www.bc.edu /research/cjl/meta-elements/ sites/ partners/ ccjr/signer02.htm> accessed on 18 March 2008. 620 Cf. Metz in the Introduction to this study.

Israel's remembrance of how God is "intervening on our behalf" is of "fundamental importance to [Jewish] religious practice."621 A Christian return to the Jewish voice as living tradition may only encourage the kind of hermeneutical retrieval essential to Christianity's future with others. To that end, the Christian Scholars Group on Christian-Jewish Relations issued this encouraging response to *Dabru Emet*, highlighting the following:

Judaism is a living faith, enriched by many centuries of development. Many Christians mistakenly equate Judaism with biblical Israel. However, Judaism, like Christianity, developed new modes of belief and practice in the centuries after the destruction of the Temple. The rabbinic tradition gave new emphasis and understanding to existing practices, such as communal prayer, study of Torah, and deeds of loving-kindness. Thus Jews could live out the covenant in a world without the Temple. Over time they developed an extensive body of interpretive literature that continues to enrich Jewish life, faith, and self-understanding. Christians cannot fully understand Judaism apart from its post-biblical development, which can also enrich and enhance Christian faith. 622

Heschel's prophetic call (cf. Chapters 1-3), and Edith Stein's prophetic response (cf. Chapters 4-7) -- this dynamic relationship between the thought of the two -incarnates a remembering-for-how-Jews-remember-the-other. The call ← → response dynamic is also a hermeneutical 'tool' where the doctrine and life of Stein, in dialogue with the pathic perspectives of Heschel, gives us a further lens through viewing how empathy may be at the service of actualizing a robust *teshuva*. Indeed, while a hermeneutics from empathy is a way of remembering, it is also a way of living Einfühlung as healing for and with the other. It is a remembering that is restorative.

Samuel Kobia, General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, in a lecture at the Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin, eloquently reminded us that the work of dialogue will have to be about the work of healing memories, for

621 Morrill, Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory, 150.

⁶²² The Christian Scholars Group on Christian-Jewish Relations, A Sacred Obligation: Rethinking Christian Faith in Relation to Judaism and the Jewish People (1 September 2002): http://www.bc. edu/research/cjl/meta elements/sites/partners/csg/Sacred Obligation.htm> accessed on 18 March 2008.

we have brought with us into the twenty-first century "wounded memories," and we need to initiate a process for "undergoing a release from this woundedness." Again, to quote *Sacred Obligation*,

Christians meet God's saving power in the person of Jesus Christ and believe that this power is available to all people in him. Christians have therefore taught for centuries that salvation is available only through Jesus Christ. With their recent realization that God's covenant with the Jewish people is eternal, Christians can now recognize in the Jewish tradition the redemptive power of God at work. If Jews, who do not share our faith in Christ, are in a saving covenant with God, then Christians need new ways of understanding the universal significance of Christ. 624

Part of a Christian *teshuva* will mean always asking, or at the very least keeping, the above principles in mind as we approach our Jewish friends in dialogue.

In the following section of our study, and in light of both Heschel and Stein's (em)pathic challenges, we will take up the concern of Dr. Kobia and widen the question for the Christian community, by way of conclusion, and 'open the question' on how Judaism remembers those who have been wronged. From a Christian perspective, this way of remembering may only inform and guide us towards a dialogical perspective, a perspective that carries with it the hope-filled memory of building an interreligious unity "which has been 'dismembered'" by the *tremendum* epoch of the *Shoah*. 625

It is in light of the above that our way of proceeding will be to bring Emmanuel Levinas' Talmudic commentary on 2 Samuel 21, on the Hebraic understanding of atonement/repentance into dialogue with the International Theological Commission's interpretation of 'Old Testament' forgiveness as presented in the document, *Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past*.

⁶²³ Samuel Kobia, "*Hope and the Healing of Memories*," notes taken from a lecture given at The Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College (Dublin: 30 April 2007).
⁶²⁴ A Sacred Obligation.

⁶²⁵ Kobia, Healing of Memories, 30 April 2007.

This inquiry may renew a Christian *appreciation* for, and (re)appropriation of, how the Jewish doctrinal tradition radicalizes repentance/atonement (*teshuva*). A lack of *empathy* between strangers, and the absence of a compassionate concern towards the *other(s)*, is nothing less than a forgetfulness for the divine. Judaism appreciates how this *apatheia* towards the Other shows itself through a disregard for the other(s) through the 'real-time' exigencies of injustice, bias, hatred and ultimately murder. The "taking into account the suffering of the others, the suffering of the foreigner" is, as Metz argues, the foundation of atonement: "the basis of a universal responsibility" that is necessary for remembering and redressing injustices. Coming to appreciate a wider Jewish sense of atonement, and the 'righteous' welcome of the stranger as an ethical manifestation of this atonement, may now be situated against the horizon of the 'memory' of Edith Stein's *Einfühlung* theory and praxis.

(8.1) Memory and Reconciliation: Levinas, Daniélou and Why Shared Memory is Important.

In 1958 Emmanuel Levinas responded to a talk given by Jesuit Father Jean Daniélou on the common -- Jewish and Christian -- foundations of a Mediterranean civilization. Levinas was 'very comforted' by the "objective terrain of coexistence and collaboration" Daniélou was anticipating as the ground and vision of aggiornamento Catholicism. Nevertheless, as a way of encouraging further debate and exploration, Levinas drew attention to a *lacuna* in Daniélou's considerations: "Father Daniélou completely left out [in his presentation] the element that remains

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626 Metz, In Memory of the Other's Suffering, 181.

628 Levinas, DF, 175-177; 175.

⁶²⁷ NB: The Levinas text, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, (trans.) Sean Hand (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), hereafter *DF*, does not provide reference to the name of the conference or the paper of then Fr. Daniélou (named Cardinal in 1969 by Pope Paul VI). Also in 1958, the same year as the conference referred to above, Daniélou published *Théologie du Judéo-Christianisme* (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1958).

essential to those of us who are Jews: the constitution of the Talmud." Levinas went on to say to Daniélou,

Rabbinical Judaism, in the centuries that preceded and followed the destruction of the Second Temple, is the primordial event in Hebraic spirituality. If there had been no Talmud, there would have been no Jews today (It certainly would have saved the world a lot of problems!) Or else, we would have been the survivors of a finished world. This is the suggestion that, in spite of everything, persists in Catholic thought. We reject, as you know, the honor of being a relic. 629

Levinas' concern, originally addressed to Daniélou, still has significance today. Sacred Obligation reminded us, 'Christians cannot fully understand Judaism apart from its post-biblical development, which can also enrich and enhance Christian faith'. The living Jewish tradition may enrich the present dialogue between Christians and Jews.

The Talmudic commentary on 2 Samuel 21, presented by Emmanuel Levinas, on the Hebraic understanding of atonement/forgiveness, critically complements (i.e., 'radicalizes') the International Theological Commission's interpretation of 'Old Testament' forgiveness as presented in their recent document, Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past.

Section 2.1 "Biblical Approach: The Old Testament," of the document Memory and Reconciliation attempts to 'clarify'; that is to say, frame the limits of Jewish atonement. For example, the document argues that Jews of the 'Old' Testament, "did not feel the need to address requests for forgiveness to present interlocutors for the sins committed by their fathers... "630" Yet, "the extensive body"631 of Jewish interpretation challenges the delimiting claims of this conclusion (8.1.1).

⁶²⁹ *Ibid*.

⁶³⁰ International Theological Commission, Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past (The Vatican: 1999): <www.vatican.va> accessed on 4 February 2008, and the following quotes in this section unless noted otherwise; *italics* added. 631 *A Sacred Obligation*.

Levinas' reading of both the Hebrew Scripture and the *Talmud* (*tractate Yebamot*) challenges the above opinion/hypothesis of the commission. Specifically, his consideration of 2 Samuel 21 (see: *Appendix 3* for complete text), and *tractate Yebamot* challenges the claim that "present interlocutors" did *not* attempt to make amends for "the sins committed by their fathers" (8.1.2). We may begin to appreciate anew how *addressing present interlocutors* radicalizes atonement, where *teshuva* may become a necessary pre-condition for constructing an "objective terrain of coexistence and collaboration" between Jews and Catholics -- an empathic locus of shared memory (8.1.3).

We will therefore examine the claims of *Memory and Reconciliation* through a critically minded, Talmudic hermeneutic. In reading *Memory and Reconciliation* through the living tradition of the *Talmud* and *Midrash*⁶³² we may appreciate how Jewish texts, far from being a relic, may challenge Catholicism towards a deeper empathy with the Jewish understanding of forgiveness. This is made even more apparent when we come to consider how the welcome of the stranger (8.2) may also be a way of repentance and 'at-one-ment' with the other as presented in Heschel's commentary on Moses in *Heavenly Torah: as Refracted Through the Generations* (*Torah min ha-shamayim be aspaklaria shel ha-dorot*), and Edith Stein's gloss of the prophet Elijiah's praxis (8.3). Let us first turn our attention to consider section 2.1 of *Memory and Reconciliation* before (re)reading the text vis-à-vis Levinas' Talmudic commentary.

⁶³² *Talmud*: (lit. 'Learning') a comprehensive term for *Mishnah* (codification of the Jewish law) and *Gemara* (the traditions, discussions and rulings of the Rabbis); *Midrash*: a collection of statements, commentaries that propose to be a discovery of meanings other than the literal one in the Bible.

(8.1.1) The International Theological Commission's 'clarification': "Biblical Approach: The Old Testament".

In section 2.1, "Biblical Approach: The Old Testament" of the International

Theological Commission's 'clarification', *Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past* the commission, under the leadership of then Cardinal

Ratzinger, attempted to frame Pope John Paul II's project of purifying memory through the confession of past sins. *Memory and Reconciliation* asks the question,

"[w]hat background does the testimony of Sacred Scripture furnish for John Paul II's invitation to the Church to confess the faults of the past?" In regards to the Hebrew Scriptures, the document argues that "requests for forgiveness can be found throughout the Bible – in the narratives of the Old Testament, in the Psalms, and in the Prophets," and these requests may be divided into "two principal categories of 'confession texts'...a) confession texts of individual sins, and b) confession texts of sins of the entire people (and of those of their forebears)." The document is principally interested in the latter category, and its exegesis of the Hebrew Bible reveals the following three 'groupings' of confessional practice:

- A first series of texts represents the entire people (sometimes personified as a single "I") who, in a particular moment of its history, confesses or alludes to its sins against God without any (explicit) reference to the faults of the preceding generations.
- Another group of texts places the confession directed to God of the current sins of the people on the lips of one or more leaders (religious), who may or may not include themselves explicitly among the sinful people for whom they are praying.
- A third group of texts presents the people or one of their leaders in the act of
 mentioning the sins of their forebears without, however, making mention of
 those of the present generation.
- More frequent are the confessions that mention the faults of the forebears, linking them expressly to the errors of the present generation.

Against the above, the document wants to conclude the following from this particular exeges of Hebrew Scripture: "from the testimonies gathered that in all cases where

the 'sins of the fathers' are mentioned, the confession is addressed solely to God, and the sins confessed by the people and for the people are those committed directly against him rather than those committed (also) against other human beings..."⁶³³

The document leaves theologians and others with the following query: "[t]he question arises as to why the biblical writers did not feel the need to address requests for forgiveness to present interlocutors for the sins committed by their fathers, given their strong sense of solidarity in good and evil among the generations (one thinks of the notion of 'corporate personality')." Memory and Reconciliation proposes the following "hypotheses" as to why the Israelites did not ask for forgiveness from their "present interlocutors":

- (i) there is the prevalent theocentrism of the Bible, which gives precedence to the acknowledgement, whether individual or national, of the faults committed against God...
- (ii) [t]he experiences of maltreatment suffered by Israel at the hands of other peoples and the animosity thus aroused could also have militated against the idea of asking pardon of these peoples for the evil done to them.

Another reading of the Hebrew Scriptures, through the Jewish and Talmudic hermeneutic, may challenge these concluding hypotheses (i-ii) of *Memory and Reconciliation*.

⁶³³ Memory and Reconciliation, italics added.

(8.1.2) tractate Yebamot: Asking for Forgiveness from 'Present Interlocutors'.

Levinas reveals, in both his exegesis of 2 Samuel 21:1-6, and his explication of the Talmud tractate Yebamot, a radical example of Israel asking for forgiveness from 'present interlocutors'. 634 Let us first consider 2 Samuel 21: 1-6 and then Levinas' commentary:

David Avenges the Gibeonites

Now there was a famine in the days of David for three years, year after year; and David inquired of the Lord. The Lord said, 'There is blood-guilt on Saul and on his house, because he put the Gibeonites to death.' 2So the king called the Gibeonites and spoke to them. (Now the Gibeonites were not of the people of Israel, but of the remnant of the Amorites; although the people of Israel had sworn to spare them, Saul had tried to wipe them out in his zeal for the people of Israel and Judah.) ³David said to the Gibeonites, 'What shall I do for you? How shall I make expiation, that you may bless the heritage of the Lord?' ⁴The Gibeonites said to him, 'It is not a matter of silver or gold between us and Saul or his house; neither is it for us to put anyone to death in Israel.' He said, 'What do you say that I should do for you?' ⁵They said to the king, 'The man who consumed us and planned to destroy us, so that we should have no place in all the territory of Israel -- ⁶let seven of his sons be handed over to us, and we will impale them before the Lord at Gibeon on the mountain of the Lord.' The king said, 'I will hand them over.'

There was a three year famine in the land and "[King David] asked the Eternal about it and found out that 'this was because of Saul...and because he put the Gibeonites to death'...the Gibeonites were a Canaanite tribe mentioned in the Book of Joshua..." The Gibeonites were slaves in Israel, and Saul "sought to strike at them in his zeal for Israel." When David asked God as to why there is a famine in the land, God responded that the famine is the result of an "unredressed" injustice: namely, the extermination of the Gibeonites by Saul. Atonement therefore needs to be done for the injustice and violence done by Saul to the Gibeonite people (2 Samuel 21:1). David decides to rectify the situation. Levinas tells us, by way of his commentary, "[The Gibeonites] complained to David that King Saul had made their presence on the land of Israel impossible, that he had persecuted them and had tried to destroy them.

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⁶³⁴ Levinas, "Toward the Other: From the tractate Yoma, Pp. 85a-85b," in Nine Talmudic Readings, (trans.) Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), 22-29, hereafter NT; the following quotes in this section are from pp. 25-29 unless otherwise noted.

They want neither gold nor silver. No compensations!" But what they do ask for is far more dramatic: "seven of Saul's descendants...they will put them to death by nailing them to the rock on the Mountain of Saul. And David answers: I shall give them."

What insights from the Talmudic commentary on 2 Samuel 21 may help us understand the lesson behind such a radical gesture? Levinas reports: "[b]ut here is what the Talmud has to say about it (tractate *Yebamot*, pp. 58b-59a)" -- after searching the land for signs of "idolatry" and "debauchery" there seems to be a "more secret" reason for the famine. David concluded, "[t]here must be a political wrong here, an injustice not caused by private individuals" but a wrong committed by a nation against a community of stranger(s). Levinas explains,

The Talmud also knows the fault of Saul toward the Gibeonites, for which we cannot find a trace in the Bible...[i]n executing the priests of Nov, Saul left the Gibeonites who served them without a means of subsistence. The Midrash affirms that the crime of extermination begins before murders take place, the oppression and economic uprooting already indicate its beginnings, that the laws of Nuremberg already contain the seeds of the "final solution."

Genocide's originary act of destroying otherness -- religious, ethnic and otherwise -- is the imposition of limitation(s) by the state on basic human rights, especially of a minority community. Whenever the state engages in such behavior they reduce themselves to totalitarianism.

Against this horizon, Levinas leaves us with the question, in regards to the princes of Saul's household who were given over to the Gibeonites, "does one have the right to punish children for the faults of their parents?" The Talmud's answer: "it is better that a letter of the Torah be damaged than that the name of the Eternal be profaned." But does this mean a return to the cruelty of the *lex talionis*? Is 'an eye

⁶³⁵ Ibid., 27.

for an eye' justice ever an appropriate response? 636 Levinas would want to conclude by way of the Talmudic commentary, "[t]o punish children for the faults of their parents is less dreadful than to tolerate impunity when the stranger is injured. Let the passerby know this: in Israel, princes die a horrible death because strangers were injured by the sovereign. The respect for the stranger and the sanctification of the name of the Eternal are strangely equivalent."637

(8.1.3) Teshuva: The Relevance of 'Return' for Dialogue.

As we may recall, *Memory and Reconciliation* proposed the following "hypotheses":

- (i) there is the prevalent theocentrism of the Bible, which gives precedence to the acknowledgement, whether individual or national, of the faults committed against God.
- (ii) [t]he experiences of maltreatment suffered by Israel at the hands of other peoples and the animosity thus aroused could also have militated against the idea of asking pardon of these peoples for the evil done to them. 638

These above hypotheses are based on the presupposition that Jews of the "Old Testament" did not "feel the need to address requests for forgiveness to present interlocutors" for the sins committed by their leaders. Our Levinasian reading of 2 Samuel 21 and tractate Yebamot challenges hypotheses (i) and (ii).

First of all, the very presupposition from which the above hypotheses are derived is problematic. When David finds out from the Eternal that the cause of the famine has something to do with the injustice done to the 'strangers' he directly addresses his 'present interlocutors' as a way of both (a) ending the famine, and (b) doing atonement. In so doing, David -- the leader of that present generation -- does

⁶³⁶ Talion (lex talionis, "law of retaliation") is a term for a punishment equal to the offense. It is derived from Genesis 9:6, "Whoever sheds a man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." Most talions were abolished in Talmudic times (BK 8. 1) on the grounds that "an eye for an eye" is only superficial justice, i.e., an eye for an eye may be stronger than the other, but nonetheless it was ultimately accepted that the measure by which man measures is the measure by which he will be measured (Sat. 1. 7) from John Bowker, The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 944: <www.themystica.com/mystica/articles/t/talion.html> on 16 February 2006. 637 Levinas, NT, 25-29.

⁶³⁸ Memory and Reconciliation.

teshuva with both God and a foreign people. He makes amends for the sins of their father and leader, Saul, by directly engaging with his 'present interlocutors' the Gibeonites.

In regards to hypothesis (i) while it may be argued that there is a prevalent "theocentrism" our readings tell us that there is also a rather dominant anthropocentrism: a concern for the rights and justice of the stranger. Again, God prompts David to leave the Temple and engage in the project of teshuva: "David said to the Gibeonites, 'What must I do for you and how must I make atonement, that you may bless the inheritance of the LORD?' (2 Samuel 21:3)."

In regards to hypothesis (ii) there clearly exists animosity in the relationship between the Israelites and the Gibeonites. After all, the Gibeonites are not necessarily the most honest interlocutors. Let us recall, from The Book of Joshua: the Gibeonites went to Joshua at Gilgal, and falsely represented themselves as 'friends of the Lord' from distant lands rather than revealing their status as Canaanites. Joshua hastily took their word, and swore by the Lord God an oath with the Gibeonites. In so doing they gained the protection of Israel from the other Canaanite kings and armies. When the Gibeonite deception was discovered, Joshua still honored his agreement, for the Lord expected Joshua to honor His name by honoring the agreement (Joshua 9). The Gibeonites remained under the protection of Israel but they remained as indentured servants within the sanctuary, working for people like the priests of Nov. Later on in the relationship, for reasons unknown to us, Saul first strikes down the priests of Nov (tractate Yoma), and then "exterminates" the Gibeonites (2 Samuel 21:5). In sum, there would appear to be grounds for concluding that there was a healthy level of "animosity" between the two peoples that "militated against the idea" of Israel "asking pardon" from the Gibeonites. And yet, David recognizes a wrong done to a

people by the nation, and in a rather dramatic scene, Israel "gives up" its own princes, to be crucified to a rock, for the faults perpetrated by Saul:

[The Gibeonites] said to the king, As for the man who was exterminating us and who intended to destroy us that we might have no place in all the territory of Israel, let seven men from among his descendants be given to us...[t]he king replied, 'I will give them up' (2 Samuel 21:5-6).

Our contemporary milieu, theological and otherwise, rightly condemns the *lex talionis* of retributive justice, and one will please excuse the graphic nature of the above example. And yet, when set against the *tremendum* horizon of the *Shoah*, where "good and evil, that were once as real as day and night, have become a blurred mist," 639 -- against such a backdrop, one is required to come to a more sober appreciation of what is at stake when society is heedless to both the welcome of the stranger, and the importance of atoning for wrongs done against both strangers and friends. The Jewish doctrinal tradition radicalizes atonement wherein, as Levinas argued, 'the respect for the stranger and the sanctification of the name of the Eternal are strangely equivalent'.

The Talmud (and Midrash) is therefore accomplishing two very important tasks for our reflections: (1) it continues the process of handing down the Biblical story into the present time, while concomitantly (2) revealing for post-*Shoah* Jews and Christians how this narrative-memory, and our empathy with this memory, may have a contemporary relevance.

Contemporary Catholicism has been challenged in recent years to acknowledge the 'sins of the fathers'. What is constitutive to this acknowledgement for a Post-*Shoah* Jewish-Christian dialogue? We have been arguing that a return to empathy may be part of this acknowledgment. Where empathy means, as we considered with Stein and Heschel, a dialectically sensitive way of relating sameness

⁶³⁹ Heschel, "The Meaning of this Hour," MQG, 147-151; 149.

to otherness for, as we considered with Halpern in chapter 7, '[t]he work of empathy is precisely trying to imagine a view of the world that one does not share, and in fact may find it quite difficult to share.' But "even this element of distinctiveness and mutual exclusiveness, even this distancing", Levenson argues, "can be a source of closeness in its own paradoxical way. For the Jewish and the Christian midrashim, different as they are in so many ways, also have profound points of contact." ⁶⁴¹

It strikes us that in *a dialogue of atonement* not every word needs to be a constant apology. Yet, the 'I'm sorry' only becomes authentic in the deed. The deed of the righteous welcome of the interreligious other, the 'face-to-face' that issues forth in *tiqqun* 'olam, may be a profound point of contact. This way of dialoguing may mean fewer words, humbler words -- where my 'welcome' of the other is conveyed in a willingness to listen. Yet this *return* (*teshuva*) to *dia*-logue is the practical work of empathy. Before we move further in considering how atonement may be constituent to the welcome of the other (8.3), let us engage with a phenomenology of welcome as drawn from the Hebrew Scriptures (Genesis 18: 1 – 8). 643

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⁶⁴⁰ Halpern, "Rehumanizing the Other," 581.

⁶⁴¹ Jon D. Levenson, "Can Catholicism Validate Jewish Biblical Interpretation?" *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations*, 1 (2005): 170-185; 179: http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art19 accessed on 1 February 2008.

⁶⁴² Edward Kessler, "Less Sinned Against Than Sinning," *The Tablet* (26 September 2009): 8-9; 9: "True repentance is no mere momentary spasm of remorse to be proclaimed in front of the cameras. Repentance must influence and leave its mark in terms of character, action and life. True repentance ends with a life change which must be based upon a real transformation rather than a flimsy but eloquent public apology."

⁶⁴³ See: Palmisano, *The Kenotic '(Inter)givenness' of Mission: An essay exploring 21st century missionary praxis through the dialogical horizon of Martin Royackers, SJ (1959-2001) and the local church of Annotto Bay, Jamaica.* STL Dissertation (Dublin: Milltown Institute Pontifical Athenaeum, April 2007).

(8.2) Philoxenia: Welcoming the Stranger.

The Lord appeared to Abraham by the oaks of Mamre, as he sat at the entrance of his tent in the heat of the day. ²He looked up and saw three men standing near him. When he saw them, he ran from the tent entrance to meet them, and bowed down to the ground. ³He said, "My lord, if I find favor with you, do not pass by your servant. ⁴Let a little water be brought, and wash your feet, and rest yourselves under the tree. ⁵Let me bring a little bread, that you may refresh yourselves, and after that you may pass on -- since you have come to your servant." So they said, "Do as you have said." ⁶And Abraham hastened into the tent to Sarah, and said, "Make ready quickly three measures of choice flour, knead it, and make cakes." ⁷Abraham ran to the herd, and took a calf, tender and good, and gave it to the servant, who hastened to prepare it. ⁸Then he took curds and milk and the calf that he had prepared, and set it before them; and he stood by them under the tree while they ate.

We pause here to remember a 'portrait' of Jewish welcoming of the stranger. It is a portrait where the *(em)pathos* of God - a metaphoricity as Heschel tells us - means 'no one is ever alone', is painted for us in vivid colors. We find this vignette in none other of a place than "[i]n the beginning..." (*Bereshit*) of the *Torah*. Genesis 18:1-8:

Abraham and Sarah's welcoming of the three 'strangers'. This portrait may give us a necessary appreciation for how the passionate drama between God and a people reveals a covenant of empathy and righteousness. 645

The three visitors "materialize in front of Abraham's tent as if from nowhere." Abraham is at first "startled" by their appearance. But the "generosity" of his hospitality in running to slaughter a choice calf (v. 7), and presenting Sarah's finest cakes at table (v. 6) only becomes "enhanced by [Abraham's] attempt to disparage his efforts" -- (vv. 4-5: *a little water...a little bread*). 646

The biblical term for the kind of hospitality Abraham is showing may be translated "as an 'ingathering of travelers." And the *ingathering* of these three guests (v. 2) widens empathy through a generous welcome. Abraham and Sarah, and the

rooted in Israel's passion for God - in the dual sense of a passion for God and a suffering unto God." ⁶⁴⁶ E.A. Speiser, *Genesis. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary,* The Anchor Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), 128-131; 131.

Genesis 18:1-8, *NRSV Online*: http://bible.oremus.org accessed on 5 November 2007.

Metz, *A Passion for God*, 121-132; 127: "What later comes to be named biblical monotheism is

entire household, enrapture these 'strange' others "into a circle of compassion and concern, where they nourish them with both food and kindness. Hospitality is timely, gracious, and abundant. It is undiscriminating and welcomes all who come."647 Abraham and Sarah welcome these 'others' as if they are welcoming God. And yet, it is only later in the dialogue when Abraham has the 'aha!' moment and realizes the supernatural identity of his welcomed guests:

...it dawns on the host (vs. 10) that the ' $^ad\bar{o}n\bar{i}$ (approximately 'sir'...) to whom he had been speaking is no mere mortal; and vs. 14 shows him to be Yahweh himself, so that now Abraham can address him deferentially as 'adonay' the Lord'. 648

But this 'aha' is entirely different for the reader. Verse 1 unhesitatingly informs us who visited the household: " $^ad\bar{o}n\bar{a}y$ " or 'the Lord' appeared to Abraham. The reader/worshipper enters the text always already aware that it is 'the Lord' visiting Israel. Indeed, the reader inaugurates a process of anamnesis with the text by remembering with Abraham the visit of 'the Lord', and this anamnesis issues forth in a kenosis of oneself. Through an Einfühlung with the text one comes to experience and 'feel' something new in the *present* from what is being told from the past. That is to say, we are told "from the start that Yahweh is present" while concomitantly being invited "to share Abraham's uncertainty and thus re-enact the patriarch's experience" -- such is the anamnesic intentionality of the text. 649 Through our *remembrancing* with the text we come to 'feel-with' the experience of loving concern being experienced as the perichoretic *inter-gathering* of 'the Lord' ("dōnāy) with God's own beloved.

What Abraham is doing through this 'in gathering of travelers' is giving back to God God's very own givenness of compassion e.g., "[t]he Talmud associates the

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⁶⁴⁷ Sarah Schwartzberg, "Abraham's Hospitality to Strangers (Genesis 18): A Model for Interreligious Dialogue," Monastic Interreligious Dialogue Bulletin 79 (July 2007): http://www.monasticdialog .com> accessed on 3 November 2007.

⁶⁴⁸ Speiser, Genesis, 131. 649 Ibid.

quality of *chesed* with Abraham. Those who hold fast to the covenant of Abraham are to be 'bestowers of lovingkindness' (B. Talmud Kethubot 8b)."⁶⁵⁰ In receiving hospitality God also *undergoes* a concern and responds in love. Heschel is instructive on this point, reminding us of what is ultimately attributive of God:

When the soul of man is asked: What is God to you? there is only one answer that survives all theories which we carry to the grave: He is full of compassion. The Tetragrammaton, the great Name, we do not know how to pronounce, but we are taught to know what it stands for: 'compassion'...[o]nly one attribute is reserved for God: he alone is called in the Bible *rahum* the Merciful One.⁶⁵¹

Indeed, Genesis 18: 1 - 8 invites our iteration: we watch, name and ultimately reenact this ebb and flow of mutual concern through the givenness of empathy.

One great work of Christian religious art based on Genesis 18: 1 – 8, Andrei Rublev's (1360-1430) icon *Old Testament Trinity*, has come to be regarded as an eloquent way for conveying this sense of *rahum* (see: Appendix 4).⁶⁵² In the icon three angels appear at table, their figures are "supple and graceful," and their "flowing gestures and delicately inclined heads imply a sense of profound unanimity and universal love." The icon has come to be known by its more interreligiously sensitive title "Philoxenia" which means "the love of and hospitality to strangers (in contrast to xenophobia, hatred of strangers)." In the icon one comes 'face to face' with the three angels sitting around a table. The three faces 'make space', as it were, for the 'other' at the table. They invite 'me' to come and break bread.⁶⁵³

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⁶⁵⁰ Schwartzberg, "Abraham's Hospitality to Strangers".

⁶⁵¹ Heschel, *MNA*, 148: "The term is probably related to the word rehem, womb, and may have the connotation of motherly love. In the Babylonian Talmud, Rahmana, the Merciful One, is frequently used to denote both God and Scripture, Law, or the word of God. The Law *is* Mercy."

⁶⁵² Solrunn Nes, *The Mystical Language of Icons* (Fairfax, Va: Eastern Christian Publications, 2004), 36-37; 37: "Abraham took good care of his guests; he practiced the virtue of hospitality (in Greek *philoxenia*) by receiving strangers in a friendly way...this event can be interpreted as a prefiguration of the Holy Trinity. The divine mystery which unfolds in the relationship between the three persons of the Godhead – Father, Son, and Holy Spirit – was revealed to Abraham in the form of three visitors....Man, who is created in the image of the Trinity, is thus a relational being, created with the ability to go beyond himself [herself] and love others."

⁶⁵³ Richard Harries, *Art and the Beauty of God: A Christian Understanding* (London: Continuum, 2005), 117-133; 126, 129.

Through the intentionality of the icon the "human gaze is engulfed," i.e., 'I' am changed by what sees 'me' -- for when 'we' contemplate the icon 'we' *exchange* 'our' gaze "for the gaze that iconistically envisages us." ⁶⁵⁴ Through this exchange 'I' become part of a dialogical nexus -- "we are invited into the divine life itself, to share it and *reflect* it." ⁶⁵⁵ In the *Philoxenia*, 'my' eyes meet the eyes of the three angels. They are calling me into table fellowship, and teaching 'me' through this relationality how to contemplate and *reflect* a divine concern in the world: "the icon regards us -- it *concerns* us, in that it allows the intention of the invisible to occur visibly" through us. ⁶⁵⁶

The intentionality of Genesis 18: 1 – 8 therefore undergoes a 'reversal' through Rublev's icon. The three visitors, in the language of the icon, appear to be the ones doing the welcoming, and they invite the new interlocutor; namely, 'me' -- as if I were Abraham or Sarah -- to come and sit with them. This is an interesting change of perspective. The icon opens up the possibility that any one may take the position of the dinner guest. Heschel comments the following on the phenomenological intentionality of a great work of art:

The fact is that we do not turn to art in order to gratify, but in order to foster interests and feelings. A work of art introduces us to emotions which we have never cherished before...Great works produce rather than satisfy needs by giving the world fresh craving. By expressing things we were not even aware of, works of art inspire new ends, anticipated visions. 657

Indeed, there is little doubt Rublev's *Philoxenia* renews and gives 'the world fresh craving' for a more genuine and radical *remembrance for*, and *self-emptying towards*, one another in hospitality. And yet, one still has to wonder -- in a constructively critical way, what happens to Abraham and Sarah in the icon? Abraham and Sarah, as

⁶⁵⁴ Marion, GB, 19.

⁶⁵⁵ Harries, Art and the Beauty of God, 129, italics added.

⁶⁵⁶ Marion, GB, 19.

⁶⁵⁷ Heschel, MNA, 218.

if "two in one flesh," -- who show "the ultimate form of hospitality in their readiness to listen" to their visitors -- what happens to their 'faces'?⁶⁵⁸ Do we run the risk of obfuscating *who* is doing the original inviting to table? Is it the three visitors?

Let us recall from the text of Genesis 18: 1 - 8: Abraham and Sarah show hospitality to God who arrives as a stranger. This is a subtle point and easy to glance over: Abraham and Sarah are 'gathering-in' God! The narrative reveals for us, as Christians and Jews, how to welcome a God who may be found in every 'strange' face. The humanity of Abraham and Sarah accomplishes the divine welcome of the stranger, it is nothing less than "an interweaving of divine and human empathy." 660

This is all to say, do we run the risk of forgetting the drama of the human event in Genesis 18: 1 – 8 and subtly, maybe even unconsciously, substitute a Christian Trinitarian dogma? This raises for us a necessary aide memoire: what may be iconic for the Christian may be idolic for the Jew. Judaism rejects and challenges the reification of God i.e., "[i]t is not with a sense of pride that we recall the making of the Golden Calf, nor do we condemn as an act of vandalism the role of Moses in beating it into pieces and grinding it very small, 'until it was as a fine dust'...[n]othing is more alien to the spirit of Judaism than the veneration of images." An idolic intentionality actualizes itself whenever a controlling desire attempts "to put our hands on the divine, to permanently place it at our disposal, to

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⁶⁵⁸ David N. Power, "Hospitality and Inter-faith Exchange," *Doctrine and Life* 57/9 (November 2007): 42-46; 43.

⁶⁵⁹ Claus Westermann, "Genesis 18:1-16a: Abraham and the Three Guests," in *Genesis 12-36: A Commentary* (London: SPCK, 1986), 272-82; 276-77: "The visit of a stranger could be of vital, decisive importance for the one visited. The stranger comes from another world and has a message from it. This is the starting point of a great number of narratives in which an event is set in motion by one coming from afar..."

⁶⁶⁰ See the recent pastoral application/consideration of Trinitarian relationality in Paul S. Fiddes, *Participating in God: a Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2000), 208.

⁶⁶¹ Heschel, MQG, 115-144; 123.

have it enslaved (and at the same time to be enslaved by it)." The idol may therefore wield the power of shifting one's direction away from an engagement with otherness in our removal, or 'disposal', of God's otherness. The otherness in the world -- all of us who, some more than others, are in need of time, care and attention -- remain forgotten in so far as the intentionality of the idol accomplishes itself.⁶⁶³ Idolic intentionality has the power to trap the ego and collapse *philoxenia*. From this, the negative strophe of the *cogito* may easily arise, and make possible a self-isolating modus vivendi: what 'I think,' 'I want,' 'I know' is all that really matters in so far as 'I' attain what 'I' want. A closed amnesic system, a totalizing ideology, is born from the eidolon and its structure. 664

Hebrew religiosity does resist, as we considered above, the reification of the divine. One nevertheless wonders if this qualifies every re-presentation of the divine as idolic so as to subtly introduce a false dichotomy or distance between immanence and transcendence? Here Blenkinsopp may be critically instructive to the above position(s) on idolic intentionality:

662 Chauvet, Symbol, 216-218; 217.

⁶⁶³ Heschel, The Sabbath, (intro.) Susannah Heschel (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2005), 5: "The memorial becomes an aid to amnesia; the means stultify the end. For things of space are at the mercy of man. Though too sacred to be polluted, they are not too sacred to be exploited. To retain the holy, to perpetuate the presence of god, his image is fashioned. Yet a god who can be fashioned, a god who can be confined, is but a shadow of a man."

⁶⁶⁴ Levinas argues persuasively in AT, 32: how a "closed" and impersonal epistemology is opened up and widened through the face of the other. Levinas says: "[t]he responsibility for the other is not reducible to a thought going back to an idea given in the past to the 'I think' and rediscovered by it. The natural conatus essendi of a sovereign I is put in question before the face of the other...[T]he responsibility for the other signified -- as an order -- in the face of the neighbour is not in me a simple modality of the 'transcendental apperception."

An image can focus the energy and concentrate the attention of a group engaged in common worship. It can give concrete expression to the sense of the real presence of the divinity. That the sense of divine presence fills a powerful and understandable human need can be seen in the incident of the Golden Calf (Exod 32-34). Like any other expression of religious sentiment or conviction, an image is subject to abuse and can degenerate into superstition, but a religion that claims to dispense with such assurances of divine presence expressed by physical symbols can also end up being heartless, cruel and monomaniacally fanatical. 665

While Hebrew sensibility does tell us God's intentionality may not be 'constrained' in the sense of being demanded or 'manufactured,' it wants to concomitantly maintain that one's way of receiving the *Invisible* may not be so easily divisible into two categorically opposed modes of apprehension: either complete presence or complete absence. 666 For example, while the calf is supposedly idolatrous, the ark (and tabernacle, meeting tent) is not. Why so? The symbolic intentionality of the ark metaphor reveals how the manufacturer's intention is not to dis-place God or substitute the ark for God. Yet the ark, as a 'concrete expression,' does 'focus' and 'concentrate' the energy of Israel to God. The ark, and the tabernacle, is a symbolically rich nexus whereby God comes into a mediated contact with humanity as presence and absence: "[t]hen the cloud covered the Tent of Meeting, and the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle (Exodus 40:34)." Divine self-communication, in so far as divinity has something to 'say' as a presence-in-the-world, is mediating itself through a symbolic order. That is to say, God's presence and availability to humanity does "make sense in a ritual context" -- and this context "gives expression to and draws the worshiper into a world of symbolic meanings."667 Heschel would seem to corroborate Blenkinsopp's point. Heschel argues,

⁶⁶⁵ Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah, 40-55: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible, vol. 19a (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 234-243; 241.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.: "[t]he dictionary definition of idolatry as 'the worship of a physical object as a god' very clearly implies that the term is prejudicial and that it entails a subjective and, more often than not, false judgement on certain religious expressions." ⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

What is the purpose and justification of symbolism? It is to serve as a meeting place of the spiritual and the material, of the invisible and the visible. Judaism, too, had such a meeting place -- in a qualified sense -- in the Sanctuary. Yet in its history the point of gravity was shifted from space to time, and instead of a place of meeting came a moment of meeting; the meeting is not a thing but a deed.⁶⁶⁸

But Heschel's position also creatively extends Blenkinsopp's thesis: we would do well to concern ourselves less with the place, and more with what happens at the place -- the happening itself is decisive for Judaism. It is a meeting, a face to face, where something is being said through an event. Judaism is an event –a history–"God manifested himself in events rather than in things, and those events were never captured or localized in things." The event of hospitality not only "takes precedence even over prayer and spiritual exercises" in scripture but it is also "closely associated with the covenant that God made with Abraham." If hospitality to strangers is regarded as "a covenantal responsibility" then it "must be understood in the context of social justice and right relationships." The theophanic givenness does not overwhelm because the Other's gaze comes to 'me' from the face of the 'stranger' (Genesis 18: 1-8), and asks 'me' to respond in justice and righteousness to their call. Are not then the strophic movements of immanence and transcendence, one subtending the other, in a more subtle dialectical tension in the event, in the encounter?

While the cultivation of a new "gnoseological humility" and re-focusing "on what we do not know" gives "the long tradition of apophatic or negative theology" a necessary aggiornamento, the kenosis of oneself towards a world of otherness, through an everyday teshuva-inspired solidarity i.e., an 'at-one-ment' that is the very openness to suffering with and for the other, may be an 'icon' for a renewed

⁶⁶⁸ Heschel, MOG, 139.

⁶⁷⁰ Schwartzberg, "Abraham's Hospitality to Strangers".

'philoxenia' between Christians and Jews. 671 This is why Heschel may argue the "purpose of ritual art" in Judaism "is not to inspire love of God but to enhance our love of doing a mitzvah" –the right and the good act for another. 672 It would be altogether easy to forget that Genesis 18: 1-8 *does* convey the *human* drama of God's encounter with a people if we were to concentrate solely on the intentionality of Rublev's icon.

Heschel echoes the rabbis in retrieving Judaism's way of 'holding' the *imago*Dei within the subtle dialectic of immanence and transcendence: "in the biblical tradition, God was not immured in a conception of absolute transcendence. The Lord who created the world manifests His presence within the world. He is concerned with man and is present in history...[f]undamental to biblical belief is a tradition of theophanies in which God's power and love become active and apparent in history," and it is "within the tradition of theophanies in which God approaches man in decisive moments in history (Gen. 12:7: 18:1; 26:2; 32:31; Exod. 3:16; 24:10; 33:11, 23...)." What does this have to do with *teshuva*? In this 'divine approach' towards humanity we experience the narrative unfolding of a portrait of empathy where the centerpiece of the relationship between God and others is repentance and atonement. Making a return (*teshuva*) to the other through welcoming the stranger is a form of atonement whereby fulfilling repentance means "direct[ing]...penitential energy towards acts of goodness." In this sense, the fulfillment of atonement is already contained within genuine acts of repentance. And genuine acts of repentance are

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⁶⁷¹ Scanlon, "The Postmodern Debate," 233; *cf.* Stein's praxis as detailed in Chapter 6.

⁶⁷² Heschel, MQG, 123.

⁶⁷³ Heschel, *Prophets*, 465 – 66.

⁶⁷⁴ Kessler, "Less Sinned Against Than Sinning," 9.

ratified through the authentic action of righteousness towards others. This fulfillment of the covenantal responsibility in justice and right relationships aids in the repair of a fragmented world (*tiqqun 'olam*): Rabbi Meir, a follower of Rabbi Akiva, teaches, "So great is the act of repentance, that if but a single person repents, God pardons not only him but the sins of the world." This reverberation of empathy in the righteous welcome of the stranger, as being a form of *teshuva*, is particularly evocative in the midrashim concerning the theophany of Exodus 33: 23. To this consideration we now turn.

(8.3) Adonai's Immanence in Atonement.

Heschel, in further sharpening our considerations with Levinas on *teshuva*, tells us that the "accepted view" in Jewish teaching is that "the pardon of sins" consists "of two elements, repentance and atonement, each distinct from the other. Repentance was a human responsibility" while atonement is God's responsibility. Repentance is a necessary "precondition to atonement" for "one cannot achieve atonement unless he first repented". Heschel reports that the prophets are "unanimous" on the link between repentance-atonement: "atonement cannot be achieved without repentance. Hosea's call to Israel was: 'Return, O Israel, to the Lord your God' (Hosea 14:2)."

Heschel situates the question of repentance and atonement by reflecting with an *aggadah* (homily/wisdom-story teaching) on the theophany of Exodus 33: 22 -

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⁶⁷⁵ Sifra Emor 102a: "The sin offering, the guilt offering, death, and Yom Kippur do not bring atonement without repentance"; *BT Berakhot* 23a: "Be not like those fools who sin and bring their offerings but do not repent", in Heschel, *TMH*, 181.

⁶⁷⁶ BT Yoma 86B in Heschel, TMH, 180-181.

⁶⁷⁷ Heschel, *TMH*, 181.

23.⁶⁷⁸ The question is: how may we "use the terms 'back' and 'face' when referring to God? Is it not written, 'I fill heaven and earth, said the Lord' (Jeremiah 23: 24) or 'His glory fills the whole earth' (Isaiah 6:3)? How can we reconcile such lofty prophetic concepts with 'seeing God's back but not his face"?⁶⁷⁹ Rabbi Akiva "did not doubt that Moses saw God's likeness." Indeed, the Akivan school of interpretation holds that "when Moses declaimed the Torah, he was in heaven; and that the divine glory descended upon Mount Sinai."⁶⁸⁰

The following ninth century *aggadah* from the text *Pinkie de-Rabbi Eliezer* attempts to respond to, and elaborate on, the theophany of God's revelation to Moses on the Day of Atonement (Exodus 33:23):

Moses said that on Yom Kippur he will see the glory of the Holy and Blessed One. How did Moses know this? He said, "Master of the Universe, show me your glory" (Exodus 33:18). Whereupon God answered, "You cannot see My glory, lest you die...[but] because of My name which I made known to you, I shall agree to your request. Stand at the entrance of the cave and I shall cause all my ministering angels to pass before you, as it is written, 'I will make all My goodness to pass before you.' When you hear the Name that I have made known to you, I shall be standing there before you. Exert all your strength and stand firmly, do not be afraid." When the angels heard this, they spoke up before the Holy and Blessed One. "We minister to You day and night; yet we are not permitted to see Your glory! Yet this man, born of woman, dares to demand to see your glory!" The angels rose in anger and dismay against Moses to kill him. He was near to death when the Holy and Blessed One appeared in a cloud, covered him with the palm of his hand, and saved him. When the Holy and Blessed One had passed, He drew back His hand, and Moses saw the back of the Shekinah.⁶⁸¹

Set against the horizon of Yom Kippur, the *aggadah* conveys a sense of God's desire to show mercy for the "sin of the calf" as a healer and saver of life. Having

⁶⁸¹ Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer [hereafter PRE] 46 in Heschel, TMH, 307.

⁶⁷⁸ Exodus 33: 22-23: (v. 22) When my glory passes I will set you in the hollow of the rock and will cover you with my hand until I have passed by. (v. 23) Then I will remove my hand, so that you may see my back; but my face is not to be seen.

⁶⁷⁹ MI Shirata 4, in Heschel, TMH, 306.

⁶⁸⁰ Heschel, TMH, 307.

⁶⁸² Footnote [24] in Heschel, *TMH*, 307-308: "The reference to Yom Kippur in this aggadah is based on the idea -- bolstered in several rabbinic texts by a (nearly, but not quite, exact) chronology of Moses' three forty-day stays on Mount Sinai -- that Moses descended from the mountain for the third time on the tenth of Tishri, carrying the second tablets and announcing God's forgiveness of the sin of the calf. That day became Yom Kippur, because it was the first act of forgiveness by God for the people as a

heard the repentant cries of Moses for the sin of the people (Exodus 32), God desires to draw near to Moses on the day of atonement: 'I shall be standing there before you'. This incites the jealousy of the angels. The would-be ministers of the Lord's 'goodness' become envious: 'we are not permitted to see Your glory! Yet this man, born of woman, dares to demand to see your glory'. The angels attack Moses; unable to 'stand firmly', he collapses and is near death. God's response is one of protection and healing: 'the Holy and Blessed One appeared in a cloud, covered him with the palm of his hand, and saved him'. In healing and forgiveness, God honors the "personal distinctiveness" of the prophet over and against the murderous intent of covetous angels, thus elevating the personhood of Moses that extends to all of Israel. 684

Edith Stein's reflections on Elijah's praxis echoes this dynamic of the 'face-toface': The Lord is made known to those who take seriously the project of teshuva. And, in this being made known, in 'standing before the face' of God, one is called to righteously stand for the other:

whole. Moses' beholding God with immediacy on the first Yom Kippur can be seen as being reenacted to some extent by the High Priest entering behind the veil of the Holy of Holies on subsequent Yom

Kippurs."

⁶⁸³ Stein, *PA*, 400-401; 401: "It cannot be proven rationally that there cannot be two men alike. But arguments can be given from faith. If each angel represents it own species, its specific (=individual) distinctiveness should obviously be seen as a bonum [good]. Various reasons are given for this, but the primary one is that angels are created in God's image -- as are all creatures, but they in a privileged way. But as creatures they can resemble [nachbilden], not the whole of divine being but only a ray thereof. This is why a diversity of specifically different creatures can reflect more of the divine being than a plurality of like creatures...The privileged way in which man was created in God's image, stressed in the creation account, also suggests man's distinction, that every man in his peculiarity was to reflect a ray of divine essence, that his personal distinctiveness -- now in its full sense as quale [p.400: "the specific mode of his being: as he himself is as himself.], openness, and power -- is the special 'talent' that God gave each particular man to take him into life...This gift represents man's highest nobility -- higher still than his general privilege of being endowed with reason since this gift brings each man into a quite personal relationship with God...'

⁶⁸⁴ Heschel, *TMH*, 309: "The superiority that Moses had over the angels, in that he was privileged to behold the Divine Presence, was shared by the people of Israel. In various midrashim it is pointed out that when the ministering angels sang their hymns of praise to God they did so in a loud voice. Why because they were a great distance removed from the Holy and Blessed One and did not know where He was, as it is written, 'Blessed is the Divine Glory in His Place' (Ezekiel 3:12). But when the people of Israel stand in prayer they know that God is near to them, as it is written, 'He stands at the right hand of the needy' (Psalm 109:31)."

Elijah stands before God's face because all love belongs to the Lord...Elijiah's zeal to serve God tears him apart: 'I am filled with jealous zeal for the Lord, the God of hosts' (1 Kgs 19:10, 14...). By living penitentially, he atones for the sins of his time. The offense that the misguided people give to the Lord by their manner of worship hurts him so much that he wants to die. And the Lord consoles him only as he consoles his especially chosen ones: He himself appears to Elijah on a lonely mountain, reveals himself in the soft rustling after a thunderstorm, and announces his will to him in clear words...[The prophet] stands before God's face...awaiting his sign, always ready to serve. [The prophet] has no other will than the will of [the] Lord...When God wills it, [the prophet] leaves the country at the threat of violence; but [the prophet] also returns at God's command, though the danger has not disappeared.

The Lord's face-to-face 'consolation' to Elijah comes gently. The revelation of God's will is the very 'face' of the Other. Heschel and Stein's perspectives are disarming in how they presuppose a divine-human proximity between Moses, and later Elijah, that is intimate, restorative and empowering of the prophet: "Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Judah, and Rabbi Simeon were all quoted as saying, "The righteous are greater than the ministering angels." There is an ethical heightening of humanity's status in the near-moment of coming 'face-to-face'. The prophetic witness is called to be God-like in recreating God's righteousness for others. In turning to Maimonides, Heschel concludes:

[W]e are required to be more scrupulous with the commandment of charity than with any other positive commandment, for charity is emblematic of the righteous descendants of Father Abraham, as it says: "for I have singled him out, that he may instruct his children and his posterity to keep the way of the Lord by doing what is just" (Genesis 18:19). Jewish sovereignty and the true faith itself can only endure through charity, as it says: "you shall be established through righteousness" (Isaiah 54:14). Through charity alone will Israel be redeemed, as it says: "Zion shall be saved by her justice, her repentant ones by righteousness" (Isaiah 1:27).

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⁶⁸⁵ Stein, *The Hidden Life: Essays, Meditations, Spiritual Texts*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 4, (eds.) L. Gelber and M. Linssen, (trans.) Waltraut Stein (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1992), 1-6; 2, hereafter *HL*.

⁶⁸⁶ Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer (ed. Enelow) p. 292; Midrash Haggadol to Genesis, (ed.) Margaliot, pp. 571ff, in Heschel, *TMH*, 777-778.

⁶⁸⁷ Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, "Laws Concerning Gifts to the Poor," 10:1, in *TMH*, 777-778.

Heschel tells us that what charity means in this instance (lest it be viewed through the lens of Christianity's *caritas*) is *tzedakah*. Tzedakah accomplishes the righteous act. The righteous person, the 'Tzaddik' responds to the call of justice by responding to the Other in need. "According to Rabbenu Asher, 'The Holy and Blessed One values more those commandments through which the needs of people are satisfied than those that are strictly between a person and the Creator."

This *tzedakah*, or righteousness, is made superbly explicit through the event of *teshuva*. It is a righteousness grounded in the empathic movements of renewing solidarity with others through a repentance that threatens all that is hateful. Our reflections on the theory and praxis of empathy in Stein's own theory and praxis in life and death, as *read through* Heschel's thesis of pathos, has borne out the thesis that the prophet's face-to-face encounter with God may necessarily mean 'returning to a country' in the midst of violence: "Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said, 'Just as Yom Kippur atones for man's sins, so does the death of the righteous." Righteousness and atonement are intimately linked -- giving us a way of proceeding with others in dialogue and friendship.

Levinas, again as Jewish Talmudic exegete, reinforces Heschel and Stein's perspectives on the ethical significance of *teshuva* with the following commentary on the *Mishna*:

⁶⁸⁸ Danny Siegel, *Tzedakah: A Time For Change*, (ed.) Karen L. Stein (New York, NY: United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, 2007), 124: "The term 'קירע" -Tzaddik (m)...Tzadeket(f)' is often translated as 'righteous person'. Actually it frequently means a 'good person', a Mensch.' Grammatically, 'Tzedakah' and 'Tzaddik/Tzadeket' are from the same Hebrew rootp -¬- The language itself shows that there is an intimate connection between the Tzedakah-act and the persondoing-Tzedakah at any given moment."

⁶⁸⁹ Rabenu Asher [thirteenth-fourteenth century, Germany and Spain], *Commentary on Misnah Peah* 1:1, in Heschel, *TMH*, 778.

⁶⁹⁰ Leviticus Rabbah 20:12, in TMH, 181.

- (i) The trangressions of man toward God are forgiven him by the Day of Atonement:
- (ii) The transgressions against other people are not forgiven him by the Day of Atonement if he has not first appeared the other person (*Tractate Yoma* pp.85a-85b).⁶⁹¹

Levinas says in regards to (i), "my faults toward God are forgiven without my depending on his good will!" as long as one fulfills the ritual requirements of Yom Kippur. Trangressions against God by an individual is a matter to be taken up between God and that person. On the day of atonement, this God who is "other, par excellence, the other as other, the absolutely other" is also the God of all mercy and forgiveness for the one who desires to atone for his transgressions against the Other. In this sense, "my standing with this God depends only on myself. The instrument of forgiveness is in my hands." In contradistinction to (i) however, Levinas interprets (ii) in the following way: "my neighbor, my brother, man, infinitely less other than the absolutely other, is in a certain way more other than God: to obtain his forgiveness on the Day of Atonement I must first succeed in appeasing him. What if he refuses? As soon as two are involved, everything is in danger." Gillian Rose argues, in "[t]his face to face" what becomes "expressed" is nothing less than "the trace of God which is discernible in the countenance of the neighbour" It is this "proximity of the stranger – near and far – that reveals the exaltation and height of God and, equally, it reveals the command to expunge or assuage the suffering of the Other."693

In the moment of asking for forgiveness one enters the place of *dia*-logue. It is an unnerving place for at the moment of interchange 'everything is in danger': there exists the possibility of non-reception to the question, 'Will you forgive me?'

⁶⁹¹ Levinas, *NT*, 16.

⁶⁹² Ihid

⁶⁹³ Rose, "Is there a Jewish Philosophy," 16.

All the more reason why, especially in the area of interreligious dialogue, we need to dialogue with the intention of *teshuva*.

Concluding Remarks.

Irish Theologian David Power, in a brief excursus on the inter-faith significance of Abraham's welcome in Gen 18:1 – 8, argued at the 2007 Glenstal ecumenical conference that what one "learns to see, to acknowledge, to respect and ultimately to love is the difference revealed in [the] face." While scripture tells us that human beings are created a little less than the angels, the angels are never regarded in scripture with quite the same 'indisputable' *imago Dei* credentials as human beings. Indeed, the *human* 'other' who represents all that is 'strange' and 'foreign' to 'my' point of view, challenges 'me' to be -- as if like Moses or Elijah -- prophetically attentive and clear in 'my' response to them. The face of the other calls me, and my response to the call reverberates back outwards in the mode of an empathic intergivenness. This call ← → response dynamic cuts through the *chiaroscuro* of forgetfulness; 'We' begin to see the face of the other as reflecting the Face of Love in our welcome of one another. 696

The other's piercing gaze *dislodges* us, and *strikes* us more and more out of our own "chosen circle[s]". ⁶⁹⁷ The gaze from the other ultimately opens up a space

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⁶⁹⁴ Power, "Hospitality and Inter-faith Exchange," 43.

⁶⁹⁵ Gordon H. Clark, "The Image and Likeness of God," *The Trinity Review* (September-October, 1983): <www.lgmarshall.org> accessed on 11 December 2007: "If it be suggested that angels also have rational knowledge, they too must have been created in God's image and therefore man is not the only image of God. This is plausible since the *Psalms* say that man was created a little lower than the angels. But it does not militate against man's being the image of God. And further, while the Bible distinctly asserts the image in man, it does not make this assertion of angels. The creation of angels is left in obscurity, and so we too must leave it there."

⁶⁹⁶ Heschel, *MNA*, 148; see: footnote *: "It is an old rabbinic doctrine that the Tetragrammaton, usually rendered the Lord, expresses the divine attribute of love... (Sifre Deuteronomy § 27; *Pesikta*, ed. Buber, pp. 162a and 174a)."

⁶⁹⁷ Westermann, "Genesis 18:1-16a: Abraham and the Three Guests," 276-77: "[N]o one is in a hurry elsewhere in the patriarchal stories; here it is haste in the service of others: he saw...ran...bowed down...said. The following picture, the invitation, the acceptance, the entertainment is an element of early civilization whose proper meaning is for the most part misunderstood. We understand civilization

within 'me' for both encounter with the other, and anamnesis for the other.

Anamnesis coming as a kind of call, 'remember me!' is necessarily a further call to dialogue. This solidarity in Jewish-Christian memory is therefore both a dynamic call and response to one another where 'remember me' is, in effect, 'a remembering me!' In remembering what has been given to 'me' from the other I (re)empathize with this otherness, thereby creating a larger space in 'myself' for the other. Power concludes, "[w]e are not merely to respect life, to let live, but we have to let live what is different and to live in a communion with this otherness." Doing the *teshuva* work of atonement with the interreligious other, and being righteous for, as Stein might say, a 'diversity' of other faces, is the work of the contemporary prophetic witness.

We have considered *Memory and Reconciliation* through a Jewish hermeneutical lens. Far from being a relic, Jewish scriptural exegesis and commentary is a 'living present-tense memory'. To intimate that Jews do not ask for pardon from 'present interlocutors' would obscure a hermeneutics from empathy. It would be a way of distancing ourselves from the one call; from that fundamental memory of a covenant that is mysteriously built upon the pathos of an atoning love. A living Jewish tradition is a "system" worthy of respect and recognition in and of itself. This

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primarily in relation to objects (products of civilization); early civilization looks to people; civilization unfolds itself in human relationships. Secondly hospitality in modern culture is practiced by and large within a chosen circle, whereas it is available in Gen. 18 to whomever needs it." *Pierce* -- etymology: Middle English *percen*, from Anglo-French *percer*, from Vulgar Latin *pertusiare, from Latin *pertusus*, past participle of *pertundere* to perforate, from *per- through + *tundere* to beat -- more. See: <www.merriam-webster.com accessed> accessed on 6 December 2007.

⁶⁹⁸ Power, "Hospitality and Inter-faith Exchange," 43.
699 Levenson, "Can Catholicism Validate Jewish Biblical Interpretation?" 173: "...[W]e cannot deny that both the classical Jewish and classical Christian interpretations depend on the conventions of reading of their times, that both are, in a sense, midrashim, not simply the literal or plain sense (what Western Christians have traditionally termed the *sensus literalis* and Jews, the *peshat*). This means that these two systems of interpretation derive from a type of interpretation that is to some degree at odds with those types that strive to place the passage within its most immediate literary or historical context. The implication is that what validates interpretation is 'the vision of their respective faiths,' [*The Jewish People*, §62] and not simply the intentions of the biblical authors themselves, authors who, I must stress, lived before the emergence of either Christianity or rabbinic Judaism. This, in turn, implies that Judaism and Christianity are *systems*, and one cannot turn to this verse or that in order to

living tradition may correct and extend a one-sided Christian exegesis while concomitantly encouraging Jewish-Christian dialogue towards a new depth.

A phenomenology on the righteous welcome of the stranger moved us deeper still on our reflections. Listening for the excessive givenness of God -- the call of the one God of both Judaism and Christianity is nothing less than a being sensitive to the other. The righteous reception of the other is *teshuva*. It reminds Catholics that our way of doing atonement springs forth from a shared memory of being concerned with the suffering of others. This recognition opens up a space for a more radical *Einfühlung* between Catholics and Jews.

At Vatican II, the Catholic Church publicly acknowledged that the church's way of 're-membering' itself with the suffering other is "in continuity and communion" with Judaism. It strikes us that if the church's memory and remembering-structure is shared with Judaism, then any mission to the Jews, as *Nostra Aetate* promulgates, is challenged by a more expansive remembering that opens up, in even more radical terms, the possibility of a shared eschatological future. The *mystery* of a shared Jewish-Christian future only becomes a possibility through an empathic, *teshuva*-filled dialogue: "[i]n dialogue and encounter we are moved from 'eschatology' where

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score points for one's own religion at the expense of the other. Instead, the systemic reality, the architectonic structure, of each tradition must be a given for its interpreters of sacred scripture."

⁷⁰⁰ Marion, *RG*, 197: "If it is important to maintain the difference between these two calls (one Christian, the other Jewish), it is even more important to hear in them the unique word from which they both issue: "Listen, Israel, Jahweh our God, Jahweh alone" (Deuteronomy 6:4)...In fact, the call that demands "Listen!" does not pronounce *one* call among other possibilities to the benefit of a particular authority so much as it performs *the* call as such -- the call to render oneself to the call itself, with the sole intention of holding to it by exposing oneself to it."

⁷⁰¹ Carlo Maria Martini, "Reflections Towards Jewish-Christian Dialogue," in *The Catholic Church and the Jewish People*, 29-38; 37: "[i]f we Christians believe that we are in continuity and in communion with the patriarchs, those exiled to Babylon, and the Maccabean martyrs, it is necessary that this communion be realized in all possible ways. This includes communion with those Jews who began to codify the Misnah at Yavneh and redacted the Talmud at Babylon, and with those Jews who were persecuted by the Crusaders..."

we tend to hide our weaknesses, to 'humility' where our weaknesses become our only true title, because all the rest is gift."⁷⁰²

· At Vatican II, during a debate on *Nostra Aetate*, Cardinal Lercaro said that the Church's desire for a new relationship with Judaism is

...[m]uch more due to inner impulses which have come to maturity at the deepest, supernatural core of the life and consciousness of Christ's Church, quite apart from any external event and stimulus...she has only now attained a deeper insight into certain aspects of the mystery of her existence...everything that the Church has she inherited from the Jewish people...⁷⁰³

A hermeneutics from empathy is very much concerned with the eschatological question. And yet, it is a hermeneutic, as Adolfo Nicolás argues, that gives itself over to the other in 'humility', whereby our nearest approach to the future will be conditioned by how Christianity lives from the heavy memory, 'a deeper insight', that is rooted and grounded in Jewish otherness: 'everything that the Church has she inherited from the Jewish people'. Heschel argues, "[h]umility and contrition seem to be absent where most required -- in theology. But humility is the beginning and end of religious thinking, the secret test of faith. There is no truth without humility, no certainty without contrition." The echo of Jewish otherness reverberates for Christians from the depths of a radical prophetic pathos, heard with and through the Gospel of Christ's preferential option of humbly being with the marginalized and disregarded.

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⁷⁰² Nicolás, "Christianity in Crisis," 70.

⁷⁰³ John M. Oesterreicher, *The New Encounter between Christians and Jews* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1986), 203-204.

⁷⁰⁴ Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 245. Also see: Stanisław Obirek, "The Jewish Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel as a Challenge for Catholic Theology" in *Friends on The Way: Jesuits Encounter Contemporary Judaism*, (ed.) Thomas Michel (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2007), 71-82.

⁷⁰⁵ Scott Holland, "This Side of God: A Conversation with David Tracy," *Cross Currents* 52 (2002): 58-59, in Dermot Lane, *Christian Identity in a Postmodern Age: Celebrating The Legacies of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan*, (ed.) Declan Marmion (Dublin: Veritas, 2005), 91-112; 108: "David Tracy, for instance, points out that when 'the second coming of Christ...becomes a symbol as important as the symbols of the incarnation, cross and resurrection' then 'the work of Christology will open into a...theological interpretation of Christianity in relationship to other religions."

The *teshuva hermeneutic* we have been considering may 'guide' us through our subsequent reflections on how the 'eschatological turn' in *Nostra Aetate* opened up the possibility for a greater reception of the *Jew as Jew*. Our hermeneutic from empathy, with the added lens of *teshuva*, forms a kind of 'double hermeneutic of *teshuva-empathy*'. This methodology, *this way of looking*, may be calling us to a renewal of solidarity through forgiveness; a movement reawakening the memory of the other in 'me'. This reverberating presence of the other incites a real-time anamnesis, and this hermeneutic has given us a tool for exploring how the church has been empathically living *from* teshuva $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ em/pathy in its documentary tradition since *Nostra Aetate*.

Has the Catholic Church applied a hermeneutics from empathy in the development of its documentary positions as articulated in *Nostra Aetate* and over the subsequent forty years? May the eschatological forays, and subsequent positions articulated within the doctrine and life of the church, be characterized by the intentional spirit of *teshuva* and humility? As a way of further 'opening the question', and by way of conclusion to this essay, to this consideration we now turn. We will therefore consider 'the ground' of *Nostra Aetate*: the development of the text and recent Jewish and Christian reflections on the contemporary importance of the text.

Chapter 9 Towards a Conclusion - An Ecclesial, and Eschatological, (Re) Turn to Einfühlung?: The Contemporary Significance of Nostra Aetate.

Phillip Cunningham, following the history of the development of *Nostra Aetate*, as presented by John M. Oesterreicher, reports that an earlier version of Nostra Aetate "was leaked in American media and contained a paragraph that provoked public controversy: 'In addition, it is worthy of remembrance that the union of the Jewish people with the Church is a part of Christian hope. With unshaken faith and deep longing, the Church awaits, in accordance with the Apostles, the entry of this people into the fullness of the People of God which Christ has founded."⁷⁰⁶ This version, according to Cunningham, was deemed deficient because it was "understood by many, especially in the Jewish community, to mean that Catholics should actively pursue the goal of bringing Jews into the Church." A "two-day exchange" followed in the fall of 1964 with the bishops giving their support to the document's Coordinating Commission. Ultimately, as Cunningham reports, the "deficient draft was strengthened and enlarged in 1965 by the Secretariat for Christian Unity."⁷⁰⁷

Cardinal Giacamo Lercaro, in one of the more memorable interventions during the renewed debate on the new Nostra Aetate draft (28-29 September 1964), says the following:

⁷⁰⁶ Oesterreicher, The New Encounter between Christians and Jews, 186 in Cunningham, "Reflecting on the Reflections," given at a panel discussion sponsored by The Boston College Center for Christian-Jewish Learning on: "Should Catholics Seek to Convert Jews (If Jews Are in True Covenant with God)?" (9 February 2005): 1-22; 9: http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center /events/cunningham 9Feb05.htm> accessed on 30 January 2008. ⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid*.

Our desire, however, is simply to profess the faith and hope of Paul, namely that God "has not rejected His people whom He foreknew" (Rom 11:29), that [the Jews] are "beloved" of God (Rom 11:28), and that "their full inclusion" is not yet revealed (Rom. 11:12). But in what ways will their fullness be revealed? Certainly, in ways that are religious and mysterious, whose mysteriousness we must respect. Those ways are hidden in the wisdom and knowledge of God. Therefore, they should not be confused with human ways, that is, with methods of propaganda and external arts of persuasion. Only an eschatological turn of events will bring [Jews and Christians] to the common messianic meal of the eternal Pasch. 708

The 'deficient' draft(s) ultimately became "the much more eschatologically humble statement, '... the Church awaits the day, known to God alone, when all people will call upon the Lord with a single voice and "serve him with one accord" (Zeph 3:9)." Nostra Aetate therefore became "an expression of the long-term 'eschatological' hope of the church for the eventual unity of all mankind, reported the New York Times."710

The leaking of the document to the press may be considered, looking back some forty years on, a moment of crisis in the development of the text. But the crisis had a rather positive outcome: "crisis happens every time we open ourselves to the 'others' and let our minds, hearts and imaginations be affected (enriched) by them."⁷¹¹ This moment of 'crisis' for Nostra Aetate gave rise to the following comment from Heschel on the completed text: "this is the first statement of the church in history - the first Christian discourse dealing with Judaism - which is devoid of any expression of hope for conversion."⁷¹²

Another decisive moment in this 'crisis', that in all likelihood solidified the document's eschatological turn, was the historic meeting of Heschel and Pope Paul VI in 1964. Heschel tells us in an interview with Carl Stern, "I succeeded in persuading even the Pope, the head of the Church, you realize; he personally crossed out a

⁷⁰⁸ Oesterreicher, *The New Encounter*, 204-205 in Cunningham, "Reflecting on the *Reflections*."

⁷⁰⁹ Cunningham, "Reflecting on the Reflections," 14.

⁷¹⁰ Cunningham, "Uncharted Waters: The Future of Catholic-Jewish Relations".

⁷¹¹ Nicolás, "Christianity in Crisis," 65.

⁷¹² Heschel, "Carl Stern's Interview with Dr. Heschel," 399.

paragraph in which there was a reference to conversion or mission to the Jews...[t]his great, old, wise Church in Rome realizes that the existence of the Jews as Jews is so holy and precious that the Church would collapse if the Jewish people ceased to exist."⁷¹³

When we look further into the development of the document we may come to appreciate how the positive 'crisis' of the council fathers' struggling with the draft, through further discussion and debate, set the conditions for the text's eschatological turn towards recognizing the theological relevance of the empathy in mystery we share as Jews and Catholics. Indeed, the development of Nostra Aetate (NA65), over successive drafts, gives credence to the following hypothesis: "the struggle" the council fathers, even Paul VI, were grappling with was both theological and ethical: "the problem was theological antisemitism, with the political implication that the whole respublica Christiana in general, and the state of the Church in particular, had inspired this in centuries of history and of culture." By comparing the original draft (1961; DI61) to the final text (1965; NA65), against the horizon we have constructed vis-à-vis Heschel and Stein in our study, we may come to appreciate how the eschatologically attuned language in the document speaks with a 'grammar' that is drawn from the lexicon of *Einfühlung*. 715 Yet, we also open this concluding question from a spirit of teshuva. A double hermeneutic of empathy, concomitant with the 'opening of the question' with a spirit of teshuva (cf. chapter 8), may allow Heschel's positive affirmation of the 'Church of Rome' to also be, for the contemporary

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⁷¹³ *Ibid*.

⁷¹⁴ Alberto Melloni, "*Nostra Aetate* and the Discovery of the Sacrament of Otherness," in *The Catholic Church and the Jewish People*, 129-151; 139.

⁷¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 130: "Beginning in 1955, [noted French historian] Jules Isaac had attempted to convince a very reluctant Pius XII of the necessity of a visible rethinking of the Jewish question through the modification of the *oratio universalis* of Good Friday. The "Jewish question,"...would eventually be brought to the attention of the former Vatican legate to Istanbul, who at the time had been actively involved in the effort to rescue the Jews from genocide, and who would in 1958 become pope with the name of John XXIII."

interreligious dialogue, a searching question of self-examination for Catholicism: 'do we realize that the existence of the Jews as Jews is so holy and precious that the Church would collapse if the Jewish people ceased to exist'?

While our double hermeneutic of empathy/teshuva helps us reveal the 'light' within the document -- that is to say, the positively attuned eschatological themes that ratify our consanguinity with Judaism, Heschel's question, as a moment of selfcritique, also invites us to visit the 'shadows' -- the 'places' within the development of Nostra Aetate itself, which have continued to pose a challenge for maintaining an empathic relationship with Judaism. Our way of proceeding will be to establish a constructive horizon by first visiting the 'lights' within the document as conveyed through the themes of 'mystery' and 'memory' (9.1). Against this horizon, we may call forth from the 'shadows' those elements from within the document's development that call for teshuva: areas of liturgico-theological concern that have left a legacy of ambivalence around what the church hopes for in its relationship with Judaism (9.2). This comparative reflection raises the question for us: is the church's relationship one of honoring its consanguinity with Judaism through a solidarity that is respectful of difference or is a subtle supersessionist desire still lurking in the shadows? In light of these two movements within the document, we will consider what the documentary legacy has been over the last forty years since Nostra Aetate, and reprise how the intentionality of empathy, as a tool for interreligious dialogue, may keep in check the tendency of substituting oneself for the other, whenever one becomes forgetful of the other (9.3). But first, let us consider the 'lights' within the document.

(9.1.) Nostra Aetate's Lights: 'Mystery' and 'Memory'.

The original preparatory document, Decree on the Jews (*Decretum de Iudaeis*, henceforth DI61), completed in November 1961 by Cardinal Bea for John XXIII is very strong on highlighting the Catholic 'proximity' to the Jewish people; a metaphoricity foreshadowing the sentiments of John Paul II's regard of our 'older brothers and sisters' in the faith. *DI61* reads:

The Church, in fact, believes that Christ, who "is our peace," embraces Jews and Gentiles with one and the same love and that He made the two one (see Eph 2:14). She rejoices that the union of these two "in one body" (Eph 2:16) proclaims the whole world's reconciliation in Christ. Even though the greater part of the Jewish people has remained separated from Christ, it would be an injustice to call this people accursed, since they are greatly beloved for the sake of the Fathers and the promises made to them (see Rom 11:28). The Church loves this people. From them sprang Christ the Lord, who reigns in glory in heaven; from them sprang the Virgin Mary, mother of all Christians; from them came the Apostles, the pillars and bulwark of the Church (1 Tim 3:15). Furthermore, the Church believes in the union of the Jewish people with herself as an integral part of Christian hope. ⁷¹⁶

The themes of justice and right relationship, and the abrogation of blood-guilt: 'it would be an injustice to call this people accursed'; and the affirmation of love: 'The Church loves this people' are eschatologically attuned developments within Bea's draft. Comparing D161 with the 1965 draft (NA65), one begins to appreciate how mystery and memory rise as thematic metaphors undergirding the document's rapprochement:

DI61: The Church, the Bride of Christ, acknowledges with a heart full of gratitude that, according to God's mysterious saving design, the beginnings of her faith and election go as far back as to the Israel of the Patriarchs and Prophets. Thus she acknowledges that all Christian believers, children of Abraham by faith (see Gal 3:7), are included in his call.

NA65: As this Sacred Synod searches into the mystery of the Church, it remembers the bond that ties the people of the New Covenant to Abraham's stock. With a grateful heart, the Church of Christ acknowledges that, according to God's saving design, the beginnings of her faith and her election were already among the patriarchs, Moses, and the prophets. 717

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⁷¹⁶ Decretum de Iudaeis (Rome: November 1961): http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/cjrelations/resources/education/NA_draft_history.htm accessed on 3 February 2008.
⁷¹⁷ Emphasis added to original text.

The document 'acknowledges' and 'remembers' itself with Judaism. The mystery of the covenant is acclaimed through memory for all Christians; 'children of Abraham by faith'. What is the significance of this eschatologically attuned metaphoricity?

Michael Signer, in commenting on the importance of the development of *mystery-memory* as dialogically attuned metaphor(s) within *NA65* for bolstering the relationship with the Jewish people argues, "[t]he words 'Mysterium ecclesiae' imply that the Council Fathers enter their discussion of Judaism as part of a theological search internal to the Church. The 'spiritual bond' between Judaism and the Church is not an object fully known at the outset, but part of a continuing search for a 'mysterium', a reality that is constantly open to the process of discovery," and this *mysterium* will ultimately "be disclosed in the future". Correspondingly, on memory, Signer tells us, where we read in *NA65*: "the church cannot forget that it received the revelation of the Old Testament by way of that people with whom God in his inexpressible mercy established the ancient covenant," -- even one sentence, in "emphasiz[ing] the importance of memory," when combined with a reference to "inexhaustible mercy" allows the "the memory of a merciful covenant" to challenge a one-sided Christian "tendency" of reading the "covenant with the Jewish people as one of judgement rather than mercy."

Upon entering this "slow and silent stream" of faith through memory we experience, Heschel argues, the "echo" and "recall" of God's past deeds in the present, now opening up onto the eschatological plane: "there is *mystery* and there is a *meaning*. There is a great deal that we can understand and there is a great deal that

⁷¹⁸ Michael A. Signer, "Nostra Aetate after 40 Years: A Decisive Change," from *The Boston College Center for Christian-Jewish Learning*: http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/

God holds in store for Himself, perhaps *l'atid lavo* ['In days to come']."⁷²⁰ This *slow* and silent stream, "is open to all" -- and those living in faith will find themselves "in the community of countless men of all ages, of all nations, to whom it was shown that one man with God is a majority against all men of malice, that love of mercy is stronger than power. Creeds may divide it, zealots may deny it, the community of faith endures forever. Wars cannot destroy it..."⁷²¹

Heschel and Signer are rightly pointing us towards acknowledging how mystery and memory are *in empathy* with each other. Their 'con-primordial' rising -- one with the other, carries with it an *existential* significance. While we are already being drawn into the deeply human memory where, as Heschel tells us, the 'love of mercy is stronger than power', we are also inaugurating a new kind of solidarity in our 'Jewish-Christian' friendship by waiting together for what remains to be revealed: the fullness of mercy. Heschel concludes, "if we want to understand ourselves, to find out what is most precious in our lives, we should search into our memory." And to remember is to have faith -- "...we sanctify the present by remembering the past...the essence of faith is memory. To believe is to remember." And through 'our' faith "we do not seek to unveil or to explain but to perceive and to absorb the rarities of mystery that are gleaming softly from all things; not to know more, but to know what is more than anything we can grasp." 722

The promulgation of *Nostra Aetate* was a way of acknowledging the tension between the propositional and the mystical. The church was beginning to recognize

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⁷²⁰ Heschel, "Jewish Theology," 154-163; 161.

⁷²¹ Heschel, *MNA*, 163.

⁷²² Heschel, "Faith," reprinted from "Faith," *The Reconstructionist* (November 3, 1944): 12-16 in *MgSa*, 328-339; 333-334. See: Rothschild, *Introduction*, 17: "The awareness that we are open and communicative to someone who transcends us and to whom we are accountable does not remain our permanent possession once we have gained it in a moment of spiritual insight. *Faith* is not assent to a proposition but an attitude of the whole person, of sensitivity, understanding, engagement, and attachment. It includes *faithfulness* -- loyalty to the higher moments of insight even during the long periods of ordinary living."

that its desire to 'unveil' and 'explain' all, often in proscriptive terms, was necessarily being kept in check by the insistent memory that the *mysterium ecclesiae* is in empathy with the *mysterium Israel*. This acknowledgement set the conditions for the possibility of a new relationship with Judaism. This desire for a new relationship is positively borne out in the subsequent documentary tradition from 1974 and 1985, respectively, that explicates, in more practical terms, possible implementations of *Nostra Aetate* (9.1.1).

(9.1.1) '74 and '85: 'To Prepare the World for the Coming of the Messiah'.

The Vatican Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews in 1974 and 1985, attempted to expand and buttress an eschatologically sensitive approach through *mystery-memory* by appealing to the shared Jewish-Christian project of repairing the world:

1974: The problem of Jewish-Christian relations concerns the Church as such, since it is when "pondering her own mystery" that she encounters the mystery of Israel. Therefore, even in areas where no Jewish communities exist, this remains an important problem. There is also an ecumenical aspect to the question: the very return of Christians to the sources and origins of their faith, grafted on to the earlier Covenant, helps the search for unity in Christ, the cornerstone. 723

1985: Attentive to the same God who has spoken, hanging on the same word, we have to witness to one same memory and one common hope in Him who is the master of history. We must also accept our responsibility to prepare the world for the coming of the Messiah by working together for social justice, respect for the rights of persons and nations and for social and international reconciliation. To this we are driven, Jews and Christians, by the command to love our neighbor, by a common hope for the Kingdom of God and by the great heritage of the Prophets. 724

⁷²³ Vatican Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, "Guidelines and Suggestions for Implementing the Conciliar Declaration *Nostra Aetate*, No. 4 [issued 1 December 1974],": http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/cjrelations/resources/documents/catholic/Vatican_Guidelines.htm accessed on 2 February 2008, emphasis added.

⁷²⁴ Vatican Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, "Notes on the Correct Way to Present Jews and Judaism in Preaching and Teaching in the Roman Catholic Church, II, §11 [issued on 24 June 1985]," in Audrey Doetzel, "Nostra Aetate, §4, the Rabbis, and the Messianic Age," Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations, 1/15 (2005-2006): http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art15 accessed on 30 January 2008, emphasis added.

One cannot help but be encouraged by how both documents impel *aggiornamento*, echoing an eschatological sensitivity that is set in the key of mystery and memory.

Both suggest practical ways of 'preparing the world for the coming of the Messiah'.

There is an ecumenical significance ('74) to a dialogue with Judaism. While this debate, as Signer argued, might be more 'internal' to the Catholic church, this 'continuing search' for the 'mysterium' is a dialogue that ought nevertheless be carried out among *the churches*, for all Christian communities are rooted within a foundational Jewish memory. God's compassionate and empathic concern is rooted and grounded in the voice of the Jewish other, offering all Christians the possibility of a more profound *empathy* with this otherness: "[w]hen man loves man he enters a union which is more than an addition, more than one plus one. To love is to attach oneself to the spirit of unity, to rise to a new level, to enter a new dimension."⁷²⁵

The *tiqqun* 'olam project of working together as Christians and Jews for 'social and international reconciliation' by encouraging a wider 'respect for the rights of persons and nations' is a way of hastening the reign of God ('85). This way of living out the 'command to love our neighbor' through the righteous reception of the other is the work of repairing the world through *teshuva* (cf. Chapter 8).

Christianity receives this pathic call, as attested to in the 1974 and 1985 documents, from the otherness of Judaism. Being truly empathic with this otherness will mean that any "concern for unity" will not ignore an "essential dynamic in human relation: the perception of the other as one whose difference claims me with a claim kindred to myself." Indeed, a more complex intentionality, rather than a direct, unmediated *sym*-pathos is called for in dialogue (*cf.* Chapter 3). The guidelines attempt to balance this dialectic of sameness/otherness through an

⁷²⁵ Heschel, MNA, 206.

⁷²⁶ Plank, Eclipse, 73.

"affirmation of otherness" where recognition of "the integrity and freedom of an other's existence" is in creative tension with a mysteriously grounded "comparable hope":

[I]n underlining the eschatological dimension of Christianity we shall reach a greater awareness that the people of God of the Old and the New Testament are tending towards a like end in the future: the coming or return of the Messiah - even if they start from two different points of view. It is more clearly understood that the person of the Messiah is not only a point of division for the people of God but also a point of convergence (*Sussidi per l'ecumenismo*, Diocese of Rome, no. 140). Thus it can be said that Jews and Christians meet in a comparable hope, grounded on the same promise made to Abraham (Gn. 12:1-3; Heb. 6:13-18).

The themes arising from both documents: 'when "pondering her own mystery" that she encounters the mystery of Israel' ('74), and 'we have to witness to one same memory and one common hope' ('85) reveals an eschatological sensitivity-cummetaphoricity within a doctrine that opens further possibilities for deepening and widening the Jewish-Christian dialogue. Again, Michael Signer reminds us, "[i]t is helpful for Jews to understand that the notion of mystery assures the possibility that the topic of relations with the Children of Abraham's stock cannot be exhausted by any one definition or any single era of history. It is the very nature of mystery to continually disclose itself." And because mystery never fully discloses itself, the Christian-Jewish relationship is one of working together in the *present* towards a shared future where an embodied, interreligious shared memory is the necessary prefix or ground for an eschatological inflection into this mysterious future. Or, as Carlo Maria Cardinal Martini encourages us, we need to 'struggle' together "to find the right relationship between messianic eschatological hope and the hopes and the expectations of individuals and communities in relation to justice, human rights and

⁷²⁷ *Ibid.*, 72.

^{728 &}quot;Notes on the Correct Way to Present Jews and Judaism [24 June 1985]."

⁷²⁹ Signer, "Nostra Aetate after 40 Years: A Decisive Change".

⁷³⁰ Cf. Introduction; Phan, "Eschatology," 178.

so forth."⁷³¹ Heschel rhetorically wonders: "Is not our duty to help one another in trying to overcome hardness of heart, in cultivating a sense of wonder and mystery, in unlocking the doors of holiness in time...in seeking to respond to the voice of the prophets?"⁷³²

The development of *Nostra Aetate*, over successive drafts, highlights how the Council Fathers of Vatican II struggled to find a way of both honoring Jewish difference while also cultivating a new sense of consanguinity with Judaism. In this section of our study we have been considering how the eschatologically 'generous' metaphors of mystery and memory may contribute to a new empathy between Christians and Jews. Yet, this is only half of the story. The Council also desired to highlight the difference between Catholicism and Judaism in such a way that was respectful to the integrity of both faiths. For the most part, the document succeeded in this task. There are, however, 'places' -- from within the development of the text -- that employ a kind of language of *distance-from-the-other* that may unnecessarily encourage a subtle 'forgetfulness for the other'. This contretemps from within the document itself obscures the intention of empathy. These developments, to which we now turn, may arguably cast a 'shadow' upon the contemporary church's relationship with Judaism, in so far as the teachings from the church since *NA* reflect this ambivalence.

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732 Heschel, Prophets, 242.

⁷³¹ Martini, "Reflections Towards Jewish-Christian Dialogue," 34.

(9.2) Nostra Aetate's Shadows: The 'Eclipse' of Supersessionism.

The difference in language in the final paragraph of *DI61* which developed into the penultimate paragraph in *NA65* is rather striking. Let us first place both texts side-by-side:

Decretum de Iudaeis (1961):

As the Church, like a mother, condemns most severely injustices committed against innocent people everywhere, so she raises her voice in loud protest against all wrongs done to Jews, whether in the past or in our time. Whoever despises or persecutes this people does injury to the Catholic Church.

Nostra Aetate (1965):

Furthermore, in her rejection of every persecution against any man, the Church, mindful of the patrimony she shares with the Jews and moved not by political reasons but by the Gospel's spiritual love, decries hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism, directed against Jews at any time and by anyone.

The forceful language of *DI61*: 'condemns most severely injustices'; 'loud protest against all wrongs', seemingly undergoes a shift in *NA65*. For example, *NA65* qualifies its condemnation of violence and persecution against Jews as not being motivated by 'political reasons'. This qualification is not present in *DI61*. Some have argued that both Arab nations, and Middle-Eastern Churches, were concerned that a statement of solidarity with Jews, like *NA*, may risk being interpreted as uncritical approval for the State of Israel. ⁷³³ Yet, the replacement of the following:

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⁷³³ It was during the 28-29 September 1964 public debate on *NA* when Bea made his case most forcefully that the document was not to be interpreted as a political statement. During his public intervention "[Bea] assess[ed] the possible political implications and -- without omitting a mention of John XXIII -- went overboard to stress the "religious" character of the text that...did not seem to be at the center of the debate: "we are not speaking here of Zionism or the state of Israel." See: Giovanni Miccoli, "Two Sensitive Issues: Religious Freedom and the Jews," *History of Vatican II*, vol. 4 (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2003), 154-55 in Melloni, "*Nostra Aetate* and the Discovery of the Sacrament of Otherness," 140; Also see: "The 'Holy War' Against the Declaration", Oesterreicher, *The New Encounter*, 237-243.

- (i) 'condemns [damnat] most severely injustices' with 'loud protest against all wrongs done to Jews, whether in the past or in our time' (DI61) with the more discreet language
- (ii) 'rejection of every persecution' and 'decries [deplorat] hatred' (NA65)

is a development within the language of the text that obscures a hermeneutics from empathy and undercuts a sense of solidarity with the Jewish people.

When the change in *NA65* is read alongside *DI61*'s rather solidarity-building closing sentence: "[w]hoever despises or persecutes this [Jewish] people does injury to the Catholic Church" it becomes increasingly clear how the entire tenor of the document as conveying a sense of empathy, solidarity and consanguinity is now being challenged by a language of distance. Indeed, the editors ultimately revise this aforementioned concluding sentence (*'[w]hoever despises or persecutes this [Jewish] people does injury to the Catholic Church'*) because of this apparent lack of consistency. Simply put, this final sentence no longer fits.

If, in fact, injury is done to the church when Jews are despised and persecuted, then wouldn't the church want to condemn (damnat) such persecutions (i), in the strongest of language, rather than merely deplore (deplorat) them (ii)? While condemnation (damnat) of injustice is indeed stronger than 'decrying' (deplorat) or 'rejecting' (reprobat) the injustice it has been argued that

damnat was changed to reprobat because damnare was normally used only against heresies, and anti-Semitism, however deserving of the strongest possible rejection, was not exactly a 'heresy'...and besides, Pope John had explicitly asked that the Council not declare any condemnations.⁷³⁴

⁷³⁴ James M. Somerville, "The Successive Versions of *Nostra Aetate*: Translation, Outline Analysis, Chronology, Commentary," in Bruteau (ed.), *Merton and Judaism*, 341-372; 369. S. is following the exegetical work of Mikka Ruokanen, *The Catholic Doctrine of Non-Christian Religions: According to the Second Vatican Council* (New York: Brill, 1992), 42. Also see: Oesterreicher, *The New Encounter*, 268-269; 269: "In the draft of 1964, the disapproval of the hatred and persecution of Jews was expressed by the verbs *deplorare et condemnare*, 'to decry resolutely and to condemn.' In the final version, the text was shortened; only *deplorare* remained..."

Yet, Oesterreicher concludes that, "[t]he explanation that in the language of Councils 'condemn' was applied only to heresies, not to sins or crimes, did not convince anyone. For the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World condemned expressly -- God be praised! -- the inhumanity of total war [§§77.2; 72.2; 80.3-4]. In any case, Antisemitism is not only sinful, but also heretical." Would not then such condemnation show to others how the church was beginning again to appreciate its consanguinity, its 'grafted-on-ness' to Judaism? The stronger language -- damnat -- was dropped, and so too the last sentence: 'Whoever despises or persecutes this people does injury to the Catholic Church'.

It is arguable such a distancing, 'apathetic' language in the text introduces a subtle 'forgetfulness for the other'. This distancing by means of language allowed the document to 'drift' away from its original intention of highlighting an empathic solidarity between the two faiths in the most ardent of terms. This drift continued until the final promulgation of the document. For example, in March and May of 1965 new amendments were introduced to *NA*, and what had originally read:

November 18, 1964: May all, then, see to it that in their catechetical work or in their preaching of the word of God they do not teach anything that could give rise to hatred or contempt of Jews in the hearts of Christians. May they never present the Jewish people as one rejected, cursed, or guilty of deicide. All that happened to Christ in His passion cannot be attributed to the whole people then alive, much less to that of today. Besides, the Church has always held and holds now that Christ underwent His passion and death freely, because of the sins of all people and out of infinite love. Therefore, Christian preaching is to proclaim the Cross of Christ as a sign of God's all-embracing love and as the fountain from which every grace flows.

would now read in its final form:

⁷³⁵ *Ibid*.

October 28, 1965: True, the Jewish authorities and those who followed their lead pressed for the death of Christ; still, what happened in His passion cannot be charged against all the Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today. Although the Church is the new people of God, the Jews therefore should not be presented as rejected or accursed by God, as if this came from the Holy Scriptures. All should then ensure that, in catechetical work or in the preaching of the Word of God they do not teach anything that does not conform to the truth of the Gospel and the spirit of Christ. 736

Notice how in the final text the refutation of 'deicide' is dropped, and 'the Church' has replaced Israel as 'the new people of God'.

Somerville, in a helpful commentary on the development of *Nostra Aetate*, tells us that the addition of 'although the Church is the new people of God' is a "questionable item, since it could imply that the Jews had lost standing before God and had been replaced, in spite of the fact that God does not repent of his gifts". The new language could be interpreted as carrying supersessionist intentions: it is "to suggest their being left out and left behind, while a new group supersedes them." Is this still a relevant concern some forty years on? Rabbi Di Segni, commenting as recently as 2004, tells us the following:

[t]here is a sentence in *Nostra Aetate* that is hardly ever cited, but that reveals the core of the problem: "and although it is true that the Church is the new people of God..." says the document. This is in some way a reprise of the old theme of the verus Israel, which in its conciliar formulation leaves open the problem whether the existence of a "new" people of God means that the old one can no longer be considered as such, or whether the old and the new people are both called to play a role in the history of salvation. Cardinal Bea, who courageously defended this conciliar document...had no doubts on this matter. He once explained that "of course it is true that the Jewish people is no longer the people of God in the sense of being an institution of salvation for humanity". ⁷³⁸

⁷³⁶ See: "The Drafting of Nostra Aetate," *The Boston College Center for Christian-Jewish Learning:* http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/cjrelations/resources/education/NA_draft_history.htm accessed on 3 February 2008.

⁷³⁷ Somerville, "The Successive Versions of Nostra Aetate": 365, 369.

⁷³⁸ Riccardo Di Segni, "Steps Taken and Questions Remaining in Jewish-Christian Relations Today". Bea is quoted from: "The Jewish people in the divine plan of salvation," *Civiltà Cattolica* 1965, vol. IV, 209-229, reprinted in *The Christian Churches and Judaism* 1947-1982, (eds.) L. Sestieri, G. Cereti (Casale Monferrato/Milano: Marietti, 1983), 95.

While it would seem to be somewhat facile to take Bea's comments out of the 1965 context, and 'read' them superficially with twenty-first century eyes, one would nevertheless have to wonder with Di Segni, in light of recent events, as to whether or not a supersessionism, subtly echoed in a distancing-language, and even echoed from within NA, is (re)solidifying its position.

(9.2.1) 2008 – The Good Friday Prayer: Revision or Regression?

The 2008 'revision' of the Good Friday prayer is arguably a regressive step back towards a 'locum tenens' position of conversionism. The following lines of the prayer, "that our God and Lord enlighten their hearts so that they recognize Jesus Christ, the Savior of all mankind" and "graciously grant that by the entry of the abundance of all people into your Church, Israel will be saved" would seemingly

⁷³⁹ Good Friday Revision, promulgated on 5 February 2008: http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-room elements/texts/cjrelations/news/Prayer for Jews.htm> accessed on 10 February 2008. See: Appendix 5 for comparative reading of Good Friday prayer. For a helpful survey of hierarchical interpretation(s) on Benedict XVI's motu proprio Summorum Pontificium, 7 July 2007 see: Mary C. Boys, "Does the Catholic Church Have a Mission 'with' Jews or 'to' Jews?" Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations 3 (2008): 1-19; 8-9: http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol3 accessed on 15 September 2009: "Amidst the controversy spawned by the new prayer, the question has arisen whether it inspires or even implicitly mandates Catholics to seek the conversion of Jews. Or, should the prayer be understood eschatologically, as a hope that at the End of Days 'all Israel may be saved when the fullness of the nations enter into Your Church'? Various interpretations of the prayer have been offered, and it is not clear that one is to be regarded as definitive...Cardinal Kasper has offered the lengthiest, most nuanced interpretation of the prayer in an April 2008 article in L'Osservatore Romano [See: Cardinal Walter Kasper, "Striving for Mutual Respect in Modes of Prayer," L'Osservatore Romano, weekly edition (16 April 2008), 8-9]. He notes the importance of sensitivity to Jewish concerns, recognizing that 'Many Jews consider a mission to the Jews as a threat to their existence; some even speak of it as a Shoah by different means.' Kasper reads the first part of the prayer - that Jews 'may acknowledge Jesus Christ as the savior of all men' - as based in the 'whole of the New Testament' and as an indication of the 'universally acknowledged fundamental difference between Christians and Jews.' He notes that Catholics do not expect that Jews will agree with the Christological aspect of the prayer, but that 'we do expect them to respect that we as Christians pray in accordance with our belief, just as we evidently do as regards their mode of prayer.' The 'really controversial question,' Kasper admits, is twofold: 'Should Christians pray for the conversion of the Jews? Can there be a mission to the Jews?' The cardinal claims, as he had in his 2001 address ["The Church and the Jews," given at the Seventeenth meeting of the International Catholic-Jewish Liaison Committee, cf. fn. §75 of this study and following.]...that the 'Catholic Church has no organised or institutionalised mission to the Jews,' and, in a reading of Rom 9-11, he infers that in the end God will bring about Israel's salvation, 'not on the basis of a mission to the Jews but on the basis of the mission to the Gentiles, when the fullness of the Gentiles has entered. He alone who has caused the hardening of the majority of the Jews can dissolve that hardening again. He will do so when "the Deliverer" comes from Zion (Rom 11:26).' Thus, in Kasper's view, the wording of the pope's Good Friday prayer 'expresses this hope in a prayer of intercession directed to God.' He continues: 'Basically, with this prayer the Church is repeating the petition in the Lord's Prayer: "Thy kingdom come" (Mt 6:10; Lk 11:2), and the early Christian liturgical cry, "Marantha": "Come Lord Jesus, come soon" (1 Cor 16:22); (Rv 22:20; Did 10, 6). Such petitions for the coming of the Kingdom of God and for the realization of the mystery of salvation are not by nature a call to the Church to undertake missionary action to the Jews. Rather, they respect the whole depth of the Deus absconditus, of his election through grace, of the hardening and of his infinite mercy. So in this prayer the Church does not take it upon herself to orchestrate the realisation of the unfathomable mystery. She cannot do so. Instead, she lays the when and the how entirely in God's hands. God alone can bring about the Kingdom of God in which the whole of Israel is saved and eschatological peace is bestowed upon the world." Also see the reaction of The German Bishops: Christa Pongratz-Lippitt, "Bishops 'Unhappy' over Good Friday Prayer," *The Tablet* (29 March 2008): 32: "The deputy head of the bishops' conference, Bishop Heinrich Mussinghof of Aachen, told the German press agency dpa on Maundy Thursday that the German bishops would have preferred that the 1970 wording of the Good Friday Prayer for the Jews be used in both the Tridentine and the New Order of the Mass, because it emphasised the Jews' faithfulness to God's covenant and 'the dignity of Israel' was thus preserved."

"deny for Jews what is most necessary for their well-being, in the same way that universalisms exclude difference: a basic freedom to stand apart from as well as along with others, in order to forge an identity congruent with the distinctiveness of their historical situation." Are we reducing, by way of a prayer, Judaism's otherness-to-the-same? Does such a prayer authentically express a hope as enlivened and embedded within the mystery-memory eschatological metaphoricity of *NA*?

This "eclipse of difference"⁷⁴¹ in the Good Friday prayer occasioned the director of the Jewish Anti-Defamation League in the USA to comment the following:

Alterations of language without change to the 1962 prayer's conversionary intent amount to cosmetic revisions, while retaining the most troubling aspect for Jews, namely the desire to end the distinctive Jewish way of life. Still named the "Prayer for Conversion of the Jews," it is a major departure from the teachings and actions of Pope Paul VI, Pope John Paul II, and numerous authoritative Catholic documents, including Nostra Aetate. 742

In light of such contemporary developments, where a liturgical prayer expresses 'the desire to end the distinctive Jewish way of life' one has to wonder what Heschel might think. In commenting after his meeting with Paul VI, Heschel said that Catholicism finally realized once and for all that: 'the Church would collapse if the Jewish people ceased to exist'. But does the Catholic Church really believe it would collapse without the Jew?

The *Good Friday* revision therefore gives rise to the larger ethico-theologicial question: does *Nostra Aetate* continue to stir the consciences of the Catholic Church such that there could be no doubt that a hermeneutics from empathy is *the* dialogical approach towards our Jewish brothers and sisters? The revision liturgically enacts a

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⁷⁴⁰ Plank, Eclipse, 73.

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁷⁴² Abraham H. Foxman, *Anti-Defamation League Statement on the Revision of the 1962 Prayer* (January 22, 2008): http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/cjrelations/news/ADL_Prayer_Jews.htm accessed on 15 February 2008.

"foreign prejudicial estimation", of the Jew, and therefore challenges our hermeneutics from empathy through a distancing language that (re)introduces a forgetfulness for the other. Such a lack of empathy with the other as other only raises the specter of violence against the other i.e., "...only a short step separates the Church's assertion that the Jew should not be a Jew from saying the Jew should not be. Translated politically, the spiritual fratricide of conversion too easily becomes a literal murder and the exclusion of difference, a death-camp logic."⁷⁴⁴ How do we deal with, as dialogists, the lingering shadow of supersessionism; that subtle desire to reduce Jewish otherness to the same? It strikes us -- to be sure, with the benefit of forty years of reflection -- that the framers of NA may not have fully appreciated the weight of the 'death-camp' horizon against which the document was being crafted: the Shoah. One might have expected that the horror of the Holocaust would have challenged the consciences of the Council Fathers to reinforce Nostra Aetate with an Einfühlung language that was condemnatory of the 'heresy' of anti-Semitism in order to exhibit how the *mysterium ecclesiae* is irrevocably in communion with the mysterium Israel. In this way the document might also have been interpreted as a contemporary ethical response to a post-genocidal world.⁷⁴⁵

It was in 1964, when one Council Father, Cardinal Richard Cushing of Boston, during the 28-29 September 1964 debate that resulted in the more

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⁷⁴³ Dupuis, "Christianity and Religions: From Confrontation to Encounter": "The theological terminology used even today by many Christian preachers and theologians retains traces of ways of speaking about the 'others' which are clearly pejorative. There is still talk about 'pagans', even about 'infidels' or 'non-believers'. 'Infidels' to whom or to what, it can be asked. The very term 'non-Christians' ought to be considered offensive. What would we think if the 'others' were to consider us and call us 'non-Hindus' or 'non-Buddhists'? People must be named on the basis of the self-comprehension which they have of themselves, not of some foreign prejudicial estimation."

⁷⁴⁴ Plank, *Eclipse*, 73.

⁷⁴⁵ Oesterreicher, *The New Encounter*, 322: "I am sure the Fathers of the Council thought they were expressing their horror, disgust, and indignation at the tortures inflicted on Jews by the Nazis when they said that the Church 'decries hatred, persecutions, displays of Antisemitism, staged against Jews at whatever time in history and by whomsoever.' Many may think that these words are not strong enough, not explicit enough. I will not context this criticism. Yet are there words in Latin or English, or any other language, forceful and graphic enough to deal with the abysmal event of the slaughter of Jews by the Nazis, when hell went on a rampage the world has never seen before?"

eschatologically appropriate rendering, '... the Church awaits the day, known to God alone, when all people will call upon the Lord with a single voice and "serve him with one accord" (Zeph 3:9), made the following intervention:

I ask myself, Venerable Brothers, whether we should not humbly acknowledge before the whole world that, toward their Jewish brethren, Christians have all too often not shown themselves as true Christians, as faithful followers of Christ. How many [Jews] have suffered in our own time? How many died because Christians were indifferent and kept silent? ...If in recent years, not many Christian voices were raised against those injustices, at least let ours now be heard in humility. ⁷⁴⁶

Cushing's penetrative questions '[h]ow many [Jews] have suffered in our own time? How many died because Christians were indifferent and kept silent?' sharpens our reflection and, from the perspective of forty years, opens up for us a necessary moment of self-examination.

The words of Heschel's beloved colleague and dialogue partner Thomas Merton may stir Catholic consciences today. Merton wrote in his journal, not long before the 'eschatology debate', during Lent-Eastertide 1964: "Can one look attentively at Christ and not see *Auschwitz*?" Notice how Merton's insight subverts a supersessionist intention, and raises the question for us: do we see Christ for who he is, as other, as a wandering suffering Jew? Our 'Good' Friday prayer, and all our prayer, will be truly 'good' in expressing an authentic empathy with the suffering other only when we come to fully believe in a God who is also one of the suffering others. Does prayer meet praxis, issuing forth in our kenosis towards the

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⁷⁴⁶ Oesterreicher, *The New Encounter*, 197-198. Also see: Cunningham, "Reflecting on the *Reflections*."

⁷⁴⁷ James Carroll, "Thomas Merton and a Full Christian *Teshuva*," in *Merton and Judaism*, 43-56; 51: "He wrote [the remark] in his journal, interestingly, during Easter Week in 1964. I say 'interestingly' because of course in the Christian tradition Easter Week and Holy Week leading up to it were the occasion for the worst of the pogroms, for the obvious reason. And note, Merton did not put it the other way around as Catholics are wont to do...It is in looking at Christ that we Christians must see Auschwitz – where, if he had been there, we should recall, he would have died, not as the savior of the world, but as another anonymous Jew with a number on his arm, that's all."

other as other; an *Einfühlung* that flows and breaches the walls of any grasping desire to substitute the Jew -- or any religious other -- for who 'I' think they should be?⁷⁴⁸

James Bernauer, in a lecture given to mark the fortieth anniversary of *Nostra Aetate*, "The Holocaust and the Catholic Church's Search for Forgiveness" makes the following astute point: historically, the "attitude" of "Christendom" was one that generated a "fortress Christianity" mentality whereby the church "best interpreted itself through a particular form of European culture that asserted its spiritual surpassing of Judaism." Is there a risk of reintroducing a 'fortress-mentality' such that *our* way of proceeding may be easily perceived as being minatory and dismissive of Judaism?

Heschel, for one, did not approach naïvely a new relationship with Catholicism. He too realized that whatever Vatican II said, the church would still have to deal with the question of difference, of meeting Jews as Jews:

Why is so much attention being paid to what Vatican II is going to say about the Jews? Are we Jews in need of recognition? God himself has recognized us as a people. Are we in need of a "Chapter" acknowledging our right to exist as Jews?...It is not gratitude that we ask for: it is the cure of a disease affecting so many minds that we pray for. ⁷⁵⁰

Following Heschel, Plank concludes, "if one overcomes distance by suppressing alterity then one simply creates another form of indifference by effacing the

⁷⁴⁸ *NB*: Not long after the promulgation of the revised prayer, Cardinal Christoph Schönborn of Vienna offered a nuanced reflection on how Christianity's soteriological claims need not come through the erasure of the Jewish other. Echoing the eschatological leitmotifs of mystery, memory and freedom of conscience, found in *NA* and throughout Vatican II, Schönborn writes: "The individual conscience must always be respected. Religious liberty requires this of everyone. But the vocation of the Jews requires Christians to recognize *the mystery* of the specific choice of those to whom belong "the adoption [as children], the glory, the covenants, the giving of the law, the worship, and the promises; to them belong the patriarchs, and from them, according to the flesh, comes the Messiah (Romans 9:4-5)." See: Christoph Schönborn, "Judaism's Way to Salvation," *The Tablet* (29 March 2008): 8-9; 8, *italics* added to original.

⁷⁴⁹ Bernauer, "The Holocaust and the Catholic Church's Search for Forgiveness".

⁷⁵⁰ Eva Fleischner, "Heschel's Significance for Jewish-Christian Relations," in *Abraham Joshua Heschel: Exploring His Life and Thought*, (ed.) John C. Merkle (New York: Macmillan, 1985), 154 in Plank, *Eclipse*, 72.

distinctiveness of the other's experience." Is it possible then to move into a shared future together while respecting difference?⁷⁵¹

Perhaps the argument could be made that "Nostra Aetate ultimately fails because the question of conversion concerns not simply the Church's proselytizing but the value of the Jew as Jew" precisely because of recent developments. 752 Yet, to dismiss the entirety of Nostra Aetate eschews all the good it has done in opening up new channels for understanding and dialogue. To deny the positive contribution(s) would unduly hamper our process of (re)discovering kinship. Indeed, the document's positive intentions have been, and may continue to be, a basis for dialogue. So while our considerations are one way of humbly beginning to acknowledge a 'partial eclipse', we also need to acknowledge how the church has been attempting to make a return (teshuva) -- even in the midst of inescapable setbacks -- to Judaism through dialogue over the last decade. To this consideration we now turn.

(9.3) Catholicism's 'Return': Recent Developments since Nostra Aetate.

The interreligious scholar Rabbi David Rosen appreciates the recent current within Catholicism of honoring the Eternal by doing *teshuva* with religious others(ness). Rosen recently paid particular tribute to John Paul II's project of 'radicalizing' atonement at a recent Vatican conference marking the fortieth anniversary of Nostra Aetate:

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., 75.

⁷⁵² Plank, Eclipse, 72.

The sense of intergenerational solidarity in sin (and in grace) remains relevant in the biblical testimony and is expressed in the confession before God of the 'sins of the fathers,' such that John Paul II could state, citing the splendid prayer of Azaria: 'Blessed are you, O Lord, the God of our fathers... For we have sinned and transgressed by departing from you, and we have done every kind of evil. Your commandments we have not heeded or observed' (Dn 3:26, 29-30). This is how the Jews prayed after the exile (cf. also Bar 2:11-13), accepting the responsibility for the sins committed by their fathers. The Church imitates their example and also asks forgiveness for the historical sins of her children. 753

This sense of "intergenerational solidarity" in confessing before God the sins of our fathers, as advocated by John Paul II, embodies a praxis of teshuva as 'read through' a hermeneutic from empathy. Any attempts made to 'limit' the purification of memory from within Catholicism may have the undesirable effect of causing more amnesia than anamnesis for the faults of the past. And it is rather interesting to note that, days after the publication of Memory and Reconciliation, John Paul II reiterated the radical message of *Incarnationis Mysterium* in his *Day of Pardon* homily (12 March 2000):

"...[a]ll of us, though not personally responsible and without encroaching on the judgment of God who alone knows every heart, bear the burden of the errors and faults of those who have gone before us' (Incarnationis mysterium, n. 11). The recognition of past wrongs serves to reawaken our consciences to the compromises of the present, opening the way to conversion for everyone. 754

In light of our above considerations on the radical nature of atonement, it would appear Catholicism's commitment to dialogue with Judaism, as mediated through Judaism's various matrices of meaning, may be a learned and wise way of 'making present' -- in all its radicality -- the otherness of the Jewish voice, a voice echoing to present day Christianity. Rather than 'compromising' our relationship, the recognition of past wrongs by searching our consciences for prejudices-in-the-present,

⁷⁵³ David Rosen, "Nostra Aetate', Forty Years after Vatican II: Present & Future Perspectives." Paper presented at the Conference of the Holy See's Commission for Religious Relations with Jewry (Rome: 27 October 2005): <www.vatican.va> accessed on 15 February 2006.

754 John Paul II, *Day of Pardon Homily* (Rome: 12 March 2000): <www.vatican.va> accessed on 15

February 2006.

such a level of *Einfühlung* praxis, may only foster a post-*Shoah* solidarity with our beloved elder brothers and sisters in the faith. ⁷⁵⁵

(9.3.1) A Legacy of Empathy: Aggiornamento with Cassidy and Kasper.

In recent years, members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy have been actively reflecting on the unique relationship shared by Catholics and Jews. In April 2001, Cardinal Walter Kasper, the Vatican secretary for the promotion of Christian Unity and Jewish-Catholic Dialogue, articulated the nature of the relationship from a Catholic perspective. He said at the International Catholic-Jewish Liaison Committee (I.L.C.), "remember that Judaism, in the mind of the church, is unique among the world's religions, because, as *Nostra Aetate* states, it is 'the root of that good olive tree onto which have been grafted the wild olive branches of the Gentiles."

The Gentile, as grafted upon the olive tree of Judaism, shares the religious identity of the Jew. The Christian identity therefore, far from being *ex nihilo*, is *given* as *gift* from the Jewish other through Jesus, son of Joseph. Kasper underlines this point by highlighting John Paul II's message to the Jewish people of Rome, at their synagogue along the Tiber, across the river from the Vatican, on April 13, 1986: "The Jewish religion is not 'extrinsic' to us [Catholics], but in a certain way is 'intrinsic' to our own religion. With Judaism, therefore, we have a relationship which we do not have with any other religion. You are dearly beloved brothers and, in a certain way, it

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The trials humanity has passed through in the course of the twentieth century are, in their horror, not only a measure of human depravity, but a renewed call back to our vocation. I have the impression they have altered something in us. I think specifically the Passion of Israel at Auschwitz has profoundly marked Christianity itself and that a Judeo-Christian friendship is an element of peace." In "Violence du visage, An interview with Angelo Bianchi," 181, quoted from Palmisano, "To Give of Ourselves: A Way of Proceeding in Interreligious Dialogue, Same-Edith Stein-Other: A Living Dialectic," 13-14.

⁷⁵⁶ Walter Kasper, "The Church and the Jews," given at the *Seventeenth Meeting of the International Catholic-Jewish Liaison Committee*, *America* 185/7 (17 September 2001): 12-14.

could be said you are our elder brothers," a common ancestry from "patriarchae nostri Abrahae". 757

What does the covenantal relationship between Catholics and Jews 'look' like today? Kasper rightly points out Vatican II's reform of doing away with a triumphalistic theology of 'substitution,' where the Jewish 'Old' covenant was superseded by the 'New' covenant. Kasper says, "As you know, the old theory of substitution is gone since the Second Vatican Council. For Christians today the covenant with the Jewish people is a living heritage, a living reality. There cannot be a mere coexistence between the two covenants. Jews and Christians, by their respective specific identities, are intimately related to each other." The interreligiously-minded theologian is left with the task of dealing with "how this intimate relatedness should or could be defined." For the very question, as Kasper argues, "touches the mystery of Jewish and Christian existence." To this end, he encourages further dialogue on the nature of this intimate relatedness.

Kasper's predecessor for promoting Jewish-Christian dialogue, Cardinal Edward Cassidy, has also done much in forwarding the conversation on the relationship between Catholics and Jews in the twenty-first century. Cassidy, one of the framers of the Church's *We Remember-Reflections on the Shoah*, locates a need in the dialogue for a Catholic (re)conversion to *teshuva* for building "a new relationship between Catholics and Jews." Cassidy concluded, "[i]f we could heal the wounds

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⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid*.

⁷⁵⁸ Kasper, "The Church and the Jews," 14.

⁷⁵⁹ *Ibid*.

⁷⁶⁰ Cassidy says in reflecting on *We Remember*, "While expressing deep sorrow and repentance (*teshuva*) for the failures of the sons and daughters of the Church, *We Remember* makes a binding commitment to ensure that 'evil does not prevail over good as it did for millions of the children of Jewish people...Humanity cannot permit all that to happen again'. 'Most especially', we read in the Vatican document, 'we ask our Jewish friends whose terrible fate has become a symbol of the aberrations of which man is capable when he turns against God, to hear us with open hearts," Cassidy, "We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah -- The Aftermath," given at *The International Consultation of The International Council of Christians and Jews: Unity without Uniformity, The*

that bedevil Christian-Jewish relations, we would contribute to the healing of the wounds of the world, the *tiqqun 'olam* (the mending of the world) which the Talmud considers to be a necessary action in building a just world and preparing for the kingdom of the Most High."⁷⁶¹

Jewish scholar Michael A. Signer, in commenting on the fortieth anniversary of *Nostra Aetate*, offers a complementary point: "we Jews want to repair the world precisely because of our deep belief in a truth expressed by the book of Psalms, 'The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof.' What animates us as Jews is the ability to restore the divine foundations of humanity and the world by our actions that lead to restoring what has been broken by arrogance or neglect." Again, it strikes us that this comes down to a question of *teshuva*. Cardinal Cassidy, for example, advises that the Christian must go farther than atonement in the post-*Shoah* Jewish-Christian dialogue. He says, "It is not enough, however, to express repentance. Our sorrow and atonement for the tragedy of the *Shoah* is slowly giving way to "a new relationship between Catholics and Jews." 763

In some ways, our response as a church in creating a 'new relationship between Catholics and Jews' has been, pace Cassidy, a response deferred. The deletion, for example, from Nostra Aetate of: '[w]hoever despises or persecutes this [Jewish] people does injury to the Catholic Church', as we considered above, reechoes the Church's ambivalence around how it remembers its relationship with Judaism. We are reminded here of our reflections with the 'Hidden Encyclical'. While, in the later 1930s, when Pius XI was reminding the church that '[s]piritually,

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Challenge of Pluralism, Erlbach, Germany (23 – 26 August 1998), in From The Martin Buber House, Information and Documentation Bulletin of the International Council of Christians and Jews, No. 26, (ed.) Ruth Weyl (Spring 1999): 104.

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid*.

⁷⁶² Signer, "Nostra Aetate after 40 Years: A Decisive Change".

⁷⁶³ Cassidy, "We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah -- The Aftermath," 104.

we are all Semites,' at approximately the same time, the draft encyclical Humani Generis Unitas was warning 'against an over-familiarity with the Jewish community that might lead to customs and ways of thinking contrary to the standards of Christian life [§142].⁷⁶⁴ We are comforted that the draft was never published; we nevertheless mourn that '[w]hoever despises or persecutes this [Jewish] people does injury to the Catholic Church' was deleted from NA. This oscillation between a language of continuity, and its usurpation by the language of discontinuity, does little to assuage the lingering suspicion that our response for a 'new', 'intimate relatedness' with Judaism has been, at times, a hesitant response. A decisively empathic response, however, is the response Judaism deserves to hear; it is also a response that the Catholic Church continually needs to hear for itself. It is a form of return (teshuva) to our best selves through the affirmation of the other. Carroll argues, "[e]thics leads to theology – which is more than saying ethics leads to apology. And that is why I insist that apology is the beginning of something, not the end."⁷⁶⁵ Indeed, now is the time for engaging in an ethics of return by doing the teshuva work of challenging an antisemitism that "has found a place in Christian thought" -- this acknowledgement hastens a new empathy between Christianity and Judaism. ⁷⁶⁶

Our study has attempted to be more than an apology by arguing for *how* our response to the call of the other comes by way of making a return to the other through

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⁷⁶⁴ *Cf.* Chapter 5.

⁷⁶⁵ Carroll, "Thomas Merton and a Full Christian *Teshuva*," 51.

⁷⁶⁶ Cassidy, remarks given at International Liaison Committee, Prague (September 1990), *Information Service of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity* 75 (1990): 175 in "Why Dialogue? Some Reflections on Catholic-Jewish Dialogue," *Toward Greater Understanding: Essays in honor of John Cardinal O'Connor*, (ed.) Anthony J. Cernera (Fairfield, C.T.: Sacred Heart University Press, 1995), 35-53; 42: "It seems to me that as Christians we have a particular obligation to take the initiative in working to eliminate all forms of anti-semitism, for the faith that we profess is in a God of love, who reconciles man to God and man to man. If we are to serve Him we must too love each and every one of those whom he has created; and we do that by showing respect and concern for our neighbor, by promoting peace and justice, by knowing how to pardon. *That anti-semitism has found a place in Christian thought and practice calls for an act of* Teshuva *and of reconciliation on our part as we gather in this city [Prague], which is a witness to our failure to be authentic witnesses to our faith at times in the past."*

empathy. The intentionality of a remembering empathy, which is a remembering love; the deep intention of Nostra Aetate, runs the risk of being compromised if our response to our Jewish brothers and sisters continues to oscillate between an ecclesial, hierarchical ratification of Catholicism's consanguinity with Judaism, and a hidden desire to supersede it. What is needed is a change of heart. While official statements are helpful in naming what the hopes are for a 'new' relationship, the intention of empathy encourages a devotion to Otherness; what Heschel calls kavanah. The empathic intentionality of kavanah may move us closer to the eschatological realization of peace and justice amongst people of faith: "Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more (Isaiah 2:3-4)." As Purcell argues, "theology", and the theological endeavor of authentic inter-religious dialogue, "will only ever be worthy of the name when it is attentive to the holiness of neighbour, that is, when it is ethically redeemed."⁷⁶⁸ While not wanting to belabor the point, I would like to briefly reprise, by way of conclusion to both this chapter and our study, what the intentionality of empathy 'looks' like in terms of devotion to otherness.

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⁷⁶⁷ Heschel, "The God of Israel and Christian Renewal," [originally published in *Renewal of Religious Thought: Proceedings of the Congress on Theology of the Church Centenary in Canada, 1867-1967*, (ed.) L. K. Shook (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1968), 105-129.] in *MgSa* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), 268-285; 283.

⁷⁶⁸ Michael Purcell, "'Levinas And Theology'? The Scope And Limits Of Doing Theology With Levinas," *Heythrop Journal* 44/4 (October 2003): 468-479, 468.

Concluding Remarks: Empathy as Kavanah.

Jews and Christians are being challenged to find a way beyond the possibility of not receiving the other. On 23 February 2003, The Joint Commission for the Jewish-Catholic Dialogue renewed the dialogue at *Grottaferrata*:

...[T]he basis for our ongoing dialogue must be truthfulness and honesty, respecting our different religious identities. We are dialoguing as people of faith having common spiritual roots and patrimony. Dialogue is a value in itself and excludes any intention of converting...We take into account our different traditions and respect each other in our otherness. We feel the call to proclaim testimony to the One God in the world and we are willing to cooperate in fostering common religious values, peace with justice, truth and love. 769

When Jews and Christians say together we feel the call to proclaim testimony to the One God in the world and we are willing to cooperate in fostering common religious values, one may not help but be drawn to a deeper appreciation for how Nostra Aetate, through its lights and shadows, is opening up the possibility for a more serious dialogue wherein our shared Jewish-Christian memory for the One God may enflame a hermeneutics from empathy. Yet, the application of this hermeneutic depends on how interreligious dialogists, and all people of good will, live from a desire to participate in the diversity of otherness through dialogue and friendship.

Heschel describes kavanah as an "inner participation"; a participation "of the heart", where ritual and deed come together through the "awareness" of the Other. The prophetic witness is one who approaches life with a *kavanah* intentionality: "kavanah is awareness of an ineffable situation". 770 One experiences the 'work' of

⁷⁶⁹ Joint Statement (Roma, Grottaferrata: 23 – 27 February 2003): <www.vatican.va/ roman curia/pontifical councils/chrstuni/relations-jews-docs/rc pc chrstuni doc 20030226 grottaferrata-meeting en.html> accessed on 7 April 2008.

Heschel, MQG, 136-137. See: Rabbenu Yonah, Commentary on Alfassi, Berachoth, Ch. 4, beginning, in MQG, 84: "In the words of the Mishnah, kavanah means 'to direct the heart to the text or content of the prayer." Also see: Rivka Horwitz, "Abraham Joshua Heschel On Prayer And His Hasidic Sources," Modern Judaism 19 (1999): 293-310, 301-302: "Heschel's thought emphasizes kavanah-intention. In this respect he is close to Maimonides who was in many ways his mentor and whom he quotes. The affinity between Hasidism and Maimonides, and their reliance on him is an important theme which has not yet been sufficiently studied [See: Heschel, Man's Quest For God, p. 66; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, "Tefillah," 4, 15]. In the Laws of Tefillah 4, 15, Maimonides wrote:

the ritual as a deepening of awareness; an *awakening* to the presence of God -- i.e., "awaking in the presence of God, we strive not to acquire objective knowledge, but to deepen the *mutual* allegiance of man and God."⁷⁷¹ Through the intentionality of *kavanah* we "pour our perception, volition, memory, thought, hope, feeling, dreams, all that is moving in us, into one tone" so that the "devotion of the heart" might again "correspond" to God's pathos in the world. And this devotion comes in a form of "self-expression" that ought to be respected. ⁷⁷²

Heschel argues in 1954, in an essay entitled The Person and the World,

What we said about self-expression applies to empathy. There is no such thing as *absolute* empathy, as empathy without expression. Genuine response to the liturgical word is more than an automatic echo; it is an answer of the whole person. Empathy, moreover, is evocative; it calls up what is hidden.⁷⁷³

The intentionality of *kavanah* presupposes a kind of *empathic* awakening. And please notice here that an '*absolute*' empathy — an empathy *without* the I's unique 'expression'— is nothing more than the 'automatic echo' of a direct *sym-pathos*. The inwardness of *kavanah*-participation, *perforce*, disposes us towards otherness.

Correspondingly, Stein argues that the person calls up 'what is hidden' in oneself through *turning toward* absolute being. Stein argues (and one hears the echo

^{&#}x27;Prayer without kavanah is no prayer at all. He who has prayed without kavanah ought to pray once more....If one is weary or distressed, it is forbidden to pray until one's mind is composed.' Maimonides cites the sages who considered that one should wait three days without praying when one returns from a journey. Rabbinical authorities after Maimonides did not follow this line of spontaneity as they were more eager to emphasize regularity. Wanting to stress kavanah, Heschel returns to Maimonides. This approach is typical to early Hasidism and is an attitude with which Heschel grew up and a learning that he absorbed and followed. Heschel used early Hasidism and Maimonides to moderate Halakha and make it more tolerant. Not only did he use Maimonides to strengthen kavanah, he also quotes him to teach a person how to prepare for it: 'One must free his heart from all other thoughts and regard himself as standing in the presence of the Shechinah. Therefore before engaging in prayer, the worshipper ought to go aside a little in order to put himself into a devotional frame of mind, and then he must pray quietly and with feeling, not like one who carries a weight and throws it away and goes farther' (Tefillah, 4,16) [see: Heschel, MQG, p. 87]...Heschel emphasizes the need to seek God, the demands of the heart. He wishes to awaken the Jew to inwardness: 'God seeks the heart,' Rahmana liba bae. He criticizes those who claim that meticulous attention to the laws is the main thing in Judaism: the observance of the Shulhan Aruch [halacha] should be accompanied by inwardness." ⁷⁷¹ Heschel, *MQG*, 12.

⁷⁷² *Ibid.*, 32.

⁷⁷³ *Ibid*.

of Reinach) that "a free turning toward absolute being" means "liberation", where a *turning towards* is akin to, in Heschel's terms, being empathically awakened to a world of otherness: one is "motivated in a positive attitude that belongs to the personal being toward some be-ing". And the existential turning towards the other presupposes an intellectual openness to the memory of the other. Stein says on memory:

My freedom of memory consists in my ability to turn to the thing that comes to mind, to concern myself with it in an intention that makes it present and in a whole series of intentions that go with it and pass into one another as they are motivated.⁷⁷⁵

Through the act of remembering the proverbial pebble is dropped into the still pond. I *concern* myself with a memory. Yet this memory reverberates outward, encouraging other memories and broadening my intentionality. In terms of *kavanah*, the prophetic (interreligious) witness's self-expression of "empathy with [her] people and their past" incarnates a remembering love. The 'inner participation' of 'my' heart *turns towards* an outward-oriented participation with the other. This ever increasing memory of the other, and the praxis this entails, reminds 'me' that 'I' am "not alone" but in solidarity with otherness. The stein argues,

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⁷⁷⁴ Stein, *PA*, 216.

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid., 368.

⁷⁷⁶ Horwitz, "Abraham Joshua Heschel On Prayer And His Hasidic Sources," 300: "By using the term 'prayers of empathy,' he distances himself in a way from the Halakhic commandment, perhaps so as not to lose contact with the modern Jew. When a Jew prays out of empathy with the Jewish community, Heschel says he prays out of empathy with his people and their past. Prayers of empathy allow us entry into our own prayer book, in which we will find the spirit of Israel: the thought of the Prophets, of the great Zaddikim and of the learned masters of all generations. For it is their prayers we find in the prayer book. For Heschel, these prayers lift us and allow the music of the generations to play in our hearts."

The Stein, PA, 387: "When we meet a living soul, we feel inwardly affected in a quite different way than when we meet lifeless things... We are 'alone' as long as there is nothing near at hand (as far as we can tell) that can touch us inwardly or that we can touch inwardly. At times we realize for the first time that we are not alone when we are inwardly affected this way. What does 'not alone' mean? I sense contact with something like myself and what is more with something whose life is one with my own. I sense along with it, 'so to speak,' what befalls it, what threatens it. Moreover, I may 'scent' something hostile or friendly in it -- and I may scent this in myself. I automatically notice its attitude to me -- timid, trusting, or indifferent, ready to attack or to flee -- and I adopt corresponding attitudes in myself."

intellectual openness enables us to follow and understand -- not just be affected by -- the life of the soul of others disclosed to us. It is not merely life as such that is united here but to a much greater degree a specific life; I am referring to the spiritual activity involved in sharing one other's [sic] thoughts, feelings etc. and in thinking, feeling, willing together.⁷⁷⁸

And through this "unity of life" I come to know others not as "analogues of myself" but I come to "know them in such a way that with them I have more 'power,' for their mere presence strengthens me." Beyond any idea of 'absolute empathy', the presence of the other as other strengthens me. The richness of diversity in self-expression is the very heightening of being. This turning towards the fullness of being human through an increasing concern for otherness, through the intergivenness between oneself and the diversity of others, may ultimately mean "a heightening in being, a raising to a higher mode of being" that "we call 'grace". ⁷⁸⁰

The intentionality of kavanah may help theologians and dialogists realize that our *turning toward* a new relationship with Judaism is a turning toward a privileged place that is already full of grace and wonder. A *kavanah*-intentionality, as we have been arguing for throughout our study, needs to be the intentionality of the Catholic dialogist with Judaism. Donald Grayston argues, "Anti-Semitism eclipses kinship; hyper-empathy eclipses difference. Thus when the partial eclipse of difference is acknowledged and we move back from it, we can see how kinship and difference can stand in right relation to each other." Now is the time for deepening a 'mutual allegiance'; an empathy with Judaism that leaves room for self-expression

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⁷⁷⁸ Stein, *PA*, 389.

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 387-388.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 217.

⁷⁸¹ Horwitz, "Abraham Joshua Heschel On Prayer And His Hasidic Sources," 303: "The emphasis, according to Heschel, is on *kavanah*, on the heart, on communion, on the duties of the body which are related to the duties of the heart."

⁷⁸² Donald Grayston, "Thomas Merton, The Holocaust, and the Eclipse of Difference," in *Merton and Judaism*, 83-104; 96.

and uniqueness. Certainly, our relationship with Judaism has the complexion of mystery.

Heschel, soon after the promulgation of *Nostra Aetate*, concluded that all people of faith and good-will are 'marked' with an eschatological sensitivity to diversity:

Religion is a means, not an end. It becomes idolatrous when it becomes an end in itself...[d]oes not the all-inclusiveness of God contradict the exclusiveness of any particular religion? The prospect of all men embracing one form of religion remains an eschatological hope. What about here and now? Is it not blasphemous to say: I alone have all the truth and the grace...[d]oes not the task of preparing the Kingdom of God require a diversity of talents, a variety of rituals, soul-searching as well as opposition? Perhaps it is the will of God that in this eon there should be diversity in our forms of devotion and commitment...⁷⁸³

Heschel's words may only encourage Jews and Christians to move closer towards the mystery of, as Cardinal Lercaro argued, a 'shared eternal Pasch'. We may do so by firstly leaving behind any "messianic calculations," and then engage in the eschatologically *humble* task of *tiqqun olam*.⁷⁸⁴ A repairing of the world through an

⁷⁸³ Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 244-245.

⁷⁸⁴ Heschel, *IEE*, 163-166: "There is, moreover, a passage in the New Testament that seems to reflect the belief of the early Christian community in the restoration of the kingdom to the Jewish people. According to the Book of Acts, the disciples to whom Jesus presented himself alive after his passion, asked him: 'Lord, is it at this time that thou restorest the kingdom of Israel?' And he said to them: 'No one can know times and seasons which the Father fixed by His own authority' (Acts 1: 6-7). What is the meaning of this question and this answer? It was a time when Jerusalem was taken away from the Jewish people, the holy temple destroyed, Jews sold into slavery. Pagan Rome ruled in the Holy Land. But there was hope, a hope of deliverance from the pagans, there was the promise offered by the prophets, of returning Jerusalem to the kingdom of Israel. It was the most urgent of questions. So when they saw Jesus for the first time in these extraordinary circumstances, it is understandable that this was the first question they asked, their supreme concern: 'Is it at this time that thou restorest the kingdom?' In other words, they asked about the restoration. Jesus' answer was that the times of fulfillment of the divine promise were matters which lay within the Father's sole authority. So, earlier, he had assured them that he himself did not know the day or hour of his parousia. 'But of that day or the hour [of the parousia] no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father' (Mark 13:32). A similar awareness is common in Rabbinic literature. 'Nobody knows when the house of David will be restored.' According to Rabbi Shimeon the Lakish (ca. 250), 'I have revealed it to my heart, but not to the angels.' Jesus' answer is as characteristic of the Rabbinic mind of the age as the question...the simple meaning of the entire passage has a perfect Sitz im Leben, and both question and answer must be understood in the spirit of their times. The Apostles were Jews and evidently shared the hope of their people of seeing the kingdom of God realized in the restoration of Israel's national independence. So now, hearing their Master speak of the new age, they asked if this was to be the occasion for restoring the kingdom of Israel. We can scarcely fail to realize or to understand the naturalness of their question. The expectation was burned into their very being by the tyranny of the Roman rule. The answer confirms the expectation that the kingdom will be restored to Israel -- an expectation expressed again and again in ancient Jewish liturgy. The point in history at

engagement that searches for an ever-deepening inclusivity -- i.e., *Einfühlung*, in the midst of a widening plurality.

which that restoration will take place remains the secret of the Father [see: F.F. Bruce, Commentary on the Book of the Acts (Grand Rapids, 1954), 38.]...Jesus' answer is not a rebuke of the Apostles' hope; it is, rather, a discouragement of Messianic calculations (see Luke 17:20-21)."

Appendix 1: The Meaning of This Hour (1938) by Abraham Joshua Heschel [AH'38]. 785

The essential part of this essay was originally delivered in March 1938 at a conference of Quaker leaders in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany. It was expanded and published in 1943.

§1: Emblazoned over the gates of the world in which we live is the escutcheon of the demons. The mark of Cain in the face of man has come to overshadow the likeness of God. There has never been so much guilt and distress, agony, and terror. At no time has the earth been so soaked with blood. Fellowmen turned out to be evil ghosts, monstrous and weird. Ashamed and dismayed, we ask: Who is responsible?

§2: History is a pyramid of efforts and errors; yet at times it is the Holy Mountain on which God holds judgment over the nations. Few are privileged to discern God's judgment in history. But all may be guided by the words of the *Baal Shem*:

§3: If a man has beheld evil, he may know that it was shown to him in order that he learn his own guilt and repent; for what is shown to him is also within him.

§4: We have trifled with the name of God. We have taken the ideals in vain. We have called for the Lord. He came. And was ignored. We have preached but eluded Him. We have praised but defied Him. Now we reap the fruits of our failure. Through centuries His voice cried in the wilderness. How skillfully It was trapped and imprisoned in the temples! How often It was drowned or distorted! Now we behold how It gradually withdraws, abandoning one people after another, departing from their souls, despising their wisdom. The taste for the good has all but gone from the earth. Men heap spite upon cruelty, malice upon atrocity.

§5: The horrors of our time fill our souls with reproach and everlasting shame. We have profaned the word of God, and we have given the wealth of our land, the ingenuity of our minds and the dear lives of our youth to tragedy and perdition. There has never been more reason for man to be ashamed than now. Silence hovers mercilessly over many dreadful lands. The day of the Lord is a day without the Lord. Where is God? Why didst Thou not halt the trains loaded with Jews being led to slaughter? It is so hard to rear a child, to nourish and to educate. Why dost Thou make it so easy to kill? Like Moses, we hide our face; for we are afraid to look upon *Elohim*, upon His power of judgment. Indeed, where were we when men learned to hate in the days of starvation? When raving madmen were sowing wrath in the hearts of the unemployed?

§6: Let modern dictatorship not serve as an alibi for our conscience. We have failed to fight for right, for justice, for goodness; as a result we must fight against wrong, against injustice, against evil. We have failed to offer sacrifices on the altar of peace; thus we offered sacrifices on the altar of war. A tale is told of a band of inexperienced mountain climbers. Without guides, they struck recklessly into the wilderness. Suddenly a rocky ledge gave way beneath their feet and they tumbled headlong into a

⁷⁸⁵ Heschel, "The Meaning of This Hour," in MQG, 147-151.

dismal pit. In the darkness of the pit they recovered from their shock only to find themselves set upon by a swarm of angry snakes. Every crevice became alive with fanged, hissing things. For each snake the desperate men slew, ten more seemed to lash out in its place. Strangely enough, one man seemed to stand aside from the fight. When indignant voices of his struggling companions reproached him for not fighting, he called back: If we remain here, we shall be dead before the snakes. I am searching for a way of escape from the pit for all of us.

§7: Our world seems not unlike a pit of snakes. We did not sink into the pit in 1939, or even in 1933. We had descended into it generations ago, and the snakes have sent their venom into the bloodstream of humanity, gradually paralyzing us, numbing nerve after nerve, dulling our minds, darkening our vision. Good and evil, that were once as real as day and night, have become a blurred mist. In our every-day life we worshiped force, despised compassion, and obeyed no law but our unappeasable appetite. The vision of the sacred has all but died in the soul of man. And when greed, envy and the reckless will to power came to maturity, the serpents cherished in the bosom of our civilization broke out of their dens to fall upon the helpless nations.


§8: The outbreak of war was no surprise. It came as a long expected sequel to a spiritual disaster. Instilled with the gospel that truth is mere advantage and reverence weakness, people succumbed to the bigger advantage of a lie – "the Jew is our misfortune" – and to the power of arrogance – "tomorrow the whole world shall be ours," "the peoples' democracies must depend upon force." The roar of bombers over Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, was but the echo of thoughts bred for years by individual brains, and later applauded by entire nations. It was through our failure that people started to suspect that science is a device for exploitation; parliaments pulpits for hypocrisy, and religion a pretext for a bad conscience. In the tantalized souls of those who had faith in ideals, suspicion became a dogma and contempt the only solace. Mistaking the abortions of their conscience for intellectual heroism, many thinkers employ clever pens to scold and to scorn the reverence for life, the awe for truth, the loyalty to justice. Man, about to hang himself, discovers it is easier to hang others.

§9: The conscience of the world was destroyed by those who were wont to blame others rather than themselves. Let us remember. We revered the instincts but distrusted the prophets. We labored to perfect engines and let our inner life go to wreck. We ridiculed superstition until we lost our ability to believe. We have helped to extinguish the light our fathers had kindled. We have bartered holiness for convenience, loyalty for success, love for power, wisdom for information, tradition for fashion.

§10: We cannot dwell at ease under the sun of our civilization as our ancestors thought we could. What was in the minds of our martyred brothers in their last hours? They died with disdain and scorn for a civilization in which the killing of civilians could become a carnival of fun, for a civilization which gave us mastery over the forces of nature but lost control over the forces of our self.

- **§11:** Tanks and planes cannot redeem humanity, nor the discovery of guilt by association nor suspicion. A man with a gun is like a beast without a gun. The killing of snakes will save us for the moment but not forever. The war has outlasted the victory of arms as we failed to conquer the infamy of the soul: the indifference to crime, when committed against others. For evil is indivisible. It is the same in thought and in speech, in private and in social life. The greatest task of our time is to take the souls of men out of the pit. The world has experienced that God is involved. Let us forever remember that the sense for the sacred is as vital to us as the light of the sun. There can be no nature without spirit, no world without the *Torah*, no brotherhood without a father, no humanity without attachment to God.
- §12: God will return to us when we shall be willing to let Him into our banks and factories, into our Congress and clubs, into our courts and investigating committees, into our homes and theaters. For God is everywhere or nowhere, the Father of all men or no man, concerned about everything or nothing. Only in His Presence shall we learn that the glory of man is not in his will to power, but in his power of compassion. Man reflects either the image of His Presence or that of a beast.
- §13: Soldiers in the horror of battle offer solemn testimony that life is not a hunt for pleasure, but an engagement for service; that there are things more valuable than life; that the world is not a vacuum. Either we make it an altar for God or it is invaded by demons. There can be no neutrality. Either we are ministers of the sacred or slaves of evil. Let the blasphemy of our time not become an eternal scandal. Let future generations not loathe us for having failed to preserve what prophets and saints, martyrs and scholars have created in thousands of years. The apostles of force have shown that they are great in evil. Let us reveal that we can be as great in goodness. We will survive if we shall be as fine and sacrificial in our homes and offices, in our Congress and clubs as our soldiers are on the fields of battle.
- **§14:** There is a divine dream which the prophets and rabbis have cherished and which fills our prayers, and permeates the acts of true piety. It is the dream of a world, rid of evil by the grace of God as well as by the efforts of man, by his dedication to the task of establishing the kingship of God in the world. God is waiting for us to redeem the world. We should not spend our life hunting for trivial satisfactions while God is waiting constantly and keenly for our effort and devotion.
- §15: The Almighty has not created the universe that we may have opportunities to satisfy our greed, envy and ambition. We have not survived that we may waste our years in vulgar vanities. The martyrdom of millions demands that we consecrate ourselves to the fulfillment of God's dream of salvation. Israel did not accept the Torah of their own free will. When Israel approached Sinai, God lifted up the mountain and held it over their heads, saying: "Either you accept the *Torah* or be crushed beneath the mountain."
- **§16:** The mountain of history is over our heads again. Shall we renew the covenant with God?

Appendix 2: The White Crucifixion.



THE WHITE CRUCIFIXION
by Marc Chagall
1938, 153 x 140 cm
© 2001 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York / ADAGP Paris.

Appendix 3: 2 Samuel 21: 1 - 22. 786

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During David's reign there was a famine for three successive years. David had recourse to the LORD, who said, "There is bloodguilt on Saul and his family because he put the Gibeonites to death."

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So the king called the Gibeonites and spoke to them. (Now the Gibeonites were not Israelites, but survivors of the Amorites; and although the Israelites had given them their oath, Saul had attempted to kill them off in his zeal for the men of Israel and Judah.)

David said to the Gibeonites, "What must I do for you and how must I make atonement, that you may bless the inheritance of the LORD?"

The Gibeonites answered him, "We have no claim against Saul and his house for silver or gold, nor is it our place to put any man to death in Israel." Then he said, "I will do for you whatever you propose."

They said to the king, "As for the man who was exterminating us and who intended to destroy us that we might have no place in all the territory of Israel,

let seven men from among his descendants be given to us, that we may dismember them before the LORD in Gibeon, on the LORD'S mountain." The king replied, "I will give them up."

The king, however, spared Meribbaal, son of Jonathan, son of Saul, because of the LORD'S oath that formed a bond between David and Saul's son Jonathan.

But the king took Armoni and Meribbaal, the two sons that Aiah's daughter Rizpah had borne to Saul, and the five sons of Saul's daughter Merob that she had borne to Adriel, son of Barzillai the Meholathite,

and surrendered them to the Gibeonites. They then dismembered them on the mountain before the LORD. The seven fell at the one time; they were put to death during the first days of the harvest--that is, at the beginning of the barley harvest.

Then Rizpah, Aiah's daughter, took sackcloth and spread it out for herself on the rock from the beginning of the harvest until rain came down on them from the sky, fending off the birds of the sky from settling on them by day, and the wild animals by night.

When David was informed of what Rizpah, Aiah's daughter, the concubine of Saul, had done,

⁷⁸⁶ NAB Online: < http://www.usccb.org/nab/bible/2samuel/2sa

he went and obtained the bones of Saul and of his son Jonathan from the citizens of Jabesh-gilead, who had carried them off secretly from the public square of Beth-shan, where the Philistines had hanged them at the time they killed Saul on Gilboa.

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When he had brought up from there the bones of Saul and of his son Jonathan, the bones of those who had been dismembered were also gathered up.

Then the bones of Saul and of his son Jonathan were buried in the tomb of his father Kish at Zela in the territory of Benjamin. After all that the king commanded had been carried out, God granted relief to the land.

There was another battle between the Philistines and Israel. David went down with his servants and fought the Philistines, but David grew tired.

Dadu, one of the Rephaim, whose bronze spear weighed three hundred shekels, was about to take him captive. Dadu was girt with a new sword and planned to kill David,

but Abishai, son of Zeruiah, came to his assistance and struck and killed the Philistine. Then David's men swore to him, "You must not go out to battle with us again, lest you quench the lamp of Israel."

After this there was another battle with the Philistines in Gob. On that occasion Sibbecai, from Husha, killed Saph, one of the Rephaim.


There was another battle with the Philistines in Gob, in which Elhanan, son of Jair from Bethlehem, killed Goliath of Gath, who had a spear with a shaft like a weaver's heddle-bar.

There was another battle at Gath in which there was a man of large stature with six fingers on each hand and six toes on each foot--twenty-four in all. He too was one of the Rephaim.

And when he insulted Israel, Jonathan, son of David's brother Shimei, killed him.

These four were Rephaim in Gath, and they fell at the hands of David and his servants.

Appendix 4: The Old Testament Trinity.



THE OLD TESTAMENT TRINITY
by Andre Rublev
c. 1410. Tempera on wood. 142 x 114 c.
The Tretyakov Gallery
Moscow, Russia

Appendix 5: Good Friday Revision. 787

On February 5, 2008 a reformulation by Pope Benedict XVI of the 1962 Tridentine Rite Good Friday Prayer for the Jews was made public. This followed the "Motu Proprio" edict of July 2007 in which Pope Benedict widened the use of the 1962 Latin Tridentine missal.

The Good Friday Prayer for Jews, revised after the Second Vatican Council and officially approved in 1970 for the Roman Missal, reads:

Let us pray for the Jewish people, the first to hear the word of God, that they may continue to grow in the love of his name and in faithfulness to his covenant.

Almighty and eternal God, long ago you gave your promise to Abraham and his posterity.

Listen to your church as we pray that the people you first made your own may arrive at the fullness of redemption.

The newly-formulated Good Friday prayer applies only to the 1962 missal, and its use among Roman Catholic Christians will be the exception. The original Good Friday prayer in the 1962 Latin missal, from which the phrase, "faithless Jews," - from the Latin 'perfidis' - had already been deleted in 1960, read: (Translation from Latin)

Let us pray also for the Jews:
that almighty God may remove the veil from their hearts;
so that they too may acknowledge Jesus Christ our Lord.
Let us pray. Let us kneel. Arise.
Almighty and eternal God, who doest not exclude from thy mercy the Jews:
hear our prayers, which we offer for the blindness of that people;
that acknowledging the light of thy Truth, which is Christ,
they may be delivered from their darkness.

In an effort to remove derogatory language toward Jews, this Tridentine rite prayer - which retains the 1962 heading "Prayer for the Conversion of the Jews" - has been reformulated as follows: (Translation from Latin)

We pray for the Jews.

That our God and Lord enlighten their hearts so that they recognize Jesus Christ, the Savior of all mankind. Let us pray. Kneel down. Arise.

Eternal God Almighty, you want all people to be saved and to arrive at the knowledge of the Truth, graciously grant that by the entry of the abundance of all people into your Church, Israel will be saved. Through Christ our Lord.

⁷⁸⁷ *Good Friday Revision*, promulgated on 5 February 2008: http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/cjrelations/news/Prayer_for_Jews.htm accessed on 10 February 2008.

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
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
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