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Studies on Anti-Immigration Attitudes and Discriminatory Behaviour towards Ethnic Minorities in Irish and European Contexts

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Dublin, Trinity College, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Social Sciences and Philosophy

2020

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Under the Supervision of

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Declaration

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Summary

Immigration has become a salient issue in recent years with anti-immigration attitudes prevalent in many European countries (Gijsberts et al., 2004; Meuleman et al., 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Davidov and Semyonov, 2017). The main aim of this thesis is to examine prejudice, via anti-immigration sentiment, and discriminatory behaviour in Ireland and other European countries.

The thesis has three, broad, main aims: i) to examine the hypothesis that anti-migrant sentiment can be explained via the perceived objective and economic threat which migrants pose to the native population, ii) to examine attitudes towards specific sub-groups of migrants which reflect the current migratory inflows and public debate, with a particular focus on Muslim migrants and asylum seekers, and iii) to investigate the extent of discrimination towards ethnic minorities in the Irish context. The thesis consists of four separate papers which constitute four empirical chapters (chapters 2-5), an introduction (chapter 1) and a conclusion (chapter 6).

Study one (chapter 2) examines if individuals in occupations and sectors which i) are exposed to economic decline as measured by job losses, and ii) which have a greater share of migrants, are more likely to express anti-immigrant sentiment in the Irish context. Two rich datasets, the European Social Survey and the Labour Force Survey, covering the period from 2008 to 2016, are used to empirically test the economic threat hypothesis. The study finds that, consistent with the threat hypothesis, job losses and a greater share of migrants within occupational and sectoral levels are negatively associated with attitudes towards immigration and acceptance of migrants. Furthermore, the study finds that the change in job growth year-on-year has an impact on attitudes. Therefore suggesting that, in the short-term, job losses do lead to a decreased acceptance towards migrants for individuals affected by the economic decline.

Study two (chapter 3) uses the European Social Survey (2002, 2014 and 2016) to examine the role of the threat hypothesis as a determinant of anti-asylum

sentiment, cross-nationally. It considers i) if threat related to economic resources and the size of the ethnic group is associated with more negative sentiment and ii) if asylum seekers are perceived as a distinct sub-group of migrants in need of help and thus is there greater willingness to help and tolerance towards this group. The study finds that greater levels of generalised trust and trust in national institutions are associated with greater support towards asylum seekers. However, in contrast to the threat hypothesis, unemployed individuals and countries with higher rates of unemployment show greater support for asylum seekers rather than more resistance. The study also points to divided attitudes across Europe and the need to examine attitudes towards asylum seekers and migrants separately.

Study 3 (chapter 4) uses the seventh round of the European Social Survey and linking it to other data sources, examines i) if there is greater opposition towards Muslim migrants than towards migrants in general, and ii) if the threat hypothesis in relation to security, the size of ethnic group and integration can account for anti-Muslim sentiment. The analysis shows that in most European countries there is significantly greater opposition to Muslim immigration than immigration in general, particularly in Eastern Europe. On the country level, objective measures of threat do not explain the pattern of cross-country variation. Countries with a higher share of Muslims and higher incidence of terrorist attacks are more welcoming towards further Muslim immigration. Furthermore, the study finds that women are more opposed to Muslim immigration than men.

While studies 1-3 focus on survey data and overt attitudes, the final study (chapter 5) focuses on discriminatory behaviour. The study collects primary data via a field experiment i) to detect discrimination in the Irish housing market and, ii) to measure the extent of this discrimination. The study uses established methods in the area of correspondence studies and focuses on Irish, Polish and Nigerian nationals. This field experiment is the first experiment on the housing rental market in the Irish context. The study finds evidence of ethnic and gender discrimination as ethnic minority applicants and men are less likely to be invited to view an apartment than Irish applicants and women. Findings suggest that Nigerian applicants are the most disadvantaged when looking for rental property.

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Abbreviations

CSO	Central Statistics Office
EC	European Commission
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMN	European Migration Network
EPSC	European Political Strategy Centre
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ILO	International Labour Organization
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations
LFS	Labour Force Survey
MGCFA	Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis
NACE	'Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes' (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities)
NMS	New Member State
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
TCN	Third Country National
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US/USA	United States/ United States of America
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators

Country Codes

AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CH	Switzerland
CZ	Czechia
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
EE	Estonia
ES	Spain
FI	Finland
FR	France
GR	Greece
HU	Hungary
IE	Ireland
IS	Iceland
IT	Italy
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
LV	Latvia
NL	Netherlands
NO	Norway
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania

SE	Sweden
SK	Slovakia
SI	Slovenia
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States

Chapter 1: Introduction

In 2017, there were almost 258 million international migrants residing globally. Over 60 per cent of all international migrants reside in Europe and Asia[1], with Europe remaining one of the leading receiving destinations (UN, 2017). While immigration is a not a new phenomenon in Europe, it has become a salient issue in recent years. For example, it was one of the key issues in the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union (Clarke et al., 2017; Migration Observatory, 2019).

The rise of right-wing parties in Europe in recent years has also been marked by anti-immigration rhetoric with immigration becoming one of the key areas of focus for populist parties in the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden (Kehrberg, 2007; BBC, 2018).

Recent terrorist attacks in Belgium, France and Germany further fuelled debates regarding immigration, particularly in relation to integration and security (Erlanger, 2016). The refugee crisis, which began in 2013, added to the debate with a noticeable shift from initial humanitarian concerns to economic and security fears in political and public spheres and in the representation of the crisis in the European media (Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017).

The increasing presence of migrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities in Europe has led to debates regarding the economic, social and cultural impact of newcomers on the receiving societies (Davidov and Semyonov, 2017).

A large body of literature on public attitudes towards immigrants indicates that anti-immigration sentiment is prevalent in European societies (see Meuleman et al., 2009, Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010 for a review). While overall attitudes towards migrants have remained stable over time, empirical studies indicate an increase in anti-immigration sentiment, particularly in the early 2000s (Davidov and Semyonov, 2017). Since 2008, public attitudes have moved towards a more

[1] In 2017, approximately 30 per cent of all international migrants were residing in Europe. Asia was the main destination continent with 31 per cent of all international migrants (UN, 2017).

restrictive approach to immigration, particularly in countries more strongly affected by economic recession (Billiet et al., 2014).

Figure 1.1 illustrates attitudes towards immigration[2] in Europe using the latest round of the European Social Survey data (ESS), with higher scores indicating greater support. Cross-national differences can be observed across Europe. For example, in Iceland the average score is 7.1 indicating overall pro-immigration views. In contrast, the lowest score can be observed in Hungary with 3.6 score indicating greater prevalence of anti-immigration sentiment.

Figure 1.1 Support for Immigration in Europe



Source: ESS (2016a) and ESS (2014a).
Note: Attitudes are measured on an eleven point scale, with higher scores indicating greater support for immigration. Data for Denmark is from 2014 as it did not participate in round 8 in 2016. Weighted results using post-stratification weights. Table with figures is included in the Appendix (see section 1.6).

This thesis examines anti-immigration sentiment in a comparative European context and in an Irish setting using rich primary and secondary data. Each

[2] The scale is combined from three ESS questions regarding cultural, economic and overall impact of immigration. See Appendix in section 1.6 for exact wording of the 3 questions.

chapter contains a literature review, theoretical framework, and methodology used; hence the 4 papers[3] which constitute this thesis are self-contained. However, in order to contextualise the four papers, this chapter is structured as follows: firstly, the background, contextual information and a brief history regarding immigration to Europe and Ireland are presented. Secondly, the rationale and justification for studying attitudes and discriminatory behaviour are provided. The overall research questions of the thesis and the broader contribution to the literature are outlined. Finally, the main theoretical framework this thesis engages with, the methodology and data sources used are briefly discussed, drawing on their advantages and limitations.

1.1 Migration in Europe and Ireland: A Brief Overview

Immigration to Europe is not a new occurrence as European societies have experienced both emigration and immigration throughout their history. Since the mid-17th century, immigration has been shaping and influencing the social and economic composition of European societies (Moch, 2003) but post-war migratory movements in particular were unprecedented in their scope and scale (Castles and Miller, 2009).[4] Figure 1.2 illustrates inward migration to Europe from 1990 to 2017. Steady increases in inward migration can be observed.

[3] Throughout the thesis, the 4 empirical papers, which constitute this thesis, may be referred to as papers, studies, or chapters.

[4] See Bade (2003), Castles et al. (2013) and Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014) for a comprehensive overview of immigration history, patterns and trends in Europe.

Figure 1.2 Immigration to Europe, 1990 - 2017



Source: Eurostat (2019a).

Immigration to Europe can be divided into several phases (see Hansen, 2003; Castles et al., 2013; Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014). From the 1945 to 1970s most of the migration to European countries resulted from the 'guest-worker' schemes. Economic migrants from Southern Europe, Turkey and North Africa were recruited to Western Europe[5], in order to fill labour shortages during the economic recovery in the post-war period (Castles et al., 2013). In addition, countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, France and Belgium sourced additional workforce from their former colonies. Overall, Germany, France and Switzerland received over half of Western Europe's total post-war labour migrants, yet none of these countries expected the migrants to settle permanently (Miller, 2010). As the name implies, most 'guest-workers' were seen as temporary sojourners (Triandafyllidou et al., 2014).

From the 1970s to the 1980s, the European economy slowed down and was particularly impacted by the oil crisis (Eichengreen, 2008). This led to efforts to curb immigration by implementation of restrictive immigration policies and attempts to encourage 'guest-workers' to return to their home countries (Castles et al., 2013). While many did return, others chose to permanently settle in their host societies with family reunification following in time. Thus, altering the ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural composition of many European countries

[5] In particular by Germany, Belgium, France, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands (Castles et al., 2013).

(Solomos and Schuster, 2000) and leading to increased diversity and emergence of multicultural and multilingual societies (Castles et al., 2013).

The Schengen Agreement in 1985[6] and the Schengen Convention[7] led to the establishment of the Schengen Area which abolished internal EU borders[8] allowing for intra-EU movement. In addition, traditional countries of emigration in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) started to attract migrants from North Africa and South America due to labour shortages and economic revival. Ireland, also traditionally a country of emigration, started to experience inward migration from the late 1990s.

The early to mid-2000s were marked by two events which had significant repercussions for patterns of migration and treatment of migrants. First, the 9/11 bombings (2001) in New York and terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) brought increased focus on the overlap between immigration and security concerns (Karyotis, 2007). This particularly affected the Muslim population in Europe given that the majority of Muslims in Europe are of a migrant background (Cesari, 2013)[9]. The terrorist attacks in the early and mid-2000s brought the issue of Muslim migrants to the forefront of public and political debate and also led to increased anti-Muslim sentiment (Helbling, 2012a).

[6] The Schengen Agreement was signed in June 1985 between Belgium, France, West Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to abolish internal border checks between the five countries. It is defined as 'an agreement between some EU Member States and some neighbouring non-Member States to gradually remove controls and their common borders and introduce freedom of movement for all nationals of the signatory Member States, other Member States or third countries' (EMN, 2014a: 256).

[7] 'Legislation supplementing the Schengen Agreement and laying down the arrangements and safeguards for implementing freedom of movement' (EMNa, 2014: 257).

[8] Currently 22 EU states are in the Schengen Area (except for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom) and Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (EC, 2009a).

[9] Cesari (2004) has identified 3 phases of Muslim migration to Europe. Phase I – from the 1950s economic migration, primarily, from former colonies; Phase II – from the 1970s as 'guest workers' permanently settling in receiving countries; family reunification follows; and Phase III since the 1980s as asylum seekers and refugees. Bleich and Maxwell (2012) argue that despite diverse national and ethnic backgrounds, Muslims are often portrayed as a homogenous group in the European context.

Second, the EU enlargement in 2004 (and to a lesser extent enlargement in 2007) rapidly increased intra-EU migration from the New Member States (NMS). Ireland, one of the few countries which allowed immediate, unrestricted access to its labour market, experienced unprecedented inward migration (Quinn, 2010). During this period, a large share of migrants to Ireland came from the NMS to fill the labour and skill shortages in the booming economy. From the late 2000s, Europe entered a deep recession in 2009 (EC, 2009b). Recent migrants were severely affected by the economic downturn and experienced higher rates of job loss and unemployment across Europe (Fix et al., 2009). In the case of Ireland, this led to significant outward migration (Glynn et al., 2013).

As Europe emerged from the economic recession, inward immigration resumed (see figure 1.2). By 2017, the overall foreign-born[10] population constituted a substantial share of the total population in many European countries (see figure 1.3)[11].

[10] Country of birth is considered to be a more accurate measure of immigration status due to different rates of naturalisation in European countries as well as different regulations related to acquisition of nationality. See Fleischmann and Dronkers (2007).

[11] Official statistics are often used in cross-national research; however it is worthwhile noting that comparability can be limited due to availability of data (including different reference years) and collection of data methods. For example, OECD (2019a) note that data for the OECD foreign-born indicator may be collected through several methods, for example registers, residence permits, statistical surveys, or censuses, depending on the country.

Figure 1.3 Stock[12] of Foreign Born Population in Europe



Source: OECD (2019a) and Eurostat (2019b) used for AT, CZ, DE, FR, GR, IE, LT, PL, RO and UK. Eurostat (2019c) used for remaining countries. See abbreviations for country codes.
*Note: Data refer to 2017, except for *Ireland, Romania and Lithuania (2016) and **Poland and Czechia (2012).*

A large part of European migration is composed of intra-EU flows. In 2017 over one third[13] or approximately 44 per cent of foreign workers consisted of citizens of other EU Member States (see figure 1.4). As can be observed, the proportion of European workers varies from country to country, for example in Latvia only 3 per cent of foreign workers were from Europe in comparison to 85 per cent in Luxembourg.

[12] Stock data represents a 'snapshot' of a population at single point in time.
[13] Approximately 12.4 million out of just under 28 million foreigners of working age were EU Citizens (EC, 2019).

Figure 1.4 Share of European and non-European Migrants in Europe, 2017



Source: EC (2019).
Note: The figures refer to stock of foreign workers.

In addition, the recent refugee crisis has led to an unprecedented rise in the number of asylum applications and migrants attempting to reach Europe, often in dangerous and hazardous conditions. Figure 1.5 shows the trend in asylum applications in Europe since 2000. A significant increase can be noted since 2014.

Figure 1.5 Asylum Applications in Europe, 2000-2018



Source: Eurostat (2009) for 2000-2007 data and Eurostat (2019d) for 2008-2018 data.

Distinct consequences due to the recent inflows of refugees can be noted in European countries. Resources have become overstretched in the 'border' countries, particularly in the Mediterranean area, while other countries not previously accustomed to receiving asylum seekers have become crossing countries for the first time (e.g. Hungary). Others, such as Germany and Sweden, which could be classified as 'traditional' refugee receiving countries, have been dealing with a record number of applications since the start of the 'refugee crisis'.

Immigration has become one of the key issues for Europeans, with concerns related to the social and political consequences (Silver, 2018; Connor and Krogstad, 2018). It is predicted that migration is likely to increase in the coming decades (Hollifield, 2010; EPSC, 2018) and hence the salience of immigration is likely to grow.

1.2 Study Justification, Aims and Research Questions

Recent migratory and asylum trends and the increased presence of ethnic minorities, coupled with the relatively recent financial crisis, have led to concerns about the economic, social and cultural impact of immigration in Europe (Davidov and Semyonov, 2017). The main aim of this study is to examine anti-immigration sentiment. The research uses rich primary and secondary data to explore various facets of anti-immigration attitudes in Ireland and in a comparative European context. In addition to focusing on explicit attitudes towards migrants[14] via survey data, the thesis also investigates discriminatory behaviour, thus covering two important dimensions of prejudice; attitudes and behaviour.

[14] The term 'migrant' used here and throughout the thesis refers to a general category and includes all categories of migrants, for example economic migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, unless otherwise stated.

Prejudice can be defined as

> '*…any attitude, emotion or behaviour towards members of a group, which directly or indirectly implied some negativity or antipathy towards that group.' (Brown, 2010:7)*

The following sub-section details justifications for the study of negative attitudes and discriminatory behaviour towards migrants and ethnic minorities.

1.2.1 Why Study Attitudes?

An attitude can be defined as a tendency

> *'...to impute a certain degree of positive or negative evaluation to a given attitude object' (Jonas and Ziegler, 2007: 29).*

While individuals may hold specific attitudes towards social objects and constructions, an individual also shares collective attitudes with other members of their group which result in 'broad patterns of culture' (Allport, 1935: 789) or public opinion.

Public opinion towards migrants and minority groups can play a key role in future policy formation and may influence the decisions of politicians and policymakers (McGinnity et al., 2013). European societies are facing contrasting challenges in both attracting international migrants and attempting to manage migratory flows. The ageing population will result in a shrinking labour force in all European countries in the coming years. Fargues and McCormick (2013) predict that in the absence of immigration, the European labour force will decrease by approximately 7 per cent by 2025. In addition to demographic challenges, labour and skills shortages are often cited by employers and policymakers as one of the main reasons to attract migrants (EC, 2018) but increased global competition for certain skills impacts on Europe's ability to do so. In addition to demographic challenges and labour and skill shortages, policymakers must also take into consideration and balance the concerns of the native population, the needs of refugees, as well as the successful integration of

migrants (Heath et al., 2015). Migrant participation in the host country depends on the extent of their access to social, political, and economic rights as well as integration into the receiving society (Rudiger and Spencer, 2003). Hence attitudes of the native population can directly affect migrants' day-to-day experience in the host country. In the long-term, the host society's perception of migrants is an essential element of successful integration, therefore a better understanding of anti-immigration sentiment is crucial for overall social cohesion and the integration of migrants.

1.2.2. Why Study Discriminatory Behaviour?

In very broad terms, discrimination can be understood as differential or unequal treatment on the basis of one's group membership[15]. The focus of this thesis is on ethnic discrimination. A significant proportion of the European population is composed of migrants (UN, 2017). Discrimination against minority and non-dominant groups, including ethnic minorities is well-documented (Al Ramiah et al., 2010). In the European context, there is evidence of discrimination against migrants in a variety of settings and markets (Riach and Rich, 2002). Explicit prejudice and anti-immigration attitudes may pose great difficulties for the integration of ethnic minorities and for social cohesion. However, discriminatory behaviour is likely to have much more significant consequences for those who are discriminated against. Thus, measuring discrimination is important in order to better understand prejudice towards ethnic minorities.

1.2.3 Definitions and Terminology Used: Migrants versus Natives

Who are the Natives?

The main purpose of this thesis is to study the attitudes and behaviours of the majority group towards a minority group. In this context, the majority group of a receiving or host country is defined as the 'native' population of that particular State. For the purpose of this thesis, the native population is defined as individuals born in the country and whose parents were also born in the country.

[15] See Blank et al., (2004a) and Pager and Shepherd (2008) for a discussion on the definition of discrimination.

Country of birth is considered to be a more accurate measure of immigration status than citizenship due to different rates of naturalisation in European countries as well as different regulations relating to acquisition of nationality (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2007). In addition, individuals with a migratory background are more likely to hold more positive attitudes towards migrants than individuals with non-migratory backgrounds (Dustmann and Preston, 2004; McGinnity et al., 2013) and hence are not included in the conceptualisation of the 'native' population for the purpose of this thesis. Throughout the thesis, the terms 'majority group' and 'native population' will be used interchangeably. In addition, in the context of group conflict theory (discussed in section 1.3) the native population may be referred to as an in-group.

Who are the Migrants?

There is no universally accepted definition of who constitutes a migrant (EMN, 2018a) and the definition varies greatly depending on context (Triandafyllidou et al., 2014). For statistical purposes, generally a period of at least 12 months is needed in order to change one's country of usual residence to another country (EMN, 2018a). In academic literature and policy documents, a variety of terms are used such immigrant, migrant, foreigner, foreign-born, non-national and minority group (Triandafyllidou et al., 2014). In this thesis, the term migrant is used most frequently, as it carries fewer connotations than some of the other terms (Ruz, 2015).

For the purpose of this thesis, the broad term 'migrant' includes asylum seekers and refugees. However, it must be noted that they comprise two distinct groups. The line between asylum seekers and economic migrants can at times be blurred, with the groups using similar means and modes to arrive in their host countries (Sales, 2007). While similarities may exist, it should be acknowledged that asylum seekers and refugees constitute a sub-group of migrants with specific needs and different vulnerabilities from other migrant groups (Edwards, 2016).

In addition, the term asylum seeker and refugee are used interchangeably, however it should be noted that in legal status and entitlements, the two terms refer to different stages of the asylum process[16].

In the context of group conflict theory (discussed in section 1.3) ethnic minority groups, including economic migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are referred to as out-groups.

This section focusses on how migrants are defined for the purpose of data analysis in this thesis. However, it is important to note that respondents may have a specific sub-group of migrants in mind when answering survey questions related to migration (Blinder, 2015). A limitation of survey data in relation to measurement equivalence is discussed in section 1.4.1.3

Studies have shown that generally there is a hierarchy of acceptance towards different ethnic groups (Hagendoorn, 1993; Ford, 2011) which may further determine who is perceived as a migrant. A qualitative study in Ireland found that some migrants can 'elevate [themselves]… beyond the taxonomy of immigration', provided that they belong to an upper social class and are White (Byrne, 2014: 253). Evidence suggests that social construction of out-groups and who is defined as a migrant by the native population may differ greatly from how the term is understood and used by researchers and policymakers (Byrne, 2014; Blinder, 2015). Mainstream media and social media may also play a role in a social construction of out-groups.

The Role of the Media

How mass media presents information including, the type of information that is presented as well as its quantity and quality, can give heightened relevance to some concerns and issues while ignoring others (Bleich, et al., 2015). In addition mass media and social media play a role[17] in the social construction of who is perceived to be a migrant and in the creation of out-groups (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Blinder and Allen, 2016). A study by Blinder and Allen (2016) shows that the

[16] See EMN (2014a) for definitions and explanations regarding the different status of asylum seekers and refugees.

[17] The role of media is outside the scope of this study and not operationalised in the subsequent chapters, however it is acknowledged here as it can play an important role in attitude formation and the creation of out-groups.

media depiction of migrants as 'illegal' or as 'failed asylum seekers' is mirrored in the public perception of migration in Britain. A quantitative analysis of the language used by Britain's newspapers by William and Blinder (2013) found that the most common descriptor for the word immigrants was illegal. In this study the role of the media is particularly relevant in relation to Muslim migrants and asylum seekers[18].

Muslim migrants are often portrayed in a stereotypical manner and as a threat to security (Bennett, et al, 2011). Allen (2010) argues that anti-Muslim statements are much more tolerated in political and public spheres than they would be if they were made against other minority or religious groups. Furthermore Cesari (2013) notes that public discourse has endorsed the 'clash of civilisations' in order to make sense of political and social changes in Europe. It is likely that the social construction of Muslims as a threat to the West (Cinnirella, 2012) in the media has played a role in the public perception regarding Muslim integration and immigration.

Media has also played a significant role in the portrayal of asylum seekers and refugees. While asylum seekers are often portrayed as 'failed' the language related to refugees is distinctly different and focusses on the vulnerability of their situation (William and Blinder, 2013). The portrayal of refugees during the 'refugee crisis' in the media played a significant role in how the crisis was framed in the public discourse. Georgiou and Zaborowski (2017) note that the portrayal of refugees during this period and public perception shifted from humanitarian concerns to economic and security fears.

An experimental study by Blinder and Jeannet (2016) shows that even subtle coaxing and framing can alter public perception and conceptualisation of immigration towards a more realistic understanding. It is clear that media, and particularly in recent times social media, can play an important role in attitude formation. Investigating this in future work may aid in our understanding of determinants of anti-immigration sentiment and discriminatory behaviour.

[18] However note, that it also can play a significant role in the portrayal of economic migrants, undocumented migrants and other ethnic groups.

1.2.4 Research Questions and Aims

The main aim of this thesis is to examine prejudice, via anti-immigration sentiment, and discriminatory behaviour in Ireland and other European countries. The thesis has three, broad, main aims: i) to examine the hypothesis that anti-migrant sentiment can be explained via the realistic, in particular economic threat which migrants pose to the native population, ii) to examine attitudes towards specific sub-groups of migrants which reflect the current migratory inflows and public debate, with a particular focus on Muslim migrants and asylum seekers, and iii) to investigate the extent of discrimination towards ethnic minorities in the Irish context. The thesis focuses on the topics and research questions which are under-researched so as to extend our understanding of prejudice towards ethnic minorities.

The first research question addressed in this thesis concerns the economic threat posed by migrants in the Irish context:

1. *Can economic threat, related to economic decline and a greater share of migrants within occupational and sectoral levels, explain resistance to immigrants and immigration in the Irish context?*

Study one (see chapter 2) examines if individuals in occupations and sectors i) exposed to economic decline as measured by job losses, and ii) which have a greater share of migrants, are more likely to express anti-immigrant sentiment. Two rich datasets, the European Social Survey and the Labour Force Survey, covering the period from 2008 to 2016, are used to empirically operationalise the 'economic threat' hypothesis in the Irish context. To my knowledge, this is the first study to consider individual attitudes at the level of occupation and sector.

Studies two (chapter 3) and three (chapter 4) consider attitudes towards asylum seekers and Muslim migrants, respectively. Within the larger body of literature, attitudes towards these two sub-groups of migrants are under-researched in a European context.

Study two addresses the following research questions:

2. *Can the threat hypothesis, related to economic resources and the size of the ethnic group, explain anti-asylum seeker sentiment? Do humanitarian concerns and trust promote greater support for asylum seekers?*

Study two uses data from the European Social Survey (2002, 2014 and 2016) to examine the threat hypothesis as a determinant of anti-asylum sentiment, cross-nationally. The main focus of this study is on economic threat, however it also considers, if asylum seekers are perceived as a distinct sub-group of migrants in need of help and thus if there is greater tolerance and willingness to help this group.

The third study focuses on anti-Muslim sentiment and the following research questions:

3. *Is there greater opposition towards Muslim migrants than migrants in general? Can objective threat related to the size of the Muslim population, terrorist attacks and lower levels of integration explain anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe?*

Using the seventh round of the European Social Survey and linking it to other data sources, this study examines i) if there is greater opposition towards Muslim migrants cross-nationally, and ii) can the threat hypothesis in relation to security, the size of ethnic group and integration account for anti-Muslim sentiment. In addition, the study explores potential explanations for opposition to Muslim migrants in the absence of realistic threat.

The first three studies discussed above focus on survey data and overt attitudes. The final study focuses on discriminatory behaviour. Using a field experiment, this study addresses the final research questions:

4. *Is there discrimination in the Irish property rental market against ethnic minorities? Does the level of discrimination vary across ethnic groups?*

The final study collects primary data via a field experiment i) to detect if there is discrimination in the Irish housing market and ii) to measure the extent of this discrimination. The study uses established methods in the area of correspondence studies and focuses on Irish, Polish and Nigerian nationals. This field experiment is the first experiment on the housing rental market in the Irish context.

This thesis does not suggest that anti-immigration attitudes lead to discriminatory behaviour or vice versa. However, they both constitute important sub-dimensions of prejudice and evidence is necessary to better understand and reduce both anti-immigration sentiment and discrimination.

Together, the four studies use a broad range of methods and address topical, and under-researched areas, thus providing rich insights into attitudes and behaviour towards ethnic minorities in Irish and European contexts.

1.2.4.1 Why Focus on European and Irish Contexts?

As mentioned earlier, this thesis examines topics and research questions, which are under-researched using rich primary and secondary data. A justification for focussing on either Ireland or a wider European context is provided in each individual chapter and briefly summarised here.

Irish Context

Ireland relatively recently transformed from a country of emigration to a country of immigration while its economy experienced an unprecedented boom followed by a deep recession (Quinn, 2009). In addition, research indicates that in countries with a more severe experience of recession, shifts in opinion are more marked (Hatton, 2016). This makes the Irish context ideally suited to study economic threat, which is the focus of chapter two.

Study four which focusses on discriminatory behaviour also uses Ireland as a case study. There is consistent evidence of ethnic discrimination in the housing market in a European context (Flage, 2018), however no such experiment has

been carried out in Ireland to-date. Considering that a significant proportion of the Irish population is composed of non-Irish nationals (CSO, 2017c) who are more likely to live in a privately rented accommodation (Grotti, et al., 2018) and the existing research gap, the focus on Ireland can be justified.

In addition, a comparative perspective regarding studies 1 and 4 also would not have been possible due to data limitations and constrains.

European Context

Studies two and three (chapters 3 and 4) examine attitudes towards i) Muslim migrants and ii) asylum seekers, respectively. The focus here is on European context due to a growing Muslim population (Pew Research Center, 2017) and an unprecedented 'refugee crisis' (UNHCR, 2016). In comparison, the Muslim migrant (Fahey, et al., 2019) and asylum populations (EMN, 2018b) in Ireland are relatively small. In addition, a large proportion of non-European migrants coming to Europe do so under family reunification and humanitarian grounds (OECD and EU, 2016). Considering availability of rich secondary data which allows for a cross-national comparison and a relatively small body of literature which focusses on attitudes towards Muslim migrants and asylum seekers, examining it in a European rather than Irish context is justified.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

Realistic group conflict theory has been used extensively to explain intergroup conflict (Jackson, 1993), including anti-immigration attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Meuleman et al., 2009; Quillian, 1995; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013). This is the main theoretical framework used in the first three studies. In this section a brief overview of this theory is provided. In addition to realistic group conflict theory, social identity theory has also dominated research on anti-immigration attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). While social identity theory is not the focus of this thesis[19], it is briefly reviewed here as it useful for understanding how group identity is formed while realistic group conflict theory,

[19] See Tajfel and Turner (1979); Turner and Giles (1981) and Sidanius and Pratto (1999).

which is the focus here, aims to explain why intergroup conflict occurs. Contact theory is also briefly mentioned.

1.3.1 Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory endeavours to explain how intergroup relations are largely influenced through the social and psychological processes which guide the development and maintenance of group identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1978). The basis of intergroup relations is the perceived distinction between an in-group and an out-group. The theory encompasses social categorisation, social identification and finally, social comparisons and group distinctiveness. Individuals strive to achieve and maintain a positive self-image through their social identity (Tajfel, 1981). Positive social identity[20] can be achieved through social comparisons of one's own in-group with other groups. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that there is a tendency to view one's own in-group positively in order to develop and maintain a positive social identity and self-image. Hence self-image and social identity are largely intertwined with one's membership to a particular social group. As a result of social comparisons between an in-group and other out-groups and at the same time the desire to maintain a positive social identity, group distinctiveness emerges. Individuals selectively associate positive characteristics with their own group and negative (or less positive) characteristics with out-groups (Brown, 2010). An individual may feel prejudice or express direct prejudice towards an out-group or towards an individual from an out-group because of his or her membership of that group (Allport, 1954) and group position may lead to intergroup bias (Hewstone et al., 2002).

The more distinct an out-group is from an in-group the more likely it is that an intergroup bias will develop (Brown, 2010). This is of particular relevance to the perception of Muslim immigrants in Europe as they may be distinguished as different from the native population not only through ethnic but also religious identity markers. Empirical research indicates that there is a hierarchy of acceptance towards different ethnic groups (Hagendoorn, 1993; Sniderman et al.,

[20] Membership to a particular social group may also lead to a negative social identity (See Tajfel and Turner, 1979 and Tajfel 1978).

2004). For example, Ford (2011) found that White and culturally similar migrants were preferred over other groups in Britain. This relates back to social identity theory and the tendency to assess groups which are more like one's own in-group more favourably. While social identity theory is useful in understanding how identification with an in-group develops, group conflict theory aims to expound on why intergroup conflict emerges.

1.3.2 Realistic Group Conflict Theory

Realistic group conflict theory has been used extensively in empirical research related to anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment (Esses et al., 1998; Zárate et al., 2004; Riek et al., 2006; Meuleman et al., 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Billiet et al., 2014).

The main premise of group conflict theory holds that intergroup conflict occurs when two or more groups compete for scarce resources (Blumer, 1958; Sherif, 1967; Quillian, 1995). According to this theoretical framework, prejudice or hostility form as a defensive reaction to intergroup competition for limited resources (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967). For example, Sherif's (1967) summer camp studies have shown how groups will compete with each other when resources are limited and have been influential in the development of this theoretical framework.

According to Blumer (1958), prejudice towards out-groups derives from: i) a feeling of superiority, for example by attaching negative characteristics or stereotypes to members of an out-group; ii) an 'us' versus 'them' conceptualisation which leads to a perception that an out-group is fundamentally different from an in-group; iii) a perception that an in-group and the individuals within the in-group have a legitimate right and claim to certain privileges and advantages due to the groups position in reference to other groups, and iv) a fear that an out-group may threaten the social position or certain privileges and

resources which are seen as belonging to the in-group[21].

Hostility or negative attitudes towards out-groups, for example ethnic minorities, originate from the perception that the interests of one's own group, or an in-group, are threatened by an out-group (Coser, 1956; Blumer, 1958; Campbell, 1965) or in other words, a perception may form that one group's gain is another group's loss (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). According to Sherif (1967) the more valuable and significant the goal to be achieved the greater the hostility between the two (or more) groups. Blalock (1967) argues that intergroup competition can be separated into actual competition and perceived competition. Coenders et al. (2004a: 14) note that

> *'...one must assume that actual conflict of interests between groups leads to individual perceptions of the intergroup conflict of interests. This perceived conflict of interest, in turn, affects individual attitudes towards the ethnic ingroup and outgroups.'*

Coser (1956) and Blumer (1958) both perceive ethnic groups as competitors for scarce resources, power, status and privilege. However while Coser (1956) concentrates on actual threat which stems from competition and frustration over specific resources, Blumer (1958) focusses on perceived threat. According to Blumer (1958) individuals perceive themselves to belong to specific groups and this identification with an in-group is a continuous process through which an in-group defines and re-defines the subordinate position of out-groups. In turn, prejudice and hostility form as a defensive reaction to perceived threat to the in-group's dominant position and can relate to realistic or symbolic threats. Blalock (1967) notes that perceived threat and competition arise from actual competition for resources and the visibility of ethnic groups.

Regardless of whether competition is 'real' or 'imagined' (LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Quillian, 1995)[22], once the interests of an in-group are

[21] Blumer (1958) argues that individual members of the group may not necessarily share all of the group's held beliefs and may regard members of the out-group positively, but prejudice becomes a reactionary position which aims to maintain and protect the interests and position of the in-group.

threatened or perceived to be in-threat, there is potential for prejudice and hostility to emerge (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010).

Within this framework, two types of threat have been identified as primary drivers of anti-immigration sentiment and hostility towards ethnic minorities; realistic and symbolic (Stephan et al., 1999, Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010)[23]. Realistic threat relates to tangible items such as jobs, housing or social security payments as well as perceived threat to political, economic or physical wellbeing of the in-group (Sherif, 1967; LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Stephan and Stephan, 2000). While symbolic threat relates to threats to beliefs, morals and values of an in-group (Stephan and Stephan, 2000; Sears and Henry, 2003; Kinder and Sears, 1981). Both are important drivers of anti-immigration sentiment and attitudes towards ethnic minority groups have been found to be the most negative in presence of both realistic and symbolic threats (Stephan et al., 2005).

While two types of threat, realistic and symbolic, can be distinguished, they may also overlap (Riek, et al., 2006; Makashvili et al., 2018) and even co-exist together. For example in the case of anti-Muslim sentiment, opposition may originate from realistic threats related to security and symbolic threats related to traditions and values. Furthermore both realistic and symbolic threats can relate to actual threat and perceived threat. Actual threat may relate to tangible items such as employment but also to group's identity and values. Blalock (1967) notes that perceived threat and competition arise from actual competition for resources and the visibility of ethnic groups.

This thesis focuses on the 'realistic threat' hypothesis as further explained in each individual study. Symbolic threat, which also is a key driver of anti-immigration sentiment (McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Ivarsflaten, 2005) is not discussed in more detail here as it is not empirically tested in the studies. However, future studies should consider symbolic threat in greater detail as it

[22] See Coenders et al., (2004a) for a discussion on whether or not competition must be 'real' or 'imagined'.

[23] In addition, several extensions of group conflict theory have been formulated. For example, integrated threat theory encompasses not only economic and symbolic threats but also negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety (See Stephan and Stephan, 2000) and ethnic competition theory which integrates social identity and realistic group conflict frameworks (See Gijsberts et al., 2004).

may gain increasing importance as a driver of anti-immigration sentiment in the context of increasingly diverse and multicultural societies.

1.3.3 Contact Theory

In addition to social identity and realistic group conflict theories, contact theory is becoming increasingly important in understanding prejudice and, by inference, opposition to immigration more generally. Contact theory holds that intergroup contact decreases[24] prejudice and hostility between two groups (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011). Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) carried out a meta-analysis of over 500 studies dealing with intergroup conflict, concluding that there is an inverse relationship between intergroup contact and prejudice. Successful intergroup contact between two or more groups generally occurs when the following conditions are met[25]: i) there is equal status within the contact situation, ii) groups strive for common goals and cooperate rather than compete, and iii) intergroup cooperation is supported by institutional authorities (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011).

If ethnic prejudice is a consequence of actual or perceived threat to either economic interests or differences in belief systems, then positive contact between two groups should reduce such conflict. McLaren (2003) found that intimate contact mainly through the medium of friendship with minority groups can reduce threat perceptions and in turn reduce negative perceptions of ethnic minorities in general. With increasing immigration and substantial numbers of first and second-generation migrants in European countries, contact between the native population and minority groups is likely to increase. Whether this leads to

[24] The theory holds that with contact intergroup prejudice reduces. However, this does not necessarily occur in all incidents and not under all conditions for example social norms may oppose change in attitudes, as was the case in the 1960s between black and white miners in the US. While the minors cooperated and worked together once they emerged from the mines they did not question the segregation that was in place in their daily lives (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011). The same could apply to other groups in conflict who have regular contact, but this does not reduce hostility between the two groups e.g. Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. This indicates that factors such as segregation as well as political and cultural contact play a significant role in intergroup conflict.

[25] Not all are necessary or even required for successful intergroup contact to occur. See Pettigrew and Tropp (2011).

more positive attitudes toward migrants remains to be seen and is an avenue for future research.

1.3.4 The Limitations of Theoretical Frameworks for Understanding Anti-immigration Sentiment

The theories discussed above assist in better understanding the social forces that shape intergroup behaviour. However, as with any theoretical framework, they all have certain limitations.

While social identity theory is useful in understanding how positive in-group and negative out-group identification occurs, it is also likely that an individual could positively identify with his or her own group without contra-identifying with other groups (Coenders et al., 2004a).

Group conflict theory, on the other hand, presumes that conflict and ethnic prejudice are inevitable due to the 'in-group' and 'out-group' conceptualization. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) argue that one of the limitations related to group conflict theory is the presumption that 'real' groups exists and have a shared identity. Individuals may have a connection or attachment to the so called 'in-group', however they may not necessarily identify other groups as 'out-groups'. The framework assumes a zero-sum competition for resources, however, not all individuals are likely to perceive members of out-groups as a threat or to be competing for resources. In addition, it mainly concentrates on ethnic prejudice originating from group identity and does not consider the possibility that ethnic prejudice may also derive from socially constructed images of migrants through the medium of public discourse particularly by the political elites and the media.

1.3.5 Why Do People Discriminate?

It is generally assumed that discrimination towards ethnic minorities is based on prejudice (Allport, 1954). Several perspectives have attempted to explain why discrimination occurs. 'Taste based' discrimination refers to discrimination which occurs due to fear, prejudice and hostile attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Becker, 1957). The main premise of 'taste based' discrimination is that individuals, for example landlords and employers, discriminate because they

hold xenophobic attitudes towards an individual or minority groups. Another framework put forward to explain discrimination relates to statistical discrimination. This type of discrimination occurs when due to a lack of information or imperfect information about an individual, real or perceived attributes of a group to which the individual belongs to, are used as the basis for discrimination against the person in question (Phelps, 1972). In addition, building on social identity and realistic group conflict theories, an individual may discriminate in favour of their own in-group due to greater empathy and positive feelings about the in-group (Hewstone et al., 2002). Hence in this case, an individual may prefer to allocate scarce resources to one's own in-group due to a more positive identification with the group (Al Ramiah et al., 2010). These perspectives are considered in greater detail in study four. The main limitation of these frameworks is that no research method used can causally identify exactly why people discriminate, nonetheless it may provide some possible explanations.

1.4 Methodology and Data

The methodology and data used are discussed in detail in each individual chapter and briefly summarised here.

This thesis has used a broad range of methods including observational and experimental designs. Studies 1 to 3 use rich secondary data to test the threat hypothesis. The main source of data is the European Social Survey (ESS). Studies 1-3 use representative data and thus have high external validity. Study 4 uses a field experiment which resembles, but does not equate to, a classical experimental design with the aim of inferring i) if discrimination exists and ii) measuring the extent of it. While the external validity of experiments can be limited, they are highly regarded due to higher internal validity in comparison to observational studies (Bryman, 2016). Thus, this thesis uses two of the main research designs in quantitative research.

1.4.1 Cross-national Research and Survey Data

The use of social surveys allows for rich and representative data to be used to analyse a specific case or a number of cases. This thesis uses representative survey data to examine determinants of anti-immigration sentiment using Ireland as a specific case (chapter 2) as well as cross-nationally within Europe (chapters 3 and 4). Multilevel models are employed in order to allow for the hierarchical structure of the data, where, for example, individuals are nested within occupations and sectors, nested within country-time points or countries.

1.4.1.1 European Social Survey

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven, multi-country survey with the primary aim of monitoring and interpreting changing public attitudes and values in Europe[26]. The survey is repeated biennially. Each round contains a core questionnaire/module with repeated questions in each round which explore topics such as moral and social values, trust, national and religious identities and immigration. Each round also has a special or 'rotating' module which focusses on a specific theme in greater detail. The first (ESS, 2002) and seventh (ESS, 2014a) rounds focus on immigration, allowing for an in-depth analysis.

The ESS data are collected through face-to-face interviews and the questionnaire is translated into each language used as a first language by five per cent or more of a country's population (Harkness, 2007). All countries aim for a minimum sample size of 1,500 (Häder and Lynn, 2007). Respondents are selected by means of a random probability sampling[27] and generally includes resident population aged 15 and above. The response rate is set at 70 per cent and while not all countries are able to meet this target, response rate is considered to be reasonably high for most countries (Billiet et al., 2014). A relatively high response rate makes this dataset particularly useful for this thesis.

[26] See https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
[27] Sampling design varies between countries and includes stratified, clustered, simple random, systematic random and stratified (un-clustered) random sampling (Häder and Lynn, 2007).

The use of a survey, such as the ESS, also brings with it a number of limitations. However, they are not specific to the ESS and also apply to other surveys. While the questionnaire is translated into each first language of each country there is no way to determine if the question has been understood in the same manner across countries or even by individuals in the same country. The ESS aims to reduce this by carefully phrasing the questions asked. For example, the word 'migrant' is not used in any of the questions as individuals in different countries may perceive this to relate to a particular group of people. Despite this, there is always a chance that the question may be interpreted differently by interviewees.

The ESS has been used extensively in research on attitudes toward immigration (see for example Coenders et al., 2004b; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Billiet et al., 2014; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016). The data have been used to analyse attitudes on both individual and country-level factors (Coenders et al., 2004b) as well as over time (Meuleman et al., 2009). This thesis also uses the ESS as it is reliable, representative and allows for a close examination of attitudes towards migrants.

1.4.1.2 Additional Data Sources

In addition to the European Social Survey, data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) is also used in study 1. The Labour Force Survey is the official source used for quarterly labour force estimates in Ireland (CSO, 2017a) and represents a rich data source with high quality and reliable data regarding the labour market.

Contextual country-level data on unemployment rate, aid, number of refugees and asylum seeker applications are derived from official statistics from Eurostat, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Study 3 links the ESS to additional datasets such as those from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, the Pew Research Centre and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project.

Data sources are indicated in each individual study.

1.4.1.3 Limitations of Cross-National Research and Survey Data

Measurement Equivalence

Measurement equivalence

> *'…is a property of a measurement instrument … implying that the instrument measures the same concept in the same way across various subgroups of respondents' (Davidov et al., 2014:58)*

and infers that different individuals who share a trait or hold the same views regarding a latent construct which is being measured, provide similar responses to survey questions (Mellenbergh, 1989). In cross-national research, equivalence is necessary to ensure the same constructs are being measured when comparing different time points and countries.

Study 1 examines Irish attitudes across different time points. Multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) was carried out to ensure measurement equivalence. At least strong measurement equivalence was established for all latent variables in this study which allows for a meaningful comparison of latent means across groups to be carried out (Davidov et al., 2014).

Studies 2 and 3 contain several latent variables related to trust and human values. Previous research has found that the latent variables; trust in institutions (Allum et al., 2011), generalised trust (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008) and human values[28] (Schwartz, 2007; Davidov et al., 2008a; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; Davidov et al., 2014), measure the same latent concepts across Europe and across time. In addition, the main objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between these latent variables and the dependent variable, rather than to compare latent means. In this case metric equivalence is deemed to be sufficient and the items used in the ESS show high metric equivalence (Fitzgerald, 2016).

[28] The thesis focuses on conservatism and openness to change as higher order values are more reliable than single indicators and allow for reliable latent variables. See Schwartz (2007).

An additional challenge in measuring attitudes towards ethnic minorities is in the use of the word 'migrant' itself (see section 1.2.3). Who is considered a migrant may vary cross-nationally but also within a country. The word (im)migrant may conjure diverse connotations for individuals, for example some may think of asylum seekers while others may think of economic migrants. Blinder (2015:87-88)[29] shows that in Britain asylum seekers dominate the public 'imaginings of immigration'. The potentially different conceptualisations of who are migrants create difficulties in accurately measuring anti-immigration sentiment. The ESS attempts to reduce this by not using the term 'migrant' and instead use a more neutral wording such as 'people of the same ethnicity as the majority' or 'people of a different ethnicity as a majority' (See ESS, 2016b). This is a notable attempt to ensure measurement equivalency. However it must be noted that it is still possible that one's understanding of who is perceived to 'belong to a different ethnicity from the native population' may differ depending on respondent's own identity and social identification.

Multilevel Analysis and Sample Size

Multilevel analysis is employed in studies 1-3 due the nested nature of the data. Hox (2002) suggests that the highest level in multilevel models should have 30 groups or more. However, this is often not possible when using international survey data, such as the ESS, due to a much lower number of countries taking part. Much of the existing cross-national research (for example see Meuleman et al., 2009) has used less than 30 groups. Furthermore, Maas and Hox (2005) note that even when the highest level is less than 20 groups, standard errors for intercept variances may be underestimated but regression coefficients can still be interpreted correctly.

[29] In addition, while immigration policy in Britain focusses on restricting international students, this sub-group of migrants is rarely considered by the native population (Blinder, 2015).

Social Desirability Bias

One of the main limitations of social surveys is social desirability bias (Nederhof, 1985). Social desirability relates to the tendency to answer questions in a socially acceptable or desirable way, particularly relating to questions and topics which may be perceived as socially or politically incorrect. Negative attitudes towards immigration and migrants may be perceived as socially undesirable and hence respondents may not answer the questions truthfully or may attempt to hide their 'true' views.

It is possible that Europeans may share similar feelings across countries and towards different migrant groups but due to social desirability bias may express different attitudes. A qualitative study in Ireland by Byrne (2014) shows that professional social classes in Ireland are conscious of social desirability and the expected behaviour of their social status and class. A list experiment by Kuppens and Spears (2014) suggests that highly educated respondents are more likely to conceal negative attitudes than respondents with lower levels of education. Another study using list experiment by Creighton and Jamal (2015) shows that opposition towards Muslims and Christian migrants is similar when accounting for social desirability bias.

This has several implications for studies in this thesis. For example it is likely that highly skilled respondents may respond differently to lower skilled respondents while in reality the difference in attitudes may be marginal. On the other hand, respondents may feel that is more socially acceptable to oppose further Muslim migration than migration of other groups while holding similar attitudes towards both groups. In addition, social desirability bias may play a role in attitudes towards asylum seekers. When a survey question uses the term 'refugee' rather than 'asylum seeker' attitudes may relate to a socially desirable response which shows willingness to help rather than more positive attitudes towards either group.

Social desirability remains an issue in surveys such as the ESS. However the advantages of surveys, for example representative samples, outweigh the social desirability bias limitation.

1.4.2 Experimental Design and Field Experiments

Randomized controlled experiments are praised for rigor, control and internal validity (Blank et al., 2004b). The classical experimental design of randomisation, pre-test, treatment and post-test allow for causal inferences (de Vaus, 2001). Field experiments, which have frequently been used in social sciences have many features of the classical experimental design (Blank et al., 2004b) even if they cannot infer causality to the same extent.

Field experiments have several strengths. A classic experiment requires that both treatment and control groups be exposed to the same environment except for the intervention and hence generally take place in a laboratory (de Vaus, 2001). A field experiment takes places in the 'real world' thus eliminating artificiality of laboratory experiments. Second, observational studies can examine overtly stated discriminatory attitudes or perceived discrimination but cannot measure discrimination (Blank et al., 2004b). While a field experiment can provide direct evidence of discrimination.

In study 4, a field experiment is used to examine discrimination towards ethnic minorities in the rental housing market. The experimental design involved creating six fictitious applicants with names signalling ethnicity and gender. These applicants applied for vacant rental apartments in the Dublin area that were advertised online, and discrimination was measured based on the responses the applicants received.

1.4.2.1 Limitations of Field Experiments

This section briefly summarises limitations of field experiments as a research method, with a particular focus on the experiment carried out in the rental housing market.

As mentioned earlier, experimental design has higher internal validity than observational research. However, even if a field experiment can point to causality, for example study 4 identifies that there is a link between an invitation

to view an apartment (y) an ethnicity (x), it is possible that other factors are at play which have either not been considered by the researcher or are outside the researcher's control.

The field study in this experiment used an established research design and randomisation was used where possible. However, some factors could not be controlled. First, the experiment took place on-line and hence it is not possible to ascertain with certainty who is making the decision regarding invitations to view a property or what reasons are behind his or her decision making. However, I would argue that the study shows strong evidence of discrimination as ethnicity was manipulated while holding all other factors constant. Second, as the experiment took place in 'the real world', other individuals could have applied for the apartments and thus may have had an impact on the experiment. For example, if a prospective landlord received a high volume of emails after the first applicant from the experiment applied, then he or she may not have responded to the other applicants due to practical reasons rather than discrimination. The order of applicants was randomised in order to prevent this occurring. Third, like all field experiments, the study has limited generalisability. However the findings largely replicate those from studies in other countries, thus suggesting that they may be applied outside of the specific context in which the study took place.

In addition, ethical considerations need to be taken into account. The four key principles of ethical research include beneficence, informed consent, respect for privacy and avoidance of deception (Babbie, 2016). The experiment contains deception and involuntary participation as covert methods had to be applied in order to carry out this research[30]. All efforts to minimise inconvenience to prospective landlords were made, for example by declining offers to view a property promptly. In addition, only publicly available information was used and no information about specific individuals was collected or stored.

Deception is one of the key features of field experiments. However it is also a violation of one of the key ethical principles. Landlord and letting agents are

[30] Ethics approval for this study was granted by the Research and Ethics Committee at Trinity College Dublin.

contacted by fictitious applicants who do not wish to rent an apartment yet the former do not have an opportunity to agree or withdraw from the experiment or to provide consent. Riach and Rich (2004) provide several justifications[31] for the use of field experiments in housing[32]. First discrimination and dishonesty is a frequent occurrence in the housing market and the subjects of the experiment do not constitute a vulnerable group. Second minimal inconvenience is imposed. The evidence that such studies provide is accurate and transparent and could not be obtained using alternative research methods. Third, and I would argue most importantly, 'great harm is done to the social fabric by discriminatory practices' (Riach and Rich, 2004: 465) and hence deception is justifiable. I would further argue that finding evidence of discrimination outweighs any minimal inconvenience caused to landlords, as the consequences are much greater for the ethnic minorities against whom this occurs.

1.4.3 Mixing Methods

While observational and experimental studies are two very distinct research strategies, I would argue that they add strength to this thesis. First, while survey data is ideally suited for analyses which allow for generalisations beyond the case in question due to the available sample size and sampling methods used, experimental design allows for direct observation and identification of social processes. Second, methods were chosen based on the research questions, the type of analysis used and the overall aims of each study. Thus, ensuring that the most suitable methods were employed. Third, as I outlined in the earlier sections of this chapter, this thesis does not suggest that anti-immigration attitudes lead to discriminatory behaviour or vice versa. However, as they both constitute important sub-dimensions of prejudice and evidence is necessary to better

[31] In addition, Bovenkerk (1992, cited in Riach and Rich, 2004:459) argues 'that there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy in the act of hiring labour, as national governments and international bodies have accepted the onus of ensuring equality of opportunity for all citizens by declaring discrimination in employment unlawful.' A similar logic could be applied to housing markets where the right to housing is recognised as a fundamental right by various international and national organisations (see chapter 5).

[32] The authors consider deception in the broader market which includes labour , housing and product markets.

understand it and to reduce it, the use of different, albeit complimentary methods is justified.

1.5 Thesis Structure

The aim of this chapter was to introduce the thesis. The subsequent chapters are structured as follows. Chapter 2 contains study 1 and examines economic threat in the Irish context. Study 2 is presented in chapter 3. It considers the threat hypothesis in relation to asylum seekers using cross-national research. Chapter 4 contains study 3 and considers anti-Muslim sentiment cross-nationally. The field experiment measuring discrimination in the Irish rental market is presented in chapter 5. The final chapter provides a summary of the key findings and draws on the overall contributions of the four studies, their limitations as well as future research avenues, lastly concluding the thesis with some final remarks.

1.6 Appendix

Table A1.1 Indicators Used in Constructing 'Support for Immigration in Europe' Scale

ESS Question	Scale
1. Would you say it is generally bad or good for country's economy that people come and live here from other countries?	0 (worse) – 10 (better)
2. Would you say that country's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?	0 (undermined) - 10 (enriched)
3. Is country made worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?	0 (worse) – 10 (better)

Source: ESS (2016b)
Note: Specific country names in each country.

Table A1.2 Mean Scores for 'Support for Immigration in Europe' Scale

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.
Austria	4.48	2.36
Belgium	5.47	1.91
Czechia	3.63	2.04
Denmark	5.71	2.20
Estonia	4.68	2.13
Finland	6.23	1.90
France	5.17	2.34
Germany	5.59	2.19
Hungary	3.55	2.15
Iceland	7.12	1.81
Ireland	6.08	2.23
Italy	3.95	2.48
Lithuania	4.75	2.13
Netherlands	5.75	1.72
Norway	5.71	1.98
Poland	5.58	1.92
Portugal	5.66	1.99
Slovenia	4.63	2.26
Spain	5.97	2.17
Sweden	6.56	2.10
Switzerland	5.80	1.90
UK	5.78	2.27

Source: ESS (2016a) and ESS (2014a).
Note: Data for Denmark is from 2014 as it did not participate in the ESS in round 8 in 2016. Weighted results.

Chapter 2: The Land of One Hundred Thousand Welcomes? Economic Threat and Attitudes towards Immigration in Ireland [33]

Abstract

Immigration has become a salient issue in Europe and public opinion has moved towards a more restrictive approach to immigration since 2008, particularly in countries more strongly affected by economic recession. This is generally assumed to be a consequence of economic threat as there is greater competition for scarce material resources, such as employment, leading to hardening of attitudes towards immigrants. However, not all individuals are affected equally by i) job losses, nor by ii) the presence of migrants. Using the last five rounds of the European Social Survey (2008-2016), in conjunction with the Labour Force Survey, this paper examines if individuals within occupations and sectors which face economic decline as measured by job losses, and which have a greater representation of migrants, are more likely to express anti-immigration sentiment in the Irish context. In line with the threat hypothesis and group conflict theory, this study finds that positive job growth is associated with pro-immigration sentiment while a greater share of migrants within occupations and sectors is linked to greater opposition towards immigration. In addition, individuals in more vulnerable socio-economic positions are more likely to express anti-immigration sentiment. The wider implications of these results are discussed.

Keywords: anti-immigration attitudes, Ireland, economic threat, European Social Survey.

[33] This chapter is currently under review at an international journal. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the *European Consortium for Political Research Annual Conference* (Hamburg, 2018) and the *American Sociological Association Annual Meeting* (New York, 2019).

2.1 Introduction

Europe is one of the main destinations for international migrants (UN, 2017). Most Western European countries are facing contrasting challenges in both attracting international migrants and attempting to manage migratory flows (EC, 2017). The ageing European population will result in a shrinking labour force in most European countries in the coming years; Fargues and McCormick (2013) predict that, in the absence of immigration, the European labour force will decrease by approximately 7 per cent by 2025. In addition to these demographic challenges, labour and skills shortages are often cited by employers and policymakers as one of the main reasons for the need to attract immigrants (EC, 2018). However increased global competition for certain skills impacts on Europe's ability to do so (OECD and EU, 2016).

Ireland, like many other Western European countries, requires migrants in order to address its labour and skill shortages (Gusciute et al., 2015). Labour force projections indicate that it is unlikely that Ireland can meet its future labour force demand without continued immigration (CSO, 2008).

Attitudes of the host society play an important role not only in successful integration of ethnic minorities but also in attracting immigrants. Several studies have linked individual attitudes towards immigration[34] to one's position in the labour market. Lower skilled individuals have been found to express greater levels of resistance towards immigrants and a preference for more restrictive immigration policy (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). At a country level poor economic performance, linked to higher levels of unemployment rate, as well as the share of migrants have been used to explain anti-immigration sentiment (Quillian, 1995; Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; Meuleman et al., 2009; Billiet et al., 2014; Polavieja, 2016). These findings provide support for the economic threat hypothesis, particularly in relation to the competition between immigrants and low-skilled native workers.

[34] Immigration here includes attitudes towards immigration, immigration policy and immigrants themselves.

However, alternative interpretations regarding the relationship between economic threat and skills have also emerged, for example exposure to education has a direct effect on attitudes toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Education levels have been used as a proxy for individual skills in a number of studies with consistent evidence that higher levels of education and in turn one's skill level are associated with pro-immigration views (Kessler, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; d'Hombres and Nunziata, 2016). While many studies have established a strong positive association between education and pro-immigration attitudes (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010), it is less clear why this relationship exists. Some argue that individuals with higher levels of education express pro-immigration attitudes due to their stronger position in the labour market in comparison to individuals with lower levels of education (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Others point to the 'liberalising' effect of education and more openness towards diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007) and selection effects (Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015). Finally, social desirability bias has been put forward as a possible explanation (An, 2015). How one's occupation and sector relate to anti-immigration sentiment have not been considered.[35]

Immigration has become a salient issue in Europe. Public opinion has moved towards a more restrictive approach to immigration since 2008, particularly in countries more strongly affected by economic recession (Billiet et al., 2014; Turner and Cross, 2015). This is generally assumed to be a consequence of economic threat as there is greater competition for scarce material resources such as employment leading to hardening of attitudes towards immigrants. However, not all individuals are affected equally by i) economic challenges[36], nor by ii) the presence of migrants. In addition, macro-level measures such as unemployment rate may be too distant from individual economic concerns (Polavieja, 2016). This chapter argues that individuals within occupations and sectors which face economic decline, and which have greater representation of migrants are more

[35] For example, an individual with high levels of education working in an occupation/sector which is likely to face economic decline may arguably feel more threatened by migrants than an individual with low levels of education working within an occupation/sector which is expanding or is more likely to expand.

[36] Economic challenges refer to economic decline within occupations/sectors as measured by job losses or negative job growth.

threatened by immigrants and in-turn are more likely to express anti-immigration sentiment.

Using pooled data from the European Social Survey (ESS), in conjunction with data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), this study finds that positive job growth is positively associated with pro-immigration sentiment while a greater share of migrants within occupations and sectors is linked to a greater opposition towards immigration.

As immigration is likely to increase, to both Ireland and other European countries, finding a balance between concerns of the native population and attracting immigrants to alleviate labour and skills shortages will be of paramount importance (Heath et al., 2015). Hence understanding the factors that determine attitudes is an important task.

This study contributes to the larger body of research on anti-immigration attitudes and enhances our understanding of economic threat in the formation of public attitudes towards migrants. This chapter has several strengths. First, a multilevel-approach is used to account for occupations and sectors as well as time-points in determining individual attitudes. Second, rich sources of data are combined, drawing on two high quality surveys, and innovative measures are used to operationalise economic threat. Thirdly, the study focuses on Ireland, a country that has undergone a significant economic and migratory transformation in a relatively short period of time and hence this chapter not only adds to the wider literature on attitudes but also compliments and extends Irish research in this area.

2.2 Ireland as a Case Study

Ireland is used as a case study for the purpose of this chapter as it is an ideal example through which to examine the role of economic threat in determining anti-immigration attitudes.

First of all, Ireland became a country of immigration relatively recently. Most Western European countries experienced inward migration since the post war period. However, Ireland, traditionally a country of emigration, did not experience high levels of immigration until the late 1990s (see figure 2.1) when improving economic conditions attracted both returning Irish emigrants and non-Irish nationals. While immigration to Ireland has been increasing since the late 1990s, it reached unparalleled levels following the EU enlargement in 2004 when Ireland was one of the few countries[37] which allowed unrestricted access to its labour market to the nationals of the newest EU states (Quinn, 2010), with net migration increasing from 8,000 in 1996 to 104,800 in 2007 (CSO, 2014).

Figure 2.1 Migration Trends in Ireland, 1987-2017



Source: CSO (2018a).
Note: Own calculations.

Ireland became an attractive migration option for many immigrants as a result of the increased economic opportunities during the Celtic Tiger[38] period. However, while Ireland's demographic composition was altering, the Irish economy also underwent a significant change. After a period of strong economic growth, the economy entered into a deep recession in 2007 which was marked by high levels

[37] Denmark and the United Kingdom also permitted unrestricted access to nationals from the accession states.
[38] Term used to refer to the unprecedented economic growth in Ireland.

of unemployment and negative gross domestic product (GDP) growth[39] (see figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 Unemployment Rate (%) & GDP growth (%) in Ireland, 2006-2016



Source: Unemployment rate *(CSO, 2019b); GDP growth (CSO, 2017b, CSO, 2018b).*
Note: Own calculations for unemployment rate.

The recession had a particularly severe effect on the newly arrived immigrants as the unemployment rate was significantly higher for non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals in this period (Barrett and Kelly, 2010; McGinnity et al., 2013)[40]. Many migrants opted to leave Ireland during this period (CSO, 2012a; Gilmartin, 2013). Figure 2.3 illustrates the inverse relationship between unemployment and net migration in the Irish context[41]. When unemployment levels were low, net migration remained positive, this was particularly noticeable during the early 2000s. During the recession, net migration was negative and only returned to inward net migration in 2015, in line with improving economic conditions.

[39] Note that the 'peak' in the GDP growth in 2015 is mostly due to the activity of multinational companies and represents distorted economic growth and performance. See CSO (2019a).
[40] Since the recession the gap between native Irish and migrants has narrowed and is smaller than the EU average. See McGinnity et al., (2018a).
[41] Between 2008 and 2016, the correlation between unemployment rate and share of immigrants is negative and very strong ($r=-0.93$, $p<0.001$). Own calculations using CSO data.

Figure 2.3 Unemployment Rate (%) & Net Migration (000s) in Ireland, 1998-2016



Source: Net migration *(CSO, 2018a);* Unemployment rate *(CSO, 2019b).*
Note: Own calculations for unemployment rate.

2.2.1 Irish Attitudes towards Newcomers

As mentioned previously, the composition of Irish society has transformed in recent decades due to increased immigration. Empirical studies indicate that, generally, increasing flows of immigrants are associated with increased hostility towards newcomers (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008). In the case of Ireland, the increasing proportion of non-Irish nationals has been found to be associated with positive attitudes when controlling for economic conditions (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). This could be partly explained by the fact that inward immigration to Ireland is closely linked with the overall economic conditions of the country (see figure 2.3). In addition, there has been little anti-immigration rhetoric in the political and public spheres, even at times of economic downturn (Fanning, 2016).

However, Irish attitudes towards immigration have been found to vary depending on the economic conditions in the country. Turner (2010a), using data from the ESS, found that Ireland was one of the most liberal European countries regarding attitudes towards immigration in 2004, attributing this to the booming economy. Public sentiment towards migrants remained positive until 2006 with a significant shift towards more negative attitudes in 2008 with the onset of economic recession (McGinnity et al., 2013). The period of economic downturn,

coupled with increasing levels of unemployment, was marked by an increase in anti-immigration sentiment (Turner and Cross, 2015; McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). While attitudes towards immigration have become more positive since the recession, they are still less positive than during the pre-recession period and are lower than the Western European average (McGinnity et al., 2018b). This chapter builds on the existing literature and particularly Irish research, regarding attitudes towards immigration. The existing Irish research discussed above has focussed on the association between individual attitudes and macro-conditions at the country level, however even in periods of economic uncertainty not all individuals are likely to perceive immigrants as an economic threat. No study to-date has specifically examined if individuals working in occupations and sectors with higher shares of migrants and which are more vulnerable to economic changes[42] are more likely to hold anti-immigration views. This chapter aims to address this research gap.

2.3 Theoretical Approach and Hypotheses

Group conflict theory is one of the key theoretical frameworks that has been used to study attitudes towards migrants and intergroup dynamics (Esses et al., 1998; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Zárate et al., 2004; Riek et al., 2006; Meuleman et al., 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Billiet et al., 2014). Within this framework, intergroup conflict occurs when two or more groups compete for scarce resources (Blumer, 1958; Sherif, 1967; Quillian, 1995). The nature of the competition can relate to actual but also perceived rivalry (LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Negative sentiments can emerge as a form of defensive reaction as a result of real or perceived competition, (Campbell, 1965).

Realistic threat is one of the main components of group conflict theory (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). Perceptions of realistic threat, i.e. anticipation of negative consequences related to the arrival and/or presence of immigrants in a country, drive anti-immigration sentiment. Economic threat, which relates to competition, (perceived or real) for economic resources such as employment, is one of the key

[42] Vulnerable to economic changes refers to job losses within occupations and sectors.

components of realistic threat[43] and one of the main drivers of anti-immigration attitudes (Quillian, 1995; Mayda, 2006; Pereira et al., 2010, Billiet et al., 2014). Research indicates that public opinion has moved towards a more restrictive approach to immigration since 2008, particularly in countries more strongly affected by economic recession (Billiet et al., 2014; Turner and Cross, 2015). This is generally assumed to be a consequence of labour market concerns of the native population (Mayda, 2006; Polavieja, 2016) and greater competition for scarce material resources such as jobs, thus leading to hardening of attitudes towards immigrants (Esses et al., 2001; Raijman and Semyonov, 2004). However, not all individuals are affected equally by, firstly, economic downturn or uncertainties, and secondly, the presence of migrants.

Job insecurity has been found to be linked to anti-immigration sentiment and greater prejudice (Weerdt et al., 2007; Billiet et al., 2014). Ortega and Polavieja (2012) found that individuals in employment which is less exposed to competition from immigrants are more likely to hold pro-immigration views. In addition, the perception of threat may be heightened for individuals who hold similar positions to migrants in the labour market (Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Scheepers et al., 2002). The hypotheses in this chapter are based on the concept of labour market segmentation. Labour markets are organised according to occupations and sectors. Individuals have specific human capital linked to particular occupations and sectors due to job-specific experience, and investments in further education, qualifications, and up-skilling which makes job mobility across sectors and occupations costly. Economic decline within one's occupation/sector is likely to lead to a loss of employment opportunities and increased competition for an individual; and thus, may lead to hardening of attitudes.

Using group conflict theory and existing research, the following main hypotheses are formed:

[43] Note that realistic threat may also relate to non-economic threat, for example power, status.

H1: Individuals in occupations and sectors, which face economic decline or are more likely to do so, are more likely hold negative attitudes towards immigration.

H2: Individuals in occupations and sectors which have a greater share of migrants are more likely to hold negative attitudes towards immigration.

Moreover, it is expected that the combination of economic decline and a high share of immigrants leads to particularly strong anti-immigration sentiments:

H3: The effect of job growth increases with increasing share of migrants within occupation and sector segments.

Control Variables

In addition, individual attributes also have a role to play in anti-immigration attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Those in precarious or unfavourable labour market positions are more likely to express anti-immigration sentiment (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Kunovich, 2004). Individuals experiencing greater financial difficulties or those who are unemployed are more likely to feel threatened by the presence of immigrants (Coenders et al., 2004b; Semyonov et al., 2006; Coenders et al., 2008; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013). As mentioned in the introductory section, education has been found to be a significant determinant of anti-immigration attitudes. Lower levels of education have also been linked to ethnic prejudice as individuals with lower levels of education are more likely to be exposed to spells of unemployment (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). Education levels, financial difficulties and unemployment are thus included as control variables.

Controls for gender and age are also included as both factors have been found to have an impact on public attitudes. Existing research indicates that older individuals are more likely to express anti-immigration sentiment than younger individuals, which is often attributed to more conservative leanings associated with increasing age (Coenders et al., 2004b; Ford, 2011). Mixed evidence exists

regarding gender and attitudes towards immigrants. Some studies show that men are more opposed to immigration (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Semyonov et al., 2006), others indicate there are no significant differences in attitudes between men and women (Coenders et al., 2004b), while others find that women are more likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Research in the Irish context indicates that women are more likely to hold more negative views towards immigration (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017; McGinnity et al., 2018b).

2.4 Data and Methods

This chapter combines datasets from the ESS and LFS, allowing for a comprehensive analysis. Data were pooled from the last five rounds of the ESS, covering the period from 2008 to 2016 (ESS, 2008; ESS, 2010; ESS, 2012; ESS, 2014a; ESS, 2016a). The ESS is a cross-national, academically driven survey conducted every two years measuring attitudinal changes in Europe. The survey consists of a core questionnaire with repeated questions relating to immigration in each round allowing for a comprehensive evaluation of attitudes over time. All individual level variables, except for sector and occupation data, were drawn from the ESS datasets. Sectoral and occupational data were obtained from the LFS. The LFS is conducted using mixed mode data collection (CSO, 2017a) and the data used in this chapter corresponds to the period from 2008 to 2016 (CSO, 2017a; 2019c). Descriptive statistics and detailed information on occupations and sectors are supplied in the Appendix in section 2.7.

2.4.1 Sample Size

The analysis is limited to ‘natives’, which for the purpose of this chapter are defined as respondents who were born in the country and whose parents were also born in the country. Respondents with a migratory background are excluded as research has shown that they are more likely to express more positive views regarding immigration than the native population (Dustmann and Preston, 2004;

McGinnity et al., 2013)[44]. As the main focus of this chapter is on economic threat linked to the labour market, respondents who are not active in the labour market, i.e. those who are retired are excluded from the analysis[45]. Respondents with missing values on the dependent variables were also excluded from analysis. The overall sample consists of 5,612 respondents, nested within occupation sector time points (level 2), which are nested within occupations and sectors (level 3). The sample size for each round of the ESS used in the models is available in the Appendix in section 2.7.

2.4.2 Dependent Variables

Two latent variables are used in the analysis to examine attitudes towards immigration and migrants. In order to ensure reliability multiple indicators are used instead of single items (Bryman, 2016). Table 2.1 details indicators used.

Attitudes towards immigration are operationalised using 3 indicators which measure economic, cultural and overall impact of immigration on a scale from 0-10 with higher values indicating more positive attitudes. The scale is highly reliable with Cronbach's alpha of 0.89. The scale is also reliable at different time-points with Cronbach's alpha ranging from 0.88 to 0.90. Multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) was carried out to ensure measurement equivalence for the latent variable across different time-points[46].

[44] The focus of this study is on the attitudes of the native population, hence respondents with migratory background are excluded from the study. However, it is worthwhile noting that not only the natives but also migrants already in the country might be threatened by newcomers. In the case of the latter, they may perceive recently arrived immigrants to be in direct competition for jobs as they are more likely to occupy the same or similar positions as newly arrived migrants. Empirical research indicates that immigrants are more likely to take up jobs which require manual skills and increase the demand for more complex tasks which are often carried out by the native population (D'Amuri and Peri, 2011). In addition, immigration has been found to reduce earnings of migrants already in the country but not the native population (Manacorda et al., 2012).

[45] Other respondents such as students or homemakers are left in the analysis if they stated their current occupation/sector. Controls for main activity are included in the models.

[46] Strict measurement invariance established across different ESS rounds. $\chi = 197.25$ (df=28, $p<0.001$). RMSEA =0.07; CFI=0.98; SRMR=0.02. See Hooper et al., (2008).

Table 2.1 Dependent Variable Operationalisation

Dependent Variable	ESS Question	Scale
Attitudes towards overall impact of immigration (henceforth attitudes towards immigration)	1. Would you say it is generally bad or good for Ireland's economy that people come and live here from other countries?	0 (worse) – 10 (better)
	2. Would you say that Ireland's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?	0 (undermine) – 10 (enrich)
	3. Is Ireland made worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?	0 (worse) – 10 (better)
Attitudes towards immigration policy/acceptance of migrants (henceforth attitudes towards immigrants)	1. To what extent do you think Ireland should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most Irish people to come and live here?	1 (allow none) – 4 (allow many)
	2. To what extent do you think Ireland should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most Irish people to come and live here?	
	3. To what extent do you think Ireland should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here?	

Note: Support for immigration and acceptance of migrants in Ireland.

Attitudes towards immigrants are inferred and operationalised using 3 indicators which measure preference for restricting/allowing; migrants of the same ethnicity, migrants of a different ethnicity, and migrants from less economically prosperous non-European countries, to come to Ireland. Responses to the questions were reverse coded from the original coding so that lower scores represent preference for restrictions while higher scores indicate greater acceptance. The answers were treated as Likert scale responses: 1= allow none and 4=allow many (Vagias, 2006) [47]. The scale is highly reliable with Cronbach's alpha of 0.91. The scale is also reliable at different time-points with Cronbach's alpha ranging from 0.89 to 0.92. MGCFA was carried out to ensure measurement equivalence for the latent variable across different time-points[48].

[47] Logistic regression models were also carried out to ensure that the coefficients did not change from the coefficients obtained using linear regression.

[48] Strong measurement invariance established across different ESS rounds. χ = 102.03 (df=16, $p<0.001$). RMSEA =0.07; CFI=0.99; SRMR=0.01. See Hooper et al., (2008).

While there is a strong, positive correlation between the two dependent variables ($r=0.58$, $p<0.001$), the two variables measure different aspects of the overall attitudes towards immigration and hence both are used in the subsequent analysis.

2.4.3 Independent Variables

Data on occupations and sectors

Using the ESS data, occupations were coded according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) major groups[49] (ILO, 2010) and sectors were coded according to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities (NACE[50]) sections[51] (Eurostat and EC, 2008).

The levels used in the analysis refer to occupation and sector time point cells (level 2) which are nested within occupation and sector cells (level 3) within an overall occupation and sector grid. For brevity reasons, level two is referred to as occupation/sector time points while level three is referred to as occupations/sectors. Figure 2.4 illustrates the data structure used for the analysis. As mentioned earlier, job growth and share of migrants are operationalised using data from the LFS.

[49] Major Groups: Managers, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals, Clerical support workers, Service and sales workers, Craft and related trades workers, Plant and machine operators, and assemblers, Elementary occupations. Skilled agricultural workers and Armed forces were excluded due to a lack of data availability.

[50] NACE is an acronym derived from the French title 'Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes'.

[51] Broad NACE sectors: Industry, Construction, Wholesale and retail trade, Transportation and Storage, Accommodation and food service activities, Information & Communication, Professional, scientific and technical activities, Administrative and support service activates, Public administration, Education, Human health, Other. Agriculture, forestry and fishing were excluded due to a lack of data availability.

Figure 2.4 Hierarchical Structure of the Occupation and Sector Data, Ireland



Note: Also see Appendix. Level 1 = Individuals (N= 5,612), Level 2 = Occupation x Sector x Time Cells (N=401), Level 3 = Occupation x Sector Cells (N=85)

Occupations and sectors which face economic decline are operationalised and measured as *job growth*. *Job growth* is measured as change in the rate of people employed in the occupation and sector within each reference year (level 2). For example, this is the percentage of managers in industry in 2010 versus the percentage of managers in industry in 2008. A negative change is interpreted as loss of jobs within occupations and sectors and hence those occupations/sectors are more vulnerable to changes within the economy. A positive change is interpreted as job growth within the occupations and sector cells. The *average job growth* refers to the average change in the rate of individuals employed in occupation and sector cells between 2008 and 2016 (level 3).

Share of migrants is measured as the share of migrants within occupations and sectors from the total persons within those occupation/sector time points (level 2). An increasing share of migrants indicates that more migrants worked within those occupations and sectors while a decrease indicates that less migrants were

present within those jobs year-on-year. The *average share of migrants* refers to the average change in the number of migrants employed in the occupation and sector cells between 2008 and 2016[52].

Multilevel models are employed in order to account for the hierarchical structure of the data. 3 level models are used as both time-points as well as overall occupation/sector segments may be important for individuals. For job growth, sudden job losses may occur within different time-periods and within relatively short timeframes. However, for the share of migrants there is little variation within the occupation/sector cell from year-on-year but increases/decreases can be observed within occupation/sector segments, on average between 2008 and 2016.

Control Variables

Level of Education is coded into 3 categories: 1 = primary and lower secondary education, 2 = upper secondary education and apprenticeship[53], and 3 = tertiary education. *Unemployed* is a dummy variable corresponding to respondents who are unemployed. *Financial difficulties* are coded as 1 = Difficult on present income, 2 = Coping on present income, 3 = Living comfortably on present income. *Worked abroad* is a dummy variable corresponding to respondents who have worked abroad for a period of more than 6 months. *Age* is an ordinal variable corresponding to respondents aged 15-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-66, 66+. *Gender* is a dummy variable with values 1 for men and 0 for women. Reference categories used are indicated in the models.

2.5 Results

2.5.1 Descriptive Results

In the period 2008-2016, the largest contractions in terms of average job growth occurred in elementary and semi-skilled occupations in sectors such as

[52] Note that the LFS does not include questions on parents' country of birth, hence the share of migrants here refers to first-generation migrants only.
[53] This generally applies to individuals who may complete an apprenticeship, or a short course post their secondary school education, but who do not go on to complete tertiary education.

construction, industry and wholesale. In the same period, the largest share of migrants, on average, worked in elementary and semi-skilled occupations in a variety of sectors but also in highly skilled occupations in sectors such as finance and information and communication. This is not surprising as a large share of migrants that came to in Ireland since the early 2000s are from the New EU Member States[54] and despite having higher levels of education and qualifications than the native population (Barrett et al., 2006) took up employment in low-skilled occupations below their skill level (Barrett and Duffy, 2008; Turner, 2010b; Voitchovsky, 2014). In addition, labour and skills shortages in highly skilled occupations in sectors such as finance and information and communication have persisted since the economic recovery (Behan et al., 2015; Gusciute et al., 2015); hence it is not surprising that there is also a large share of migrants in those sectors.

Table 2.2 shows the average scores for attitudinal scales measuring 'natives' attitudes towards immigration and migrants. Attitudes towards immigration have not fluctuated much, with the exception of 2010 when respondents perceived the impact of immigration to be more negative than in previous years. However, as suggested in 2.2.1, this could be explained by deteriorating economic conditions during that period with attitudes becoming more positive in subsequent rounds of the ESS. Less variation can be observed regarding attitudes towards migrants. Throughout the period, the native population in Ireland is more likely to accept more migrants than to express preferences for restricting immigration.

Table 2.2 Mean Scores for Attitudinal Scales, Ireland

Year	Attitudes towards immigration (0-10 scale)	Attitudes towards immigrants (1-4 scale)
2008	5.19	2.65
2010	4.76	2.48
2012	5.11	2.57
2014	5.13	2.48
2016	5.86	2.72

Source: ESS (2008-2016).
Note: Weighted results of native population, excluding respondents who have retired. Own calculations.

[54] The proportion of non-EEA nationals in Ireland in employment is low (Quinn and Gusciute, 2013).

On average, individuals in elementary and semi-skilled occupations across a variety of sectors were more likely to perceive the impact of immigration negatively while those working as managers or professionals in professional and finance sectors were least likely to do so. A similar pattern can be observed regarding attitudes towards allowing immigrants to the country. Average mean scores for all occupations and sectors are available in the Appendix in section 2.7.

2.5.2 Results from Multi-level Modelling

Results from the multilevel models are reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The random intercept model for overall impact of immigration indicates that 12 per cent of the variance in attitudes is due to occupation and sector time-points (level 2), and a further 7 per cent of the variance is due to occupations and sectors (level 3). The random intercept model for acceptance of migrants indicates that 8 per cent of the variance in attitudes is due to occupation and sector time-points (level 2), and a further 4 per cent[55] of the variance is due to occupations and sectors (level 3) .

All subsequent models are random intercept models with fixed effect predictors. Models 1 and 1a include all control individual level predictors as well as job growth and share of migrants. Financial hardship is added in later models, as it may be directly linked to one's occupation and sector and hence partially mediate the main effects. Models 2 and 2a consider job growth and share of migrants at levels 2 and 3. At level 3, average job growth and share of migrants are added. At level 2, deviations from the average for both variables are added. Models 3 and 3a build on models 2 and 2a and include an interaction effect between the share of migrants and job growth (level 2) as well as the financial hardship variable. Post-stratification weights have been applied to all models.

[55] A rule of thumb is that an interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of 5% or more should not be ignored and multilevel models used instead of single-level models. (See Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2017). The ICC for acceptance of migrants at level 3 is nearly 5%, furthermore the likelihood-ratio test ($\chi 2\ 2 = 215.12$, $p<0.001$) indicates that the three-level model offers a better fit to the data than the single-level model.

Table 2.3 Attitudes towards Immigration and Migrants in Ireland, Random Intercept Model and Models 1/1A

	Null Model: Immigration	**Null Model: Acceptance**	**Model 1: Immigration**	**Model 1A: Acceptance**
Fixed Effects				
Constant	5.334***	2.602***	6.026***	3.018***
	(0.080)	(0.024)	(0.159)	(0.054)
Level 1				
Age (*Ref: 15-25*)				
26-35			-0.085	-0.153**
			(0.133)	(0.051)
36-45			0.116	-0.144**
			(0.136)	(0.054)
46-55			0.112	-0.165**
			(0.138)	(0.059)
56-65			0.054	-0.172**
			(0.132)	(0.062)
66+			0.295*	-0.179**
			(0.137)	(0.075)
Male			0.589***	0.032
			(0.071)	(0.027)
Education (*Ref: Tertiary*)				
Primary/lower secondary			-1.612***	-0.434***
			(0.122)	(0.039)
Upper secondary			-0.964***	-0.264***
			(0.097)	(0.032)
Worked abroad			0.303**	0.050
			(0.113)	(0.043)
Unemployed			-0.347***	-0.084*
			(0.087)	(0.040)
Level 2				
Job growth			0.361***	0.095***
			(0.105)	(0.028)
Share of migrants			-0.015*	-0.005*
			(0.006)	(0.002)
Random Effects				
Level 1	4.321	0.595	4.078	0.579
	(0.113)	(0.014)	(0.111)	(0.013)
Level 2	0.264	0.025	0.175	0.019
	(0.067)	(0.006)	(0.060)	(0.005)
Level 3	0.342	0.027	0.091	0.006
	(0.068)	(0.006)	(0.042)	(0.004)
Model Fit				
Chi-square (df)			439.88 (16)	327.81 (16)
Log. lik.	-12813.88	-6942.30	-12595.28	-6824.946
Deviance	25627.76	13884.60	25190.56	13649.892

Note: Weighted results. Standard errors in parentheses.
N= 5,612 (level 1), 401 (level 2) and 85 (level 3).
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models 1 and 1A confirm the main hypotheses of this study. As hypothesised, job growth is associated with greater overall support for immigration and migrants in both models (*H1*). While a greater share of migrants within occupations/sectors is associated with greater resistance (*H2*). The results indicate that the threat hypothesis does play a role in attitude formation.

Respondents who are more vulnerable within the labour market are also more likely to hold anti-immigration views. In both models, those with lower levels of education, as well as those that are unemployed are more likely to perceive the impact of immigration negatively as well as prefer to restrict further immigration to Ireland. While previous experience of working abroad is linked to increased pro-immigration attitudes, albeit only statistically significant in the case of the overall impact of immigration. This could be explained by the fact that those who have worked abroad may perceive immigration to have a positive impact on the country based on their own experience. Regarding other control variables, interesting results can be observed in relation to age. In line with existing research, older individuals are more likely to prefer greater restrictions towards incoming migrants than younger cohorts and this is often attributed to more conservative views on the part of the latter (Coenders et al., 2004b; Ford, 2011). In terms of the impact of immigration on the country, older people are more likely to hold pro-immigration views than younger cohorts, however this is only significant regarding the 66+ group in comparison to 15-25-year olds. Regarding gender, men are more likely to perceive immigration as having a positive impact than women. This is line with previous Irish research which indicates that women are more likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes than men (McGinnity et al., 2018a). Men are also more likely to be accepting of incoming migrants, however the difference between men and women is not statistically significant.

Table 2.4 *Attitudes towards Immigration and Migrants in Ireland, Models 2/2A and Models 3/3A.*

	Model 2: Immigration	**Model 2A: Acceptance**	**Model 3: Immigration**	**Model 3A: Acceptance**
Constant	6.067***	3.028***	6.178***	3.062***
	(0.156)	(0.055)	(0.162)	(0.059)
Level 1				
Age (*Ref: 15-25*)				
26-35	-0.083	-0.153**	-0.035	-0.139**
	(0.133)	(0.051)	(0.134)	(0.050)
36-45	0.117	-0.143**	0.175	-0.128*
	(0.136)	(0.054)	(0.136)	(0.053)
46-55	0.112	-0.165**	0.148	-0.155**
	(0.137)	(0.059)	(0.141)	(0.059)
56-65	0.056	-0.172**	0.035	-0.177**
	(0.132)	(0.062)	(0.135)	(0.063)
66+	0.295*	-0.179*	0.256	-0.190*
	(0.137)	(0.075)	(0.138)	(0.075)
Male	0.592***	0.032	0.544***	0.019
	(0.071)	(0.027)	(0.073)	(0.028)
Education (*Ref: Tertiary*)				
Primary/ lower secondary	-1.614***	-0.436***	-1.485***	-0.401***
	(0.122)	(0.040)	(0.127)	(0.040)
Upper secondary	-0.965***	-0.265***	-0.887***	-0.245***
	(0.097)	(0.032)	(0.098)	(0.031)
Worked abroad	0.302**	0.049	0.303*	0.050
	(0.113)	(0.043)	(0.120)	(0.044)
Unemployed	-0.346***	-0.084*	-0.164	-0.036
	(0.087)	(0.040)	(0.089)	(0.039)
Financial difficulties (*Ref: Comfortable*)				
Difficult			-0.654***	-0.175***
			(0.095)	(0.035)
Coping			-0.161*	-0.052
			(0.072)	(0.027)
Level 2				
Job growth (jg)	0.403***	0.113***	0.367***	0.111***
	(0.105)	(0.025)	(0.105)	(0.026)
Share of migrants (sm)	-0.010	-0.004	-0.010	-0.004
	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.004)
Job growth x share of migrants			-0.049	0.011
			(0.059)	(0.016)
Level 3				
Average job growth	0.108	0.005	0.122	0.004
	(0.167)	(0.083)	(0.155)	(0.084)
Average share of migrants	-0.018**	-0.006*	-0.016*	-0.005*
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.002)
Random Effects				
Level 1	4.078	0.579	4.034	0.576
	(0.111)	(0.013)	(0.109)	(0.013)
Level 2	0.175	0.018	0.158	0.018
	(0.059)	(0.005)	(0.058)	(0.006)
Level 3	0.089	0.006	0.087	0.005
	(0.041)	(0.004)	(0.042)	(0.004)
Model Fit				
Chi-square (df)	453.65 (14)	373.95 (14)	622.25 (17)	440.95 (17)
Log. lik.	-12594.72	-6824.44	-12557.76	-6806.62
Deviance	25189.44	13648.88	25115.52	13613.23

Note: Weighted results. Standard errors in parentheses. N= 5,612 (level 1), 401 (level 2) and 85 (level 3). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models 2 and 2A include job growth and share of migrants at level 2 which represent deviations from the average and the average for job growth and share of migrants (level 3). Job growth at level 2 is positively associated with pro-immigration attitudes across all models and is statistically significant. This indicates that the change in job growth is an important predictor in attitudes. However, the average rate of job growth over the period 2008-2016 has no significant effect on attitudes. One possible explanation for this could be that individuals are more affected by immediate changes within the labour market, for example sudden job losses within an occupation and sector may lead to hardening of their attitudes towards migrants. As mentioned in the earlier section, in the long-term individuals can move from economically declining labour market segment, but job losses in the short term imply considerable losses for individuals concerned. Regarding the share of migrants, the opposite can be observed. The average share of migrants is negatively associated with attitudes and is statistically significant across all models, but the share of migrants at level 2 is no longer significant. This could be explained by the fact that little variation occurs within occupations and sectors between different years[56]. However, the overall growing share of migrants may be observed over time.

In the final models (3 and 3A), an interaction effect between share of migrants and job growth is included. The interaction effect is not significant and hence there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that the effect of job growth increases with the increasing share of migrants within occupations and sectors (*H3*). In addition, individuals experiencing financial difficulties are more likely to hold anti-immigration views than those who have sufficient means. The effects of job growth and the average share of migrants are slightly decreased with the addition of the financial difficulties variable. This is not surprising as one's financial situation is likely to at least partially mediate the effects of one's position in the labour market. In addition, the difference between unemployed individuals and those in employment becomes insignificant once controlling for one's financial situation.

[56] The correlation between share of migrants at different time points and the average share migrants in the period is very strong and positive ($r=0.87$, $p<0.001$).

2.6 Discussion and Conclusion

Using group conflict theory and Ireland as a case study, this chapter empirically tested if those in sectors and occupations i) in economic decline, and ii) with a greater share of migrants can account for hardening of attitudes towards immigration and migrants. The findings are consistent with the threat hypothesis and existing research as positive job growth is associated with pro-immigration attitudes towards immigration and acceptance of migrants. While the increasing share of migrants is negatively associated with attitudes towards both the overall impact of migrants and acceptance of further migration. Thus, suggesting that economic threat does play a role in attitudes towards immigration, however not all individuals are likely to be affected by this. Furthermore, the study finds that once controls are introduced at all levels of the models, it is the change in job growth year-on-year rather than the absolute job growth that has an impact on attitudes. Thus, suggesting that, in the short-term, job losses do lead to a decreased acceptance towards migrants for individuals in employment which is in economic decline.

On the other hand, the change in the share of migrants between different time points does not influence attitudes. However, on average, a high share of migrants within occupations and sectors does lead to anti-immigration sentiment. While empirical research has found that increasing flows of migrants are associated with increased hostility towards newcomers (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008), in the Irish case an inverse relationship has been found by McGinnity and Kingston (2017). As mentioned previously, a strong correlation can be observed between unemployment rate and inflows of migrants in Ireland. The flexible labour supply adjustment during the recession (Barrett and Kelly, 2010) may explain why the overall attitudes towards migrants have not become more negative overall. The overall presence of migrants in the country may not lead to anti-immigration sentiment as migrants may not be perceived as a threat. However, in the employment context, individuals may perceive migrants to be in direct competition for resources such as jobs. Thus, perhaps suggesting that individual context plays a more significant role than larger macro processes at country level.

In addition, it was found that individuals in more vulnerable socio-economic positions such as those experiencing financial hardship, those who are unemployed, and those with lower levels of education, are more likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes. This can be linked directly to economic threat as more vulnerable individuals within the labour market are more likely to be exposed to spells of unemployment and thus may perceive immigrants as direct competitors for jobs. Individuals who have worked abroad for at least 6 months are more likely to perceive the impact of immigration positively, however no significant differences are observed regarding acceptance of migrants.

Future research could consider contact hypothesis with a particular focus on the work environment, especially in the context of increasing immigration to Ireland and the presence of many multinational companies. This research has focussed on attitudes towards immigration and immigrants, but future studies could further investigate if attitudes differ towards highly skilled versus low skilled migrants. There is mixed evidence regarding attitudes towards highly skilled and low skilled migrants. Some studies have shown that highly skilled migrants are preferred to low skilled migrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010) irrespective of individuals' skill level[57] while other studies have found that highly skilled natives prefer low skilled immigrants as they do not directly compete with them in the labour market (Helbling, 2011; Facchini and Mayda, 2012). This may be of particular relevance in the Irish case, due to the labour and skill shortages existing in a wide range of sectors and occupations, ranging from construction to the information communications and technology (ICT) sectors (Murray, 2018).

This study provides evidence that economic threat does play a role in reduced support for immigration and anti-immigration sentiment. However there are several caveats related to this study which must be acknowledged. First job losses were used to operationalise economic threat. While controls are used for financial hardship and education other aspects of socio-

[57] O'Connell (2011) argues that highly skilled natives are protected from direct competition with immigrants due to the former's high level of specialisation.

economic status may also have an effect on attitudes towards immigration and migrants, for example social class or income. Future work could build on this study by further examining economic threat within occupations and sectors while considering the effect of income and social class as moderators of economic threat. The study also finds that a large share of migrants within occupations and sectors contributes to a greater resistance towards immigration and migrants. However it must be noted that majority of migrants in Ireland in this period came from the New EU Member States and took up employment in low-skilled occupations (Barrett and Duffy, 2008; Voitchovsky, 2014). Hence occupations and sectors with a higher share of migrants may simply reflect a large concentration of migrants in labour market segments which have labour but not skill shortages and which have a larger proportion of low-skilled natives (Pecoraro and Ruedin, 2017). The gap between low skilled and high skilled natives in their attitudes may be masked by social desirability bias rather than significant differences between the two groups. Future research which considers low and skilled migrants while also considering occupations and sectors with both labour and skill shortages would further enhance our understanding of economic threat within the labour market.

A further limitation of this study is that the focus here is on a single country and hence findings may not be generalisable beyond the case in question. Ireland may be a specific case in a European context as no other European country underwent such a rapid transformation from a country of emigration to a country of immigration while also undergoing economic boom followed by a deep recession. Hatton (2016) analysed attitudes towards immigration in 20 countries between 2002-2012 and found a small shift in public opinion, but observed a considerable country variation. The study found that in countries more severely impacted by the recession, changes in attitudes were more marked. Research focussing on Ireland also found a marked change in attitudes during the recession (Turner and Cross, 2015; McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). Therefore it is likely that economic

threat as detected in this study may be more pronounced in countries with experience of a deep recession, like Ireland.

Overall, attitudes were found to be more positive towards both the overall impact of immigration as well as acceptance of migrants in the latest round of the ESS survey. This is not surprising in the context of booming economy as attitudes towards immigration and immigrants are closely linked to the overall economic conditions of the country (McGinnity et al., 2013; Turner and Cross, 2015; McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). However, monitoring of attitudes is key, particularly in the context of economic uncertainty due to Brexit[58] and the potential adverse effects this may have for the Irish economy and in turn migrants in Ireland.

[58] Brexit is the portmanteau of "British" and "exit"; and relates to the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union.

2.7 Appendix

Table A2.1 Descriptive Statistics, Ireland

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Immigration impact (DV)	5,612	5.19	2.23	0.00	10.00
Acceptance of migrants (DV)	5,612	2.55	0.82	1.00	4.00
Share of migrants within occupations and sectors at time points	5,612	10.23	7.33	0.00	44.11
Average share of migrants within occupations and sectors	5,612	10.12	6.27	0.67	37.91
Job growth within occupations and sectors at time points	5,612	0.03	0.33	-1.00	5.85
Average job growth within occupations and sectors	5,612	0.02	0.13	-1.00	1.23

Variable	Category	Freq.	%
Age	15-25	497	8.86
	26-35	1,154	20.56
	36-45	1,413	25.18
	46-55	1,219	21.72
	56-65	1,003	17.87
	66+	326	5.81
	Total	*5,612*	*100*
Sex	Male	2,350	41.87
	Female	3,262	58.13
	Total	*5,612*	*100*
Education	Primary/lower secondary	1,599	28.49
	Upper Secondary/apprenticeship	2,765	49.27
	Tertiary	1,248	22.24
	Total	*5,612*	*100*
Worked abroad for more than 6 months	Yes	411	7.32
	No	5,201	92.68
	Total	*5,612*	*100*
Unemployed	Yes	724	12.90
	No	4,888	87.10
	Total	*5,612*	*100*
Financial hardship	Difficult	1,509	26.89
	Coping	2,662	47.43
	Comfortable	1,441	25.68
	Total	*5,612*	*100*

Table A2.2 Sample Size for Each ESS Round, Ireland 2008-2016

Reference Year	ESS Round	N	%
2008	4	872	15.54
2010	5	1,155	20.58
2012	6	1,292	23.02
2014	7	1,050	18.71
2016	8	1,243	21.15
Total		5,612	100

Note: Excluding non-natives, retired individuals and missing values on the dependent variables.

Table A2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Occupations Used in the Analysis, Ireland

Occupation	N	%
Managers (M)	566	10.09
Professionals (P)	982	17.50
Technicians and Associate Professionals (TAP)	618	11.01
Clerical Support Workers (CSW)	570	10.16
Services and Sales Workers (SSW)	1,347	24.00
Craft and Related Trades Workers (CTW)	525	9.35
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers (PMOA)	440	7.84
Elementary Occupations (EO)	564	10.05
Total	5,612	100

Note: Using ISCO coding.

Table A2.4 Descriptive Statistics and Sectors Used in the Analysis, Ireland

Sector	N	%
Industry (I)	806	14.36
Construction (C)	537	9.57
Wholesale and retail trade (W&RT)	822	14.65
Transportation and storage (T&S)	265	4.72
Accommodation and food service activities (A&FS)	407	7.25
Information and communication (IC)	150	2.67
Financial insurance and real estate activities (F&RE)	236	4.21
Professional scientific and technical activities (PS&T)	231	4.12
Administrative and support service activities (AS)	349	6.22
Public administration and defence (PA)	188	3.35
Education (E)	459	8.18
Human health and social work activities (H&SW)	737	13.13
Other NACE activities (O)	425	7.57
Total	5,612	100

Note: Using NACE coding.

Table A2.5 Occupation x Sector Cells and Mean Scores for Attitudinal Scales in Ireland

Occupation & sector	N	%	Mean – Immigration	Std. Dev.	Mean – Migrants	Std. Dev.
M x I	81	1.4	6.21	1.95	2.85	0.77
M x C	35	0.61	5.89	1.75	2.44	0.65
M x W&RT	105	1.82	5.63	2.23	2.67	0.81
M x T&S	24	0.42	5.56	1.84	2.56	0.90
M x A&F	64	1.11	5.61	2.41	2.58	0.87
M x IC	33	0.57	6.22	2.00	2.90	0.65
M x F&RE	49	0.85	6.88	1.87	3.03	0.68
M x PS&T	28	0.48	6.93	1.91	2.95	0.72
M x AS	33	0.57	5.75	2.20	2.68	0.68
M x PA	13	0.23	6.17	1.81	3.10	0.83
M x E	29	0.5	6.45	2.12	3.05	0.70
M x H&SW	29	0.5	6.17	2.45	2.82	0.80
M x O	56	0.97	5.82	2.15	2.82	0.76
P x I	71	1.23	6.31	2.23	2.86	0.77
P x C	27	0.47	4.62	2.53	2.41	0.80
P x W&RT	25	0.43	6.25	2.13	2.91	0.68
P x IC	65	1.13	6.54	2.07	2.80	0.70
P x F&RE	35	0.61	6.64	2.06	3.05	0.65
P x PS&T	100	1.73	6.75	1.69	2.92	0.74
P x AS	29	0.5	5.60	1.95	2.52	0.85
P x PA	29	0.5	6.63	1.88	3.07	0.71
P x E	313	5.42	6.16	2.04	2.86	0.73
P x H&SW	249	4.31	5.54	1.93	2.72	0.77
P x O	52	0.9	6.28	2.26	2.83	0.80
TAP x I	96	1.66	5.79	1.94	2.81	0.70
TAP x C	32	0.55	5.25	1.47	2.48	0.73
TAP x W&RT	21	0.36	5.76	1.70	2.92	0.72
TAP x T&S	11	0.19	4.33	2.36	2.59	0.81
TAP x A&F	38	0.66	5.01	2.21	2.48	0.73
TAP x IC	30	0.52	5.60	1.98	2.55	0.79
TAP x F&RE	64	1.11	5.78	1.84	2.72	0.70
TAP x PS&T	62	1.07	5.48	2.24	2.57	0.78
TAP x AS	42	0.73	5.46	1.81	2.83	0.66
TAP x PA	39	0.68	4.83	2.37	2.45	0.83
TAP x E	29	0.5	5.46	2.25	2.74	0.71
TAP x H&SW	115	1.99	5.73	1.89	2.73	0.72
TAP x O	72	1.25	5.50	1.89	2.84	0.77
CSW x I	57	0.99	5.23	1.91	2.48	0.81
CSW x C	15	0.26	4.73	1.76	2.48	0.84
CSW x W&RT	66	1.14	5.04	1.92	2.66	0.70
CSW x T&S	44	0.76	5.57	2.04	2.55	0.75
CSW x AS	15	0.26	5.98	2.07	2.51	0.75
CSW x IC	19	0.33	5.42	2.04	2.61	0.94
CSW x F&RE	85	1.47	5.49	1.96	2.62	0.75

CSW x PS&T	37	0.64	5.23	1.87	2.59	0.83
CSW x AS	78	1.35	4.81	2.17	2.38	0.79
CSW x PA	61	1.06	5.53	1.79	2.48	0.65
CSW x E	24	0.42	4.78	2.11	2.49	0.86
CSW x H&SW	43	0.74	4.93	1.89	2.55	0.65
CSW x O	34	0.59	5.27	2.32	2.73	0.76
SSW x I	25	0.43	4.58	2.34	2.58	0.75
SSW x C	8	0.14	4.92	1.70	2.60	0.66
SSW x W&RT	489	8.47	4.97	2.06	2.51	0.79
SSW x T&S	11	0.19	6.35	1.67	2.75	0.88
SSW x AS	240	4.16	4.73	2.21	2.50	0.82
SSW x F&RE	8	0.14	5.79	1.40	2.51	0.49
SSW x AS	72	1.25	4.96	2.25	2.55	0.88
SSW x PA	29	0.5	5.49	2.01	2.68	0.77
SSW x E	56	0.97	4.55	2.12	2.56	0.78
SSW x H&SW	276	4.78	4.95	2.23	2.48	0.81
SSW x O	170	2.94	4.54	2.31	2.44	0.71
CTW x I	167	2.89	4.22	2.04	2.30	0.89
CTW x C	263	4.55	4.81	2.27	2.38	0.81
CTW x W&RT	65	1.13	5.04	1.93	2.44	0.86
CTW x T&S	7	0.12	5.08	2.65	2.59	0.50
CTW x IC	6	0.1	5.46	1.76	2.71	0.56
CTW x PS&T	9	0.16	4.50	2.73	2.13	0.83
CTW x AS	7	0.12	4.59	1.92	2.38	0.63
CTW x O	10	0.17	5.55	2.86	2.60	0.99
PMOA x I	215	3.72	4.46	2.25	2.41	0.86
PMOA x C	43	0.74	4.29	2.54	2.14	0.68
PMOAxW&RT	25	0.43	4.54	1.98	2.25	0.78
PMOA x T&S	140	2.42	4.17	2.29	2.28	0.78
PMOA x A&FS	9	0.16	4.52	2.07	2.18	0.88
PMOA x AS	12	0.21	3.59	2.52	1.93	0.74
PMOA x PA	6	0.1	4.27	2.41	2.62	0.65
PMOA x H&SW	10	0.17	3.96	2.39	2.56	0.58
PMOA x O	15	0.26	4.37	1.94	2.60	0.60
EO x I	110	1.9	4.90	2.23	2.53	0.84
EO x C	125	2.16	4.93	2.66	2.27	0.87
EO x W&RT	42	0.73	5.24	2.18	2.73	0.89
EO x T&S	31	0.54	4.75	1.90	2.20	0.86
EO x A&FS	73	1.26	4.07	2.20	2.48	0.73
EO x AS	82	1.42	4.75	2.11	2.53	0.90
EO x PA	24	0.42	5.14	3.05	2.59	0.68
EO x E	24	0.42	4.88	1.90	2.38	0.73
EO x H&SW	29	0.5	4.19	2.49	2.36	0.74
EO x O	39	0.68	4.58	2.00	2.82	0.70
Total	*5,775*	*100*	*5.23*	*2.22*	*2.58*	*0.80*

Note: Weighted means.

Chapter 3: Asylum Seekers Welcome? A Multilevel Analysis of Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers in Europe [59]

Abstract

Since the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015, European countries have received an unprecedented number of applications for asylum. While there is a large body of literature on attitudes towards immigrants, relatively few studies have focussed on attitudes towards asylum seekers, and even fewer studies have looked at this topic cross-nationally. Using data from three rounds of the European Social Survey (2002, 2014 and 2016), this paper examines two questions: first, if the threat hypothesis can explain anti-asylum sentiment in Europe; second, does generalised trust and trust in institutions account for greater support towards asylum seekers? On average, attitudes towards the admissions of asylum seekers' have become more lenient since 2002. However, a small but significant shift towards greater resistance can be observed between 2014 and 2016 in most European countries. Results from the multi-level analysis indicate that greater levels of generalised and institutional trust are associated with greater support towards asylum seekers. However only partial support is found for group conflict theory. On an individual level, respondents in vulnerable socio-economic conditions are more opposed to asylum seekers, and on a country level higher number of refugees in the country are associated with greater resistance. In contrast to the threat hypothesis, higher levels of unemployment on a country level are associated with greater support for asylum seekers rather than resistance. The wider implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: asylum-seekers, attitudes, European Social Survey, threat, trust

[59] This chapter is currently under review at an international journal. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the *International Migration Conference "EU at the Crossroads of Migration: Critical Reflections on the 'Refugee Crisis' and New Migration Deals*" (Utrecht, 2018) and the *American Sociological Association Annual Meeting* (New York, 2019).

3.1 Introduction

Since the beginning of the European 'refugee crisis' in 2015, over 2 million applications for asylum have been recorded in European states (see figure 3.1)[60]. In 2015 alone, over 1.3 million people applied for asylum in Europe. By comparison, the largest inflow of asylum seekers before this was in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, with the highest numbers recorded in 1992 when over 600 thousand people applied for asylum. According to the latest data from Eurostat, asylum applications decreased in 2018 and were comparable to 2014 figures (Eurostat, 2019e). However even with the decrease in applications, it is predicted that the number of asylum seekers will remain high due to on-going conflict in the Middle East (UNHCR, 2016).

Figure 3.1 Total Asylum Applications in Europe, 1985-2016



Source: Eurostat (2009; 2019d).

While the number of applications for asylum in the last few years is unprecedented, not all European countries are affected equally by this. For example, Germany, a country which could be classified as a 'traditional' refugee receiving country, has received a record number of applications, accounting for 46 per cent of all asylum applications received in 2015 and 2016. Hungary has

[60] While the number of asylum seekers in the last two years is unprecedented in Europe, most asylum seekers remain in border countries. In 2015, Europe hosted the seconded largest number refugees just less than 4.4 million with the majority of refugees residing in Turkey. African countries hosted the largest number of refugees (UNHCR, 2016).

become a ‘crossing’ country for the first time and has received the second largest number of asylum applications during the same period (8 per cent of total applications), whilst other Eastern European countries have received less than 0.1 per cent of total applications (see Appendix in section 3.8).

In addition to the differing rates of asylum applications, the response to the crisis has also varied across countries from ‘Refugees Welcome’ campaigns to construction of fences, attacks on reception centres and closing of the Schengen borders (BBC, 2015). While on one hand some Europeans displayed solidarity through volunteering initiatives and support for asylum seekers (Nowicka et al., 2019), others expressed fears of economic burden, security concerns (Pew Research Center, 2016) and hostility towards forced migrants (Bansak et al., 2016).

While the role of the media is outside the scope of the study it is important to acknowledge its role in the portrayal of asylum seekers as outsiders. In the media the distinction is often drawn between ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘refugees’, with the former portrayed as ‘failed’ while the latter as ‘vulnerable’(William and Blinder, 2013). During the recent ‘refugee crisis’ media played a significant role in the portrayal of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers and refugees were seen as outsiders who are different to Europeans and portrayed as either vulnerable or dangerous (Georgiou and Zaborowskim, 2017). The coverage of the crisis shifted from ‘careful tolerance over the summer, to an outpouring of solidarity and humanitarianism in September 2015, and to a securitisation of the debate and a narrative of fear in November 2015’ (Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017:22). Therefore it is important to bear in mind that media’s construction of asylum seekers as outsiders and as an out-group to be helped or feared may have had an influence on public attitudes and may have influenced public discourse surrounding the crisis.

A large body of literature examines attitudes towards immigrants (for an overview see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014), but there is relatively little research on attitudes towards asylum seekers, particularly in the European context. Using group conflict theory and data from

three rounds (1, 7 and 8) of the European Social Survey (ESS), this chapter focusses on cross-national, multilevel analysis to assess determinants of attitudes towards asylum seekers. Two rationales are examined, i) the threat hypothesis linked to economic threat and ii) and solidarity linked to trust and willingness to help. The study first sets out the rationale for examining attitudes towards asylum seekers, discusses current literature and introduces the hypotheses of the study. Secondly, data and methods used are discussed before descriptive and multilevel results are presented. Finally, results, limitations, as well as future research areas are discussed.

3.2 Why Examine Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers and Refugees[61]?

Ethnic minorities' participation in the host country depends on the extent of their access to social, political and economic rights as well as integration into the receiving society (Rudiger and Spencer, 2003). Attitudes of the native population towards minorities affect not only the latter's day-to-day experience but can also have an impact on their overall social cohesion and successful long-term integration (McGinnity et al., 2018b). The recent influx of asylum seekers to Europe has prompted an increased emphasis on integration policies and outcomes (Arnold et al., 2019). Regarding refugee integration, literature has often focussed on practical or functional terms (Atfield et al., 2007) involving access to integration supports and services such as housing and language courses, and access to the labour market (Castles et al., 2002), whilst how host societies perceive refugees is less researched (Bansak et al., 2016). This chapter argues that attitudes of the native population towards asylum seekers in host societies is an important dimension of the overall integration process[62].

[61] Note that the focus of this paper is on asylum seekers, i.e. persons who have applied for refugee status. The terms 'asylum seekers' and 'refugees' are often used interchangeably in academic writing and media reports despite the fact that they refer to very distinct stages in the asylum process regarding legal status and entitlements. For the purpose of this study the two terms will be used interchangeably and refer to persons who have applied for refugee status, unless otherwise stated.

[62] A qualitative study in Canada, Germany, Turkey, and the US found that negative attitudes were one of the main reasons for refugees and asylum seekers perceiving the likelihood of their long-term integration as unsuccessful (Balta Ozgen, 2019). Esses et al., (2017) argue that one of the solutions to the 'refugee' crisis is resettlement, however the authors' note that for this strategy to

In addition, there is a large body of literature which examines attitudes towards immigrants (Quillian, 1995; Mayda, 2006; Meuleman et al., 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014[63]) but relatively few studies focus on attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees (but see Coenders et al., 2004b; Louis et al., 2007; Hercowitz-Amir et al., 2017; Koos and Seibel, 2019). The distinction between migrants and asylum seekers and refugees is often blurred (Sales, 2010). However, asylum seekers face much greater challenges regarding integration (Ager and Strang, 2008) and differ greatly from migrants in general, due to their previous experiences of trauma (UNHCR, 2013). Hence, I argue that focusing specifically on public opinion towards asylum seekers rather than ethnic minorities on the whole is important as different factors may count in the determinants of attitudes towards the two groups.

The main motivation of this chapter is to add to the small body of literature which focuses specifically on public opinion towards asylum seekers. On one hand the study examines if threat, derived from group conflict theory, can account for anti-asylum sentiment. On the other hand, asylum seekers fleeing war, conflict and political unrest may be perceived as being in need of help and hence there may be greater willingness by receiving societies to accept asylum seekers.

3.3 Asylum Seekers as a Threat?

Group conflict theory has emerged as one of key theoretical frameworks in explaining intergroup dynamics and has been used extensively to study attitudes towards immigrants (Esses et al., 1998; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Zárate et al., 2004; Riek et al., 2006; Meuleman et al., 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Billiet et al., 2014) and asylum seekers (Coenders et al., 2004b; Schweitzer et al., 2005). According to group conflict theory, intergroup conflict occurs when two or more groups compete for resources (Blumer, 1958; Sherif, 1967; Quillian, 1995). The competition for resources can relate to actual or perceived rivalry (LeVine

be successful public attitudes towards refugees need to be improved to ensure successful resettlement and long-term integration.

[63] See Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010 and Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014 for a detailed review.

and Campbell, 1972). Irrespective of the nature of this competition, prejudice and preference for exclusion can emerge as a defensive reaction when interests of the in-group are threatened by an out-group (Blumer, 1958; Campbell, 1965).

Realistic threat is one of the main components of group conflict theory and can relate to tangible items such as employment, social welfare and housing (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). This type of threat originates from the perception that an out-group is

> *'...endangering the existence, political or economic power, or physical well-being of the in-group' (*Bizman and Yinon, 2001:191*).*

Existing research indicates that realistic threat related to economic concerns is one of the main drivers of anti-refugee sentiment (McKay and Pittam 1993; Curry, 2000; Schweitzer et al., 2005). Schweitzer et al. (2005) found a high prevalence of negative attitudes towards asylum seekers in Australia, with participants expressing negative sentiment related to realistic threat associated with economic resources.

Refugees and immigrants in many host countries are more likely to receive lower wages and are at a higher risk of unemployment than the native population (Dancygier and Laitin, 2014). However in the case of refugees, the disadvantage in the labour market is much more pronounced, as they face greater challenges compared to other groups of migrants (Connor, 2010; Bevelander, 2011) and may need additional supports. Hence it is likely that they may be perceived as placing a greater economic burden on the State than economic migrants. In addition, individuals in more vulnerable socio-economic positions, such as those who are unemployed, have lower levels of education, are in financial hardship or are working in lower skilled occupations have been found to be less supportive of ethnic minorities (Mayda, 2006), including asylum seekers (Coenders et al., 2004b). Poor economic performance, measured by lower economic growth and higher unemployment rates, on the country level has also been found to be associated with greater prejudice towards minorities (Quillian, 1995; Mayda, 2006; Billiet et al., 2014).

Another threat component originating from group conflict theory is related to the size of the ethnic group. The presence of large ethnic groups has been found to be associated with greater resistance towards migrants (Meuleman et al., 2009). Recent studies indicate that, in addition to fears related to economic burden, large inflows of asylum seekers have been identified as one of the key concerns for the native population in Europe (Bansak et al., 2016; Pew Research Center, 2016).

Regarding the threat hypothesis, several hypotheses are formulated:

> *H1: Individuals in more vulnerable socio-economic conditions (unemployed, in lower skilled occupations, with lower levels of education, those in financial hardship) will be less likely to support further admission of asylum seekers.*
>
> *H2: Higher levels of unemployment are associated with greater resistance towards asylum seekers.*
>
> *H3: Larger numbers of refugees in a country are associated with greater resistance towards asylum seekers.*
>
> *H4: Larger numbers of asylum applications made in a country are associated with greater resistance towards asylum seekers.*

3.4 Willingness to Help?

While asylum seekers may be perceived as a threat it is also likely that, unlike other ethnic minorities, they may also be more accepted by the native population due to their specific circumstances and vulnerability. There is evidence to suggest that determinants of attitudes towards refugees are different to determinants of attitudes towards immigrants (O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006) and hence an alternative approach linked to trust is considered.

One of the key factors in fostering social cohesion (Putnam, 1993), cooperation (Luhmann, 1979), and binding individuals together without expectations of reciprocity, is trust (Uslaner, 2001). For the purpose of the study the focus is on two types of trust; i) generalised trust which can be defined as trust in strangers

> '*the perception that most people are part of [one's] moral community'* (Uslaner, 2001:8),

and ii) institutional trust defined as the

> '*belief that country's institutions not, at worst, knowingly or willingly do them harm, at best, act in everybody's interests*.' (Halapuu et al., 2013: 4).

Greater levels of trust have been linked to various societal outcomes such as solidarity, volunteering and acceptance towards minorities (Uslaner, 2001; Rustenbach, 2010). Uslaner (2001:1) argues that more trusting individuals are more likely to volunteer, give to charity, and support policies aimed at assisting those who are less fortunate. Several studies have also shown that trust in national institutions is a predictor of greater tolerance towards ethnic minorities (Crepaz, 2008; McLaren, 2010; Halapuu et al., 2013). Trust in national institutions is particularly relevant in the case of asylum seekers, as their admission to the host country is highly regulated. Hence the following hypothesis is formulated:

> *H5: individuals who have higher levels of trust in their national institutions and who are more trusting of others will be more likely to be receptive to further admissions of asylum seekers*.

According to Uslaner (2001), countries which have more 'trusters' are more like to redistribute resources within the society. In addition, countries which show greater concern for people outside their borders, for example through aid, are more likely to show greater acceptance of asylum seekers (Thielemann, 2010).

Figure 3.2 Average Asylum Applications and ODA Flows in Europe



Source: Asylum applications (Eurostat, 2009, Eurostat, 2019d) ODA (OECD, 2019b).
Note: Average of 2002, 2014 and 2016 data. Official development assistance (ODA) flows are expressed as the percentage of the average gross national income (GNI). Asylum applications been transformed using the logarithm function.

Hence it likely that, on a country level:

> *H6: Higher spending on aid is associated with greater support for asylum seekers.*

In addition, several control variables which have been deemed to be important in predicting attitudes towards ethnic minorities are included; higher levels of education (Coenders et al., 2004b; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007) and liberal political leanings (McLaren, 2003; Pew Research Center, 2016). Both have been found to be positively associated with greater tolerance towards ethnic minorities.

3.5 Data and Methods

3.5.1 Data

This study uses data from the first (ESS, 2002), seventh (ESS, 2014a), and eight (ESS, 2016a) rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a cross-national, academically driven, survey conducted every two years measuring attitudinal changes in Europe. Each national sample is designed to reflect a random probability sample of the resident population aged 15 and over (Jowell et al., 2007). All three rounds contain a specific question related to attitudes towards asylum seekers. To my knowledge, no studies to-date have used all three rounds to examine attitudes towards asylum seekers. Post-stratification and population size weights were applied to analyses[64].

All individual level variables were drawn from the ESS datasets. Country-level measures were derived from Eurostat, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) databases (see Appendix in section 3.8 for country level information and sources).

3.5.2 Sample Size

The sample was pooled from the three rounds of the ESS and contains 21 countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Czechia (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH) and the United Kingdom (UK). Most countries participated in all 3 rounds[65].

The focus of this chapter is on natives' attitudes towards asylum seekers. Hence respondents with a migratory background are excluded from the study. In addition, immigrants tend to have more positive views regarding immigration in

[64] The weights used were computed by multiplying the post-stratification and population weights. See ESS (2014b) for more information.
[65] All countries participated in all 3 rounds of the ESS, except for Denmark (Round 1 and Round 7), Italy (Round 1 and Round 8) and Estonia and Lithuania (Rounds 7 and 8) which participated in 2.

general than the native population (Dustmann and Preston, 2004; McGinnity et al., 2013). Hence, the analysis is limited to 'natives' who are defined as those respondents who were born in the country and whose parents were also born in the country. Respondents with missing values on the dependent variable were also excluded from analysis. Hence the sample consists of 76,000+ individuals (level 1) nested within 59 country time points (level 2) which are nested within 21 countries (level 3)[66]. Sample sizes, descriptive statistics, and country level data are included in the Appendix (see section 3.8).

3.5.3 Dependent Variable

Attitudes towards asylum seekers are measured using the ESS question;

> *'Some people come to this country and apply for refugee status on the grounds that they fear persecution in their own country. ... please say how much you agree or disagree that: 'the government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status',*

henceforth referred to as *support for asylum seekers*. Responses to the question were reverse coded from the original coding so that higher scores represent greater support. The answers were treated as Likert scale responses (1=disagree strongly, 5=agree strongly)[67].

3.5.4 Individual-level Independent Variables

Variables related to economic threat: Skill level is measured using respondents' occupation. Occupations are defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and re-coded into 4 categories: high skilled white collar (reference category), low skilled white collar, high skilled blue

[66] Note that sample size at level 1 and level 2 varies for some models due to missing data on some of the variables. Listwise deletion has been applied.
[67] Level of agreement measured on 5-point scale (see Vagias, 2006).

collar, and low skilled blue collar[68]. *Main activity* refers to the individuals' position within the labour market and is coded into 5 categories: in employment (reference category), in education, unemployed, retired and other. *Financial hardship* is coded into 3 groups: difficult on present income (reference category), coping on present income and living comfortably on present income[69].

Trust in institutions was constructed using 4 ESS questions measuring trust in the country's parliament, legal system, political parties and politicians. All four variables were measured on a scale from 0-10 with higher values indicating complete trust. The scale is highly reliable with the overall Cronbach's alpha of 0.85. The scale is reliable at country time points with Cronbach's alpha ranging from 0.74 to 0.89. Measurement equivalence is discussed below.

Generalised Trust scale was constructed using three items; i) 'Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful', ii) 'Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair' and iii) 'Most of the time people are helpful or mostly looking out for themselves.' All three variables were measured on a scale from 0-10 with higher values indicating higher levels of trust in others. The scale is highly reliable with the overall Cronbach's alpha of 0.77. At country time points the scale is moderately reliable and ranges from 0.62 to 0.86. The lower Cronbach's alpha for country time points is not surprising as the items which make up the generalised trust scale are more heterogeneous and cover a broad meaning of trust in others than institutional trust which contains much more homogenous indicators[70]. Measurement equivalence is discussed below.

The two variables related to trust are positively correlated ($r=0.47$, $p<0.001$). As figure 3.3 illustrates, in countries with higher levels of generalised trust there are also higher levels of trust in national institutions.

[68] ISCO occupations are coded into 4 categories of employment based on skill in accordance with internationally accepted categories. See the Appendix in section 3.8 for further information on the coding used.
[69] Most of the missing data relates to the financial hardship variable. The variable was included in the study as several studies have shown that one's financial situation is an important predictor of attitudes towards minorities (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Davidov and Semyonov, 2017 for a review).
[70] Schwartz et al., (2001) argue that lower alpha's can result due to i) a small number of items in each scale and ii) the heterogeneity of the items.

Figure 3.3 Generalised Trust and Trust in National Institutions in Europe



Source: ESS (2002, 2014a and 2016a).
Note: Own calculations. Weighted results.

Control Variables: Several individual level variables which have been shown to have a significant effect on attitudes towards minorities are included as controls. Age is a continuous variable and measures individual's age in years. It has been centred using grand mean centering to reflect a 'typical case' (Roeder, 2011)[71]. Gender is a dummy variable with values 1 for men and 0 for women. Level of education is coded into 4 categories; primary (reference category), secondary, tertiary and apprenticeship/vocational. Political affiliation is measured on one's own placement on the left-right scale (0=left, 10=right).

3.5.5 Contextual Variables

Country level variables related to the threat hypothesis, which are included in the analysis, are: unemployment rate, share of asylum applications and share of refugees already in the country.

[71] Centering allows for a better interpretation of the expected value of Y as centred X reflects the expected value of Y when X is at its mean. In this case only age was centered as the interpretation of the intercept when age is zero is undesirable. Other continuous independent variables have not been centered as zero represents a meaningful value, e.g. political affiliation is measured from 0 to 10 with 0 indicating one's placement on the left.

The *unemployment rate* is measured as the percentage of the active population, which is unemployed at each country-time period (level 2)[72] and the average unemployment rate[73] between 2002, 2014, and 2016 (level 3).

Share of Asylum applications are the number of applications submitted in each country time point per 1,000 inhabitants (level 2) as well as the average change in asylum applications submitted in the period under analysis (level 3) per 1,000 inhabitants. The *share of refugees* is the number of refugees in the country at each country-time period per 1,000 inhabitants. In addition, number of inhabitants in each country is included as a control variable.

As mentioned earlier, countries that spend more on aid have been found to be more tolerant towards ethnic minorities. Official development assistance (ODA) is henceforth referred to as aid. It is measured as the flows of the ODA as the percentage of the gross national income (GNI) [74]

3.5.6 Limitations and Issues with Cross-national Research

Two main issues arise relating to cross-national research. Firstly, often a multi-level analysis is necessary due to the nested nature of the data (e.g. individuals nested within countries). Hox (2002) suggests that the highest level in multilevel models should have 30 groups or more. However, this is often not possible when using international survey data, such as the ESS, due to the much lower number of countries taking part. Much of the existing cross-national research (for example Meuleman et al., 2009) has used less than 30 groups. Furthermore, Maas and Hox (2005) note that even when the highest level is less than 20 groups, standard errors for intercept variances may be underestimated but regression coefficients can still be interpreted correctly.

[72] Note that the unemployment rate at level 2 is the deviation from the entire period average.
[73] The average is included to ensure that a stable figure for unemployment is included. A similar approach has been employed by Van Hootegem et al., (2019).
[74] GDP was originally included as a control variable. However due to high multicollinearity between GDP and ODA it was excluded from the models (the correlation coefficient between the two variables is $r=0.56$, $p<0.001$). All coefficients for predictors remain the same when the models include GDP instead of the ODA.

Secondly, measurement equivalence for latent variables is necessary in order to compare countries and various points in time, to ensure the same constructs are being measured across groups. In this analysis, two latent variables (generalised trust and trust in institutions) are used. Previous research has found that both latent variables, trust in institutions (Allum et al., 2011), and generalised trust (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008), measure the same latent concept across Europe and time. In addition, the main interest is to examine the relationship between these the two latent variables and the dependent variable, rather than to compare latent means. In this case metric equivalence is deemed to be sufficient and the items used in the ESS show high metric equivalence (Fitzgerald, 2016).

3.6 Results

3.6.1 Descriptive Results

Support for asylum seekers varies across time points and countries. In 2014, respondents expressed greatest support for asylum seekers, with approximately 47 per cent of respondents agreeing/strongly agreeing that the government should be generous in judging applications for refugee status. The support for asylum seekers was lower in 2002 and 2016, with 32 per cent and 39 per cent of respondents' agreeing/strongly agreeing with the statement, respectively (See table 3.1). While attitudes towards asylum seekers have become more positive since the early 2000s, a relatively large proportion of the European population think that the government should be more stringent regarding asylum applications, with 26 per cent in 2014 and 37 per cent in 2016 wishing to restrict further admissions (in comparison to 42 per cent in 2002).

Table 3.1 Government Should be Generous Judging Applications for Refugee Status (%) in Europe

	2002	2014	2016
Strongly Agree	5.11	10.73	9.84
Agree	27.21	36.24	29.22
Neutral	26.15	26.77	24.35
Disagree	31.42	19.43	24.54
Disagree strongly	10.12	6.83	12.05

Source: European Social Survey, Round 1 (2002), Round 7 (2014a) and Round 8 (2016b).
Note: Weighted results.

The mean value on the 'support for refugees' scale was 2.87 in 2002, increasing to 3.25 in 2014, and decreasing to 3.0 in 2016[75]. Greater support for asylum seekers in 2014 could be linked to the start of the refugee crisis, while as the crisis got worse in 2015 and 2016, it is likely that Europeans may have become less tolerant towards asylum seekers. It is worthwhile to note that the proportion of the respondents disagreeing that the government should be generous in judging asylum applications between 2014 and 2016 increased significantly in a relatively short period of time.

Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of respondents in support of greater lenience towards asylum seekers by their respective governments. There is great variation across countries, as almost half of the respondents in Poland, France, and Portugal across the three rounds expressed support towards asylum seekers in comparison to much lower proportions in the Netherlands, Hungary and Czechia, where the support varied from 9 per cent to 29 per cent across rounds. Country groupings[76] which can generally be observed in anti-immigration research, do not appear as strong in the case of attitudes towards asylum seekers.

[75] Two sample t-tests were used to confirm that the differences in means between rounds are statistically significant ($p<0.001$).
[76] For example, in Eastern European countries anti-immigration attitudes have consistently been found to be more prevalent than in Western Europe (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010).

Figure 3.4 Support towards Asylum Seekers (%)in Europe, 2002, 2014 and 2016



Source: ESS (2002), ESS (2014a) and ESS (2016b).
Note: Support for asylum seekers = agree/strongly agree that the government should be generous judging applications for refugee status. Weighted results.

3.6.2 Multi-level Modelling Results

A multilevel modelling approach was employed to account for the hierarchical/nested data structure. Results from multilevel models are reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Table 3.4 displays standardised beta coefficients from the final model.

The random intercept model (null model) was used to determine if multi-level analysis is necessary (see section 3.8). The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) at country level (level 3) is 0.12, i.e. indicating that 12 per cent of the variance in support for asylum seekers is due to country level differences. The ICC at country level time points (level 2) is 0.16, i.e. indicating that 16 per cent of the variance in support for asylum seekers is due to country at time point differences. Therefore, multilevel modelling is used in order to account for the nested structure of the data.

Model 1 includes individual all individual and country level variables excluding generalised trust, trust in institutions, political leanings and financial hardship [77].

Table 3.2. Support for Asylum Seekers in Europe. Unstandardised Parameter Estimates from Multilevel Models1-2

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Fixed Effects				
Constant	2.064***	(0.254)	1.878***	(0.287)
Level 1				
Male	-0.047*	(0.022)	-0.035	(0.020)
Tertiary Education	0.289***	(0.047)	0.190***	(0.037)
Students	0.288***	(0.034)	0.206***	(0.026)
Unemployed	0.051	(0.042)	0.079*	(0.035)
Retired	0.042*	(0.020)	0.040*	(0.017)
Low skilled white collar	-0.054*	(0.022)	-0.042*	(0.019)
High skilled blue collar	-0.122**	(0.032)	-0.092**	(0.029)
Low skilled blue collar	-0.088***	(0.027)	-0.055*	(0.027)
Placement on left right scale			-0.089***	(0.011)
Generalised trust			0.070***	(0.008)
Institutional trust			0.059***	(0.010)
Level 2				
Unemployment rate	0.032***	(0.007)	0.032**	(0.008)
Share of refugees	-0.033*	(0.014)	-0.034**	(0.013)
Share of asylum applications	-0.019	(0.020)	-0.015	(0.021)
Aid	0.978***	(0.178)	0.812**	(0.171)
Level 3				
Average unemployment rate	0.084**	(0.026)	0.090**	(0.030)
Change in asylum application	-0.004	(0.002)	-0.004	(0.002)
Random Effects				
Level 1	1.072	0.059	1.007	0.053
Level 2	0.028	0.007	0.029	0.008
Level 3	0.096	0.030	0.100	0.030
Model Fit & Observations				
Deviance	223223.2		218417.4	
Log. Lik.	-111611.6		-109208.7	
N Level 1	77,691		77,691	
N Level 2	59		59	
N Level 3	21		21	

Note: Controlling for age, education (*Ref: Primary*), main activity (*Ref: Employed*), skill level, (*Ref: High skilled white collar)* and the number of inhabitants. Share of refugees and asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[77] Generalised trust, institutional trust and political leanings may act as mediators and hence are added in later models. Financial hardship variable is added to the last model due to missing values at level 1 and level 2.

The addition of the individual and country level variables explains 49 per cent of variance at the country time points and 37 per cent of variance at country level. In line with the threat hypothesis (*H1*), individuals working in low-skilled occupations are more likely to oppose further refugee admissions that those individuals working in highly skilled jobs. While higher levels of education are associated with greater support. Students and retired individuals are also more likely to support asylum seekers. This finding could possibly be linked to the fact that neither group is active in the labour market to a significant degree and hence not competing with asylum seekers for jobs. However, in contrast to the hypothesis (*H1*), unemployed individuals are more likely to support asylum seekers than those who are in employment, however the difference is not statistically significant at the conventional 5 per cent significance level. It is likely that, rather than the threat of labour market competition, fear of the financial burden associated with asylum seekers could lead to more negative attitudes. This may particularly be relevant for individuals in the labour market and those who make significant tax contributions. Regarding control variables, men are less likely to support asylum seekers in comparison to women while age has no significant effect on attitudes.

In line with hypothesis three (*H3*) relating to the size of the ethnic population, a higher share of refugees already in the country is associated with greater resistance toward further admissions of asylum seekers ($p<0.05$). Hypothesis four (*H4*) is not supported as neither share of asylum applications nor the change in asylum applications in the period have a negative impact on attitudes towards asylum seekers.

In line with the hypothesis related to aid (*H6*), higher spending on development assistance at the country level is associated with greater support towards asylum seekers ($p<0.001$). Poor economic conditions measured by the unemployment rate do not provide support for the threat hypothesis (*H2*). Pearson's correlation between the dependent variable and average unemployment rate is positive and

statistically significant (r= 0.22, p<0.001) [78]. Greater support for asylum seekers in countries with higher unemployment rates is observed and illustrated in figure 3.5. These results hold even when countries which have significantly higher rates of unemployment in comparison to other countries, e.g. Spain, are removed from the analysis [79]. Possible explanations for this finding are provided in the discussion and conclusion section.

Model 2 builds on the previous model by including generalised trust, institutional trust and political leanings. Hypothesis 5 (*H5*) is supported as both higher levels of generalised trust and institutional trust are positively associated with support for asylum seekers (p<0.001). In addition, the control for political leanings is in line with existing research as individuals with less conservative political leanings, i.e. leanings towards the left (p<0.001) are more likely to express support towards asylum seekers. The effect of unemployment at level 1 and level 3 regarding support for asylum seekers is stronger when controlling for generalised trust, institutional trust and political leanings. Unemployed individuals are more likely to express support for asylum seekers than those in employment and the difference between the two groups is statistically significant (p<0.05). The addition of generalised trust, trust in institutions and political leanings significantly improves the model fit ($\chi 2$ (3) 4805.7, p<0.001) in comparison to the previous model.

[78] The country level effects regarding unemployment mirror the individual-level effect of being unemployed.
[79] The results also remain the same when a dummy variable for Spain is included in the models.

Figure 3.5 Relationship between Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers and Unemployment Rate in Europe



Note: Weighted results. Average unemployment rate 2002-2016 (%).

Model 3 includes financial difficulties[80] and it further improves the model fit ($\chi 2$ (2) 11565.1, $p<0.001$) in comparison to the previous model.

[80] As noted earlier, the variable was not included in the earlier models due to missing values at levels 1 and 2.

Table 3.3 Support for Asylum Seekers in Europe. Unstandardised Parameter Estimates from Multilevel Model 3

	Model 3	
	B	**SE**
Fixed Effects		
Constant	1.886***	(0.286)
Level 1		
Age centered	0.001*	(0.001)
Unemployed	0.100**	(0.032)
Low skilled white collar	-0.036	(0.020)
High skilled blue collar	-0.079**	(0.028)
Low skilled blue collar	-0.047	(0.029)
Difficult on present income	-0.059*	(0.028)
Random Effects		
Level 1	0.993	0.044
Level 2	0.030	0.008
Level 3	0.099	0.031
Model Fit & Observations		
Deviance	206852.4	
Log. Lik.	-103426.2	
N Level 1	76,229	
N Level 2	58	
N Level 3	21	

Note: Controlling for all variables included in models 1 and 2 and financial difficulties (ref: living comfortably). Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Individuals facing financial difficulties are more likely to support greater restrictions towards asylum seeker admissions. Once controlling for financial hardship, age becomes positively associated with support for asylum seekers ($p<0.05$), which is line with Coenders et al. (2004b) study regarding asylum seekers. The difference between highly skilled white collar workers and lower skilled white and blue collar workers is no longer statistically significant, when controlling for one's financial situation. However, highly skilled blue collar workers remain significantly more opposed to further admissions of asylum seekers in comparison to highly skilled white collar workers ($p<0.01$). This finding is consistent with previous research regarding attitudes towards asylum seekers (Scheepers et al., 2002). The difference between those who are unemployed and those who are employed increases significantly, with the former expressing much greater support for asylum seekers, once financial difficulties are taken into consideration. As discussed previously, this could be linked to fears of the financial burden related to taxes and social welfare rather than

competition within the labour market. No changes occur in terms of other coefficients (results not reported). These findings are discussed in greater detail in section 3.7

Table 3.4 displays standardised beta coefficients. Left-right political scale (β= -0.17, p<0.001), generalised trust (β= 0.11 p<0.001) and trust in institutions (β= 0.10, p<0.001) have the largest relative importance in predicting attitudes towards asylum seekers. On a country-level, the average unemployment rate (β= 0.33 p<0.01), aid (β= 0.17 p<0.001), and the share of refugees (β=-0.13, p<0.05) have the largest effect on attitudes.

Table 3.4 Support for Asylum Seekers in Europe. Standardised Beta Coefficients, Model 3

	β
Individual level variables	
Placement on left right	-0.169***
Generalised trust scale	0.111***
Institutional trust	0.102***
Tertiary education	0.065***
Highly skilled blue collar worker	-0.024**
Unemployed	0.023**
Country level variables	
Average unemployment rate	0.331**
Aid	0.170***
Share of refugees	-0.126*
Unemployment at country time points	0.081***

Standardized beta coefficients
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

3.7 Discussion and Conclusion

Attitudes towards asylum seekers' admissions have become more lenient since 2002 with 47 per cent of respondents agreeing that the government should be more generous in judging refugee applications in 2014 compared to 33 per cent in 2002. In 2016, 39 per cent of respondents agreed with this statement. While attitudes became more positive towards asylum seekers in 2014 across all countries, by 2016 a divergence can be observed across Europe. This could be partially explained by the initial concern and urgency to help asylum seekers at the start of the crisis later turning into concerns related to the potential negative

impact of the increasing inflows as the crisis intensified (Pew Research Center, 2016).

It is also worthwhile noting that, while attitudes towards asylum seekers have improved since 2002, 37 per cent of respondents in the 8th round of the ESS in 2016 disagreed that their government should be more lenient towards asylum seekers. In addition, significant variations can be observed across different European countries. In 2016, opposition towards asylum seekers varied from 10 per cent in Portugal to 73 per cent in Estonia. Diverging attitudes towards refugees in European societies may partly explain the EU's approach[81] to the 'migration crisis' as member states could not reach a unanimous decision on how to deal with the increased inflows of refugees. This polarisation in attitudes is likely to further complicate the already fragmented EU approach to asylum seeker integration and resettlement.

On a country level, a higher share of refugees already living in the country is associated with greater resistance (H3) while higher spending on aid is associated with greater support (H6). Higher share of asylum applications lodged do not have a significant impact on attitudes (H4)..

Regarding the threat hypotheses (H1, H2) related to economic threat, mixed results can be observed. Economic threat can relate to several 'fears'; increased competition for jobs and increased competition for state benefits. The findings of the study suggest that neither play a role in public attitudes towards refugees[82]. Individuals in worse economic situations, working in lower skilled jobs and those with lower levels of education are more opposed to asylum seekers (H1). However, the difference between those in elementary occupations and highly skilled individuals is not significant once controlling for financial difficulties. Furthermore, unemployed individuals and those that are retired are more supportive of asylum seekers than individuals in employment. Arguably, both unemployed and retired individuals are more likely to be sensitive to a potential

[81] See Greenhill (2016) for a discussion on EU's approach.
[82] Regarding state benefits, only main activity is included in the models. Future studies could consider the relationship between state social welfare and attitudes in much greater detail.

reduction of transfers in cash and kind (state benefits) than employed individuals, however this does not seem to play a role in attitudes towards asylum seekers.

Individual effects of being unemployed are mirrored by unemployment rate on a country level. Unemployment at both individual and country levels has a significant impact on attitudes, but in an opposite direction to the hypotheses (H1, H2). Several possible explanations may clarify this. Firstly, there is evidence to suggest that determinants of attitudes towards refugees are different to determinants of attitudes towards immigrants (O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Coenders et al. (2004b) found that national economic conditions were associated with attitudes towards immigrants but not refugees. In a recent study, Koos and Seibel (2019)[83] show that unemployment is associated with greater levels of solidarity with asylum seekers. They argue that that this could be due to several reasons such as perceptions of deservingness of refugees as well as a lesser threat posed by them on the labour market in comparison to economic migrants. It is likely that contextual characteristics of a country, such as unemployment, play a lesser role regarding attitudes towards asylum seekers, than they do in relation to economic migrants. As suggested by Koos and Seibel (2019), it is likely that refugees are perceived as 'more deserving' than other groups of migrants and hence willingness to help becomes a more important factor than economic threat.

In addition, individuals in more prosperous countries may fear the potential financial 'burden' on their economy and welfare system. Refugees require greater assistance in the labour market integration and are more likely to face challenges than economic migrants (Connor, 2010; Bevelander, 2011). Therefore, there may be a greater desire to limit or restrict further admissions of asylum seeker. In addition, countries with higher unemployment rates have received less asylum applications than more prosperous countries, not only recently but also historically.

Asylum seekers are a distinct sub-group with specific vulnerabilities. Hence there may be greater willingness to sympathise with and help refugees or at least

[83] This study uses data from the Eurobarometer survey.

an expressed willingness to do so, despite economic conditions of a country. Hypothesis 5 is supported as greater levels of trust in institutions and generalised trust are associated with greater tolerance towards asylum seekers. Both variables have a relatively large effect on the attitudinal scale. This is an important finding which provides evidence for facilitation of successful integration through actions and policies which aim to foster solidarity and greater social cohesion. It is not surprising that more trusting individuals are less likely to oppose asylum seekers. It is likely that those respondents with higher levels of trust are more likely to perceive asylum seekers as 'deserving'[84] and hence are more accepting.

Government institutions also have a significant role to play in fostering greater acceptance towards ethnic minorities. For example, Veebel and Markus (2015) argue that in the case of Estonia, anti-asylum sentiment may be linked to a lack of support for and dissatisfaction with the national government rather than an actual strong opposition to asylum seekers. In the case of asylum seekers, whose general admission is strongly linked to government decisions and national policies, it is not surprising that a lack of trust in national institutions has a negative impact on support for admission of ethnic minorities. Further research should focus on the relationship between different types of trust and attitudes towards ethnic minorities.

This study highlights the need to consider attitudes towards immigrants and asylum seekers separately as different determinants drive public attitudes. In addition, future research should consider different 'categories' of asylum seekers as the ESS specifically refers to refugees rather than asylum seekers despite very differential meaning regarding legal status of the two terms, with the latter term often carrying more negative connotations (William and Blinder, 2013). The reference to refugees fleeing '*on the grounds that they fear persecution in their own country'* in the ESS survey may also influence how the native population responds to survey questions. Humanitarian concerns and greater vulnerability have been found to be linked to greater acceptance of refugees (Bansak et al., 2016), and hence may be perceived by the host societies as 'justified' reasons for

[84] See Sales (2007; 2010).

asylum (von Hermanni and Neumann, 2019). Future research could examine if different reasons for applying for international protection affect attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees.

In addition to the phrasing of the question, existing policies and practices in granting refugee status may also play a role in how survey respondents' conceptualise and answer this question. National policies vary in their approach, in the type of status granted to asylum seekers[85] (Bordignon and Moriconi, 2017) and in reception and integration approaches and supports which are available to them (EMN, 2014b; EMN, 2016). In countries with more generous supports and lenient policies, the native population may perceive the government to be already generous in its approach towards asylum seekers. Therefore preference for a less generous approach may reflect not necessarily attitudes towards asylum seekers but existing approach and immigration policies. Future research could explore this further by focussing on the role that immigration policies play in attitudes towards ethnic minorities.

While the number of asylum applications in Europe has increased significantly, most asylum seekers and displaced individuals remain in the neighbouring countries and only a small minority continue onwards due to lack of financial resources and social networks. Longitudinal research on attitudes towards refugees would be beneficial in further understanding the factors that drive resistance towards asylum seekers as well as monitoring the change in attitudes. Once in the host country, future outcomes for refugees can vary depending not only on the characteristics of the latter but also on the actions of the host country (Castles et al., 2013). Hence further research on attitudes towards ethnic minorities is necessary in order to ensure positive outcomes regarding economic and societal integration.

[85] Bordignon and Moriconi (2017) note that in some countries, e.g. in Germany a large number of asylum seekers were granted refugee status while in others, e.g. in France and Austria many asylum seekers were given subsidiary protection status. Subsidiary protection status guarantees some rights and entitlements but does not carry the same entitlements as a Geneva Convention refugee status. See EMN (2018a) for more information on different international protection statuses.

3.8. Appendix

Table A3.1 Descriptive Statistics, Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers in Europe

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Support for asylum seekers (DV)	77,691	2.95	1.13	1.00	5.00
Age (centered)	77,691	0.18	18.15	-34.89	55.11
Left-right scale	77,691	5.12	2.15	0.00	10.00
Trust in institutions scale	77,691	5.14	1.99	0.00	10.00
Generalised Trust	77,691	5.49	1.84	0.00	10.00
Share of refugees	77,691	4.00	5.04	0.04	23.37
Share of applications	77,691	1.51	2.04	0.001	8.78
Average number of applications	77,691	18.30	21.24	-6.60	80.30
Aid	77,691	0.42	0.28	0.01	1.12
Unemployment rate (%)	77,691	7.70	3.28	3.98	18.91
Change in unemployment	77,691	0.01	2.23	-7.41	7.73

Variable		**Freq.**	**%**
Gender	Female	39,442	50.77
	Male	38,249	49.23
	Total	*77,691*	*100*
Education	Primary or less	7,668	9.87
	Secondary	43,871	56.47
	Tertiary	18,332	23.6
	Vocational	7,820	10.07
	Total	*77691*	*100*
Main activity	Employed	40,909	52.66
	Education	5,816	7.49
	Unemployed	5,204	6.70
	Retired	19,209	24.72
	Other	6,553	8.43
	Total	*77,691*	*100*
Skills	High skilled white collar	36,328	46.76
	Low skilled white collar	18,544	23.87
	High skilled blue collar	11,178	14.39
	Low skilled blue collar	11,641	14.98
	Total	*77,691*	*100*
Financial hardship	Difficult on present income	12,801	16.79
	Coping on present income	36,024	47.26
	Living comfortably on present income	27,404	35.95
	Total	*76,229*	*100*

Table A3.2 Country Level Data and Sample Size

Country and year	Sample size	Share of Refugees per 1,000 inhabitants	Share of Applications per 1,000 inhabitants	Unemployment (%)
AT 2002	1,698	1.75	3.66	4.4
AT 2014	1,393	7.14	3.63	5.6
AT 2016	1,593	10.72	8.78	6.0
BE 2002	1,541	1.22	1.93	7.5
BE 2014	1,330	2.61	0.89	8.5
BE 2016	1,318	3.73	2.13	7.8
CH 2002	1,415	7.46	3.85	2.9
CH 2014	889	7.69	2.56	4.8
CH 2016	878	9.93	3.70	4.9
Cz 2002	1,121	0.13	0.75	7.3
Cz 2014	1,851	0.30	0.05	6.1
Cz 2016	2,013	0.35	0.07	4.0
DE 2002	2,466	11.89	0.61	8.6
DE 2014	2,431	2.69	2.80	5.0
DE 2016	2,226	8.15	7.15	4.1
ES 2002	1,334	0.17	0.15	11.5
ES 2014	1,576	0.12	0.16	24.5
ES 2016	1,585	0.28	0.44	19.6
FI 2002	1,852	2.38	0.66	9.1
FI 2014	1,927	2.16	0.32	8.7
FI 2016	1,791	3.35	1.02	8.8
FR 2002	1,139	2.15	0.56	7.9
FR 2014	1,400	3.81	0.84	10.3
FR 2016	1,566	4.57	0.94	10.1
GB 2002	1,695	4.40	0.70	5.1
GB 2014	1,729	1.82	0.57	6.1
GB 2016	1,493	1.82	0.72	4.8
HU 2002	1,420	0.60	0.10	5.6
HU 2014	1,569	0.29	1.59	7.7
HU 2016	1,467	0.48	0.35	5.1
IE 2002	1,734	1.38	1.79	4.7
IE 2014	1,880	1.26	1.00	11.9
IE 2016	2,106	1.21	0.91	8.4
NL 2002	2,055	9.21	3.61	3.7
NL 2014	1,570	4.90	0.41	7.4
NL 2016	1,405	5.99	0.61	6.0
NO 2002	1,831	11.15	3.86	3.7
NO 2014	1,190	9.21	1.41	3.6
NO 2016	1,285	11.42	1.45	4.8
PL 2002	1,814	0.04	0.14	20.0

PL 2014	1,426	0.41	0.07	9.0
PL 2016	1,538	0.31	0.09	6.2
PT 2002	1,036	0.04	0.02	6.2
PT 2014	1,089	0.07	0.03	14.1
PT 2016	1,108	0.12	0.08	11.2
SE 2002	1,561	15.96	3.71	6.0
SE 2014	1,394	14.74	5.89	7.9
SE 2016	1,207	23.36	8.44	6.9
SI 2002	1,240	0.20	0.10	6.3
SI 2014	939	0.12	0.03	9.7
SI 2016	1,031	0.22	0.15	8.0
DK 2002	1,278	13.71	0.88	4.6
DK 2014	1,288	3.16	0.76	6.6
IT 2002	1,058	0.18	0.00	7.9
IT 2016	2,195	2.43	1.65	10.1
EE 2014	1,126	0.07	0.07	7.4
EE 2016	1,323	0.24	0.03	6.8
LT 2014	1,740	0.34	0.05	10.7
LT 2016	1,778	0.45	0.05	7.9
Source	*ESS*	*UNHCR*	*Eurostat & UNHCR*	*Eurostat & OECD*

See: Share of refugees (UNHCR, 2004; 2015; 2017). Asylum applications (Eurostat, 2009; 2019d); if Eurostat data were not available then the number of applications were taken from the UNHCR statistical year-books (see UNHCR, 2004; 2015; 2017). Data for the number of inhabitants is taken from Eurostat (2019b).
Unemployment (Eurostat, 2019f; OECD, 2019c)

Table A3.3 Skill Level and ISCO Occupation Coding

Skill Level	**ISCO Occupation Codes (Major Groups)**	**Occupations (Major Groups)**
High Skilled White Collar	1, 2, 3	Managers, Professionals, Technicians and Associate Professionals
Low Skilled White Collar	4, 5	Clerical Support Workers, Services and Sales Workers
High Skilled Blue Collar	6, 7	Skilled agricultural and fishery workers, Craft and Related Trades Workers
Low Skilled Blue Collar	8, 9	Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers, Elementary Occupations

Source: Eurofound (2010) and ILO (2012).

Table A3.4 Null Model, Support for Asylum Seekers in Europe

	Null model	
	B	**SE**
Fixed Effects		
Constant	2.962***	(0.093)
Random Effects		
Level 1	1.091	0.061
Level 2	0.054	0.010
Level 3	0.151	0.033
Model Fit & Observations		
Log. Lik.	-112333.7	
Deviance	224667.4	
Level 1	77,691	
Level 2	59	
Level 3	21	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Chapter 4: Attitudes towards Muslim Migrants in Europe[86]

Abstract

Islam is becoming an increasingly prevalent religion in Europe due to large inflows of Muslims over the last number of decades. Previous social survey research suggests that the European public is critical of immigration from Muslim countries with concerns relating to integration and security. Using the 7th round of the European Social Survey and linking it to other data sources, this paper examines if threat hypotheses can explain anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe. The study finds that opposition to Muslims is significantly higher than opposition to migrants in general, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe. The threat hypothesis is not supported on a country level as counties with higher 'stock' of Muslim population are more welcoming towards further Muslim immigration. In addition, neither the number of Islamic terrorist attacks nor lower levels of integration measured vis-à-vis spoken language have an impact on attitudes. Furthermore, the study finds that women are more opposed to Muslim immigration than men. The wider implications of these findings and alternative explanations are discussed.

Keywords: Anti-immigration attitudes, threat, anti-Muslim attitudes, European Social Survey, East versus West

[86] This chapter is currently under review at an international journal. A previous version of this paper was presented at the *Research Seminar Series*, Department of Sociology, Trinity College Dublin (Dublin, 2016) and the *Irish Sociological Association Annual Conference 2016* (Belfast, 2016).

4.1 Introduction

Europe is one of the main destinations for international immigrants. In 2017, 78 million immigrants were residing in Europe, which accounts for 30 per cent of all international migrants (UN, 2017)[87]. With increasing immigration, European countries have experienced large inflows of immigrants from Muslim countries in the last decade. In 2010, the majority of migrants coming to Europe were Muslim (see figure 4.1). In addition, the recent refugee crisis has also added to the increasing Muslim population in Europe, with more than half of all asylum applications coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan in the last few years (Eurostat, 2019e).

Figure 4.1 Religious Composition of Immigrants to Europe in 2010



Source: *Pew Research Center (2012).*
Note: *Migration figures refer to the total number or cumulative stocks of migrants rather than to the annual rate of migration. Percentages are calculated from rounded numbers and may not add to 100 due to rounding.*

There is a large and growing body of literature which focuses on attitudes towards migrants (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010 for a review). However, there are relatively few studies which focus specifically on attitudes towards Muslim migrants (but see Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Helbling, 2012b; Doebler, 2014; Schlueter et al., 2019). Existing studies indicate that attitudes towards

[87] Approximately 60 per cent of all international migrants reside in Europe and Asia, with the latter hosting 80 million migrants (31 per cent). See UN (2017).

Muslim migrants are significantly more negative than attitudes towards migrants in general (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008).

The aims of this chapter are threefold. Firstly, the study aims to add to the relatively small, but growing body of literature specifically focusing on Muslim migrants. Secondly, using paired t-tests, the chapter examines if attitudes towards Muslim migrants differ in comparison to migrants of the same ethnicity as, and different ethnicity to, the native respondents. Statistically significant differences across most countries are found, with pronounced differences in opposition towards Muslim migrants in Eastern Europe. Thirdly, using data from the European Social Survey and additional databases, several hypotheses derived from group conflict theory related to realistic threat are tested. On a country level, threat hypotheses are not supported, and the chapter argues that realistic threat cannot explain opposition towards Muslim migrants, particularly in Eastern European countries. Objective measures of threat do not explain cross-country variations; countries with a higher share of Muslims and a higher incidence of terrorist attacks are more welcoming towards further Muslim immigration. This may be due to the fact that countries with a higher share of Muslim migrants have higher quality governance and have been experiencing Muslim immigration over the last few decades (Kettani, 2010), and hence are less affected by objective measures of threat. While countries with poor governance, and with relatively non-existent Muslim populations are more likely to perceive Muslims as a threat. The implications of this are discussed in this study.

4.2 Muslim Migrants in Europe

With the growing Muslim population, Islam is becoming an increasingly important religion in Europe (Helbling, 2012b); in many Western European countries it constitutes the second largest religion after Christianity (Helbling, 2014). The Pew Research Center (2017) estimate that in 2016, approximately 5 per cent of the European population was Muslim. It is predicted that the Muslim population share will increase to 8 per cent by 2030 (Pew Research Center,

2011a). Continued immigration[88] is the primary driver of the increase in the share of Muslims in most European countries, with significant increases predicted in Western and Northern Europe (see figure 4.2). It is expected that Muslim populations in Eastern and Central European countries will remain at less than 1 per cent (Pew Research Center, 2011a).[89]

Figure 4.2 Muslim Population (%) in Europe, 2010 and 2020



Source: Pew Research Center (2011a) and National Censuses.
Note: The data for Portugal, Lithuania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia is amalgamated from the Pew Research Centre and National Censuses. The Muslim population in these countries is estimated to be less than 0.5 per cent of the total population. It is estimated that Muslim population will remain less than 1 per cent in these countries. This refers to recently arrived immigrants and excludes the native Muslim population in some of the countries, for example the Tatars.

In addition, the Pew Research Center (2015) estimates that the religious composition in Europe will change over the coming decades, resulting in greater religious diversity. It is predicted that Christianity will decrease from 75 per cent in 2010 to 65 per cent by 2050. The Muslim population as well as the share of population with no religion are expected to increase from 5 per cent and 19 per cent in 2010 to 10 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively (see figure 4.3).

[88] It is estimated, that even in the unlikely event of 'zero immigration scenario', the Muslim population in Europe is expected to increase to 7.4 per cent by 2050 (Pew Research Centre, 2017).
[89] The indigenous Muslims which arrived to some of the Central and Eastern European countries since the end of communism, e.g. Tatars are outside the scope of this paper as the focus is on more recent immigrants.

Figure 4.3 Estimated Religious Composition in Europe, 2010-2050



Source: Pew Research Center (2015)

The European public is critical of immigration from Muslim countries (Vellenga, 2008). The increasing presence (and visibility) of Muslims in Europe has led to a variety of debates which portray Muslims as a threat to the West (Esposito, 1999; Cesari, 2013). The recent terrorist attacks in Belgium, Germany, France and England, have intensified these debates and have led to increasing Islamophobic discourse and incidents in Europe (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2017). Islam and Muslims have been portrayed through the discourse of violence, with parallels drawn between terrorism and immigration (Allen, 2010; Cesari, 2012).

4.3 Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses

There is a growing body of literature which focuses on attitudes towards migrants (see Meuleman et al., 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010 for a review) but there are relatively few studies which specifically focus on attitudes towards Muslim migrants. Most studies in this area have related to a single country (Velasco González et al., 2008; Kalkan et al., 2009; Bevelander and Otterbeck, 2010; Bleich and Maxwell, 2012; Strabac and Valenta, 2012) and a limited number of studies have focussed on cross-country analysis (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Doebler, 2014; Schlueter et al., 2019).

Previous cross-country research indicates that Europeans are more likely to express anti-Muslim attitudes than anti-migrant attitudes (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Doebler, 2014). Anti-Muslim sentiment is related to, but generally exceeds, prejudice against migrants in general; and Muslims are particularly likely to become a target of prejudice. Doebler (2014:79) suggests that this not surprising in the context of post 9/11 and the '*persistent Islamophobia that has been reinforced through mass media'*. In addition, empirical research indicates that there is a hierarchy of acceptance towards different ethnic groups (Hagendoorn, 1993; Sniderman et al., 2004). For example, Ford (2011) found that White and culturally similar migrants were preferred over other groups in Britain. This is of particular relevance to the perception of Muslim immigrants in Europe as they may be distinguished as different from the native population not only through ethnic but also religious identity markers. Based on existing empirical literature the first hypothesis states that:

> *H1: Opposition to Muslim immigration will exceed opposition to immigration in general.*

The expectations are that opposition to Muslim immigration will significantly exceed opposition to immigration of migrants who are ethnically similar to the native population (H1a) but will not significantly exceed opposition to immigration of migrants who are ethnically different from the native population (H1b).

4.3.1 Attitudes toward Muslim Immigration as a Reaction to 'Objective' Threat

Group conflict theory has been prominent, and used extensively, in empirical research related to anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment (Esses et al., 1998; Zárate et al., 2004; Riek et al., 2006; Meuleman et al., 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Billiet et al., 2014).

The main premise of group conflict theory holds that intergroup conflict occurs when two or more groups compete for scarce resources (Blumer, 1958; Sherif, 1967; Quillian, 1995). According to this theoretical framework, prejudice or hostility forms as a defensive reaction to intergroup competition for limited resources (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967). Hostility or negative attitudes towards out-groups, for example ethnic minorities, originate from the perception that the interests of one's own group, or an in-group, are threatened by an out-group (Coser, 1956; Blumer, 1958; Campbell, 1965). One of the key features of this theoretical framework is realistic threat.

Realistic threat can relate to tangible items such as jobs, housing or social security payments as well as perceived threat to political, economic or physical wellbeing of the in-group (Sherif, 1967; LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Stephan and Stephan, 2000). Regardless whether threats are 'real' or 'imagined' (LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Quillian, 1995), once the interests of an in-group are threatened or perceived to be under threat, there is potential for prejudice and hostility to emerge (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). One of the main arguments put forward in favour of restricting Muslim immigration relates to security concerns (Cesari, 2011; 2012).

International terrorism has led to an increase in security measures in public buildings and spaces in Europe (Triandafyllidou et al., 2012), with Muslim immigration repeatedly equated with security concerns and terrorist attacks (Allen, 2010). Since the 9/11 attacks, hostility towards Muslims has increased (Allen and Nielsen, 2002), with frequent verbal and physical attacks (Cesari, 2011). A recent report on Islamophobia in Europe highlights increasing hostility towards Muslims, particularly following recent terrorist attacks in a number of European cities (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2017). In addition to the fear of terrorism from international terrorist groups, a growing fear of 'home-grown' European terrorists has further embedded the perception that immigration threatens security (Cesari, 2013). In Britain, for example, various attacks by British Muslims have increased fears of both an external and internal threat to Britain (Bleich and Maxwell, 2012). Wike and Grim (2010) found that attitudes towards Muslims in Britain, France, Germany, Spain and the USA were directly related to perceived

threats linked to security. Hence, the second hypothesis relates to security concerns:

> *H2: Opposition to Muslim immigration will be greater in countries with a higher incidence of Islamic terrorist attacks.*

In addition to security concerns, a perceived lack of integration is another prominent factor in favouring the restriction of Muslim immigration to Europe (Cesari, 2013). Perception of a lack of integration among Muslim migrants is influenced by 'realistic' cultural threats and the widespread perception that Muslim immigrants do not wish to integrate into their host societies (Vellenga, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2011b). Integration is a multi-faceted concept which encompasses many different dimensions (Ager and Strang, 2008). For the purpose of this chapter, the focus is on integration relating to the native language of the host country. The focus is specifically on language, as it is one of the key elements of national identity (Smith, 1991), and is a strong signal of successful integration to host populations (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003; Ager and Strang, 2008). In addition, 48 per cent of respondents in the 7th round of the ESS indicated that migrants' ability to speak the official language of the country is a very important requirement for incoming migrants[90]. Other dimensions of integration, for example socio-economic integration elements are outside the scope of this chapter. Hence, language spoken at home is used as an indicator of linguistic integration with the following hypothesis:

> *H3: Lower levels of integration (measured as not speaking the official language of a country at home) are associated with greater opposition to Muslim immigration.*

According to group conflict theory, the larger the minority group, the greater the threat towards an in-group and hence the greater the likelihood of prejudice

[90] The ability to speak official language was the second most important criteria seen as very important; proceeded by commitment to a way of life in the country (57%) and followed by having needed work skills (44%), having good education qualifications (35%), being of Christian background (12%) and being White (8%). Own calculations based on ESS data, native population only. Weighted results.

and/or hostility developing towards the out-group (Blalock 1967). Several studies indicate that larger ethnic/immigrant groups are associated with anti-immigration sentiment (Quillian, 1995; Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; Meuleman et al., 2009). However other studies have found that the size of the migrant group does not increase anti-immigration sentiment. Schlueter and Davidov (2011) found that the size of the migrant group was not associated with increasing anti-immigration sentiment in Spain. A cross-national study by Strabac and Listhaug (2008) found that the size of the Muslim population did not increase anti-Muslim sentiment. On the other hand, Coenders and Scheepers (1998) found that, in the Netherlands, anti-immigration attitudes were more prevalent at times of increased levels of immigration. Based on realistic threat and an increase in the share of Muslims in Europe the third hypothesis states that:

> *H4: Opposition to Muslim immigration will be greater in countries with a higher 'stock' of Muslim migrants.*

4.3.2 Human Values and Opposition of Muslims in the Absence of 'Objective' Threat

The main hypotheses tested in this chapter relate to 'objective' threat related to group conflict theory. However not only 'objective' threats, but also perceptions of threat may play a role in anti-Muslim sentiment. In addition, the role of human values, particularly conservatism and openness to change, is also considered.

4.3.2.1 Human Values

Human values have been found to be important predictors of attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Davidov et al., 2008a; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012). Human values can be defined as '*…desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person…*' (Schwartz, 1994: 21), and can serve as standards to evaluate other people and guide attitudes and behaviour (Schwartz, 2006). Figure 4.4 illustrates the lower and higher order human values.

Values in the top of figure 4.4 (*Self-Enhancement* and *Openness to Change*) relate to individual interests and characteristics while value in the bottom (*Self-Transcendence* and *Conservatism*) relate to the collective and how individuals relate to others (Schwartz, 2012). For the purpose of this chapter the focus is on openness to change and conservatism[91].

Figure 4.4 Human Values



Source: Adapted from Schwartz (2012).

Conservatism focuses on resistance to change and may relate to perceptions of collective threat. Regarding immigration,

> '*the arrival of immigrants ... coupled with potential societal changes that are opposite to the preferences of conservative individuals*' (Davidov and Meuleman, 2012: 761),

may be viewed as a threat to established norms and traditions, and hence likely to be associated with greater resistance towards ethnic minorities.

[91] See Davidov et al., (2008a) and Davidov and Meuleman (2012) regarding other human values and how they relate to attitudes towards immigration.

Openness to change, can be seen as a direct opposite to conservatism. It

> '*…involves independent action, thought, and feeling and readiness for new experiences…*' (Davidov and Meuleman, 2012:760).

Regarding immigration and attitudes towards Muslim migrants, it is likely that openness to change will be associated with greater tolerance to different ethnic minorities (see Schwartz, 1994).

4.3.2.2 East versus West?

Existing literature on attitudes towards immigration and attitudes towards Muslim migrants indicates that there is greater opposition to incoming ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe in comparison to Western European countries (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Coenders et al., 2009; Doebler, 2014). As figure 4.2 illustrates, the Muslim population is expected to grow in most European countries, however marginal growth is predicted in Eastern Europe. The largest increases are projected in countries which already have large Muslim populations (Pew Research Center, 2017). In addition, the terrorist attacks in Europe which have led to increasing Islamophobic discourse (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2017) have not occurred in any of the Eastern European countries. What could potentially explain anti-Muslim sentiment in the absence of 'objective' threat?

First, hostility and negative attitudes in Eastern European countries extend not only to incoming migrants, but also towards existing ethnic minorities (Bandelj, 2019), Jews (Bergmann, 2008) and homosexuals (Kuntz et al., 2015). Bandelj (2019) argues that existing minorities in Eastern Europe are already marginalised and seen as the 'other' and therefore it is not surprising that there is much lesser acceptance towards incoming migrants or even potential migrants. Wallace (2002) argues it is not unexpected that xenophobia is present in Eastern Europe. The isolation behind the Iron Curtain combined with culturally homogenous societies make the idea of multicultural and diverse cultures almost 'alien' (Wallace, 2002: 618).

Second, public discourse has endorsed a 'clash of civilisations' in order to make sense of social and political changes in Europe (Cesari, 2013). Countries with greater shares of Muslim populations also have stronger governance than countries with lower shares of Muslim populations. In the case of Eastern Europe, elites may use anti-Muslim rhetoric to deflect potential discontent from poor governance and economic misery to gain support on the basis of 'imagined' ethno-religious community with Muslims used as scapegoats.

Existing hostility towards minorities, poor governance, and perception of a potential threat of influx of Muslim migrants in the context of ethnically homogenous societies with relatively small migrant populations may be sufficient to drive anti-Muslim sentiment, even in the absence of 'objective' threats. Hence it is expected that:

> *H5: Opposition to Muslim immigration will be greater in countries with poor governance.*

4.4 Data and Methods

The main source of data is the seventh round of the European Social Survey[92] (ESS, 2014a). The ESS is a multi-country survey, conducted every two years, which aims to measure European attitudes toward various social and political changes. The main advantage of using the ESS is its suitability for cross-national research. In addition, each national sample is designed to reflect a random sample of the resident population aged 15 and over (Jowell et al., 2007). The seventh round of the survey has a special module on immigration and for the first time includes a question relating to Muslim migrants which makes this analysis timely[93].

The original dataset contained 40,185 respondents from 21 countries. The 2,562 respondents from Israel were excluded from the analysis as the focus of this chapter is solely on European countries. As the focus is on opposition towards

[92] The European Social Survey data is publicly available. See www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.
[93] See Schlueter et al., (2019) for a recent analysis using the ESS.

Muslim migrants, the analysis is limited to 'natives', which for the purpose of this chapter are defined as respondents who were born in the country and whose parents were also born in the country[94]. Respondents with missing values on the dependent variable were also excluded from the analysis. Hence, the sample consists of 26,000+ individuals (level 1) nested in 20 countries[95] (level 2).

Sample size is often a concern in multilevel modelling. The minimum number of units required at level 2 varies in the literature from 8 to 100 groups at the higher levels (Stegmueller, 2013). Kreft's 30/30 rule is often cited which requires 30 individuals nested in 30 groups (Hox, 2002). However, in social science research, particularly related to cross-national analysis, the number of higher units is often lower, and researchers have used 20 countries (Green, 2009), or less (Meuleman et al., 2009). Furthermore, Maas and Hox (2005) note that if less than 30 groups have been used, the regression coefficients are estimated correctly but the standard errors for intercept variances may be deflated. Hence while the limitations of multilevel modelling with less than 30 groups are acknowledged, country level coefficients can be interpreted correctly in the analysis as suggested by Maas and Hox (2005).

In addition to the ESS data, 3 other datasets are used: the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2016), the Global Religious Futures Project (Pew Research Centre, 2012) and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2019).

Descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in the Appendix (see section 4.7).

[94] Country of birth is considered to be a more accurate measure of immigration status due to different rates of naturalisation in European countries as well as different regulations related to acquisition of nationality. See Fleischmann and Dronkers (2007).

[95] Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Czechia (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Lithuania (LT), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK). At the time of writing, data for Latvia were not released.

4.4.1 Dependent Variables

The dependent variable is acceptance of Muslim immigration. It is operationalised using the ESS question *'To what extent [country] should allow Muslims from other countries to come and live here'*. Responses to the question were coded as: 1 = allow none, 2 = allow a few, 3 = allow some and 4 = allow many[96] with higher scores indicating less restrictive preferences.

4.4.2 Independent Variables

4.4.2.1 Country-level Independent Variables

The Percentage of Muslims indicates the percentage of Muslims in each country. The main source of data is the Global Religious Futures Project from the Pew Research Centre (Pew Research Centre, 2012). The National Censuses were used to supplement this data for some Eastern and Central European countries.

Percentage of terrorist attacks is measured using the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2016)[97]. The attacks refer to the percentage of attacks by Islamic terrorists in the country based on the total number of attacks. The reference period is from 2000 to 2014.

Linguistic integration is operationalised using pooled data from seven rounds of the ESS[98] and is measured as the percentage of native born Muslims with either both parents or at least one parent born abroad who do not speak the official language of the country as their first language. Cases with missing values were excluded[99]. The 'realistic' cultural threat related to linguistic assimilation was operationalised similarly by Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011). However, it is noted that language is just one dimension of integration and the study does not claim

[96] Note that the original coding has been reversed here, i.e. in the survey 1= allow many and 4= allow none.
[97] See LaFree and Dugan (2007) and LaFree (2010) for further information on the Global Terrorism Database. Information is also available at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
[98] See ESS (2002; 2004; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2012; 2014a)
[99] The integration measure used here is intended to measure an aspect of integration and is not a multi-dimensional measure of integration.

that this measurement reflects or encompasses multidimensional aspects of integration as a concept.

4.4.2.2 Individual-level Independent Variables

Religiosity and religious affiliation

In addition to fears related to terrorism, opposition towards Muslim migrants is also attributed to the fear of 'Islamic threat' (Esposito, 1999) which can be attributed to the 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington, 1996) and increasing debates on the incompatibility of Islam with Christianity. Empirical evidence suggests that strong religious beliefs are negatively associated with intolerance towards other groups (Doebler, 2014). Hence it is expected that on an individual level, religiosity will be associated with higher levels of opposition towards Muslim immigration (*H6*). Religiosity is operationalised using the ESS question '*How religious are you?'*. The scale measures religiosity with values ranging from 0 = not at all religious to 10 = very religious. In line with existing research (Verkuyten and Poppe, 2012) and group conflict theory, if Muslims are seen as a threat then Christians would be expected to express higher levels of opposition towards Muslim immigration than other religious groups. On the other hand, atheists and individuals who do not identify with any religion are as likely to perceive Muslims as a threat to their secular way of life. *Religious affiliation* is coded as 1=Roman Catholic, 2=Protestant, 3=other Christian denomination, 4=Jewish, 5= Islamic (reference category), 6= other non-Christian denomination and 7= No religious affiliation. The expectation is that, both Catholics and atheists are more likely to perceive Muslims as a threat in comparison to respondents of Islamic faith, who are much more likely to sympathise with incoming Muslims.

Human Values

Openness to change is measured by six questions measuring hedonism, stimulation and self-direction on a 6-point scale. The scale is reliable with the overall Cronbach's alpha of 0.75. The scale is moderately reliable for different countries and ranges from 0.68 to 0.84. *Conservati*sm is measured by six

questions measuring tradition, conformity and security on a 6-point scale. The scale is reliable with the overall Cronbach's alpha of 0.71. At country time points the scale is moderately reliable and ranges from 0.63 to 0.77.

The coding has been reversed so that 1 indicates 'not like me at all' and 6 indicates 'very much like me' for both variables. The lower Cronbach's alpha for countries is not surprising as the items which make up the scale are heterogeneous in order to cover the broad meaning of the value (Roccas et al., 2017)[100]. Measurement equivalence is discussed below. It is expected that openness to change will be associated with higher levels of support towards Muslim immigration (*H7a*) while conservatism will be associated with greater resistance (*H7b*).

4.4.3 Control Variables

In addition to the individual and country-level variables, several control variables are included. *Age* is a continuous variable and measures an individual's age in years. It has been centred using grand mean centering[101]. *Gender* is measured as a dummy variable with values of 1 for women and 0 for men. *Level of Education* is coded into 4 categories: 1 = primary (reference category), 2 = secondary, 3 = advanced vocational/diploma, 4 = tertiary. *Main activity* indicates an individual's position in the labour market and is coded as: 1 = employed, 2 = unemployed (reference category), 3 = retired, 4 = education, 5 = other. *Political affiliation* is measured on one's own placement on the left-right scale with 0 = left and 10 = right. *The frequency of contact with different race or ethnic group* is measured on an ordinal scale ranging from never (1) to every day (7).

[100] Roccas et al., (2017) note that lower internal reliability relates to the broad nature of the construct and not measurement problems. Schwartz argues that alpha's as low as 0.4 are reliable for values due to a small number of items in each scale and their heterogeneity. See https://essedunet.nsd.no/cms/topics/1/ for more information.

[101] Centering allows for a better interpretation of the expected value of Y as centred X reflects the expected value of Y when X is at its mean. In this case only age was centered as the interpretation of the intercept when age is zero is undesirable. Other continuous independent variables have not been centered as zero represents a meaningful value, e.g. political affiliation is measured from 0 to 10 with 0 indicating one's placement on the left.

On a country level, a 6-item index for quality of governance is included. Data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators Project are used (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2019). The index encompasses: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Higher values indicate better governance. The index is highly reliable with Cronbach's alpha of 0.93 across countries[102]. The WGI index allows for meaningful cross-country comparisons (Kaufmann et al., 2010)[103].

4.4.4 Measurement Equivalence

Measurement equivalence for latent variables is necessary in order to ensure the same constructs are being measured across countries. In this analysis, two latent variables are used (see Appendix in section 4.7).

Previous research has found that human values measure the same latent concept across Europe and time (Davidov et al., 2008a; Davidov et al., 2008b; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; Davidov et al., 2014). In addition, the main interest is to examine the relationship between the two latent variables and the dependent variable, rather than to compare latent means. In this case metric equivalence is deemed to be sufficient and the items used in the ESS show high metric equivalence (Fitzgerald, 2016).

4.5 Results

4.5.1 Descriptive Findings

First, opposition to Muslim immigration is compared to opposition to immigration in general. In addition to the question '*To what extent do you think [country] should allow Muslims from other countries to come and live in [country]?*' the following ESS questions are used:

[102] Note it was not possible to calculate Cronbah's alpha for each country as only country level items are available.
[103] See Kaufmann et al., (2010) for detailed information on the indicators and methodology used.

1. *'To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here'* and
2. *'To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here'* [104].

Figure 4.5 illustrates opposition (allow none) towards different sub-groups of migrants. In all countries, there is a distinct preference for limiting Muslim immigration in comparison to the other two groups. While 24 per cent of people are in favour of completely restricting Muslim immigration, only 12 per cent and 7 per cent are in favour restricting immigration of migrants of different ethnicity to the native population and migrants of the same ethnicity as the native population, respectively (see figure 4.5). Only 6 per cent of Europeans are in favour of restricting immigration to all 3 groups.

There is a clear preference for migrants of the same ethnicity over the other two groups. In addition, in all European countries, migrants of a different ethnicity are favoured to Muslim immigrants, which may imply that not only ethnic but also religious differences are important in favouring one group over another. There are great variations between different countries, for example 55 per cent of respondents from Czechia would prefer to completely restrict the flow of Muslim immigrants, whilst only 4 per cent of Swedish respondents would prefer to do so, indicating that there is great polarisation between European countries regarding attitudes towards Muslim migrants. While 17 per cent of respondents in Northern and Western Europe would completely restrict Muslim immigration, 41 per cent of respondents in Eastern and Central Europe would prefer to do so.

[104] Answers to all questions are coded as 1 = allow none, 2 = allow a few, 3 = allow some and 4 = allow many. The original scale has been reversed.

Figure 4.5 Opposition to Immigration, by Sub-Group of Migrants, Europe



Sources: Own calculations based on ESS data, native population. Weighted results.
Note: Opposition = allow none to come live in [country].

Next, the focus is solely on respondents who would completely restrict Muslim immigration (n=7,423), i.e. would prefer to '*allow none to come and live in their country*' (see figure 4.6). On average, 60 per cent of these respondents would restrict only Muslim immigration but not immigration for the other two groups. 21 per cent would restrict immigration for all 3 groups while 18 per cent would restrict immigration to Muslims and migrants of a different ethnicity but not migrants of the same ethnicity as the native population. Only 2 per cent would restrict immigration to Muslim immigrants and immigrants of the same ethnicity.

Figure 4.6 Attitudes of Respondents Who Oppose Muslim Immigration towards Other Migrants, Europe



Sources: Own calculations based on ESS data, native population. Weighted results.
Note: M= Muslims only; M&D=Muslims and migrants of a different ethnicity to the native population; M&D&E=Muslims, migrants of a different ethnicity to the native population and migrants of the same ethnicity as the native population.

4.5.1.1 Are Inter-country Differences Statistically Significant?

The percentage of people who would restrict Muslim immigration are compared with respondents who would restrict immigration to migrants of the same ethnic group and migrants of a different ethnic group as the native population. Paired t-tests are used to test whether these differences are statistically significant (see table 4.1). Hypothesis 1 (*H1*) is supported, as opposition to Muslim immigration significantly exceeds opposition to migrants in general in all European countries.

The percentage of respondents opposing Muslim migrants in comparison to immigrants of the same ethnicity as the native populations is significantly higher in all countries ($p<0.001$). In accordance with *H1a*, there is significantly higher opposition to Muslim immigrants compared to immigrants of the same ethnicity as the native population.

The percentage of respondents opposing Muslim migrants rather than migrants of a different ethnicity to the native population, is significantly higher in nearly

all countries (p<0.001, except for the UK where p<0.01). France is the only exception; with no significant differences regarding attitudes towards Muslim immigrants and immigrants of a different ethnicity. In contrast to H1b, while differences between Muslim immigrants and immigrants of a different ethnicity were smaller than differences between Muslim immigrants and immigrants of the same ethnicity, these differences were significant, indicating much stronger opposition to Muslim immigration overall.

Table 4.1 The Percentage of Respondents Completely Opposing Immigration to Different Groups of Migrants in Europe

	Muslims (M)	**Immigrants of same ethnicity (IS)**	**Immigrants of different ethnicity (ID)**	**Difference M-IS**	**Difference M - ID**
Austria	22.6	7.52	14.94	15.08***	7.66***
Belgium	20.33	8.07	13.6	12.26***	6.73***
Switzerland	14.46	1.45	4.34	13.01***	10.12***
Czechia	54.94	16.48	28.49	38.46***	26.45***
Germany	6.58	1.26	3.68	5.32***	2.9***
Denmark	11.12	1.99	5.9	9.13***	5.22***
Estonia	40.91	4.11	12.15	36.8 ***	28.76***
Spain	20.83	8.2	11.63	12.63 ***	9.2***
Finland	17.43	2.52	8.59	14.91 ***	8.84***
France	13.92	6.59	12.2	7.33***	1.72
GB	19.14	10.05	14.28	9.09***	4.86**
Hungary	51.45	11.89	31.55	39.56***	19.9***
Ireland	24.4	9.18	13.9	15.22***	10.5***
Lithuania	34.86	7.07	11.1	27.79***	23.76***
Netherlands	14.47	5.26	6.42	9.21***	8.05***
Norway	8.28	0.75	1.42	7.53***	6.86***
Poland	32.84	6.25	10.12	26.59***	22.72***
Portugal	34.51	12.83	18.6	21.68***	15.91***
Sweden	3.67	0.42	0.49	3.25***	3.18***
Slovenia	21.81	6.57	11.06	15.24***	10.75***
Average	23.7	6.59	11.99	17.11***	11.71***

Note: ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Weighted results.

4.5.2 Multilevel Analysis

Results from the multilevel ordered logistic regression[105] are displayed in Tables 4.2 to 4.4.

[105] Proportional odds assumption criterion could not be conclusively confirmed with the available Stata commands. Therefore it is possible that slope estimates between different outcomes/response categories may not be equal. A linear multilevel model with the dependent

Model 1 includes all individual and country level variables related to the threat hypothesis. Model 2 builds on Model 1 and includes two human values (conservatism and openness to change) and quality of governance. Model 3 includes a dummy variable for Eastern Europe. Note that quality of governance is not included in model 3 due high multicollinearity between the quality of governance index and the dummy variable for Eastern Europe ($r = -0.71$, $p<0.001$).

The 'null' model indicates that approximately 16 per cent of the variation in attitudes towards Muslims is due to between-country variation.

Model 1 indicates that 7 per cent of the variation in attitudes towards Muslim immigration is due to between country variations. The individual and country level variables explain 57 per cent of the between country variance. Religiosity and religious affiliation do not provide support for group conflict theory. Respondents who self-reported as religious were less opposed to Muslim immigration than those that did not (*H6*). While no significant differences can be observed between different religious affiliations or atheists in relation to respondents of Islamic faith. The control variables are in-line with existing research regarding attitudes towards migrants in general. The probability of expressing opposition towards Muslim immigration increases with age, right-wing political views, lower levels of education, and less contact with other ethnic groups. An interesting finding relates to gender. The study finds that women favour greater opposition to Muslim immigration relative to men. This is in contrast to previous research which showed that men were generally less tolerant towards migrants (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). While women may be less likely to oppose immigration and migrants in general, it is likely that they may be more likely to oppose certain groups, particularly those which may be perceived as challenging their own position. One possible explanation for this finding is that in most European countries continued progress has been made towards gender equality[106]. Muslims are often perceived as a homogenous group (Bleich

variable treated a a scale was used to check the robustness of the results. Reported results remain the same regarding sign, significance and effect size.

[106] See Joannin and Bloj (2019).

and Maxwell, 2012) which is violent, misogynistic (Allen, 2010) and one which is incompatible with the liberal, egalitarian West. It is likely that women, more than men, may perceive Muslim migrants as a threat to gender equality and egalitarian values.

Table 4.2 Acceptance of Muslim Immigration. Results from Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression Models 1 and 2

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
Fixed Effects				
Level 1				
Age centered	-0.008**	(0.003)	-0.005	(0.003)
Female	-0.113*	(0.054)	0.310*	(0.142)
Secondary Ed.	0.497***	(0.057)	0.482***	(0.054)
Advances vocational & other Ed.	0.845***	(0.088)	0.800***	(0.080)
Tertiary Ed.	1.482***	(0.086)	1.411***	(0.081)
Religiosity	0.028**	(0.010)	0.039***	(0.009)
Placement on left right scale	-0.124***	(0.024)	-0.119***	(0.022)
Contact with different ethnic group	0.133***	(0.013)	0.127***	(0.013)
Conservatism			-0.301***	(0.030)
Openness to change			0.087***	(0.022)
Conservatism x female			-0.094**	(0.033)
Level 2				
Muslim Population	0.186***	(0.048)	0.145***	(0.044)
Foreign language	0.004	(0.005)	0.002	(0.004)
Islamic attacks	0.019	(0.016)	0.010	(0.015)
Governance			0.538*	(0.270)
Random Effects				
Estimated between country variance	0.259***	(0.056)	0.221***	(0.045)
Model Fit & Observations				
Log lik.	-30175.57		-29523.38	
Deviance	60351.14		59046.76	
Level 1	26,184		25,792	
Level 2	20		20	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for education (*Ref: Primary*), main activity and religious affiliation,
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Country level variables do not support the 'objective threat' hypothesis. While country level variables are significantly correlated with the dependent variable (see Appendix in section 4.7), only Muslim population has a significant effect on attitudes, albeit not in the hypothesised direction. In contrast to realistic threat related to the size of the ethnic population, countries with higher 'stock' of Muslims are more accepting towards further Muslim immigration than countries with lower numbers of Muslim population (*H4*). Models were also estimated

with the change in Muslim population as well as predicted share of Muslims in 2020 (see table 4.3). The same results can be observed as both variables are associated with greater acceptance of Muslim migrants.

Table 4.3 Acceptance of Muslim Immigration and the Size of the Muslim Population.

	B	SE	β
Fixed Effects			
Level 2			
Muslim population	0.145***	(0.044)	0.376***
Predicted Muslim population in 2020	0.142***	(0.042)	0.236*
Change (2020-2010)	0.510***	(0.152)	0.477***

Note: Results from multilevel ordered logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for all individual and country level variables included in model 2. No changes to regression coefficients of other variables.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and Islamic attacks and integration are weak and positive, indicating that a higher number of attacks by Islamic terrorist groups, and lower levels of linguistic assimilation, are positively correlated with less opposition towards Muslim immigration. The study does not find any support for the threat hypotheses related to security threats and linguistic integration as neither having a higher level of native born Muslims who speak a language other than the official language of the country (*H3*) nor the percentage of Islamic attacks have a statistically significant effect on attitudes (*H2*).

Model 2 builds on the previous model and includes human values (conservatism and openness to change) and quality of governance. Approximately 6 per cent of the variation in attitudes towards Muslim immigration is due to between country variation and 15 per cent of the between country variance is explained by the additional variables. Human values play a significant role in attitudes towards ethnic minorities and are in line with the hypothesis seven (*H7a, H7b*). Openness to change is associated with greater tolerance (r=12, p<0.001) while conservatism is associated with greater resistance (r= -0.24, p<0.001).

Conservatism has a more significant effect[107] on attitudes indicating that collective threat matters in attitudes towards Muslims. In addition, once human values are included, women are more likely to support further admission of Muslim migrants than men. However, conservatism and one's sex have a significant impact on attitudes; conservative females are more opposed to Muslims than conservative men, as indicated by a significant interaction effect. On a country level, higher quality of governance is associated with greater support for Muslim migrants (*H5*).

The final model includes a dummy variable for Eastern/Central Europe. Just under 6 per cent of the variation in attitudes towards Muslim immigration is due to between country variation and 12 per cent of the between country variance is explained by the additional variable. The negative, significant coefficient indicates that despite the lack of 'objective threat' in Eastern/Central Europe, opposition towards Muslim migrants is significantly higher than opposition in Western Europe.

[107] Standardized beta coefficients are -0.252 ($p<0.001$) for conservatism and 0.077 ($p<0.001$) for openness to change.

Table 4.4 Acceptance of Muslim Immigration. Results from Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression Model 3

Fixed Effects	**B**	**SE**
Level 1		
Age centered	-0.005	(0.003)
Female	0.310*	(0.142)
Secondary Ed.	0.484***	(0.054)
Advances vocational & other Ed.	0.802***	(0.080)
Tertiary Ed.	1.413***	(0.081)
Religiosity	0.039***	(0.009)
Placement on left right scale	-0.119***	(0.022)
Contact with different ethnic group	0.127***	(0.013)
Conservatism	-0.301***	(0.030)
Openness to change	0.087***	(0.022)
Conservatism x female	-0.094**	(0.033)
Level 2		
Muslim Population	0.106*	(0.048)
Foreign language	0.004	(0.003)
Islamic attacks	0.012	(0.015)
Governance		
East/Central Europe dummy	-0.634*	(0.322)
Random Effects		
Estimated between country variance	0.201***	(0.053)
Model Fit & Observations		
Log lik.	-29522.45	
Deviance	59044.90	
Level 1	25,792	
Level 2	20	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for education (ref: primary), main activity and religious affiliation,
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4.6 Discussion and Conclusion

The analysis here has shown that in most European countries there is significantly greater opposition to Muslim immigration than immigration in general. While 24 per cent of Europeans are in favour of completely restricting Muslim immigration, only 12 per cent and 7 per cent are in favour of restricting immigration of migrants of different ethnicity and the same ethnicity as the majority, respectively. The results confirm previous findings by Strabac and Listhaug (2008) and Doebler (2014), who also found that prejudice toward Muslims exceeds prejudice towards migrants in general. While the study finds that opposition to migrants in general and Muslim migrants is related, it is clear that there is much greater tolerance towards migrants who are not Muslim, even if they are ethnically different. This may imply that Muslims are seen differently

in comparison to other migrant groups and distinguished as such not only through ethnic but also religious identity markers.

On the individual level, two findings stand out. In contrast to previous research (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010), women are more opposed to Muslim immigration than men. It is possible that women may perceive Muslims as more of a threat than men because of the public discourse framing Islam as misogynistic and oppressive (Vellenga, 2008; Allen, 2010). In addition, conservative women are significantly more likely to oppose Muslim immigration than conservative men.

The study does not find support for the objective threat hypotheses. In contrast to the hypothesis regarding the size of Muslim population and attitudes, countries with a higher 'stock' of Muslim population are more welcoming towards further Muslim immigration. It's likely that in countries with fewer Muslims, further immigration from predominantly Muslim countries may be perceived as a threat due to the more homogenous population and this 'imagined' threat is intensified by the media portrayal of Muslims in Western Europe. It is likely that the native population in Eastern Europe has a stronger in-group identification than natives from Western Europe which may explain greater opposition to out-groups, particularly those that are visibly and culturally distinct (see Hewstone et al., 2002). In addition, countries with a higher share of Muslim migrants have higher quality of governance and have been experiencing Muslim immigration over the last few decades (Kettani, 2010), and hence may be less affected by objective measures of threat. On the other hand, countries with poor governance, and with relatively non-existent Muslim populations are more likely to perceive Muslims as a threat. The positive association between the size of the ethnic group and greater acceptance towards Muslims remains even when controlling for the quality of governance and region. Future research should investigate this further.

The number of Islamic terrorist attacks does not provide support for group conflict theory. It is likely that the fear of an attack, rather than actual attacks, is driving anti-Muslim sentiment, particularly in countries which have not been affected by such terrorism. One of the limitations of this study is that data was

collected before the recent attacks in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK and hence it is not possible to measure if these attacks have had any impact on attitudes towards Muslim immigration. Previous research indicates that following the 9/11 attacks there was increased hostility towards Muslims (Allen and Nielsen, 2002) with both verbal and physical attacks taking place (Cesari, 2004). The recent report on Islamophobia in Europe indicates that Islamophobic incidents have increased since the recent attacks (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2017). One possible explanation is that anti-Islam sentiment increases following an attack, however it is also likely that people who dislike minority groups may feel more justified in expressing their hostility more openly following terrorist attacks linked to Islamic terrorism. In addition, the countries which have had the highest number of attacks by Islamic terrorists have also had much higher number of terrorist attacks in general and hence may not necessarily identify Muslims as more of a threat than any other group. However while the analysis was conducted before the recent attacks, some of the European Social Survey interviews were conducted after the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris in January 2015. This may have increased anti-Muslim sentiment in some of the countries in the analysis. Fahey, et al., (2019) found that attitudes to Muslim immigration became more negative in Ireland after this attack. Ireland has had no Islamic terrorist attacks and has a relatively low Muslim population, yet a notable shift in attitudes towards Muslim migrants can be observed. Savelkoul and Te Grotenhuis (2018) also found attitudes towards Muslim migrants to be more negative post-attack, but only in countries with small Muslim populations. This may suggest that firstly, perceived rather than actual threat may drive anti-Muslim sentiment. Secondly, attitudes towards Muslim migrants may be more 'globalised' in a way that attitudes towards other groups are not. This may be particularly applicable to countries with no experience of Islamic attacks and low Muslim populations. The framing of Muslims as an external and internal threat (Cesari, 2013) in the media and public discourse is likely to have led to 'globalised' perceived threat in Europe, and particularly in countries with very small Muslim populations.

The specific integration measure related to language, did not support the threat hypothesis. It must be noted that this a unidimensional indicator of integration

and future research should investigate multi-dimensional approaches to integration to better understand the 'cultural clash' that is often portrayed in the media and public discourse (Vellenga, 2008).

A caveat of this study is that threat was operationalised as objective threat related to security, integration and the size of the Muslim population. While the objective threat hypothesis is not supported in the study, it is likely that this type of threat may not be the primary determinant of anti-Muslim sentiment. As discussed in chapter 1, realistic and symbolic threats may overlap (Riek, et al., 2006; Makashvili et al., 2018) and even co-exist together. In the case of anti-Muslim sentiment, opposition may originate from realistic threats related to security and symbolic threats related to traditions and values. In the case of Muslim migrants who are perceived as the 'other' (Esposito, 1999; Cesari, 2013) objective threat may be 'used' as a justification for anti-Muslim sentiment employed to 'mask' fears related to perceived and symbolic threat.

The presence of Muslim population may be perceived as an objective threat related to security but also as a symbolic threat to the predominantly Catholic but also increasingly secular Europe. In the case of a homogenous Eastern European societies which are predominantly Catholic, Muslim migrants may pose a double symbolic threat; a threat to homogenous i) ethnic and ii) religious identities. Gender differences which can be observed regarding attitudes, may also relate to symbolic threat. It is likely that women may oppose Muslims more than men due to the perceived symbolic threat to egalitarian values related to gender equality and freedom.

There is also a great variation between European countries regarding attitudes towards Muslim migrants. Eastern and Central European countries are significantly more opposed to further Muslim immigration compared to Northern and Western European countries. While 17 per cent of respondents in Northern and Western Europe would completely restrict Muslim immigration, 41 per cent of respondents in Eastern and Central Europe would do so. This is in line with previous research which indicates that Eastern European countries favour lower levels of immigration (Coenders et al., 2009; Meuleman et al., 2009) and tend to

significantly favour a reduction in Muslim immigration (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Doebler, 2014). In addition, negative attitudes towards other minority groups are more widespread in Eastern Europe than Western Europe, for example, hostility towards Jewish (Bergmann, 2008) and homosexual (Kuntz et al., 2015) minority groups. Therefore it is not surprising that there is greater opposition towards Muslims, a visibly and culturally distinct minority group.

The significantly greater opposition to Muslim migrants than migrants in general indicates that Europeans are 'much more uneasy about religious than ethnic minorities' (Helbling, 2014:243). A caveat of this study is that attitudes measured via surveys can suffer from social desirability bias. It is possible that Europeans may share similar feelings across countries and towards different migrant groups but due to social desirability bias may express different attitudes. Creighton and Jamal (2015) used list experiments to assess anti-immigrant sentiment in the United Sates and found that opposition towards Muslims and Christian migrants was similar when accounting for social desirability. While respondents concealed opposition towards Christian migrants they did not do so towards Muslim migrants. Even if this applies to a European context, the fact that respondents may feel that is socially acceptable to express anti-Muslim sentiment suggests that Muslims are perhaps more likely to become an overall target of prejudice. Allen (2010) argues that anti-Muslim statements are much more tolerated in political and public spheres than they would be if they were made against other minority or religious groups. Furthermore Cesari (2013) notes that public discourse has endorsed 'clash of civilisations' in order to make sense of political and social changes in Europe. This study highlights the importance of research looking at different groups of migrants when exploring anti-immigration sentiment rather than migrants in general as there may be significant differences in attitudes toward different groups. Attitudes towards Muslim migrants should be particularly monitored in order to better understand what factors drive increasing Islamophobia in European societies and what could be done to prevent it.

4.7 Appendix

Table A4.1 Descriptive Statistics, Attitudes towards Muslim Migrants in Europe

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
DV – Acceptance of Muslims	29,536	2.31	0.97	1	4
Age (centered)	29,488	0.000004	18.73	-35.91	54.09
Self-declared religiosity scale	29,380	4.17	3.02	0	10
Left-right wing scale	26,686	5.11	2.17	0	10
Frequency of contact with different ethnic groups	29,325	4.32	2.16	1	7
Conservatism	28,995	4.33	0.81	1.00	6.00
Openness to change	28,996	4.07	0.87	1.00	6.00
Muslim population (%)	29,536	3.00	2.51	0.001	7.5
Governance index	29,536	1.31	0.39	0.53	1.84
Islamic attacks in a country (%)	29,536	3.56	7.91	0	33
Linguistic assimilation (%)	29,536	28.53	27.49	0	100

Variable		Freq.	%
Easter/Central Europe	Yes	8,621	29.19
	No	20,915	70.81
	Total	*29,536*	*100*
Gender	Female	15,446	52.33
	Male	14,073	47.67
	Total	*29,519*	*100*
Education	Primary	3,072	10.42
	Secondary	15,847	53.78
	Advanced vocational & other	4,095	13.9
	Tertiary	6,455	21.9
	Total	*29,469*	*100*
Labour Market Activity	Employed	14,715	49.98
	Unemployed	1,460	4.96
	Retired	7,933	26.94
	In Education	2,446	8.31
	Other	2,889	9.81
	Total	*29,443*	*100*
Religious affiliation	Catholic	10,420	35.48
	Protestant	4,750	16.17
	Other-Christian Affiliation	402	1.37
	Jewish	12	0.04
	Islamic	21	0.07
	Non-Christian denomination	114	0.39
	No religious affiliation	13,649	46.48
	Total	*29,368*	*100*

Table A4.2 Pairwise Correlations, Attitudes towards Muslim Migrants in Europe

	Dependent Variable (Acceptance of Muslim Immigration)	**Linguistic Integration**	**Islamic Attacks in a Country**	**Governance**	**Muslim Population**
Dependent Variable	1.000				
Linguistic Integration	0.226***	1.000			
Islamic Attacks in a Country (%)	0.194***	0.248***	1.000		
Governance	0.288***	0.357***	0.386***	1.000	
Muslim Population (%)	0.320***	0.463***	0.311***	0.512***	1.000

*Note: *** p< 0.001*

Table A4.3 Null Model, Attitudes towards Muslim Migrants in Europe

	Null Model	
Random Effects		
Estimated between-country variance	0.608**	(0.216)
Model Fit & Observations		
Log. Lik.	-36186.35	
Deviance	72372.7	
N (Level 1)	29,536	
N (Level 2)	20	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A4.1 Latent Variable – Openness to Change



Chi-square (6) = 731.44, p< 0.001. RMSEA=0.07, CFI=0.98, SRMR=0.03.

Figure A4.2 Latent Variable – Conservatism



Chi-square (8) = 411.63, p< 0.001. RMSEA=0.04, CFI=0.98, SRMR=0.02.

Chapter 5: Discrimination in the Rental Housing Market: A Field Experiment in Ireland[108]

Abstract

This paper presents the results of a field experiment on ethnic discrimination in the rental housing market in Ireland. This field experiment is the first of its kind in the Irish context and hence addresses a significant research gap in the area of ethnic discrimination in the rental housing sector. In addition, it's one of the few studies, in the European context, to consider ethnic discrimination against European and non-European migrants. The experimental design involved creating six fictitious applicants with different ethnic and gender names. These applicants applied for vacant rental apartments in the Dublin area that were advertised online. Results of the experiment show that Irish applicants are more likely to be invited to view an apartment than both Polish and Nigerian applicants. In addition, Polish applicants are more likely to be invited to view an apartment than Nigerian applicants, which points to discrimination between minority groups. There is also evidence of gender discrimination with females receiving more invitations to view apartments than male applicants. Overall, the Irish female is the most likely to receive an invitation to view an apartment and the Nigerian male is the least likely, with a statistically significant lower response rate of 23 per cent. Providing additional information about employment does not increase the chances of securing an invitation to view an apartment for ethnic minorities, pointing to 'taste' based discrimination.

Keywords: discrimination, Ireland, rental housing market, field experiment

[108] This chapter is currently under review at an international journal.. A previous version of this paper was presented at the *Research Seminar Series*, Department of Sociology, Trinity College Dublin (Dublin, 2018), *Department of Sociology PhD Day*, Trinity College Dublin (Dublin 2019) and the *Migration Conference 2019* (Bari, June 2019).

5.1 Introduction

Access to housing is recognised as one of the fundamental human rights by the United Nations[109]. Discrimination regarding access to housing is prohibited by international bodies and national legislation in Europe. However, there is consistent evidence of discrimination against ethnic minorities in the housing market (Riach and Rich, 2002). A review carried out by Rich (2014) indicates that housing discrimination is prevalent across the United States (US) and Europe, and ethnic minorities are treated less favourably than natives (Pager and Shepherd, 2008). No such study has been carried out in Ireland.

Since the early 2000s, Ireland has become a country of immigration (see figure 5.1), and currently approximately 12 per cent of the Irish population is composed of non-Irish nationals (CSO, 2017c).

Figure 5.1 Migration in Ireland, 2000-2018



Source: CSO (2018a)
Note: 2017 and 2018 figures are preliminary.

Existing Irish research indicates that discrimination towards ethnic minorities is prevalent in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2006; Bond et al., 2010a). According to the Central Statistics Office (CSO) Quarterly National Household Survey (CSO, 2015), 11 per cent of non-Irish nationals report experiencing discrimination when

[109] See Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948).

accessing services, including housing, in comparison to 7 per cent of Irish nationals. A field experiment in the Irish labour market[110] by McGinnity and Lunn (2011), found that Irish candidates were twice as likely to get invited to a job interview compared with non-Irish candidates. Research relating to housing discrimination in Ireland is limited, but growing, and is mostly based on self-reported data (McGinnity et al., 2012). Until this study, there have been no field experiments carried out in the Irish housing market.

This chapter is organised as follows: first, the rationale for conducting a field experiment in the Irish context is outlined; second, previous studies and the design of the experiment are discussed; third, the results of the experiment are presented and discussed in the final sections of the chapter.

5.2 Why a Field Experiment in Ireland?

The rationale behind the study is twofold: first, a significant proportion of the Irish population is composed of non-Irish nationals and they are more likely to live in privately rented accommodation than Irish nationals[111] (Grotti et al., 2018). Most studies examining discrimination in the Irish context have focussed on self-reports of discrimination (McGinnity et al., 2012; McGinnity et al., 2017) and statistical analysis of outcomes (Maître and Russell, 2017). Analysis of self-reported discrimination in accessing services indicates that access to housing is the area with most widespread discrimination[112], with Black and Asian ethnic groups reporting higher rates of discrimination than Irish nationals or other ethnic minorities (McGinnity et al., 2012). A more recent study by McGinnity et al. (2017) found that Black respondents are five times more likely to report discrimination in accessing services, including housing in comparison to White Irish respondents. In addition to greater challenges in securing accommodation, discrimination in the housing market has significant social and economic consequences for individuals and society. For individuals, discrimination in the

[110] This is the first field experiment conducted in Ireland in the area of discrimination.
[111] In 2014, 77 per cent of Irish nationals were homeowners in comparison to 25 per cent of non-nationals. Differences in the rate of home ownership remain even when the length of time in Ireland is taken into account. See Maître and Russell (2017).
[112] 3.4 per cent of respondents reported experience of discrimination when accessing housing. See McGinnity et al., (2012).

housing market may lead to poorer access to employment and education (Flage, 2018), a decrease in welfare and overall well-being (Eurofound, 2004) and worse health outcomes (Cattaneo et al., 2009). It is also associated with a higher chance of becoming homeless (Shinn and Gillespie, 1994), for example in Ireland Grotti et al., (2018) found that African nationals are at a higher risk of becoming homeless than other ethnic groups. At a societal level, housing discrimination can lead to residential segregation (Flage, 2018) and lower levels of integration.
Whilst analysis of self-reported discrimination and statistical analysis of outcomes are useful in measuring discrimination, both have their limitations: self-reports of discrimination are subjective (McGinnity et al., 2012) and may be inaccurate. Statistical analysis of differential outcomes across different population groups cannot decisively exclude causes other than discrimination (Bond et al., 2010b). A field experiment can show direct evidence of discrimination. However, no such experiment in the housing market has been carried out in Ireland to-date. This study aims to address this research gap in the Irish context.

Second, the Irish rental market is currently marked by low supply but high demand for rental properties. Data from the first quarter of 2019 indicate that the availability of rental properties is the lowest it has ever been, while rents have reached an all-time high (Lyons, 2019). The standardised average rent increased by 55 per cent between quarter 1 in 2011 and quarter 3 in 2017 in the Dublin area (Grotti et al., 2018). Given this, housing can be considered a scarce resource allowing any potential landlord or letting agency to choose their preferred tenant. If so, this could also provide opportunities to those who may discriminate against ethnic minorities and express in-group favouritism towards Irish nationals.

5.3. Why Discriminate?

Pager and Shepherd (2008:182) define racial and ethnic discrimination as

> *'... unequal treatment of individuals or groups on the basis of their race or ethnicity.'*

Why might a landlord or letting agent discriminate against ethnic minority applicants? Several frameworks have been put forward which aim to explain the possible reasons for discrimination. 'Taste based' discrimination refers to discrimination which occurs due to fear, prejudice and hostile attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Becker, 1957). The main premise of 'taste based' discrimination is that individuals, for example landlords and employers discriminate because they hold xenophobic or negative attitudes towards an individual or minority groups. Another framework put forward to explain discrimination relates to statistical discrimination. This type of discrimination occurs when due to a lack of information or imperfect information about an individual, real or perceived attributes of a group to which the individual belongs to are used as the basis for discrimination against the person in question (Phelps, 1972). In the housing market a landlord may take ethnic origin as a proxy for the unknown information and may discriminate in favour of individuals from their own in-group because it is deemed to be less risky (Flage, 2018). In addition, extending on social identity and realistic group conflict theories, an individual may discriminate in favour of their own in-group due to greater empathy and positive feelings about the in-group (Hewstone et al., 2002). Hewstone et al. (2002) note that intergroup bias can range from prejudice to discrimination and refers to a tendency to evaluate the members of one's own in-group more favourably than non-members. Hence an individual may prefer to allocate scarce resources to one's own in-group due to more positive identification with the group (Al Ramiah et al., 2010). In the case of the landlord, this may lead to a preference to rent out a property to a native person rather than an individual belonging to an ethnic minority.

5.4 Previous Research Using Field Experiments

As mentioned in the previous section, it can be difficult to show that differences in outcomes regarding access to services and markets are due to discrimination. Surveys, which focus on self-reports of discrimination, may be subjective. In addition, some forms of prejudice and discrimination are likely to be covert and subtle (Pager and Shepherd, 2008). An experimental approach through field experiments has been employed in a number of studies in order to detect

discrimination, particularly in areas such as the rental housing market (Riach and Rich, 2002).

In-person audits (Yinger, 1986; Turner et al., 2002; Zhao et al., 2006) and telephone audits (Klink and Wagner, 1999; Fischer and Massey, 2004; Drydakis, 2010; Drydakis, 2011; MacDonald et al., 2016) have been used in previous studies and have shown than ethnic minorities are less likely to be offered accommodation and/or shown less properties than the 'native' population. However, one of the main limitations of these methods is the lack of internal validity due to different tester characteristics (Heckman and Siegelman, 1993)[113]. Field experiments which use correspondence tests via email inquiries have become increasingly prevalent in studies examining discrimination as they allow researchers to manipulate key independent variables of interest while controlling for different characteristics[114].

Field experiments have been used extensively to uncover discrimination in the housing market outside of Ireland (see Rich, 2014; Flage, 2018; Auspurg et al., 2019 for detailed reviews of previous studies). Studies in the US (Carpusor and Loges, 2006; Hanson and Hawley, 2011; Hanson and Santas, 2014), Canada (Hogan and Berry, 2011), Sweden (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008; Ahmed et al., 2010; Carlsson and Eriksson, 2014), Norway (Andersson et al., 2012), Finland (Öblom and Antfolk, 2017), Iceland (Björnsson et al., 2018), Germany (Mazziotta et al., 2015; Auspurg et al., 2017), France (Acolin et al., 2016), Belgium (Heylen and Van den Broeck, 2016), Spain (Bosch et al., 2010; Bosch et al., 2015) and Italy (Baldini and Federici, 2011) have consistently provided evidence of ethnic discrimination in the rental market.

[113] In addition, a study by Heylen and Van den Broeck (2016) found that the rate of discrimination using a correspondence approach was higher in comparison to telephone audits for certain groups of applicants. The study suggests that future research should explore if it is easier for landlords do discriminate using more anonymous approach such as email versus a more personal and direct contact via a telephone.

[114] Neumark and Rich (2019) provide evidence that the estimated effect of discrimination in housing markets is robust.

The first experiment in the housing market by Carpusor and Loges (2006) carried out in Los Angeles found that Arab and African American sounding names were significantly less likely to receive positive responses from landlords. A similar experiment carried out in Sweden found evidence of ethnic discrimination as individuals with Arab/Muslim names received fewer invitations to view accommodation than individuals with Swedish names (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008). A more recent field experiment conducted in the German housing market found significantly higher levels of discrimination against Turkish applicants than German applicants (Auspurg et al., 2017). The correspondence tests have found varying levels of net discrimination rates, ranging from 4.5 per cent between White Americans and African Americans (Hanson and Hawley, 2011) and 25 per cent between Swedish and Arab/Muslim applicants (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008). Table 5.1 provides a summary of select studies[115] and illustrates lower response rates received by ethnic minorities.

In the US context, studies have focussed on the differences between White Americans and African Americans or Hispanic minority groups, while most of the European research has considered the differences in responses between the majority group and Arabic/Muslim applicants (Flage, 2018). Few European studies have focussed on the differences between the natives and European migrants, providing mixed evidence regarding discrimination (Baldini and Federici, 2011; Acolin et al., 2016; Öblom and Antfolk, 2017; Björnsson et al., 2018). A study in Iceland[116] found that Polish men received significantly fewer invitations to view an apartment than Icelandic applicants (Björnsson et al., 2018). Öblom and Antfolk (2017) found significant discrimination against Arabic applicants but no significant differences were observed between the native Finish and Swedish applicants. Other European studies have focussed on the difference between the majority group and Eastern European and non-European migrant groups, all finding consistent evidence of greater discrimination towards non-Europeans. A study in Italy found that Eastern Europeans were discriminated against in comparison to Italians, albeit to a lesser

[115] See specific studies for further information. Ethnic origin refers to terminology used in each study. E/SE Asian refers to East/Southeast Asian.
[116] To my knowledge this is the only study which has specifically focussed on differences between natives and European migrants.

extent than Arab/Muslim applicants (Baldini and Federici, 2011). However, in the case of France, Acolin et al. (2016) showed that Eastern European migrants were not discriminated against while non-Europeans received lower response rates in comparison to both European migrants and native French applicants.

Several studies have shown that gender discrimination is also prevalent in housing markets, with females more likely to receive a response and an invitation to view an apartment. Native females are preferred over all other applicants, while ethnic minority women are discriminated against, but to a much lesser extent than their male counterparts (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008; Baldini and Federici, 2011; Hogan and Berry, 2011; Carlsson and Eriksson, 2014; Bosch et al., 2015; Björnsson et al., 2018).

Table 5.1 Summary of Select Studies in Field Experiments in the Housing Market

Ethnic Origin	**Location**	**Lower Response Rate for Minority Applicants**	**Reference**
Swedish & Arab/Muslim	Sweden	35% - 25%[117]	Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008)
White American, African American & Arabic/Muslim	US	33%-23%	Carpusor and Loges (2006)
German & Turkish	Germany	30%-13%	Mazziotta et al. (2015)
French, Poland, Portugal-Spain, Turkey, Northern & Sub-Saharan African	France	22% - 16%[118]	Acolin et al. (2016)
Belgian & Turkish/Moroccan	Belgium	19%[119]	Heylen and Van den Broeck (2016)
Spanish & Moroccan	Spain	18%	Bosch et al. (2015)
Italian, Arab/Muslim & East European	Italy	18%-12%	Baldini and Federici (2011)
Swedish & Arab/Muslim	Sweden	16%[120]	Ahmed et al. (2010)

[117] Arab/Muslim applicant received less responses than Swedish male (25 per cent) and Swedish female (35 per cent).
[118] African and Turkish applicants received less responses than French (22 per cent) and Europeans (16 per cent).
[119] Refers to email audit only.

Spanish & Moroccan	Spain	15%	Bosch et al. (2010)
Finish, Swedish & Arabic	Finland	14%[121]	Öblom and Antfolk (2017)
Norwegian & Arabic	Norway	13%	Andersson et al. (2012)
Icelandic & Polish	Iceland	12%	Björnsson et al. (2018)
Anglo-Saxon Caucasian, African American, E/SE Asian, Muslim/Arabic, & Jewish	Canada	12%-5%[122]	Hogan and Berry (2011)
Swedish & Arabic/Muslim	Sweden	11%-7%[123]	Carlsson and Eriksson (2014)
German & Turkish	Germany	9%	Auspurg et al. (2017)
White American & African American	US	6%-4.5%[124]	Hanson and Hawley (2011)
White American & Hispanics	US	5.8% [125]	Hanson and Santas (2014)

Note: Studies are presented in the order of the rate of discrimination.

5.5 Research Questions and Design

The research design employed in this study is based on methodologies used in similar field experiments in the housing market (for example see Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008; Hanson and Hawley, 2011; Hanson and Santas, 2014; Auspurg et al., 2017) as well as the Irish experiment in the labour market (McGinnity and Lunn, 2011).

As mentioned earlier, this is the first field experiment in the Irish housing market. The primary aim of this study is to detect if there is evidence of discrimination consistent with previous research outside of Ireland. The main

[120] Response rate is higher for applicants who provided additional information, e.g. about employment.
[121] In relation to Finish applicants.
[122] Muslim/Arabic men received 12 per cent, E/SE Asian men 7 per cent, Black applicants and Muslim/Arabic women 5 per cent less responses than Anglo-Saxon Caucasian.
[123] Lower response rates relate to male (11 per cent) and female (7 per cent) applicants with Arabic/Muslim names.
[124] 6 per cent refers to African Americans when lower social class is indicated.
[125] This study includes Hispanic applicants who have assimilated and Hispanics who are recent immigrants. The lower response rate refers to the latter group.

research question is to ascertain if there are any differences in responses to Irish and minority applicants.

> *Hypothesis 1: Non-Irish applicants will receive fewer invitations to view an apartment than Irish applicants.*

The experiment also aims to detect variation in the extent of discrimination between minority groups. Previous studies suggest that non-White immigrants face higher levels of discrimination (Carpusor and Loges, 2006; Hanson and Hawley, 2011; Acolin et al., 2016).

> *Hypothesis 2: Black applicants (Nigerians) will receive fewer invitations to view an apartment than White European applicants (Polish).*

Several studies have found that providing additional information about applicants, e.g. stating one's employment status can reduce the extent of discrimination (Ahmed et al., 2010; Bosch et al., 2010; Baldini and Federici, 2011; Bosch et al., 2015). If there is discrimination in the Irish housing market, can providing information about employment, thus signalling one's ability to pay rent, reduce it?

> *Hypothesis 3: Providing information about one's employment status will reduce the extent of discrimination towards ethnic minority applicants.*

5.5.1 Experimental Design

Six fictitious applicants whose names represent different ethnic groups were created: 2 Irish applicants (male and female), 2 Polish applicants (male and female), and 2 Nigerian applicants (male and female). Similarly to previous field experiments, names were used to signal ethnic background and gender. A small-scale pilot test was carried out to ensure that ethnicity would be easily

identifiable via names[126]. The two ethnic minority groups were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, both groups represent two large migrant groups in Ireland. Polish migrants constitute the largest overall group of migrants in Ireland; approximately 23 per cent of all foreign nationals in Ireland (see table 5.2). According to the most recent census, approximately 84 per cent of Polish nationals were living in rented accommodation (CSO, 2018c).

Table 5.2 Top 10 Non-Irish Nationalities Residing in Ireland, 2016

Nationality	Total Number	% of All Foreign Nationals*
Polish	122,515	22.9%
UK Nationals	103,113	19.3%
Lithuanian	36,552	6.8%
Romanian	29,186	5.5%
Latvian	19,933	3.7%
Brazilian[127]	13,640	2.5%
Spanish	12,112	2.3%
Italian	11,732	2.2%
French	11,661	2.2%
German	11,531	2.2%

Source: CSO (2018c).
Note: * Percentage of all foreign nationals (own calculations).

Nigerians constitute the largest group of African migrants in Ireland and overall make up approximately 1 per cent of all foreign nationals[128] (see table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Top 5 African Nationalities Residing in Ireland, 2016

Nationality	Total Number	% of African nationals in Ireland	% of foreign nationals in Ireland
Nigerian	6,084	28.1%	1.1%
South African	3,208	14.8%	0.6%
Mauritian	1,929	8.9%	0.4%
Congolese	1,276	5.9%	0.2%
Egyptian	957	4.4%	0.2%

Source: CSO (2017c).
Note: Own calculations for percentages.

[126] Ethnic groups had to be limited in order to ensure that a sufficient sample size was obtained for each group. The pilot study highlighted some problematic names for example German names were often interpreted as Dutch.
[127] Brazilians represent one of the fastest growing groups in Ireland (CSO, 2017c). However, the pilot study showed that their names were often mistaken for Spanish and Portuguese names.
[128] This is a decrease from approximately 3.2% in 2011 (See CSO, 2012b). A significant proportion of this decrease can be attributed to large numbers of Nigerian nationals naturalising and hence for the purpose of the census they are then classified as Irish nationals.

Second, the two ethnic groups were chosen as they represent predominantly White (in the case of Polish) and predominantly Black (in the case of Nigerian) migrants and would also arguably would be seen as two distinct groups by the majority group in Ireland. Black non-Irish groups are more likely to be disadvantaged in the labour market, and to experience discrimination seeking work, and in the workplace (McGinnity et al., 2018c). McGinnity et al. (2017) found that Black respondents are five times more likely to report discrimination in accessing services, including housing in comparison to White Irish respondents. Hence, it is likely that Nigerian applicants are more likely to be discriminated against in the rental market than Irish and Polish nationals.

To test for discrimination in the private rental market an online site, *Daft*[129] was used. It is the main online site used for property searches with over 2.5 million users each month (Lyons, 2019). On *Daft*, both private property owners and letting agencies can place adverts for rental properties. Responding to an advert is free of charge and little information about the applicant is required. A name and email address must be provided before an inquiry can be sent, while a phone number and a message are optional. It must be noted however that one of the limitations of using the Internet for field experiments is that individuals may use other, less formal ways to find accommodation for example through friends or social media. Similar limitations have been identified by previous studies (Ahmed et al., 2010; Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008).

Email accounts, using Google's Gmail[130], were created for each applicant. The email addresses involved the person's first name and surname; where this was not possible a number or numbers were added to the email address. Ethnicity signalling through names occurred through the email address and through the email sent through *Daft* by including the applicant's name and email signature.

The experiment took place between May and November 2018. Only new adverts in the Greater Dublin Area were used and no restrictions to size, rent, or location were applied. All ads which asked for applicants to call rather than email were

[129] www.daft.ie.
[130] www.google.com/gmail/.

eliminated from the study. Each advert was applied to three times by an Irish, Polish and Nigerian applicant in a random order (similarly to Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008), while holding gender and employment status constant, i.e. all the applicants would always be male or female and would either only inquire about the available property or would also provide additional information about their employment status. Throughout the experiment, adverts were tracked to ensure that the same landlord or letting agent were not contacted several times[131].

When employment status was provided, the applicant stated that he or she worked in accountancy, IT or the financial sector. These occupations were chosen to represent current sectors in Ireland where there are plenty of job opportunities and also sectors with average salaries high enough to be able to pay Dublin area rents. The employment status was used to signal to prospective landlords and letting agents that the applicant is in employment and has sufficient income.

Equivalent templates were used and assigned at random to each applicant to keep all other experimental conditions constant and to ensure that applicants only varied on the key variable of interest, ethnicity. Each applicant applied for entire rather than shared accommodation in order to avoid providing additional information which may be necessary for the latter type of accommodation. In addition, it is less clear who is making decisions regarding viewings in shared accommodation, for example it may be the current tenants or the owner of the property. The order of application (e.g. who applies first, second, third) was also set randomly. The time delay between each email varied between 30 minutes to 1 hour to ensure that sufficient time had elapsed between applications (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008; Hogan and Berry, 2011). See Appendix in section 5.8 for a sample experimental procedure.

Information about the apartment (for example number of bedrooms, rent, location), whether the landlord was a private owner or a letting agent, the

[131] Some new adverts had to be excluded from the study if the applicants had already contacted the property owner or letting agent in order to avoid suspicion. However, it is possible that a private landlord may advertise several properties using different names.

landlord's gender and ethnicity (where applicable), and the time and date of application were recorded. Once emails were sent out, responses were recorded which included; i) if an applicant received a response and ii) type of response (for example requests for further information or an invitation to view an apartment). Any evidence of differential treatment was also recorded, for example, if one applicant was asked for additional information such as extra references or given preferential treatment regarding viewings in comparison to one or more of the other applicants. When a positive response was received, a prompt rejection of the invitation was sent out.

Discrimination is measured by response rate to the emails, with a particular focus on invitations to view an apartment. Invitation to view an apartment rather than other types of positive responses such as requests for further information are used in the analysis as the former marks the first step in the rental process. While requests for further information may lead to an invitation, it may not happen in all instances. In addition, equivalency would be harder to ensure when providing further information without causing suspicion on the behalf of the landlords/letting agents.

5.6 Results

5.6.1 Descriptive

Each applicant applied for 512 apartments and 1,024 apartments were applied for in total. The responses to the emails are displayed in Table 5.4 and segregated by gender and ethnicity. 'Invited to a viewing' indicates that the applicant was invited to view an apartment while 'no response' indicates that no response was received at all. 'Further information' indicates that the applicant was asked to provide further information about themselves before a potential viewing could be set up. In such cases, the experiment was stopped in order to avoid adding additional information, which could have had an impact on the response. This type of response was not added to the overall call-back rate as it cannot be presumed that the response is equivalent to an invitation or is likely to lead to

one. 'Other' category includes instances where applicants were placed on a reserve list or informed that the apartment was already rented out.

Table 5.4 Responses to Emails, Field Experiment in Ireland

	Irish		**Polish**		**Nigerian**	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Invited to a Viewing	50%	44%	44%	37%	32%	27%
No Response	36%	42%	42%	50%	57%	63%
Further Information	11%	11%	11%	11%	8%	8%
Other	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	512	512	512	512	512	512

From Table 5.4 it can be observed that Irish women are the preferred applicant with half of all the emails sent resulting in an invitation to view an apartment. Irish men and Polish women are the second most preferred, with 44 per cent of all their emails resulting in an invitation to view an apartment. In the case of Polish men, 37 per cent of all emails resulted in an invitation to view an apartment while half of the emails did not receive a response. Perhaps the most notable difference can be observed in relation to the Nigerian applicants. In the case of Nigerian women, 32 per cent of the emails that were sent out resulted in an invitation to view an apartment while for Nigerian men 27 per cent of emails resulted in an invitation to view an apartment. In both cases, more than half of the emails resulted in no response.

Table 5.5 provides a classification of responses as well as the discrimination rate and relative call-back rate for different groups. This relates to a response of any type and does not necessarily mean the applicant was invited to a viewing. From table 5.5 we can observe that Irish applicants are the most likely to receive a response of some type when other respondents received no response. There were only 4 cases in which the Nigerian applicant was the only one who received a response of some type, which equates to less than 1 per cent of all emails sent out. The Nigerian applicant is more likely to be left out while the other two received a response; with 13 per cent of all emails resulting in a response to Irish and Polish applicants only. Only 6 per cent of all emails resulted in a response to one or both minority applicants but not the Irish applicant.

Table 5.5 Classification of Responses by Ethnicity, Field Experiment in Ireland

Applicant	**N**
Irish only	108
Polish only	39
Nigerian only	4
Irish and Polish only	130
Irish and Nigerian only	19
Polish and Nigerian only	16
All received a response	368
None received a response	340
Discrimination rate[132]	
Irish vs. Polish	11%
Irish vs. Nigerian	34%
Polish vs. Nigerian	23%

5.6.2 Are Differences Statistically Significant?

Tables 5.6 and 5.7 contain observed frequencies regarding invitation to view an apartment by ethnicity and gender. In addition, equality of proportions was tested to ensure that differences within groups are statistically significant. Firstly, focusing only on ethnicity, Irish applicants are more likely to be invited than Polish applicants. Irish applicants received 67 more invitations than Polish applicants, which equates to a difference of approximately 6 per cent. The hypothesis that Irish applicants are more likely to receive an invitation than Polish applicants is statistically significant ($p<0.01$). In relation to Nigerian applicants, Irish applicants received 180 more invitations, which equates to a 15 per cent difference which is statistically significant ($p<0.001$). Polish applicants received 113 more applications in comparison to Nigerian applicants which resulted in a 9 per cent difference which is also statistically significant ($p<0.001$).

Table 5.6 Observed Frequencies by Ethnicity, Field Experiment in Ireland

	Irish	Polish	Nigerian	*Total*
Not Invited to a Viewing	543	610	723	1,876
Invited to a Viewing	481	414	301	1,196
% of All Invitations to View	40%	35%	25%	100%
Total	1,024	1,024	1,024	3,072

χ^2 (2) 67. 99, $p<0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.15

[132] Here discrimination rate is calculated as ((Irish receives a response minority does not – Minority receives a response Irish does not) / (Both receive a response + Irish receives a response minority does not + Minority receives a response Irish does not). E.g. in the case of Irish vs Polish discrimination rate is calculated as ((127-55)/ (127 + 55+ 130 + 368)).

Regarding gender, women are more likely to receive an invitation to view to an apartment than men, with the former receiving an additional 90 invitations. This equals to a difference of 8 per cent which is statistically significant ($p<0.05$) suggesting that there is not only ethnic but also gender discrimination in the Irish housing market.

Table 5.7 Observed Frequencies by Gender, Field Experiment in Ireland

	Female	Male	*Total*
Not invited to a Viewing	893	983	1,876
Invited to a Viewing	643	553	1,196
% of All Invitations to View	54%	46%	100%
Total	1,536	1,536	3,072

χ^2 (1) 11. 09, $p<0.01$, Cramér's V = 0.06

The results are further segregated by differences in response rates to view an apartment by each applicant. As the Irish female ('Aoife') received the most invitations, all other applicants are compared to 'Aoife'.

Table 5.8 Differences in Response Rates (%) to View an Apartment

	Irish		**Polish**		**Nigerian**	
	Female	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*
Difference in Relation to Irish Female		-6	-6	-13***	-18***	-23***
Difference in Relation to Irish Male			0	-7 *	-12 **	-17***
Difference in Relation to Polish Female				-7 *	-12 **	-17***
Difference in Relation to Polish Male					-5	-10 **
Difference in Relation to Nigerian Female						-5

*Field Experiment in Ireland . * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001*

The lower response rate can be observed for all applicants in relation to the Irish female. The most notable difference can be observed between the Irish female and the Nigerian male with the latter receiving 23 per cent lower response rate. Another way to look at the results is to consider how many emails one needs to send out in order to receive an invitation to view an apartment. The Irish woman needs to send 2 emails in order to receive an invitation to view an apartment

while the Nigerian man has to send 4 emails in order to receive an invitation to view an apartment.

Multivariate logistic regression models were employed in order to test hypotheses and to also examine if employment status, landlord/letting agency characteristics, and apartment features matter in relation to receiving an invitation to view an apartment. Descriptive statistics for variables of interest are supplied in the Appendix in section 5.8.

5.6.3 Do Ethnicity, Gender and Employment Status Matter?

Model 1 is used to confirm the main hypotheses; Irish ethnicity is the reference category used in Model 1 and Polish ethnicity is the reference category for Model 1A. All other models use Irish applicants as a reference category. Additional models with Polish as a reference category are included in the Appendix in section 5.8.

Table 5.9 Logistic Regression Results, Models 1 and 1A, Field Experiment in Ireland

	Model 1		***Model 1A***	
	Log Odds	S.E.	Log Odds	S.E.
Ethnicity				
Irish	*Ref*		0.27**	(0.09)
Polish	-0.27**	(0.09)	*Ref*	
Nigerian	-0.77***	(0.09)	-0.50***	(0.09)
Male	-0.25***	(0.08)	-0.25***	(0.08)
Employment status stated	0.44***	(0.08)	0.44***	(0.08)
Pseudo R^2	0.028		0.028	
Log lik.	-1995.35		-1995.35	
Chi-square (df)	116.22 (9) ***		116.22 (9) ***	
N	3,072		3,072	

Standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for month, order and template of application.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Both hypotheses are supported. First, Irish applicants are more likely to receive an invitation to view an apartment than Polish and Nigerian applicants, when controlling for gender and employment. The odds of a Polish applicant being invited to view an apartment decrease by 24 per cent while the odds of a Nigerian applicant being invited to view an apartment decrease by 54 per cent in comparison to Irish applicants. Second, Polish applicants are more likely to

receive an invitation to view an apartment than Nigerian applicants, controlling for gender and employment, with odds decreasing by 39 per cent regarding Nigerian applicants. In addition to ethnic discrimination, gender discrimination is present in the Irish rental housing market, as the odds of receiving an invitation to view an apartment decrease by 22 per cent for men. Regarding employment status, providing information about one's employment in the initial email increases the odds of receiving an invitation by 56 per cent. No significant differences between templates used, order of application, or month of application are observed. There are also no significant differences between different occupations.

Model 2 includes interaction effects between employment status, gender and ethnicity. Once the interaction effects are included, Polish applicants are still less likely to receive an invitation than Irish applicants. Although the difference is no longer statistically significant at the conventional 5 per cent significance level[133]. Nigerian applicants are less likely to receive an invitation to view a property, with the odds decreasing by 51 per cent. Providing information about employment and thus signalling one's ability to be able to pay rent does not reduce discrimination towards Nigerian applicants. The small and insignificant interaction effects between ethnicity and employment status indicate that signalling employment status does not have a significant impact on the extent of discrimination. This suggests that discrimination towards Nigerians and Polish applicants in the rental market is more likely be 'taste' based.

Stating one's employment status increases the likelihood of receiving an invitation for women as indicated by a significant interaction effect between the two variables ($p<0.01$).

[133] The difference remains significant at 10 per cent.

Table 5.10 Logistic Regression Results, Model 2, Field Experiment in Ireland

	Log Odds	S.E.
Ethnicity (*Ref: Irish*)		
Polish	-0.27†	(0.16)
Nigerian	-0.71***	(0.17)
Male	-0.04	(0.15)
Employment status stated	0.67***	(0.15)
Polish x Male	-0.04	(0.18)
Nigerian x Male	0.04	(0.19)
Polish x Employment status stated	0.03	(0.18)
Nigerian x Employment status stated	-0.14	(0.19)
Male x Employment status stated	-0.40**	(0.15)
Pseudo R^2	0.030	
Log lik.	-1991.27	
Chi-square (df)	124.38 (14) ***	
N	3,072	

Standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for month, order and template of application.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$., † p<0.10

Irish women are more likely than Irish men to be invited to view an apartment when they state that they are in employment in their initial email. This also holds for other ethnic groups (models not included). The odds of receiving an invitation for Irish men decrease by 33 per cent when both Irish applicants state they are in employment. While this suggests that women may have a higher chance of receiving an invitation, this particularly applies when the prospective landlord is told the applicant has a job. Thus, suggesting that employment status plays a more significant role in the case of females. See predictive margins in the Appendix in section 5.8.

5.6.4 Additional Controls

Despite random allocation which was employed in this experiment, there is a possibility that attributes are asymmetrically distributed across the experimentally controlled conditions, resulting in an unbalanced design. The controls, such as landlord characteristics and apartment features are added to the models in order to ensure robustness of results. No changes regarding ethnicity or gender are observed once controls are introduced.

Landlord characteristics

Female landlords and female letting agents are more likely to invite an applicant to a viewing than male landlords/letting agents. The odds of an invitation to view an apartment increase by 26 per cent when the landlord or letting agent is female. No significant differences are observed between Irish and non-Irish landlords or letting agents/companies.

Table 5.11 Logistic Regression Results, Model 3, Field Experiment in Ireland

	Log Odds	S.E.
Ethnicity (*Ref: Irish*)		
Polish	-0.27†	(0.16)
Nigerian	-0.72***	(0.17)
Male	-0.03	(0.15)
Employment status stated	0.67***	(0.15)
Polish x Male	-0.04	(0.18)
Nigerian x Male	0.04	(0.19)
Polish x Employment status stated	0.03	(0.18)
Nigerian x Employment status stated	-0.14	(0.19)
Male x Employment status stated	-0.41**	(0.15)
Female landlord/letting agent (*Ref: Male*)	0.23**	(0.08)
Letting agency (*Ref: Private landlord*)	0.27**	(0.09)
Pseudo R^2	0.036	
Log lik.	-1979.92	
Chi-square (df)	147.08 (19) ***	
N	3,072	

Standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for month, order and template of application, type of landlord, landlord sex and ethnicity.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, † p<0.10

Individual landlords are less likely to invite an applicant to a viewing than letting companies; the odds of an invitation to view an apartment increase by 31 per cent when an email is sent to a letting agency instead of a private letting. This is line with previous studies (see Flage, 2018).

Apartment features

The length of lease has no significant impact on the likelihood of being invited to view an apartment. Higher rent is associated with increased likelihood of receiving an invitation to view an apartment, however the odds increase by less

than 1 per cent. The odds of receiving an invitation decrease when apartments are bigger, i.e. apartments with more bedrooms. This could be explained by the fact that the templates used did not provide much information regarding the financial situation or family status of each applicant and hence it is likely that the prospective landlord may be less willing to invite such applicants to view a bigger apartment.

Table 5.12 Logistic Regression Results, Model 4, Field Experiment in Ireland

	Log Odds	S.E.
Ethnicity (*Ref: Irish*)		
Polish	-0.29†	(0.16)
Nigerian	-0.77***	(0.17)
Male	-0.003	(0.15)
Employment status stated	0.66***	(0.15)
Polish x Male	-0.05	(0.19)
Nigerian x Male	0.04	(0.20)
Polish x Employment status stated	0.03	(0.19)
Nigerian x Employment status stated	-0.16	(0.20)
Male x Employment status stated	-0.41*	(0.16)
Female landlord/letting agent (*Ref: Male*)	0.23**	(0.09)
Letting agency	0.13	(0.09)
Rent	0.001***	(0.001)
Number of beds	-0.39***	(0.08)
Area (*Ref: Northside*) Southside	0.27**	(0.09)
Greater Dublin Area & County Dublin	0.30*	(0.12)
Pseudo R^2	0.093	
Log lik.	-1861.81	
Chi-square (df)	383.30 (26) ***	
N	3,072	

Standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for month, order and template of application, type of landlord, landlord sex and ethnicity, length of lease and area.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$., † $p<0.10$

In terms of area, the odds of receiving an invitation increase by 31 per cent when the property is located on the Southside and by 35 per cent when the property is in the Greater Dublin area and County Dublin. Two possible reasons may explain this. Firstly, rents in the Southside of Dublin tend to be higher than rents in the Northside. Hence it is likely that the chances of receiving an invitation increase when rents are higher and hence the pool of potential applicants may be smaller. Secondly, regarding the Greater Dublin area, this may be perceived as a less desirable area than Dublin City and hence the pool of potential applicants may be

smaller due to the location of the apartments which as a result increase the chances of receiving an invitation.

The odds of Nigerian applicants receiving an invitation in comparison to Irish and Polish applicants remain lower and statistically significant across all models and controlling for all variables of interest, indicating clear evidence of discrimination.

5.6.5 Differential Treatment and Requests for Further Information

In addition to direct evidence of discrimination, there is also evidence of differential treatment. In terms of ethnicity, Irish applicants are more likely to receive preferential treatment which varied from being asked to provide less information via email or to bring less information to the prospective viewing than Polish or Nigerian applicants. Irish applicants received preferential treatment in 78 instances. Comparative figures for Polish and Nigerian applicants were 43 and 7 respectively. The differences between Irish and ethnic minority applicants and between the two ethnic groups are statistically significant ($p<0.001$) [134]. An earlier study by Hanson et al. (2011) found that landlords were more likely to give preferential treatment to White Americans than to African Americans.

Irish applicants were also more likely to receive invitations to specific viewings rather than open viewings or were offered several viewings when other applicants were only offered one. In total, 402 specific viewings were offered to applicants; out of these 46 per cent were for Irish, 33 per cent were for Polish and 21 per cent for Nigerian applicants. The differences are statistically significant ($p<0.001$) between Irish and ethnic minority applicants and between the two ethnic groups.

[134] Test for proportions were carried out to test if differences in preferential treatment and type of viewing offered are statistically significantly different between different groups.

The most frequent requests by landlords and letting agents when inviting prospective tenants to view an apartment were related to providing references from previous landlords and current employer, and evidence of financial capabilities through contracts, payslips, bank statements and saving accounts. Permanent and full-time employment was often necessary as well as a deposit of 2 month's rent. This highlights the difficulties faced by individuals looking for rented property in Dublin as clear preference is given to individuals who have rented previously and who are in a financially stable situation. This may have a particular impact on migrants, who may have never previously rented in Ireland and may be looking for accommodation for the first time. In addition, the templates which signalled the applicant's occupation, and hence financial status, provided limited information to prospective landlords and letting agents. Previous studies have found that providing additional information regarding references, employment, and financial situation, significantly improves the odds of receiving a response and/or an invitation to view an apartment (Ahmed et al., 2010; Bosch et al., 2010; Baldini and Federici, 2011; Bosch et al., 2015). Future research in the Irish context should investigate if providing additional information reduces discrimination towards ethnic minorities.

In terms of differential treatment and gender, while women received more invitations to view an apartment, they were also asked more often if they were renting alone or in a couple and if they had children, even when looking for a 1 bedroom apartment and providing information about their employment. Male applicants were never asked about children and rarely asked about their family status even when applying for apartments which had more than 1 bedroom. This highlights the prevalence of stereotypical assumptions regarding gender and employment and family duties. On the other hand, male applicants were often asked to provide information about themselves while female applicants were not, perhaps highlighting that as tenants, females are more trusted than males.

5.7 Discussion and Conclusion

This study presents the first field experiment on discrimination in the Irish housing rental market. In line with previous field experiments conducted outside of Ireland, ethnic and gender discrimination is prevalent in the Irish rental market. On average, Irish applicants are more likely to be invited to view an apartment than minority applicants, while Polish applicants are more likely to be invited to view an apartment than Nigerian applicants. Irish applicants are also more likely to receive preferential treatment and to be offered specific viewings than the two ethnic minority groups. In turn, Polish applicants are likely to be treated more favourably in comparison to Nigerian applicants. Nigerian men are less likely to receive an invitation to view an apartment than Irish women, with a discrimination rate of 23 per cent. Irish women received most of the invitations to view an apartment, with half of all the emails resulting in an invitation to view. This is consistent with existing studies, which have found native females to be the most preferred applicants while minority men are the most disadvantaged (Flage, 2018).

While women are more likely to be invited to view an apartment than men, they are also more likely to be asked if they are renting alone or with their partner and if they have children. In addition, women are more likely to be invited to view an apartment than men when they state that they are in employment in their initial email. This points to stereotypical assumptions regarding gender and employment. In the case of men, it is likely that there is an assumption that they are employed and able to afford renting a property, while female applicants have to signal that they are in employment. Male applicants on the other hand were more likely to be asked to provide information about their character, lifestyle and interests, highlighting that female applicants may be perceived as more trustworthy as tenants. Arguably, two types of statistical discrimination may be at play regarding gender. Men are asked for information regarding lifestyle and habits, while women are presumed to be good tenants, for example more clean, and reliable. Second, when women do not provide information about their employment status this information is requested while it is not in the case of men.

Noting, that there is a low supply of rental properties, this experiment also highlights the difficulties in obtaining accommodation in Dublin. The experiment took place in County Dublin and the Greater Dublin area with no restrictions regarding specific areas or rent. In reality it is likely that any prospective applicant may have a much smaller area to focus on when looking for accommodation and hence may find it more difficult to receive an invitation to view an apartment. Housing can be considered a scarce resource and hence this study highlights that it is likely that in-group favouritism plays a part in decision making of prospective landlords when offering a viewing. It is also worthwhile to note that an invitation to view an apartment is just the first step in securing accommodation. Further discrimination may occur at the viewing itself.

While this experiment provides direct evidence of discrimination, it also has limitations. Even though we know that there is discrimination, we cannot examine why this discrimination exists. In the case of ethnic minority applicants there is evidence to suggest that discrimination is 'taste' based. However, the templates which were used provided minimal information regarding one's ability to pay rent. Future research could further examine if discrimination is linked to 'taste-based discrimination' or if it is linked to 'statistical discrimination' for example by providing additional information such as availability of references and greater information about one's employment. The study uses names to signal ethnicity. While this is standard procedure in field experiments of this type, it is possible that the prospective landlord does not associate the name with the intended origin. A name may also signal other factors in addition to ethnicity, for example social class (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) which was not foreseen by the researchers. For example in the Irish case, it is possible that Polish names may be associated with economic migrants even when the applicants do not state their occupation. While, Nigerian names may be associated with asylum seekers, a status which may signal limited possibility to work.

A particular focus should be paid to discrimination towards Nigerian applicants. Existing studies suggest that Black non-Irish and Black Irish are at a greater disadvantage in the labour market and in seeking employment (McGinnity et al.,

2018c) and are more likely to self-report experience of discrimination in accessing services (McGinnity et al., 2017). Policies to monitor the extent of discrimination for this group as well as measures to reduce should be one of the key priorities for Irish integration policy.

This experiment is the first field experiment in the Irish context. It should also be noted that the fieldwork for this study was conducted in a period of exceptionally high demand for rental properties in the Irish housing market, potentially giving landlords more scope to discriminate. Future studies could consider if other minority groups and individuals belonging to disadvantaged groups in Ireland experience discrimination and if so, to what extent.

5.8 Appendix

Table A5.1 A Sample of Experimental Procedure in the Irish Rental Market

Advert	Applicant Order	Gender	Employment Status	Occupation	Template
1	1. Polish	Male	Not stated	N/A	PL - 1
	2. Nigerian				NG - 3
	3. Irish				IE - 2
2	1. Irish	Female	Stated	IE – IT	IE – 1
	2. Nigerian			NG – Accountant	NG – 2
	3. Polish			PL – Finance	PL – 3
3	1. Polish	Female	Stated	PL – Finance	PL – 2
	2. Irish			IE - Accountant	IE - 1
	3. Nigerian			NG – IT	NG – 3
4	1. Nigerian	Male	Stated	NG – Finance	NG – 1
	2. Polish			PL – IT	PL – 2
	3. Irish			IE – Accountant	IE – 3
5	1. Nigerian	Female	Not stated	N/A	NG – 1
	2. Polish				PL – 3
	3. Irish				IE – 2
6	1. Irish	Male	Not stated	N/A	IE – 1
	2. Nigerian				NG – 2
	3. Polish				PL – 3

Note: Employment status not stated = email sent with an inquiry about a vacant property without providing any additional information about one's financial or employment status. PL =Polish, NG= Nigerian and IE= Irish. IT = Information and Technology.

Table A5.2 Descriptive Statistics, Field Experiment in Ireland

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Rent	3,072	1,791. 63	621.77	430	10,000
Bathrooms	3,072	1.37	.52	1	4

Variable		Freq.	%
DV - Received an invitation to view	Yes	1,196	38.93
	No	1,876	61.07
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Ethnicity	Irish	1,024	33.33
	Polish	1,024	33.33
	Nigerian	1,024	33.33
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Sex	Male	1,536	50
	Female	1,536	50
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Employment status	Stated	1,542	50.2
	Not stated	1,530	49.8
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Occupation	Accountant	514	16.73
	IT	514	16.73
	Financial services	514	16.73
	Not stated	1,530	49.8
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Landlord	Private	1,932	62.89
	Letting agency	1,140	37.11
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Ethnicity of landlord/letting agent	Irish	2,709	88.18
	Non-Irish	273	8.89
	Not applicable	90	2.93
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Sex of landlord/letting agent	Male	1,437	46.78
	Female	1,116	36.33
	Not applicable	519	16.89
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Area	Northside	1,042	33.92
	Southside	1,559	50.75
	Greater Dublin area	471	15.33
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Lease	3 months	132	4.3
	6 months	219	7.13
	1 year	2,427	79
	No minimum	237	7.71
	Other	57	1.86
	Total	*3,072*	*100*
Bedrooms	Studio	219	7.13
	1 bed	991	32.26
	2 bed	1,636	53.26
	3 bed	211	6.87
	4 bed	15	0.49
	Total	*3,072*	*100*

Table A5.3 Logistic Regression Results with Polish Nationality as a Reference Category

	Model 2A		**Model 3A**		**Model 4A**	
	Log Odds	S.E.	Log Odds	S.E.	Log Odds	S.E.
Ethnicity (*Ref:Polish*)						
Irish	0.27†	(0.16)	0.27†	(0.16)	0.29†	(0.16)
Nigerian	-0.44***	(0.17)	-0.45***	(0.17)	-0.48***	(0.17)
Male	-0.08	(0.15)	-0.07	(0.15)	-0.05	(0.16)
Employment status stated	0.70***	(0.15)	0.70***	(0.15)	0.69***	(0.16)
Irish x Male	0.04	(0.18)	0.04	(0.18)	0.05	(0.19)
Nigerian x Male	0.08	(0.19)	0.08	(0.19)	0.09	(0.20)
Irish x Employment status stated	-0.03	(0.18)	-0.03	(0.18)	-0.03	(0.19)
Nigerian x Employment status stated	-0.17	(0.19)	-0.17	(0.19)	-0.20	(0.20)
Male x Employment status stated	-0.40**	(0.15)	-0.41**	(0.15)	-0.41*	(0.16)
Female landlord/letting agent (*Ref: Male*)			0.23**	(0.08)	0.23**	(0.09)
Letting agency			0.27**	(0.09)	0.14	(0.09)
Rent					0.001***	(0.001)
Number of beds					-0.39***	(0.08)
Area (*Ref: Northside*)					0.27**	(0.09)
Southside Greater Dublin Area & County Dublin					0.30*	(0.12)
Pseudo R^2	0.030		0.036		0.094	
Log lik.	-1991.27		-1979.92		-1861.40	
Chi-square (df)	124.38 (14) ***		147.08 (19) ***		384.13 (28) ***	
Observations	3,072		3,072		3,072	

Standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for month, order and template of application, type of landlord, landlord sex and ethnicity, length of lease and area.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. † p<0.10

Figure A5.1 Predictive Margins, Field Experiment in Ireland



Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis examined anti-immigration sentiment and discrimination in a comparative European context and in an Irish setting, using rich secondary and primary data. How newcomers are perceived by the 'native' population is one of the key concerns for the host societies (Heath et al., 2015) in the context of increasing and continuing immigration to many European countries, including Ireland. It is also an important dimension of successful integration and long-term social cohesion (McGinnity et al., 2018b). Attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigration have been studied extensively (see Meuleman et al., 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010 for a review). However, gaps in our understanding remain despite the large body of literature in this area. This research sought to address some of these gaps by examining attitudes in a variety of contexts and towards different immigrant groups and ethnic minorities. In addition, an experimental approach has been employed in order to examine not only overt attitudes via survey data but also attitudes which may be covert via the measure of discriminatory behaviour.

This final chapter is structured as follows. First the key findings from the four studies are briefly summarised. Second, the studies and the findings are situated within the context of previous research in the area of attitudes towards migrants. The overall contributions of the four studies, their limitations as well as future research avenues are discussed. Finally, the chapter closes with some concluding remarks.

6.1. Summary of Key Findings

The main aim of this thesis is to examine prejudice, via anti-immigration sentiment, and discriminatory behaviour in Ireland and other European countries. The thesis has three, broad, main aims:

1. to examine the hypothesis that anti-migrant sentiment can be explained via the realistic, in particular economic threat which migrants pose to the native population;
2. to examine attitudes towards specific sub-groups of migrants which reflect the current migratory inflows and public debate, with a particular focus on Muslim migrants and asylum seekers;
3. to investigate the extent of discrimination towards ethnic minorities in the Irish context.

Studies 1-3 address the first two objectives using representative survey data, thus allowing for observational exploration of social processes i) in the Irish context and ii) cross-nationally. The final objective is addressed in study 4 with the collection and analysis of primary data via a field experiment to provide direct observations of discrimination.

Study 1: The Land of One Hundred Thousand Welcomes? Economic Threat and Attitudes towards Immigration in Ireland

One of the main objectives of this thesis was to better understand the role of threat in anti-immigration attitudes. According to group conflict theory, competition related to economic resources such as employment is one of the key drivers of anti-immigration sentiment (Quillian, 1995; Mayda, 2006; Pereira et al., 2010; Billiet et al., 2014). However, not all individuals are likely to be in direct competition with or feel threatened by newcomers. The first research question addressed in this thesis asked:

1. *Can economic threat, related to economic decline and a greater share of migrants within occupational and sectoral levels, explain resistance to immigrants and immigration in the Irish context?*

The findings of the study support the threat hypothesis as job losses (or negative job growth) and a greater share of migrants within occupational and sectoral levels are negatively associated with attitudes towards immigration and

acceptance of migrants. Furthermore, the study finds that the change in job growth year-on-year rather than the absolute job growth over the period 2008 to 2016 has an impact on attitudes. This finding suggests that, in the short-term, job losses do lead to a decreased acceptance towards migrants for individuals in employment, which is in economic decline. In addition, individuals in vulnerable socio-economic positions such as those experiencing financial hardship, those who are unemployed, or those with lower levels of education, are more likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes. This can be linked directly to economic threat as individuals who are more vulnerable within the labour market are more likely to be exposed to spells of unemployment and thus may perceive immigrants as direct competitors for resources such as jobs. Overall the study finds that mean scores on attitudinal scales have improved since the recession. However, with the uncertainty of Brexit and its potential negative impact on the Irish economy (Bergin et al., 2019), the study highlights the need to closely monitor Irish attitudes towards ethnic minorities.

Study 2: Asylum Seekers Welcome? A Multilevel Analysis of Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers in Europe

Study 2 also examined the economic threat hypothesis but in relation to asylum seekers in Europe. Since the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015, European countries have received an unprecedented number of applications for asylum. While there is a large body of literature on attitudes towards immigrants (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010 for a review), relatively few studies have focussed on attitudes towards asylum seekers and even fewer studies have looked at this topic cross-nationally (see Coenders et al., 2004b). The study focussed on the following research questions:

2. *Can the threat hypothesis, related to economic resources and the size of the ethnic group, explain anti-asylum seeker sentiment? Do humanitarian concerns and trust promote greater support for asylum seekers?*

Using data from three rounds of the European Social Survey (2002, 2014 and 2016), this study firstly considered if threat related to economic resources and the

size of the ethnic group is associated with greater opposition towards asylum seekers. Secondly, the study examined if humanitarian aid and greater levels of generalised and institutional trust foster greater acceptance of asylum seekers. Unlike other group of migrants, asylum seekers may be perceived as a distinct group by the 'native' population due to their specific circumstances and there may be greater willingness to help them.

The study finds a positive association between attitudes and levels of trust and spending on aid. However, only partial support for the economic threat hypothesis is found. At the individual level, respondents in vulnerable socio-economic conditions are more opposed to asylum seekers and at the country level larger numbers of refugees in the country are associated with greater resistance. In contrast to the threat hypothesis, unemployment at the individual level and higher rate of unemployment at the country level are associated with greater support for asylum seekers rather than more resistance. Overall, the study finds that on average, attitudes towards asylum seekers' admissions have become more lenient since 2002. However, a small but significant shift towards greater resistance can be observed between 2014 and 2016 in most European countries.

Study 3: Attitudes toward Muslim Migrants in Europe

Islam is becoming an increasingly prevalent religion in Europe due to a large influx of Muslims in recent decades. Previous research suggests that anti-Muslim sentiment is widespread in most European countries (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008) and exceeds general anti-immigration sentiment. Using cross-national data (ESS, 2014a), the third study explored the threat hypothesis but focussed on threats related to security and group size instead of economic fears. It addressed the following research question:

3. *Is there greater opposition towards Muslim migrants than migrants in general? Can objective threat related to the size of the Muslim population, terrorist attacks and lower levels of integration explain anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe?*

Consistent with previous research (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Doebler, 2014), the study finds that there is significantly greater opposition towards Muslim migrants than immigrants in general, including migrants which are ethnically different from the 'native' population. Anti-Muslim sentiment is particularly prevalent in Eastern European countries. At the country level, objective measures of threat do not explain the pattern of cross-country variation. Countries with a higher share of Muslims and higher incidence of terrorist attacks are more welcoming towards further Muslim immigration. This may be due to the fact that countries with a higher share of Muslim migrants have a higher quality of institutional governance, have been experiencing Muslim immigration over the last few decades (Kettani, 2010) and hence are less affected by objective measures of threat. The study discusses the implications of these results suggesting that other factors such as country's history, ethnic homogeneity and attitudes towards existing minorities may explain greater resistance towards Muslim migrants in countries where objective threats are not present. On an individual level, an interesting finding relates to women, as they are more likely to express anti-Muslim sentiment than men; with conservative women in particular objecting to further Muslim immigration.

Study 4: Discrimination in the Rental Housing Market: A Field Experiment in Ireland

The first three studies in this thesis focussed on survey data and overt attitudes. The final study focuses on discriminatory behaviour. Empirical literature indicates that ethnic discrimination is widespread in the United States and Europe (Rich, 2014). Correspondence studies have consistently provided evidence of discrimination in the housing market (Flage, 2018). Using a field experiment, this study addressed the final research question:

4. *Is there discrimination in the Irish property rental market against ethnic minorities? Does the level of discrimination vary across ethnic groups?*

The study used established methods in the area of correspondence studies. Fictitious emails were sent to prospective landlords and letting agents from female and male applicants with Irish, Polish and Nigerian names. Discrimination was measured by the response rate to emails, with a particular focus on whether the fictitious person was invited to view an apartment.

This study is the first field experiment in the Irish housing market, and it provides direct evidence of discrimination. Irish applicants received significantly more invitations to view apartments than Polish and Nigerian applicants. The greatest difference in response rate can be noted between Irish women and Nigerian men, with the latter receiving 23 per cent less invitations. This finding is also consistent with previous studies which have found that native women are preferred applicants (for example see Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008). In addition, the study finds evidence of discrimination between ethnic groups as Polish applicants are more likely to receive an invitation to view an apartment than Nigerian applicants. The study suggests that discriminatory behaviour is most likely linked to 'taste' based discrimination as providing additional information about one's employment status did not increase the odds of receiving an invitation for ethnic minorities. Gender discrimination is also present in the Irish housing market, as men are 39 percent less likely to be invited to view an apartment than women. The study also highlights that in addition to direct discrimination, there is evidence of differential treatment. Irish applicants are significantly more likely to receive preferential treatment in comparison to ethnic minorities.

6.2. Study Contribution, Limitation and Future Research

A discussion of the wider contributions of each study, their limitations and suggestions for future research is provided in each individual chapter. This section aims to further situate the findings in the wider literature and to highlight the overall significance of this work.

The first three studies discussed above indicate that many factors contribute to anti-immigration sentiment and that attitudes differ depending on the sub-group of the ethnic minority, individual, contextual and country characteristics. The final study demonstrates that covert methods such as experiments can demonstrate forms of prejudice, which may not be apparent via observational studies. Together, these studies provide rich insights into attitudes and behaviour towards ethnic minorities in both European and Irish contexts, addressing key societal issues.

Undoubtedly, many other determinants and factors play a significant role in the formation of attitudes and in turn behaviour, and no one study can consider all these aspects. The aim of this thesis was to study anti-immigration sentiment and discriminatory behaviour in a variety of contexts using rich primary and secondary data while addressing research gaps and under-researched areas.

6.2.1 Economic Threat and Attitudes towards Immigration

A large body of literature has shown that economic threat is an important determinant of anti-immigration sentiment (Quillian, 1995; Kunovich, 2004, Mayda, 2006; Coenders et al., 2008; Billiet et al., 2014; Polavieja, 2016). The work presented in this thesis (study 1) has empirically tested the economic threat hypothesis using job decline/growth and variation in migrant density across occupations and sectors in the Irish context.

This work makes several important contributions. The study contributes to the existing literature by combining two rich survey datasets, the European Social Survey and the Labour Force Survey, empirically testing the 'threat' hypothesis derived from group conflict theory and providing support for economic threat as a determinant of anti-immigration sentiment. Previous work considered macro-level factors such as worsening economic conditions in a country in examining the role of economic threat in anti-immigration sentiment (Quillian, 1995). Research in the Irish context has found that rising unemployment has negatively affected attitudes towards migrants (Turner and Cross, 2015; McGinnity and

Kingston, 2017). However not all individuals will be affected by deteriorating economic conditions, even in times of recession. To my knowledge, no study to date has considered attitudes at the occupational and sectoral levels, examining actual rather than perceived job decline, and the size of the ethnic minority group. Hence, this work addresses a research gap in this area. The study finds that the change in job growth rather than the absolute job growth has an impact on attitudes, suggesting that in the short-term job losses do lead to a decreased acceptance towards migrants for individuals in employment which is in economic decline. It is worthwhile noting that it may be the case that the individual situation (or micro level economic factors) play a more significant role in shaping anti-immigration sentiment than the wider macro-economic factors.

Second, the increasing average share of migrants rather than changes between time-points appears to lead to greater resistance towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. This too is consistent with the existing literature. The size of ethnic minorities has been found to be an important element in the context of perceived competition for resources (Blalock, 1967). Empirical research has found that increasing 'stock' of migrants is associated with increased hostility towards newcomers (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008). However, an inverse relationship has been found in the Irish context when controlling for macro-economic conditions (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017)[135]. Both this thesis and previous studies suggest that the size of an out-group is an important determinant of anti-immigration sentiment. However, the relationship between attitudes and the size of the out-group may be context dependent. Individuals may not perceive the overall increasing share of migrants as a 'threat' if they are not negatively impacted by this. In the case of Ireland, the increasing share of migrants within a country may not be perceived negatively because the majority of migrants in the period of the analysis were White Europeans and, hence, ethnically similar to the native population (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). Second, many migrants left during the period of economic recession (CSO, 2012a; Gilmartin, 2013). However, an individual may perceive the size of the out-group differently if the presence of the out-group is noticeable

[135] A strong negative correlation can be observed between unemployment rate and inflows of migrants in the Irish case.

in areas such as one's work. In the labour market, individuals may perceive migrants as being in direct competition which may suggest that the distribution of migrants across occupations and sectors may play a more important role in the development of negative sentiment than the overall number or proportion of migrants in the country.

A possible limitation of this study is the generalisability of the findings from Ireland to other European countries. Ireland's rapid transition from a country to emigration to a receiving country as well as a recent history of economic boom and bust may make it a unique case. Future research should consider comparative case study analyses, as well as cross-national analyses, to examine if economic threat operates in a similar manner in other contexts. In addition, this study only considered the attitudes of the native population. Whilst migrants and individuals with a migratory background tend to be more accepting of newcomers than the native population (Dustmann and Preston, 2004), they are also more likely to occupy similar positions as incoming migrants (Manacorda et al., 2012) and hence may be more likely to feel 'threatened' by increased migratory flows. Future empirical research could further investigate if migrants already in the country are likely to be supportive of further migration in all contexts and how their attitudes differ from the 'native' population.

This study has focussed on attitudes towards immigration and migrants in general, while future research could explore if there is a variation in attitudes towards highly skilled versus low-skilled migrants. There is mixed evidence regarding the skill level of migrants. Some studies have shown that highly skilled migrants are preferred to low-skilled migrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010) irrespective of individuals' skill level[136] while other studies have found that highly skilled natives prefer low-skilled immigrants as they do not directly compete with them in the labour market (Helbling, 2011; Facchini and Mayda, 2012). This may be of particular relevance in the Irish case, due to the labour and skills shortages existing in a wide range of sectors and

[136] See O'Connell (2011).

occupations, ranging from construction to the information communication and technology sectors (Murray, 2018).

Monitoring of attitudes will be particularly important in the context of attempting to attract foreign workers while ensuring that anti-immigration sentiment does not exacerbate in Ireland. In addition, Brexit is likely to have an impact on the Irish economy (Barrett et al., 2015). Some of the potential impacts which have been estimated include increasing unemployment but also potentially increasing immigration as Ireland may prove to be an attractive option for those no longer being able to move to the UK (Bergin et al., 2019). In such a scenario, understanding how and under what circumstances economic threat leads to anti-immigration sentiment and monitoring of attitudes will be paramount.

6.2.2 Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers and Refugees[137]

Since the start of the 'refugee crisis', European countries have received an unprecedented number of asylum seekers. There is a large, and growing, body of literature focussing on attitudes towards immigrants (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Davidov and Semyonov, 2017 for a review), however relatively little research has been dedicated to attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees (but see Coenders et al., 2004b; Hercowitz-Amir et al., 2017). The recent influx of asylum seekers to Europe has placed an increased emphasis on migrant and refugee integration (Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017). Most of the research in this area has focussed on practical dimensions of integration such as employment and housing (Castles et al., 2002), while the manner in which receiving societies perceive asylum seekers has attracted much less attention despite playing a key role in the day-to-day experience of ethnic minorities and their long-term integration. Realistic threat, derived from group conflict theory, related to economic resources is one of the main drivers of anti-immigration (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010) and anti-refugee sentiment (Schweitzer et al., 2005). This research (study 2) has empirically tested the 'threat' hypothesis cross-nationally

[137] Note that for the purpose of this study terms asylum seeker and refugee are used interchangeably, while noting that the two terms have different connotations and differ in their legal status and entitlement. See section 1.2.3.

using three rounds of the European Social Survey. The study finds that unemployment is positively associated with attitudes towards asylum seekers, in contrast to group conflict theory.

This work makes several important contributions. Firstly, it addresses a topical area in the European context, which is currently under-researched. Asylum seekers and refugees are likely to become permanent settlers in their respective host societies (Vink, 2017). Research has documented that outcomes for refugees in employment, housing and education are significantly worse than for the native population or other groups of migrants (Zimmermann, 2017). Considering the difficulties that asylum seekers already face in their host countries, negative attitudes and prejudice are likely to amplify the challenges they face in the process of integration. I would argue that a specific focus should be paid to attitudes towards asylum seekers in order to ensure greater cohesion in European societies.

Secondly, the study highlights the importance of examining attitudes towards sub-groups rather than migrants in general. Future studies could consider attitudes towards different sub-groups of migrants instead of migrants in general as different determinants and factors may play a role. In addition many studies use a broad variety of terms to refer to diverse groups of migrants (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2011), however as mentioned in chapter 1, who is considered to be a migrant may vary cross-nationally and between individuals within the same country. Future research studies which focus on either specific groups or attempt to establish who respondents consider to be a migrant would advance the current body of literature in migration studies. In addition, the size of the ethnic population has been found to have an impact on attitudes. The inclusion of the share of migrants, especially specific groups of migrants, as a predictor in attitudes would allow researchers to examine if the size of the ethnic population in the country or rather a share of specific group of migrants can enhance our understanding of anti-immigration sentiment.

Only partial support for the 'threat' hypothesis is found and in addition, an opposite relationship to the expected direction between unemployment and attitudes is noted. Empirical evidence suggests that economic conditions of a receiving country are linked to anti-immigration sentiment (Mayda, 2006). However, there is evidence to suggest that determinants of attitudes towards refugees are different to determinants of attitudes towards immigrants (O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Coenders et al. (2004b) found that national economic conditions were associated with attitudes towards immigrants but not refugees. Future research could focus on the reasons why these differences exist and examine if other forms of 'threat' leads to greater resistance towards asylum seekers.

The results of this study are consistent with Koos and Seibel's (2019) research using Eurobarometer data. Some studies focussing on anti-immigration sentiment have found only a weak link with economic threat and a much stronger association with non-economic factors (McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Facchini et al., 2013; Gang et al., 2013, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016). While economic threat remains an important determinant of anti-immigration sentiment, future studies should focus on non-economic factors in greater detail, particularly in the context of increasing diversity and multiculturalism in European societies.

Thirdly, the study points to the importance of 'alternative' determinants of attitudes, at least at the individual level. Greater generalised trust and trust in a country's institutions are positively associated with greater support for asylum seekers. This is an important finding and may help to facilitate successful integration by highlighting the need for actions and policies which aim to foster solidarity and greater social cohesion. Future research could focus on the relationship between different types of trust and attitudes towards ethnic minorities.

Finally, while attitudes towards asylum seekers have improved since 2002, divisions across European countries can be observed. Generally speaking, countries can be 'grouped' with regard to their pattern of attitudes toward migrants, but grouping is more difficult in relation to attitudes towards asylum

seekers. For example, between 2014 and 2016, acceptance towards refugees increased in Lithuania but decreased significantly in Estonia. Future research could attempt to untangle the determinants of acceptance or resistance towards asylum seekers at the country level.

While this study adds to the literature focussing on attitudes towards asylum seekers, it also has several limitations. First, the survey data have only a single indicator to measure attitudes towards asylum seekers. The phrasing of the survey question: '*Some people come to this country and apply for refugee status on the grounds that they fear persecution in their own country. … please say how much you agree or disagree that: 'the government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status'* may also influence how the native population responds. Sales (2010) argues that asylum seekers are often portrayed as underserving while refugees are portrayed as deserving. The phrasing of the ESS question is likely to connote and conjure an image of a deserving refugee with great vulnerabilities rather than an asylum seeker who may be perceived as exploiting the system and arriving for economic rather than safety reasons (McKay et al., 2012). It is possible that if the posed question included the word 'asylum seeker', attitudes may be less positive across European countries. Inclusion of multiple indicators[138] to measure attitudes in future surveys would allow for richer empirical analysis. Future research could focus on i) if and ii) how different terms, e.g. 'asylum seeker' and 'refugee' as well as different reasons given for applying for international protection, affect attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees. Secondly, the period in the analysis takes in most of the 'refugee crisis' and hence the findings could be period specific. Europeans may have expressed more tolerant views toward asylum seekers due to the crisis while others may have expressed greater resistance due to the perceived negative impact of the unprecedented inflows. Hence further research, allowing for a closer monitoring of attitudes, post the refugee crisis would be beneficial.

[138] The latest round of the ESS included 3 questions.

6.2.3. Attitudes towards Muslim Migrants

With the growth of the Muslim population in European countries, Islam is becoming an increasingly important religion (Helbling, 2012b), and in many Western European countries it constitutes the second largest religion after Christianity (Helbling, 2014). It is predicted that the Muslim population share will increase to 8 per cent by 2030 (Pew Research Center, 2011a). Despite the growing Muslim population, attitudes which are critical of immigration from Muslim countries are growing (Vellenga, 2008). The increasing presence (and visibility) of Muslims in Europe has led to a variety of debates which portray Muslims as a threat to the 'West' (Esposito, 1999; Cesari, 2013), with terrorist attacks in Belgium, Germany and France further intensifying the backlash against Muslim migrants.

This study empirically tested if realistic (objective) threat operationalised by the size of the Muslim population in the country, incidents of Islamic terrorist attacks, and lower levels of integration can account for negative sentiment towards Muslim migrants. On a country level, objective measures of 'threat' do not explain cross-country variation. Countries with a higher share of Muslims within the population and a higher incidence of terrorist attacks are more welcoming towards further Muslim immigration.

The contributions of this research are two-fold. First, attitudes toward Muslim migrants is an under-researched area in cross-national research[139] (but see Strabac and Listhaug; 2008, Doebler, 2014). The existing cross-country research indicates that anti-Muslim sentiment is greater than anti-immigrant sentiment in a European context. This study adds to this body of literature, by confirming previous findings. Europeans are more opposed to Muslim migrants than other migrants in general, including migrants who are ethnically different from the majority group. On average, 60 per cent of Europeans would prefer to restrict further Muslim immigration, with 24 per cent favouring complete restriction. In line with findings by Strabac and Listhaug (2008), respondents in Eastern Europe

[139] Most research has focussed on single country analysis. See section 4.3 in chapter four.

are more likely to oppose Muslim immigration than respondents in Western Europe.

Second, while the study does not find support for the threat hypothesis, it provides a critique of the group conflict theory and points to alternative explanations of anti-Muslim sentiment. Several possible explanations for negative attitudes towards Muslim migrants are put forward and these are briefly discussed here.

Poor governance, greater ethnic homogeneity, and hostility towards ethnic minorities already in the country, may all contribute towards anti-Muslim sentiment. It was not possible to test all of these reasons empirically in the current study. Future research could consider if these factors may account for greater resistance towards Muslim migrants in Europe, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe.

Contact theory may also provide a fruitful avenue for future research. While a large Muslim population may increase the perception of threat, it is also likely that it would allow for greater opportunities for contact and lead to reduced hostility. In the countries where such opportunities do not exist, it is likely that perceived threat may be heightened due to concerns of a potential influx of Muslim migrants. I would further argue that in Eastern Europe, which underwent rapid social changes after after-the fall of the Iron curtain and the subsequent joining of the EU, there might be greater resistance to further change[140]. The 'fear' of further changes may be fuelling prejudice towards ethnic minorities, particularly those which are distinct and visible. Future research could focus on providing empirical evidence to explain the great divergence of attitudes towards Muslim migrants and ethnic minorities in Europe. It is also possible that Europeans may share similar feelings across countries and towards different migrant groups, but due to varying degrees of social desirability bias, may express different attitudes.

[140] Particularly any change which may be perceived as 'threatening' to the national and cultural identity.

At the individual level, the most interesting finding relates to sex. Women are more likely to oppose further Muslim immigration than men. This is in contrast with research which generally finds that men, rather than women, are more likely to hold anti-immigration views (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). This finding highlights the need to examine attitudes towards sub-groups of migrants. While women may be less likely to oppose immigration and migrants in general, it is likely that they may be more likely to oppose certain groups, particularly those which may be perceived as challenging their own position. One possible explanation for this finding is that in most European countries continued progress has been made towards gender equality (Joannin and Bloj, 2019). Muslims are often perceived as a homogenous group (Bleich and Maxwell, 2012) which is violent and misogynistic (Allen, 2010) and as one holding values which are incompatible with the liberal, egalitarian West. Given this, it may be that women, more than men, perceive Muslim migrants as a threat to gender equality. Future research could further investigate this by looking at the relationship between gender-egalitarian attitudes and attitudes towards Muslim migrants.

In addition, openness to change is associated with greater acceptance and conservatism is associated with greater resistance towards Muslim migrants. This is line with previous research (Davidov and Meuleman, 2012) as individuals who are more conservative, and value traditional norms are more likely to oppose further Muslim immigration. This holds in particular for conservative women. The focus of this study was not on human values, but on threat, hence future analysis may consider the role of human values in greater detail.

Two main limitations of this study stand out. First of all, data collection took place before the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016 and hence it is not possible to measure if these attacks have had any impact on attitudes towards Muslim immigration. Previous research indicates that following the 9/11 attacks there was increased hostility towards Muslims (Allen and Nielsen, 2002). Second, a one-dimensional measure of integration related to language was used in the analysis. Arguably linguistic integration can be considered as a signal of successful integration for all sub-groups of migrants. However it must be noted that while economic integration may play a role in acceptance of economic

migrants, cultural and social integration may play a more significant role in acceptance of ethnic groups such as Muslim migrants. Regarding attitudes towards Muslim migrants, future studies could consider economic, social and cultural integration as determinants of acceptance or resistance towards this group of migrants [141]. Investigating multi-dimensional approaches to integration may aid in a better understanding of the often proposed 'culture clash' between native Europeans and Muslim migrants (Vellenga, 2008). A question specifically focussing on Muslim migrants was included for the first time in the ESS in 2014. Incorporation of this question in future rounds would be beneficial, particularly in the context of the increasing Muslim population in Europe.

6.2.4 A Field Experiment to Measure Discrimination in the Irish Rental Housing Market

The first three studies in the thesis focussed on the analysis of rich survey data to examine explicit attitudes i) in a variety of contexts and ii) towards a variety of ethnic minorities. While attitudes and behaviour are two different concepts, they are also linked. It is likely that, for example, negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities may lead to actions and behaviour which are discriminatory. Of course, it must be noted that not all individuals who hold prejudiced views will engage in discriminatory behaviour and vice versa (Al Ramiah et al., 2010).

The aim of this thesis is not to establish a link between attitudes and discrimination but to examine a variety of facets of anti-immigration sentiment. I would argue that while explicit prejudice and anti-immigration attitudes may pose greater difficulties for the integration of ethnic minorities and for social cohesion, discriminatory behaviour is likely to have much more significant consequences for those who are discriminated against (Al Ramiah et al., 2010). Markaki and Longhi (2012) argue that discriminatory behaviour is captured by survey questions which ask for respondents' preferences to restrict immigration of specific sub-groups or to limit access to certain resources and rights. Earlier,

[141] For example percentage of Muslim migrants in employment, level of religiosity of migrants, migrants' attitudes towards gender and homosexuality, close contact with the native population, migrants' civic participation could all be considered as broader measures of integration.

in study 3, discriminatory behaviour towards Muslim migrants was found, with the majority of Europeans preferring to limit Muslim immigration to a certain extent. The fourth, and final, study extends survey research by applying experimental methods to investigate if there really is a preference to limit access to resources such as housing to the native population at the expense of ethnic minorities.

This study, using data from a field experiment in the Irish housing market, found that direct observations of ethnic and gender discrimination. Irish applicants are more likely to be invited to view an apartment than minority applicants. In turn, Polish applicants are more likely to be invited to view an apartment than Nigerian applicants. On average, women are more likely to be invited to view an apartment than men.

The study makes a number of important contributions. First, it provides direct evidence of discrimination which would be hard to measure via other research methods such as surveys or self-reports of discrimination. Second, this is the first field experiment in the housing market in the Irish context, thus addressing a significant research gap in the area of discrimination[142]. The study provides empirical support in the Irish context and also adds to the body of literature which has demonstrated consistent evidence of discrimination in the rental housing market in Europe and North America (see Flage, 2018 for a comprehensive review).

In addition, this study; i) highlights that discrimination differs amongst ethnic groups, and ii) emphasises that discrimination exists not only towards migrants which may be perceived as ethnically and culturally different but also towards European migrants. The study found that while Polish applicants are discriminated against in relation to Irish applicants, they are significantly favoured over Nigerian applicants. Thus, indicating the presence of a social hierarchy (Hagendoorn, 1993; Hagendoorn and Pepels, 2003), with a preference for White and culturally similar migrants (Ford, 2011). This is of particular

[142] But also see a field experiment in the Irish labour market (McGinnity and Lunn, 2011).

relevance for Irish research, which has found that Black and African migrants are more disadvantaged in the labour (Kingston et al., 2015) and housing markets (Grotti et al., 2018). Greater attempts to reduce discrimination towards this group are needed.

Secondly, much of the European research in housing discrimination has focussed on the difference between natives and Arab/Muslim migrants (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008) or Turkish migrants (Auspurg et al., 2017) but relatively few studies have also considered discrimination against European migrants. Similarly to the field experiment in this thesis, Björnsson et al. (2018) found that Polish migrants were discriminated against in the housing market in Iceland. Future research could further investigate if this is the case in other European countries, particularly those which have received large inflows of European migrants post the 2004 EU enlargement. While discrimination towards Europeans may be less pronounced than towards Turkish, Muslim and African migrants, empirical evidence measuring the extent of it is necessary.

This research is not without limitations. While it provides direct evidence of discrimination, it cannot examine the wider structural influences related to discrimination or provide clear reasons for discrimination. There is evidence to suggest that 'taste' based discrimination exists in the Irish case, as the odds for both Polish and Nigerian migrants to be invited to view an apartment remained much lower even when controlling for employment status. The additional information supplied may not have been enough to reduce discrimination and future research could investigate if providing additional information related to one's socio-economic status can limit the extent of discrimination. The study uses names to signal ethnicity. While this is standard procedure in field experiments of this type, it is possible that the prospective landlord does not associate the name with the intended origin. A name may also signal other factors in addition to ethnicity, for example social class (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) which was not foreseen by the researchers. For example in the Irish case, it is possible that Polish names may be associated with economic migrants even when the applicants do not state their occupation. While, Nigerian

names may be associated with asylum seekers, a status which may signal limited possibility to work.

As this field experiment is the first of its kind in the Irish rental market, future research could focus on extending this research further, for example outside of the Greater Dublin area as well as considering discrimination against other ethnic minorities, and groups which are likely to be discriminated against. In addition, with increasing Muslim population in Europe, including Ireland, future experiments could identify if there is discrimination towards Muslim migrants and if so to what extent. This would further enhance Irish research in this area and would add to the international literature. In addition, studies on shared accommodation is an area with potential avenues for research. Future studies could consider if similar rates of discrimination that have been observed in private accommodation can also be found in shared accommodation. As mentioned earlier, the templates used provided little additional information about the applicants. Future field experiments could investigate if providing additional information such as references, lifestyle etc. reduces discrimination towards ethnic minorities.

6.3 Final remarks

Overall, this research has addressed research gaps regarding public attitudes towards ethnic minorities using a broad range of quantitative methodologies, and thus contributes to the Irish and European literature on attitudes and discrimination.

The research presented in this thesis demonstrates that determinants of anti-immigration sentiment are complex, inter-tangled and cannot always be easily explained. Furthermore, they vary significantly cross-nationally and towards different sub-groups of migrants. Massey et al. (1993: 1993) argue that

> *'...there is no single coherent theory of international migration, only fragmented set of theories ... full understanding of contemporary*

migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on tools of one discipline alone, or by focusing on a single level of analysis. Rather, their complex, multifaceted nature requires a sophisticated theory than incorporates a variety of perspectives, levels and assumptions.'

Similarly to the reasons for inward migration, which vary greatly from individual to individual and are an amalgamation of a wide range of factors, determinants of anti-immigration cannot be understood without a holistic approach, which considers different theories, methods and disciplines. In the most likely scenario of continued immigration to Europe, the attitudes of the native population and the reception of newcomers will continue to be a concern for receiving societies and policy makers. As the newcomers are likely to become permanent residents in the host countries, their participation in the cultural, social and economic spheres in their host countries is likely be dependent on the degree of their acceptance by the native population. In addition, Europe is likely to face demographic challenges as well as acute labour and skills shortages in the coming decades, hence attracting migrants may become not only a policy preference but also a necessity. In the current climate of political and social change, and increasing multiculturalism and diversity in many European societies, examination of attitudes and discrimination will continue to be a difficult but necessary task to ensure social cohesion.

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