



# MCIB

Marine Casualty Investigation Board  
*Bord Imscrúdú Taisní Muirí*

**REPORT INTO AN INCIDENT  
INVOLVING KAYAKERS AT  
BULLOCH HARBOUR/DALKEY ISLAND  
COUNTY DUBLIN  
13 SEPTEMBER 2020**

**REPORT NO. MCIB/304  
(No.4 OF 2021)**

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) examines and investigates all types of marine casualties to, or on board, Irish registered vessels worldwide and other vessels in Irish territorial waters and inland waterways.

The MCIB objective in investigating a marine casualty is to determine its circumstances and its causes with a view to making recommendations to the Minister of Transport - for the avoidance of similar marine casualties in the future, thereby improving the safety of life at sea and inland waterways.

The MCIB is a non-prosecutorial body. We do not enforce laws or carry out prosecutions. It is not the purpose of an investigation carried out by the MCIB to apportion blame or fault.

The legislative framework for the operation of the MCIB, the reporting and investigating of marine casualties and the powers of MCIB investigators is set out in the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

In carrying out its functions the MCIB complies with the provisions of the International Maritime Organisation's Casualty Investigation Code and EU Directive 2009/18/EC governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector.



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## Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CI	Canoeing Ireland
C	Celsius
CoP	Code of Practice: The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)
ECA	European Canoe Associationm
ECG	Electrocardiogram
EPIRB	Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon
ETA	Estimate time of arrival
GPS	Global Positioning System
hp	Horse power
HW	High water
IAMSAR	International Aeronautical & Maritime Search & Rescue
ICF	International Canoe Federation
IRCG	Irish Coast Guard
ISC	Irish Sports Council
Lat	Latitude
Local time	Universal Co-ordinated Time + 1 hour
Long	Longitude
MCIB	Marine Casualty Investigation Board
MRCC Dublin	Dublin Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre
OFI	Olympian Federation of Ireland
Pan Pan	International Urgency Signal
PFD	Personal Floatation Device
PLB	Personal Locator Beacon
RNLI	Royal National Lifeboat Institution
RNLI ALB	Royal National Lifeboat Institution All Weather Lifeboat
RNLI ILB	Royal National Lifeboat Institution Inshore Lifeboat
R116	Coast Guard Helicopter
SAR	Search & Rescue
SOLAS	Intervention Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
UTC	Universal Co-ordinated Time
VHF	Very High Frequency
Weather Report	Met Éireann estimated weather and sea state conditions for the coastal area 1 nautical mile east of Colliemore Harbour (east of Dalkey Island Lat 53° 17.22' Long N 6° 5.50' W) on the afternoon of Sunday 13 September 2020.
Z	Zula time (Universal Co-ordinated Time)
m	Metres
NM	Nautical Mile

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## 1. SUMMARY

- 1.1 In the late afternoon/early evening of Sunday 13 September 2020, a party of 15 kayakers (the Group) set out on a commercial sea kayaking tour. The intended plan was a return trip from Bulloch Harbour to Dalkey Island.
- 1.2 The Group was comprised of three instructors (Instructors and each an Instructor) and 12 participants (Participants and each a Participant).
- 1.3 The Group got separated; one small group (the Small Group) towards the north of Bulloch Harbour and the second larger group (the Large Group) towards the north end of Loreto Convent.
- 1.4 Three separate members of the public placed 999 calls to emergency services between 19.03 hrs and 19.14 hrs to report kayakers in difficulty.
- 1.5 The Small Group comprised two kayaks; a single kayak and a double kayak. Unable to cope with the waves which they encountered outside Bulloch Harbour, the Small Group drifted northwards. The single kayak was overturned by a wave and the Participant was thrown out of the cockpit. This Participant, with the aid of two Instructors in two separate single kayaks, was able to get back into her kayak. However, she was thrown out a second time and a second time assisted back into her kayak and again thrown out a third time. On the third occasion, this Participant held on to the kayak in the water until a third Instructor arrived and, assisted by one of the other Instructors, who managed to put this Participant back into her kayak.
- 1.6 Those on the double kayak (according to the Participant) who formed part of the Small Group also went into the water and assistance was rendered by local Fishers.
- 1.7 The Participants in the Small Group were assessed by ambulance personnel on shore at Bulloch Harbour. In the case of the single kayaker, this Participant reports that she was advised by the ambulance personnel of their wish to bring her to hospital, due to their concern with the amount of sea water which she had swallowed but she declined their recommendation.
- 1.8 The Large Group comprised an unknown number of double and single kayaks, totalling nine Participants.
- 1.9 The Large Group made its way to rocks by the shore close to the north end of Loreto Convent and from there, traversed the rocks and proceeded to Bulloch Harbour on foot.
- 1.10 All Participants and Instructors were accounted for and made it safely back to shore.
- 1.11 All times are stated in local time unless otherwise stated. Local time equals UTC + 1 hr. Local time also equals Z + 1 hr.

## **2. FACTUAL INFORMATION**

### **2.1 The Kayaks**

- 2.1.1 Attached at Appendix 7.1 is a photograph of two of the kayaks, taken by one of the Fishers who went to the assistance of the Small Group.
- 2.1.2 As can be seen, the photograph shows two different versions of kayak, the red kayak being one with a cockpit and the yellow kayak being a “sit-on-top” version. To the foreground in the photograph, there are two two-bladed paddles.
- 2.1.3 It has not been possible to verify the precise specifications of the kayaks. However, based on the photograph, they both appear to comprise of a moulded plastic hull with the “cockpit” canoe facilitating the use of a spray deck. The organiser has indicated in correspondence that all the cockpit kayaks used are of German manufacture and that they are fitted with airtight hatches fitted with a specific tubing system rendering them unsinkable. It is asserted that this is a requirement under German law when kayaks are used for commercial purposes.

### **2.2 Kayak Party**

- 2.2.1 The Group comprised 15 people being 12 participants (the Participants and each a Participant) and three instructors (the Instructors and each an Instructor).
- 2.2.2 Two of the Participants had neither relevant qualifications nor any experience except in the case of one, a kayaking adventure as a child and in the case of the other a coastal sea kayaking tour in the month preceding the incident.
- 2.2.3 It has not been possible to determine the level of relevant qualifications or experience of either the Participants (save for two) nor of the Instructors.
- 2.2.4 In observations made by the organiser of the Tour on a draft of this report circulated in accordance with Section 36 of the 2000 Act (“the organiser’s observations”), the organiser states that among other qualifications, one of the Instructors had “kayaking Level 3 Sea Skills” (see Section 3.5 of this report).

### **2.3 Code of Practice**

- 2.3.1 The kayaks are recreational craft. The Recreational Craft EU Directive does not apply to kayaks powered solely by human power.
- 2.3.2 Code of Practice (CoP): The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017) sets out recommendations for kayaking.<sup>1</sup>

1. Updates to the Code of Practice: The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (2017), (Marine Notice (MN) No.51), were published in November 2019. The updates can be downloaded in electronic format at: ><https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/66ff7e-safe-operation-of-recreational-craft/>

## 2.4 Safety Equipment

- 2.4.1 It has not been possible to determine what safety equipment or communication equipment such as Very High Frequency (VHF) was in use or available to the Instructors at the time of the incident, save that from the descriptions given by two of the Participants, Personal Floatation Devices (PFDs) buoyancy vests were used by them and they witnessed the use of tow ropes and a pump by the Instructors. The organiser asserts in her written communications that the instructors carried a VHF, and each had a mobile phone, first aid equipment, tow lines, pumps, split paddles, and other marine safety equipment. In the organiser's observations, the organiser expands this list of equipment to include karabiners and slings, sugary food, knives, sun cream, survival bag, glow sticks, head torch, paddle float, spare hat and gloves, whistle, water and paddle leash.

## 2.5 Voyage Particulars

- 2.5.1 A guided kayak coastal tour from Bulloch Harbour to Dalkey Island and back of approximately 2.86 Nautical Mile (NM). See Appendix 7.2 Location Diagram.

## 2.6 Marine Incident Information

Type:	Marine incident which posed the potential threat of death or serious injury, and/or loss of a person overboard involving the call out of rescue services.
Date:	13 September 2020.
Time:	18.03 hrs to 19.53 hrs (all times stated in Z).
Position:	Latitude (Lat) 53° 17.47' N - Longitude (Long) 006° 06.00' W.
Air Temperature:	15/16° Celsius (C).
Sea Temperature:	15° C.
Commercial Sea Kayaking Tour:	Commercial sea kayaking tour.
Location Factor:	Sea conditions.
Consequences:	Intervention of rescue services and medical assessment on shore.



## 2.7 Weather

- 2.7.1 Attached at Appendix 7.3 is the Met Éireann Weather Report which estimates the weather and sea state conditions between 12.00 hrs UTC and 18.00 hrs UTC on the day of the incident for the coastal area 1 NM east of Colliemore Harbour (east of Dalkey Island Lat 53° 17.22' N 006° 5.50' W).
- 2.7.2 The Weather Report records the weather as fine; mostly clear skies and sunny spells. It records the wind as being estimated as moderate to fresh south-south westerly backed southerly - Beaufort 4 or 5 - (mean wind speed 15 - 20 knots) with occasional gusts up to 30 knots. Attached at Appendix 7.4 are extracts from Appendix 6 of the CoP depicting Beaufort force 4, 5 and 6 conditions along with their descriptions.
- 2.7.3 The Weather Report records the sea state as being estimated to have been slight to moderate with significant wave height between 0.5 m and 1.5 m with a south-south westerly wave direction and an estimated wave period of 4 or 5 seconds.
- 2.7.4 The Weather Report also recites the 24-hour sea area forecasts issued between 12.00 noon on 13 September 2020 and 12.00 noon on 14 September 2020 (Sea Area Forecasts).
- 2.7.5 The Sea Area Forecasts note that the gale warning was “nil”.
- 2.7.6 In respect of the Sea Area Forecast issued at 12.00 hrs on Sunday 13 September 2020, there was a small craft warning in operation on coasts from Valentia to Malin Head to Carnsore Point. In respect of the Sea Area Forecast issued at 18.00 hrs on Sunday 13 September 2020, there was a small craft warning in operation on coasts from Valentia to Erris Head to Fair Head.
- 2.7.7 According to Met Éireann, Small Craft Warnings are issued if winds of Beaufort Force 6 (minimum mean of 22 knots) are expected up to 10 NM offshore. The next most serious level of warning is a Gale Warning (issued if winds of Beaufort Force 8 are expected).
- 2.7.8 Met Éireann also issue Sea Area Forecasts which are broadcast live from Met Éireann's General Forecasting Division on RTÉ Radio. The latest Sea Area Forecast, Small Craft Warning and Gale Warnings (if any) are available on the Met Éireann web site, as is the Sea Surface Temperature forecast map available on the Met Éireann website for 7 days ahead.
- 2.7.9 Irish Coast Guard (IRCG) Coast Radio Stations make a prior announcement of weather forecasts on Marine VHF Radio Ch16 and then broadcast the forecast on the named relevant VHF Radio working channel. Sea Area Forecasts are broadcast every three hours beginning at 01.03 local time i.e. broadcast times are: 01.03, 04.03, 07.03, 10.03, 13.03, 16.06, 19.03, 22.03 local time.

2.7.10 In the organiser's observations, the organiser states that the weather forecast and weather estimate from Met Éireann are incorrect, that the organiser uses other sources for weather reporting such as magicseaweed.com and windguru.cz which she finds in general, though not always, to be more accurate and reliable than "traditional" sources. The organiser contends that use of the Dublin Bay Buoy is not an appropriate guide and that the decision to embark on the Tour was informed by local conditions. The organiser concludes on this issue with an opinion that the draft report is inaccurate in its analysis of the weather and sea conditions.

## **2.8 Tidal Tables and Tidal Streams**

2.8.1 Attached to Appendix 7.5 are the Tide Tables for 2020 (which include tidal streams) at Dublin North Wall. The tide table for 13 September 2020 records the high-water mark (HW) at 21.32 hrs.

2.8.2 The HW at the location of the incident (Bulloch Harbour/Dalkey Island) is approximately at the same time as the HW at Dublin North Wall, the HW at the location of the incident being approximately six minutes earlier. Accordingly, on the day of the incident, the HW at Bulloch Harbour/Dalkey Island was approximately 21.26 hrs.

2.8.3 The tidal stream is denoted by reference to a series of diagrams marked "HW-6" through to "HW+6", HW denoting the high-water mark, -6 denoting the tidal stream 6 hrs before the HW (at Dublin North Wall) and +6 denoting the tidal stream 6 hrs after the HW (at Dublin North Wall).

2.8.4 Accordingly, as the HW at the location of the incident is approximately the same as the HW at Dublin North Wall, the diagram marked "HW" denotes the tidal stream at the location of the incident at its HW (21.32 hrs).

2.8.5 Further, as the time of the incident commenced at 19.03 hrs (18.03 Z per IRCG SITREP and Report at Appendix 7.7) the tidal stream at that time approximates to that shown in diagrams marked HW-3 (i.e. 18.32 hrs) and HW-2 (i.e. 19.32 hrs).

2.8.6 In the organiser's observations, the organiser states there was nothing strange about the currents/tides on the day of the incident, that the Tour route is planned to be close to land in order to get off the water at any stage for any reason and that the Tour planning takes into account tidal flow.

## **2.9 Rescue Services and Response**

2.9.1 Attached at Appendix 7.6 are the records (redacted as to names/addresses) of three "999" calls alerting the rescue services to the incident. Those calls record concern on the part of members of the public that the kayakers were struggling; that some had become separated from the main group and were drifting towards Dublin Harbour; that one seemed to have capsized; that a kayaker appeared to

be in the water; that the instructors were rushing to assist; that the “small boat” (presumably a reference to the Royal National Lifeboat Institution Inshore Lifeboat (RNLI ILB)) should be sent to assist; and that the kayakers were in trouble.

## 2.9.2 IRCG SITREP and Report

The IRCG generates a situation report, or “SITREP”, in respect of every incident co-ordinated or processed by the IRCG. Attached at Appendix 7.7 is the IRCG SITREP (1 page) and Report (11 pages) (redacted as to names/mobile telephone numbers) from which the following is noted (all times stated in Z):

- 18:03 First 999 call.
- 18:04 Second 999 call.
- 18:06 MRCC tasked Dún Laoghaire IRCG.
- 18:09 MRCC tasked R116.
- 18:14 Third 999 call.
- 18:16 R116 In the air now.
- 18:19 Dun Laoghaire RNLI tasked to Dalkey.
- 18:21 R116 proceeding.
- 18:22 MRCC receives additional information from member of public.
- 18:23 Dún Laoghaire CG confirming one person ashore. Standby.
- 18:23 Fishing vessel North Western en route to kayaks. Sees four kayakers in possible difficulty.
- 18:25 Dún Laoghaire CG noting four kayakers in possible difficulty with another separate group also in possible danger.
- 18:27 RNLI ALB proceeding.
- 18:30 R116 on scene noting two taken by fishing vessel, three under own steam, assistance needed, will send RNLI ALB.
- 18:33 Noting second group of kayakers at north end of Loreto Convent.
- 18:34 Fishing vessel North Western arriving at Bulloch with three kayakers aboard. Request to send ambulance to medically assess casualties as they are very cold.
- 18:35 RNLI ILB estimated five minutes to Loreto Convent.

- 18:35 MRCC tasks ambulance service to Bulloch Harbour to assess kayakers that were capsized.
- 18:37 RNLI ALB noting three kayaks. Four canoe. Off Bulloch. Proceeding under own steam. Require no further assistance. Will get R116 to keep eyes on and proceed to next group in difficulty.
- 18:37 RNLI ILB re-tasked.
- 18:39 CG noting that possibly can get kayakers ashore. Looking for path.
- 18:39 [ ] of fishing vessel North Western confirming having brought three kayakers ashore into Bulloch having been in the water for approximately 40 minutes. Noting ambulance en route.
- 18:40 Ambulance en route.
- 18:42 Organiser of kayak group attempting to recover kayaks but [ ] will attempt to prevent until it is safe. Need to get information on head count as report of 10, 12 and 17 kayakers.
- 18:43 MRCC requiring ambulance quicker than one hour.
- 18:43 R116 request to proceed to Bulloch to drop a WM to assess casualties with CG members due to ambulance delay.
- 18:44 Noting thirteen persons ashore.
- 18:51 All persons (15 total) accounted for. CG transferring one to Bulloch Harbour. Medical assistance required.
- 18:51 RNLI ALB released.
- 18:51 RNLI ILB released.
- 18:51 R116 released.
- 18:52 ETA on ambulance
- 18:52 Ambulance ten minutes out.
- 19:02 Three kayakers in jeep awaiting ambulance.
- 19:03 RNLI ILB operations normal.
- 19:08 RNLI ALB returned to base
- 19:08 R116 returned to base. Shutting down.
- 19:09 Updated on kayak incident.

19:27 RNLI ILB returned to base.

19:28 RNLI ILB.

19:36 National Ambulance Service have assessed two/three cases and released. Will update on No. 3.

19:43 All casualties assessed and released. Return to base.

19:53 CG returned to base.

2.9.3 Attached at Appendix 7.8 are the incident reports (redacted as to names) for the RNLI ALB and RNLI ILB tasked to the incident.

2.9.4 Attached at Appendix 7.9 are the ambulance service call out details (redacted as to names and I.D. numbers).

## 3. NARRATIVE

- 3.1 According to two Participants on the Tour, in or about 17.30 hrs, on the day of the incident, the Group embarked on a guided sea kayaking tour, departing Bulloch Harbour intending to travel to Dalkey Island, and back (the Tour). It is not known what level of experience the Participants or the Instructors had (save for one unnamed instructor who the organiser states had “*kayaking Level 3 Sea Skills*” and while the organiser did not identify the accrediting body it is assumed to be Canoeing Ireland (CI)). In the case of two Participants, they had no relevant qualifications while their experience was limited to two previous excursions (one in childhood and the other a month previously). The Location Diagram (Appendix 7.2) estimates the course which would require the Group to paddle north-west out of Bulloch Harbour and then turn north-east to clear the Harbour and then south towards Dalkey Island.
- 3.2 As the Weather Report notes, the weather at the time of the incident was fine with mostly clear skies and sunny spells. The wind was moderate to fresh, south - south westerly backing southerly, Beaufort 4 or 5 with mean wind speeds of 15 - 20 knots and occasional gusts up to 30 knots. The sea state is estimated to have been slight to moderate with significant wave height between 0.5 m and 1.5 m with a south-south westerly wave direction and an estimated wave period of 4 or 5 seconds. The Sea Area Forecasts (in respect of the forecast issued at 12.00 hrs) for Irish coastal waters from Malin Head to Howth Head to Carnsore Point and for the Irish Sea forecast southwest winds force 5 or 6 and reaching force 7 on the Irish Sea; decreasing force 4 to 5 soon; later decreasing southeast or variable force 3 or 4 and (in respect of the forecast issued at 18.00 hrs) for Irish coastal waters from Fair Head to Howth Head to Carnsore Point and for the Irish Sea forecast south to southwest winds force 5 or 6 and gusty, locally force 7 at first in the Irish Sea; imminently decreasing force 4 or 5, locally force 6 in the Irish Sea; soon decreasing southerly force 3 or 4; later backing south westerly force 2 to 4; further backing south east to east or variable force 2 to 4 by the end of the period.
- 3.3 The Group arrived at the put-in at Bulloch Harbour. The Participants were each given wetsuits, PFDs, a kayak and oar. The Group changed on the slipway, stored their personal effects in either private cars or in a vehicle provided by the organiser of the Tour. They were given instructions on the slipway as to how to manoeuvre their kayaks forward and backward and were called upon to confirm that they could swim. According to two of the Participants, the Group was shown how to put on the PFDs which were secured by zips and buckles. In the organiser’s observations, the organiser states that a “capsize drill” is conducted before leaving the slipway, as a matter of best practice and quotes from what appears to be a document “*Instructor Detailing Slipway Prep on eve of 13 September 2020*” as each group getting “...a talk specifically on what to do in the event of capsize during the tours”. While the title of what is presented as a document suggests it is a specific reference to the Tour and what took place,

the language quoted is suggestive of an outline of best practice as opposed to clear confirmation of what actually took place before the Tour embarked on the evening in question. In any event, according to two Participants, no warnings were given that they might capsize or become immersed in the water nor were any safety instructions given to them in the event that they did capsize or became immersed in water.

- 3.4 As noted above, it is not known what relevant qualifications and/or experience any of the Participants in the Group had except in the case of two who had no qualifications while their experience was limited to an excursion in childhood and an excursion a month previous to the incident.
- 3.5 It is not known whether any of the Instructors (save for one; see paragraph 3.1) had qualifications from CI or any other accrediting body nor is it known what safety equipment accompanied the Group save for tow ropes and a pump. In particular, it is not known whether VHF radios were available to or in use by the Instructors. According to the organiser, instructors carried VHF radios. Two of the Participants did not recall them in use.

The organiser had during the investigation, been requested pursuant to section 30(1) of the 2000 Act to provide information and records to the Investigator as set out in the correspondence at Appendix 7.10 and was asked to identify all participants and instructors on the Tour. The organiser did not do so. Where the contents of the organiser's observations on the draft report have not been corroborated by any other information or documentary records no changes have been considered to be warranted to the Report. By way of example, only, the organiser provided details of the qualifications of one unnamed instructor alleged to have been one of the three instructors supervising the Tour. As the organiser did not provide the identity of the person their qualifications cannot be readily verified.

The organiser detailed her own qualifications, the relevant ones of which are described as follows: *"I am a level 4 instructor and hold the highest level skills award which is level 5. I am a tutor which means I can train and assess instructors."* The organiser was not one of the instructors on the Tour. The organiser does not consider regard should be had to CI as she asserts that the current awards are *"not fit for purpose for tour guiding as opposed to providing more in depth instruction"*.

- 3.6 In or about 17.30 hrs, the Group set out. According to one of the Participants, the Group was instructed to get accustomed to the kayaks by using the relatively calm waters of Bulloch Harbour to paddle around. As noted at Section 3.3 of this report, according to the organiser's observations a capsize drill is carried out at the harbour but no information has been provided as to who gave this instruction for this Tour, nor as to what the content was on the date in question. The drill is described as following "best practice" but no source for that practice was

provided. As noted at Section 3.3 of this report, no such capsizing drill took place according to two of the Participants. Shortly after familiarisation with the kayaks, the Group then set out north-west to exit Bulloch Harbour with a view to then turning north-east to clear the harbour and then south towards Dalkey Island.

- 3.7 After leaving Bulloch Harbour, the Participants became separated into two groups with the Small Group drifting northwards and the Large Group making their way (eventually) to the north end of Loreto Convent.

### **The Small Group**

- 3.8 According to one of the Participants in the Small Group, once outside the relative calm of Bulloch Harbour, she realised that the conditions were very windy with big waves, that the waves were coming towards her at an angle from the right (consistent with the Weather Report which noted that the winds would be south/south westerly) and thus, as the Small Group attempted to turn north-east and eventually south, they met those winds head on. The Participant recalled a gap of seconds between each wave and that they were quite big. In the organiser's observations, the organiser states the waves were appropriate to the Group but goes on to state that does not mean someone would not have been put off by them or was unhappy with them.
- 3.9 This Participant recalled feeling "in deep water" shortly after leaving the calm of Bulloch Harbour in the sense that she believed she had no control over the direction of her kayak and that the waves were taking her where they wanted. She felt her kayak was being pushed away from the direction of the planned destination at Dalkey Island each time that she tried to turn into the waves. The Participant recalled being terrified, not being able to speak and having to try to attract the attention of the Instructors by waving her hands.
- 3.10 An Instructor called out to her to "come back", not immediately appreciating (according to this Participant) that she had in fact lost control and could not control her kayak in order to change course. The Participant recalls that a big wave flipped her kayak over and that she was thrown out of the cockpit over the front of the kayak. The organiser's observations assert that this could not have happened as described by the Participant but acknowledges that a novice kayaker may consider this is something that happened. No alternate witness has been provided by the organiser to describe what happened. Once in the water, the Participant noticed that her PFD had burst open, but it still remained on her upper body. Having become separated from her kayak, she swam towards it and grabbed on to it. She struggled to hold on to the kayak. Each time a wave passed over she felt her legs being pulled under as if being dragged under the kayak. The organiser's observations assert that this could not happen. Nonetheless, this is the Participant's recollection and description. On each occasion that a wave passed over, she gulped air and hung on as best she could but in so doing



swallowed sea water. She was coughing and expending energy in an effort to keep her head above the water.

- 3.11 An Instructor came to her assistance. He told her to hang on to his kayak while he attempted to empty water out of hers. A second Instructor then arrived who was towing a double kayak with two Participants from the Small Group. Both Instructors then tried to help her back into her kayak. They were successful but almost immediately, another wave threw her out again. The two Instructors managed to assist her back into her kayak a second time, but she was again thrown out a third time. Her recollection is that the tow ropes connecting the double kayak to the second Instructor's kayak were getting in the way and that the Instructors were struggling to control the situation and that the Small Group seemed to be going around in circles. On one occasion she recalls being hit on the head by the double kayak which was being towed.
- 3.12 On her third time going into the water, she continued to hold on to her own kayak to which one of the instructors attempted to fasten a tow rope and tow her while she held on to her kayak. They attempted to circle back but could not get any forward movement and continued to circle. At that, a third Instructor arrived. Her recollection is that he arrived out of nowhere and was paddling very fast. She found his presence reassuring. He attempted to pump water out of her kayak and he and another Instructor managed to get her back into hers. Once back in her kayak, the third Instructor physically held on to her and, according to this Participant, apologised and said he should not have brought out the Group and should have made a call sooner. In contrast to what this Participant recalls about what she was told at that point during the incident, the organiser's observations provide what is presented as a quote from an unidentified senior member of the organiser's staff, employed as a kayaking guide and instructor, who was present at Bulloch Harbour prior to the Tour embarking, and who having conducted two tours earlier that day, saw no reason that the scheduled Tour should not go ahead.
- 3.13 Shortly after the third Instructor managed to reach her, a boat with an outboard engine arrived with two Fishers onboard. They took her onboard. Also already onboard were the two members of the Small Group who had been on the double kayak who, according to this Participant's recollection, had also gone into the water. By this time this Participant estimated she had been in the water for about 40 minutes. The organiser's observations assert that this Participant was not in the water for 40 minutes, "...*though she was in the water for longer than usual*". The organiser's observations also point to the timeline in the SITREP as being suggestive of a lesser period in the water. However, that timeline does not record the period prior to the first 999 call when the incident first began.
- 3.14 On her arrival back to Bulloch Harbour, this Participant was treated by two paramedics from the Ambulance Service. An Electrocardiogram (ECG) was used to examine her heart rate and her temperature and glucose levels were

assessed. She recalls being advised by the paramedics that her temperature and oxygen levels were low and oxygen was administered to her through a mask. This Participant described herself as being “tachycardic” by which she meant that her heart rate was very fast. She was monitored by the paramedics who in the interim had discharged the two kayakers from the double kayak who came in with this Participant and indicated to her that they wished to take her to hospital. This Participant declined to do so because of Covid-19 concerns but assured the paramedics that she lived with a nurse and two medics and would get them to bring her to hospital if that should later prove necessary. She recalls that the paramedics were concerned with the amount of sea water she had swallowed.

- 3.15 Upon her discharge from the ambulance, the Participant changed on the slipway, left her car there overnight and was driven home by a friend. That night she felt sick from the sea water she had swallowed and reported nightmares for a week afterwards. She did not go to work the following day as she felt shaken, tired and nauseous. The following day she was contacted by the organiser of the Tour by WhatsApp asking after her and to call her. The Participant did not do so.
- 3.16 The organiser’s observations assert that this Participant exited the ambulance apologising profusely, saying she was sorry and felt embarrassed. This is not what the Participant recalled and that the extent of the interaction with the organiser was the organiser asking after her wellbeing.

### **The Fishing Vessel**

- 3.17 The Fishers who went to the assistance of the Small Group were alerted to the incident by the VHF radio traffic about the incident which they heard while ashore in their hut at Bulloch Harbour. One of the two Fishers who assisted had previously been a volunteer on the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) Lifeboat for twenty-six years. Upon being alerted to the incident over the VHF radio by an International Urgency Signal (Pan Pan) call, they proceeded to it on board an 18-foot Malahide boat with a 15 hp outboard engine. They brought VHF radios and as they left Bulloch Harbour recalled meeting with a heavy sea swell.
- 3.18 Because of the troughs encountered as they headed out, they could not immediately see where the kayakers were and called the IRCG for assistance in locating the Small Group. When they arrived on the scene of the Small Group, one of the female kayakers was in the water and her kayak was partially submerged having taken on water. Another female kayaker was sitting in her kayak which also was partially submerged. According to his recollection, the Fishers took on board two female kayakers, the two male kayakers (who he believed were Instructors) having confirmed that they were safe to get back to shore on their own. The Fisher recalls being aware that R116 was overhead which he considered gave some comfort should further assistance be needed given the efforts they had to expend in order to get the two kayakers on board.

His recollection of one of the kayakers who was in the water when he arrived on the scene was that she was very cold.

- 3.19 While this Fisher's recollection is that he took on board two female kayakers, the IRCG SITREP and Report (Appendix 7.7) records the fishing vessel as having taken three kayakers on board. The Fisher explains this seeming contradiction on the basis that the reference to "three kayakers" in the VHF radio traffic is in fact a reference to three kayaks, namely that he took on board two kayakers and three kayaks, the third kayak being an empty kayak which he believes was being towed by one of the Instructors in the Small Group.
- 3.20 This Fisher's recollection of the wind and sea conditions were such that in his view, having regard to his experience (previously having been a volunteer on the RNLI Lifeboat for 26 years and as a Fisher on the fishing vessel, the North Western), there was no prospect of the female kayakers being able to proceed further. His recollection is that he came upon them beyond the Bulloch Harbour racing buoy and south of the East Pier of Dun Laoghaire Harbour going in the direction of the Bailey Lighthouse in an area he describes as Carrig Rock. Based on his experience of Dublin Bay, having regard to the weather and sea state, he believed this was the most likely location where the kayakers would get into difficulty due to a combination of southerly winds and an ebb tide. His recollection is that such were the conditions on the day that these created significant difficulties for the kayakers. His recollection is that by the time he got to the two female kayakers, they were tired, cold, wet and fatigued.
- 3.21 The IRCG SITREP and Report (Appendix 7.7) records this Fisher stating that the Participants in the Small Group had been in the water for approximately 40 minutes. It was also clear to him that they were amateurs and that from his observation of their physical state and the sea and weather conditions there was no prospect of them returning to shore unaided. In his view, given his experience, such were the weather conditions that the kayakers should not have gone out. His recollection is that at the time of the incident the weather was bad, it having been forecast to turn nasty. There were big tides with the wind in a south-south westerly direction. There was also an ebb tide, flowing south with the effect of wind against tide and a sea swell of approximately 1.5 m, (consistent with the Weather Report) together with gusts and a lot of "white horses". His recollection of the conditions is that they were such that no Fishers were out.

### The Large Group

- 3.22 The second of the two Participants was in the Large Group. Her recollection of the single kayak that she used was one whereby she sat into a large opening with her legs visible. Her recollection of the weather was that it was okay on land, a bit windy but not particularly cold. She did not recall anything striking about the weather before she set out.

- 3.23 While instructed to manoeuvre her kayak within Bulloch Harbour in order to get the feel of it, she found doing so difficult. She found that the first few minutes paddling, after leaving Bulloch Harbour, were fine but then noticed that the waves were getting very choppy and seemed to be coming at her at an angle from the right (i.e. from a southerly direction). She recalls that some in the Large Group assured her that it would be fine on the return trip from Dalkey Island as the waves would be with them. She, along with other members of the Large Group, intended to turn in a southerly direction towards Dalkey Island but the waves made it difficult to do so.
- 3.24 This Participant found her own going to be very slow and she got separated for a time from the Large Group. She recalls being left behind with two other double kayaks. An Instructor made his way between her, the two other double kayaks and the main group intermittently encouraging them to speed up. She and the two other double kayaks eventually made it up to the main group and together they formed the Large Group.
- 3.25 This Participant recalls that the Large Group were near rocks when she noticed that the organiser of the Tour had come out from shore in a kayak towards them. The other Instructors who had been on the water with them had instructed them to wait where they were while they went to the assistance of the Small Group. Upon the arrival of the organiser, she recalls being told that there were people in the water and that the Group could not continue on to Dalkey Island. Initially, this Large Group then tried to turn back towards Bulloch Harbour. At this point, this Participant was being towed by the organiser, but no sooner was the tow released then she began to drift off and could not control her kayak or course. She recalls that the Large Group were quite close to rocks and that a couple on a double kayak fell in but were able to swim/walk to shore as they were so close. With that, the Large Group congregated in their kayaks at the rocks. The organiser pointed to an opening through which kayaks could float and one of the Participants in this Large Group then helped each kayaker out onto the rocks.
- 3.26 This Participant recalls that when the Large Group disembarked onto the rocks, a IRCG officer appeared and instructed them to wait where they were and to get onto a lifeboat which would be along shortly. This instruction, according to her recollection, was countermanded by the organiser who instructed them to make their way over the rocks, on foot. This Participant had the impression that the disagreement arose because the organiser felt it would look bad if part of the Group ended up coming back to shore onboard a lifeboat.
- 3.27 According to this Participant, another Participant in the Large Group asked the IRCG officer and the organiser to stop giving conflicting orders as it was confusing. This Participant's recollection was that she would have preferred to follow the directions of the IRCG as she was not happy about climbing over the rocks as she did not have proper footwear and she was anxious and fearful about slipping.

- 3.28 According to this Participant, the organiser was adamant that the Large Group should climb over the rocks and the Large Group duly did so, without incident. They were unable to access a gate through a wall at the top of the rocks and had to make their way around the wall onto other (less slippery) rocks and then onto a flat shore where they were met by the IRCG officer.
- 3.29 This Participant recalls hearing radio traffic and that someone radioed the IRCG officer who met them to the effect that some of the Group had come in off the water and were in Bulloch Harbour suffering from hypothermia. In turn, the IRCG officer conveyed this to his base over the radio which was overheard by the organiser who took issue with the IRCG officer's use of the word "hypothermia".
- 3.30 This Participant was driven by the IRCG officer to Bulloch Harbour where she met up with her companion who had been part of the Small Group.

### Records and Communications

- 3.31 During the course of this investigation, the organiser of the Tour was asked to provide certain records within the meaning of Section 30(1) the 2000 Act and to provide any additional information relating to the incident. No such records or additional information were made available over and above various statements about the incident made by the organiser in written exchanges with the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) (and by way of the observations and related correspondence). Instead, the organiser raised a number of issues (taken from the organiser's letter to the investigator of the 23 January 2021) under the following headings: -
- "The four corners of the 'incident'";
  - "Anonymous/redacted e-mails";
  - "I was asked to provide a statement... to the Maritime Safety Policy division";
  - "I am still asking you to define 'marine casualty'";
  - "Identity of anonymous e-mail writers";
  - "Canoeing Ireland/Sea Kayaking Ireland";
  - "What is the statutory basis for your demand for information within seven days?";
  - "Competence and Training";
  - "GDPR and Privacy Policy";
  - "Your Identity";
  - "Reservation".

The organiser's observations on the draft report repeat and expand on these issues.

- 3.32 Attached at Appendix 7.10 is the exchange of communications between the organiser and the investigator (redacted as to names/addresses) during the course of which the organiser was asked to make available records under Section 30(1) of the 2000 Act including the identity of participants and instructors on the Tour, and was asked to confirm her availability to meet the investigator by zoom or telephone (as opposed to in person in light of Covid 19 restrictions).
- 3.33 On 18 December 2020, the organiser wrote to the Deputy Director of the Irish Coast Guard requesting the retraction, withdrawal and correction of the IRCG SITREP (part of Appendix 7.7). It was copied by the organiser to the MCIB. Attached at Appendix 7.11 is a copy of the letter (redacted as to names or other personal identifiers and as to a private matter). In it, there are a number of factual statements by the organiser relating to the incident, summarised as follows:
- There was “neither an incident nor an accident...” (opening paragraph);
  - There were “highly qualified instructors” who explained “...the nature of the adventure about to be embarked upon which includes capsizing and getting wet, and the protocol for dealing with such paid-for inevitability” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 2.0);
  - “There was no ‘incident’. No one was ever ‘in difficulty’ or at risk. No one was ‘in danger’. No one was ‘drifting in danger’. No one was ‘drifting’ as a result of any such ‘danger’. There were no injuries. No one was injured. There were no casualties by any yard stick.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 3.0);
  - “No member of our group was ever ‘in difficulty’” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.2);
  - “You present it as though the group ‘split’ because of an unfolding life-threatening incident (which never happened) without any regard that this might have been a perfectly normal decision made by a trained group leader to bring part of the group towards the Maiden’s Rock.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.3);
  - “To be clear, none of this group was compromised, in difficulty or ‘drifting away’.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.4);
  - “None of our guests or instructors needed to be ‘brought safely to shore by the RNLI’.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.5);
  - “No life was at risk or put at risk on our tour...” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.6);

- “This is entirely false. The Fishing Vessel North Western based at Bulloch Harbour did not sail, did not sail to a group of four kayakers and was not involved in this matter. It simply never happened.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.7);
- “They required no advice from ICG”. (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.8);
- “My concern for their safety had nothing to do with my tour or the conditions. It was caused in its entirety by the disruption to their equilibrium with the sudden and unnecessary arrival in our space of the ICG Search and Rescue helicopter, the RNLI ALB and the ILB life boats and the ICG land-based vehicle...” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.8);
- “The approaching tsunami of rescue services swarming around my guests suggested an urgent and imminent danger where none existed” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.8);
- “...he alarmed my group of guests by undermining my authority as their group leader and shouting/ordering me to ‘stand down’ (sic)” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.8);
- “Nobody ‘required’ medical assessment. ...They very reluctantly agreed to this” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.12);
- “As well as carrying a VHF” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 9.1);

## 4. ANALYSIS

### Marine Notice

4.1 Marine Notice No. 9 of 2003 (“MN9/2003”) is a notice in relation to recreational craft to the effect that certain regulations, being part of Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS V), came into force on the 1 July 2002. Specific reference is made to V/34 “Safe Navigation and Avoidance of Dangerous Situations”. Attached at Appendix 7.12 is a copy of MN9/2003. It details prior planning for a boating trip and requires recreational craft users to take into account a number of factors when planning such a trip, including: -

- Weather;
- Tides;
- Limitation of the vessel;
- Crew;
- Navigational dangers;
- Contingency planning;
- Information ashore.

In particular, it notes that before any trip the weather forecast should be checked and regular updates obtained; that the tidal predictions fit with the planned trip; that there be contingency planning in place should anything go wrong; and, that someone ashore should know the plans of the trip.

### Code of Practice

4.2 Attached at Appendix 7.13 is Section 7 of the CoP which sets out recommendations for canoeing/kayaking. In the case of training, the CoP recommends that recognised training courses be undertaken so that participants are completely familiar with relevant rescue/recovery drills and notes that CI has a comprehensive training and accreditation scheme which covers river kayaking, sea kayaking and open canoes.

4.3 In the case of sea kayaking, at Section 7.4, the CoP recommends that sea kayakers should observe the following precautions, in addition to those generally outlined in the preceding sections: -

- Be aware of the weather forecast and sea area forecast. Only operate within your limits and abilities. Canoeing in a wind force 4 or above should only be considered for the very experienced;
- Be aware of the tidal conditions for the areas that you are operating in;
- Be aware of the effects of interaction between wind and tide on sea states;



- Carry a chart for the area of operation. These can be laminated and attached to the kayak deck;
- Carry a handheld compass;
- Ensure a nominated person ashore is aware of your itinerary, departure and return times;
- Have a passage plan and alternative emergency plans, e.g., safe landing area downwind etc.;
- Do not operate alone - kayak in company;
- If capsized and floating outside your craft, remain with it. It offers a better target to rescuers and has a high buoyancy factor. Do not attempt to swim for shore unless adjacent to the shore.

4.4 In addition, Section 7.4 of the CoP goes on to identify additional equipment which should be considered in the case of sea kayaking: -

- Flares;
- Tow ropes/throw bag;
- Torch;
- Suitable knife;
- Portable waterproof VHF radio;
- Portable Global Positioning System (GPS) unit;
- Personal Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRB);
- First aid kit;
- Spare food/drink;
- Paddle float/leash;
- Sun cream and sun hat.

The CoP was published by the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport in 2017 (with updates in 2019). It is a code of practice for the safe operation of recreational craft and was prepared with the assistance of Canoeing Ireland, CH Marine Ltd., Inland Waterways Association of Ireland, Irish Sailing Association, Water Safety Ireland, Maritime and Coastguard Agency UK, Met Éireann, RNLI and Waterways Ireland. While not mandatory in terms of legal enforceability, it is a code that encourages compliance with safety recommendations. The organiser's observations make no reference to the CoP, and no records were provided that would either directly or indirectly indicate any regard being had by the tour organisation to its content.

## Sea Conditions

- 4.5 Attached at Appendix 7.14 is Appendix 6 of the CoP which outlines “Weather, Sea States and Tides” and in particular refers to “Small Craft Warnings” being a small craft warning issued for expected winds of force 6 or more (as per the Met Éireann description above). At the time in question, it is noted that the Sea Area Forecast, in its forecast for Irish coastal waters from Malin Head to Howth Head to Carnsore Point and for the Irish Sea for the 24 hr period from 12.00 hrs on the 13 September 2020 to 12.00 hrs on 14 September 2020, notes wind as being “Southwest force 5 or 6 and reaching force 7 on the Irish Sea. Decreasing force 4 to 5 soon. Later decreasing Southeast or variable force 3 or 4”.
- 4.6 It also recorded a Small Craft Warning as having been issued at 12.00 hrs on the day of the incident on coasts from Valentia to Malin Head to Carnsore Point. This then changed at 18.00 hrs (approximately 30 minutes after the Tour started, according to two of the Participants) on the day of the incident such that it only applied on coasts from Valentia to Erris Head to Fair Head. As such, for the 5.5 hrs preceding the commencement of the Tour, and at the time the Tour started, there was a Small Craft Warning in operation on the coast where the Tour took place. That Small Craft Warning ceased to operate approximately 30 minutes after the Tour had commenced and approximately 1 hr before the incident (19.00 hrs) on the coast where the Tour took place. Furthermore, in view of the winds forecast, regard should have been had to the CoP (at Chapter 7.4 set out above) which provides that going out in a wind force 4 or above should only be considered for the very experienced kayaker.
- 4.7 As no records or information relating to the Tour planning were made available it has not been possible to determine to what extent the existence of a Small Craft Warning, which was in operation for 5.5 hrs leading up to the start of the Tour and in operation at the time the Tour set out, formed part of the planning. The organiser’s observations did not provide any record of actual weather assessment or checking on the day before or of the scheduled Tour departed (or in respect of the two earlier tours). The organiser asserts that the wind and wave conditions were suitable. No details have been provided to show if the sea and wind conditions were otherwise assessed or evaluated in the context of the experience of the kayakers. It had also not been possible to determine, in particular, whether at the time the Tour set out, it was known to the Tour organisation that a Small Craft Warning was in operation since 12.00 hrs, and whether the Tour went ahead regardless, or, in the alternative, whether the weather forecast had not been checked since 12.00 hrs on that day when the warning was first published. The organiser’s observations accepts that a small craft warning was in existence but provides no detail as to whether it was known prior to the Tour embarking. The organiser’s observations state that two tours had gone out previously that same day. This meant that these tours took place (if after 12.00 hrs) when a small craft warning was in place. If the warning was known, it would be expected that an explanation would be provided to explain

why it was disregarded. Given the absence of such detail, and having regard to the opinion of the organiser as to the lack of value of Met Éireann forecasts, it is reasonable to conclude that the small craft warning was not known or, if known, was ignored. Regardless of the detail of the planning, the fact remains that there was a Small Craft Warning in operation at the beginning of the period when the Tour in question set out (17.30 hrs approximately).

- 4.8 The Weather Report estimated winds of force 4 or 5 (mean wind speed 15 - 20 knots) with occasional gusts up to 30 knots. In addition, the Small Craft Warning only ceased to be in operation at 18.00 hrs on the day of the incident. As the Tour embarked approximately 30 minutes before that safety warning ceased to be in operation and given that at least some preparation must have occurred in the preceding period, it follows that neither the CoP nor the Small Craft Warning were followed. As MN No 9 of 2003 notes, before any trips the weather forecast and tides should be checked, and regular updates obtained (and regard also had to the crew). As no records or planning information have been made available, it has not been possible to determine whether any planning for the Tour took place as required, in particular in relation to the weather conditions and the Small Craft Warning. In any event, regardless of whatever planning did or did not take place, the winds were such that according to Chapter 7.4 of the CoP (to which the organisers observations make no reference) inexperienced kayakers should not have gone out. At least two of the Participants were inexperienced kayakers. In the organiser's observations, the organiser does not agree with the weather report from Met Éireann, states that it is incorrect and that it has been incorrectly interpreted. The organiser does not agree that the Met Éireann weather forecast and weather estimates are correct. The organiser says that conditions are gathered and analysed for tours but provided no details of any analysis having been carried out for this Tour, what sources of information were used to gather information on conditions, and, who carried out the analyses. The organiser referred to her use of other web-based weather forecast sources. Persons planning trips on the sea may use a variety of forecast data to gather as much information as possible before setting out and for trip planning. However, the significant distinction between Met Éireann and web-based information sources is that Met Éireann provides reports to record what the weather actually was, so it can be compared with the forecasts.

#### Canoeing Ireland Training and Accreditation Schemes

- 4.9 As noted at Section 7.1 of the CoP, CI has a comprehensive training and accreditation scheme which covers river, sea kayaking and open canoes. On its website, under the heading "Education", CI outlines instructor and coach qualifications. Attached at Appendix 7.15 is an extract from that website in respect of "Instructor and Coach Qualifications". As can be seen, in the column entitled "Sea Kayaking", it categorises a "Beginner" as being a person having the equivalent to its "Level 1" or "Level 2" accreditation, an "Intermediate

Instructor” as being a person having the equivalent to its “Level 3 Instructor” and “Level 4 Instructor” accreditation and in the case of an “Advanced Instructor” as being a person having the equivalent to its “Level 5 Instructor” accreditation.

- 4.10 Attached at Appendix 7.16 is an extract from CI’s website under the section “Education” and entitled “Personal Skills Awards”, together with an extract from the same section detailing the Level 3 Sea Skills Awards. The distinction between Personal Skills Awards and instructor qualifications (see further - Appendix 7.17) is that the former is an award denoting a holder’s personal skill level while the latter is a qualification denoting a holder’s accreditation (from CI) to instruct.
- 4.11 Attached at Appendix 7.17 is an extract from CI’s website under the section “Education” and entitled “Become an Instructor or Coach”. As can be seen, this summarises instructor qualifications accredited by CI and in the case of sea kayaking, categorises the following levels of instructor: -
- 4.11.1 Level 3 instructor: qualified to instruct and lead groups safely on coastal trips with waves averaging 0.5 m in height and average wind speeds of 15km/h; can train and assess for level 1 - 3 Skills Awards; instruct on flat water with a ratio of 1:8. Instruct on seas of 0.5 m and wind 15km/h with a ratio of 1:6 being one instructor to six participants;
- 4.11.2 Level 4 instructor: qualified to instruct and lead groups safely on seas with waves averaging 1 m in height and average wind speeds of 30km/h; can train and assess for Level 1 - 4 Skills Awards; operate within the ratio above. Instruct on seas of 1 m waves and wind of 30km/h with a ratio of 1:4 being one instructor to four participants;
- 4.11.3 Level 5 instructor: qualified to instruct and lead groups safely on advanced seas with waves exceeding 2.5 m in height and average wind speeds of 35km/h and higher; can train and assess for level 1 - 5 Skills Awards; operate within any of the ratios above. Instruct on seas of 2.5 m with winds of 35km/h with a ratio of 1:4 being one instructor to four participants.
- 4.12 Given the ratio of Participants (twelve) to Instructors (three), the ratio of the Group on the day was 1:4 (Instructor: Participant). In overall terms for the Group as a whole, the ratio of Participants to Instructors was in keeping with that identified on the CI’s website (Appendix 7.17) namely a ratio of 1:4.
- 4.13 Having regard to the average wave heights reported as having been encountered at the time of the incident (up to 1.5 m) and the average wind speeds (Beaufort 4/5 with mean wind speeds of 15/20 knots and occasional gusts up to 30 knots;), it appears that the appropriate qualification recommended by CI for an instructor taking out a group in conditions similar to those encountered on the Tour is a “Sea Kayaking Level 4 Instructor”.

- 4.14 As noted above, it has not been possible to determine the relevant qualifications of the Instructors in the Group on the day. It is not known what, if any, qualifications the Participants in the Group had except that two of the Participants had neither any relevant qualifications nor any meaningful experience. The organiser's observations state the qualifications of one or possibly two unidentified instructors who may have been on the Tour. One is described as being a "*qualified kayaking instructor*" but no level of qualification is identified. Either the same person, or a different person, is described as having Kayaking level 3 Sea skills, Kayaking level 4 training, and Kayaking level 2 instructor. As explained previously, in the absence of the organiser supplying the identity of the instructors the qualifications cannot be readily verified nor can it be verified what sea kayaking instructor qualifications that instructor held. While the organiser's observations assert a number of qualifications for the instructor and include "Kayaking Level 4 Training" and "Kayaking Level 2 Instructor", as is apparent from CI's Instructor qualifications (Appendix 7.17) these qualifications appear to relate to "kayaking" as distinct from "sea kayaking" while the reference to Level 3 Sea Skills is a reference to a Personal Skills Award, not an instructor qualification and as such does not entitle the holder to lead or instruct others.
- 4.15 The organiser detailed her own qualifications, the relevant ones of which are described as follows: "*I am a level 4 instructor and hold the highest level skills award which is level 5. I am a tutor which means I can train and assess instructors.*" The organiser was not one of the instructors on the Tour. The organiser does not consider regard should be had to the CI framework as she asserts that the current awards are "*not fit for purpose for tour guiding as opposed to providing more in depth instruction*". In addition, the organiser's observations assert that the report misleadingly presents CI "*as some kind of statutory authority; which it is not*". The organiser is correct that CI is not a statutory authority. The level of qualification CI considers appropriate is described as "recommended" at Section 4.13 of this report. However, it is an acknowledged contributor to the CoP and, according to its own website, is recognised by the Irish Sports Council (ISC) and the Olympian Federation of Ireland (OFI) as the governing body of the sport and recreation of canoeing and paddle sports in Ireland and is affiliated to the International Canoe Federation (ICF) and the European Canoe Association (ECA).
- 4.16 CI have confirmed the qualifications held by the organiser at Appendix 7.18 (redacted as to names) which record among other qualifications Level 5 River Skills, Level 4 River Instructor and Level 3 Sea Skills Award. In view of the distinction between Sea as distinct from River qualifications (see further 4.17), the "Level 5 River Skills" and "Level 4 River Instructor" referenced in Appendix 7.18, are specific to river (not sea) kayaking. The reference in Appendix 7.18 to "Level 3 Sea Skills" is a reference to CI's Personal Skills Awards (referred to as "Level 3 SK Skills" under the column entitled "Sea Kayak" per Appendix 7.16) which according to CI enables those who hold it to (i) kayak safely and

competently in smooth seas (Douglas Sea Scale) as a member of a group of peers, (ii) paddle competently in following winds, head winds and beams winds of up to force three, (iii) assist in rescues and (iv) have an understanding of the importance of weather as a factor in kayaking on the sea. This award (Level 3 Sea Skills), according to CI's accreditation, does not entitle the holder to lead or instruct others.

- 4.17 CI has drawn the attention of the MCIB to the distinction between Sea as distinct from River qualifications. The reason for the classification system adopted by CI is as follows:

*“The main reason for the classification system we use when defining the scope of our awards is to promote safe practice both at personal skills level and as Instructors in any of the disciplines. It is our view that Sea and River are [sic] two entirely separate disciplines, thus our training and assessment scheme reflects that difference.”*

*“While some of the skills are transferrable across the two disciplines, there is a requirement for an individual to be trained and assessed for the specific environment in which they are paddling in order to comply with our safety guidelines.”*

- 4.18 CI have identified the criteria for each type of activity and the reasons for the difference in their training and qualifications regime as follows:

*“The difference between River and Sea Awards is quite distinct. For example, the kayaks themselves, have substantial differences in how you paddle, operate and rescue them. River or whitewater kayaking takes place on fresh water with challenges such as rapids, boulders, drops, stoppers etc. to navigate. Sea kayak training focuses on wind, weather and tides.”*

- 4.19 CI explain that:

*“The following awards are part of the Sport Ireland Coaching Instructor Developer framework:*

- *Level 2 Generic Tutor*
- *Level 2 Kayak Instructor Assessment Panel*
- *Level 2 Kayak Instructor Training Panel*
- *Level 1 Kayak Instructor Assessment Panel*

*Level 2 generic tutor, mean the individual has passed the NGB Instructor developer assessment and is a fully qualified instructor developer. The assessment and training panel certs means that the individual has met the requirements to be on the panel usually sitting in and observing on a*

*minimum of two assessments or training courses per panel cert. Achievement of these certs is linked to their instructor qualification, for example a level four river instructor who has gone on to become a generic tutor could not become a Sea kayak panel member as they would not have the required instructorship.”*

4.20 The information relating to instructor qualifications is available from this link: <https://www.canoe.ie/become-an-instructor-or-coach/>. As noted at 4.16 of this report, and according to CI: *“The aims of the Level 3 Sea Skills Award are to enable participants to:*

- 1. Kayak safely and competently in smooth seas (Douglas Sea Scale) as a member of a group of peers.*
- 2. Paddle competently in following winds, head winds and beams winds of up to force three.*
- 3. Assist in rescues.*
- 4. Have an understanding of the importance of weather as a factor in kayaking on the sea.*

*There is no provision within this award to lead or instruct other paddlers. It allows only for kayaking as part of a group of paddlers with an equivalent qualification (Item 1 above).”*

## Weather

4.21 In terms of the Weather Report, there are a number of essential factual matters, as follows:

4.21.1 Winds were moderate to fresh south to south westerly backed southerly, Beaufort 4/5 with mean wind speeds of 15/20 knots and occasional gusts up to 30 knots;

4.21.2 Significant wave height was between 0.5 m and 1.5 m with an estimated wave period of four/five seconds;

4.21.3 The Sea Area Forecasts (in respect of the forecast issued at 12.00 hrs) for Irish coastal waters from Malin Head to Howth Head to Carnsore Point and for the Irish Sea forecast southwest winds force 5 or 6 and reaching force 7 on the Irish Sea; decreasing force 4 to 5 soon; later decreasing southeast or variable force 3 or 4 and (in respect of the forecast issued at 18.00 hrs) for Irish coastal waters from Fair Head to Howth Head to Carnsore Point and for the Irish Sea forecast south to southwest winds force 5 or 6 and gusty, locally force 7 at first in the Irish Sea; imminently decreasing force 4 or 5, locally force 6 in the Irish Sea; soon decreasing southerly force 3 or 4; later backing south westerly force 2 to 4; further backing south east to east or variable force 2 to 4 by the end of the period.

- 4.21.4 The Sea Area Forecast issued approximately six hours before the incident stated that a 24 hr small craft warning was in operation. At the time of the incident from around 19.00 hrs, that small craft warning had ceased to be in operation. The organiser's observations accept that this warning did occur but did not provide any confirmation of the warning having been known in advance of the Tour embarking. If known, it appears it was disregarded.
- 4.21.5 The organiser's observations assert that using the "Dublin Bay Buoy" as a reference for sea conditions is not appropriate as it is located at the north of Dublin Bay and not where the Tour took place. However, as the Weather Report notes, its estimated weather and sea state conditions were for the coastal area 1 NM east of Colliemore Harbour (east of Dalkey Island). In addition, the Weather Report notes (page 11) that *"if there are no measurements or observations available for an exact location, then the estimated conditions in the report are based on all available meteorological measurements and observations which have been correlated on the routine charts prepared by Met Éireann"*. While clearly very localised conditions can vary, the central criticism of the Weather Report by the organiser to the effect that it is "incorrect" is unsupported by any alternative reports relied on by the organiser to state that the weather was anything other than what it was stated to be in the Weather Report from Met Éireann.
- 4.22 The tidal tables and streams (Appendix 7.5) indicate that at the time of the incident (19.00 hrs), the HW at the location of the incident was expected 2.5 hrs later, at 21.32 hrs. The tidal streams at the time of the incident (denoted by diagrams HW-3 (i.e. 18.32 hrs) and HW-2 (i.e. 19.32 hrs) show the tide flooding in a northerly direction at the location of the incident.
- 4.23 The weather report records the winds as moderate to fresh, south-south westerly backed southerly. Accordingly, the tidal streams and weather report indicate the wind was with the tide (i.e. both going in the same direction), not wind against tide (i.e. each going in opposite directions).
- 4.24 As noted at Section 3.20 the Fisher's recollection is that at the time of the incident it was an ebb tide (i.e. going out), flowing south and with the winds in a south westerly direction meaning wind against tide, contributing to poor sea conditions. This contradicts the data evident from the tidal streams. It has not been possible to reconcile that inconsistency. However, irrespective of whether the tidal stream was flowing north or south, the Group still encountered challenging sea conditions (relative to what is known about at least two of the Participants' experience). If the tidal stream was flowing south (according to the Fisher) the Participants had to contend with the effect of wind against tide, kayaking into the southerly wind and contending with waves between 0.5 m and 1.5 m. If the tidal stream was flowing north (according to the tidal stream data, diagrams HW-3 and HW-2) the Participants had to contend with kayaking against the tide, kayaking into southerly winds and contend with waves between 0.5 m



and 1.5 m. In either version of the directional flow of the tidal stream at the time of the incident, the Participants (relative to what is known of at least two of the Participants' limited experience) faced challenging sea conditions.

- 4.25 The organiser's observations criticise the foregoing analysis as "bizarre" and the Fisher's evidence generally. While it has not been possible to reconcile the inconsistency, that does not preclude a logical observation being made that irrespective of the tidal stream flow, the recollection of the two Participants and the Fisher are that challenging conditions "*relative to what is known about at least two of the Participants' experience*" were encountered. The contradiction does not detract from that observation.

### Water Safety

- 4.26 Water Safety Ireland (formerly Irish Water Safety) identifies two problems associated with sudden immersion in sea water, namely "cold shock" and "hypothermia" (where the body temperature drops by at least 2°C). Attached at Appendix 7.19 is an extract from Water Safety Ireland. It identifies those two problems in the case of immersion for people not used to cold water (temperature less than 15°C). As is noted in the Weather Report, the sea temperature at the time of the incident was 15°C.
- 4.26.1 In the case of the Participant in the Small Group, her recollection of the effects of her immersion in the water are of taking a gulp of air as each wave came, coughing and swallowing a lot of sea water. When brought ashore, and assessed by the ambulance personnel, she was administered oxygen and described herself as being "tachycardic", i.e. that her heart rate was very fast. She was informed by the ambulance personnel that her temperature and oxygen levels were low. They were concerned at the amount of sea water she had swallowed. They advised her to attend hospital, which she declined. The Fisher recalls that those he took on board were tired, cold, wet and fatigued, and that they had been in the water for 40 minutes. While there is no evidence to indicate that the Participant in the Small Group suffered either "cold shock" or "hypothermia", the conditions encountered are indicative of a potential risk of either or both when challenging conditions are encountered by Participants in such water-based recreational activities.
- 4.26.2 According to this Participant, she was not informed of the possibility of immersion in the water, nor what to do or not to do in such a potential event.
- 4.26.3 The organiser's observations, while challenging whether the Participant was in the water for 40 minutes, accepts the Participant was "*...in the water for longer than usual*". The quoted extract in the organiser's observations entitled "Trip Leader Description of Person in the Water" to the effect that the Participant expressed herself warm enough to be towed into land is at odds with both the Participants' recollection of being terrified and not being able to speak

(Section 3.9), coughing and expending energy (Section 3.10), of the third Instructor having to physically hold on to her after her third time going into the water (Section 3.12), of being advised her oxygen and temperature levels were low, of being “tachycardic”, of being advised to attend hospital (Section 3.14) and the Fisher’s recollection of the Participant being very cold (Section 3.18), of being tired, cold, wet and fatigued (Section 3.20) and that such was the Participant’s physical state there was no prospect of her returning to shore unaided (Section 3.21).

## The Tour

4.27 As mentioned at Section 3.33 of this report, the organiser of the Tour outlined a number of factual assertions in her letter to the Irish Coast Guard of 18 December 2020 (Appendix 7.11), each of which are dealt with below. Before so doing, the MCIB notes that the organiser’s observations state she has no faith in the accuracy of the IRCG documentation and complained to the IRCG to the effect that the records are false. IRCG logs are recorded during high pressured casualty rescue situations. The IRCG generates a situation report, or “SITREP”, in respect of every incident coordinated or processed by the IRCG. The SITREP is prepared by the Maritime Rescue Co-Ordination Centre (MRCC) in accordance with an established template, which is aligned with the International Aeronautical & Maritime Search & Rescue (IAMSAR) Volume II, Appendix I and international norms for such types of communication. It is not intended for publication and is not released to the general public. Every SITREP generated by the IRCG is copied to the MCIB regardless of outcome. It is a matter for the MCIB to determine whether a particular incident constitutes a marine casualty, within the meaning of the 2000 Act, and/or whether an investigation ought to be conducted into any particular incident. The IRCG has no role in determining whether an incident is a ‘marine casualty’ within the meaning of the Act. Further, the IRCG has no role or involvement in the decision of the MCIB as to whether an investigation might be carried out in respect of any particular incident. The MCIB are satisfied that the content of the IRCG documentation is consistent with the other information and records gathered during this investigation. On receipt of such SITREPs the MCIB may request additional information before deciding on the most appropriate course of action.

4.27.1 There was “neither an incident nor an accident...” (Appendix 7.11 opening paragraph);

The organiser says that the Tour was monitored from the shore. It is not clear what form that monitoring took, whether by the organiser or by some other person or what was visible from the shore (or what part of the shore) as to what was unfolding. According to the Fisher, as he headed out, he could not immediately see where the kayakers were. The organiser’s observations state that she canoed out to the Large Group (the Instructor(s) with that group having gone to assist the Instructor(s) with the Small Group). On returning with the kayakers she observed the First Participant and the Instructors. At that stage the

incident had been on-going for some time. Therefore, the assertion by the organiser that the Participant was not in the water for around 40 minutes cannot be supported by her own observation.

Having regard to the 999 calls, the tasking of the rescue services and the account given by two of the Participants, each of whom was in the Small Group and the Large Group, it is clear that there was “an incident”.

- 4.27.2 There were “*highly qualified instructors*” who explained “...*the nature of the adventure about to be embarked upon which includes capsizing and getting wet, and the protocol for dealing with such paid-for inevitability*” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 2.0);

As no records were furnished by the organiser, it has not been possible to determine whether the Instructors were “*highly qualified*”.

While the organiser states that the Instructors explained that the nature of the adventure included capsizing and getting wet and the protocol for dealing with such, two Participants indicated that no such forewarning (of capsizing) was given nor were any safety protocols explained to them.

- 4.27.3 “There was no ‘incident’. No one was ever ‘in difficulty’ or at risk. No one was ‘in danger’. No one was ‘drifting in danger’. No one was ‘drifting’ as a result of any such ‘danger’. There were no injuries. No one was injured. There were no casualties by any yard stick.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 3.0);

One of the Participants in the Small Group recalls that upon leaving the harbour, she felt “in deep water”, being so terrified that at times she could not speak. This Participant also recalls her kayak being pushed away from the direction of Dalkey Island and as having no control over the direction of her kayak and that the waves were taking her where they wanted. This Participant also recalls being administered oxygen through a mask (when brought ashore), as being “tachycardic”, that she felt sick from the sea water that she had swallowed and reported nightmares for a week afterwards. She recalls feeling shaken, tired and nauseous. As such, according to this Participant, she felt in danger and was drifting. The organiser’s observations accept that “if one floats in the sea, the wind and tide will carry you somewhere”. In addition, the organiser’s observations assert that the waves were such that they would not knock someone out of a kayak but any wave could cause someone to lean over and capsize. Irrespective of the organiser’s assertions, the Participant in the Small Group recalled going into the water three times and on the first occasion as having been thrown out of the cockpit over the front of the kayak. That is the Participant’s recollection and description of the event.

- 4.27.4 “No member of our group was ever ‘in difficulty’” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.2);

Both of the Participants recall being in difficulty. Three members of the public were sufficiently concerned that they felt obliged to call 999 and alert the emergency services.

- 4.27.5 “You presented as though the group ‘split’ because of an unfolding life-threatening incident (which never happened) without any regard that this might have been a perfectly normal decision made by a trained group leader to bring part of the group towards the Maiden’s Rock.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.3);

The Participant who ended up in the Small Group recalled that she (and a double kayak) drifted northwards, away from the Group, thus splitting the Group into the Small Group and the Large Group. As such, whatever about a hypothetical decision made by a “trained group leader” to split the Group, the fact remains that sea conditions appear to have been the primary reason for the Group becoming separated, the decision of the trained group leader being a reaction to unfolding events. The organiser’s observation state that she canoed out to the Large Group, as the Instructor(s) with that group had gone to assist the Instructor(s) with the Small Group.

- 4.27.6 “To be clear, none of this group was compromised, in difficulty or ‘drifting away’” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.4);

As noted at Section 3.9 of this report, the Participant in the Small Group recalls being pushed away from the direction of Dalkey Island and as having no control over the direction of her kayak and that waves were taking her where they wanted. This is all suggestive of drifting rather than evidencing any deliberate action arising from a route change or otherwise.

- 4.27.7 “None of our guests or instructors needed to be ‘brought safely to shore by the RNLI’.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.5);

The IRCG SITREP and Report (Appendix 7.7) notes that while the Royal National Lifeboat Institution All Weather Lifeboat (RNLI ALB) and Royal National Lifeboat Institution Inshore Lifeboat (RNLI ILB) proceeded to the incident, none of the Participants or the Instructors were brought to shore by either.

- 4.27.8 “No life was at risk or put at risk on our tour.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.6);

According to the Fisher, the kayakers who he took on board were tired, cold, wet and fatigued and that there was no prospect of them proceeding further. It is difficult therefore to reconcile the Fisher’s recollection with the organiser’s view that no life was at risk.

- 4.27.9 “This is entirely false. The Fishing Vessel North Western based at Bulloch

Harbour did not sail, did not sail to a group of four kayakers and was not involved in this matter. It simply never happened.” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.7);

The Fisher is a fisher on the fishing vessel North Western. However, the boat which the Fisher used to go to the assistance of the Small Group was an 18-foot Malahide boat, not the fishing vessel the North Western. As such, it is correct to say (as the organiser notes) that the fishing vessel North Western did not render assistance, rather a Fisher from that fishing vessel using an 18-foot Malahide boat did go to the aid of the kayakers.

4.27.10 “They required no advice from ICG” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.8);

The advice from the IRCG officer who met the Large Group at the rocks towards the north end of Loreto Convent is recited at Section 3.26 of this report. The Participant in the Large Group recalls (Section 3.27) that she would have preferred to follow the direction of the IRCG officer to await arrival of the lifeboat, given her concerns with climbing over the rocks.

4.27.11 “My concern for their safety had nothing to do with my tour or the conditions. It was caused in its entirety by the disruption to their equilibrium with the sudden and unnecessary arrival in our space of the ICG Search and Rescue helicopter, the RNLi ALB and the ILB life boats and the ICG land-based vehicle...” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.8);

The organiser states that her concern for the safety of the Group had nothing to do with the Tour or the conditions but was caused by the disruption attendant on the arrival of the rescue services. As is evident from the timings recorded in the IRCG SITREP and Report, the arrival of the rescue services on the scene of the incident came after the Group encountered difficulties as reported by 999 calls. The Fisher recalls R116 overhead as he was taking the kayakers on board (from which he took comfort) at which point, according to the Fisher’s radio communication, they had been in the water for 40 minutes. In addition, it is clear from what the two Participants in both the Small Group and the Large Group recall is that their concerns stemmed from the sea conditions which they encountered.

The organiser’s observations criticise an alleged failure by the MCIB to consider the role of the IRCG. Neither of the Participants nor the Fisher expressed such concerns and, to the contrary, the Fisher expressed relief at knowing that rescue services were tasked. In addition, three separate members of the public were sufficiently concerned from their observations of the unfolding events to make 999 calls relating to the same incident as a consequence of which rescue services were tasked.

- 4.27.12 “The approaching tsunami of rescue services swarming around my guests suggested an urgent and imminent danger where none existed” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.10);

As noted (Section 3.33 of this report).

- 4.27.13 “...he alarmed my group of guests by undermining my authority as their group leader and shouting/ordering me to ‘stand down’ (sic)” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.8);

Insofar as the order to “stand down” attributed by the organiser to the IRCG officer who met the Large Group on the rocks is concerned, the instruction from that officer to the Large Group to wait on the rocks and to get onto a lifeboat stemmed, according to the Participant and the IRCG officer, from concerns over the Group’s safety in climbing over the rocks.

- 4.27.14 “Nobody ‘required’ medical assessment. ...They very reluctantly agreed to this” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 8.12);

The Participant in the Small Group recalls being medically assessed by the ambulance personnel when she was brought ashore to Bulloch Harbour. She recalls being administered oxygen, having an ECG undertaken and being monitored by the paramedics who indicated their wish to take her to hospital, which she declined, all of which suggests a medical assessment.

- 4.27.15 “As well as carrying a VHF” (See Appendix 7.11 paragraph 9.1);

The organiser has stated that as well as carrying a VHF, the Instructors also carried other equipment. As no records have been furnished by the organiser, it has not been possible to determine what safety (or communication) equipment accompanied the Instructors. The organiser states the Instructors carry a VHF (and other equipment). The description given by two of the Participants recalled the use of tow ropes and a pump but could not say whether VHF radios were available to or in use by the Instructors.

According to the organiser, at no stage did the IRCG seek to contact “us” over VHF. Assuming the reference to “us” is a reference to the organiser and one or more of the Instructors (which appears consistent with the organiser’s statement that as well as carrying a VHF, Instructors also carried other equipment). Based on the fact that there is no record of such contact in the IRCG SITREP and Report, the organiser is correct where she states that at no stage did the IRCG attempt to contact her (or the Instructors) over VHF. However, similarly based on the same fact (that there is no record of such contact in the IRCG SITREP and Report), it appears equally clear that no contact was made by the organiser or Instructors from their VHF with the IRCG (or rescue services) over VHF.

The organiser's observations state that the Instructors did not contact the IRCG by VHF as "we did not require the assistance of the Coast Guard" and that "our instructor was not aware that any chatter on channel 16 related to our kayak tour". However, as highlighted previously (Section 3.17 of this report), the Fisher was alerted to the incident by the VHF radio traffic and, contrary to the organiser's observations that he went out "...to see what was going on...", went out in response to emergency calls over the VHF, emergency calls which apparently went unheard by the Tour. If the emergency calls over VHF were sufficient to prompt two Fishers to go out to assist, it is reasonable to assume that those on the Tour in possession of a VHF, turned on and tuned in to channel 16, would have heard the same emergency call. However, the explanation by the organiser for the difference in reaction (the Fishers rendering assistance; those on the Tour taking the position that they did not require assistance), namely a belief that the "chatter" did not relate to the Tour does not adequately explain the failure to use the VHF to communicate. Presumably, if the Instructors believed the chatter did not relate to the Tour and that the Tour did not need assistance, a call to that effect by one of the Instructors to the rescue services over channel 16 would have been warranted. No such call was made.

### Canoeing Ireland and Safety Regulation

- 4.28 CI is recognised by the ISC and the OFI as the governing body of the sport and recreation of canoeing and paddle sports in Ireland and is affiliated to the ICF and the ECA. It is an acknowledged contributor to the CoP. CI is tasked with the development and promotion of paddlesports in Ireland and is grant funded to achieve these objectives.
- 4.28.1 Canoeing operates a Training Award scheme that caters separately for each of the following paddlesport disciplines; river, sea, open canoeing and stand-up paddle boarding. Each of these has specific criteria for the craft and environments within which they operate. CI have clear guidance on the different skills and Instructor awards and as to what the remit of each award allows for. The information relating to instructor awards is available from this link: <https://www.canoe.ie/become-an-instructor-or-coach/>.
- 4.28.2 CI is a non-statutory body and has no legislative power to regulate or accredit instructors. It operates on the basis that its accreditation is recognised as a valued and respected accreditation, and that its accredited instructors are similarly recognised as valued and respected accredited instructors. CI rely on their accredited instructors to conduct themselves in accordance with their training and any standards, rules and regulations of CI. It has no legal basis to enforce standards of conduct. It reports that it believes its accredited instructors do conduct themselves in compliance with the CI safety regime, and thereby contribute to safety standards in clubs, and commercial providers of paddlesports. It has no regulatory remit in respect of commercial paddlesports providers, save

indirectly through the voluntary conduct of its accredited instructors.

- 4.28.3. CI describe themselves as having *“a broad role in educating and information sharing to assist both the casual paddler and the enthusiast in water safety. As our inland and costal waterways are public spaces, we accept that our capacity to reach all paddlers is limited. We consistently promote safety on our website and in regular social media posts: <https://www.canoe.ie/safety-on-the-water/>. Any courses or events run by our partners and clubs are risk assessed to a very high standard and safety is one of our key strategic priorities and is built into everything that we do.”*
- 4.28.4 CI has introduced a Professional Course Provider Partnership (See appendix 7.20). It explains its rationale as follows: *“Canoeing Ireland has a responsibility to participants in our sport to provide a basis on which to evaluate the structure and effectiveness of our programmes. This will be the primary aim of the Partnership Agreement. In conjunction with our plans to strengthen capabilities within our clubs, we are establishing a strong link with providers who are teaching our syllabus in a mutually beneficial partnership.”*

Course providers who are eligible for the Partnership Agreement are those defined as *“individuals, clubs, businesses, schools, ETB’s, OEC’s and social, community, educational or commercial organisations who offer Paddlesport activities including courses in a commercial framework and who meet the Canoeing Ireland Quality Assurance and Safety Standards.”*

- 4.28.5 The Partnership Agreement sets out what conditions have to be met to be eligible for registration as follows:

#### ***“Staff Qualifications***

*Registered Providers must maintain an up-to-date list of their primary/core Canoeing Ireland qualified staff, both full time and freelance and have the list available on request from Canoeing Ireland. Canoeing Ireland instructor qualifications are only valid when Garda vetting has been completed successfully, Safeguarding courses have been attended and an up-to-date Canoeing Ireland recognised first aid qualification has been obtained.*

*Registered Providers should only use staff who hold the qualifications relevant to the environment and courses they are delivering. Providers will be registered to run only those courses and operate in environments for which their staff hold the appropriate qualifications.*

*All qualified staff must be registered members of Canoeing Ireland. It is the responsibility of the registered Provider to ensure their staff have in-date Canoeing Ireland membership and relevant instructor qualifications and requirements.*



*Registered providers must maintain and provide copies of up to date first aid and Safeguarding certificates for all activity staff which will be recorded on the CI database.*

### ***Insurance***

*Registered course providers must maintain and provide if requested, a copy of their insurance certificate and details of their conditions of cover and operating environment. Providers must ensure that they maintain an appropriate level of insurance for the business that they are engaged in.*

*Note that Instructors & Coaches operating voluntarily in a non-commercial context are covered for liability through the Canoeing Ireland insurance policy.*

### ***Standard Operating Procedures and Risk Assessments***

*Registered course providers must maintain copies of their standard operating procedures and risk assessments and have same available on request from Canoeing Ireland.”*

The structure is designed in effect to make available CI accreditation rights though providers of training courses who enter into the arrangement but on the terms laid out, and in particular on the condition that “*Registered Providers should only use staff who hold the qualifications relevant to the environment and courses they are delivering. Providers will be registered to run only those courses and operate in environments for which their staff hold the appropriate qualifications.*” The scheme therefore has the capacity to indirectly improve safety standards by extending the CI regime through its accredited instructors in those course providers.

- 4.28.6 The organiser drew the attention of the MCIB to the Professional Course Provider Partnership but made clear in her observations the reasons for her not joining it. Had the commercial organisation providing the Tour been a member of the scheme the MCIB, and the public, would have had some external assurances as to standards although it must be pointed out that the Tour was not designed as a training exercise and there is no obligation on any commercial paddlesport provider to prove training whether CI accredited or not. This illustrates both a lacuna in the regularity capacity of CI in respect of commercial paddlesport providers, and, the value in terms of safety standards of being able to ascertain and verify instructors qualifications working in commercial paddlesport providers. There is no regulatory regime of any nature in operation in the commercial paddlesport provider sector save through accredited personnel or those with relevant accredited skills who work in that sector.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

This incident occurred because of a combination of factors set out below:

- 5.1 At the time of the start of the incident (around 19.00 hrs), there was no Small Craft Warning in operation. However, at the time the Tour set off (around 17.30 hrs) there was. Notwithstanding that Small Craft Warning, the kayaks, being small craft, embarked on the Tour. It follows that insufficient regard was had to the Small Craft Warning. In light of that safety alert, the Tour should not have departed at the time it did. Weather forecasting is a very particular skill and Met Éireann has a number of experts in that field. It is therefore unsafe to disregard what the State's meteorologists say about the forecast. While the forecast (which denotes predicated weather) on the 13 September 2020 could have been incorrect, the weather report (which denotes actual weather) confirms that it was not. Disregard for Met Éireann forecasts contributed to the decision to embark on a potentially unsafe Tour.
- 5.2 Section 7.4 of the CoP (Appendix 7.13) notes that canoeing/kayaking in a wind force 4 or above should only be considered for the very experienced. The Weather Report noted moderate to fresh winds of Beaufort force 4 or 5. Having regard to the lack of experience on the part of at least two of the Participants (who could not be categorised as "very experienced"), it follows that insufficient regard was had to the recommendation outlined at Section 7.4 of the CoP and accordingly, at least in respect of two of the Participants (given their inexperience), the Tour should not have departed. The organiser's observations did not refer to the CoP so it is reasonable to assume that no regard was had to its contents. Disregard for the CoP contributed to the decision to embark on a potentially unsafe Tour. In addition, the qualifications ascribed by the organiser's observations to one or other of the Instructors (kayaking Level 3 Sea Skills, kayaking Level 4 Training and kayaking Level 2 Instructor) did not meet the appropriate qualifications recommended by CI for an instructor taking out a group in conditions similar to those which were encountered on the Tour (Section 4.11 and 4.13 of this report) even if the Instructor qualification was referable to Sea rather than River conditions.
- 5.3 As described by the Fisher who went to the assistance of the Small Group, his recollections of the local conditions were such that the combination of an ebb tide with wind from the south/south west had the effect of wind against tide giving rise to "white horses" and a sea swell of approximately 1.5 m. While this contradicts the data evident from the tidal streams, for the reasons outlined at Section 4.24 of this report whether at the time of the incident the tide was flowing south (as the Fisher recalls) or flowing north (as the tidal stream diagrams (HW-3 and HW-2) indicate), challenging sea conditions were encountered. Section 7.4 of the CoP notes (Appendix 7.13), sea kayakers should be aware of the effects of interaction between wind and tide on the sea states. It therefore follows having regard to sea conditions experienced at the time of the incident that

insufficient regard was had to those conditions. In effect the conditions were such that the Tour should not have commenced in these conditions.

The organiser's observations did not refer to the CoP so it is reasonable to assume that insufficient regard was paid to its contents. Disregard for the CoP contributed to the decision to embark on a potentially unsafe Tour. The organiser's observations state that the conclusions in this paragraph are based entirely on the Fisher's observations and includes "*conjecture on his musings*". For the reasons stated at Sections 4.24 and 4.25, notwithstanding the inconsistency in relation to tidal stream, challenging conditions (according to the Participants and Fisher) were encountered. This is not based entirely on the Fisher but on what the Participants experienced and on the objective evidence of the Weather Reports.

- 5.4 Having regard to the sea conditions experienced at the time of the incident, the required level of instructor for sea kayaking recommended by CI's website appears to be "Level 4 Sea instructor". It has not been possible to determine the levels of the Instructors in the Group, although the overall ratio of Participants to Instructors was in keeping with that identified by CI's website (Appendix 7.16) namely a ratio of 1:4. While it is the case that CI has neither a statutory nor a mandatory remit in relation to instruction, training and awards it is the national governing body and the apparent complete disregard for its instructor training regime seems to have contributed to the decision to embark on a potentially unsafe Tour.
- 5.5 In view of the risks associated with "cold shock" and hypothermia as noted in the extract from Water Safety Ireland (Appendix 7.19), there existed a risk that an inexperienced Participant, should they become immersed in the water, could suffer from either or both. While such a risk can never be eliminated, it can be managed by using the "Prevention" steps outlined by Water Safety Ireland. In addition, two of the Participants indicated that no warnings were given to them that they would become immersed in the water. They also indicate that they were not told what to do in the event of their becoming immersed in the water. Having regard to the experience of one of the Participants in the Small Group, a forewarning of what to expect if immersed in the sea and safety instructions as to what to do (or not to do) should have been issued before the put-in.
- 5.6 Insufficient regard appears to have been paid to MN9/2003. No reference is made to this in the organiser's observations. If adequate consideration had been given to all applicable factors, the incident might have been avoided. Of the factors listed by MN9/2003, for the reasons stated earlier in this report, weather and tides were a factor. As to the factor (identified in MN9/2003), "limitation of the vessel" no records have been produced in relation to those in use on the day of the incident, the only available record being the photograph at Appendix 7.1 and the organiser's description of the cockpit kayaks (Section 2.1.3 of this report). Accordingly, it is not possible to determine the relevance of this factor. MN9/2003

also notes that account should be taken of the experience and physical ability of “the crew”. While clearly the Participants who paid for the tour were not “crew” within the ordinary meaning of that word, the import of the necessity for such consideration arguably applies equally to those participating in a sea kayaking tour, most notably the effect on such participants of cold and tiredness. In particular, it is noted that the Fisher who went to the assistance of the Small Group noted that the female kayakers whom he took on board were tired, cold, wet and fatigued and would not have made it ashore on their own. It does not appear that navigational changes were a factor. As no records were made available, it has not been possible to determine what contingency planning was in place. MN9/2003 also notes that account should be taken of contingency planning. No contingency plan was referred to by the organiser’s observations. In the organiser’s observations, it is stated that a detailed form is required to be completed by persons when booking a tour. The forms signed by any of the Participants on the Tour in question were not provided. According to one Participant, she completed a form for her first excursion with the organiser a month previously but did not complete a second for the Tour while the other Participant does not recall completing any form. The form contains a detailed purported waiver of any liability on the part of the organiser. It is not the function of this report to comment on its legal validity. A waiver of liability form is not a substitute for the proper assessment of conditions and participants in a sporting or recreational activity on the water. Planning for an activity requires contingency planning for what is to happen if someone gets into difficulty. The First Participant described her experience of the incident at Sections 3.8 -3.16 of this report. The organiser stated of the First Participant *“On the 13 September we had a client who was not keen to get back into her kayak and who was feeling tired. She was eventually returned to her kayak with the help of three instructors. If one floats in the sea the effect of wind and water will carry you somewhere. That is the nature of floating in the sea. It doesn't mean that the conditions were inappropriate”, and, “one woman capsized more than once and needed some convincing to get back into her kayak”. I have no wish to embarrass anyone and I don't see the need to say any more other than she was eventually returned to her kayak, and that she was not in the water for 40 minutes, though she was in the water for longer than usual”*. Proper safety planning requires acknowledgment of the fact that not everyone will react in the same way when subjected to circumstances that are, to them at least, perceived as threatening. The First Participant was in an uncontrolled situation in and out of the water for a period of approximately 40 minutes. Over this time two instructors had been unsuccessful in addressing the situation, and even when the third Instructor arrived (leaving the Large Group unsupervised, or supervised by the organiser who had to paddle out to them) the First Participant was not able to proceed independently (she describes having to be held in the kayak by that Instructor). No information was provided of any contingency planning for what was to happen if someone or, a number of Participants encountered difficulties. The ready availability of a rescue boat would have provided appropriate facilities in the event that a situation arose.

- 5.7 MN9/2003 requires that “...someone ashore knows the plans of the trip and knows what to do should they become concerned for the crews’ wellbeing”. It also refers to the “Yacht and Boat Safety Scheme” operated by the IRCG and that all vessels planning “...to sail off-shore are encouraged to submit a Sail Plan before commencing the voyage”. Whilst the organiser of the Tour was aware of it, and in a position to go to the assistance of the Large Group when the incident unfolded, it has not been possible to determine whether there was in place a plan for the Tour should it get into difficulties. No information was provided to the MCIB of any contingency planning for what was to happen if someone or, a number of Participants on the Tour encountered difficulties.
- 5.8 As it has not been possible to determine the relevant qualifications of the Instructors, it cannot be said whether their qualifications were consistent with CI’s recommendations as to their adequacy to enable them to safely bring out the Participants, having regard to the weather and sea conditions. Even if the Instructors had Level 4 Sea instructor or Level 5 Sea instructor qualifications (per CI accreditation), given the Weather Report, Sea Area Forecast and the sea conditions at the time of the incident and that at least two of the Participants had insignificant experience, it follows, given Section 7.4 of the CoP (which recommends that canoeing in wind force 4 or above should only be considered for the very experienced) (Appendix 7.13), that at least those two Participants should not have been out, regardless of the qualifications or experience of the Instructors or other Participants.
- 5.9 The alert to the emergency services came from three “999” calls from members of the public who witnessed the incident from the shore as it unfolded. Based on the IRCG SITREP and Report (Appendix 7.7), there appears to be no record of any communication over VHF between the Tour Group and the organiser or Instructors, such VHF “traffic” as is recorded on the IRCG SITREP and Report being that exchanged between the emergency services among themselves to co-ordinate the operation and as between the Fisher and the rescue services.
- 5.10 As noted earlier in the report where the contents of the organiser’s observations on the draft report were not corroborated by any other information or documentary records, no changes were considered to be warranted to the Report. Changes were made to the draft report circulated under Section 36 of the Act where they were warranted. A further draft report was sent to the organiser. In the response made the organiser advanced, for the first time, evidence described as being provided to her by the Fisher. As that evidence was inconsistent with what had been stated by the Fisher to the investigator, the investigator asked the Fisher whether such engagement, as advanced in the response, had taken place, and was advised that no such communication as described in the response took place with him.

## 6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

### Preamble

Notwithstanding that certain information has not been made available to the MCIB in this investigation, the following safety recommendations are made in particular having regard to the findings in the Maritime Safety Strategy 2015-2019 and the first report from the National Search and Rescue Plan. The Board is also conscious of the publically reported heightened recreational water activities during Covid-19 restrictions on vacationing options, with the greater risk of incidents occurring.

In 2015 the then Minister for Transport Tourism and Sport published the Maritime Safety Strategy 2015-2019. The Report records that in the 12-year period from 2002 to 2013, there were 137 fatalities which were related to recreational craft, fishing vessels, passenger vessels and cargo ships. The vessel categories most at risk in relation to fatalities are recreational craft and fishing vessels, followed by passenger vessels and cargo ships. MCIB investigation reports indicate that there are similarities in the events which contribute to the loss of life in the maritime sector. Based on analysis of MCIB reports, on fatalities arising since 2002, combined with information from IRCG incident reports, ten factors have been identified in the Report which tend to arise most frequently.

Although the focus is on fatalities, similar factors contribute to incidents where there has been no loss of life. Thus by tackling the factors highlighted, both fatalities and incidents overall can be reduced. The prevalence of these factors is borne out by the practical experience of the IRCG in its management of emergency response in the maritime sector.

The Reports also notes that *“A common underlying factor when reading through the MCIB reports over the years is the need for an enhanced culture of safety in the maritime sector; this factor is therefore listed first. There is a strong sense that insufficient attention is paid by individuals to maritime safety as a matter of course. Taking to the water is so familiar that it risks being taken for granted, and basic safety checks overlooked. The safety culture will only change when it becomes second nature for people to think ‘safety first’ when planning and undertaking a voyage or water-based activity.*

*The MCIB reports have indicated that a lack of compliance with maritime safety requirements can be a factor in marine casualties and that better enforcement could address this issue. Enforcement can be improved, and additional deterrents can be put in place, but these actions alone will not be enough - a dramatic change in attitudes and practice across the maritime sector is the main requirement to improve maritime safety.”*

The MCIB has also had regard to the developments in enhancing Search and Rescue (SAR) in Ireland and the publication of a National Search and Rescue Plan in 2019 by the

Minister of State with responsibility for Maritime Transport, Department of Transport. This measure was in part in response to a previous MCIB report and recommendations.

The MCIB notes the publication in September 2020 of the first report from the National Search and Rescue Plan by the Minister of State with responsibility for Maritime Transport, Department of Transport.

See at: [https://merrionstreet.ie/en/News-Room/Releases/NSP\\_Annual\\_Report.pdf](https://merrionstreet.ie/en/News-Room/Releases/NSP_Annual_Report.pdf).

The MCIB has previously welcomed the 2020 report and notes the areas identified for further work at part 6 of the report including the Health and Safety Forum priorities which includes:

*The joint development of a reporting format to provide stakeholders' information pertaining to known incidents/near-misses, for publication (by Q4 2020) within each member's respective organization in support of Continuous Improvement.*

The MCIB has published a number of reports in relation to marine casualties involving canoeing and kayaking which confirm the observations made in the Maritime Safety Strategy.

The MCIB also notes that the provisions of Section 20 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1992 as amended by the 2000 Act whereby the Minister may make regulations including for the following under Section 20(2):

- (e) for the registration of specified classes of pleasure craft and the licensing or certification of masters or persons in control of or operating pleasure craft or specified classes of pleasure craft,*
- (f) (i) regulate the use of pleasure craft or specified classes of pleasure craft by reference to the age or other qualifications of masters or persons in control of or operating pleasure craft or pleasure craft of a specified class,*
  - ii) regulate or prohibit the use of pleasure craft or specified classes of pleasure craft in particular circumstances, and the consumption of alcohol or drugs by masters or persons in control of or operating pleasure craft or pleasure craft of a specified class,*
- (g) prohibit the use of pleasure craft or specified classes of pleasure craft unless there are in force policies of insurance under which the owners of the pleasure craft or, if the pleasure craft are on hire, the persons to whom they are on hire are insured to a specified extent against specified risks relating to the use of the pleasure craft,*

## Recommendations to the Minister for Transport.

- 6.1 While the requirements set out at Chapter 7 of Code of Practice have been highlighted by Marine Notices 31 of 2019 and 30 of 2020, consideration should be given to an assessment of the most effective way of delivering the important safety content of the Code of Practice. Chapter 7 requirements should also be highlighted again by means of a further Marine Notice, especially to commercial providers.
- 6.2 Consideration should be given to the establishment of a directory of commercial providers of coastal sea and river paddle facilities.
- 6.3 Consideration should be given to how best to enhance safety standards within the commercial paddlesport provider sector including whether a mandatory registration or licencing scheme which requires the registration of instructors and their qualifications should be introduced.
- 6.4 Consideration should be given to a mandatory requirement that commercial providers of coastal sea kayaking facilities register in advance with the local Coast Guard to ensure that the rescue services are aware, in advance, of the group's itinerary, departure and return times, as well as numbers in the group.
- 6.5 Consideration should be given to the mandatory use of suitably licensed VHF radios by commercial providers of coastal sea kayaking facilities.
- 6.6 Consideration should be given to including in the Code of Practice guidance for hazard identification and avoidance with recommendations for minimum rescue facilities.

## Recommendations to Canoeing Ireland.

- 6.7 That Canoeing Ireland in conjunction with Sports Ireland consider establishing a programme to facilitate Canoeing Ireland in establishing a scheme for the mandatory audit of safety policies and practises in clubs in collaboration with related sport national governing body, and, insofar as it is possible, the audit of instructors in commercial paddlesport providers.
- 6.8 That Canoeing Ireland consider whether a safety audit and compliance system could be developed within its instructor training and registration system so that registered instructors have training in relation to safety requirements including those in the Code of Practice and Marine Notices, and so that Canoeing Ireland could better contribute to safety through its regulation of its accreditation and registration system.




- 6.9 That Canoeing Ireland consider developing a safety compliance system in conjunction with its Registered Provider Programme through its regulation of its accreditation and registration system.


## 7. APPENDICES

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Appendix 7.1 Photograph of Two Kayaks



## Appendix 7.2 Location Diagram



Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



**Met Éireann**

**The Irish Meteorological Service**

Climate Services  
Glasnevin Hill  
Dublin 9

Seirbhísí Aeráide  
Cnoc Ghlas Naíon  
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Tel: +353-1-8064260  
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Our Ref: WS1730/2010\_11

Your Ref: MCIB/12/304

**Estimated weather and sea state conditions for the coastal area 1 nautical mile east of Coliemore Harbour (east of Dalkey Island latitude/longitude: 53° 17.22' N 6° 5.50' W) on the afternoon of Sunday 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 (time of accident: 18:00 hours approximately).**

**Meteorological synopsis:** A moderate to fresh south-southwesterly airflow covered Ireland on the 13<sup>th</sup> as an Atlantic depression (1004 hPa) to the northwest of the country tracked northeastwards as it filled; the associated frontal trough was slow-moving off the west coast. An anticyclone of 1028 hPa over central Europe extended a ridge of high pressure eastwards across Ireland during the evening and overnight; the airflow backed southeasterly on the 14<sup>th</sup>.

**Estimate of weather & sea state conditions:**

**13-Sep-2020 12:00 – 18:00 hours UTC:**

**Weather:** Fine; mostly clear skies and sunny spells.


**Temperature:** Air temperature 15 or 16 degrees Celsius

**Wind:** Moderate to fresh south-southwesterly backed southerly – Beaufort 4 or 5 - (mean wind speed 15 – 20 knots) with occasional gusts up to 30 knots.

**Visibility:** Good (greater than 10 nm)

**Sea State:** The sea state is estimated to have been slight to moderate with significant wave height between 0.5 and 1.5 m with a south-southwesterly wave direction and an estimated wave period of 4 or 5 seconds.

**Sea temperature:** 15 degrees Celsius.



Met Éireann, The Irish Meteorological Service  
Climate Services, Research and Applications Division  
Legal Unit | Email: [legal@met.ie](mailto:legal@met.ie)

Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



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
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
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**Synoptic Chart 12UTC 13-September-2020**



**Satellite picture 13-Sep-2020 17:00 UTC**



Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



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
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**Observations 13-September-2020 from nearest (land based) Meteorological Station including Windrose. Station Dublin Airport**



Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



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
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**Observations 14-September-2020 from nearest (land based) Meteorological Station including Windrose. Station Dublin Airport**





Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



**Met Éireann**

The Irish Meteorological Service

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**Observations (3 hourly) 13-September-2020 12:00 noon to 14-September-2020 12:00 noon from offshore weather buoy M2 (stno = 62091 approximate location decimal degrees: 53.481 -5.430)**

Date – time (UTC)	sig_wave_height (meter)	max_wave_height (meter)	wave_direction (degree)	sig_wave_period (second)	Wind-direction	Wind-speed (knots)	Wind-gust (knots)
13-Sep-2020 12:00:00	1.6	2.5	178.6	5.0	199.3	19.9	25.1
13-Sep-2020 15:00:00	2.0	3.0	181.4	5.0	189.5	24.5	28.9
13-Sep-2020 18:00:00	2.2	2.8	184.2	4.7	181.4	26.2	33.0
13-Sep-2020 21:00:00	1.4	1.8	184.2	4.3	189.8	17.1	22.2
14-Sep-2020 00:00:00	1.4	2.1	184.2	4.8	192.7	15.2	20.1
14-Sep-2020 03:00:00	0.9	1.6	178.6	4.2	190.2	13.7	16.4
14-Sep-2020 06:00:00	0.8	1.1	181.4	3.5	177.9	11.2	13.7
14-Sep-2020 09:00:00	0.6	0.8	182.8	3.3	175.8	12.2	17.2
14-Sep-2020 12:00:00	0.5	0.7	168.8	3.6	166.3	9.4	11.7

Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



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Tel: +353-1-8064260  
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**Copies of Archived Sea Area Forecasts as were issued at the time between 12:00 hours 13-Sept-2020 and 12:00 hours 14-Sept-2020**

<p><b>24-hour Sea Area Forecast</b>                  Updated at 0000 / 0600 / 1200 / 1800</p> <p>Sea Area Forecast until 1200 Monday, 14 September 2020                  Issued at 1200 Sunday, 13 September 2020</p> <p>1. Gale warning: Nil                  Small craft warning: In operation</p> <p>2. Meteorological situation at 0900: Ireland lies between a 1020hPa anticyclone over central Europe and a depression of 1004hPa north of Ireland, tracking northwards. This is generating a strong southwesterly airflow over the country.</p> <p>3. Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Slyne Head to Rossan Point to Malin Head</p> <p>Wind: Southwest force 5 or 6, later decreasing force 4 or 5 before backing south to southwest and easing force 3 or 4.                  Weather: Mainly fair, but patchy drizzle, mist or fog locally                  Visibility: Mostly good, but moderate or poor in rain, drizzle, mist or fog.</p> <p>Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Malin Head to Houth Head to Carramore Point and for the Irish Sea</p> <p>Wind: Southwest force 4 to 6 and veering force 5 on the Irish Sea. Decreasing force 4 to 5 soon. Later decreasing southwesterly or variable force 3 or 4.                  Weather: Mainly fair, but patchy drizzle, mist or fog locally                  Visibility: Mostly good, but moderate or poor in rain, drizzle, mist or fog.</p> <p>Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Carramore Point to Mizen Head to Slyne Head</p> <p>Wind: Southwest force 4 to 6 soon backing south to southwest and decreasing force 3 or 4. Later further backing east to southeast and increasing force 4 or 5 and gusty.                  Weather: Mainly fair, but patchy drizzle, mist or fog locally, showers                  Visibility: Mostly good, but moderate or poor in rain, drizzle, mist or fog.</p> <p>Warning of Heavy Swell: Nil</p> <p>4. Outlook for a further 24 hours until 1200 Tuesday 15 September 2020: Moderate to fresh and gusty southwesterly winds along the south and west. Moderate to fresh southwesterly or variable winds along the west coast, easing light to moderate later. Weather: Showery rain, heavy at times, developing along south, west and northwesterly coasts, mostly fair with isolated showers elsewhere.</p>	<p><b>Text of Gale Warning</b>                  Nil</p> <p><b>Text of Small Craft Warning</b>                  Southwest winds will occasionally reach force 6 or higher today (Sunday) on coasts from Valentia to Malin Head to Carramore Point</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Coastal Reports</th> <th>12 Noon Sunday, 13 September 2020</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Malin Head Automatic</td> <td>Southwest, 26 Knots, Gust 37 Knots, Cloudy, 14 Miles, 1011, Rising slowly</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Dublin Airport</td> <td>West-Southwest, 10 Knots, Gust 21 Knots, Fair, 20 Miles, 1017, Rising slowly</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Buoy M5 61° 41'N 6° 42'W</td> <td>South-Southwest, 13 Knots, Wave Ht. 1.3 m. 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<p><b>24-hour Sea Area Forecast</b>                  Updated at 0000 / 0600 / 1200 / 1800</p> <p>Sea Area Forecast until 1800 Monday, 14 September 2020                  Issued at 1800 Sunday, 13 September 2020</p> <p>1. Gale warning: Nil                  Small craft warning: In operation</p> <p>2. Meteorological situation at 1500: A mostly moderate to fresh and very humid south to southwesterly airflow covers Ireland. It follows an extensive anticyclone of 1024 hPa over central Europe and low pressure systems to the west and north. A weak depression to the northwest is tracking northwards and filling. As it does so, the airflow over Ireland will back south to southwest and slacken.</p> <p>3. Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Slyne Head to Rossan Point to Fair Head</p> <p>Wind: Southwest to south, force 5 to 7 and gusty. Soon decreasing force 4 to 6, strengthened in the northwest. Later decreasing southerly, force 4. Winds backing southeasterly force 4 or 5 by the end of the period, possibly force 6 in the west.                  Weather: Patches of drizzle, mist or fog but otherwise fair. Outbreaks of rain developing on Monday.                  Visibility: Moderate or poor at times locally in rain, drizzle, mist or fog.</p> <p>Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Fair Head to Houth Head to Carramore Point and for the Irish Sea</p> <p>Wind: South to southwesterly, force 5 or 6 and gusty, locally force 7 at first in the Irish Sea. Immediately decreasing force 4 or 5, locally force 6 in the Irish Sea. Soon decreasing southerly force 3 or 4. Later backing southwesterly force 2 to 4. Further backing southwesterly to east or variable force 2 to 4 by the end of the period.                  Weather: Mainly fair, but patchy drizzle, mist or fog locally                  Visibility: Mostly good, but moderate or poor in drizzle, mist or fog.</p> <p>Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Carramore Point to Mizen Head to Slyne Head</p> <p>Wind: Mainly south to southwesterly, force 3 or 4, but force 5 or 6 for a time between Valentia and Slyne Head, immediately decreasing, mainly south to southwesterly force 3 or 4, except between Valentia and Loop Head. Soon backing south to southwesterly force 3 or 4. Later increasing southeasterly force 4 to 6, stronger in the southwest and west.                  Weather: Patches of drizzle, mist or fog but otherwise fair. Outbreaks of rain developing on Monday.                  Visibility: Moderate or poor at times locally in rain, drizzle, mist or fog.</p> <p>Warning of Heavy Swell: Nil</p> <p>4. Outlook for a further 24 hours until 1800 Tuesday 15 September 2020: Mostly moderate southwesterly to east winds, backing southwesterly to south, strong for a time locally in the west and north, decreasing light to moderate westerly or variable. Showery rain, heavy at times, developing along south, west and northwesterly coasts. Mainly fair elsewhere, with isolated showers.</p>	<p><b>Text of Gale Warning</b>                  Nil</p> <p><b>Text of Small Craft Warning</b>                  South to southwest winds will reach force 6 or higher this evening (Sunday) and for a time on Sunday night on Irish coasts from Valentia to Fair Head to Carramore Point</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Coastal Reports</th> <th>5 PM Sunday, 13 September 2020</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Malin Head Automatic</td> <td>South-Southwest, 16 Knots, Gust 29 Knots, Cloudy, 10 Miles, 1013, Rising slowly</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Dublin Airport</td> <td>South-Southwest, 11 Knots, Gust 21 Knots, Fine, 30 Miles, 1017, Steady</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Buoy M5 61° 41'N 6° 42'W</td> <td>South-Southwest, 10 Knots, Wave Ht. 1.3 m. 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Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



**Met Éireann**  
The Irish Meteorological Service  
Climate Services  
Glasnevin Hill  
Dublin 9

Seirbhísi Aeráide  
Cnoc Ghlas Naíon  
Baile Átha Cliath 9

Tel: +353-1-8064260  
Email: enq@met.ie  
Email: legal@met.ie

Our Ref: WS1730/2010\_11

Your Ref: MCIB/12/304

## 24-hour Sea Area Forecast

Updated at 0000 / 0600 / 1200 / 1800

Sea Area Forecast until 0000 Tuesday, 15 September 2020  
Issued at 0000 Monday, 14 September 2020

**1. Gale warning:** Nil  
**Small craft warning:** In operation

**2. Meteorological situation at 2100:** A mostly moderate to fresh and humid south to southwest airflow covers Ireland, between an extensive anticyclone of 1025 hPa over central Europe and areas of low pressure to the west and north. A wave depression to the northwest of Ireland continues to track northwards whilst filling. As it does so, the airflow over Ireland will back south to southeasterly and slacken.

**3. Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Slyne Head to Rossein Point to Main Head**  
Wind: South to southwest force 4 to 6, reaching force 7 locally in the northwest. Decreasing southerly force 4 to 6 erratically. Soon backing south to southeast and decreasing force 3 to 4. Becoming mainly southwest force 3 to 5 later but touching force 6 locally south of Erris Head.  
Weather: Patches of drizzle, mist or fog but otherwise fair. Outbreaks of rain developing on Monday.  
Visibility: Moderate or poor at times locally in rain, drizzle, mist or fog.

**Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Main Head to Howth Head to Roches Point and for the Irish Sea**  
Wind: South to southwest force 4 or 5, occasionally force 6 in the Irish Sea at first. Decreasing southerly force 3 or 4 erratically. Soon backing southeast to east and increasing force 4 to 6. Becoming mainly southwest later and decreasing force 3 to 5 by the end of period.  
Weather: Mainly fair, but patchy drizzle, mist or fog locally.  
Visibility: Mainly good, but moderate or poor in drizzle, mist or fog.

**Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Roches Point to Valentia to Slyne Head**  
Wind: South to southwest force 4 or 5, occasionally force 6 at first north of Loop Head. Erratically decreasing force 3 or 4. Soon backing southeast to east and increasing force 4 to 6. Becoming mainly southwest later and decreasing force 3 to 5 by the end of period.  
Weather: Patches of drizzle, mist or fog but otherwise fair. Outbreaks of rain developing on Monday.  
Visibility: Moderate or poor at times locally in rain, drizzle, mist or fog.

**Warning of Heavy Swell:** Nil

**4. Outlook for a further 24 hours until 0000 Wednesday, 16 September 2020:** Mostly moderate southwest to west winds, becoming light to moderate southerly or variable on Tuesday morning, increasing moderate to fresh or strong northeasterly on northwestern coasts on Tuesday night. Scattered showers, possibly heavy, becoming confined to southern and western coasts later. Mist and fog patches also.

Text of Gale Warning	
Nil	

Text of Small Craft Warning	
South to southwest winds will reach force 6 or higher overnight on Irish Coasts from Slyne Head to Rossein Point to Main Head. 2. Southeast winds will occasionally reach force 6 during Monday on Irish Coasts from Mizen Head to Loop Head to Erris Head.	

Coastal Reports	
11 PM Sunday, 13 September 2020	
Main Head Automatic	Southwest, 18 Knots, Fair, 24 Miles, 1015, Rising slowly
Dublin Airport	South-Southwest, 9 Knots, Fair, 16 Miles, 1019, Rising slowly
Buoy M3 51° 41'N 0° 42'W	South, 10 Knots, Wave H 0.9 m, The visibility of Turku is greater than 10 Miles, 1023, Rising slowly
Roches Point Automatic	South-Southwest, 8 Knots, Fair, 23 Miles, 1020, Steady
Sherkin Island Automatic	South-Southwest, 9 Knots, Cloudy, 10 Miles, 1019, Rising slowly
Valentia Automatic	South, 7 Knots, Cloudy, 8 Miles, 1018, Rising slowly
Mace Head Automatic	South, 11 Knots, Cloudy, 10 Miles, 1017, Rising slowly
Beinmhuil Automatic	South-Southwest, 21 Knots, Cloudy, 7 Miles, 1015, Rising slowly
Buoy M1 53° 0'N, 11° 12'W	Report not available
Buoy M2 53° 29'N, 0° 28'W	South-Southwest, 16 Knots, Wave height not available, 1019, Rising slowly
Buoy M3 51° 13'N, 10° 33'W	Report not available
Buoy M4 50° 0'N 10° 0'W	South-Southwest, 27 Knots, Wave Ht 3.8 m, 1013, Rising slowly
Buoy M5 53° 4'N 10° 56'W	South-Southwest, 11 Knots, Wave Ht 3.4 m, 1010, Rising slowly

Disclaimer: Buoy locations are approximate and are not for navigational purposes

Sea Crossings	
State of sea until 0000 Wednesday 16 September 2020	
Dublin - Holyhead	Decreasing slight overnight
Rosslane - South Wales	Decreasing slight overnight
Cork - South Wales	Slight to moderate, decreasing slight Monday night
Rosslane - France	Moderate, decreasing slight to moderate Monday night
Cork - France	Moderate, decreasing slight to moderate Monday night

Next update before 0700 Monday, 14 September 2020

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## 24-hour Sea Area Forecast

Updated at 0000 / 0600 / 1200 / 1800

Sea Area Forecast until 0600 Tuesday, 15 September 2020  
Issued at 0600 Monday, 14 September 2020

**1. Gale warning:** Nil  
**Small craft warning:** In operation

**2. Meteorological situation at 0300:** A mostly moderate to fresh and humid southerly airflow covers Ireland, between an extensive anticyclone of 1031 hPa over central Europe and low pressure systems in the Atlantic. A wave depression located to the far northwest of Scotland continues to track northwards whilst filling. As it does so, the airflow over Ireland will back south to southeast allowing a depression to the southwest to steal slowly troughs over the country.

**3. Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Mizen Head to Loop Head to Erris Head**  
Wind: South to southwest force 4 or 5, soon backing southeast to east force 4 to 6. Decreasing south to southwest force 4 or 5 later.  
Weather: Scattered showers with patches of mist and fog. Showers merging to rain at times today.  
Visibility: Moderate or poor at times in rain, drizzle, mist or fog.

**Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Erris Head to Bloody Foreland to Fair Head**  
Wind: South to southwest force 4 to 6, backing south to southeast erratically and decreasing force 3 or 4. Soon becoming mainly southeast, increasing force 3 to 5 later, possibly touching force 6 locally.  
Weather: Scattered showers with patches of mist and fog. Showers merging to rain at times today.  
Visibility: Moderate or poor at times in rain, drizzle, mist or fog.

**Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Fair Head to Carnore Point to Mizen Head and for the Irish Sea**  
Wind: Southerly force 3 or 4, touching force 5 locally west of Roches Point. Soon becoming easterly or variable force 2 to 4.  
Weather: Isolated showers. Mist and fog patches.  
Visibility: Moderate or poor in showers, mist or fog. Otherwise mostly good.

**Warning of Heavy Swell:** Nil

**4. Outlook for a further 24 hours until 0600 Wednesday 16 September 2020:** Light to moderate southerly or variable winds, becoming east or northeast later, fresh at times in the northwest. Scattered showers, possibly heavy, soon becoming confined to southern and western coasts. Mist and fog patches also.

Text of Gale Warning	
Nil	

Text of Small Craft Warning	
Southeast winds will occasionally reach force 6 today (Monday) on Irish Coasts from Mizen Head to Loop Head to Erris Head.	

Coastal Reports	
6 AM Monday, 14 September 2020	
Main Head Automatic	South-Southwest, 11 Knots, Cloudy, 20 Miles, 1010, Rising slowly
Dublin Airport	East-Southwest, 4 Knots, Fair, 10 Miles, 1018, Falling slowly
Buoy M3 51° 41'N 0° 42'W	Southwest, 7 Knots, Wave H 0.9 m, The visibility of Turku is greater than 10 Miles, 1010, Falling slowly
Roches Point Automatic	Southeast, 9 Knots, Mist, 2 Miles, 1018, Falling slowly
Sherkin Island Automatic	East-Southwest, 11 Knots, Mist, 3 Miles, 1017, Falling slowly
Valentia Automatic	Southwest, 7 Knots, Fair, 21 Miles, 1015, Falling slowly
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Beinmhuil Automatic	South-Southwest, 14 Knots, Gust 25 Knots, Cloudy, 9 Miles, 1015, Rising slowly
Buoy M1 53° 0'N, 11° 12'W	Report not available
Buoy M2 53° 29'N, 0° 28'W	South, 11 Knots, Wave height not available, 1010, Falling slowly
Buoy M3 51° 13'N, 10° 33'W	Report not available
Buoy M4 50° 0'N 10° 0'W	South-Southwest, 20 Knots, Wave Ht 3.7 m, 1014, Rising slowly
Buoy M5 53° 4'N 10° 56'W	South, 4 Knots, Wave Ht 3.4 m, 1011, Steady

Disclaimer: Buoy locations are approximate and are not for navigational purposes

Sea Crossings	
State of sea until 0600 Wednesday 16 September 2020	
Dublin - Holyhead	Slight
Rosslane - South Wales	Slight
Cork - South Wales	Slight to moderate, decreasing slight Monday night
Rosslane - France	Moderate, decreasing slight to moderate Monday night
Cork - France	Moderate, decreasing slight to moderate Monday night

Next update before 1300 Monday, 14 September 2020

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## Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



### Met Éireann

The Irish Meteorological Service

Climate Services  
Glasnevin Hill  
Dublin 9

Seirbhísi Aeráide  
Cnoc Ghlas Naíon  
Baile Átha Cliath 9

Tel: +353-1-8064260  
Email: enq@met.ie  
Email: legal@met.ie

Our Ref: WS1730/2010 11

Your Ref: MCIB/12/304

Met Éireann																																																					
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<p><b>1. Gale warning:</b> Nil</p> <p><b>Small craft warning:</b> In operation</p> <p><b>2. Meteorological situation at 0900:</b> Ireland lies in a moderate southeasterly air-flow between high pressure of 1030hPa centred over eastern Europe and low pressure of 1000hPa centred west of the Bay of Biscay. Showery troughs will track up the west coast today.</p> <p><b>3. Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Rossan Point to Carlingford Lough to Roche's Point and for the Irish Sea</b></p> <p><b>Wind:</b> Southwest or east force 3 or 4, occasionally force 5 off the north coast. Becoming south to southwest force 3 or 4 later, variable at times in the Irish Sea.</p> <p><b>Weather:</b> Patches of mist and drizzle with isolated showers, otherwise fair.</p> <p><b>Visibility:</b> Generally moderate to good, poor in mist.</p> <p><b>Forecast for Irish coastal waters from Roche's Point to Slysne Head to Rossan Point</b></p> <p><b>Wind:</b> Southwest force 4 or 5 and occasionally reaching force 6. Becoming south to southwest force 3 or 4 later.</p> <p><b>Weather:</b> Scattered showers with patches of mist. Isolated fronsáirneam possible.</p> <p><b>Visibility:</b> Generally moderate to good, poor in mist.</p> <p><b>Warning of Heavy Swell:</b> Nil</p> <p><b>4. Outlook for a further 24 hours until 1200 Wednesday 16 September 2020:</b> Light to moderate southerly or variable winds, becoming east or northeast later, fresh at times in the northwest. Scattered showers, possibly heavy, soon becoming confined to southern and western coasts. Mist and fog patches also.</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;"><b>Text of Gale Warning</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">Nil</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;"><b>Text of Small Craft Warning</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">Southeast winds will occasionally reach force 6 today (Monday) on Irish coasts from Mizen Head to Loop Head to Erris Head</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><b>Coastal Reports</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">12 Noon Monday, 14 September 2020</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Main Head Automatic</b></td> <td>South, 11 Knots, Fair, 10 Miles, 1010, Rising slowly</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Dublin Airport</b></td> <td>East, 9 Knots, Cloudy, 21 Miles, 1019, Steady</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Busy M6 41°N 6°42'W</b></td> <td>Southeast, 8 Knots, Wave 10.0m, Two visibility at Tuckers is 9 Miles, 1019, Steady</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Roche's Point Automatic</b></td> <td>East, 13 Knots, Becoming rain, 14 Miles, 1018, Rising slowly</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Sharn Island Automatic</b></td> <td>East, 9 Knots, Began shower, 14 Miles, 1017, Steady</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Valeria Automatic</b></td> <td>Southeast, 7 Knots, Cloudy, 21 Miles, 1017, Falling slowly</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Mace Head Automatic</b></td> <td>East, 10 Knots, Becoming drizzle, 18 Miles, 1016, Steady</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Gettraher Automatic</b></td> <td>South, 8 Knots, Rain shower, 4 Miles, 1017, Rising slowly</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Busy M1 63° 8'N, 11° 12'W</b></td> <td>Report not available</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Busy M2 63° 20'N, 9° 20'W</b></td> <td>South-southwest, 12 Knots, Wave height not available, 1019, Steady</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Busy M3 51° 15'N, 12° 35'W</b></td> <td>Report not available</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Busy M4 66° 0'N 0'W</b></td> <td>South, 12 Knots, Wave ht 2.9m, 1017, Rising slowly</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Busy M5 63° 4'N 18° 38'W</b></td> <td>Northwest, 11 Knots, Wave M 2.2m, 1017, Steady</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><b>Disclaimer:</b> Busy locations are approximate and are not for navigational purposes.</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><b>Sea Crossings</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Dublin - Holyhead</b></td> <td>State of sea until 1200 Wednesday 16 September 2020</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Rosslare - South Wales</b></td> <td>Slight</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Cork - South Wales</b></td> <td>Slight to moderate, decreasing slight Friday night</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Rosslare - France</b></td> <td>Moderate, decreasing slight to moderate Monday night</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Cork - France</b></td> <td>Moderate, decreasing slight to moderate Monday night</td> </tr> </table> <p>Next update before 1800 Monday, 14 September 2020</p>	<b>Text of Gale Warning</b>		Nil		<b>Text of Small Craft Warning</b>		Southeast winds will occasionally reach force 6 today (Monday) on Irish coasts from Mizen Head to Loop Head to Erris Head		<b>Coastal Reports</b>		12 Noon Monday, 14 September 2020		<b>Main Head Automatic</b>	South, 11 Knots, Fair, 10 Miles, 1010, Rising slowly	<b>Dublin Airport</b>	East, 9 Knots, Cloudy, 21 Miles, 1019, Steady	<b>Busy M6 41°N 6°42'W</b>	Southeast, 8 Knots, Wave 10.0m, Two visibility at Tuckers is 9 Miles, 1019, Steady	<b>Roche's Point Automatic</b>	East, 13 Knots, Becoming rain, 14 Miles, 1018, Rising slowly	<b>Sharn Island Automatic</b>	East, 9 Knots, Began shower, 14 Miles, 1017, Steady	<b>Valeria Automatic</b>	Southeast, 7 Knots, Cloudy, 21 Miles, 1017, Falling slowly	<b>Mace Head Automatic</b>	East, 10 Knots, Becoming drizzle, 18 Miles, 1016, Steady	<b>Gettraher Automatic</b>	South, 8 Knots, Rain shower, 4 Miles, 1017, Rising slowly	<b>Busy M1 63° 8'N, 11° 12'W</b>	Report not available	<b>Busy M2 63° 20'N, 9° 20'W</b>	South-southwest, 12 Knots, Wave height not available, 1019, Steady	<b>Busy M3 51° 15'N, 12° 35'W</b>	Report not available	<b>Busy M4 66° 0'N 0'W</b>	South, 12 Knots, Wave ht 2.9m, 1017, Rising slowly	<b>Busy M5 63° 4'N 18° 38'W</b>	Northwest, 11 Knots, Wave M 2.2m, 1017, Steady	<b>Disclaimer:</b> Busy locations are approximate and are not for navigational purposes.		<b>Sea Crossings</b>		<b>Dublin - Holyhead</b>	State of sea until 1200 Wednesday 16 September 2020	<b>Rosslare - South Wales</b>	Slight	<b>Cork - South Wales</b>	Slight to moderate, decreasing slight Friday night	<b>Rosslare - France</b>	Moderate, decreasing slight to moderate Monday night	<b>Cork - France</b>	Moderate, decreasing slight to moderate Monday night
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Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



**Met Éireann**

The Irish Meteorological Service

Climate Services  
Glasnevin Hill  
Dublin 9


Seirbhísi Aeráide  
Cnoc Ghlas Naíon  
Baile Átha Cliath 9

Tel: +353-1-8064260  
Email: enq@met.ie  
Email: legal@met.ie

Our Ref: WS1730/2010\_11

Your Ref: MCIB/12/304

**APPENDIX 1. Sea Area Map & Beaufort Scale of Wind**



Beaufort Scale of Wind					
Force	Description	Speed*		Specification -sea	Wave height** (metres)
		knots	km/hr		
0	Calm	<1	<1	Sea like mirror	
1	Light air	1-3	1-5	Ripples	0.1 (0.1)
2	Light breeze	4-6	6-11	Small wavelets	0.2 (0.3)
3	Gentle breeze	7-10	12-19	Large wavelets, crests begin to break	0.6 (1)
4	Moderate breeze	11-16	20-28	Small waves becoming longer, frequent white horses	1 (1.5)
5	Fresh breeze	17-21	29-38	Moderate waves, many white horses, chance of spray	2 (2.5)
6	Strong breeze	22-27	39-49	Large waves, white foam crests, probably some spray	3 (4)
7	Near gale	28-33	50-61	Sea heaps up, streaks of white foam	4 (5.5)
8	Gale	34-40	62-74	Moderately high waves of greater length	5.5 (7.5)
9	Strong gale	41-47	75-88	High waves, dense streaks of foam, spray may reduce visibility	7 (10)
10	Storm	48-55	89-102	Very high waves, long overhanging crests, visibility affected	9 (12.5)
11	Violent storm	56-63	103-117	Exceptionally high waves, long white foam patches cover sea	11.5 (16)
12	Hurricane	64+	117 & over	Air filled with foam and spray, sea completely white	14 (-)

\*Speed = mean speed at a standard height of 10 metres.  
\*\*Wave height is only intended as a guide to what may be expected in the open sea.  
Bracketed figures indicate the probable maximum wave height.

Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report



**Met Éireann**

The Irish Meteorological Service

Climate Services  
Glasnevin Hill  
Dublin 9

Seirbhísi Aeráide  
Cnoc Ghlas Naíon  
Baile Átha Cliath 9

Tel: +353-1-8064260  
Email: enq@met.ie  
Email: legal@met.ie

Our Ref: WS1730/2010\_11

Your Ref: MCIB/12/304

**Appendix 4. Terminology Sea State & Visibility**

**Wave Heights / State of Sea:**

The wave height is the vertical distance between the crest and the preceding or following trough. The table below gives a description of the wave system associated with a range of significant wave heights.

The Significant wave height is defined as the average height of the highest one-third of the waves. (It is very close to the value of wave height given when making visual observations of wave height.)

Sea State (Descriptive)	Significant Wave height in meters
Calm	0 – 0.1
Smooth(Wavelets)	0.1 – 0.5
Slight	0.5 – 1.25
Moderate	1.25 – 2.5
Rough	2.5 – 4
Very rough	4 – 6
High	6 – 9
Very high	9 – 14
Phenomenal	Over 14

Individual waves in the wave train will have heights in excess of the significant height. **The highest wave of all will have a height about twice the significant height.**

**Visibility Descriptions:**

Visibility (Descriptive)	Visibility in nautical miles (kilometres)
Good	More than 5 nm (> 9 km)
Moderate	2 – 5 nm (4 – 9 km)
Poor	0.5 – 2 nm (1 – 4 km)
Fog	Less than 0.5 nm (< 1km)

**Please Note:**

If there are no measurements or observations available for an exact location, then the estimated conditions in this report are based on all available meteorological measurements and observations which have been correlated on the routine charts prepared by Met Éireann.

Appendix 7.4 Extracts from Appendix 6 of Code of Practice for the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft - Beaufort Scales 4, 5 and 6

**Beaufort Force 4**



**Wind speed (knots):** 11-16  
**Wind description:** Moderate Breeze

**Sea state:**  
 Small waves, becoming longer, numerous whitecaps.

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**Beaufort Force 5**



**Wind speed (knots):** 17-21  
**Wind description:** Fresh Breeze

**Sea state:**  
 Moderate waves, taking longer form, many whitecaps, some spray.

**Beaufort Force 6**



**Wind speed (knots):** 22-27  
**Wind description:** Strong Breeze

**Sea state:**  
 Larger waves forming, whitecaps everywhere, much spray.

Appendix 7.5 Tide Tables 2020





Appendix 7.5 Tide Tables 2020

**DUBLIN PORT**  
**TIDE TABLES**  
**JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2020**  
**HIGH WATER AND LOW WATER**  
**AT DUBLIN NORTH WALL**

Tidal predictions for Dublin computed by software developed at the National Oceanography Centre, © Copyright Reserved.

The datum of the tidal predictions is Chart Datum. Chart Datum is 0.23m below the old Port Datum, and 0.20m above Irish Ordnance Datum (Poolbeg). It is the Datum for the Metric Admiralty Charts of Dublin.

High Water on Dublin Bar is 0.06m lower and Low Water on Dublin Bar is 0.06m higher than the respective heights given in the Tables for North Wall; the times are not appreciably different.

All times throughout these tables are given in Local Time using the 24 hour system - 00:00 is Midnight and 12:00 is Noon.

Summer Time 2020 is 01:00 on the 29 March to 02:00 on the 25 October. Times shown in these tables between these dates have been adjusted for Summer Time.

Disclaimer: Dublin Port Company (DPC) has compiled the information in these Tide Tables with the utmost care and attention. However, DPC accepts no liability whatsoever arising from any errors or omissions.

Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners can be found online  
[www.dublinport.ie/information-centre/notice-to-mariners](http://www.dublinport.ie/information-centre/notice-to-mariners)





## Appendix 7.5 Tide Tables 2020

APRIL 2020						
Date	High Water		Low Water		Sun Rise / Set	
	Time	m	Time	m	Time	Time
1 W	05:33 18:13	3.26 3.21	11:24 23:51	1.28 1.50	06:58	20:00
2 Th	06:42 19:35	3.16 3.17	12:48	1.32	06:55	20:02
3 F	08:08 20:54	3.23 3.31	01:19 14:09	1.54 1.18	06:53	20:03
4 Sa	09:18 21:57	3.45 3.54	02:39 15:15	1.37 0.88	06:51	20:05
5 Su	10:15 22:48	3.73 3.78	03:39 16:08	1.08 0.53	06:48	20:07
6 M	11:03 23:31	4.00 3.98	04:27 16:54	0.76 0.22	06:46	20:09
7 Tu	11:46	4.20	05:09 17:36	0.48 0.01	06:43	20:11
8 W	00:12 12:29	4.11 4.32	05:50 18:18	0.28 _0.07	06:41	20:12
9 Th	00:52 13:12	4.16 4.35	06:31 19:00	0.18 _0.02	06:39	20:14
10 F	01:33 13:58	4.14 4.28	07:14 19:45	0.20 0.15	06:36	20:16
11 Sa	02:16 14:47	4.07 4.14	08:00 20:31	0.31 0.40	06:34	20:18
12 Su	03:03 15:40	3.94 3.93	08:52 21:21	0.49 0.71	06:32	20:20
13 M	03:54 16:39	3.78 3.69	09:49 22:17	0.72 1.03	06:29	20:22
14 Tu	04:51 17:48	3.60 3.45	10:51 23:17	0.95 1.32	06:27	20:23
15 W	06:03 19:05	3.44 3.29	12:00	1.14	06:25	20:25

TIMES ARE UT(GMT)/BST

APRIL 2020						
Date	High Water		Low Water		Sun Rise / Set	
	Time	m	Time	m	Time	Time
16 Th	07:21 20:24	3.37 3.26	00:27 13:21	1.53 1.23	06:22	20:27
17 F	08:35 21:37	3.41 3.34	01:52 14:44	1.59 1.18	06:20	20:29
18 Sa	09:42 22:33	3.52 3.46	03:09 15:44	1.47 1.04	06:18	20:31
19 Su	10:36 23:16	3.65 3.55	04:02 16:29	1.27 0.90	06:16	20:32
20 M	11:17 23:48	3.74 3.62	04:43 17:06	1.08 0.79	06:13	20:34
21 Tu	11:51	3.78	05:18 17:37	0.92 0.73	06:11	20:36
22 W	00:15 12:21	3.66 3.80	05:50 18:06	0.81 0.71	06:09	20:38
23 Th	00:38 12:48	3.69 3.80	06:18 18:31	0.75 0.71	06:07	20:40
24 F	01:00 13:17	3.73 3.79	06:45 18:55	0.72 0.73	06:05	20:41
25 Sa	01:28 13:51	3.76 3.78	07:12 19:24	0.72 0.76	06:02	20:43
26 Su	02:03 14:30	3.77 3.74	07:45 20:00	0.75 0.83	06:00	20:45
27 M	02:42 15:12	3.74 3.66	08:24 20:41	0.81 0.95	05:58	20:47
28 Tu	03:27 16:00	3.66 3.55	09:10 21:28	0.91 1.11	05:56	20:49
29 W	04:15 16:53	3.54 3.42	10:05 22:24	1.03 1.29	05:54	20:50
30 Th	05:11 17:56	3.42 3.32	11:11 23:33	1.12 1.43	05:52	20:52

TIMES ARE UT(GMT)/BST

MAY 2020						
Date	High Water		Low Water		Sun Rise / Set	
	Time	m	Time	m	Time	Time
1 F	06:18 19:11	3.36 3.30	12:28	1.13	05:50	20:54
2 Sa	07:35 20:26	3.40 3.41	00:53 13:43	1.46 0.99	05:48	20:56
3 Su	08:45 21:29	3.57 3.60	02:08 14:48	1.32 0.76	05:46	20:58
4 M	09:45 22:21	3.80 3.80	03:10 15:43	1.07 0.49	05:44	20:59
5 Tu	10:38 23:08	4.01 3.96	04:02 16:32	0.80 0.26	05:42	21:01
6 W	11:26 23:51	4.17 4.07	04:48 17:17	0.56 0.13	05:40	21:03
7 Th	12:12	4.25	05:31 18:00	0.39 0.10	05:38	21:05
8 F	00:33 12:57	4.12 4.25	06:15 18:42	0.31 0.18	05:37	21:06
9 Sa	01:14 13:45	4.12 4.17	06:59 19:25	0.32 0.35	05:35	21:08
10 Su	01:57 14:33	4.06 4.03	07:47 20:11	0.41 0.58	05:33	21:10
11 M	02:43 15:26	3.97 3.84	08:38 21:00	0.55 0.84	05:31	21:11
12 Tu	03:33 16:23	3.85 3.63	09:34 21:53	0.73 1.10	05:29	21:13
13 W	04:29 17:26	3.70 3.43	10:33 22:51	0.91 1.33	05:28	21:15
14 Th	05:34 18:35	3.55 3.29	11:36 23:53	1.07 1.51	05:26	21:16
15 F	06:45 19:45	3.46 3.24	12:45	1.17	05:24	21:18

TIMES ARE UT(GMT)/BST

MAY 2020						
Date	High Water		Low Water		Sun Rise / Set	
	Time	m	Time	m	Time	Time
16 Sa	07:54 20:52	3.45 3.29	01:03 13:58	1.58 1.18	05:23	21:20
17 Su	08:57 21:48	3.50 3.40	02:17 15:00	1.53 1.11	05:21	21:21
18 M	09:51 22:33	3.58 3.51	03:18 15:50	1.38 1.02	05:20	21:23
19 Tu	10:37 23:09	3.65 3.60	04:06 16:30	1.21 0.94	05:18	21:24
20 W	11:16 23:40	3.70 3.67	04:44 17:03	1.07 0.88	05:17	21:26
21 Th	11:50	3.73	05:18 17:33	0.96 0.85	05:15	21:27
22 F	00:09 12:21	3.73 3.75	05:48 18:00	0.89 0.83	05:14	21:29
23 Sa	00:34 12:53	3.78 3.76	06:17 18:27	0.84 0.83	05:13	21:30
24 Su	01:04 13:30	3.83 3.76	06:48 19:00	0.81 0.84	05:11	21:32
25 M	01:41 14:10	3.85 3.75	07:25 19:39	0.81 0.89	05:10	21:33
26 Tu	02:23 14:56	3.84 3.71	08:08 20:23	0.82 0.98	05:09	21:35
27 W	03:09 15:45	3.80 3.64	08:58 21:13	0.87 1.10	05:08	21:36
28 Th	04:00 16:39	3.74 3.56	09:56 22:11	0.91 1.22	05:07	21:37
29 F	04:56 17:40	3.67 3.49	11:00 23:15	0.94 1.31	05:06	21:39
30 Sa	05:58 18:47	3.63 3.47	12:08	0.93	05:05	21:40
31 Su	07:06 19:55	3.65 3.53	00:25 13:16	1.33 0.86	05:04	21:41

TIMES ARE UT(GMT)/BST







## Appendix 7.5 Tide Tables 2020

DECEMBER 2020							
Date		High Water		Low Water		Sun Rise / Set	
		Time	m	Time	m	Time	Time
1	Tu	12:00	3.93	05:20 17:43	1.01 1.01	08:17	16:10
2	W	00:14 12:31	3.82 3.94	05:48 18:15	1.04 1.01	08:18	16:09
3	Th	00:51 13:09	3.80 3.93	06:22 18:53	1.09 1.01	08:19	16:09
4	F	01:34 13:52	3.75 3.89	07:02 19:37	1.17 1.04	08:21	16:08
5	Sa	02:21 14:39	3.68 3.83	07:48 20:28	1.28 1.08	08:22	16:08
6	Su	03:13 15:31	3.60 3.76	08:42 21:26	1.40 1.11	08:23	16:07
7	M	04:11 16:27	3.53 3.71	09:43 22:30	1.49 1.12	08:25	16:07
8	Tu	05:15 17:29	3.50 3.71	10:51 23:39	1.53 1.08	08:26	16:07
9	W	06:23 18:34	3.55 3.76	12:02	1.49	08:27	16:06
10	Th	07:27 19:39	3.66 3.86	00:45 13:07	0.97 1.35	08:28	16:06
11	F	08:26 20:39	3.82 3.99	01:46 14:06	0.83 1.17	08:29	16:06
12	Sa	09:19 21:36	3.97 4.10	02:42 15:00	0.69 0.97	08:31	16:06
13	Su	10:09 22:29	4.11 4.18	03:32 15:51	0.58 0.79	08:31	16:06
14	M	10:54 23:19	4.20 4.21	04:19 16:39	0.53 0.65	08:32	16:06
15	Tu	11:39	4.26	05:03 17:26	0.55 0.58	08:33	16:06

TIMES ARE UT(GMT)/BST

DECEMBER 2020							
Date		High Water		Low Water		Sun Rise / Set	
		Time	m	Time	m	Time	Time
16	W	00:07 12:24	4.17 4.26	05:47 18:12	0.63 0.57	08:34	16:06
17	Th	00:56 13:09	4.07 4.22	06:30 19:01	0.76 0.62	08:35	16:06
18	F	01:45 13:56	3.93 4.14	07:16 19:51	0.94 0.72	08:36	16:07
19	Sa	02:37 14:46	3.77 4.02	08:05 20:44	1.12 0.87	08:36	16:07
20	Su	03:33 15:40	3.60 3.89	08:58 21:39	1.31 1.03	08:37	16:07
21	M	04:33 16:38	3.45 3.74	09:55 22:36	1.48 1.18	08:37	16:08
22	Tu	05:36 17:40	3.36 3.62	10:56 23:37	1.60 1.31	08:38	16:08
23	W	06:38 18:42	3.35 3.55	12:00	1.65	08:38	16:09
24	Th	07:37 19:42	3.41 3.53	00:43 13:07	1.37 1.62	08:39	16:10
25	F	08:30 20:37	3.51 3.55	01:46 14:09	1.37 1.53	08:39	16:10
26	Sa	09:17 21:26	3.62 3.60	02:39 15:00	1.32 1.41	08:39	16:11
27	Su	09:58 22:09	3.73 3.85	03:22 15:42	1.26 1.29	08:40	16:12
28	M	10:36 22:48	3.82 3.70	03:57 16:19	1.20 1.18	08:40	16:13
29	Tu	11:09 23:23	3.89 3.75	04:29 16:53	1.14 1.08	08:40	16:14
30	W	11:40 23:58	3.95 3.79	04:59 17:25	1.08 0.99	08:40	16:14
31	Th	12:13	3.99	05:30 17:59	1.04 0.91	08:40	16:16

TIMES ARE UT(GMT)/BST

### DATUM CONVERSION




Chart Datum is 0.20m above O.D. Poolbeg

Tide is Semi-Diurnal

Above Chart Datum

Highest Astronomical Tide:	4.50m
Mean High Water Springs:	4.10m
Mean High Water Neaps:	3.40m
Mean Sea Level:	2.41m
Mean Low Water Neaps:	1.50m
Mean Low Water Springs:	0.70m

Below Chart Datum



Lowest Astronomical Tide:	-0.10m
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Annual Extremes

Low Water:	08/04/2020 -0.10m
High Water:	18/10/2020 4.50m




Appendix 7.5 Tide Tables 2020




Appendix 7.5 Tide Tables 2020

**TIDAL STREAMS**

**HW+2**




**HW+3**




**TIDAL STREAMS**

**HW+4**




**HW+5**



**TIDAL STREAMS**

**HW+6**





**METERS TO FEET CONVERSION CHART**


FEET	METERS
1 ft	0.30 m
2 ft	0.61 m
3 ft	0.91 m
4 ft	1.22 m
5 ft	1.52 m
6 ft	1.83 m
7 ft	2.13 m
8 ft	2.44 m
9 ft	2.74 m
10 ft	3.05 m
20 ft	6.10 m
30 ft	9.14 m
40 ft	12.19 m
50 ft	15.24 m
60 ft	18.29 m
70 ft	21.34 m
80 ft	24.38 m
90 ft	27.43 m
100 ft	30.48 m


Appendix 7.5 Tide Tables 2020



 DublinPortCompany

 @dublinportco

 @DublinPortCo

 www.dublinport.ie

## Appendix 7.6 Recording (redacted) of 999 calls

### 1<sup>st</sup> 999 Call

Dispatcher:	Coastguard Dublin – Hello you are through to the Coastguard.
Caller:	Hello, hello, hi, my name is [REDACTED] I live in Dalkey sort of on [REDACTED] We're looking down at a group of kayakers who seem to have come out of Bulloch and they are struggling. There is a group of about 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. Three instructors and the main group is okay but three boats have got separated from the main group and they're drifting towards Dublin Harbour with the tide. One boat seems to have capsized and overall, the group seems to be struggling.
Dispatcher:	Right, okay, so they came out of Bulloch Harbour?
Caller:	Yes, they have come out of Bulloch Harbour.
Dispatcher:	You reckon there's about 12 in total? 12 in total came out is it?
Caller:	I'm looking at, I can't, the others have just gone from view at the moment but yeah there was about I'd say 10 to 12 in total with three instructors.
Dispatcher:	How do you know they're instructors?
Caller:	Sorry? They're in red boats. Everybody else, all the students are in yellow boats.
Dispatcher:	And what are the instructors doing at the moment?
Caller:	There's 2 instructors were with the main group, one was with the two that were drifting, one additional instructor is now paddling like crazy to try and get up to where the other people are.
Dispatcher:	Okay so between the whole lot of them they're between Bulloch Harbour and where?
Caller:	They are between Bulloch Harbour and Coliemore.
Dispatcher:	Okay. Okay, we'll get assistance out there and see what's going on.
Caller:	You're very good, thank you. Bye.
Dispatcher:	Thank you.

Appendix 7.6 Recording (redacted) of 999 calls

2<sup>nd</sup> 999 Call

Dispatcher:	Coastguard Dublin
Caller:	Hi, thank you. I'm ringing from Dalkey. There are kayakers out off the shore here just South of Bulloch and they seem to be in trouble and I'm wondering if you could send a small boat out not a large boat. I don't think they need the big one.
Dispatcher:	Okay, they're South of Bulloch Harbour there yeah?
Caller:	There's one in the water. There's 3 kayaks, and one has got somebody in the water and they can't get it back up and they're well off shore. They're not closed in. They're out sort of level with [indecipherable] Dalkey Island.
Dispatcher:	Level with Dalkey Island. Okay and there are three kayaks and one person in the water.
Caller:	There's three kayaks, one double and a couple of singles but there was somebody in the water. I think they're trying to tow them but they're desperately in trouble out there now.
Dispatcher:	Okay and what's your name, sorry?
Caller:	██████████ We just live on the shore here.
Dispatcher:	Okay, are you phoning from your home?
Caller:	I am but I'm phoning from my mobile number from my home, yeah.
Dispatcher:	Yeah, perfect, perfect. Yeah if you could just standby the phone there if we need any further updates we might give you a call back but yeah I'll get someone to have a look at that one if you think they're in trouble, yeah, they might need a bit of assistance.
Caller:	Thanks yeah I see there's a rib there now but I don't know whether they're going, I don't see if they're going near them so.
Dispatcher:	Okay there's a rib in the vicinity but...
Caller:	Yeah but it's not going near them, doesn't seem to be.
Dispatcher:	Okay are there any other vessels in the area there now?
Caller:	I can't see any at the moment, no.
Dispatcher:	Okay, okay. Yeah I'll have a look into that for you, thanks ██████████ okay.

Appendix 7.6 Recording (redacted) of 999 calls

Caller:	Thank you, bye.
Dispatcher:	Cheers, bye now.

Appendix 7.6 Recording (redacted) of 999 calls



3<sup>rd</sup> 999 Call

Dispatcher:	Coastguard Dublin
Caller:	“Eh”
Dispatcher:	Yeah, go ahead
Caller:	Sorry, we’re living in Dalkey on the shoreline and we’ve been watching a group of kayakers. There were 17 of them but...
Dispatcher:	How many did you see?
Caller:	Well there were 17 passed but three or four have been left behind and are being blown, now for the last half hour they have been blown off the coast. They’re much further away than they were.
Dispatcher	Yeah look we’ve tasked a lifeboat to go down there to see what’s going on. We got a couple of calls about that so, yeah we’ll have assistance over there shortly. I might just give you a ring back there in a few minutes just for an update if you don’t mind.
Caller:	Sure yeah, okay.
Dispatcher:	Thank you.
Caller:	Okay.
Dispatcher:	Thank you, bye bye.

## Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

9/13/2020	Oversee
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### REPORT OF GROUP OF KAYAKERS IN DIFFICULTY OUTSIDE BULLOCH

UIIN2017/20  
NMOC Dublin

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#### SITREPs

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<b>SITREP1/UIIN2017/20</b>	
Transmission	ROUTINE
Entry Date	13 1831Z Sep 20
From	<u>NMOC Dublin</u>
To	<u>MRCC Dublin Sitrep Group</u>
SITREP Number	ONE AND FINAL
Incident	REPORT OF GROUP OF KAYAKERS IN DIFFICULTY OUTSIDE BULLOCH
Reference Number	SITREP1/UIIN2017/20

A. ID of Casualty	GROUP OF KAYAKERS
B. Position	OUTSIDE BULLOCH HARBOUR
C. Situation	KAYAKER GROUP SPIT AND IN DIFFICULTY
D. Number of Persons	15
E. Assistance Required	BRING SAFELY ASHORE
F. Coordinating RCC	<u>NMOC Dublin</u>
G. Description of Casualty	GROUP OF KAYAKERS
H. Weather On Scene	Wind: 4, S / Sea: Slight / Swell: Low wave / Air Temp: 16.2°C / Water Temp: 15.1°C / Cloud Cov: Broken / Sitrep Weather-Time: 13 1803Z Sep 20
J. Initial Actions Taken	TASK R116 AND DUN LAOGHAIRE ALB
K. Search Area	BETWEEN BULLOCH HARBOUR AND COLLIMORE
L. Coordinating Instructions	LOCATE AND RECOVER
M. Future Plans	INCIDENT CLOSED
N. Additional Information	1803 999 CALL RECEIVED FROM MOP ADVISING OF GROUP OF KAYAKERS 10-12 DEPARTED BULLOCH HARBOUR, NOW GROUP HAS SPLIT AND THERE ARE SOME CAPSIZED AND SOME DRIFTING. DUN LAOGHAIRE CGU, DUN LAOGHAIRE ALB AND R116 TASKED. 1819 DL ILB TASKED AFTER COMPLETING INCIDENT AT SANDYMOUNT. 1823 DL CGU ON SCENE 1823 FV NORTH WESTERN PROCEEDING TO GROUP OF 4 KAYAKERS. 1833 DL CGU ADVISE SECOND GROUP AT NORTH END OF LORETTO CONVENT. 1835 AMBULANCE REQUESTED FOR BULLOCH HARBOUR. 1835 DUN LAOGHAIRE ALB ON SCENE -ESCORTS KAYAKERS . 1830 R116 ON SCENE 1834 FV NORTH WESTERN BRINGS 3 KAYAKERS SAFELY ASHORE INTO BULLOCH HARBOUR. 1844 DUN LAOGHAIRE CGU ADVISES ALL MEMBERS OF KAYAKING GROUP (15) NOW ACCOUNTED FOR AND SAFELY ASHORE. THREE REQUIRE MEDICAL ASSESSMENT. 1851 DL LIFEBOATS AND R116 RELEASED 1943 CASUALTIES ASSESSED BY AMBULANCE CREW AND RELEASED. CGU RELEASED AND RTB. INCIDENT CLOSED.



silas-cloud.department.ir/#/incident?id=UIIN2017%2F20&incidents=UIIN2017%2F20	1/1
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Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

**REPORT**

12/23/2020 Oversee

## REPORT OF GROUP OF KAYAKERS IN DIFFICULTY OUTSIDE BULLOCH

**UIIN2017/20**  
**NMOC Dublin**  
**13 Sep 2020**

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**Summary**

Incident Name	REPORT OF GROUP OF KAYAKERS IN DIFFICULTY OUTSIDE BULLOCH
Incident Number	UIIN2017/20
Originating Log Entry	<a href="#">L120495/20</a>
Type of Incident	Person(s) Thought to be in Trouble, Maritime SAR, PIW
Nature of Incident	REPORT OF GROUP OF KAYAKERS IN DIFFICULTY
Casualty	Unknown
Position	<a href="#">53°17.47'N 006°06.00'W</a>
Time of Incident	13 1803Z Sep 20
Outcome	Assistance/service provided
Incident Status	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed
Assigned Station	<a href="#">NMOC Dublin</a>
Originating Station	<a href="#">NMOC Dublin</a>
HSE CAD Number	None
Date Started	13 1803Z Sep 20 / [REDACTED]
Date Resolved	13 1953Z Sep 20 / [REDACTED]
Incident Duration	1h 49m
Date Completed	23 1417Z Sep 20 / [REDACTED]
Last Modified	21 1426Z Dec 20 / [REDACTED]
Signatures	SMC: 13 2009Z Sep 20 / [REDACTED] DC: 23 1417Z Sep 20 / [REDACTED]

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**Incident Details**

Nature of Incident	REPORT OF GROUP OF KAYAKERS IN DIFFICULTY
Assistance Required	LOCATE AND ASSIST
Additional Info	None
Time of Incident	13 1803Z Sep 20
Positions	<a href="#">DUBLIN BAY</a> <a href="#">53°17.47'N 006°06.00'W</a>

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**Weather On Scene**

Incident Position [53°17.47'N 006°06.00'W](#)

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## Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020

Oversee

Incident Time 13 1803Z Sep 20

Wind Speed 4 - Moderate Breeze (11 - 16 kn) Beaufort

Wind Direction ↑ S

Air Temperature 16.2 °C

Sea State Slight (0.5 - 1.25 m) Douglas

Swell Low wave (0 - 2 m)

Water Temperature 15.1 °C

Visibility Unknown

Cloud Cover Broken (5 - 7 oktas)

Precipitation Unknown

**Log Entries**

## ☉ Unknown &gt; NMOC Dublin

Entry DTG 13 1803Z Sep 20

Channel 999/112 Call

Details GROUP OF KAYAKERS THAT HAVE COME OUT OF BULLOCH HARBOUR AND SOME BOATS ARE DRIFTING TOWARDS DUBLIN PORT. 10 - 12 KAYAKERS IN TOTAL 3 INSTRUCTORS ALL KAYAKERS ARE BETWEEN BULLOCH HARBOUR AT COLLIMORE

Casualty GROUP OF KAYAKERS

Position Unknown

## ☎ [REDACTED] &gt; NMOC Dublin

Entry DTG 13 1804Z Sep 20

Channel 999/112 Call

Details [REDACTED] Informant.  
in difficulty.

1 person in the water, 2 helping 1 in water out onto kayak. 3 kayaks in total.  
A good bit out from shore, strong tide running, level with Dalkey island.

## ☎ MRCC DUBLIN &gt; Dun Laoghaire CGU

Entry DTG 13 1806Z Sep 20

Channel Telephone

Details REQ UNIT MEMEBR TO PROCEED TO CHECK REPORT OF KAYAKERS IN DIFF BULLOCH HRBR

## ☎ MRCC DUBLIN &gt; R116 Dublin Helicopter

Entry DTG 13 1809Z Sep 20

Channel Telephone

Resource R116 Dublin Helicopter

Event Alerted

Event DTG 13 1809Z Sep 20

Details TASKED FOR BULLOCH HRBR

## ☎ [REDACTED] &gt; NMOC Dublin

Entry DTG 13 1814Z Sep 20

Channel 999/112 Call

Details

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Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020 Oversee

LIVING IN DALKEY AND SEE A GROUP OF KAYAKERS (17) 3 OR 4 HAVE BEEN LEFT BEHIND ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND AND BEING BLOWN WAY OFF//RGR WE ARE ORGANISING ASSISTANCE TKS

**✈ R116 Dublin Helicopter > MRCC DUBLIN**

Entry DTG 13 1816Z Sep 20  
 Channel TETRA  
 Resource R116 Dublin Helicopter  
 Event On Ramp (H)  
 Event DTG 13 1816Z Sep 20  
 Details R116 in the aircraft now

**✈ Dun Laoghaire RNLI > DUBLIN CGR**

Entry DTG 13 1819Z Sep 20  
 Channel 16 VHF  
 Resource Dun Laoghaire RNLI  
 Event Tasked/Requested  
 Event DTG 13 1819Z Sep 20  
 Details tasked to dalkey

**✈ R116 Dublin Helicopter > DUBLIN CGR**

Entry DTG 13 1821Z Sep 20  
 Channel TETRA  
 Resource R116 Dublin Helicopter  
 Event Proceeding  
 Event DTG 13 1821Z Sep 20  
 Details 4 pob 2.5hrs. 5 min eta. // sitrep given

**☎ MRCC DUBLIN > MOP**

Entry DTG 13 1822Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Details UPDATE??1 KAYAKER CAME BACK TO JOIN THE OTHER GROUP. THEY WERE MOVING OUT TO SEA AND NOW SEEM TO BE MOVING BACK TOWARDS LAND.

WHERE EXACTLY WILL I SEND LB? THERE ARE TWO GROUPS 3 IN AND 1 IN THE OTHER. THEY ARE MOVING WEST

RGR WE HAVE CGU ON SCENE NOW AND THEY HAVE A VISUAL

**☎ Dun Laoghaire CGU > MRCC DUBLIN**

Entry DTG 13 1823Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Details [REDACTED] 1 person ashore. standby

**☎ F/V North Western > DUBLIN CGR**

Entry DTG 13 1823Z Sep 20  
 Channel 16 VHF  
 Details fishing vessel north western en route to kayaks. see 4 kayaks in possible difficulty.

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## Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020

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## 🚁 Dun Laoghaire CGU &gt; DUBLIN CGR

Entry DTG 13 1825Z Sep 20  
Channel 83 VHF  
Resource Dun Laoghaire CGU  
Event Ops Normal  
Event DTG 13 1825Z Sep 20  
Details 4 kayakers possibly in difficulty. another separate group also in possible danger. // rgr  
please direct R116 on vhf 16

## 🚁 Dun Laoghaire RNLI &gt; DUBLIN CGR

Entry DTG 13 1827Z Sep 20  
Channel 16 VHF  
Resource Dun Laoghaire RNLI  
Event Proceeding  
Event DTG 13 1827Z Sep 20  
Details ALB eta 7 min. POB 5.

## 🚁 R116 Dublin Helicopter &gt; DUBLIN CGR

Entry DTG 13 1830Z Sep 20  
Channel 16 VHF  
Resource R116 Dublin Helicopter  
Event On Scene  
Event DTG 13 1830Z Sep 20  
Details 5 kayakers. 2 taken by FV. 3 under own steam. need assistance. will send ALB to your  
position.

## 🚁 Dun Laoghaire CGU &gt; DUBLIN CGR

Entry DTG 13 1833Z Sep 20  
Channel 16 VHF  
Details second group at north end of loretto convent.

## 🚁 North Western &gt; DUBLIN CGR

Entry DTG 13 1834Z Sep 20  
Channel 16  
Details north western.  
ARRIVING AT BULLOCK WITH 3 KAYAKERS ONBOARD. PLEASE SEND AMBULANCE TO  
MEDICALLY ASSESS CASUALTIES AS THEY ARE VERY COLD.

## 🚁 Dun Laoghaire RNLI &gt; DUBLIN CGR

Entry DTG 13 1835Z Sep 20  
Channel 16 VHF  
Resource Dun Laoghaire RNLI  
Event Ops Normal  
Event DTG 13 1835Z Sep 20  
Details ILB ETA 5 MIN to loretto convent

## 🚁 MRCC DUBLIN &gt; NEOC/HSE

Entry DTG 13 1835Z Sep 20

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Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020 Oversee

Channel Telephone  
 Details REQ AMBULANCE FOR BULLOCH HRBR TO ASSESS KAYAKERS THAT WERE CAPSIZED

**📍 Dun Laoghaire RNLI > DUBLIN CGR**

Entry DTG 13 1837Z Sep 20  
 Channel 16 VHF  
 Resource Dun Laoghaire RNLI  
 Event Ops Normal  
 Event DTG 13 1837Z Sep 20  
 Details ALB. 3 KAYAK. 4 CANOE. OFF BULLOCK. PROCEEDING UNDER OWN STEAM. REQUIRE NO FURTHER ASSISTANCE. WILL GET R116 TO KEEP EYES ON AND PROCEED TO NEXT GROUP IN DIFFICULTY

**📍 MRCC DUBLIN > Dun Laoghaire RNLI**

Entry DTG 13 1837Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Details LOM UPDATED ILB RETASKED

**📍 Dun Laoghaire CGU > DUBLIN CGR**

Entry DTG 13 1839Z Sep 20  
 Channel 16 VHF  
 Resource Dun Laoghaire CGU  
 Event Ops Normal  
 Event DTG 13 1839Z Sep 20  
 Details Possibly can get those kayakers ashore. looking for a path for them to get up. // rgr will send on ilb abd alb to stand by. // 10 persons in total in this group

**📍 [REDACTED] > NMOC Dublin**

Entry DTG 13 1839Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Details I BROUGHT 3 KAYAKERS ASHORE INTO BULLOCH THEY WERE IN THE WATER FOR APPROX 40 MIN. RGR CAN YOPU STAY WITHN THEM. AMBULANCE EN ROUTE

**📍 MRCC Dublin > NEOC/HSE**

Entry DTG 13 1840Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Details 1 hour for ambulance Bulloch Hbr. // Rgr, any AP // Neg. nothing available sooner. Trying to free up from St Vincent's ED

**📍 [REDACTED] > NMOC Dublin**

Entry DTG 13 1842Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Details ORGANISER OF YAVAK GROUP ATTEMPTING TO RECOVER KAYAKS BUT I WILL TRY AND PREVEMNT IT UNTIL IT'S SAFE// RGR NEED TO GET CONFIRMATION FROM ORGANISERS ON HEAD COUNT. REPORT OF 10, 12 AND 17 KAYAKERS// RGR WILL GET CONFIRMATION AND REVERT

**📍 MRCC DUBLIN > NEOC/HSE**

Entry DTG 13 1843Z Sep 20

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## Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020

Oversee

Channel Telephone

Details REQUIRE AMBULANCE QUICKER THAN 1HR// RGR TRYING. WILL TRY WITH DFB// OK APPRECIATED

## 📌 R116 Dublin Helicopter &gt; MRCC DUBLIN

Entry DTG 13 1843Z Sep 20

Channel TETRA

Resource R116 Dublin Helicopter

Event Ops Normal

Event DTG 13 1843Z Sep 20

Details Finished at Bullock. Now at 2nd scene dn waiting for head count. // Can you proceed to bullock to see if you can drop a WM to assess the casualties. they are with CGU members and given blankets but would like to assess further. Amb requested but etq is 1hr // rgr will assess area and revert

## 📌 [REDACTED] &gt; NMOC Dublin

Entry DTG 13 1844Z Sep 20

Channel Telephone

Details Total 13 pers. All ashore with DL CGU. Will ask each person of any others

## 📌 Dun Laoghaire CGU &gt; DUBLIN CGR

Entry DTG 13 1851Z Sep 20

Channel 16 VHF

Resource Dun Laoghaire CGU

Event Ops Normal

Event DTG 13 1851Z Sep 20

Details All pers. (15 Total) accounted for. Trans. to Bulloch Hbr with 1 x MOP. Req. Med. asst. // Rgr

## 📌 Dun Laoghaire RNLI &gt; DUBLIN CGR

Entry DTG 13 1851Z Sep 20

Channel 16 VHF

Resource Dun Laoghaire RNLI

Event Released

Event DTG 13 1851Z Sep 20

Details ALB released

## 📌 Dun Laoghaire RNLI &gt; DUBLIN CGR

Entry DTG 13 1851Z Sep 20

Channel 16 VHF

Resource Dun Laoghaire RNLI

Event Released

Event DTG 13 1851Z Sep 20

Details ILB Released

## 📌 MRCC DUBLIN &gt; R116 Dublin Helicopter

Entry DTG 13 1851Z Sep 20

Channel 16 VHF

Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020 Oversee

Resource R116 Dublin Helicopter  
Event Released  
Event DTG 13 1851Z Sep 20  
Details Released. Car en route - eta 10 min. All persons in water accounted for. Stand down.

**📞 MRCC DUBLIN > NEOC/HSE**

Entry DTG 13 1852Z Sep 20  
Channel Telephone  
Details UPDATE ON ETA FOR PARAMDEIC? ETA FOR CAR 10 MIN

**📞 NEOC > NMOC Dublin**

Entry DTG 13 1852Z Sep 20  
Channel Telephone  
Details LOUGHLINSTOWN BASE LOGGED ON AND AMBULANCE WILL BE ON SCEN IN 10 MIN. WILL KEEP CAR GOING ASWELL// RGR TKS

**📞 [REDACTED] > NMOC Dublin**

Entry DTG 13 1902Z Sep 20  
Channel Telephone  
Details WE HAVE 3 KAYAKERS IN JEEP AWAITING AMBULANCE ...AMBULANCE JUST ARRIVED NOW. WILL RING BACK SHORTLY

**📞 Dun Laoghaire RNLI > DUBLIN CGR**

Entry DTG 13 1903Z Sep 20  
Channel 16 VHF  
Resource Dun Laoghaire RNLI  
Event Ops Normal  
Event DTG 13 1903Z Sep 20  
Details ILB Ops Normal, DL Hbr

**📞 Dun Laoghaire RNLI > DUBLIN CGR**

Entry DTG 13 1908Z Sep 20  
Channel 16 VHF  
Resource Dun Laoghaire RNLI  
Event Returned to Base  
Event DTG 13 1908Z Sep 20  
Details ALB RTB

**📞 R116 Dublin Helicopter > MRCC DUBLIN**

Entry DTG 13 1908Z Sep 20  
Channel TETRA  
Resource R116 Dublin Helicopter  
Event Returned to Base  
Event DTG 13 1908Z Sep 20  
Details RTB SHUTTING DOWN

**📞 MRCC DUBLIN > ON CALL**

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Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020
Oversee

Entry DTG 13 1909Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Details UPDATED ON KAYAK INCIDENT

**📣 [REDACTED] > DUN LAOGHAIRE RNLI > DUBLIN CGR**

Entry DTG 13 1927Z Sep 20  
 Channel 16 VHF  
 Resource Dun Laoghaire RNLI  
 Event Returned to Base  
 Event DTG 13 1927Z Sep 20  
 Details ILB RTB

**📞 [REDACTED] > NMOC Dublin**

Entry DTG 13 1928Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Details DL RNLI ILB UIINs passed

**📞 [REDACTED] > NMOC Dublin**

Entry DTG 13 1936Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Details NAS have assessed 2/3 cas. & released. Will update on no. 3

**📣 [REDACTED] > NMOC Dublin**

Entry DTG 13 1943Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Resource Dun Laoghaire CGU  
 Event Released  
 Event DTG 13 1943Z Sep 20  
 Details ALL CASUALTIES ASSESSED AND RELEASED. WE RTB. WILL CALL WHEN CLOSING

**📣 [REDACTED] > NMOC Dublin**

Entry DTG 13 1953Z Sep 20  
 Channel Telephone  
 Resource Dun Laoghaire CGU  
 Event Returned to Base  
 Event DTG 13 1953Z Sep 20  
 Details RTB

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**Units Tasked**

**R116 Dublin Helicopter**

Alerted 13 1809Z Sep 20  
 Tasked/Requested 13 1809Z Sep 20  
 Request Declined Unknown  
 Mission Aborted Unknown  
 On Ramp (H) 13 1816Z Sep 20

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Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020	Oversee
Proceeding	13 1821Z Sep 20
On Scene	13 1830Z Sep 20
Released	13 1851Z Sep 20
Returned to Base	13 1908Z Sep 20
<b>Dun Laoghaire RNLi</b>	
Alerted	13 1819Z Sep 20
Tasked/Requested	13 1819Z Sep 20
Request Declined	Unknown
Mission Aborted	Unknown
On Ramp (H)	Unknown
Proceeding	13 1827Z Sep 20
On Scene	Unknown
Released	13 1851Z Sep 20
Returned to Base	13 1908Z Sep 20
<b>Dun Laoghaire CGU</b>	
Alerted	13 1806Z Sep 20
Tasked/Requested	13 1806Z Sep 20
Request Declined	Unknown
Mission Aborted	Unknown
On Ramp (H)	Unknown
Proceeding	Unknown
On Scene	13 1823Z Sep 20
Released	13 1943Z Sep 20
Returned to Base	13 1953Z Sep 20
 <b>SITREPs</b>	
<b>SITREP1/UIIN2017/20</b>	
Transmission	ROUTINE
Entry Date	13 1831Z Sep 20
From	<u>NMOC Dublin</u>
To	<u>MRCC Dublin Sitrep Group</u>
SITREP Number	ONE AND FINAL
Incident	REPORT OF GROUP OF KAYAKERS IN DIFFICULTY OUTSIDE BULLOCH
Reference Number	SITREP1/UIIN2017/20
A. ID of Casualty	GROUP OF KAYAKERS
B. Position	OUTSIDE BULLOCH HARBOUR
C. Situation	KAYAKER GROUP SPIT AND IN DIFFICULTY
D. Number of Persons	15
E. Assistance Required	BRING SAFELY ASHORE
F. Coordinating RCC	<u>NMOC Dublin</u>
G. Description of Casualty	GROUP OF KAYAKERS
H. Weather On Scene	Wind: 4, S / Sea: Slight / Swell: Low wave / Air Temp: 16.2°C / Water Temp: 15.1°C / Cloud Cov: Broken / Sitrep Weather-Time: 13 1803Z Sep 20
J. Initial Actions Taken	TASK R116 AND DUN LAOGHAIRE ALB
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## Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020

Oversee

- K. Search Area
- L. Coordinating Instructions
- M. Future Plans
- N. Additional Information

**BETWEEN BULLOCH HARBOUR AND COLLIMORE**  
**LOCATE AND RECOVER**  
**INCIDENT CLOSED**  
 1803 999 CALL RECEIVED FROM MOP ADVISING OF GROUP OF KAYAKERS 10-12 DEPARTED BULLOCH HARBOUR, NOW GROUP HAS SPLIT AND THERE ARE SOME CAPSIZED AND SOME DRIFTING. DUN LAOGHAIRE CGU, DUN LAOGHAIRE ALB AND R116 TASKED.  
 1819 DL ILB TASKED AFTER COMPLETING INCIDENT AT SANDYMOUNT.  
 1823 DL CGU ON SCENE  
 1823 FV NORTH WESTERN PROCEEDING TO GROUP OF 4 KAYAKERS.  
 1833 DL CGU ADVISE SECOND GROUP AT NORTH END OF LORETTO CONVENT.  
 1835 AMBULANCE REQUESTED FOR BULLOCH HARBOUR.  
 1835 DUN LAOGHAIRE ALB ON SCENE -ESCORTS KAYAKERS .  
 1830 R116 ON SCENE  
 1834 FV NORTH WESTERN BRINGS 3 KAYAKERS SAFELY ASHORE INTO BULLOCH HARBOUR.  
 1844 DUN LAOGHAIRE CGU ADVISES ALL MEMBERS OF KAYAKING GROUP (15) NOW ACCOUNTED FOR AND SAFELY ASHORE. THREE REQUIRE MEDICAL ASSESSMENT.  
 1851 DL LIFEBOATS AND R116 RELEASED  
 1943 CASUALTIES ASSESSED BY AMBULANCE CREW AND RELEASED.  
 CGU RELEASED AND RTB.  
**INCIDENT CLOSED.**

### Statistics

#### Type of Incident

Maritime SAR  
 PIW  
 Person(s) Thought to be in Trouble

#### Geographic Location

Inshore (0 - 1 nm)

#### Initial Event (Persons)

Person in water  
 Person thought to be in trouble

#### Casualty Activity (Persons)

Kayaking

#### Possible Causes (Persons)

Wind/Wave  
 Tide/current

### Outcomes



#### Outcome

Assistance/service provided

#### Persons

Lives saved	0
Persons assisted	15
Lives lost before alert received by RCC	0
Lives lost after alert received by RCC	0
Persons missing	0
<b>Total persons at risk</b>	<b>15</b>

## Appendix 7.7 IRCG SITREP and Report (redacted)

12/23/2020	Oversee
<b>Drownings</b>	
Possibly despondent	Unknown
Drownings after alert received	Unknown
Drownings before alert received	Unknown
<b>Body recoveries</b>	
Bodies recovered by CGUs	Unknown
Bodies recovered by helicopters	Unknown
Bodies recovered by other authorities	Unknown
<b>Property (estimated value)</b>	
Value of property saved	Unknown
Value of property lost	Unknown
<b>Concluding Remarks</b>	
	
Type	Senior Management
Comment	DC to conduct IR per Ops 33/20 App 02.
Author	
Date Created	21 1426Z Dec 20

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## Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020



**Lifeboats**

### Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

#### Record Overview

ID	LBI07803/2020
Lifeboat Station	Dun Laoghaire Lifeboat Station
Gin Number	Dub 2017/20
Lifeboat Name	Anna Livia
Date of Incident	13/09/2020 19:25:00
Status	Record Created
Assignment Type	Lifeboat Incident
Date & Time Record Printed	29/10/2020 17:02:44
User Printed	[REDACTED]
Last Saved	07/10/2020 12:00:32
Submitted?	No
Assigned	-

#### Record details

##### Narrative

Please give your narrative of the incident	Dublin C/G requested both ALB & ILB for a report of a group of kayakers in difficulty off of Bulloch harbour.
--	---

##### Request

Lifeboat Station	Dun Laoghaire Lifeboat Station
Was this a self launch?	No
Global Incident Number (GIN)	Dub 2017/20
Crew paged/alerted by	Coastguard
Date when crew were paged/alerted?	13/09/2020
Time when crew were paged/alerted?	19:12
Who first alerted the RNLI?	Coastguard
Time when RNLI were alerted?	19:12
And when were they alerted?	13/09/2020
What type of Lifeboat did the Coastguard request?	ALB
What type of launch was requested?	Launch
What was the nature of your tasking?	Search and Rescue
What was the reported casualty position?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W

##### Response > Launch

Did the Lifeboat launch?	Yes
Did you launch from Station?	Yes
Which RNLI rescue craft did you use?	Anna Livia
Date Lifeboat launched	13/09/2020
Time Lifeboat launched	19:25
Was there a delay in launching?	
Did the Lifeboat arrive at scene?	Yes
If this incident is linked please specify?	

##### Response > Personnel > Personnel Questions

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Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

Was there a crew change?	No
Were any non-enrolled crew on board the Lifeboat? (e.g. retired crew)	No
Were there any non-RNLI personnel on board the Lifeboat? (e.g. Paramedic)	No
Were any shorecrew used to launch or recover the Lifeboat?	No
Which people responded to pager but were not utilised as crew/shore crew?	
Were there any Officials present?	Yes
Were there any Officials or Regional staff on board the Lifeboat?	No
Start time of incident	19:25
Finish time of incident	20:05
If you used any extra crew please explain why.	
If you used any extra shorecrew please explain why.	

Response > Personnel > Crew Table

Crew	[REDACTED]
Main role	ALB Coxswain
Crew Claiming	Yes
Row: 1	
Crew	[REDACTED]
Main role	ALB Mechanic
Crew Claiming	Yes
Row: 2	
Crew	[REDACTED]
Main role	ALB Navigator
Crew Claiming	Yes
Row: 3	
Crew	[REDACTED]
Main role	ALB Crew
Crew Claiming	Yes
Row: 4	
Crew	[REDACTED]
Main role	ALB Navigator
Crew Claiming	Yes

Response > Personnel > Officials Table

Officials present	[REDACTED]
Official Role	Deputy Launching Authority

Response > Personnel > Authority

Who was the RNLI Launching Authority?	Deputy Launching Authority (DLA)
Launching Authority remarks	

Response > Weather

Weather	Part Cloudy
Visibility	Good Visibility
Wind Force	4 Moderate breeze (11-16 knots)
What direction was the wind coming from?	South
Wind Condition	
Sea State	0.5 to 1.25m Slight
General weather comments	

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## Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

River conditions - approximate rate	
River conditions - direction	
Time of high water	21:35
Time of low water	

### Situation & Action > Where and When

Date arrived on scene	13/09/2020
Time arrived on scene	19:33
What was the position of the incident?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
Did this Lifeboat perform a search pattern?	No

### Situation & Action > Weather On Scene

Weather	Part Cloudy
Visibility	Good Visibility
Wind Force	4 Moderate breeze (11-16 knots)
What direction was the wind coming from?	South
Wind condition	
Sea state	0.5 to 1.25m Slight
General weather comments	
River conditions - approximate rate	
River conditions - direction	

### Situation & Action > Equipment Used

Equipment used	
Communication equipment used with the casualty	

### Situation & Action > Difficulties

Were there any difficulties or barriers faced in performing this service?	No
Communication equipment used by the Coastguard	VHF
Did you experience problems with communications with the Coastguard?	No
Did any of the Lifeboat crew unintentionally enter the water?	No
Did the Lifeboat capsize?	No
Did the Lifeboat sustain any damages as a result of slamming events?	No

### Situation & Action > Other Organisations

Other emergency services/organisations involved	Coastguard
Unit	Vehicle, Helicopter
Police incident number	
Helicopter GIN	
Helicopter base	Dublin
Aircraft operator	Irish Coastguard
Aircraft type	S92A
Helicopter call sign	R116

### Situation & Action > Casualty Overview

Was this incident a mass rescue? (more than five craft or casualties)	Yes
How many craft were involved in this incident?	15
How many casualties were involved in this incident?	0
How many body recoveries were involved in this incident?	0
How many animals were involved in this incident?	0

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Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

How many others were involved in this incident?	0
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**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:33
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

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Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:33
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	

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### Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

#### Casualties > > Casualty Time and Location

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:33
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

#### Casualties > > Casualty Craft

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Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

#### Casualties > > Casualty Time and Location

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Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

#### Casualties > > Casualty Craft

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Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

#### Casualties > > Casualty Time and Location

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:33
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020

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Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

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Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:33
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Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
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What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

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Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
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Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
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What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

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## Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

### Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
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Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

### Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location

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Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:33
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What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No

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## Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB &amp; RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No
---	----

**Casualties > > Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

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What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
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Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
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Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

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Company name of craft (if known)	
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Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties > > Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:33
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Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty location?	No

**Casualties > > Mass Rescue**

What was the type of craft?	Manually powered craft
Number of craft assisted	0
Number of craft escorted	0
Number of craft towed in	0
Number of craft sunk/wrecked	0
Male child	0
Male teen	0
Male adult	0
Female child	0
Female teen	0
Female adult	0

**Outcome > Close**

What was the outcome of the service?	Launched - no assistance given
What was the original reported casualty?	Craft
If you would like to specify the exact casualty type please detail below.	
Were any photographs or any video footage taken?	No
Learning point from the wet debrief	
Details of the helicopter ground briefing	
Date depart from scene/search location	13/09/2020
Time depart from scene/search location	19:50
Date return to Station	13/09/2020
Time return to Station	20:05
Were you diverted to another incident?	No
Did the crew need to reassemble to rehouse the Lifeboat?	No

**Outcome > Crew Welfare**

Were any crew injured or were there any near misses during the service?	No
Was this a potentially traumatic service?	No

**Outcome > Damage**

Was the Lifeboat damaged at launch?	No
Was the Lifeboat damaged during service?	No
Was the Lifeboat damaged during Recovery?	No

This report may contain personal information and should be kept securely in accordance with the data protection act. When no longer needed, this report must be securely destroyed.

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**Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).**

Incident Report: LBI07803/2020

Did the Lifeboat/crew injure any third party?	No
Did the Lifeboat/crew damage anyone elses craft/equipment?	No

**Outcome > Known Faults**

Did the Lifeboat go to sea with any known issues?	No
---	----

Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

**Incident Report: LBI07975/2020**

**Record Overview**

ID	LBI07975/2020
Lifeboat Station	Dun Laoghaire Lifeboat Station
Gin Number	Dub 2017/20
Lifeboat Name	Realt Na Mara
Date of Incident	13/09/2020 18:55:00
Status	Record Created
Assignment Type	Lifeboat Incident
Date & Time Record Printed	29/10/2020 16:59:16
User Printed	[REDACTED]
Last Saved	28/10/2020 15:59:33
Submitted?	No
Assigned	-

**Record details**

**Narrative**

Please give your narrative of the incident	ILB had just finished a service call when Dublin C/G requested it to go to the aid of 15 kayakers in difficulty off of Bulloch Harbour.
--	---

**Request**


Lifeboat Station	Dun Laoghaire Lifeboat Station
Was this a self launch?	No
Global Incident Number (GIN)	Dub 2017/20
Crew paged/alerted by	Coastguard
Date when crew were paged/alerted?	13/09/2020
Time when crew were paged/alerted?	19:19
Who first alerted the RNLI?	Coastguard
Time when RNLI were alerted?	19:12
And when were they alerted?	13/09/2020
Who first alerted the emergency services?	Coastguard
What type of Lifeboat did the Coastguard request?	ILB
What type of launch was requested?	Launch
What was the nature of your tasking?	Search and Rescue
What was the reported casualty position?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W

**Response > Launch**

Did the Lifeboat launch?	Yes
Did you launch from Station?	Yes
Which RNLI rescue craft did you use?	Realt Na Mara
Date Lifeboat launched	13/09/2020
Time Lifeboat launched	18:55
Was there a delay in launching?	
Did the Lifeboat arrive at scene?	Yes
If this incident is linked please specify?	

**Response > Personnel > Personnel Questions**

This report may contain personal information and should be kept securely in accordance with the data protection act. When no longer needed, this report must be securely destroyed.



**Lifeboats**

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## Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

Was there a crew change?	No
Were any non-enrolled crew on board the Lifeboat? (e.g. retired crew)	No
Were there any non-RNLI personnel on board the Lifeboat? (e.g. Paramedic)	No
Were any shorecrew used to launch or recover the Lifeboat?	Yes
Which people responded to pager but were not utilised as crew/shore crew?	
Were there any Officials present?	Yes
Were there any Officials or Regional staff on board the Lifeboat?	Yes
Start time of incident	18:55
Finish time of incident	20:00
If you used any extra crew please explain why.	
If you used any extra shorecrew please explain why.	

### Response > Personnel > Crew Table

Crew	[REDACTED]
Main role	ILB D Class Helm
Crew Claiming	Yes
Row: 1	
Crew	[REDACTED]
Main role	ILB D Class Crew
Crew Claiming	Yes
Row: 2	
Crew	[REDACTED]
Main role	ILB D Class Crew
Crew Claiming	Yes

### Response > Personnel > Shorecrew Table

Shore crew	[REDACTED]
Which role for Shorecrew	ALB Mechanic
Shorecrew Claiming	Yes
Row: 1	
Shore crew	[REDACTED]
Which role for Shorecrew	Trainee ILB Crew
Shorecrew Claiming	No

### Response > Personnel > Officials Table

Officials present	[REDACTED]
Official Role	Deputy Launching Authority

### Response > Personnel > Authority

Who was the RNLI Launching Authority?	Deputy Launching Authority (DLA)
Launching Authority remarks	

### Response > Weather

Weather	Part Cloudy
Visibility	Good Visibility
Wind Force	4 Moderate breeze (11-16 knots)
What direction was the wind coming from?	South
Wind Condition	
Sea State	0.5 to 1.25m Slight

This report may contain personal information and should be kept securely in accordance with the data protection act. When no longer needed, this report must be securely destroyed.

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Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

General weather comments	
River conditions - approximate rate	
River conditions - direction	
Time of high water	21:35
Time of low water	

**Situation & Action > Where and When**

Date arrived on scene	13/09/2020
Time arrived on scene	19:40
What was the position of the incident?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
Did this Lifeboat perform a search pattern?	No

**Situation & Action > Weather On Scene**

Weather	Part Cloudy
Visibility	Good Visibility
Wind Force	4 Moderate breeze (11-16 knots)
What direction was the wind coming from?	South
Wind condition	
Sea state	0.5 to 1.25m Slight
General weather comments	
River conditions - approximate rate	
River conditions - direction	

**Situation & Action > Equipment Used**

Equipment used	
Communication equipment used with the casualty	

**Situation & Action > Difficulties**

Were there any difficulties or barriers faced in performing this service?	No
Communication equipment used by the Coastguard	VHF
Did you experience problems with communications with the Coastguard?	No
Did any of the Lifeboat crew unintentionally enter the water?	No
Did the Lifeboat capsize?	No
Did the Lifeboat sustain any damages as a result of slamming events?	No

**Situation & Action > Other Organisations**

Other emergency services/organisations involved	Coastguard
Unit	Vehicle, Helicopter
Police incident number	
Helicopter GIN	
Helicopter base	Dublin
Aircraft operator	Irish Coastguard
Aircraft type	S92A
Helicopter call sign	R116

**Situation & Action > Casualty Overview**

Was this incident a mass rescue? (more than five craft or casualties)	No
How many craft were involved in this incident?	15

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
---------------------------------------	----

This report may contain personal information and should be kept securely in accordance with the data protection act. When no longer needed, this report must be securely destroyed.

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## Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

### Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

### Casualties >> Casualty Craft

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

### Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

### Casualties >> Casualty Craft

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

### Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location

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Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No

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## Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No
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### Casualties >> Casualty Craft

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

### Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

### Casualties >> Casualty Craft

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

### Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

### Casualties >> Casualty Craft

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	

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Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020

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## Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB &amp; RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

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Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

**Casualties >> Casualty Craft**

Did you assist this craft in any way?	No
Craft Type	Kayak
Name of craft (if known)	
Company name of craft (if known)	
Registration of craft	
Length of craft (in metres)	
Tonnage of craft	
How many people were on board the craft but were not assisted?	1

**Casualties >> Casualty Time and Location**

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## Appendix 7.8 RNLI ALB & RNLI ILB Reports (redacted).

Incident Report: LBI07975/2020

Date arrived at craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time arrived at craft/casualty/other	19:40
Date depart craft/casualty/other	13/09/2020
Time depart craft/casualty/other	19:50
What was the position of the casualty?	53° 17.185 N, 006° 06.071 W
What was the location name? (e.g. name of bridge)	
How did you locate the casualty?	
Were there any issues or problems with locating the casualty?	No
Can you provide additional information regarding the casualty's location?	No

### Outcome > Close

What was the outcome of the service?	Launched - no assistance given
What was the original reported casualty?	Craft
If you would like to specify the exact casualty type please detail below.	
Were any photographs or any video footage taken?	No
Learning point from the wet debrief	
Details of the helicopter ground briefing	
Date depart from scene/search location	13/09/2020
Time depart from scene/search location	19:50
Date return to Station	13/09/2020
Time return to Station	20:00
Were you diverted to another incident?	No
Did the crew need to reassemble to rehouse the Lifeboat?	No

### Outcome > Crew Welfare

Were any crew injured or were there any near misses during the service?	No
Was this a potentially traumatic service?	No

### Outcome > Damage

Was the Lifeboat damaged at launch?	No
Was the Lifeboat damaged during service?	No
Was the Lifeboat damaged during Recovery?	No
Did the Lifeboat/crew injury any third party?	No
Did the Lifeboat/crew damage anyone else's craft/equipment?	No

### Outcome > Known Faults

Did the Lifeboat go to sea with any known issues?	No
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Appendix 7.9 Ambulance Service Report (redacted).

Call Details 2586305

Call Details SOE Location Map GEO Custom Fields

Call No	2586305	Type	EMG	Dispatch Code	14D05	Priority	3	Reported Casualties	3	Call Time	13 Sep 2020 19:35:30
Call back				Problem	3 X KYAKERS PULLED OUT OF HARBOUR BY IRCG		Chief Complaint	Drowning/Diving Accident			
From Location	BULLOCK HARBOUR, DALKEY,			To Location							
Notes	<p>What's The Problem:            3 X KYAKERS PULLED OUT OF HARBOUR BY IRCG            Crew Responder Information (ProQA):            Age unknown, Gender unknown, Consciousness unknown, Breathing status unknown. Multiple patients involved: 3.            Caller Statement: 3 X KYAKERS PULLED OUT OF</p>										

Main Perf Patient Res Info

Callsign	Alloc.	Mobile	Arr.Sc.	Left Sc	Arr.Dest.	Clear	Destination Facility
8L30	13 Sep 2020 19:39:32	13 Sep 2020 19:39:51				13 Sep 2020 19:53:02	ST MICHAELS DUN LAOGHRAI
SR02	13 Sep 2020 19:44:08	13 Sep 2020 19:45:22	13 Sep 2020 20:05:22			13 Sep 2020 20:42:43	ST MICHAELS DUN LAOGHRAI
5L23	13 Sep 2020 19:52:03	13 Sep 2020 19:52:16	13 Sep 2020 20:02:52			13 Sep 2020 21:29:40	ST MICHAELS DUN LAOGHRAI

13 Sep 2020 19:44:10 Allocation Details:

Status Text: [EMG]BULLOCK HARBOUR, DALKEY, DUBLIN,

Crew 1: [REDACTED] (ID: [REDACTED] :Qualifications (A)

13 Sep 2020 19:52:05 Allocation Details:

Status Text: [EMG]BULLOCK HARBOUR, DALKEY, DUBLIN,

Crew 1: [REDACTED] (ID: [REDACTED] :Qualifications (P)

Crew 2: [REDACTED] (ID: [REDACTED] :Qualifications (P)

Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)



Strictly Confidential  
Open Addressee Only



18<sup>th</sup> January 2021

Re: **Merchants Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 (“the 2000 Act”)**  
**Marine Casualty Investigation Board (“the Board”)**  
**Marine Incident at Bulloch Harbour and Dalkey Island, Dalkey, Co. Dublin on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 (“the Incident”)**  
**Investigation of the Incident pursuant to the 2000 Act (“the Investigation”)**  
**Warrant of Appointment of [REDACTED] as Investigator (“the Investigator”) dated 13<sup>th</sup> January 2021 (“the Warrant”)**

---



I am writing to you in my capacity as the Investigator appointed by the Board to investigate the Incident. I enclose a copy of the Warrant.

**The 2000 Act**

The purpose of the Investigation, in relation to the Incident, is to establish the cause of a “marine casualty” (as defined within the meaning of the 2000 Act) with a view to making recommendations.

It is not the purpose of the Investigation to attribute blame or fault.

Further information concerning the role and function of the Board can be found at [www.mcib.ie](http://www.mcib.ie).

**Investigation**

I am in receipt of communications from two people involved in the Incident. I enclose redacted copies of their communications. They are redacted as to their names

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

and contact details. As you will see, one of those emails refers to a "Guided kayak tour from Bullock Harbour to Dalkey Island with [REDACTED] on Sunday 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020". My enquiries in the Companies Registration Office indicate that the business name "Kayaking" is registered in your name.

While I will likely wish to meet with you (either at an appropriate physically distanced meeting or by Zoom), before I do, I would be most obliged if you could assist me by providing to me the following records: -

- (i) the names and contact details of the instructors referred to in the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (ii) the names and contact details of the group of people who participated in the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (iii) any incident reports maintained by you in respect of the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (iv) specification of the kayaks used as part of the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (v) specification of the personal flotation devices used by instructors and participants on the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (vi) specifications of any other equipment used by instructors and participants on the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (vii) any booking forms/waivers/competency assessment forms for participants on the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (viii) any plan/record of the course planned for the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (ix) Copy Health & Safety Statement relating to instructors' and customers' safety;
- (x) Copy of any procedures manual indicating how safety is achieved for instructors and customers;
- (xi) Copy of any risk assessment undertaken in relation to the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (xii) Details of any briefings given to instructors and participants on the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (xiii) Details of any emergency plan and rescue coverage in relation to the guided tour referred to;
- (xiv) Details of any affiliation with Canoeing Ireland and compliance with its requirements;
- (xv) Details of any affiliation with Irish Sea Kayaking Association and compliance with its requirements.

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

and contact details. As you will see, one of those emails refers to a "Guided kayak tour from Bullock Harbour to Dalkey Island with [REDACTED] on Sunday 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020". My enquiries in the Companies Registration Office indicate that the business name "Kayaking" is registered in your name.

While I will likely wish to meet with you (either at an appropriate physically distanced meeting or by Zoom), before I do, I would be most obliged if you could assist me by providing to me the following records: -

- (i) the names and contact details of the instructors referred to in the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (ii) the names and contact details of the group of people who participated in the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (iii) any incident reports maintained by you in respect of the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (iv) specification of the kayaks used as part of the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (v) specification of the personal flotation devices used by instructors and participants on the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (vi) specifications of any other equipment used by instructors and participants on the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (vii) any booking forms/waivers/competency assessment forms for participants on the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (viii) any plan/record of the course planned for the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (ix) Copy Health & Safety Statement relating to instructors' and customers' safety;
- (x) Copy of any procedures manual indicating how safety is achieved for instructors and customers;
- (xi) Copy of any risk assessment undertaken in relation to the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (xii) Details of any briefings given to instructors and participants on the guided kayak tour referred to;
- (xiii) Details of any emergency plan and rescue coverage in relation to the guided tour referred to;
- (xiv) Details of any affiliation with Canoeing Ireland and compliance with its requirements;
- (xv) Details of any affiliation with Irish Sea Kayaking Association and compliance with its requirements.

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

Please note that I regard such records as records necessary for the purpose of the Investigation within the meaning of Section 30(1) of the 2000 Act and as such, would be grateful if you could deliver those records to me at my address (noted above) within seven (7) days from the date of this letter.


If you would like to provide to me any additional information, relevant to the Incident, please do.

**Power of Investigators**

I attach to this letter a schedule summarising the power of Investigators under the 2000 Act.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,



**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** 19 September 2020 18:03  
**To:** Maritime Safety Policy Division  
**Subject:** Kayaking incident, Dalkey, 13/09/20

Hello,

I was asked to provide a statement on an incident I was involved in last weekend in Dalkey.

I was taking part in a guided kayak tour from Bullock Harbour to Dalkey Island with [REDACTED] on Sunday 13th September 2020. There was approximately 10-12 people taking part and 3 instructors. We were each given a wet suit and buoyancy aid to wear and told how to hold the oar. Most people shared 2 person kayaks and I was in an individual kayak. We set off from bullock harbour at approximately 17.30 and headed out towards dalkey island. From the beginning, it didn't feel right. The waves were quite big and no matter how hard we paddled we couldn't control the direction we were heading. Halfway between bullock harbour and dalkey island I noticed that I was drifting out to sea. I continuously raised my hand and shouted for help because I couldn't control where I was going and was drifting more. I could hear an instructor yelling at me to stop and turn back but I couldn't do anything and started to feel panicked because I had no control. A big wave flipped me and I went over the front of the kayak. I lost my glasses and my buoyancy aid burst open when I hit the sea. I was able to swim to my kayak and hold on but the waves and current were so strong I was getting pulled under the kayak and out the other side and my legs were flailing. Every time a big wave came i started swallowing water and then started to panic again. By the time an instructor got to me I was coughing and trying to keep my head above water while being hit by the waves. Eventually one of the instructors got to me and told me to hang on to the end of his kayak so he could empty the water out of mine. Another instructor came over and they both tried to help me back into the kayak which was extremely difficult as it was so rough and I had never attempted to get back into a kayak before. I got back into the kayak and the instructor let go of me and straight away another big wave knocked me over again. It felt like I had been in the water a while and it was hard to stay a float. I got back in a second time and was knocked out again. They tried to tow me while I was still in the water but they were going around in circles and couldn't get past the current. At this stage I didn't know what was happening with the rest of the group but the third instructor arrived and pumped water out of my boat. He was towing a couple on a 2 person kayak and their kayak came too close with the current or the waves and hit me in the head. The 3 instructors were surrounding me and I was hit in the head again and swallowed more water. At this stage I had been in the water for over 40 minutes and could hear the coast guard helicopter over head. I was really scared at this point and swallowed more water

1

trying to catch my breath between the waves. I was asking what was going to happen to me and wondering why I was still struggling. I managed to get back in the kayak one last time but it was a real struggle and my body felt exhausted at that stage. I was able to lean back and zip up my buoyancy aid as the 3rd instructor that came back kept hold of me and reassured me whilst the other 2 hadn't spoken to me during the whole ordeal. The third instructor apologised and said he should never had brought us out there, and that he should have made a call sooner. I couldn't catch my breath and was shaking and crying and as soon as I got back in the kayak 2 men in a motor boat arrived and lifted me on board. The couple that were being towed were already in the boat. I was told they just capsized 2 minutes ago and were pulled on to the boat. I wasn't sure what was happening at the time, I was just trying to keep my head above water and when i was pulled out I noticed I was shaking uncontrollably and hyperventilating. I couldn't stand up and was lifted out of the boat and wrapped in blankets. I was put in the coast guard jeep with heating on to await the ambulance but was still shaking. When the ambulance arrived I was assessed and treated by two paramedics. My temperature and oxygen levels were low and I was tachycardic and treated accordingly. I felt nauseous from swallowing so much water and I was genuinely terrified during the ordeal. I only found out later that night that the rest of the group had also gotten into trouble and that the owner of [REDACTED] had to paddle out to them.

My friend [REDACTED] who was also on the tour will provide a statemet as to what happened to the rest of the group and what happened when the owner arrived. Please let me know if you require any more information or detail and thank you so much for everyones help that night.

[REDACTED]

## Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday 28 September 2020 13:03  
**To:** Marine Casualty Investigation Board  
**Subject:** Kayaking Incident 13/09/2020

Dear Sir or Madam,

Please see below my account of the kayaking incident at Bullock Harbour on 13/09/2020:

We left the harbour around 17:30 or just after. We had all been given life jackets and wetsuits. I was in an individual kayak.

Very shortly after leaving the harbour, it became very difficult to paddle the kayak, the waves seemed very large and the sea seemed very rough but I had never been kayaking before so I thought maybe I just wasn't great at it. Most of the group was quite a way in front of myself and 3 other kayaks. We were finding it difficult to paddle and all had to be towed by the instructor at different points. Eventually the instructor got us near to the rest of the group and went back to the other 2 instructors as they were dealing with some kayakers who had gotten into difficulty, I didn't know exactly what was happening at this point. I was just concentrating on staying afloat.

At this point the owner of the company came into the water. She said she was watching from the shore and could see there were people in difficulty so came in. She told us that as there were people in difficulty we would be going back to shore. She said the waves were going in that direction so it would be easy to get back.

When we started going back my kayak began drifting out to sea away from the shore and I could not turn it around so she came out and towed me back. Shortly after, 2 people began shouting on a double kayak, she told them to keep paddling but their kayak then capsized. She told them to swim to nearby rocks at the shore. At this point she realised we would not be able to go back to the harbour so there was one man in the group who appeared to be a confident kayaker, he went into the rocks and helped us all in one by one. The coast guard was also here at this stage.

When we were all in the rock area we were instructed to carry the kayaks up the steps which we did.

The Coast Guard then informed us that we would not be able to come onto shore from the rocks where we were as there was a very high wall with no gate. He said we would have to wait for the lifeboat, which we could see very near, and we were all happy with this. The owner was up with the coast guard at this stage, she appeared to be disagreeing with him and was shouting down different instructions to us than he was. We were confused and didn't know who to listen to. I personally would have preferred the Coast Guard's instruction as that is his job. For some reason then the owner told us to climb around the rocks and over the rocks and wall up to shore. We were told to bring the oars for balance. Some of the rocks were very slippery with seaweed and they were all very uneven, I was very nervous climbing over them. I still am not sure why we didn't just wait for the lifeboat. Luckily none of us fell and we all got up to the shore.

When we were on the shore the Coast Guard tried to establish how many people went out to make sure we had everyone back. No one knew how many people went out. But at that point we realised we were missing 2 people in a double kayak, thankfully the Coast Guard was able to confirm they were safe over at Bullock Harbour, having been brought back by a lifeboat, I think.

The Coast Guard was then reporting on the radio when he mentioned a patient had hypothermia. Then the owner heard this and she began screaming at the coast guard again, saying "how dare you say that when you haven't even seen the person" and "how dare you make that assumption". It was clear though that the Coast Guard had received this information from his colleagues who were with the patient and was just reporting all the information from the incident back.

At this stage I was getting anxious as I wanted to get back and see how my friend was as I had no idea what had happened out in the water. The Coast Guard noticed this and offered to drive me back, He was extremely helpful and made me feel at ease. Back at the harbour there were more members of the coast guard who were again very helpful. An ambulance and an AP car arrived and all were very helpful as well. I was not physically injured so I did not require any assistance from them.

The whole incident was very frightening, especially when we were out in the rough water, and when we were trying to get back to the shore. It left me very shaken.

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)****Schedule of Powers of Investigators under the 2000 Act**


Part 3 of the 2000 Act sets out the Investigator's powers which include the following:-

- The power to enter a premises for the purpose of carrying out an investigation (and in the case of a private dwelling, only on foot of a Warrant issued by the District Court);
- To take possession and remove any object(s);
- To subject such object(s) to tests;
- To take measurements or photographs;
- To assess (and regulate access to) any vessel or wreck;
- To require a person to deliver records;
- To require a person to attend before the Investigator in order to provide information necessary for the purpose of the investigation;
- To examine any person attending before the Investigator and to require answers;
- To administer an oath.

The foregoing is not an exhaustive list of an Investigator's powers. For a complete list, please see the 2000 Act, a copy of which is enclosed with this schedule.



**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**



Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)



Strictly Confidential  
Open Addressee Only



20<sup>th</sup> January 2021

**Re: Merchants Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 ("the 2000 Act")  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board ("the Board")  
Marine Incident at Bulloch Harbour and Dalkey Island, Dalkey, Co. Dublin on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 ("the Incident")  
Investigation of the Incident pursuant to the 2000 Act ("the Investigation")  
Warrant of Appointment of [REDACTED] as Investigator ("the Investigator") dated 13<sup>th</sup> January 2021 ("the Warrant")**

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Thank you for your e-mail of the 19<sup>th</sup> January 2021. I address your queries in like paragraph order: -

1. The "Incident" is that described in the redacted communications from two people involved in it, copies of which I gave to.
2. As I mentioned in my letter of the 18<sup>th</sup> January 2021, "marine casualty" is as defined within the meaning of the 2000 Act. As is stated in the Warrant, the Board resolved to conduct an investigation into a marine casualty in the Dublin Bay area on or about 13 September 2020. As the decision to conduct that investigation was one taken by the Board, any issues you have concerning "marine casualty" should be directed to it.
3. Unfortunately, you have misread my letter. I did not say that I "... *have been in communication...*" as your email states. Rather, what I said was that "*I am in receipt of communications from two people involved in the Incident*". In any event, for the avoidance of doubt, please note that I have not been in

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

communication "... with these unidentified persons for four months prior to [my] 'appointment' as 'investigator'".


4. I did not ask either of the authors of the two redacted e-mails furnished to you to provide a statement.
5. I am investigating the Incident and as such, not disclosing the identity of the authors of the redacted e-mails furnished to you is not a question of fairness or unfairness. Their identity does not impact on the content of their emails.
6. I cannot say what relevance your affiliation (if any) with Canoeing Ireland and Irish Sea Kayaking Association and compliance with their respective requirements is until I know whether you have any such affiliation.

**Records**


I await receipt of the records set out at paragraph (i) – (xv) of my letter of 18 January.

As previously mentioned, if you would like to provide to me any additional information, relevant to the Incident, please do.


Yours sincerely,



**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**



To:



23rd January 2021

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter of 20 January 2021.

**1. The four corners of the 'incident'.**

1.1 Thank you for your confirmation to me that the four corners of the 'incident' which you purport to investigate as a statutory investigator holding a purported warrant in that regard from the Board of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board on foot of its decision to appoint you dated 13 January 2021 is that as described in two 'redacted communications' dated 19 September 2020 and 28 September 2020 respectively, the addressee in the former being the *Maritime Safety Policy Division* (presumably of the Department of Transport) and the addressee in the latter being the *Marine Casualty Investigation Board*.

1.2 Please explain how the communication dated 19 September 2020 addressed to a division of the Department of Transport came into your possession on or before 19 January 2021 some four months later.

## Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

1.3 Through whose hands did it pass?

1.4 What action was taken by any persons with respect to that email ending up in your possession?

### **2. Anonymous / redacted emails**

2.1. The manner in which you first wrote to me on 18 January 2021 stating that you *'are in receipt of communications from two persons involved in the Incident'* gave me the impression that you had been in communication with these anonymous persons for four months prior to your writing to me out of the blue on 18 January 2021.

2.2 I note that you say now that you had not been in communication with these persons.

2.3 Please provide me with a copy of all communications (email, letter, WhatsApp, MSM, telephone, minutes, notes) you have had with all persons regarding me and this purported incident:

(a) prior to the purported MCIB board decision to appoint you as investigator dated 13 January 2021, and

(b) subsequent to the purported MCIB board decision dated 13 January 2021.

### **3. 'I was asked to provide a statement ...' to the Maritime Safety Policy Division**

3.1 The opening line of the anonymous email of 19 September 2020 addressed to the Maritime Safety Policy Division states: *'I was asked to provide a statement ...'*

3.2. Please identify to me the person (name, rank, position, contact details) who asked or encouraged this unknown person to send an email concerning me to the Maritime Safety Policy Division.

### **4. I am still asking you to define 'marine casualty'.**

4.1 While you tell me now that you have 'mentioned' in your letter of 18 January that 'marine casualty' is as defined within the meaning of the 2000 Act, it is entirely unnecessary and unsatisfactory that as a purported investigator reasonably and responsibly asked by the subject of that investigation to be helpful and to particularize with exactitude the statutory wording you claim to be implementing, that you should refer me elsewhere.

4.2 One would have expected a person appointed as a statutory investigator to satisfy himself in the first instance and immediately upon appointment that there had been a marine casualty within the meaning of a specific form of words based on a specific item of legislation. It is grotesque that as a statutory investigator you refuse to define your jurisdiction.

4.3 This should have been defined to me in your first letter. I should not have been bounced off to a third party for clarification as per your second letter. It is core and central to everything you claim to be entitled to do. There is no reason why not, and every good reason why you should particularize

## Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

this to me. Your refusal stands starkly when juxtaposed with your extensive cutting and pasting of provisions of the Act when listing the information that you demand of me.

4.4 Please now specify with exactitude the wording of what you say is the meaning of 'marine casualty' that you, as purported investigator, say defines the four corners of, and is the basis of, your statutory work to investigate me.

### **5. Identity of anonymous email writers**

5.1 With respect, the identity of the authors of these two emails impacts directly on your investigation. It certainly impacts directly on me for without these two emails – and only these two emails - you tell me there would be no investigation. It impacts on my fundamental rights to fair procedures, to know the identity of my accusers and to be informed so that I might be in a position to cooperate and assist any properly constituted statutory investigation.

5.2 It matters not that you might state the purpose of your investigation is not to ascribe blame or responsibility. If the purpose of your investigation is to establish facts as truth, then you should be affording me basic fairness by disclosing identities and context. Any 'report' based on withholding such elements of fair procedures is doomed to wanton or indifferent error. It displays no genuine desire to establish actual facts and is flawed *ab initio*. How you might proceed as investigator without knowing the identity of the anonymous complainants and how you might be able to make further enquiries of these persons as your investigation proceeds is an astounding proposition.

5.3 Your anxiety to proceed while ignorant of their identity - and apparently indifferent to their identity - amounts to an assertion by you to me that you have prejudged this matter, accepted without question 'facts' contained in anonymised emails and that you intend as investigator to accept as 100% accurate without question everything that is set out in those anonymous emails.

5.4 What standard of fairness does that speak to? What standard of competence are you applying here? If you are intent on running with such statements as received truths, then I do not understand why you want to hear from me at all if you intend to prevent me from setting out information accurately and in context.

5.5 I ask again that you provide me with the names and contact details of the authors of the anonymised emails dated 19th and 28th September 2020.

5.5. Equally, [REDACTED] if it is the case you genuinely are not aware of their names and contact details, I require you to state so with complete candour.

### **6. Canoeing Ireland / Sea Kayaking Ireland**

6.1 I find it very strange that you ask me about Canoeing Ireland and the Irish Sea Kayaking Association when they are not mentioned in your warrant or in the anonymous emails you say define the four corners of your investigation.

6.2 It is bizarre that as a purported statutory investigator you should now tell me that though you have asked for information concerning affiliation with these bodies you cannot tell me what relevance it might possibly have until I tell you my affiliation. Sir, this is not an investigation. It is a fishing scattergun.

## Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

### **7. What is the statutory basis for your demand for information within seven days?**

7.1. In your letter of 18 January at paragraph (i) – (xv), you demand a long list of documents from me within seven days.

7.2 You repeat your demand in yours of 20 January 2021 under reply.

7.3 Please identify and provide me with a copy of the specific statutory provision you rely upon to require or oblige me to provide documents to you within seven (7) days as you demand.

### **8. Competence and Training**

8.1 Please confirm whether your name appears on any published list of persons from which the Marine Casualty Investigation Board may appoint a statutory investigator and provide me with a copy of this list.

8.2 Please provide me with a copy of your application form / curriculum vitae for such list or appointment.

8.3 Please confirm details including syllabus, certificates and current CPD of any approved course of training you have undertaken to establish your competency with respect to the role of statutory investigator of marine incidents or marine casualties.

### **9. GDPR and Privacy Policy**

9.1 Please provide me with a complete copy of your GDPR and Data Protection and Privacy Policies.

9.2 Please take this communication as my formal request pursuant to the General Data Protection Regulation 2016 EU 679 and the Data Protection Acts 1988 to 2018 that you provide me with a copy of all data you hold relating to me or from which I might be identified.

9.3. You are a stranger to me. Other than as might be contained in my last communication to you, I have not knowingly provided you with any information or data concerning me or from which I might be identified.

9.4 Accordingly, and in addition to my general data subject access request as set out above, I require you to provide me with all data relating to me or from which I might be identified that you have, hold or process and which you have not received from me.

9.5 With respect to the timeline for complying with my data subject access request, your regulatory obligation is to provide this data to me within one month or without undue delay. Given the manner and speed of your involvement in my life, and as my data held by you should be readily accessible by you, I require my data and information by return.

### **10. Your Identity**

10.1 You are a stranger to me. Please provide me proof of your identity and address such as a copy of your passport, driver's licence and utility bill and your PPS number.

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

**11. Reservation.**


11.1 Nothing in this communication should be taken as my accepting the truth or accuracy of anything you have written or communicated or me or your entitlement to rely on same. I reserve my position.

Yours faithfully,





**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**



**Strictly Confidential**  
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26<sup>th</sup> January 2021

**Re: Merchants Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 (“the 2000 Act”)  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board (“the Board”)  
Marine Incident at Bulloch Harbour and Dalkey Island, Dalkey, Co. Dublin on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 (“the Incident”)  
Investigation of the Incident pursuant to the 2000 Act (“the Investigation”)  
Warrant of Appointment of [REDACTED] as Investigator (“the Investigator”) dated 13<sup>th</sup> January 2021 (“the Warrant”)**

---



I refer to my previous correspondence, resting with my letter of the 20<sup>th</sup> January last (in response to your e-mail of the 19<sup>th</sup> January 2021).

**Records**

I continue to await receipt of the records set out at paragraphs (i) – (xv) of my letter of the 18<sup>th</sup> January 2021.

As previously indicated, I regard such records as records necessary for the purpose of the Investigation within the meaning of Section 30(1) of the 2000 Act.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,



**Appendix 7.10** Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

[Redacted]


Did you receive my letter of 23 January last sent by email?

Yours faithfully,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**



Strictly Confidential  
Open Addressee Only



26<sup>th</sup> January 2021

**Re: Merchants Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 (“the 2000 Act”)  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board (“the Board”)  
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
Thank you for your e-mail.

I confirm I have now received your e-mail letter of the 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2021 and will reply in due course.

Yours sincerely,



Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)



Strictly Confidential  
Open Addressee Only



1<sup>st</sup> February 2021

**Re: Merchants Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 (“the 2000 Act”)  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board (“the Board”)  
Marine Incident at Bulloch Harbour and Dalkey Island, Dalkey, Co. Dublin on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 (“the Incident”)  
Investigation of the Incident pursuant to the 2000 Act (“the Investigation”)  
Warrant of Appointment of [REDACTED] as Investigator (“the Investigator”) dated 13<sup>th</sup> January 2021 (“the Warrant”)**

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Thank you for your e-mail letter of the 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2021.

While I will reply in like paragraph format to that outlined in your letter under reply, I would like to make, what at least to me appears to be the obvious observation that what I have been tasked to do by the Board is to investigate a marine casualty, not you.

I should also make the point that tasked as I am with the Investigation, to the extent (as appears to be the case) that you have underlying legal concerns, then those should be addressed to the Board. Accordingly, and as you will see from the remainder of this letter, some of the issues that you raise require me to reiterate that position, i.e., that you address such matters to the Board (where you have not already done so).

In addition, and by way of alleviating such concerns as you may have in relation to any report, I refer you to Section 36 of the 2000 Act, the thrust of which is to afford to those persons who, in the opinion of the Board, are likely to be adversely affected by the publishing of the report or sections of it, to receive a copy of the draft report.

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

Upon its receipt, that person may make observations which in turn are included in the published report. Accordingly, to the extent (as seems evident from your letter under reply) that you have criticisms of the Investigation, then it appears to me that the appropriate place and time to deal with those criticisms are in such observations as may be made by you. Nothing in my comments however should be taken as an assumption that you are a person "... likely to be adversely affected by the publishing of the report or sections of it...", as mentioned in Section 36(1) of the 2000 Act.

**1. The four corners of the "incident"**

1.1 You thanked me for my confirmation that "... the four corners of the 'incident'... is that as described in two 'redacted communications'...". I gave you no such confirmation. In your e-mail of the 19<sup>th</sup> January 2021, you said I omitted to provide details of the Incident. In reply, I indicated that the Incident is that described in the redacted communications.

1.2 I do not see the relevance of this to my Investigation.

1.3 As above.

1.4 As above.

**2. Anonymous / redacted e-mails**

2.1 I already addressed this in my letter to you of the 20<sup>th</sup> January 2021 at paragraph 3.

2.2 As above.

2.3 No. In my view, it is not necessary and, in the alternative, would be inappropriate and inimical to the proper conduct of the Investigation to provide to you the copy communications which you demand. Again, I reiterate the Investigation is not into you.

**3. "I was asked to provide a statement..." to the Maritime Safety Policy Division**

3.1 Noted.

3.2 No, for the reasons outlined at 2.3 above.

**4. I am still asking you to define "marine casualty"**

4.1 I disagree.

4.2 I disagree. My communications to you to date clearly identify that which I am investigating.

4.3 As above.

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

4.4 No. I have already done so. I understand from the Board that you already raised this same issue with it which the Board addressed.

**5. Identity of anonymous e-mail writers**

5.1 You incorrectly assert that I have told you that there would be no investigation without the two redacted e-mails. That is untrue. I made no such statement. When you asked me to describe the "Incident", I indicated that its description is as set out in those redacted communications. At no point did I assert that without such communications "... there would be no investigation". Nor did I state that there would be no opportunity to engage with me within the Investigation with different versions of events and participants in it (and which may require their identification).

Such concerns as you have concerning your fundamental rights to fair procedures are addressed by Section 36(1) of the 2000 Act and, in any event, I repeat that you are not being investigated.

5.2 As above.

5.3 I do not have any "anxiety". I disagree.

5.4 I have not prevented you from "setting out information accurately and in context". I have invited you on two occasions to provide to me any additional information, relevant to the Incident, in addition to the records I have sought from you. Despite those two invitations, you have failed to do so.

5.5 No. I have already made my position clear in this respect.

5.5[sic] I have never said I am not aware of their names and contact details.

**6. Canoeing Ireland / Sea Kayaking Ireland**

6.1 I disagree.

6.2 I disagree.

**7. What is the statutory basis for your demand for information within seven days?**

7.1 Noted.

7.2 Noted.

7.3 I have already done so. In my letter to you of the 18<sup>th</sup> January 2021, when I identified the records that I require from you, I specifically referred you to Section 30(1) of the 2000 Act. In addition, I enclosed with my letter to you of the 18<sup>th</sup> January 2021, a copy of the 2000 Act.

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

**8. Competence and Training**

8.1 My appointment is a matter for the Board. The legislation does not limit the appointment of an investigator to any particular panel.

8.2 As above.

8.3 As above.

**9. GDPR and Privacy Policy**

9.1-5 I understand from the Board that you have already raised the same issues which they addressed.

**10. Your Identity**

10.1 No. I have provided you with a copy of the Warrant issued by the Board and I am not obliged to prove my identity to you, still less to furnish to you a copy of my passport, driver's licence, utility bill and my PPS number. If you have concerns as to my identity, please address them to the Board.

**11. Reservation**

11.1 Noted.


**Records**

Please provide to me the records that I have requested.

**Investigation**

My Investigation continues. Accordingly, I would be grateful if you can confirm your availability to meet with me (by Zoom/telephone).


Finally, if you have further concerns, please address them to the Board.



Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)



To:



3<sup>rd</sup> February 2021


Dear 

I refer to your letter of 1<sup>st</sup> February 2021 the contents of which I do not accept.

This letter addresses the question of your data obligations to me.

If I am incorrect in any supposition it will only be because of your refusal to provide me with any purposeful detail. I invite you to correct me with facts should I be inaccurate in anything I set out below.

It is my understanding that it is because (a) you responded to the MCIB (18.09.18) publicly advertised 'Call for applications for Appointment to a Panel of Investigators' (18 page pdf attached), and (b) because you satisfied the condition precedent criteria of 'Have satisfactory experience in marine casualty and incident investigation', (Section 2.1), and (c) because you demonstrated that you had then and continue to have no conflict of interest or potential for a conflict of interest, (section 2.1, page 6) and (d) that you agreed that you were not an employee of the MCIB (section 4.1.10, page 12) that your eligibility to be appointed to the MCIB's panel of occasional inspectors was established.

 if you did not respond to and apply to the MCIB on foot of such a publicly advertised call for applications to be appointed to the MCIB panel of investigators or similar, I require you to identify to me how it is that you have come to be appointed as an investigator, e.g. other 'panel', personal invitation, phone call, email, from whom and when etc.



## Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

By whatever route you came to be 'appointed' investigator it is manifest that: (a) you are not an employee of the MCIB, but rather are (b) a provider of professional services for a fee.

As the provider of professional services for a vatable fee you are an independent contractor. You are a 'Data Controller' for the purposes of GDPR. You hold data relating to me or from which I might be directly or indirectly identified.

I fully appreciate that, and as set out in Dáil Eireann last week, the legislation underpinning the Marine Casualty Investigation Board is not fit for purpose. I recognise that there are two schools of thought, one that suggests it was never fit for purpose and the other that the legislation needs adjustment following the decision of the European Court of Justice in *European Commission -v- Ireland (2020)*. I fully recognise also that the MCIB legislation predates the coming into European and Irish law of my fundamental human right to my data and the privacy of my data as enshrined in the European Union's **General Data Protection Regulation 2016 EU 679** and the **Data Protection Acts 1988 to 2018**.

However, you will be aware that this European Regulation and this Irish Statute afford me significant protection with respect to my data and my privacy. I have asserted my fundamental data and privacy rights to you. In doing so I asserted to you that the very fact of my having made a data subject access request of you [REDACTED] was in and of itself my personal data which fact I did not 'opt-in' or consent to you sharing with any third party.

It is manifest from yours of 1 February 2021 under reply that you have discussed my data subject access request with persons on the Board or on the staff or somehow seconded to the MCIB. It is distressing to know that my data access request is being discussed by persons who are strangers to me and without my consent. I find it offensive that I should need to disclose to you that in making a data subject access request of the MCIB (which is my private business and not yours) you are in possession of information about that access request directly from within the MCIB. That constitutes a breach of my privacy by both you and the MCIB and you should have taken the trouble to establish that they had my consent to disclose the fact of my GDPR request to them – which they did not have.

To facilitate your reply (but without prejudice to my data rights) I had offered to you the opportunity to disclose my data in two tranches viz, data you held relating to me or from which I might be directly or indirect identified before and after the date of your purported appointment.


I now repeat my request. For the avoidance of any doubt, I do not consent to you discussing this letter with the MCIB. Please comply fully with your data and privacy obligations to me as an independent contractor and data controller.

While you have had a period of not more than one month from my access request to comply, your legal obligation is to provide this data to me without undue delay. It is clearly readily to hand so please do comply within seven days.

I reserve my remedies whether pursuant to a complaint to the Data Protection Commission, prosecution and damages.

Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

Yours faithfully,



**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

**Strictly Confidential**  
**Open Addressee Only**

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

8<sup>th</sup> February 2021

**Re: Merchants Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 (“the 2000 Act”)  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board (“the Board”)  
Marine Incident at Bulloch Harbour and Dalkey Island, Dalkey, Co. Dublin on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 (“the Incident”)  
Investigation of the Incident pursuant to the 2000 Act (“the Investigation”)  
Warrant of Appointment of [Redacted] as Investigator (“the Investigator”) dated 13<sup>th</sup> January 2021 (“the Warrant”)**

---

[Redacted]

Thank you for your letter of the 3<sup>rd</sup> February 2021.

**Appointment**

I have already addressed this in my letter to you of the 1<sup>st</sup> February 2021 at point 8.

As my appointment is a matter for the Board, any issues you have in relation to it should be addressed to the Board.

**GDPR**

The Board is a statutory body set up to investigate marine casualties. I am appointed by the Board under its Warrant.

As indicated in my letter of the 1<sup>st</sup> February last, the Board has already addressed the issues which you raise. It is inappropriate that you would attempt to impose upon me, under the guise of “data protection”, a unilateral seal of confidentiality such as to

**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**

purportedly prohibit me from sharing with the Board communications sent to me in the context of the Investigation and, accordingly, I do not regard myself as bound by your statement that *"I do not consent to you discussing this letter with the MCIB"*.

To the extent that you remain dissatisfied with the position already communicated to you, then I respectfully suggest that you instruct Solicitors to raise that issue with the Board.


**Records**

My previous correspondence refers. Can you please furnish by return the records? Again, as previously indicated, if you would like to furnish to me any additional information, please do.


**Investigation**

My investigation continues. Accordingly, I would be grateful if you could confirm your availability to meet with me (by Zoom/telephone).

Yours sincerely,



## Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)



## Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

18 of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000 also forbids the disclosure of my confidential information unless authorised by law.

My request that you disclose to me all my data and information including information from which I might be directly or indirectly identified together with all data you have not received from me and an explanation as to the source of that data that you have not received from me and the legal basis asserted by you for having that data, is a request made of you as a separate data controller and independent of any such issue with or request made of the MCIB.

You are a complete stranger to me. Disdainfully, you refuse to provide me with any identification. I reject your assertion of underhand behaviour by me that I am attempting to impose on you under the guise (sic) of 'data protection' a unilateral seal of confidentiality to purportedly prohibit you from sharing with the Board communications sent to you in the context of the 'Investigation', such that you do not regard yourself bound by my unction that *'I do not consent to you discussing the letter with the MCIB'*.

You misunderstand my position. I am entitled in the protection of my privacy and data not to consent to third parties sharing my information. That is my fundamental right. I resent that my assertion of my fundamental right to the privacy and protection of my data should be suggested by you as being underhand 'under the guise' (sic) of my asserting to you what are established fundamental rights with respect to my data and my privacy.

I refer you to the statements made by the Minister for Transport Shane Ross (9 June 2020) and the Minister for Transport Ryan (21 July 2020) and just two weeks ago (29 January 2021). Minister Ryan has unsuccessfully sought to fast-track changes to the Marine Casualty Investigations Board and the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2002. Minister Ross explained that investigators are drawn from external panels of investigators. Minister Ryan has explained to the Public Accounts Committee that the Board of the MCIB lacks marine experience. It would appear that none of the members of the Board that 'appointed' you, have requisite or relevant marine experience.

You, as an investigator, have refused to identify to me what marine accident investigation experience or training you can boast of. The Minister, both Ministers, have been and continue to be at pains to emphasise to Dáil Éireann and citizens like me that the Board conducts 'independent' investigations and that 'all investigations of casualties are carried out by the MCIB's panel of external investigators'. I have asked you to identify to me what panel you claim to be a member of and what qualifications or training you possess to entitle you to be on any such panel. I question your independence from the Board given that your correspondence to me discloses a shared and interactive relationship with access to data relating to me which you refuse to disclose to me.

How any investigator repeatedly claimed by the Minister to be conducting independent investigations could have such intimate and undisclosed contact with the Secretariat (employed directly by the Minister) and MCIB Board members (who have no relevant marine experience or training in marine accident investigation) while remaining objectively 'independent' is a degree of aloofness I do not comprehend from what you have communicated to me to date.

In your very first email to me you told me that you are in receipt of communications from persons that suggested to me – not unreasonably – that you had been in direct contact with persons concerning me and my kayaking business across a period of months prior to your purported 'appointment'. With respect, it ought not to have been left to me to oblige you to clarify your opening statement to me as purported investigator.

## Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

I have no idea what documents or information you have about me or what has been furnished to you by or on behalf of the MCIB or any other party. Your procedures are unfair to me. It is manifest that you are not independent of the Board because your own communications tell me that you are in regular contact with the Board and are aware of my personal data which I have never consented to the Board sharing with you nor with respect to which have I ever consented to you holding or processing.

That you might assert that the MCIB is a non-prosecutorial body or that it does not enforce laws or carry out prosecutions, or that it is not the function of the MCIB or its investigations to apportion blame or fault is not borne out by the repeated apportionment of blame and fault contained on MCIB Investigation Reports into a plethora of 'incidents'.


Irrespective of whether the MCIB is a prosecutorial body, your purported 'investigation' into me as the only operator of kayaking tours from Bullock Harbour manifestly and directly impacts my business, my reputation, my good name and my ability to earn my livelihood. I am entitled to fairness and fair procedures and due process rather than the threat of breaking down my door to access my files. It is otiose and specious to tell me that I misunderstand that this is not an investigation into me personally when you well know that I am the sole operator of a kayaking tour at Bulloch that day.

You have not identified any statutory basis upon which you are not a data controller with respect to data relating to me. You have not identified any basis upon which you have demonstrated 'independence' from the Board, and I ought not to be left wondering.

Please now comply with your GDPR obligations to me and please identify to me what panel you say you are on from which, according to what successive Ministers have told the Dáil, the MCIB 'independent investigators' are drawn.

I should add that you seem to be aware that I have initiated judicial review proceedings against the MCIB. I regard your failure to provide me with my data as a direct attack on me and my ability to prosecute that matter in a timely and efficacious manner.

Yours faithfully,



Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

22<sup>nd</sup> February 2021

**Re: Merchants Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 (“the 2000 Act”)  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board (“the Board”)  
Marine Incident at Bulloch Harbour and Dalkey Island, Dalkey, Co. Dublin on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 (“the Incident”)  
Investigation of the Incident pursuant to the 2000 Act (“the Investigation”)  
Warrant of Appointment of [Redacted] as Investigator (“the Investigator”) dated 13<sup>th</sup> January 2021 (“the Warrant”)**

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[Redacted]

Thank you for your e-mail letter of the 15<sup>th</sup> February 2021.


The position remains as stated in my previous correspondence of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> February 2021.

Yours sincerely,


[Redacted]



**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**



**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**




**Appendix 7.10 Exchange of Communications Between the Organiser and the Investigator (redacted as to names/addresses)**




**Strictly Confidential  
Open Addressee Only**



**Also by email:** 

15<sup>th</sup> June 2021

**Re: Merchants Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 (“the 2000 Act”)  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board (“the Board”)  
Marine Incident at Bulloch Harbour and Dalkey Island, Dalkey, Co. Dublin on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 (“the Incident”)  
Investigation of the Incident pursuant to the 2000 Act (“the Investigation”)  
Warrant of Appointment of  as Investigator (“the Investigator”) dated 13<sup>th</sup> January 2021 (“the Warrant”)**

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
Dear 

Thank you for your e-mail of the 11<sup>th</sup> June 2021.

You refer to your e-mail letters of 23<sup>rd</sup> January and 15<sup>th</sup> February 2021. Unfortunately, you omit to refer to my replies of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2021.

My position remains as stated in those replies, namely the Board has already addressed your data access requests and to the extent you remain dissatisfied with the position already communicated to you, I suggested you instruct Solicitors to raise that issue with the Board.

Yours sincerely,



## Appendix 7.11 Letter from the Organiser of the Tour to the Irish Coast Guard dated 18 December 2020



18<sup>th</sup> December 2020

To:

[REDACTED]  
Acting Director of Irish Coast Guard,  
Leeson Lane,  
Dublin 2.

By Email To:

1. Request for Retraction, Withdrawal and Correction of SITREP1/UIIN2017/20 - 13/9/20.
2. Complaint against conduct of [REDACTED] of Dun Laoghaire ICG.

Dear Sir,

I write with respect to your agency's extraordinarily dark, misleading, false and damaging SITREP1/UIIN2017/20 of 13 September 2020. It is worded and structured to contrive to record and report something which never happened. It is manufactured to escalate and conflate a water sport paid-for experience of a capsized into something harrowing. Its false account telling of 15 capsized and drifting kayakers mischievously and untruthfully stated to have been escorted safely to shore by a massive deployment of the pantheon of Irish Coast Guard assets together with those of the RNLI lifeboat on an occasion when there was neither an incident nor an accident is stunning in its dishonesty. The bad judgment, self-aggrandising, and catastrophising misconduct of one of your senior 'on-scene' officers/volunteers warrants his removal and exclusion from any 'emergency' situation. The ICG's deliberate and misleading casualty-isation of all my guests and staff is a macabre and dangerous conceit beyond compare. SITREP1/UIIN2017/20 is untrue, unfounded and incorrect.

### 1.0 WHO I AM

I am [REDACTED] I operate a multi-award-winning kayak tour business called [REDACTED]. As you will see from our online reviews, anyone who has been kayaking with [REDACTED] has nothing but good things to say about the experience. I am an accomplished kayaker and have kayaked on rivers, seas and lakes all over the world. I am widely respected in the outdoor industry both in Ireland and internationally and have introduced thousands of people to the sport of kayaking whilst maintaining an impeccable safety record. I am a member of an international kayak team, I have represented Ireland twice, I have been on the Board of Directors of the NGB for canoeing and kayaking, I have been on the Training and Development Unit of the NGB, have been the keynote speaker at events hosted by NGBs at home and abroad, I have been on numerous expeditions around the world, I have lectured in outdoor education, I have trained instructors, I have run many safety courses, I have advised state

## Appendix 7.11 Letter from the Organiser of the Tour to the Irish Coast Guard dated 18 December 2020

boards and bodies in relation to the outdoor tourism industry and I have spent countless hours on the water over the past 20 years.

### **2.0 WE PROVIDE KAYAKING TOURS. PEOPLE GET WET.**

██████████ provides kayaking adventures on the water. People get wet in and around water. That is part of the adventure they seek and pay for. Prior to any such tour, our highly qualified instructors explain the nature of the adventure about to be embarked upon which includes capsizing and getting wet, and the protocol for dealing with such paid-for inevitability. We have an impeccable safety record.

### **3.0 KAYAKING TOUR ON EVENING OF 13 SEPTEMBER 2020**

On the evening of 13 September 2020 our group, which consisted of 12 guests facilitated by 3 instructors in a generous ratio of 1:4, departed Bulloch Harbour. During that tour, one double and one single kayak did capsize. There was no 'incident'. No one was ever 'in difficulty' or at risk. No one was 'in danger'. No one was 'drifting in danger'. No one was 'drifting' as a result of any such 'danger'. There were no injuries. No one was injured. There were no casualties by any yardstick.

### **4.0 FALSE AND INACCURATE SITREP REPORT SITREP1/UIIN2017/20**

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board have furnished me with your SitRep document of this purported incident involving purported casualties off Bulloch Harbour on the evening of 13 September 2020. Your report is the sole basis upon which the Board of MCIB has initiated a statutory investigation into me and my business with respect to an alleged incident which never happened. I believe that the investigator appointed by the Board is a person known to you. The many grave flaws in the MCIB's decision making process will be dealt with elsewhere. But your false SitRep document has done enormous damage to me, my business and my reputation. The MCIB 'investigation' is but one example.

I understand you and the MCIB Board share the same building and facilities at Leeson Lane, Dublin 2 and that both the Irish Coast Guard and the Marine Casualty Investigation Board are funded and staffed by the Department of Tourism, Transport and Sport at the same premises.

### **5.0 REQUEST FOR RETRACTION WITHDRAWAL AND CORRECTION**

I request that the Irish Coast Guard retract, withdraw and correct SITREP1/UIIN2017/20 of 13 September 2020.

### **6.0 COMPLAINT**

6.1 I complain to you about the misconduct of a ██████████ on scene on 13 September 2020. His subsequent misconduct on social media warrants criticism, withdrawal and correction. This person is not a fit and proper person to be given responsibility for the provision of emergency service or attendance at an emergency scene, whether real or imagined.

6.2 I would be grateful if you would advise me by return email of the Irish Coast Guard's protocols and procedures for formalising my complaint about ██████████

6.3 I would be grateful if you would nominate a liaison person within the Irish Coast Guard with whom I am to liaise with respect to this complaint.

**Appendix 7.11 Letter from the Organiser of the Tour to the Irish Coast Guard dated 18 December 2020****7.0 ACCURACY IS OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE**

Accuracy is a cardinal requirement of any document or report that might impact a person's good name, reputation and capacity to earn their livelihood.

The 'narrative' of SITREP1/UIIN2017/20 discloses a stark absence of any reference to any protocols implemented by ICG to verify the accuracy and credibility of or the motivation behind the 999/112 in question.

Your document discloses an uncanny level of detail conveyed by your caller such as the specifics of the point of departure, a precise though large number of kayakers stated to be in difficulty off Bulloch and the purported splitting of our group.

**8.0 FALSE NARRATIVE****8.1 GROUP OF KAYAKERS**

As our business is all about the provision of wet, water-based kayaking experiences and adventures to and for groups of persons, yes, your report is accurate in its use of the noun 'group', but little else.

**8.2 IN DIFFICULTY**

No member of our group was ever 'in difficulty'.

The false premise of your report is that there was a group of kayakers whose numbers you fluctuate from 10 to 15 persons, every one of whom was 'in difficulty' suggesting that they were all in need of rescue in an endeavour requiring the involvement of a large proportion of Ireland's maritime emergency rescue assets. You categorise each and every one of our guests together with instructors as being 'in difficulty' when this was never the case.

**8.3 GROUP HAD SPLIT UP**

You omit all context in asserting that the group had split (*spit (sic)*). You present it as though the group 'split' because of an unfolding life-threatening incident (which never happened) without any regard that this might have been a perfectly normal decision made by a trained group leader to bring part of the group towards the Maiden's Rock.

**8.4 DRIFTING**

The strength of currents in and around this area is well known. All vessels adapt as they 'drift' in these currents. To be clear, none of this group was compromised, in difficulty or 'drifting away'. Not that any of this was, in the circumstances, any of ICG's business, it is entirely wrong of ICG to categorise this as anything other than normal.

**8.5 BRING SAFELY TO SHORE**

None of our guests or instructors needed to be '*brought safely to shore by the RNLI*' whether ALB or inshore lifeboat. It is entirely false and misleading for your SitRep to suggest otherwise.

**8.6 LOCATE AND RECOVER**

No life was at risk or put at risk on our tour. No souls were lost at sea. No one went missing from our group. No one needed to be accounted for to anyone other than to me in the ordinary course of a well organised and operated kayaking adventure. The term '*search and recovery*' is a term of deep sadness, despair and despondency used only where a person is assumed drowned. It is downright dark and

**Appendix 7.11 Letter from the Organiser of the Tour to the Irish Coast Guard dated 18 December 2020**

offensive for you to record a mission as a *'locate and recovery'* mission. This deliberate or structural or systemic use of wildly inaccurate and pejorative and negative terminology speaks to a flawed allocation of assets and resources and the pretence that their deployment, engagement and use were appropriate.

**8.7 FV NORTH WESTERN PROCEEDING TO GROUP OF 4 KAYAKERS.**

This is entirely false. The Fishing Vessel North Western based at Bulloch Harbour did not sail, did not sail to a group of four kayakers and was not involved in this matter. It simply never happened.

**8.8 DL CGU ADVISE SECOND GROUP AT NORTH END OF LORETO CONVENT.**

Again, this record on an ICG SitRep document is entirely false. While a group of kayakers landed at "the nuns' bathing area" beside Rocklands just north of Loreto Convent, they required no advice from ICG. Using your inflammatory terminology, this *'group was brought safely to shore at this location'* not by the Irish Coast Guard or the RNLI but by none other than this writer in the ordinary course of my group tour.

While continuing their tour and bringing this group by sea to Bulloch, I opted to bring them ashore at this location because of my concern for their safety. My concern for their safety had nothing to do with my tour or the conditions. It was caused in its entirety by the disruption to their equilibrium with the sudden and unnecessary arrival in our space of the ICG Search and Rescue Helicopter, the RNLI ALB and the ILB lifeboats and the ICG land-based vehicle all crowned by the extraordinary conduct of [REDACTED] of the ICG on shore. As you will appreciate, being ambushed by the sudden dramatic loudness and painful decibel levels of the uninvited machinery of a helicopter and lifeboat made for a very uncomfortable and alarming attack on the aural senses of all the kayakers present. The approaching tsunami of rescue services swarming around my guests suggested an urgent and imminent danger where none existed. In the interests of common sense and the safety of all concerned, I opted to take the kayakers off the water at an area where I knew there to be a safe egress from the sea combined with a sheltered old changing area and an easy walk back to Bullock Harbour.

Your ICG 'on scene' person was a [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] He is a commercial competitor of mine in the provision of tours to Dalkey Island. The landing page for his website promoting his Dalkey Island tours displays a large photograph of his rib outside Bullock Harbour, confirming his commercial connection to the area. I believe the deputy officer in charge of the Dun Laoghaire Coast Guard Unit is the codirector of this company.

[REDACTED] had no business being at Rocklands at that time on that evening. He entirely misunderstood and misread the situation. Purporting to 'take control' of a non-incident, he alarmed my group of guests by undermining my authority as their group leader and shouting / ordering me to 'stand down' (sic). He further damaged me in their standing and caused them further and wanton anxiety by falsely announcing aloud that others from my tour group were already hospitalised or en route to hospital. This was a very foolish statement to make since [REDACTED] had no sense of what the relationship between the people standing in front of him and the people to whom he referred might be. Even if the statement were true, which it was not, the making of such a statement in the manner in which he made it runs contrary to good emergency management training. When I immediately challenged him as to this assertion of fact, he admitted he did not know it to be true.

**Appendix 7.11 Letter from the Organiser of the Tour to the Irish Coast Guard dated 18 December 2020**

██████████ sought to interfere and intermeddle in my business as a tour operator. He falsely declared everyone in my group to be a 'casualty' though he carried out no assessment of any of them. While my guests were entirely safe and dry on shore, your ██████████ next ordered me to remove my guests from their position of safety on dry land to somehow put them on to the RNLI lifeboat some distance offshore. He claimed that "the casualties need to get into the lifeboat".

This task was as utterly unnecessary as it was consummately dangerous. To get away from him, I walked my group safely to the road and around the corner to Bulloch Harbour.

I complain in the strongest manner about the involvement of a commercial competitor of mine in this manner in this matter. I complain about the role he assumed, about the false statements of purported fact he made, about the heightened anxiety he caused when he ought to have been lessening that stress, by his attempt to conflate something normal in a kayaking tour to an emergency situation which it was not, about his bad judgement, about his contrived misdescription of healthy, safe, dry and secure guests on land as 'casualties', about his bizarre and dangerous insistence that a large group of persons in whom he had by then induced anxiety should put their lives at unnecessary risk by undertaking the daft and dangerous manoeuvre of transferring them from dry land to a vessel some distance off shore.

I do not believe that ██████████ made good decisions on the evening in question. Were I not as experienced as I am, I may have followed his "orders" and people, my clients, may have been injured.

**8.9 DUN LAOGHAIRE ALB ON SCENE ESCORTS KAYAKERS.**

Again, this is an entirely false statement. The Dun Laoghaire ALB did not escort any kayakers. Please see copy email dated Dec 1<sup>st</sup>, 2020 from RNLI confirming that notwithstanding ICG assertions, the RNLI Dun Laoghaire Lifeboats did not provide assistance to me, or my group, or indeed anyone on this date at this location.

**8.10 FV NORTH WESTERN BRINGS 3 KAYAKERS SAFELY ASHORE INTO BULLOCH HARBOUR.**

Again, and again, and again, this is false. The Fishing Vessel North Western did not sail at this time and did not bring three, four or indeed any kayakers to Bulloch.

Your SitRep document creates and was intended to create in the mind of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board and other responsible bodies and authorities the false impression there was a risk to these persons' safety from me unless and until the Fishing Vessel North Western ensured they made it to shore.

**8.11 DUN LAOGHAIRE CGU ADVISES ALL MEMBERS OF KAYAKING GROUP (15) NOW ACCOUNTED FOR AND SAFELY ASHORE.**

This is again, a further falsity created by Dun Laoghaire ICG. No kayakers were in difficulty and other than meddling in my business and attempting to interpose itself between me and my staff and customers Dun Laoghaire ICGU had no right, function or role to confirm anything about my business and my guests to anyone about anything.



## Appendix 7.11 Letter from the Organiser of the Tour to the Irish Coast Guard dated 18 December 2020

### 8.12 THREE REQUIRE MEDICAL ASSESSMENT.

Nobody 'required' medical assessment. Because the ambulance was there, three of our group were asked to allow the ambulance team to examine them. They very reluctantly agreed to this – it being the easier and fastest way home - and were greatly embarrassed in having to do so.

### 8.13 CASUALTIES ASSESSED BY AMBULANCE CREW AND RELEASED.

Again, the false narrative is continued. There were no casualties. Bizarrely your report describes every one of our guests and all my crew as a 'casualty' though not a single person was hurt or injured. You accentuate the bizarre self-aggrandisement of this casualty-isation of every one of our guests and my crew by failing to provide any place or facility on your SitRep report form for your report to record or classify them as being anything other than 'casualties'.

### 8.14 INSULT TO INJURY

To add insult to injury, a social media post appeared on the Dun Laoghaire Coast Guard Facebook page on the evening of 13 September. Amongst other things, this post claimed that 15 kayakers were in the water around Dalkey Island, that a coordinated rescue operation was launched, that an ambulance was at the scene, that kayakers were evacuated at Loreto and that there was a strong easterly wind. The post was written to give the false impression that a serious incident had occurred and that the Coast Guard had come along and saved the day.

At this point I would like to make you aware, that me and my team at [REDACTED] have been suffering ongoing harassment at Bullock Harbour including name calling, damage to vehicles, anonymous unfounded complaints to government agencies including the HSA, constant photo taking and besetting and attacks on our safety at sea. This has been reported to the Gardai and the case of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is due for mention in Dun Laoghaire in March in relation to one such incident.

Following from the false Coast Guard social media post, posts appeared on the [REDACTED] Trip Advisor page reiterating that 15 people were in the water and claiming that all were rescued by the Coast Guard. Similar posts appeared on the Dalkey Open Forum and the East Coast Sea Kayak Club open forum where I was personally named in a post claiming that the Coast Guard had to rescue all my clients from the sea. This post is now showing up in Google searches of my name. Like Chinese whispers, each post that appeared added in an extra bit of calamity for good measure. Eventually there were social media reports of people "screaming on the rocks" and comments like "how long till they kill someone". While some of these posts were motivated by malice and most likely connected to the ongoing harassment we are suffering, other posters were influenced by the entirely false and misleading report published on the Irish Coast Guard social media page.

In fact, I believe the false Coast Guard social media post was shared over 40 times. This has caused untold and I believe irreparable damage to my reputation and standing in an industry in which I have made it my life's work to promote safe practice.

It has also caused untold and irreparable damage to a wonderful group of instructors carrying out their work to the highest standards.

**Appendix 7.11 Letter from the Organiser of the Tour to the Irish Coast Guard dated 18 December 2020****8.15 CONFRONTING [REDACTED] ABOUT FALSE SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS**

On Thursday 15 September, accompanied by a witness I called to the premises of the Dun Laoghaire Powerboat School where I knew [REDACTED] to be present. My intention was to try to stop, and to mitigate, the damage caused by the false Coast Guard social media post.

I asked him why the fallacious, damaging and outrageous post had been published. He claimed that the post had been published by the Coast Guard social media officer. I went through the post line by line pointing out the lies contained therein, and he said he would have it changed. I explained that the post was being used maliciously to damage my good name and reputation. He offered no apology or explanation for the outrageous and unjust publishing of such material. As I and the witness turned to leave, he said "there are stories of a report into this". The unprofessional, malicious and unfair nature of such a comment hardly needs to be stated.

The social media post was subsequently changed, but it still seeks to provide a misleading account of a non-incident.

Three days after I called to speak to [REDACTED] seeking to limit and mitigate the false narrative he and the Irish Coast Guard created and leveraged on social media, the Irish Coast Guard instead exacerbated its wrongdoing by deliberately changing the banner photograph on its Dun Laoghaire Coast Guard Facebook page. This new image served no maritime safety purpose. It shows two ICG vehicles blocking the slipway despite ample available parking space next to the slipway. I do not know (yet) who took the photograph. This photograph was insidiously staged to capture [REDACTED] ICG vehicle in the same frame along with my truck and one of my 'rescued' instructors. You published this horrible image online as the prominent banner image of Dun Laoghaire Coast Guard so that it could be seen by as many as possible in furtherance of [REDACTED] (and the ICG's) self-aggrandisement.

**9. OUR PROCEDURES**

We follow exemplary safety practices and procedures when running our kayak tours.

**9.1 OUR EQUIPMENT**

As well as carrying a VHF, our instructors also carried mobile phones, first aid equipment, tow lines, pumps, split paddles and other marine safety equipment. All our cockpit kayaks are of German manufacture. They have airtight hatches fitted with a specific tubing system rendering them unsinkable - as is required under German law where kayaks are used for commercial purposes.

**9.2 NO ATTEMPT BY ICG TO CONTACT US BY VHF**

At no stage did the ICG seek to contact us over VHF.

**9.3 TOUR MONITORED FROM THE SHORE AT ALL TIMES**

At all times, the tour followed a preplanned route and was monitored from the shore.

## Appendix 7.11 Letter from the Organiser of the Tour to the Irish Coast Guard dated 18 December 2020

### 9.4 CHECKS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL

Prior to participation, all participants filled out med check forms and stated themselves to be capable of taking part in physical activity.

Our safety standards are impeccable which is why we are held in such high regard in the outdoor industry.

### 10.0 CONSEQUENCES OF 999 CALL

As a result of this call from a purportedly by-standing member of the public, the valuable assets of the Irish Coast Guard R116 Search and Rescue Helicopter, 2 land based ICG vehicles, the RNLI main lifeboat, the RNLI inshore lifeboat, and an ambulance were deployed to deal with a non-incident.

Owing to the fact that we are suffering ongoing harassment, I am deeply suspicious as to the genuine nature of the 999 call.

### 10.0 PRESERVATION OF AUDIO AND RECORDS OF 999/112 / GDPR / FOI

10.1 I ask that the audio recording of the 999/112 call that triggered the deployment of the search and rescues assets be preserved intact.

10.2 Please take this letter as my formal **GDPR data subject access request** made of the Irish Coast Guard pursuant to the provisions of the European Union General Data Regulation 2016 EU 679 and the Data Protection Acts 1988 to 2018 that you provide me with all my data or data from which I might be directly or indirectly identified held or processed by the Irish Coast Guard at any location (including Dun Laoghaire ICG, and the phones, social media of the ICG and its volunteers whether paid or unpaid).

10.3 I require this data without undue delay and no later than one month from the date hereof.

10.4 Please also take this letter as my **formal statutory Freedom of Information request for all records** held by the Irish Coast Guard its servants or agents including volunteers whether paid or unpaid relating to or arising from the incident recorded and described in SITREP1/UIIN2017/20 - 13/9/20.

### 11.0 INVITATION TO MEET TO RESOLVE

11.1 I invite you to take the opportunity to have a purposeful discussion with respect to the above. Recourse to the High Court in the protection and vindication of my good name and reputation is a route clearly available to me. However, under Covid-19, I believe it is appropriate and as would be expected by the courts that in the first instance I reach out to you with a view to the amicable resolution of this matter, the correction of your SitRep report and the withdrawal of the offensive material you have created or caused to be transmitted relating to me.

██████████ Chairperson of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board has notified me that your one-page document constitutes the entire basis upon which the Board of the MCIB decided to initiate a purported statutory inquiry into the above purported incident, which incident simply did not occur.

### 12.0 CONCLUSION

As a provider of wet, water-based marine recreational and adventure services it is galling that one should be subjected to the horrors which flow from such a false document.

**Appendix 7.11 Letter from the Organiser of the Tour to the Irish Coast Guard dated 18 December 2020**

Ordinarily, I applaud and rely on the services provided by the Irish Coast Guard and its staff and volunteers which makes my having to write to you in this way very difficult.

I am available to meet as appropriate under Covid-19 restrictions whether by zoom or an appropriate ventilated socially distanced space.

**13.0 ACTION:**

- (a) Please arrange for the immediate retraction, withdrawal and correction of SITREP1/UIIN2017/20 - 13/9/20
- (b) Please notify and confirm to me that this has happened.
- (c) Please indicate the date by which I might receive my data.
- (d) Please indicate the date by which I might receive the records sought under Freedom of Information.
- (e) Please advise me of the Irish Coast Guard's protocols and procedures for formalising my complaint about [REDACTED] Note the complaint should be taken as now made).
- (f) Please nominate a liaison person within the Irish Coast Guard with whom I am to liaise with respect to this complaint.
- (g) Please provide me with the contact details for this Complaint Liaison Officer.
- (h) Please indicate a date and details for a meeting to resolve matters whether by Zoom or otherwise to resolve all issues.

**14.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

Please acknowledge receipt of this communication by return.



Appendix 7.12 Marine Notice No. 9 of 2003



Department of Communications, Marine  
And Natural Resources

**MARINE NOTICE No. 9 of 2003**

Notice to all Recreational Craft owners, Certifying Authorities,  
Surveyors, Training Establishments, Masters and Crews of all  
Recreational Craft.

**APPLICATION OF SOLAS CHAPTER V TO  
RECREATIONAL CRAFT.**

On 1 July 2002, some new regulations came into force, which directly affect recreational craft. These regulations are part of Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, otherwise known as SOLAS V. Most of the SOLAS convention only applies to large commercial ships, but parts of Chapter V apply to small, privately owned recreational craft. The regulations described in this Marine Notice apply to recreational craft.

**Voyage Planning**

Regulation V/34 'Safe Navigation and avoidance of dangerous situations', is a new regulation. It concerns prior-planning for a boating trip, more commonly known as voyage or passage planning. Voyage planning is basically common sense. Recreational craft users should particularly take into account the following points when planning a boating trip:

- weather: before going boating, check the weather forecast and get regular updates if planning to be out for any length of time.
- tides: check the tidal predictions for the trip and ensure that they fit with the planned trip.
- limitations of the vessel: consider whether the boat is up to the proposed trip and that there is sufficient safety equipment and stores.
- crew: take into account the experience and physical ability of the crew. Crews suffering from cold, tiredness and seasickness won't be able to do their job properly and could even result in an overburdened skipper.
- navigational dangers: make sure the crew is familiar with any navigational dangers that may be encountered during the boating trip. This generally means checking an up to date chart and a current pilot book or almanac.
- contingency plan: always have a contingency plan should anything go wrong. Before departing, consider places where the boat can take

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refuge should conditions deteriorate or if the crew suffer an incident or injury. Bear in mind that the GPS set is vulnerable and could fail at the most inconvenient time. It is sensible and good practice to make sure that the crew are not over-reliant on the GPS set and that they can navigate to safety without it should it fail.

- information ashore: make sure that someone ashore knows the plans for the trip and knows what to do should they become concerned for the crews' well being. The Irish Coast Guard has a Yacht and Boat safety scheme and all vessels planning to sail off-shore are encouraged to submit a Sail Plan before commencing the voyage. In addition, the Irish Coast Guard reminds all vessels that they should pass TR messages via their nearest Coast Radio Station. There is no charge for this service. Please note, however, that overdue reporting remains the responsibility of the vessels shore contact. The Irish Coast Guard will not initiate overdue procedures on the basis of TR messages.

**Radar Reflectors**

Many large ships rely on radar for navigation and for spotting other vessels in their vicinity. So, whatever size the boat is, it's important to make sure that it can be seen by radar. Regulation V/19 requires all small craft to fit a radar reflector 'if practicable'. If the boat is more than 15m in length, it should be possible to fit a radar reflector that meets the IMO requirements of 10m<sup>2</sup>. If the boat is less than 15m in length, it should be fitted with the largest radar reflector possible. Regardless of the size of boat, the radar reflector should be fitted according to the manufacturer's instructions and as high as possible to maximise its effectiveness.

**Life Saving Signals**

Regulation V/29 requires the boat to have access to an illustrated table of the recognised life saving signals, so that it can communicate with the search and rescue services or other boats if it gets into trouble. A table of life saving signals is produced in the Annex to this Marine Notice and it can also be found in various nautical publications. If the boat is not suitable for carrying a copy of the table on board (because it's small or very exposed), make sure the table has been studied before going boating. Larger boats should keep a copy on board.

**Assistance to other Craft**

Regulations V/31, V/32 and V/33 require a vessel:

- to let the Irish Coast Guard and any other vessels in the vicinity know if it encounters anything that could cause a serious hazard to navigation, if that hazard has not already been reported. This can be done by calling the Coast Guard on VHF, if on board, or by telephoning them at the earliest opportunity. The Coast Guard will then warn other vessels in the area.
- to respond to any distress signal that it sees or hears and help anyone or any boat in distress as best it can.

## Appendix 7.12 Marine Notice No. 9 of 2003

### **Misuse of Distress Signals**

Regulation V/35 prohibits misuse of any distress signals. These are critical to safety at sea and misusing them could put a person's life at risk.

In addition to SOLAS V, recreational craft users should note that the International Convention for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) applies and therefore they should ensure that the correct lights and shapes are carried. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) also applies. Vessels should not discharge oil or drop garbage into the sea and vessels over 12m should display a placard. Vessels of 13.7 m in length are required to meet certain life saving and fire protection requirements.

Director General  
Maritime Safety Directorate  
Department of Communications, Marine  
And Natural Resources  
Dublin 2.

29 April 2003

For any technical assistance in relation to this Marine Notice please contact the Marine Survey Office, 26-27 Eden Quay, Dublin 1 at 01-8744900.  
For general enquiries please contact the Maritime Safety Division at 01-678 2369  
Any enquiries concerning Marine Notices should be addressed to:  
Maritime Safety Directorate, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2  
Email:

Appendix 7.12 Marine Notice No. 9 of 2003

## ANNEX

### LIFE SAVING SIGNALS

To be used by Ships, Boats or Persons in Distress, when communicating with life-saving stations, maritime rescue co-ordinating centres, search and rescue aircraft and rescue operations.

**Search and Rescue Unit Replies**  
You have been seen, assistance will be given as soon as possible.

**Orange smoke flare:**  
These indicate a person in distress who is in need of assistance.

**Shore to Ship Signals**  
Safe to land here.

Vertical waving of both arms, white flag or light or sound.  
Landing here is dangerous. **ADDITIONAL SIGNALS** (if in a direction indicated).

Horizontal waving of white flag, light or sound.  
Flag, light or sound on ground and moving off with a second indicator in direction of fall of landing.

More code signal by light or sound.  
Land to the right of your current landing.  
Land to the left of your current landing.

### Surface to Air Signals

Message	International Your Signal
Require assistance	V
Require medical assistance	M
Not or negative	N
Your affirmative	Y
Proceeding in the direction	↓

**Surface to Air Replies**  
Message Understood.

Draw a message.  
Message Not Understood. Repeat.

Steady and level flight.  
Circling.  
More code signal by light.

### Air to Surface Direction Signals

Sequence of 3 manoeuvres meaning proceed to this direction.

- Circle vessel a few times.  
Your assistance is no longer required.
- Circle vessel a few times.  
Continue in the direction indicated by the signal.
- Circle vessel a few times.  
Overly maneuver and wait in required direction.

**Surface to Air Replies**  
Message Understood - I will comply.


Change course to required direction. I am unable to comply.

More code signal by light.  
More code signal by light.

Cook & emergency survival stove up.  
International flag "W".



Appendix 7.13 Chapter 7 Code of Practice (CoP): The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)



Appendix 7.13 Chapter 7 Code of Practice (CoP): The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)

Canoeing covers a wide and diverse range of disciplines including sea kayaking, white water kayaking, surf kayaking, polo, slalom, marathon, sprint, freestyle and touring.

A **canoe** is a lightweight narrow boat, typically pointed at both ends and **open** on top, propelled by one or more seated or kneeling paddlers facing the direction of travel using a single-bladed paddle.

A **kayak** is a small, narrow boat which is propelled by means of a double-bladed paddle.

In this Code of Practice, the term **canoe** when used also refers to a kayak.

There are a number of basic safety precautions that should be applied to any canoeing activity, regardless of its speciality.

**7.1 Training**

Undertake a recognised training course in the correct use of the specific type of canoe you wish to use. Be completely familiar with relevant rescue/recovery drills, self-righting techniques, e.g. Eskimo roll, etc. Practice such drills with fellow members of your group. Canoeing Ireland have a comprehensive training and accreditation scheme, which covers river, sea kayaking and open

canoes (see Appendix 9 for details of course providers).

**7.2 Prior to entering the water**

- Ensure you are a competent swimmer and capable of surviving in the water in the areas you operate in.
- Undertake a First Aid course and a life-saving course.
- Never operate alone, always canoe in company.
- Do not operate a canoe if under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
- Inspect your craft and equipment thoroughly. Check it is fitted with adequate buoyancy material and that such buoyancy is correctly distributed and secured within the hull.
- Ensure that the bung is fitted correctly.
- Do not use the canoe unless you are certain it is watertight. Boats with temporary repairs should not be used.
- If carrying additional equipment, ensure that the canoe is never overloaded.
- Use a spray deck, with quick release where relevant, and be completely familiar with its use.
- When using a spray deck, ensure that the grab loop is in good condition and is within reach.
- Always ensure that your name/contact address are permanently marked on the hull.

**Appendix 7.13** Chapter 7 Code of Practice (CoP): The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)



**7** Canoeing/Kayaking

The addition of strips of retro-reflective tape to the hull is recommended.

- Check the hull is fitted with grab loops/towing lines. Kayaks over 270 cm in length should have decklines fitted fore and aft. Kayaks less than 270 cm in length should have cowtails fitted.
- Ensure that a responsible person is aware of your intended departure, locations and return details.
- Ensure that you carry a mobile phone or Marine VHF radio in a suitable watertight cover for use to summon assistance in emergency situations.
- Open canoes are not suitable for the sea.

- All kayaks should have suitable footrests.

**7.3 Personal Safety Equipment**

- PFD/lifejacket (see Appendix 5).
- The PFD should be fitted with a whistle to attract attention, be in a Hi-Visibility colour and fitted with retro-reflective strips.
- Ensure you are suitably attired for the type of activity, area of operation and time of the year.
- Be aware of the dangers of hypothermia when wet and exposed to the elements.
- If paddling where the risk of head injury exists, a suitable helmet should always be worn.
- When making descents on remote rivers of Grade 3 and

Appendix 7.13 Chapter 7 Code of Practice (CoP): The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)



higher, and while sea-kayaking, you should carry a registered Personal Locator Beacon (PLB). This will enable early alerting of the rescue services in the event of an emergency.

**7.4 Sea Kayaking**

**Sea kayakers should observe the following additional precautions:**

- Be aware of the weather forecast and sea area forecast. Only operate within your limits and ability. Canoeing in a windforce 4 or above should only be considered for the very experienced.
- Be aware of the tidal conditions for the areas that you are operating in.
- Be aware of the effects of interaction between wind and tide on sea states.
- Carry a chart for the area of operation. These can be laminated and attached to the kayak deck.
- Carry a hand held compass.
- Ensure a nominated person ashore is aware of your itinerary, departure and return times.

- Have a passage plan and alternative emergency plans, e.g. safe landing area down wind, etc.
- Do not operate alone – kayak in company.
- If capsized and floating outside your craft, remain with it. It offers a better target to rescuers and has a high buoyancy factor. Do not attempt to swim for shore unless adjacent to the shore.

The following additional equipment should be considered:


- Flares
- Towrope/throw bag
- Torch
- Suitable knife
- Portable waterproof VHF radio
- Portable GPS unit
- Personal EPIRB
- First Aid Kit
- Spare food/drink
- Paddle float/leash
- Sun cream and sun hat.

Essential equipment should be carried on the person or in an easily recoverable buoyant grab bag.

**7.5 River Kayaking/Canoeing**

River kayaking ranges from touring on slow moving Grade 1 water in either open canoes or recreational kayaks, to the more extreme white water river running, which can include whitewater rapids, waterfalls and features such as

**Appendix 7.13 Chapter 7 Code of Practice (CoP): The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)**



7 Canoeing/Kayaking

stoppers and undercuts. Freestyle kayaking is at the more extreme end of the canoeing spectrum. Trained and competent persons only should attempt this activity.

**In addition to the basic safety precautions mentioned previously, operators should observe the following additional checks and advice:**

- Hulls are examined for damage each time prior to entering the water;
- Potential courses should be studied for hidden dangers, snags, currents, etc., prior to putting boats in the water;
- Boats should never operate alone on a stretch of water;
- In extreme and difficult locations, shore based rescue/recovery personnel should be in attendance, trained and equipped in the rapid recovery of persons in distress;
- Contact numbers for medical assistance/rescue authorities/lockkeepers should be available on site;
- Kayaks should have adequate buoyancy;
- Get First Aid training and carry a First Aid Kit on river trips;
- If carrying a throwbag, also carry a knife;
- Depending on the difficulty of the river, consider carrying some of the following:
  - Split paddles;
  - Webbing slings and carabiners;
  - Duct tape;
  - Dry clothes;
  - Group shelter;
  - Food and money;
  - Matches/lighter.
- Be aware of the river's grading and of the water level before committing. The different grades are listed in the Table on the following page.

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<b>Grade I: Flat Water</b>	Water is stationary or extremely slow moving and without any obstructions.
<b>Grade II: Moderately Difficult</b>	The way down a river is clear but simple obstructions do exist. Small stoppers and small drops can be present. There are places where the flow accelerates. There is a choice of routes.
<b>Grade III: Difficult</b>	There is a route that is easily recognisable from the water. Waves can be irregular. Boulders and obstructions can be numerous. Stoppers and small eddies exist. Inspection is advisable.
<b>Grade IV: Very Difficult</b>	The route is not always clear and inspection is advisable. Rapids are continuous and breakouts are few and small. Stoppers are powerful. Continual manoeuvring with precise control and good decision making is required.
<b>Grade V: Extremely Difficult</b>	Inspection is essential because serious dangers can exist. Large drops, narrow passages, very complex boulder fields, ever changing water and difficult holes are characteristic of this grade. Difficulties are continuous.

The Canoeing Ireland website has more detail on the levels of river grading (<http://canoe.ie/river-grading-and-area-definitions>).

- Be particularly cautious during flood water conditions.
- Inspect unknown drops before running them; be aware that drops may change or that new hazards may have formed (e.g. fallen trees, etc.). Set up bank based rescue, where appropriate.
- Consult Waterways Ireland Marine Notices and lockkeepers for local information.
- Kayaking groups making descents on remote rivers of Grade 3 and higher should carry

registered Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs). This will enable early alerting of the rescue services in the event of an emergency.

- In rivers of a high flow rate, with extended periods of rapids, it is recommended that kayaking groups should consider using waterproof radios to allow communication between group members when line of sight is not possible.

**7.6 National Association**

Canoeing Ireland is the national association for canoe and kayak based activities in Ireland (see Appendix 10 for contact details).

Appendix 7.14 Appendix 6, Code of Practice (CoP): the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)

## Appendix 6

### Weather, Sea States and Tides

#### Forecasts and Warnings

Met Éireann regularly forecasts for small boats operating in coastal waters, including essential information on the expected wind direction and strength, the state of the sea and swell, visibility, and changes expected during the forecast period. Forecasts are issued in the early morning for the remainder of the day until midnight, at about midday for the rest of the day and the following day, and in the late afternoon for that night and the following day. Check well ahead of your planned trip – you can get an idea of the changes in the weather pattern from the forecasts issued 24 hours or longer before you leave shore. Strong wind warnings are issued whenever winds of 25 knots or more are expected. The direction and strength of the wind, sea and swell information and an indication of expected developments are also given. Gale or storm warnings are issued when the wind is expected to reach Beaufort Scale Force 8 (34 knots).

#### Small Craft Warnings

The small craft warning is issued for expected winds of **Force 6 or**

**more**, and it is issued at **all times** of the year. The small craft warning covers the large internal lakes as well as coastal areas. A gale warning is issued for Force 8 or more and supersedes the small craft warning.

Weather forecasts should always be checked prior to departure and can be obtained from the following sources:

#### Primary Weather Sources:

- National Radio – shipping forecasts are broadcast on national radio stations. In addition, a service for inland waters is also broadcast for the major waterways. RTE Radio 1 broadcasts three times daily at approximately 6:02am, 12:53pm and at 11:55pm.
- Local radio stations will broadcast forecasts for local waters and inland lakes. Dublin and Galway local stations broadcast winds for the respective bays.
- National Television Channels – Met Éireann provides weather bulletins on RTE 1 and RTE 2.
- Telephone and fax – Met Éireann offers a charge service for detailed sea area forecasts.
- Internet – Met Éireann web page – [www.met.ie](http://www.met.ie).
- [M.met.ie](http://M.met.ie) is a cross platform site

**Appendix 7.14** Appendix 6, Code of Practice (CoP): the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)

designed to work on web enabled mobile phones.

- Coast Guard Radio – generally announced on VHF Channel 16 and broadcast on Channel 26. The Sea Area Forecast (SAF) is broadcast on the named channel at three hour intervals beginning 01:03 followed by 04:03, 07:03, 10:03, 13:03, 16:03, 19:03 and 22:03. Gale warnings are also preceded by an announcement on Channel 16 and usually broadcast on receipt, and repeated at the next one of the following times: 00:33, 06:33, 12:33 and 18:33.

**Secondary Weather Sources:**

- Teletext/Aertel p. 162, 163, including any small craft warnings issued.
- Harbour Offices and Marinas will post a copy of the current local sea area forecast on

noticeboards, as will yacht clubs during sailing events.

- Marine Institute Weather Buoys.
- Navtex receivers on board provide a printed forecast in addition to navigation information.
- Meteoalarm provides extreme weather alerts for Ireland and the rest of Europe ([www.meteoalarm.eu](http://www.meteoalarm.eu)). The system uses colour coding to indicate the severity of the expected hazard. An explanation of the warnings categories and thresholds can be found at [www.met.ie/nationalwarnings](http://www.met.ie/nationalwarnings).
- A number of websites are available that specialise in giving information on marine weather. Some examples are given below: <http://passageweather.com/> <https://www.windguru.cz/> <http://magicseaweed.com/>

**Beaufort Force 0**







**Wind speed (knots):** Under 1  
**Wind description:** Calm  
**Sea state:**  
 Sea is mirrorlike.



Appendix 7.14 Appendix 6, Code of Practice (CoP): the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)

Appendices 6

<p><b>Beaufort Force 1</b></p> 	<p><b>Wind speed (knots):</b> 1-3  <b>Wind description:</b> Light Airs  <b>Sea state:</b>          Ripples with appearance of scales, no foam crests.</p>
<p><b>Beaufort Force 2</b></p> 	<p><b>Wind speed (knots):</b> 4-6  <b>Wind description:</b> Light Breeze  <b>Sea state:</b>          Small wavelets, crests beginning to break, scattered whitecaps.</p>
<p><b>Beaufort Force 3</b></p> 	<p><b>Wind speed (knots):</b> 7-10  <b>Wind description:</b> Gentle Breeze  <b>Sea state:</b>          Large wavelets, crests beginning to break, scattered whitecaps.</p>
<p><b>Beaufort Force 4</b></p> 	<p><b>Wind speed (knots):</b> 11-16  <b>Wind description:</b> Moderate Breeze  <b>Sea state:</b>          Small waves, becoming longer, numerous whitecaps.</p>

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Appendix 7.14 Appendix 6, Code of Practice (CoP): the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)

**Beaufort Force 5**



**Wind speed (knots):** 17-21  
**Wind description:** Fresh Breeze

**Sea state:**  
Moderate waves, taking longer form, many whitecaps, some spray.


**Beaufort Force 6**



**Wind speed (knots):** 22-27  
**Wind description:** Strong Breeze

**Sea state:**  
Larger waves forming, whitecaps everywhere, much spray.


**Beaufort Force 7**



**Wind speed (knots):** 28-33  
**Wind description:** Near Gale  
**Sea state:**

Sea heaps up, white foam from breaking waves begin to be blown in streaks.

**Beaufort Force 8**



**Wind speed (knots):** 34-40  
**Wind description:** Gale  
**Sea state:**

Moderately high waves of greater length, edges of crests begin to break into spindrift, foam is blown into well defined streaks.

Appendix 7.14 Appendix 6, Code of Practice (CoP): the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)

**Beaufort Force 9**



**Wind speed (knots):** 41-47  
**Wind description:** Strong Gale

**Sea state:**  
 High waves, sea begins to roll, dense streaks of foam, spray begins to reduce visibility.

**Beaufort Force 10**



**Wind speed (knots):** 48-55  
**Wind description:** Storm

**Sea state:**  
 Very high waves with overhanging crests, sea takes on white appearance, foam blown in dense streaks, rolling is heavy, visibility reduced.

**Tides**


Along with the weather, an understanding of tides and how they affect sea states is important. Some knowledge of tides is desirable before going afloat on the sea.

The tide is basically the rise and fall of the sea level; is caused by the combined effects of the forces exerted by the Moon and the Sun and can have a marked effect on maritime-related activities. On Irish coastal waters, tides are semi-diurnal (two high and low waters each day). Tides can also influence marine activities in that

they result in water movements (tidal streams). This movement can be significant inshore such as on estuaries and near headlands. Tide levels/streams are important for many recreational activities including swimming, sailing, fishing, boat berthing, anchoring and passage planning. Notable hazards from tides include tide rips and races, inadvertent grounding and stray navigation. Tidal level predictions and information can be obtained from various nautical Almanacs, newspapers, websites and phone apps.

Appendix 7.14 Appendix 6, Code of Practice (CoP): the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft (revised edition 2017)

Marine Weather Services Sea Area Map



This map shows areas covered by Met Éireann marine forecasts. Note the white dashed line represents the furthest coverage limit for the Sea Area Forecast.

**Marine Institute Weather Buoys**

The Marine Institute has 5 weather buoys around the Irish coast which aim to provide improved weather forecasts and safety at sea around Ireland.

**Buoy Positions**

- M2** : 53.4800°N 05.4250°W
  - Irish Sea: Approximately 20 nautical miles (37 km) east of Howth Head.
- M3** : 51.2166°N 10.5500°W
  - Off the Cork coast: Approximately 30 nautical

miles (56 km) southwest of Mizen Head.

- M4** : 54.9982°N 09.992154°W
  - Off the Donegal coast: Approximately 45 nautical miles (83 km) west northwest of Rossan Point.
- M5** : 51.6900°N 06.7040°W
  - Off the south Wexford coast: Approximately 30 nautical miles (56 km) south of Hook Head.
- M6** : 53.07482°N 15.88135°W
  - Deep Atlantic: Approximately 210 nautical miles (389 km) west southwest of Slyne Head.

The buoy network provides vital data for weather forecasts, shipping bulletins, gale and swell warnings as well as data for general public information and research.

Appendix 7.15 Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Instructor and Coach Qualifications

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## Instructor and Coach Qualifications

	White Water Kayaking	Sea Kayaking	Canoeing	Stand Up Paddle	Paddle Surf
Advanced Instructor	Level 5 Instructor	Level 5 Instructor	Level 5 Instructor		Level 5 Instructor
Intermediate Instructor	Level 4 Instructor Level 3 Instructor	Level 4 Instructor Level 3 Instructor	Level 4 Instructor Level 3 Instructor		Level 4 Instructor Level 3 Instructor
Beginner	Level 2 Level 1		Level 2 Level 1	SUP Instructor	

- > Kayak Instructor Qualifications
- > Sea Instructor Qualifications
- > Paddlesurf Instructor Qualifications

- > River Instructor Qualifications
- > Canoe Instructor Qualifications
- > Stand-Up Paddleboard Instructor Award

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https://www.canoe.ie/instructor-coach-awards/ 1/3

**Appendix 7.15** Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Instructor and Coach Qualifications

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> Level 5 Instructor Qualification

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## Coach Qualification Information and Instructor Developer Information

COACH DEVELOPMENT INSTRUCTOR DEVELOPER QUALIFICATION

### BCU Coaching Equivalence

> BCU Coaching Equivalence

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#### CONTACT

**Canoeing Ireland**  
Irish Sport HQ,  
National Sports Campus,  
Blanchardstown,  
Dublin 15,  
email:  
[info@canoe.ie](mailto:info@canoe.ie)  
[support@canoe.ie](mailto:support@canoe.ie)  
[events@canoe.ie](mailto:events@canoe.ie)  
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[performance@canoe.ie](mailto:performance@canoe.ie)

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## Appendix 7.15 Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Instructor and Coach Qualifications

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# APPENDIX 7.16

Appendix 7.16 Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Personal Skills Awards





## Appendix 7.16 Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Personal Skills Awards

6/22/2021

Sea Kayak Skills Award | Canoeing Ireland

### Sea Kayak Skills Awards

#### Level 3 Sea Kayak Skills

##### Back to Top

##### **General aims**

The Level 3 Sea Kayak Skills Award aims to enable participants to:

- Kayak safely and competently in smooth seas (Douglas Sea Scale) as a member of a group of peers.
- Paddle competently in following winds, head winds and beams winds of up to force three.
- Assist in rescues.
- Have an understanding of the importance of weather as a factor in kayaking on the sea.

##### **2.00 Requirements for the Level 3 Sea Kayak Skills Award**

##### **Strokes**

- Forward Paddle, Reverse Paddle, Emergency Stop.
- Forward Sweep, Reverse Sweep and a combination of Forward and Reverse Sweep.
- Draw Stroke.
- Sculling Draw.
- Hanging Draw.
- Sculling for Support.
- Low Brace.
- High Brace.
- Low Brace Turn.
- Stern Rudder.
- Bow Rudder.

##### **Techniques**

- Entry and Exit.
- Edging.
- Paddling in a following wind, beam winds and head winds.
- Paddling into, bracing and turning in small surf (1 Foot).

##### **Rescues**

- Capsize Drill in deep water, getting back into kayak with assistance.
- Assisted X Rescue and an X Rescue.
- Eskimo Rescue.
- Eskimo Roll.

##### **Theory**

- Knowledge of Safety Rules.
- Record and interpret a marine weather forecast.
- Read a tide table to ascertain the time of high-water.
- An understanding of staying with your boat in the event of a capsize at sea.
- An understanding of the effects of the wind on the sea with particular reference to the danger of offshore winds. The candidate should show an understanding of what is meant by a leeshore, dumping surf, riptides and tide races.
- An understanding of various signals and commands.
- An ability to recognize several of the significant flora and fauna in the seashore environment.

##### **Assessment**

- The Level 3 Sea Kayak Skills Assessment must take place outdoors on smooth seas (Douglas Sea Scale) in winds up to a limit of force three. No part of an assessment may be taken in a swimming pool.
- During an assessment a participant must explain and demonstrate all techniques and skills at a level higher than that required for the Level 2 Kayak Skills Award. All techniques, skills and rescues must be demonstrated to an assessor's satisfaction in order to achieve this award.

<https://www.canoe.ie/sea-kayak-skills-award/>

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## Appendix 7.16 Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Personal Skills Awards

6/22/2021

Sea Kayak Skills Award | Canoeing Ireland

All strokes should be demonstrated in relevant situations i.e. low brace against a small breaking wave at a beach, and demonstrated on both sides of the kayak.  
Generally, required assessment rescues will be kept until the end of an assessment.  
Participants for this award must be at least 12 years of age.  
Participants must be members of Canoeing Ireland.

### Assessment Guidelines

It is recommended that the Level 3 Sea Kayak Skills Award be assessed by an Instructor other than the Instructor who has run the training course leading to the assessment.

The Level 3 Sea Kayak Skills Award can only be assessed by a currently registered Canoeing Ireland Instructor who is, at minimum, a Level 3 Sea Kayak Instructor.

The assessment is to be carried out with a maximum of six candidates to one assessor.

Generally guidelines will be given, should a candidate fail an assessment, as to the areas that they need to improve on.

### Equipment List required for Assessment

<p><b>Properly equipped kayak:</b> End loops and/or toggles. Suitable buoyancy Suitable foot rest Tow and Deck Lines</p>	<p><b>Personal kayaking equipment:</b> Paddle ISO approved Buoyancy Aid ISO approved helmet Spray deck Adequate footwear Wetsuit or dry pants, dry cag or dry suit, combined with sufficient thermal clothing</p>
--	---

### Level 3 Sea Kayak Skills Award Guidelines

#### Strokes

##### Entry and Exit

Can be carried out with or without the use of paddles, depending on what is most appropriate to the situation.

##### Forward and Reverse Paddling

The correct seating position, good trunk rotation, correct width of paddle grip, sufficient power to paddle against the current while the keeping the kayak straight.

##### Emergency Stop

Using forward and reverse paddling, stopping should be evident within 4 strokes.

##### Forward and Reverse Sweep Strokes

Candidates should demonstrate effective use of Sweep Strokes on slightly choppy seas.

##### Draw Stroke

Paddle near vertical, blade well covered, kayak moving in a straight line sideways for at least 5 metres. Top hand pushing while the lower hand is pulling. The blade must remain in the water throughout. Good body rotation towards the paddling side should be evident.

##### Sculling Draw

Paddle off vertical, blade covered, kayak moving in a straight line sideways for at least 5 metres. Top hand pushing while the lower hand is pulling with an efficient blade angle. Long strokes while the kayak remains level.

##### Sculling for Support

Performed sitting upright with the kayak at a precarious angle. The paddle should be kept low with good solid sweeps and confident committal to paddle.

<https://www.canoe.ie/sea-kayak-skills-award/>

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## Appendix 7.16 Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Personal Skills Awards

6/22/2021

Sea Kayak Skills Award | Canoeing Ireland

### **Low Brace Support**

The kayak must be sufficiently tilted for water to reach the spraydeck. A good push down with the elbows above paddle and associated kneelift and hip rotation should be evident.

### **High Brace Support**

The water must reach the paddler's armpit, with good push down. Associated kneelift and hip rotation should be evident. Paddle shaft no higher than chin level and arms flexed. Must be demonstrated both stationary and in small surf as appropriate.

### **Low Brace Turn**

The Low Brace Turn should be demonstrated in small breaking waves (1 Foot) or in a slightly choppy sea as the conditions allows.

### **Edging**

Demonstrate as a skill that assists in the turning of the kayak.

### **Stern Rudder**

Should be performed while on the move, a push pull action should be exhibited as well as good trunk rotation.

### **Bow Rudder**

In the Bow Rudder the paddler should show excellent posture and the kayak should turn effectively.

### **Techniques**

Paddling in head beam and following winds.

Candidates must demonstrate that they can control their kayak in wind conditions up to Force 3.

### **Rescues**

Candidates must act as rescuer and rescuee.

### **Eskimo Rescue**

A confident capsize and banging of the hull with the rescuer moving in from a distance of 5 metres. A first time recovery must follow but two attempts are allowed. Rescuer should approach from the front, or back, of rescuee to lessen the risk to rescuee's hand. Paddle or Bow Presentation method may be used.

### **Capsize Drill in Deep Water**

This aspect must be demonstrated both as a rescuee and rescuer.

### **Weather Forecast**

A candidate should be able to record that section of the Marine Forecast that is relevant to their geographical area. They should be able to describe what conditions are to be expected on the sea in Forces of wind from 1 to 5.

### **Surf Conditions**

This aspect of the assessment involves a candidate demonstrating that they can control their kayak in sea conditions where there are small waves. If there is no surf present on the day of assessment, sea conditions in up to Force 3 winds will suffice. On no account should candidates be asked to paddle, as part of the assessment, in surf conditions with waves of greater than one foot.

### **High Tide**

The candidate must simply demonstrate that they can ascertain what time high water is at the nearest standard port. They may use newspaper, almanac or local tide guide to get this information. The candidate is not expected to be familiar with secondary ports or how to work out tidal streams etc.

## Appendix 7.17 Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Become an Instructor or Coach


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### Become an Instructor or Coach



## Become an Instructor or Coach

### Canoeing Ireland Awards & Qualification Scheme

Canoeing Ireland's Award and Qualification Scheme comprises of awards and qualifications in kayaking (river kayaking), sea kayaking, and open canoeing.

The Scheme primarily consists of: *Skills Awards, Instructor Qualifications and Coach Qualifications.*

However the Scheme is further complemented by *River Safety & Rescue Awards and Coastal Navigation Awards* which are now an integral part of the Award and Qualification Scheme.

## Instructor Qualification Summaries

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<https://www.canoe.ie/become-an-instructor-or-coach/>
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Appendix 7.17 Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Become and Instructor or Coach

**Instructor Qualification Summaries**

Kayaking	Level 1 Instructor	Qualified to lead and teach groups of kayakers on flat water within close proximity to their launch point.	Can assess for Level 1 Skills Awards.	Instruct on flat water with a ratio of 1:6. Instructors and participants must stay within 300 metres of launch site
	Level 2 Instructor	Qualified to lead and teach on flat water journeys on inland and sheltered waters that remain close to bank/shore.	Can train and assess for Level 1 and 2 Skills Awards.	Instruct on flat water with a ratio of 1:6. Journeying on flat water allowed.
	Level 3 Instructor	Qualified to lead and teach groups on Grade II rivers.	Can train and assess for Level 1 – 3 Skills Awards.	Instruct on flat water with a ratio of 1:8. Instruct on Grade II rivers with a ratio of 1:6.
	Level 4 Instructor	Qualified to lead and teach groups on Grade 3 and advanced white water	Can train and assess for Level 1 – 4 Skills Awards.	Operate within any of the ratios above. Instruct on water above Grade II with a ratio of 1:4.
	Level 5 Instructor	Qualified to lead and teach groups on Grade IV and above white water. As well as in advanced conditions	Can train and assess for Level 1 – 5 Skills Awards.	Operate within any of the ratios above. Instruct on water above Grade 3 with a ratio of 1:4.
Sea Kayaking	Level 3 Instructor	Qualified to instruct and lead groups safely on coastal trips with waves averaging 0.5m in height and average wind speeds of 15km/h	Can train and assess for Level 1 – 3 Skills Awards.	Instruct on flat water with a ratio of 1:8. Instruct on seas of 0.5m and wind 15km/h with a ratio of 1:6
	Level 4 Instructor	Qualified to instruct and lead groups safely on seas with waves averaging 1m in height and average wind speeds of 30km/h	Can train and assess for Level 1 – 4 Skills Awards.	Operate within the ratio above. Instruct on seas of 1m waves and wind of 30 km/h with a ratio of 1:4.
	Level 5 Instructor	Qualified to instruct and lead groups safely on advanced seas with waves exceeding 2.5m in height and average wind speeds of 35km/h and higher	Can train and assess for Level 1 – 5 Skills Awards.	Operate within any of the ratios above. Instruct on seas of 2.5m with winds of 35 km/h with a ratio of 1:4.
Open Canoeing	Level 1 Instructor	Qualified to instruct on Grade I water in Designated Lake Areas, or in Designated Sheltered non-tidal Areas.	Can assess for Level 1 Canoe Skills Award	Instruct on flat water with a ratio of 1:6. Instructors and participants must stay within 300 metres of launch site
	Level 2 Instructor	Qualified to instruct and lead groups on Grade I water.	Can assess for Level 1 & 2 Canoe Skills Awards.	Instruct on flat water with a ratio of 1:6. Journeying on flat water allowed.
	Level 3 Instructor	Qualified to instruct and lead groups on Grade II water and within harbours and designated sheltered tidal areas.	Can assess for Level 1 – 3 Canoe Skills Awards.	Instruct on flat water with a ratio of 1:8. Instruct on Grade II rivers with a ratio of 1:6.
	Level 4 Instructor	Qualified to lead and instruct on water of Grade III - IV	Can assess for Level 1 – 4 Canoe Skills Awards.	Operate within any of the ratios above. Instruct on water above Grade II with a ratio of 1:4.
	Level 5 Instructor	Qualified to lead and instruct on water of Grade IV and above. Qualified to lead Groups in advanced conditions	Can assess for Level 1 – 5 Canoe Skills Awards.	Operate within any of the ratios above. Instruct on water above Grade 3 with a ratio of 1:4.
Paddlesurf	Level 3 Instructor	Qualified to instruct intermediate kayaking skills and lead groups of up to six people in small surf (0.5-1 meter)	Can train and assess for Level 3 Paddlesurf Skills Awards	Instruct in small surf (0.5-1 meter) with a ratio of 1:6. Specifically not qualified to instruct on reef breaks
Stand-Up Paddle	Instructor	Qualified to lead and Instruct Flat water SUP skills and lead journeys on Grade 1 water or Sheltered tidal areas in winds of up to Force 2	Train and Assess for the Intro and Flat water SUP Skills awards	Instruct on flat water with a ratio of 1:6 on Grade 1 water or Sheltered tidal areas in winds of up to Force 2

**Course Registration**

Registration of Training Courses and Assessments The following training courses and assessments must be registered with and validated by Canoeing Ireland:

- Skills Training Courses above Level 3 in all disciplines
- All Instructor Training and Assessments
- River Safety & Rescue Courses

A panel system of training and registration exists for coaches interested in running courses and assessments. Updated lists of Panel Members are available from the Canoeing Ireland Office. Membership/Registration All trainees for instructional or

**Appendix 7.17** Extract from Canoeing Ireland Website - Become and Instructor or Coach

leadership training courses must be registered with Canoeing Ireland. All Trainees and Instructors should renew registration on an annual basis. Only registered Instructors can organise Canoeing Ireland courses and request Canoeing Ireland certificates.


Appendix 7.18 Canoeing Ireland’s Record of Organiser’s Qualifications



Appendix 1


Name	[REDACTED]
Status	Current
Qualifications	Level 5 River Skills Level 4 River Instructor Level 4 River Skills Level 4 River Skills Assessment Panel Level 3 River Skills Level 3 Sea Skills Level 3 River Instructor Level 3 Sea Skills Level 2 Generic Tutor Level 2 Kayak Instructor Assessment Panel Level 2 Kayak Instructor Training Panel Level 1 Kayak Instructor Assessment Panel Level 1 Sea Coastal Navigation

## Appendix 7.19 Extract from Water Safety Ireland - Cold Shock and Hypothermia



**Irish Water Safety**  
Sábháilteacht Míne agus Míreann

# COLD SHOCK



# HYPOTHERMIA

Issued in the interests of safety by  
**Irish Water Safety, The Long Walk, Galway**

Irish Water Safety is the statutory, voluntary body established to promote water safety in Ireland.

**LoCall 1890 420 202**

**www.iws.ie**

**info@iws.ie**

### Introduction

For people not used to cold water (temp. < 15°C), sudden immersion is associated with two problems, either of which may result in death from drowning.

On initial immersion, the shock of the cold water coming in contact with the skin ("Cold Shock") can result in incapacitation and drowning in the first 2-3minutes. For those who survive this and are unable to get out of the water quickly, progressive body cooling leading to hypothermia will follow in time. The rate of onset will depend on water temperature and the protective measures you have taken to reduce body cooling.

This pamphlet gives advice on how to prevent these conditions in the first instance and what to do if you do find yourself a victim of either.

### Cold Shock

The term used to describe the initial response of a victim, unused to cold water after sudden immersion.

*Signs and Symptoms:*

- Initial deep gasping
- Uncontrollable rapid breathing, with possible dizziness and pins and needles
- Panic
- A large increase in both heart rate and blood pressure.

*Dangers:*

- Inhalation of water
- Drowning
- Stroke or heart attack

*Prevention:*

- Use recognised 'man overboard' prevention equipment
- Wear approved lifejackets.
- Wear clothing with good insulating and waterproofing properties.
- Wear Immersion Suits (dry/wet)
- Hold on to some support and do not attempt to swim until symptoms have subsided (approx. 2 - 3min)
- Exit the water as soon as possible

*Follow up:*

- Monitor airway, breathing and circulation
- Prevent further loss of heat
- Protect from wind
- Get medical help



## Appendix 7.19 Extract from Water Safety Ireland - Cold Shock and Hypothermia

### Hypothermia

Following immersion, first, the skin and limbs cool rapidly; then the heart, brain, and other deeper parts of the body cool. *Hypothermia* occurs when deep body temperature drops by at least 2°C. Body build, body fat, fitness level and types of clothing worn, all affect its rate of onset.

#### Signs and Symptoms:

- Early dulling of sensation in hands and impaired muscle function
- Violent shivering with blueness around the lips
- Armpits very cold
- Muscles stiffness
- Lethargy and disorientation
- Slow and laboured breathing
- Pulse weakens but difficult to feel in any case because of cold

#### Dangers:

- Impaired sensation & muscle coordination may impair some early vital lifesaving actions involving hands
- Loss of consciousness
- Drowning
- Cardiac arrest
- Death

**Note:** Do not assume a person is dead; they may only be in hibernation.

- Wear approved lifejackets.
- Wear Immersion Suits over warm clothing.
- Learn cold-water survival techniques (stay still with arms by sides and legs together – "HELP" position).
- Get out of water as soon as possible (life raft; upturned hull, or any other refuge in air)

#### Follow up:

- Prevent further heat loss (enclose in plastic bag)
- Monitor airway, breathing and circulation
- Move victim to shelter and lie flat
- Insulate body and specially the head
- Remove wet clothing if dry replacements are available.
- If not :
  - Enclose body – except face - in large polythene bag or other waterproof material
  - Give warm sweet drinks if conscious, DO NOT give alcohol
  - Avoid rubbing the victims body


### Facts

- a) It takes only 15 to 30 minutes in cold water before the temperature of the heart, brain and internal organs begin to drop but skin and muscle temperatures cool far quicker, which may impair some essential early lifesaving actions.
- b) Children cool much faster than adults because they are smaller and have less fat. Boys usually cool faster than girls.
- c) Swimming may give a feeling of warmth but it accelerates muscle cooling. The body may produce more heat when swimming but it is also more quickly lost from the arm and leg muscles. Once these muscles cool, swimming becomes more difficult or impossible.
- d) Normal clothes will not produce much insulation against cold water, but they will slow down the rate of loss of vital body heat.
- e) Wearing approved Lifejackets, Immersion Suits and properly fitting Wet suits will decrease the likelihood of hypothermia for all water sports enthusiasts.

### Conservation of Heat in Water

Retention of heat in water:

- 1) Avoid swimming if possible; floating or treading water increase the chances of survival. Remain still by using trapped air in clothes as a buoyancy aid. Better still wear a lifejacket.
- 2) Clothes will slow down the rate of loss of vital body heat.
- 3) H.E.L.P. (Heat, Escape, Lessening, Position) – This position (legs together elbows to sides), may be adopted if wearing a buoyancy aid. It helps slow body heat loss in calm water.
- 4) Immersion Suits: Wet suits provide extra buoyancy and reduce heat loss for considerable time, but dry suits are better for long-term survival.
- 5) Use of floating objects (e.g. Swamped or capsized boats) to get as much of the body as possible out of the water, even if the air feels colder you will always cool faster in water.



Reid Dodger / Peter www.viki.ie

Appendix 7.20 Canoeing Ireland's Professional Course Provider Partnership



**Professional Course Provider Partnership**

Canoeing Ireland  
Irish Sport HQ, National Sports Campus  
Blanchardstown  
Dublin 15

Appendix 7.20 Canoeing Ireland’s Professional Course Provider Partnership

*Canoeing Ireland*

*Professional Course Provider Partnership*

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## Appendix 7.20 Canoeing Ireland's Professional Course Provider Partnership

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### Overview

Canoeing Ireland is recognised by Sport Ireland and the Olympic Federation of Ireland (OFI) as the governing body of the sport and recreation of Paddlesport in Ireland. Canoeing Ireland is affiliated to the International Canoe Federation and the European Canoe Association.

Canoeing Ireland develops, promotes, and governs recreational and competitive Canoeing in Ireland for all. We deliver high performance and participation training and activities through strong collaboration with our network of clubs, commercial course providers and members.

Canoeing Ireland aims to be relevant to and representative of Paddlesports in Ireland, increasing participation and performance in partnership with a thriving network of clubs, social, community, educational and commercial organisations and to continually enhance our international success.

To help us achieve our aims we have established long-term working relationships with commercial providers with whom we share our skills syllabus. This Partnership Agreement will formalise what was previously an informal relationship and clearly define the expectations of both parties to the agreement.

### Why Sign Up?

Canoeing Ireland is tasked with the development and promotion of paddlesports in Ireland and is grant funded to achieve these objectives. Developing a world class syllabus, recognised as such throughout Europe, and providing opportunities to participate in events, both recreational and performance are core activities of Canoeing Ireland. The desired outcome of these activities is the attraction and retention of current and prospective participants in paddlesports. Canoeing Ireland has a responsibility to participants in our sport to provide a basis on which to evaluate the structure and effectiveness of our programmes. This will be the primary aim of the Partnership Agreement. In conjunction with our plans to strengthen capabilities within our clubs, we are establishing a strong link with providers who are teaching our syllabus in a mutually beneficial partnership.

In return for your support of the Partnership Agreement, Canoeing Ireland will work with you to further develop participation initiatives and will endorse your brand as a partner of Canoeing Ireland.

Canoeing Ireland will represent Partner Providers to other national stakeholders such as Sport Ireland, Capital Sports Grants, Department of Transport Tourism and Sport, Waterways Ireland, local development companies, LEADER, County Councils, Local Sports Partnerships, Scouting Ireland, youth groups and schools to help facilitate activity and grant applications.

### Other Benefits of Provider Partnership

- Affiliated providers who are qualified to run Level 1 and Level 2 Instructor Training (Not QQI Course) can now do so at a ratio of 1:8 participants (**Subject to prior approval of the TDO**).
- Course Admin Fee, which includes participant Logbook is reduced to €35.
- All level two logbooks and level 1 logbooks (not including QQI/Traineeship framework) may be approved by the TDO for assessment if requested by the provider/instructor. This will ease the administrative burden for providers.

## Appendix 7.20 Canoeing Ireland's Professional Course Provider Partnership

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### Who is eligible for the Partnership Agreement?

Course providers are defined as individuals, clubs, businesses, schools, ETB's, OEC's and social, community, educational or commercial organisations who offer Paddlesport activities including courses in a commercial framework and who meet the Canoeing Ireland Quality Assurance and Safety Standards.

#### Registration Criteria

Eligibility to sign up to the Partnership Agreement is dependent on the following criteria:

##### **Staff Qualifications**

Registered Providers must maintain an up-to-date list of their primary/core Canoeing Ireland qualified staff, both full time and freelance and have the list available on request from Canoeing Ireland. Canoeing Ireland instructor qualifications are only valid when Garda vetting has been completed successfully, Safeguarding courses have been attended and an up-to-date Canoeing Ireland recognised first aid qualification has been obtained.

Registered Providers should only use staff who hold the qualifications relevant to the environment and courses they are delivering. Providers will be registered to run only those courses and operate in environments for which their staff hold the appropriate qualifications.

**All** qualified staff must be registered members of Canoeing Ireland. It is the responsibility of the registered Provider to ensure their staff have in-date Canoeing Ireland membership and relevant instructor qualifications and requirements.

Registered providers must maintain and provide copies of up to date first aid and Safeguarding certificates for all activity staff which will be recorded on the CI database.

##### **Insurance**

Registered course providers must maintain and provide if requested, a copy of their insurance certificate and details of their conditions of cover and operating environment. Providers must ensure that they maintain an appropriate level of insurance for the business that they are engaged in.

Note that Instructors & Coaches operating voluntarily in a non-commercial context are covered for liability through the Canoeing Ireland insurance policy.

##### **Standard Operating Procedures and Risk Assessments**

Registered course providers must maintain copies of their standard operating procedures and risk assessments and have same available on request from Canoeing Ireland.

##### **Tax Clearance**

Registered course providers must provide their Tax Clearance Access Code to Canoeing Ireland.

### Duration

Registration will be valid for 12 months. Approved course providers will receive a certificate of compliance with Canoeing Ireland QASS on registration each year. Each certificate will list the courses and environments in which the provider is registered to operate.

Canoeing Ireland registered provider stickers will be made available to all registered providers. Canoeing Ireland flags and banners are also available at cost price.

## Appendix 7.20 Canoeing Ireland's Professional Course Provider Partnership

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*Professional Course Provider Partnership*

### Course Delivery

The Course provider is solely responsible for ensuring that the courses are run safely and in accordance with Canoeing Ireland's operating procedures and safety guidelines relevant to staff instructor qualifications, ratios, and weather conditions.

The course provider is also responsible for meeting Canoeing Ireland reporting requirements, including where necessary sending notification and confirmation of any courses to the Canoeing Ireland office and course participants, submission of course reports and assessment results, and maintaining records in case of any follow-up queries by Canoeing Ireland. The Course provider must be clearly identified in the promotion and advertising of any courses through Canoeing Ireland media platforms. Canoeing Ireland must be clearly identified in any award scheme courses.

As a rule, all Canoeing Ireland instructor training and assessment courses **must** be registered with the Canoeing Ireland office at a minimum of four weeks before commencement. All logbooks once checked and cleared by the course provider must then be submitted to the Canoeing Ireland office. The logbook will be returned to the owner along with certification.

All proficiency skills assessments from Level 4 up must also be registered with the Canoeing Ireland office via email at a minimum of 2 weeks before commencement. With the nature of courses at this level this date can be changed to allow for water level fluctuations and weather. Any change in original date must be communicated to the Canoeing Ireland office by email for recording.

### Course Provider Application Process

Once the pre-requirements are complete the following steps explain the process to become a Canoeing Ireland registered course provider.

- ✦ Complete the relevant Provider Partnership application form available on the Canoeing Ireland website.
- ✦ If the registration is successful and approved by Canoeing Ireland the course provider will receive a registered and approved course provider certificate and approved course provider stickers.
- ✦ If registration is unsuccessful the course provider will be provided with written feedback which must be addressed in full before the registration process can be completed.
- ✦ Course provider applications will be processed by the Canoeing Ireland office.

This agreement sets out in detail what Canoeing Ireland requires from registered course providers and what registered course providers can expect from Canoeing Ireland.

### Obligations of Canoeing Ireland

#### *Development*

- ✓ To conduct a review of the Canoeing Ireland Award Scheme to take place every four years.
- ✓ To develop a unique junior paddlesport syllabus and create recognisable national branding around same.
- ✓ To consistently enhance and maintain Quality Assurance and Safety Standards registration procedures for course providers.
- ✓ To review developments in training and seek to disseminate all relevant information to registered course providers.
- ✓ To participate, where possible, in Irish, European, and International forums for the continuous review of the awards to maintain best international standard.

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## Appendix 7.20 Canoeing Ireland's Professional Course Provider Partnership

### *Canoeing Ireland*

### *Professional Course Provider Partnership*

#### **Marketing**

- ✓ To ensure the online course provider directory, map, course calendar and event calendar are up to date.
- ✓ To assist and represent providers in tenders and grant applications with letters of support.
- ✓ To provide Canoeing Ireland registered centres with quality branding and visuals at cost price.

#### **Quality Assurance**

- ✓ To review course providers applications for entry to the Partnership Agreement.
- ✓ To offer CPD workshops annually.
- ✓ To ensure that the service to each training or assessment candidate, award holder and course provider is of the highest quality.
- ✓ To assist the course provider to maintain the highest standard of service delivery to the customer through monitoring and evaluation of course outcomes and customer satisfaction using online feedback forms.

#### **Administration**

- ✓ To register candidates and provide a logbook or other associated materials within ten working days of receipt of relevant and appropriately lodged applications.
- ✓ To issue certification within ten working days of receipt of relevant and appropriately lodged assessment results.
- ✓ To maintain an accurate database of the training and assessment record of all registered candidates in the CI office.

#### **Appeals and Complaints.**

- ✓ To provide facilities and personnel for dealing with any complaints and appeals procedure for either Course Providers or candidates, whenever appropriate. Canoeing Ireland will ensure that all candidates and course provider appeals are dealt with in a fair and open manner as set out in the Canoeing Ireland Complaints and Appeals Procedures.

#### **Obligations of the Course Provider**

Registering with the Canoeing Ireland as a Canoeing Ireland course Provider binds the course Provider to the below requirements.

#### **Marketing**

- To identify any courses on the Canoeing Ireland events/training calendar or website with the Provider name and contact details and logo where possible.
- To identify Canoeing Ireland award scheme courses using Canoeing Ireland logos or text in any promotion, advertising, or information.

#### **Quality Assurance**

- To have adequate liability insurance to cover students, themselves, and any additional trainers. Instructors & Coaches operating voluntarily in a non-commercial context within their own club are covered for liability through the Canoeing Ireland insurance policy.
- To use appropriately qualified staff/members, ratios and equipment for the environment and groups with which they are operating.
- To ensure qualified staff/members are registered members of Canoeing Ireland.
- To ensure that the course providers and additional trainers have appropriate and up-to-date Canoeing Ireland Garda Vetting, Safeguarding and Canoeing Ireland recognised first aid qualifications.

## Appendix 7.20 Canoeing Ireland's Professional Course Provider Partnership

### *Canoeing Ireland*

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- To run courses in suitable locations for the safety of students and for delivering the relevant syllabus.
- To ensure that any training and assessment courses offered are in accordance with the Canoeing Ireland Quality Assurance and Safety Standards and operating procedures.
- To allow moderation by an appointed Canoeing Ireland officer, of course delivery including course services and equipment used, at any time.

#### **Safeguarding**

- To partake in the Canoeing Ireland Garda vetting process for all Canoeing Ireland members & staff.
- To have an appointed Children's Officer as a member of staff or committee (Safeguarding 2)
- To have an appointed Designated Liaison Person as a member of staff or committee (Safeguarding 3)
- To be familiar with the Sport Ireland Code of Ethics and Good Practice for Children in Sport covered under Safeguarding 1.
- To comply with sex, age, and race discrimination legislation. (Equal Status Act and the Equality Act).

#### **Administration**

- To submit certification paperwork within 10 working days of course or assessment.
- To keep records of clients and course information for all Canoeing Ireland courses.
- To notify the Canoeing Ireland office when required of upcoming courses by sending in the necessary Course Registrations (Instructor Courses and L4/5 skills assessments)
- To be tax compliant.

#### **Waiver**

No failure of Canoeing Ireland to exercise any power given to it under the Quality Assurance and Safety Standards registration or to insist upon strict compliance by the course provider with any obligation or condition of the registration and no custom or practice of the parties at variance with the terms of this registration shall constitute a waiver of any of Canoeing Ireland's rights under this registration.

#### **Notices**

Each of the parties to the Quality Assurance and Safety Standards registration shall notify the other of any change of address, contact details and relevant circumstances within 48 hours of such change.

#### **Applicable Law**

This registration and all rights and obligations of the parties of the provider registration shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of Ireland, and the parties of the provider registration submit to the jurisdiction of the Irish Courts.

#### **Canoeing Ireland Moderation Process**

Signing up to the Canoeing Ireland Quality Standards and Safety Regulation confirms that course directors and provider are prepared to accept a Canoeing Ireland moderator to visit any/all the canoeing courses they run. Canoeing Ireland will carry out two lottery audits a year and may audit additional providers at any time.







## Appendix 7.20 Canoeing Ireland's Professional Course Provider Partnership








### *Canoeing Ireland*

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#### *Moderation/auditing can be any of the following:*

-  Moderation/audit on the course preparation and delivery including the Canoeing Ireland member status and qualifications of the participants involved.
-  Moderation/auditing of reports and other paperwork received at the office
-  Communication between the office and course provider.
-  A visit by a Canoeing Ireland approved representative to a whole course or part of a course

#### *Principles applicable to a moderation visit by CI Representative.*

-  The Office will contact the course provider prior to a visit.
-  The role of the moderator will be explained to the candidates
-  The moderator will not interfere with the course delivery.
-  All feedback to the course provider will be confidential to Canoeing Ireland. A written report will follow as soon as possible.
-  A copy of the moderation report will be submitted to Canoeing Ireland.
-  Details of moderation and a copy of the report will be retained by the Canoeing Ireland office.
-  Appeals made in relation to moderation should follow the Canoeing Ireland complaints and appeals procedure.

#### *Moderation/auditing will examine any or all the following.*

-  Experience of the participants and any personal pre-course requirements should they exist
-  Choice of venue in relation to proposed programme.
-  Compliance of staff with the Canoeing Ireland QASS
-  Familiarity of staff with recent developments in training and best practice
-  Fulfilment of the course preparation and syllabus delivery
-  Methods of instruction and tuition
-  Course providers must comply with any action points raised in the moderation report
-  A second moderation may take place to monitor the implementation of action points.

### **What happens if you decide this is not for you?**

Only registered Canoeing Ireland course providers will be permitted to use the Canoeing Ireland logo, its syllabi, any trademarks, and branding in a commercial context e.g., on their websites and marketing communications. Note that registered clubs can continue to use the Canoeing Ireland logo and branding in a non-commercial context.

Canoeing Ireland Quality Assurance and Safety Standards registration is a voluntary registration system.

Unregistered providers will not be permitted to use the Canoeing Ireland logo, any of the CI Syllabi, trademarks or branding in their marketing communications.

The map of providers on the Canoeing Ireland website will display only providers who have signed up to the Provider Partnership Agreement.

The Canoeing Ireland training courses calendar will display only courses provided by our Partner Providers.

## Appendix 7.20 Canoeing Ireland's Professional Course Provider Partnership

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### Termination of the provider registration

The course provider may terminate their registration at any time by notifying Canoeing Ireland in writing.

After following the complaints and appeals procedure outlined on the Canoeing Ireland website, Canoeing Ireland may terminate provider registration at any time by notifying the course provider in writing.

Subsequently any Canoeing Ireland courses that are booked must then be handed to another course provider or cancelled.

When a notice of termination is served by Canoeing Ireland the course provider can appeal according to the procedures set out in the course provider's complaints and appeals procedure. The course provider accepts that after notice of termination by Canoeing Ireland has been received and until the date of the resolution of any appeal, the course provider's accreditation shall be deemed suspended, and the course provider shall not operate any course during that period.

Upon termination or expiration of the provider registration for any reason the course provider shall immediately:

- Cease to use Canoeing Ireland official paperwork or documentation materials including the Canoeing Ireland logo.
- Return to the Canoeing Ireland or otherwise dispose of or destroy all documentation belonging to Canoeing Ireland, which the course provider was entitled to use whilst registered.
- Remove or permanently cover all signs or advertisements or anything else identifiable in any way with the Canoeing Ireland.

### Finally

Canoeing Ireland is working to formalise our relationship with our stakeholders. This will allow all interested parties to have a stronger voice in the future direction of Canoeing Ireland. Working together we are stronger and faster. You may choose not to partner with Canoeing Ireland at this time, however, you might consider this before you make your final decision. This agreement is intended to be a move towards consolidation not division. We value your expertise, and so we are offering several options for you to contribute to the administration of the scheme:

An annual fee of €150.00

***Contribution of voluntary services to your local club to the value of €150.00 annually.***

***Contribution to Canoeing Ireland of expertise, by volunteering for a committee or working group.***

For further information on this scheme, please contact:

Development Officer – Aidan Doran – [development@canoe.ie](mailto:development@canoe.ie)

## SECTION 36 PROCESS

### Section 36 of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000

It is a requirement under Section 36 that:

- (1) Before publishing a report, the Board shall send a draft of the report or sections of the draft report to any person who, in its opinion, is likely to be adversely affected by the publishing of the report or sections or, if that person be deceased, then such person as appears to the Board best to represent that person's interest.
- (2) A person to whom the Board sends a draft in accordance with subsection (1) may, within a period of 28 days commencing on the date on which the draft is sent to the person, or such further period not exceeding 28 days, as the Board in its absolute discretion thinks fit, submit to the Board in writing his or her observations on the draft.
- (3) A person to whom a draft has been sent in accordance with subsection (1) may apply to the Board for an extension, in accordance with subsection (2), of the period in which to submit his or her observations on the draft.
- (4) Observations submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2) shall be included in an appendix to the published report, unless the person submitting the observations requests in writing that the observations be not published.
- (5) Where observations are submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2), the Board may, at its discretion -
  - (a) alter the draft before publication or decide not to do so, or
  - (b) include in the published report such comments on the observations as it thinks fit.'

The Board reviews and considers all observations received whether published or not published in the final report. When the Board considers an observation requires amendments to the report, those amendments are made. When the Board is satisfied that the report has adequately addressed the issue in the observation, then no amendment is made to the report. The Board may also make comments on observations in the report.

Response(s) received following circulation of the draft report (excluding those where the Board has agreed to a request not to publish) are included in the following section.

The Board has noted the contents of all observations, and amendments have been made to the report where required.

## SECTION 36 OBSERVATIONS

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### 8. MSA 2000 - SECTION 36 OBSERVATIONS RECEIVED

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Note: The names and contact details of the individual respondents have been obscured for privacy reasons.

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

[REDACTED]

In order to make understandable and clear observations on the draft report, I have outlined my business practices and procedures which represent best practice.

### SAFETY STARTS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL

All participants are required to accept our terms and conditions at the time of booking with us and to fill out a medical/Covid check form before participating in the tour.

#### *Copy of Time of booking ts & cs and information*

1. *Names of Others in Group or Names of Kids for Camp*
2. *Med Check Form (with Covid 19 update)*

*All participants must fill out our med check form. The link to the form will be on your booking receipt. Share it with your group. Tick Box to Agree*

3. *I promise to read the info on my booking receipt*

*It is essential during the Covid 19 crisis that you read the information on your booking receipt and that you share it with any others on your booking*

4. *Subscribe to Newsletter*

*We would like to send you our updates and special offer by email. Tick the box to agree.*

5. *I will bring bottle of hand sanitiser*

*One per household group (we will get you to carry this on tour in your Buoyancy Aid)*

*Thank you for booking with [REDACTED]*

*Payment in full is required at time of booking. If you cancel 5 days before your class or trip we can offer you a full refund or reschedule your class, course or trip. If you cancel 5 - 2 days in advance we can offer you 50% refund or book you onto another class, course or trip as availability allows. If you cancel between 48 and 24 hours in advance we will book you onto another class, course or trip as availability allows. If you cancel less than 24 hours in advance we cannot guarantee that we can reschedule a class, course or trip for you and we will not refund your money.*

*We reserve the right to alter the route of a kayaking tour, course or class in the event that we consider it necessary to keep you and anyone else in your party safe.*

#### MCIB RESPONSE:

The MCIB notes the contents of this observation which have been reflected throughout the report.

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

I acknowledge that it is my duty to exercise care for the protection of others and myself while attending a Kayaking class or course. I assume the risk of physical activity with my own physical condition. I have received advice from my doctor that I am capable of kayaking and exercising or I will assume the risk of kayaking and exercising without a doctor's examination. I take complete responsibility for my presence at any inside or outside Kayaking course or class location. I will not hold Kayaking, [REDACTED] or any instructor working for Kayaking in any way responsible for any loss or damage to my person or property or responsible for any injury or loss I may incur as a result of my participation in any Kayaking course or class or discipline now or at any date in the future. I acknowledge that I use the premises, facilities and parking area at my own risk.

### Privacy Statement

As a valued [REDACTED] customer, your personal privacy is very important to us. Below is an outline of our policy concerning personal information.

This Privacy Statement applies to all information we process about you in connection with your relationship with us as a customer or potential customer.

By using our services and/or the [REDACTED] website, and by providing any personal information, you consent to the practices described in this Privacy Statement including without limitation with regard to the transfer, storage and processing of your personal information.

We may update our Privacy Statement from time to time to take account of changing requirements such as changes in technology or legislation, and request that you refer back to this Statement frequently to become aware of any such revisions.

We may use your contact information to contact you in relation to your session. For example to notify you of inclement weather or to let you know about some other information relevant to the session. Your email address will also be used to send your booking receipt to you.

From time to time we may email you to let you know about our classes, courses or tours.

### How Do I Know My Payment Details are Safe?

We do not store your credit card information in any form and all of our online payments are handled by Sagepay/Paypal who provide secure, encrypted and world renowned payment processing.

### Collection of Personal Information

We may collect personal information about you whenever you use our services, when you use our website or when you call us. For example:

- when you make a booking
- when you make an enquiry

If you wish to book using the website, we will require you to complete the Booking Form and provide us with certain information which may include the following:

- Name
- Postal Address
- Billing address
- Phone numbers
- Email address

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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- Sensitive personal data is defined in the Data Protection Acts as including certain categories of personal information, such as that about race, ethnicity, religion or health. On occasion you may provide [REDACTED] with sensitive personal data because you have requested specific medical assistance from us such as the provision of wheelchair assistance. By providing any personal information that is, or could be considered to be, sensitive personal information; you explicitly agree that we may collect and use by sharing with our tour guides where necessary this personal information to make sure we can run the session to suit your needs, as described in this Privacy Statement.

### How Do We Use Your Personal Information

We use your personal information as follows:

- to facilitate your course, class or your and deliver services you have asked us to provide
- to send you information to identify you as a customer
- to process your booking
- for statistical and marketing analysis
- for customer surveys and customer relations purposes
- for quality control and training purposes, collecting debts and managing or transferring assets in a merger or acquisition.
- if you commence but do not complete your booking your e-mail address may be used to send you information related to your booking or about your search.
- to contact you via electronic mail with information in relation to promotions and products and to provide you with relevant marketing communications including personalised marketing communications. This may include information about services, products, special offers and promotions offered by [REDACTED] and other service providers.
- to assist in any future dealings we may have with you by identifying your requirements and preferences, to develop our relationship with you and treat you more personally e.g. by delivering messages and information that we think is relevant and may be of interest to you, prior to, during, and after your experience with us.

We may contact you by any means of communication for which you have given us contact details. You will be afforded the facility at the time of booking to indicate whether you wish to receive marketing communications and upon receipt of such communications to indicate that you no longer wish to do so. Even if you have indicated that you do not wish to receive marketing information from us, we may still send you communications about the services you have booked to use, such as your travel itinerary. These communications will help you get the most from the services we provide and may also contain important information about the services you will be using. We may also send you communications about the services you have previously used, for example, where you experienced some form of issue or problem and we wish to contact you about it proactively in order to resolve it.

For the purposes stated in this paragraph 4, we may share or transmit your personal information to our own offices, credit and charge card companies.

### Contact Us

If you have any other concerns, suggestions or questions about any issues relating to privacy on the [REDACTED] web site, please contact us via e-mail. See 'Contact Us'.

I have read and agreed to the Terms of Service

**8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response****BOOKING RECEIPT INFORMATION**

Everyone who makes a booking is emailed a booking receipt.

*Thank you for your booking with Kayaking.*

*It is essential that every member of your party fills out our online [med check form here](#). While the Covid 19 situation is ongoing, we cannot let anyone on the water unless the med check form has been completed.*

*If you are booking for children please fill out the med check form for each child.*

*You can find directions to our locations as well as a list of what you need to bring with you [here](#);*

**FAQ PAGE QUESTION RE SWIMMING**

Do I need to be able to swim?

*Yes, you do need to be able to swim. You don't have to be an Olympic champion and we will provide you with Buoyancy Aids which will help you to float. You do need to be comfortable in the water and happy enough to kick your legs or move your arms while floating with the buoyancy aid.*

**Medical Check Form.**

Everyone is required to fill out a medical check prior to arrival on our tours.

**Medical Check Form**

Any information collected here is gathered for safety reasons, is sent to a secure server in strict confidence and is never shared with a third party.

\* Required

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

First Name: \* Last Name: \* Email Address: \* Address: \*



8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

Date of Birth \* Phone Number \*

7. Have you ever been advised by your GP not to exercise? \*

*Check all that apply.*

Yes  
No

8. If you have answered yes to above please give details and confirm that you have now been given permission by your GP to exercise.

9. Do you have a history of heart problems? \*

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes  
No

**8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response**

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10. Do you have high blood pressure/dizziness/ or lose consciousness? \*Mark only one oval.

Yes

No

11. Do you have a history of lung problems or asthma? \*  
Mark only one oval.

Yes

No

12. Do you have back pain or injury? \*  
Mark only one oval.

Yes

No

13. Do you have pain or limited movement in any joints?  
Ankles, knees, hips etc? \* Mark only one oval.

Yes

No

14. If Yes Specify:-

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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15. Have you been diagnosed with osteopenia or osteoperosis? \*

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

16. Do you have epilepsy? \*

*Check all that apply.*

Yes

No

17. Do you have diabetes? \*

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

18. Do you smoke? \*

*Check all that apply.*

Yes

No

19. Are you pregnant or do you have a child under 6 months? \*

*Check all that apply.*

Yes

No

**8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response**

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20. Do you know of any other reason why you should not engage in physical activity? \*Check all that apply.

Yes

No

21. If yes specify:-

22. Are you taking any prescribed medications? \*

Mark only one oval.

Yes

No

23. If yes specify:-

24. I understand that although I don't need to be a champion swimmer, I need to be comfortable floating in the water wearing a buoyancy aid in the unlikely event of a capsize \*

Check all that apply.

Yes

25. If you have had any surgical procedures, injury, chronic illness or other medical condition please give details here:-

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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26. I declare that if I have any symptoms of Covid 19 or if I have been in contact with anyone with symptoms of Covid 19, I will not attend my booking and I will contact [REDACTED] to reschedule my booking \*

*Check all that apply.*

Tick Box to Confirm

27. I will bring a bottle for hand sanitiser and make sure that we have one in total for our entire group \*

*Check all that apply.*

Option 1

28. As per the latest government guidelines, you may wear a mask or face covering if you wish. It is not compulsory while outdoors \*

*Check all that apply.*

ok

29. If I wish to wear glasses on the tour, I agree to bring a chord, strap or string to secure them so that I don't lose my glasses in the event of a capsize. \*

*Mark only one oval.*

Agree

N/A

30. I understand that due to Covid 19, there are no changing or toilet facilities at [REDACTED] locations \*

8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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*Check all that apply.*

Tick Box to Confirm

31. I agree to abide by [REDACTED] Covid 19 social distancing measures \**Check all that apply.*

Tick Box to Confirm

32. I understand that [REDACTED] reserve the right to alter the route or starting location of the tour due to weather or other safety considerations and that this does not entitle me to a refund \*

*Check all that apply.*

Tick Box to Confirm

33. I declare that I have answered all the questions on this form honestly and that I have not withheld any pertinent health or medical information. \*

*Check all that apply.*

Tick Box to Confirm

34. How Did you Hear About Us \*

*Mark only one oval.*

Google Search

Facebook Page

Friend Referral

I've been before

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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Facebook Ad  
Referral from Kayaking Club  
Other

35.

Thank you for booking with [REDACTED]. Payment in full is required at time of booking. If you cancel 5 days before your class or trip we can offer you a full refund or reschedule your class, course or trip. If you cancel 5 - 2 days in advance we can offer you 50% refund or book you onto another class, course or trip as availability allows. If you cancel between 48 and 24 hours in advance we will book you onto another class, course or trip as availability allows. If you cancel less than 24 hours in advance we cannot guarantee that we can reschedule a class, course or trip for you and we will not refund your money. I acknowledge that it is my duty to exercise care for the protection of others and myself while attending a Kayaking class or course. I assume the risk of physical activity with my own physical condition. I have received advice from my doctor that I am capable of kayaking and exercising or I will assume the risk of kayaking and exercising without a doctor's examination. I take complete responsibility for my presence at any inside or outside Kayaking course or class location. I will not hold Kayaking, [REDACTED] or any instructor working for Kayaking in any way responsible for any loss or damage to my person or property or responsible for any injury or loss I may incur as a result of my participation in any Kayaking course or class or discipline now or at any date in the future. I acknowledge that I use the premises, facilities and parking area at my own risk. \*

*Check all that apply.*

I agree to these terms and conditions

36.

If you are under 18 your parent or guardian must give permission for you to attend any activity organised by [REDACTED]. You parent our guardian must also confirm that he/she has accepted our terms and conditions

*Check all that apply.*

Parent or Guardian to Tick Box to Confirm Permission and To Confirm Acceptance of our Terms and Conditions and to Verify Medical Information

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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37. Name and Contact Number of Parent or Guardian

### **SAFETY ON ARRIVAL**

Clients are welcomed to the area and asked if they have completed our med check form and if they can swim. They are given other information about the tour and the area.

We follow best practice by fitting clients with a 5mm wetsuit and an ISO standard buoyancy aid. We explain to them how to put the gear on and we check the buoyancy aids are fitted correctly before embarking on the tour.

Again following best practice, we do a "capsize drill" before leaving the slipway. This is essentially a capsized "dry run". Capsizing is a normal part of kayaking. It is not unusual for someone to capsize and get wet while kayaking. That is why clients are given wetsuits and asked if they can swim.

### **BIZZARE CONDUCT OF IRISH COAST GUARD OFFICER, LACK OF FAITH IN THE IRISH COAST GUARD AND THE INTEGRITY OF ITS DOCUMENTS**

The bizarre behaviour of the senior Irish Coast Guard volunteer on the 13 September 2020 in and around Bulloch Harbour and subsequently is the subject of a current and ongoing investigation being conducted by a senior Irish Coast Guard Official. The Irish Coast Guard is headquartered in the same building as the Marine Casualty Investigations Board. The publication of this draft report at this time is objectively unnecessary and constitutes a direct attack on that complaint resolution process as well as an attack on the judicial review proceedings.

It is inappropriate that communications of a sensitive nature sent to the Irish Coast Guard, but copied to the MCIB for their information, should appear in this purported draft document. No consent for the information furnished in confidence by [REDACTED] has been given to this communication being included in this draft report. Likewise the MCIB has not sought or received permission or the consent of the persons identified or capable of being identified in those confidential communications.

I have no faith in the accuracy of the Irish Coast Guard documentation. The falsity of these documents has been notified to the Irish Coast Guard and the Marine Casualty Investigation Board neither of which have taken any or any appropriate steps to independently identify and verify these falsities. These are among the matters pending adjudication.

Some, but not all, of the issues I have raised with regard to the "on-scene" conduct of the Coast Guard are as follows:

*"While the Coast Guard SitRep advises that "DL CGU ADVISE SECOND GROUP AT NORTH END OF LORETO CONVENT", this record on an ICG SitRep document is entirely false. While a group of kayakers landed at "the nuns' bathing area" beside Rocklands just north of Loreto Convent, they required no advice from ICG. Using your inflammatory terminology, this 'group was brought safely to shore at this location' not by the Irish Coast Guard or the RNLI but by none other than this writer in the ordinary course of my group tour.*



## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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While continuing their tour and bringing this group by sea to Bulloch, I opted to bring them ashore at this location because of my concern for their safety. My concern for their safety had nothing to do with my tour or the conditions. It was caused in its entirety by the disruption to their equilibrium with the sudden and unnecessary arrival in our space of the ICG Search and Rescue Helicopter, the RNLI ALB and the ILB lifeboats and the ICG land-based vehicle all crowned by the extraordinary conduct of Mr. XXXX of the ICG on shore. As you will appreciate, being ambushed by the sudden dramatic loudness and painful decibel levels of the uninvited machinery of a helicopter and lifeboat made for a very uncomfortable and alarming attack on the aural senses of all the kayakers present. The approaching tsunami of rescue services swarming around my guests suggested an urgent and imminent danger where none existed. In the interests of common sense and the safety of all concerned, I opted to take the kayakers off the water at an area where I knew there to be a safe egress from the sea combined with a sheltered old changing area and an easy walk back to Bulloch Harbour. Your ICG 'on scene' person was a Mr. XXXXX, [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] He is a director of XXXXX in XXXXX. He is a commercial competitor of mine in the provision of tours to Dalkey Island. The landing page for his website promoting his Dalkey Island tours displays a large photograph of his rib outside Bulloch Harbour, confirming his commercial connection to the area. I believe the deputy officer in charge of the Dun Laoghaire Coast Guard Unit is the codirector of this company. XXXX had no business being at Rocklands at that time on that evening. He entirely misunderstood and misread the situation. Purporting to 'take control' of a non-incident, he alarmed my group of guests by undermining my authority as their group leader and shouting / ordering me to 'stand down' (sic). He further damaged me in their standing and caused them further and wanton anxiety by falsely announcing aloud that others from my tour group were already hospitalised or en route to hospital. This was a very foolish statement to make since [REDACTED] had no sense of what the relationship between the people standing in front of him and the people to whom he referred might be. Even if the statement were true, which it was not, the making of such a statement in the manner in which he made it runs contrary to good emergency management training. When I immediately challenged him as to this assertion of fact, he admitted he did not know it to be true. Mr XXXX sought to interfere and intermeddle in my business as a tour operator. He falsely declared everyone in my group to be a 'casualty' though he carried out no assessment of any of them. While my guests were entirely safe and dry on shore, your [REDACTED] next ordered me to remove my guests from their position of safety on dry land to somehow put them on to the RNLI lifeboat some distance offshore. He claimed that "the casualties need to get into the lifeboat". This task was as utterly unnecessary as it was consummately dangerous. To get away from him, I walked my group safely to the road and around the corner to Bulloch Harbour. I complain in the strongest manner about the involvement of a commercial competitor of mine in this manner in this matter. I complain about the role he assumed, about the false statements of purported fact he made, about the heightened anxiety he caused when he ought to have been lessening that stress, by his attempt to conflate something normal in a kayaking tour to an emergency situation which it was not, about his bad judgement, about his contrived misdescription of healthy, safe, dry and secure guests on land as 'casualties', about his bizarre and dangerous insistence that a large group of persons in whom he had by then induced anxiety should put their lives at unnecessary risk by undertaking the daft and dangerous manoeuvre of transferring them from dry land to a vessel some distance off shore. I do not believe that XXXX made good decisions on the evening in question. Were I not as experienced as I am, I may have followed his "orders" and people, my clients, may have been injured."

### **SLIPWAY PREPARATION BEFORE EMBARKING ON THE TOUR**

*Instructor Detailing Slipway Prep on eve of 13 September 2020*

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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"When our group arrived in Bullock harbour we set to fitting them with wetsuits and buoyancy aids to their size as normal. We then made our way through the usual procedure by ways of introduction, safety and instruction prior to getting on the water. This comprises of giving every participant their paddle and ensuring that they each hold it correctly by means of orientation and positioning to be able to paddle effectively. We then go through the basics of paddle strokes. This gives us the opportunity to ensure all participants have an idea of this movement prior to having to actively do it. We then had the participants select their boats among the single seater kayaks and double seated and each group gets a talk specifically on what to do in the event of capsize during the tours. This gives us the opportunities to observe the groups and answer any questions and put them at ease ahead of time. This includes safe movement of the kayaks from the slip to the water's edge. Here we always ensure that the participants have been briefed and understand to not go out of the harbour till everyone is on the water together. We always ensure there is one or more instructors on the water prior to participants and at least one last who helps co-ordinate the launches.

We then gave the participants a few minutes in the harbour getting used to how the boats feel balance wise on the water and practicing their paddle strokes, which we go through with them. Including the differences between control of single kayaks and doubles. We coached any techniques at this point that needed addressing."

**SAFETY GEAR AND EQUIPMENT**

During the tour, our instructors carried a VHF, mobile phones, tow lines, karabiners and slings, first aid, split paddles, sugary food, knives and sun cream. I am not aware that anyone had a sun hat. They also had an orange survival bag, glow sticks, head torch, foam paddle float, spare hat and gloves, whistle, watch, paddle leash.

**MISREPORTING OF THE WEATHER AND LACK OF COMPETENCE**

I have strong concerns about the misreporting of the weather both in this draft report and in other reports produced by the MCIB. This suggests to me a lack of competence on the part of the investigators and an ability to interpret local weather conditions.

The weather is constantly monitored by us. Forecasts are checked and sea conditions examined. We vary the starting point and or the route of the tour if we feel that the weather conditions require it.

We consider various sources for weather forecasting and reporting including magicseaweed.com and windguru.cz. We find these sources in general, though not always, are more accurate and reliable than more "traditional" sources.

We carry mobile phones on our tours so that, amongst other things, we can check the forecasts during the tour.

The wind and wave conditions on the evening in question were suitable for the kayaking tour. The weather forecast and weather estimate from MET Eireann is incorrect. It does not accurately describe the conditions. Forecasts and weather estimates do not recount how the weather actually was.

Using the "Dublin Bay Buoy" as a reference for the sea conditions is not an appropriate guide since it is located at the mouth of the bay much further offshore than the location of the tour. In a westerly/southwesterly wind the sea is flatter closer to the coast and the wind would feel much lighter closer to shore whereas further out to sea it would be much choppier and feel much windier. When it comes to wind, location is very important and the wind is not the same in all areas of the bay. The wind direction affects how one might experience the wind at a particular location.

For example, in a strong southerly wind, it would appear and feel quite calm at Sandycove while in a strong northerly wind it would feel much calmer on Killiney Beach than at Bullock

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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Harbour. Even a light easterly wind can pick up the sea and make it quite choppy in our area.

The wind measurements taken at Dublin airport which are exhibited in the report show wind of between 11 knots and 1 knot at the relevant time.

I don't believe that the wind ever got as low as 1 knot at our location. There was wind which varied in strength during the tour and there were waves which varied in size, but the wind and sea conditions were appropriate to the group.

**Comment from [REDACTED] Senior Staff Member re Weather on eve 13 September**

*"I am employed as a kayaking guide and instructor by [REDACTED] On the evening of September 13th 2020 I was present at Bullock harbour prior to our evening tour departing. Earlier that day I had conducted two tours to Dalkey Island and back without incident. Conditions throughout the day had been nominal...I saw no reason that the evening tour should not go ahead."*

As well as a degree and diploma in Outdoor Education and Facilitation and Leisure Management and being a qualified kayaking instructor, sailing instructor and scuba instructor, this staff member was [REDACTED]

a member of a boating family and has sailed and boated extensively around the Irish coastline since childhood.

The wind was very light at the start of the tour and then picked up for a little while during the tour and then dropped off again. There's nothing strange about this. There's nothing strange about different weather and wave conditions occurring in very close proximity to each other and the instructors made the correct decisions at all times. The instructors decided to take most of the kayakers to Maiden's Rock while another member of the group was being put into her kayak. This makes perfect sense and is not strange. It is perfectly normal and typical of the kind of decision making that is required in a dynamic ever changing environment.

Kitesurfers are particularly interested in the wind as they need wind to fly their kites. Here's what the biggest kitesurfing group in Dublin had to say about the wind on the eve of 13 September.

8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response



## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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I am based right by the water and have eyes on the kayak tour route for the most of the day, every day, whether there is a tour or not. I am very familiar with the area and how the sea behaves in various weather conditions.

Forecasts are checked multiple times each day.

It was a warm sunny evening on the evening in question and the area was choc a bloc with people coming and going from local swimming spots like the Vico, Killiney Beach, the 40 foot and Sandycove. The coast was awash with swimmers in bathers and bikinis.

I was around the corner from the starting point of the tour around the start time of the tour and had a brief exchange with the team in which we celebrated the glorious weather and looked forward to a really nice evening tour.


The draft report is inaccurate in its reporting of the weather and sea conditions.

### WAVES

The slight waves were "rolling" in character. This means that the waves are shorter and thicker and lighter in character than one might find elsewhere, say on a beach. Waves like this would not knock someone out of a kayak but any wave could cause someone to lean over to more to one side of the kayak more than the other and that could result in a capsize. There is nothing strange or threatening about this.

### PHOTOS OF SEA CONDITIONS COURTESY OF DALKEY CURTAIN TWITCHERS


View of Conditions at Northernmost Part of Trip, Maidens Rock (helicopter visible towards top left corner)



View of Conditions in or around Bullock Harbour, Southernmost part of the Trip

8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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View of the RNL lifeboat from the shore at Rocklands/Nun's bathing area ("the casualties need to get into the lifeboat!")

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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It is clear that there was some wind and chop in certain areas (in this case some of it is caused by water hitting the harbour wall which photographer is standing on) but there were not 1.5m waves and gusting winds.

### TIDAL STREAMS

There is nothing in the tide or tidal stream that would cause a buoyant swimmer wearing a 5mm wetsuit and buoyancy aid to have her legs dragged down under the water. This just couldn't happen.

### Direction of the Tide

The diagrams in the draft report are correct in terms of the direction of the tidal stream. On a flooding tide, halfway to two thirds way through the tide, and relatively close to shore, the tide is traveling in a northerly direction and is essentially contouring the shoreline and running parallel to the shore. It would not carry people out to sea but would gently nudge them back towards Bullock Harbour.

On the day in question, at the time in question, the wind and tide were not in opposition.

Online charts below, which are accurate enough show the tidal stream direction.

[https://eoceanic.com/sailing/harbours/54/dalkey\\_island\\_county\\_dublin\\_ireland](https://eoceanic.com/sailing/harbours/54/dalkey_island_county_dublin_ireland)

<http://fishing-app.gpsnauticalcharts.com/i-boating-fishing-web-app/fishing-marine-charts-navigation.html?title=Dublin+Bay+boating+app#14/53.2772/-6.0911>

It makes sense to paddle into the wind and into the tide at the start of the trip as then if required, it's easy to go back the other way towards Sandycove which would have been very sheltered. It does not appear that anyone is saying that the wind and tide made it too difficult to paddle. It appears as though the claim is that the waves were so big that it was difficult to paddle. The waves were appropriate to the group but that does not mean that someone didn't like them or that someone wouldn't have been put off or unhappy in them. Not everyone is comfortable doing outdoor sports in the beginning. I wasn't.

I towed a woman on the eve of the 13th who was struggling a little bit with coordination. The tide working with us meant it was an easy paddle. The woman seemed fairly relaxed and replied that she was fine when asked, and she was asked a few times. She got off the water without any difficulty and walked to the nun's changing area where she remained until I guided her towards the road. She walked and didn't clamber over anything. I have no idea if this woman is the person who made one of the anonymous statements.

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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I believe the person who made one of the anonymous statements was allegedly taken back to Bullock Harbour in a Coast Guard land vehicle. I note the SitRep exhibited in the report at 78 details the driver of this vehicle stating over the radio that:

"Trans. To Bulloch Hbr with 1 x MOP. req. Med. asst"

I have no idea why someone who had never once fallen into the water and had merely kayaked from Bullock Harbour to Maidens Rock to the Nuns Bathing area on a sunny warm evening wearing a 5mm wetsuit would require medical assistance. That makes no sense at all. This is representative of the completely disproportionate behaviour of the ICG on the eve in question and shows that just because someone says something over a radio and that statement is written down does not make that statement true or reasonable.

### **Strength of Tide**

High water was approx 9.30pm on the 13th. There is a small adjustment of approx 5/6 minutes between DL and the North Wall. By the time the group got on the water at just before 6pm, it was coming up to halfway through the tide. This means the group were in the stronger tidal flow. It makes perfect sense to paddle into the tide as that way it's an easy float back. If required then we can turn around and go the other way to Sandycove which would mean returning to Bullock at slack water. There's nothing strange about any of this.

### **Speed of the Tide**

The speed of the tide is stronger in the narrow channel of Dalkey sound than elsewhere. In any event, the group were never at Dalkey Sound. The most southerly point they reached was Maiden's Rock.

Neap tides were on the 2nd September and Springs on the 17th Sept.

### **Tidal Range**

The tidal range for the tide on the 13th was 1.92m with the high not being particularly high and the low not being particularly low.

In short there is nothing particularly strange about the currents/tide on the 13th.

On the 13th Sept, we had a client who was not keen to get back into her kayak and who was feeling tired. She was eventually returned to her kayak with the help of three instructors. If one floats in the sea, the wind and tide will carry you somewhere. That is the nature of floating in the sea. That doesn't mean that the conditions were inappropriate. The client had been returned to her kayak and was being towed to shore by the time a fishing boat arrived to see what was going on and to see if he could lend a hand.

### **Location of Kayakers**

As I paddled along by the shore near Loretto with a group of kayakers, I looked to my right and saw one of our instructors emptying a kayak and returning a paddler to the kayak. I was able to see this without difficulty and was not blocked by waves.

### **Route of Our Kayak Tours**

Our kayak tours generally run from Bullock Harbour towards Dalkey Island. We also go from Bullock Harbour to Sandycove, we run in Dun Laoghaire Harbour and from Killiney beach depending on the weather.

All of the routes we use are close to land so that we can get off the water at any stage for any reason. Dalkey island is a short distance offshore. There are many opportunities to get off the water along the coast. There is nothing strange about choosing to do so if the situation warrants it for any reason. There are public harbours, old swimming spots, beaches and even private harbours which we would have no hesitation using if say someone had a heart attack or stroke.. This is the reason our sea kayak tours are not located in other places which would require kayakers to be much further offshore.



## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

The NorthWestern



The red fishing boat in the background of this picture is called the Northwestern. We know this because it says the Northwestern on the side of it. The small white boat in the foreground is the boat, or very similar to the boat, which a local fisherman drove on the eve of 13 September.

The Northwestern didn't leave the harbour on the evening in question. There is a big difference between giving the impression that a relatively big fishing vessel came out of the harbour and saved the day, and stating that a local fisherman heard some very excited coast guard chatter on his VHF and came out for a look to see what was going on. The Coast Guard chatter did not reflect what was actually going on.

I have no idea what fisherman was asked to contribute to this draft report since his name has not been provided. I do not agree with much of what that "fisherman" has allegedly said. However, I do know a fisherman in Bullock Harbour who is a very helpful and kind neighbour in the harbour and is regularly to be found doing some good deed or other for someone.

### **Noone was in the Water for 40 Minutes**

No one on our kayak tour was in the water for 40 minutes.

If a fisherman claims he could not see the kayakers then how would he be in a position to ascertain how long someone was in the water.

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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We had some capsizes on the tour, which is not particularly unusual and all save one were either back in their kayak or on the shore within a very short space of time of less than a minute or two, as is usual.

One woman capsized more than once and needed some convincing to get back into her kayak. I have no wish to embarrass anyone and I don't see the need to say any more other than she was eventually returned to her kayak and that she was not in the water for 40 minutes, though she was in the water for longer than usual.

*Trip Leader Description of Person in the Water*

*"The client was instructed to hold on to Instructor 2's boat while her boat was lifted and emptied of water by Instructor 1. At this time, Instructor 2 checked-in with the client regarding her welfare. She was asked if she was cold and replied that she was okay. The client expressed that she felt warm enough to be towed into land while still in the water. Instructor 2 explained that the most practical option was to be assisted back into the boat"*

The SitReps on p.76 of the draft report detail that someone had arrived back at the harbour at 18.34Z with kayakers onboard. The first 999 call was allegedly made at 18.03Z. This leaves 30 mins between the first call and the arrival of 3 kayakers back at Bullock Harbour during which time one woman had twice been returned to her kayak and was being towed to shore by the instructors who were following best practice by allowing one instructor to stabilise her and the other to tow her. During this time, kayakers were boarded onto the small fishing boat and the boat had to make the journey back to Bullock Harbour.

### **ANONYMOUS STATEMENTS**

Since I have not been provided with the names of the two people who allegedly made the two redacted statements, I cannot confirm whether they were on my kayak tour or not.

This puts me in a very difficult position since I have no wish to disclose to all and sundry, details about clients in circumstances where I can't be certain that they are the people who made the statements.

In any event, I am not in a position to comment on the thoughts and feelings of anyone, no more than they are in a position to comment on my thoughts and feelings, and I have no wish to embarrass or undermine any of my clients publicly.

### **THE LAWS OF PHYSICS**

It is not physically possible for anyone to get flipped over the front of an 11 foot long kayak at the location in question on the evening in question. This would require the almost vertical raising of the kayak which could not have happened.

It is not beyond the realms of possibility that a novice kayaker may consider that this is something that happened. However, one would expect a competent Marine Casualty Investigation Board and a competent Marine Casualty Investigator with training and experience in the area of marine safety involving kayakers to know that such a thing could not and did not happen.

Similarly it is not physically possible that anyone got "thrown out" of a kayak.

It is possible for a kayak to capsize, and kayakers did capsize. This is not unusual.

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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### RESCUE SERVICES ON 13 SEPTEMBER IN OR AROUND BULLOCK HARBOUR

No Marine Rescue Services rescued anyone from the sea. There was no intervention by the RNLI or by the Coast Guard other than to offer someone a seat in a land vehicle.

Detailing over excited chatter on a radio is not evidence of anything. It is merely evidence of what someone said. In respect of one member of the Coast Guard, I don't believe that anything he said actually reflects the situation before him.

**The Coast Guard Search and Rescue helicopter did not rescue anyone from the sea.**

**The Coast Guard Land Vehicles did not rescue anyone from the sea.**

**The Irish Coast Guard Service do not operate lifeboats in the area in question.**

**The RNLI lifeboats did not rescue anyone from the sea.**

From: [REDACTED]  
Date: Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 10:21 AM  
Subject: Re: GDPR request  
To: Data Protection <data\_protection@rnli.org.uk>

Dear [REDACTED]

Many thanks for your email.

I appreciate you providing the narrative for the "returns of service".

For clarity, can you please confirm by return email that the returns of service to which you refer details that the RNLI provided no assistance or intervention and were not involved in any rescues of anyone around Bullock Harbour on the evening in question.

I look forward to hearing from you,

[REDACTED]

From: **Data Protection** <data\_protection@rnli.org.uk>  
Date: Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 3:46 PM  
Subject: RE: GDPR request  
To: [REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED]

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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I can confirm that both mention 'Launched - No Assistance Given'

I hope this draws subject access request to a conclusion



### **TAKING A GROUP OFF THE WATER**

I took a group of kayakers safely off the water at the nuns bathing area because I considered that the most sensible thing to do under the circumstances. Owing to the presence of the rescue services, it was the correct decision to make.

At page 76 and 77 of the report, the Dun Laoghaire CGU confirms that he was indeed present at the location at the time while the helicopter states it was on scene by 18.30z.

I have already outlined my grievances with the behaviour of the Irish Coast Guard Service to the Officer in Charge of the Dun Laoghaire Coast Guard Unit and to senior officials within the Coast Guard, which letter was never intended for publication, which letter was copied to you as a courtesy and to make you aware of falsities reported to you, which letter you have included in this report, and they have told me that my complaint is being dealt with internally. I therefore have no wish to air any further grievances in detail in this report, save where I consider it necessary to protect my good name and reputation. Everyone is entitled to fair procedures.

### **AMBULANCE**

An ambulance was called and 3 kayakers were strongly encouraged by a member of the Coast Guard to be seen by the ambulance crew. I spoke to all three afterwards. Two expressed complete bemusement as to why they were asked to get into an ambulance in the first place. I spoke to them the next day and they were keen to come back and do the tour again.

The third person exited the ambulance apologising profusely saying that she was so sorry and felt very embarrassed. I told her that she didn't need to worry at all. I rang this person twice in the following days and sent her a message all of which were unanswered. I considered that she may have been embarrassed or worried about getting into trouble or being blamed for the circus-like situation that unfolded at Bullock Harbour.

I don't know if this person is the person who made the anonymous statement. If it is this person, I am disappointed that she didn't engage with me. I am also very concerned that she says that "she was asked to make a statement".

I am further concerned that someone, or a group of people, may have said something to her to influence her perception of events in circumstances where I didn't get the opportunity to challenge anything that was said.

### **VHF RADIO**


At no stage did the Coast Guard follow best practice and contact us by VHF.

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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We did not contact the Coast Guard by VHF because we did not require the assistance of the Coast Guard. If we had required the assistance of the Coast Guard, we would have contacted them.

The instructor who carried the VHF radio holds a VHF licence and his VHF radio was set to channel 16.



Our instructor was not aware that any chatter on channel 16 related to our kayak tour.

"one of the larger RNLI class vessels came towards us and we could see the flashing lights of the emergency vehicles on land. When the helicopter was overhead I could hear chatter between the rescuers on channel 16 on my radio, but nothing directly towards us to respond. Normally this kind of VHF communication would come in the way of perhaps "Red kayak" or something like this where a vessel is small enough not to have a visible name, or call sign".

In addition to a VHF radio licence, the other qualifications of this instructor are listed below. He is clearly more than competent to take groups on the sea.

Emergency First Responder from November 2020,

Search and Recovery Diver Training March 2021.

Bsc Applied Psychology Level 8

Higher National Diploma in Outdoor Adventure Management, Level 6

Outdoor Sports and Recreation QQI Level 5

Dayskipper (practical)

Dayskipper (shore based)

CMAS Moniteur 1 (Diving Instructor)

**8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response**

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
This person is a kayaker of considerable experience having spent time kayaking in the Alps and on rivers, lakes and seas around Ireland. He began kayaking just after finishing primary school and is still involved in training students at the school. He holds instructor training and personal skills qualifications and has undertaken a training programme at kayaking.ie which involves assisting on tours and doing rescues under supervision. He also holds safety and rescue awards.

Following the misreporting of events in SitReps, the fallacious account of things that never happened crossed over to social media.

Below is a copy of a Facebook post, before and after it was edited, which was published by the Irish Coast Guard and shared far and wide before it was edited following understandable outrage from me. Even the edited version is entirely misleading.

Screenshots below taken from 'Irish Coast Guard - Dun Laoghaire' Facebook page <https://www.facebook.com/dlcoastguard/>


Original Post: September 14, 2020 at 7:52 AM



Edited Post: September 17, 2020 at 6:10 PM

**8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response**

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**CANOEING IRELAND**

I have been on the board of directors of Canoeing Ireland and I have been on the Training and Development Unit (responsible for the certification scheme). I have also done some work for Canoeing Ireland when I was a younger instructor. I am a level 4 instructor and hold the highest level skills award which is level 5. I am also a tutor which means that I can train and assess instructors. I also have valid first aid qualifications, have been a member of lifeboat crew which included powerboat, vhf and coastal nav courses, I have lectured in Outdoor Education, run training courses and travelled extensively around the world to kayak in rivers, lakes and seas in very challenging conditions.

There is no requirement for anyone to have any regard to Canoeing Ireland. I am not surprised it has been mentioned in the draft report since, until recently, the organisation constituted a section of the same Department which oversees the Coast Guard and the MCIB. I consider that the Canoeing Ireland award scheme needs updating in some places and that it is not always representative of best practice. I believe the organisation has a great team of staff and is working to make the scheme more relevant and I believe the organisation is working to make itself more relevant too. I spoke to someone involved in the Training and Development Unit of Canoeing Ireland recently who agreed with me that the current awards are not fit for purpose for tour guiding as opposed to providing more in depth instruction.

I am very familiar with how the organisation works. Like most organisations, it has strengths and weaknesses.

I am currently part of a very exciting programme called Bridge the Gap which aims to increase female participation in paddle sports and to address and discuss *inter alia* the issue of gender bias. I think the importance of this quest cannot be understated.

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

I know that the organisation is currently trying to introduce a registration scheme for instructors so I'm not surprised to see that the draft report recommends the same thing, this to my mind was a forgone conclusion before anyone "investigated" anything.

Extracts from my email to Canoeing Ireland in November 2020 outlining why I did not want sign up to a registration scheme details of which were not provided to me at the time

*"I am not in the habit of entering into agreements where no terms are provided. There is an ongoing obvious conflict of interest between CI and the commercial sector where CI are acting as a commercial provider themselves. You are well aware of this fact. There are also potential conflicts between CI and other sections of DTTAS. Can you please let me know how you, as an organisation, plan to address this conflict?"*

*I am also not convinced that an NGB set up is a suitable model for interfering (via regulation) in the private sector, as distinct from monitoring an awards scheme for instructors, where the strength of the organisation, despite effective staff, very much depends on who happens to be elected to the board. An efficient, qualified, and capable board today does not mean an efficient, qualified and capable board next week. I am not aware of any guidelines re board nomination. I am not aware of any data protection guidelines between board members and CI.*

*I am not entirely convinced that your provider registration form etc. complies with data protection law.*

*I also have strong concerns re CI and data protection in general.*

*After 10 years of literally back-breaking work, I am certainly not going to jeopardise the integrity of my business when I have not been provided with enough (any) information to allay my concerns.*


*I am also concerned about the ability of the organisation to efficiently deliver the product (terms unknown) that you are offering. Dealing with CI has taken a massively disproportionate amount of my work time and there have been multiple data protection breaches down through the years.*

*That said, I welcome the idea of improved communication with instructors, improved training and CPDs etc. I think this is a great idea and is in everyone's interest. Improving the quality and number of instructors is great. Perhaps CI could support the commercial sector to get going again on training new instructors etc.? We were logistically and financially disinterested from doing this for a long time. I have great faith in the abilities of the CI team and the organisation to raise the standard of instructors and to maintain and monitor that standard. However, it is surely a basic principle of common sense and fairness, that if you are to award a qualification to someone, you can not subsequently change the terms of that qualification after it has been issued."*

*Despite assurances from Canoeing Ireland staff to the contrary, the below is a screenshot of their website on the date of emailing above*  
**Canoeing Ireland Advertising Kayaking for Corporate Groups**



8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response



## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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There is clearly a conflict of interest in circumstances where a state funded body seeks to act as both a competitor to and the regulator of the commercial kayaking providers, notwithstanding that most if not all of these providers do a lot of work to promote the sport and to increase participation pro bono.

A few years ago the Canoeing Ireland minibus regularly appeared in Bullock Harbour because Canoeing Ireland were taking kids enrolled on kayak camps out for a paddle at Dalkey to see the seals for a change of scene. The boats the kids were using were small river boats without airtight hatches, the buoyancy aids were fairly old and I am not aware what marine specific equipment the instructors carried. On one occasion I considered it too windy to take my group to Dalkey island, the wind being westerly force 4/5 while the Canoeing Ireland kids kayaked out of the harbour toward the island. All concerned had a great time and I'm not aware that there were any problems. No doubt, the organisation has extensive records about these trips. I know that there are some really nice photographs. I mention this to show that Canoeing Ireland don't always follow their own recommendations.

The draft report is incorrect in its assessment of the weather at Dalkey on the evening in question. Nonetheless, I do not agree with the alleged Canoeing Ireland recommendations re wind strength. As I have outlined, when it comes to wind it depends on where one is located and what direction the wind is coming from.

I think that the draft report is misleading in that it seeks to present Canoeing Ireland as some kind of statutory authority, which it is not. The safety standards are set by groups of volunteers, of which I was one a few years ago, so I know exactly how the set up works.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

The MCIB ought to comprise members who understand and are competent in the areas they purport to investigate.

The MCIB ought to engage investigators with extensive knowledge of kayaking to investigate incidents involving kayaks. These investigators ought to be flown in from abroad when the occasion warrants it as the kayaking community in Ireland is too small to ensure independence.

The MCIB ought not to investigate events which it has no jurisdiction to investigate and it ought to make sure to investigate events which it does have jurisdiction to investigate.

The MCIB should be independent.

The Irish Coast Guard Service needs to develop policies to make sure that their reaction is proportionate and that a "common sense" approach is followed at all times .

The Irish Coast Guard Unit needs to properly train its teams.

The Irish Coast Guard Service needs to carefully monitor any reports created on scene or after an incident for accuracy.

The Irish Coast Guard Service should employ much stricter social media rules

Agencies of the state should recognise the wealth of experience and knowledge which exists outside their own offices and try to engage with it more.

### Further Observations

Lack of evidence referred to/reliance on demonstrably incorrect observations

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

The evidence of the person referred to as the "Fisher" is of concern. The "Fisher" states that one group of kayakers drifted north towards Dublin but claims that the current was going in the opposite direction. The recorded wind speeds could not have overcome the effect on the kayakers of the tides which were shown to have occurred and the recollection of the "Fisher" is flatly contradicted by the tidal and current data reproduced in the Report itself.

Despite the incident having been reported to have involved 15 to 16 persons connected to the kayaking tour, the crew of an ambulance, the Irish Coast Guard, including its local unit, the crews of its rescue helicopter and surface rescue craft, the crew of a Royal National Lifeboat Institution rescue craft, 3 persons who made emergency calls, dispatchers and the 2-person crew of a leisure/workboat type craft, with the exception of selective quotes from the organiser of the tour, only the observations of one of the persons who formed part of this latter crew and those of two persons involved in the kayaking tour are produced in the body of the Report and therefore, presumably considered, prior to its production.

It is stated in the Report at Para. 3.16 that, "*The fishers who went to the assistance of the Small Group were alerted to the incident by the VHF radio traffic which they heard while ashore in their hut at Bulloch [sic] Harbour. One of the two fishers who assisted had previously been a volunteer on the RNLi Lifeboat for twenty-six years ... as they left Bulloch Harbour ... [they] ... recalled meeting with a heavy swell.*"

At Para 3.19 it is recorded, "*This fisher's recollection of the wind and sea conditions were such that in his view, having regard to his experience (previously having been a volunteer on the RNLi Lifeboat for twenty-six years and as a fisher on the fishing vessel, the North Western), there was no prospect of the female kayakers being able to proceed further.*" Para 3.20 states, "*from his observation of their physical state and sea and weather conditions there was no prospect of them returning to shore unaided. In his view, given his experience, such were the weather conditions that the kayakers should not have gone out. His recollection is that at the time of the incident the weather was bad, it having been forecast to turn nasty. There were big tides with the wind in a south-westerly direction. There was also an ebb tide, flowing south with the effect of the wind against the tide and a sea swell of approximately 1.5 m, [emphasis added] (consistent with the Weather Report) together with gusts and a lot of "white horses". His recollection of the conditions is that they were such that no fishers were out.*"

At Appendix 7.3 a Met Éireann Weather Report stated as being of the "*Estimated weather and sea state conditions for the coastal area 1 nautical mile east of Coliemore Harbour ...*" is attached. It is described as applying to the period 1200 to 1800 UTC on the 13th September 2020 and describes the wind as "*Moderate to fresh south-southwesterly backed southerly – Beaufort 4 or 5 – (mean wind speed 15 – 20 knots) with occasional gusts up to 30 knots*" and a sea state "*estimated to have been slight to moderate with significant wave height of between 0.5 to 1.5 m with a south-southwesterly wave direction and an estimated wave period of 4 to 5 seconds.*"

At Appendix 7.5 the Dublin Port Company Tide Tables for 2020 are attached. These show the tide times and heights at Dublin's North Wall and also include a Tidal Stream Atlas for the greater area surrounding Dublin Port, including where the alleged incident occurred on the 13th September 2020. The tables for Sunday the 13th September estimate low water to have occurred on that date at 1450 and to have been 1.55 metres, while high water occurred at 2132 and was estimated to have been 3.47 m. It is therefore obvious that at approximately 1800 when the incident occurred, the tide was flooding heavily and could not have been ebbing as stated by the "Fisher" as reproduced above. In fact, it was 3 to 4 hours prior to high water, when the incoming tide would have been at its strongest flow. This is further confirmed in the Tidal Stream Atlas included in the Tide Tables and is reproduced at P. 63 of the Report. The vectors included in this Atlas indicate that the tide in the vicinity of Bullock

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Harbour floods strongly to the northwest 3 or 4 hours prior to high water in Dublin Port. This was the state of the current at approximately 1800 on the 13th September 2020.

The contradiction between the account of the "Fisher" and the objective evidence of the tide tables and tidal data presented elsewhere in the Report was noted by the author who bizarrely includes the following at Para 4.17:

*"As noted at 3.19, the Fisher's recollection is that at the time of the incident it was an ebb tide (i.e. going out), flowing south and with the winds in a south westerly direction meaning wind against tide, contributing to poor sea conditions. This contradicts the data evident from the tidal streams. It has not been possible to reconcile that contradiction. However, irrespective of whether the tidal stream was flowing north or south, the Group still encountered challenging sea conditions (relative to what is known about at least two of the Participants' experience). If the tidal stream was flowing south (according to the fisher) the Participants had contend with the effect of wind against tide, kayaking into the southerly wind and contending with waves between 0.5 m and 1.5 m. If the tidal stream was flowing north (according to the tidal stream data, diagrams HW-3 and HW-2) the Participants had to contend with kayaking against the tide, kayaking into southerly winds and contend with waves between 0.5 m and 1.5 m. In either directional flow of the tidal stream at the time of the incident, the Participants (relative to what is known about at least two of the Participants' experience) faced challenging sea conditions."*

In other words, notwithstanding that at least one of these two versions of events definitely could not have occurred, a hypothesis was considered in any event.

Furthermore, the author of the report has agreed that the "Fisher's" recollection of the number of kayakers involved is contradicted by the "SitRep" of the Irish Coast Guard (Para. 3.18).

It is further noted that there is no other confirmation of the height of "swell" (i.e. residual wave action, as opposed to localised wind waves) other than that of the "Fisher" as set above. They are not recorded in the weather forecasts which have been submitted.

Para. 5.3 of the "Conclusions" section of the Report is based entirely on the observations of the "Fisher" and includes some conjecture on his musings re wind against tide. In light of this conclusion and the apparent involvement of so many people in the event, the observations of the "Fisher" are demonstrably incorrect, are prejudicial and should not have been included in the report. Other witnesses should have been canvassed and their accounts included.

### Irrelevant/Potentially Misleading Information

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- The Report recalls a Small Craft Warning being issued on 1200 of the day in question but as having no longer applied by 1800 (shortly after the kayaking tour began). No evidence, with the exception of that supplied by the "Fisher" has been supplied to state that the weather was unsuitable at the time the tour began and notwithstanding the applicability of a very general 6-hour "Small Craft Warning" which was discontinued shortly after the tour began. This is referred to again at Para. 5.1 of the "Conclusions" section.
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- The author has failed to consider/failed to adequately consider the role of the Irish Coast Guard in the escalation of events on the 13th September 2020 in circumstances where a kayaking tour operating in fine weather conditions were the subject of an air/sea rescue, despite not having themselves having alerted the emergency services or having been in need of rescue and where guests of the tour were caused to be alarmed by the appearance on site of surface vessels of the Irish Coast Guard and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, a search and rescue helicopter of the Irish Coast Guard and an ambulance. It is disturbing that the MCIB should have failed to investigate the actions of the Coast Guard in respect of the incident given that the Coast Guard and the Marine Survey Office are Divisions of the Irish Maritime Directorate of the Department of Transport in circumstances where notwithstanding SI 444 of 2020 signed on the 16th October 2020, one month after the incident, Section 9 (1) of the Act of 2000, requires the MCIB to be composed of five persons, including the Chief Surveyor of the Marine Survey Office and the Secretary General of the Department of Marine, thereby providing a clear conflict of interest between the MCIB and the Irish Coast Guard.

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- The Report recalls a Small Craft Warning being issued on 1200 of the day in question but as having no longer applied by 1800 (shortly after the kayaking tour began). No evidence, with the exception of that supplied by the "Fisher" has been supplied to state that the weather was unsuitable at the time the tour began and notwithstanding the applicability of a very general 6-hour "Small Craft Warning" which was discontinued shortly after the tour began. This is referred to again at Para. 5.1 of the "Conclusions" section.
- The Appendix contains an abundance of email correspondence between the operator of the kayaking company and persons connected with the MCIB. Much of this email correspondence is irrelevant to the investigation of the incident of the 13th September and relates to matters pertaining to the conduct of the investigation. There is no good reason to include this correspondence within the Report.
- The author has failed to consider/failed to adequately consider the role of the Irish Coast Guard in the escalation of events on the 13th September 2020 in circumstances where a kayaking tour operating in fine weather conditions were the subject of an air/sea rescue, despite not having themselves having alerted the emergency services or having been in need of rescue and where guests of the tour were caused to be alarmed by the appearance on site of surface vessels of the Irish Coast Guard and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, a search and rescue helicopter of the Irish Coast Guard and an ambulance. It is disturbing that the MCIB should have failed to investigate the actions of the Coast Guard in respect of the incident given that the Coast Guard and the Marine Survey Office are Divisions of the Irish Maritime Directorate of the Department of Transport in circumstances where notwithstanding SI 444 of 2020 signed on the 16th October 2020, one month after the incident, Section 9 (1) of the Act of 2000, requires the MCIB to be composed of five persons, including the Chief Surveyor of the Marine Survey Office and the Secretary General of the Department of Marine, thereby providing a clear conflict of interest between the MCIB and the Irish Coast Guard.

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

Harbour floods strongly to the northwest 3 or 4 hours prior to high water in Dublin Port. This was the state of the current at approximately 1800 on the 13th September 2020.

The contradiction between the account of the "Fisher" and the objective evidence of the tide tables and tidal data presented elsewhere in the Report was noted by the author who bizarrely includes the following at Para 4.17:

*"As noted at 3.19, the Fisher's recollection is that at the time of the incident it was an ebb tide (i.e. going out), flowing south and with the winds in a south westerly direction meaning wind against tide, contributing to poor sea conditions. This contradicts the data evident from the tidal streams. It has not been possible to reconcile that contradiction. However, irrespective of whether the tidal stream was flowing north or south, the Group still encountered challenging sea conditions (relative to what is known about at least two of the Participants' experience). If the tidal stream was flowing south (according to the fisher) the Participants had contend with the effect of wind against tide, kayaking into the southerly wind and contending with waves between 0.5 m and 1.5 m. If the tidal stream was flowing north (according to the tidal stream data, diagrams HW-3 and HW-2) the Participants had to contend with kayaking against the tide, kayaking into southerly winds and contend with waves between 0.5 m and 1.5 m. In either directional flow of the tidal stream at the time of the incident, the Participants (relative to what is known about at least two of the Participants' experience) faced challenging sea conditions."*

In other words, notwithstanding that at least one of these two versions of events definitely could not have occurred, a hypothesis was considered in any event.

Furthermore, the author of the report has agreed that the "Fisher's" recollection of the number of kayakers involved is contradicted by the "SitRep" of the Irish Coast Guard (Para. 3.18).

It is further noted that there is no other confirmation of the height of "swell" (i.e. residual wave action, as opposed to localised wind waves) other than that of the "Fisher" as set above. They are not recorded in the weather forecasts which have been submitted.

Para. 5.3 of the "Conclusions" section of the Report is based entirely on the observations of the "Fisher" and includes some conjecture on his musings re wind against tide. In light of this conclusion and the apparent involvement of so many people in the event, the observations of the "Fisher" are demonstrably incorrect, are prejudicial and should not have been included in the report. Other witnesses should have been canvassed and their accounts included.

### Irrelevant/Potentially Misleading Information

The report is lacking in the technical detail/contains irrelevant and potentially misleading information which would not be expected from a work of this type from a statutory body which is seeking to carry out the functions of the Marine Accident Investigation Board, as set out in the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000.

In particular:

- As set out above, at Appendix 7.5 the Dublin Port Company Tide Tables for 2020 are attached. These show the tide times and heights at Dublin's North Wall and also include a Tidal Stream Atlas for the greater area surrounding Dublin Port, including the area where the incident occurred. However, while indicating that the tide was flooding strongly in a north westerly direction 3 hours high water, it does not

## 8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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provide the numerical strength of the current at the time in question. This information is easily available.

- As set out above, at Appendix 7.3 a Met Éireann Weather Report stated as being of the "*Estimated weather and sea state conditions for the coastal area 1 nautical mile east of Coliemore Harbour ...*" is attached. It is described as applying to the period 1200 to 1800 UTC on the 13th September 2020 and describes the wind as "*Moderate to fresh south-southwesterly backed southerly – Beaufort 4 or 5 – (mean wind speed 15 – 20 knots) with occasional gusts up to 30 knots*" and a sea state "*estimated to have been slight to moderate with significant wave height of between 0.5 to 1.5 m with a south-southwesterly wave direction and an estimated wave period of 4 to 5 seconds.*" However, other reports showing the weather conditions elsewhere, including from an offshore wave buoy, have been appended. This is irrelevant as it does not pertain to the locus of the incident being investigated and tends to skew the report in terms of the wind strengths recorded at this location, which are naturally higher than those in the inshore waters where the kayaking tour operated.
- The Report recalls a Small Craft Warning being issued on 1200 of the day in question but as having no longer applied by 1800 (shortly after the kayaking tour began). No evidence, with the exception of that supplied by the "Fisher" has been supplied to state that the weather was unsuitable at the time the tour began and notwithstanding the applicability of a very general 6-hour "Small Craft Warning" which was discontinued shortly after the tour began. This is referred to again at Para. 5.1 of the "Conclusions" section.
- The Appendix contains an abundance of email correspondence between the operator of the kayaking company and persons connected with the MCIB. Much of this email correspondence is irrelevant to the investigation of the incident of the 13th September and relates to matters pertaining to the conduct of the investigation. There is no good reason to include this correspondence within the Report.
- The author has failed to consider/failed to adequately consider the role of the Irish Coast Guard in the escalation of events on the 13th September 2020 in circumstances where a kayaking tour operating in fine weather conditions were the subject of an air/sea rescue, despite not having themselves having alerted the emergency services or having been in need of rescue and where guests of the tour were caused to be alarmed by the appearance on site of surface vessels of the Irish Coast Guard and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, a search and rescue helicopter of the Irish Coast Guard and an ambulance. It is disturbing that the MCIB should have failed to investigate the actions of the Coast Guard in respect of the incident given that the Coast Guard and the Marine Survey Office are Divisions of the Irish Maritime Directorate of the Department of Transport in circumstances where notwithstanding SI 444 of 2020 signed on the 16th October 2020, one month after the incident, Section 9 (1) of the Act of 2000, requires the MCIB to be composed of five persons, including the Chief Surveyor of the Marine Survey Office and the Secretary General of the Department of Marine, thereby providing a clear conflict of interest between the MCIB and the Irish Coast Guard.

8.1 Observation from Organiser and MCIB response

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To conclude, for the reasons set out above, this Draft Report is defective and should not be published.




21<sup>st</sup> April 2021

## 8.2 Observation from IRCG and MCIB response

An Roinn Iompair  
Department of Transport

Irish Coast Guard  
GARDA CÓSTA na hÉIREANN



██████████  
Chairperson MCIB

**Draft - Report into a Marine Casualty Dublin Bay 13<sup>th</sup> September**

Dear ██████████

Thank for your letter of 24<sup>th</sup> March and for the opportunity to comment on the Draft report.  
We wish to offer some observations for consideration.

1. It may assist to note that *Irish Water Safety* has been renamed as *Water Safety Ireland* although some of their publications may not yet have been updated to reflect the new name.
2. Para 4.19.12 includes text 'as noted in 4.17.11' This appears to be a clerical error and would appear to refer to 4.19.11.
3. Regarding para 4.19.15 and paras 9.1 / 9.2, it may assist to note that as per para 3.16 the fishers who responded were alerted to the incident by the VHF radio traffic which they heard while in their hut at Bulloch harbour. It would therefore appear that the organiser(s) had ample opportunity to similarly monitor VHF and establish contact with the Coast Guard (MRCC Dublin) given the organisers comment as quoted at 9.2.
4. We note at Appendix 7 an intention to publish the Coast Guard logs. Whereas such reports are always made available to investigations we would request that they should not be published in full. We have no objection to publication of selected extracts, but full publication is considered unreasonable as they are 'real time' notes that are made while an incident is being coordinated and are not compiled or edited in a manner that would apply to other documents or reports. Such publication could be counterproductive as it might hinder future real time note taking.

Yours sincerely,

██████████  
██████████

21<sup>st</sup> April 2021

Irish Maritime Administration  
An Roinn Iompair, Turasóireachta agus Spóirt  
Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport,  
Leeson Lane, Dublin D02 TR60.

**MCIB RESPONSE:**  
The MCIB notes the IRCG concerns relating to the publication of the incident logs. On further consultation the IRCG agreed to the publication of the log in this instance.

# OBSERVATION 8.3

## 8.3 Observation from Participant and MCIB response



**MCIB RESPONSE:**  
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation.





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